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BOOK THE THIRD.
OF PRIVATE WRONGS.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS BY THE MERE
ACT OF THE PARTIES.
AT the opening of these Commentaries (a) municipal law was in general
defined to be, "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a
state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong." (b) From
hence, therefore, it followed, that the primary objects of the law are the estab-
lishment of rights, and the prohibition of wrongs. And this occasioned (c) the
distribution of these collections into two general heads; under the former of
which we have already considered the rights that were defined and established,
and under the latter are now to consider the wrongs that are forbidden, and
redressed by the laws of England.
*In the prosecution of the first of these enquiries, we distinguished
rights into two sorts: first, such as concern, or are annexed to, the persons
of men, and are then called Jura personarum, or the rights of persons; which,
together with the means of acquiring and losing them, composed the first book
of these Commentaries: and secondly, such as a man may acquire over external
objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are called .ura rerun,
or the rights of things: and these, with the means of transferring them from
man to man, were the subject of the second book. I am now, therefore, to pro-
ceed to the consideration of wrongs; which for the most part convey to us an
idea merely negative, as being nothing else but a privation of right. For which
reason it was necessary, that before we entered at all into the discussion of
wrongs, we should entertain a clear and distinct notion of rights: the contem-
plation of what is *us being necessarily prior to what may be termed injuria,
and the definition of fas precedent to that of nefas.
Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs, and public
wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil
rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon
frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of pub-
(a) Introduc. J 2.
(b) Sanctio juta, juben lwneta, etprohibens contraria. Cic. 11. Philipp. 12. Bract. 1. 1, c. 3.
(c) Book I ch. 1. 1
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lie rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a com-
munity; and are distinguished by the harsher appellations of crimes and
misdemeanors. To investigate the first of these species of wrongs, with their
legal remedies, will be our employment in the present book; and the other spe-
cies will be reserved till the next or concluding volume.
The more effectually to accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of
justice are instituted in every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from
the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws by which
rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited. This remedy is therefore princi-
*,] pally to be sought by application to these *courts of justice; that is, by
[*3]civilsuit or action. For which reason our chief employment in this book
will be to consider the redress of private wrongs, by suit or action in courts.
But as there are certain injuries of such a nature, that some of them furnish and
others require a more speedy remedy than can be had in the ordinary forms of
justice, there is allowed in those cases an extrajudicial or eccentrical kind of
remedy; of which I shall first of all treat, before I consider the several remedies
by suit: and, to that end, shall distribute the redress of privatq wrongs into
three several species: first, that which is obtained by the mere act of the parties
themselves; secondly, that which is effected by the mere act and operation of
law; and, thirdly, that which arises from suit or action in courts, which con-
sists in a conjunction of the other two, the act of the parties co-operating with
the act of law.
And, first, of that redress of private injuries, which is obtained by the mere
act of the parties. This is of two sorts: first, that which arises from the act of
the injured party only; and, secondly, that which arises from the joint act of all
the parties together: both which I shall consider in their order.
Of the first sort, or that which arises from the sole act of the injured party, is,
I. The defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as
stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, master and ser-
vant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these his relations, (1) be
forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by
force; and the breach of the peace which happens, is chargeable upon him only
who began the affray. (d) For the law, in this case, respects the passions of the
human mind; and (when external violence is offered to a man himself, or those to
whom he bears a near connexion) makes it lawful in him to do himself that immedi-
[*4] ate justice, to which he *is prompted by nature, and which no prudential
motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future process
of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force;
since it is impossible to say to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruelty out-
rages of this sort might be carried, unless it were permitted a man immediately
(d) 2 Roll. Abr. 546. 1 Hawk. P. C. 131.
(1) In the defence of one's self, or any member of his family, a man has a right to employ
all necessary violence, even to the taking of life. Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193; Yates V.
People, 32 N. Y. 509; Logue v. Commonwealth, 38 Penn. St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich.
150 ; Maher v. People, 24 Ill. 241. But except where a forcible felony is attempted against
person or property, he is always to avoid such lamentable consequences if possible, and he can-
not justify standing up and resisting to the death when the assailant might have been avoided
by retreat. People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396. But when a man is assaulted in his dwelling, he
is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which he may defend to any extremity.
And this means not simply the dwelling-house proper; whatever at the common law is within
the curtilage is entitled to the same protection. Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150. And in decid-
ig what force it is necessary to employ in resisting the assault, a man must act upon the
circumstances as they appear to him at the time, and he is not to be held criminal because on
a calm survey of the facts afterwards it appears that the force employed was excessive. See
the cases cited above; also Henton v. State, 24 Texas, 454; Schiner v. People, 23 Ill. 17; Pat-
ten v. People, 18 Mich. 814. In the last case it was held that where a man's dwelling, in which
was his mother in feeble health, was assailed by rioters, and he had reason to believe that the
noise and threats of the assailants endangered his mother's life, he had the same right to
employ force to quell the riot that he would have had to defend his mother against an actual
attack upon her person.
2
Chap. 1.] RECAPTION: RE-ENTRY.
to oppose one violence with another. Self-defence, therefore, as it is justly
called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken
away by the law of society. In the English law, particularly, it is held an excuse for
breaches of the peace, nay even for homicide itself: but care must be taken, that
the resistance does not exceed the bounds of mere defence and prevention; for
then the defender would himself become an aggressor.
II. Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the
party injured. This happens, when any one hath deprived another of his
property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child,
or servant: in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or
master, may lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them;
so it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.(e) The
reason for this is obvious; since it may frequently happen that the owner may
have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his goods may be after-
wards conveyed away or destroyed; and his wife, children, or servants, con-
cealed or carried out of his reach; if he had no speedier remedy than the
ordinary process of law. If, therefore, he can so contrive it as to gain possession
of his property again, without force or terror, the law favours and will justify
his proceeding. But, as the public peace is a superior consideration to any one
man's private property; and, as, if individuals were once allowed to use private
force as a remedy for private injuries, all social justice must cease, the strong
would give law to the weak, and every man would revert to a state of nature;
for these reasons it is provided, that this natural right of recaption *shall [*51
never be exerted, where such exertion must occasion strife and bodily
contention, or endanger the peace of society. If, for instance, my horse is taken
away, and I find him in a common, a fair,, or a public inn, I may lawfully seize
him to my own use; but I cannot justify breaking open a private stable, or
entering on the grounds of a third person, to take him, except he be feloniously
stolen; (f) but must have recourse to an action at law.(2)
III. As recaption is a remedy given to the party himself, for an injury to his
personal property, so, thirdly, a remedy of the same kind for injuries to real
property, is by entry on lands and tenements, when another person without any
right has taken possession thereof.(3) This depends in some measure on like
(e) 3 Inst. 134. Hal. Anal. § 46. (f) 2 Roll. Rep. 55, 56, 20. 2 Roll. Abr. 565, 566.
(2) [In the case of personal property improperly detained or taken away, it may be retaken
from the house and custody of the wrongdoer, even without a previous request; but unless
it was seized or attempted to be seized forcibly, the owner cannot justify doing any thing
more than gently laying his hands on the wrongdoer in order to recover it: 8 T. R. 78; 2
Roll. Abr. 56, 208; id. 565, pl. 50; 2 Leonard, 202; Selw. N. P. tit. Assault and Battery; nor
can he without leave enter the door of a third person, not privy to the wrongful detainer,
to take his goods therefrom. 2 Roll. Abr. 55, 56, 208; id. 565, I, pl. 2; Bac. Ab. Tres-
pass, F.]
Nor can he lawfully enter upon the lands of a third party who is not a wrongdoer
for the purpose of retaking his own property: Heermance v. Vernoy, 6 Johns. 5; Blake v.
Jerome, 14 id. 406: and his attempt to do so may be resisted by force. Newkirk v. Sabler,
9 Barb. 652.
(3) [With respect to land, and houses also, resumption of possession by the mere act of the
party is frequently allowed. Thus, if a tenant omit at the expiration of his tenancy, to
deliver up possession, the landlord may legally, in his absence, break open the outer door and
resume possession, though some articles of furniture remain therein; and if the landlord put
his cattle on the land, and the tenant distrain them as damage-feasant, he may be sued.
1 Bing. R. 158; 7 T. R. 431, 432; 1 Price R. 53; Andr. 109; 6 Taunt. 202. If the landlord, in
resuming possession, be guilty of a forcible entry with strong hand, or other illegal breach of the
peace, he will be liable to an indictment. 7 T. R. 432; 3 id. 295; 6 Taunt. 202; 8 T. R. 364,
403. But the circumstance of the owner of property using too much force in regaining pos-
session, but taking care to avoid personal injury to the party resisting, will not enable the
latter to sue him. But if any unnecessary violence to the person be used in rescuing or
defending possession of real or personal property, the party guilty of it is liable to be sued.
8 T. R. 299; id. 78; 1 Saund. 296, n. 1. So, as the law allows retaking of the possession of
land, it also sanctions the due defence of the possession thereof; and therefore, though if one
enter into my ground, I must request him to depart before I can lay hands on him to turn
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reasons with the former; and like that, too, must be peaceable and without
force. There is some nicety required to define and distinguish the cases, in
which such entry is lawful or otherwise; it will therefore be more fully con-
sidered in a subsequent chapter; being only mentioned in this place for the
sake of regularity and order.
IV. A fourth species of remedy by the mere act of the party injured, is the
abatement or removal of nuisances.(4) What nuisances are, and their several
species, we shall find a more proper place to inquire under some of the sulb-
sequent divisions. At present I shall only observe, that whatsoever unlaw-
fully annoys or doth damage to another is a nuisance; and such nuisance
may be abated, that is, taken away or removed, by the party aggrieved thereby,
so as he commits no riot in the doing of it.(g) If a house or wall is erected
so near to mine that it stops my ancient lights, which is a private nuisance,
I may enter my neighbour's land, and peaceably pull it down.(h) Or if a new
gate be erected across the public highway, which is a common nuisance, any
of the king's subjects passing that way, may cut it down and, destroy it.(i)
[*61 *And the reason why the law allows this private and summary method
of doing one's self justice, is because injuries of this kind, which ob-
struct or annoy such things as are of daily convenience and use, require an im-
mediate remedy, and cannot wait for the slow progress of the ordinary forms of
justice.
(y) 5 Rep. 101. 9 Rep. 55. (A) Salk. 459. (i) Cro. Car. 184.
him out, yet if he refuse I may then push him out, and if he enter with actual force I need
not first request him to be gone, but may lay hands on him immediately. 8 T. R. 78 ; 1 Salk.
641; see 1 Bing. 158.]
(4) [Thus, in case of a public nuisance, if a house be built across a highway any person
may pull it down; but it is a general rule, that the abatement must be limited by its neces-
sity, and no wanton or unnecessary injury must be committed. 2 Salk. 458. As to private
nuisances, they also may be abated; and therefore it was recently held, that if a man in his
own soil erect a thing which is a nuisance to another, as by stopping a rivulet, and so dimin-
isbing the water used by the latter for his cattle, the party injured may enter on the soil of
the other and abate the nuisance, and justify the trespass: and this right of abatement is not
confined merely to a house, mill, or land. 2 Smith's Rep. 9; 2 Rol. Ab. 565; 2 Leon. 202;
Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 M. 42; 3 Lev. 92.
As to cutting trees, "if the boughs of your trees grow out into my land, I may cut
them." Per Croke, J., Rol. Rep. 394; 3 Buls. 198; Vin. Ab. Trees, E. and tit. Nuisance, W,
2, pl. 3.
The abater of a private nuisance cannot remove the materials further than necessary;
or convert them to his own use. Dalt. c. 50. And so much only of the thing as causes the
nuisance should be removed; as if a house be built too high, only so much of it as is too
high should be pulled down. 9 Rep. 53; God. 221; 2 Stra. 686.]
Any obstruction to a navigable river is a nuisance, which any citizen having occasion to
use the river for the passage of his vessel may lawfully remove. Inhab. of Arundel v.
McCulloch, 10 Mass. 70. And the permission of the town to create the obstruction will not
preclude the abatement. Id. But that which the legislature of the state permits cannot be
a public nuisance: Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 18 Barb. 222; unless the permission
is exceeded: Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; it may nevertheless be a private nuisance, as
where a dam erected by legislative act floods the lands of an individual, in which case he may
abate it. State v. Moffett, 1 Greene, Iowa, 247. Generally a legislative act permitting the
construction of a bridge or dam across a navigable stream is a complete protection to the
structure. Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5
Ind. 8; Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200. Except where the river constitutes a
highway for foreign or inter-state commerce, in which case the regulations which congress
might prescribe would be supreme: See Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. 6 McLean,
72; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood. and M. 401; Wheeling Bridge Case, 13
How. 518. A statutory penalty or other remedy for abating a private nuisance does not
exclude the private remedy. Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. 250; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene,
Iowa, 247. But in exercising the right to abate, as little injury is to be done as possible.
Moffett v. Brewer, id. 348. And if the nuisance consists in occupying a building for an un-
lawful purpose, it seems that this does not justify tearing down the building: Welch a.
Stowell, 2 Doug. Mich. 332; though if the occupation is such as to breed disease, it has been
held that it might be destroyed if necessary. Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397.
As to the right to abate private nuisances in general, see, further, Dimes v. Petley, 15 Q. B.
276; Jones v. Williams, 11 2. and W. 176; Davies v. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546; Hyde v. Graham
I H. and C. 598.
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V. A fifth case, in which the law allows a man to be his own avenger, or to
minister redress to himself, is that of distraining cattle or goods for non-pay-
ment of rent, or other duties; (5) or, distraining another's cattle, damage-
feasant, that is, doing damage, or trespassing, upon his land. The former
intended for the benefit of landlords, to prevent tenants from secreting or
withdrawing their effects to his prejudice; the latter arising from the necessity
of the thing itself, as it might otherwise be impossible at a future time to ascer-
tain whose cattle they were that committed the trespass or damage.
As the law of distresses is a point of great use and consequence, I shall con-
sider it with some minuteness: by inquiring, first, for what injuries a distress
may be taken; secondly, what things may be distrained; and, thirdly, the man-
ner of taking, disposing of, and avoiding distresses.
1. And, first, it is necessary to premise, that a distress,(j) districtio, is the
taking a personal chattel out of the possession of the wrongdoer into the cus-
tody of the party injured, to procure a satisfaction for the wrong committed.
1. The most usual injury, for which a distress may be taken, is that of lion-
payment of rent. It was observed in a former book, (k) that distresses were
incident by the common law to every rent-service, and by particular reservation
to rent-charges also; but not to rent-secc, till the statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28,
extended the same remedy to all rents alike, and thereby in effect abolished all
material distinction between them. So that now we may lay it down as an
universal principle, *that a distress may be taken for any kind of rent in
arrear; the detaining whereof beyond the day of payment is an injury to E*"7
him that is entitled to receive it.(6) 2. For neglecting to do suit to the lord's
couit,(1) or other certain personal service,(m) the lord may distrain, of com-
mon right. 3. For amercements in a court-leet a distress may be had of common
right; but not for amercements in a court-baron, without a special prescription
to warrant it.(n) 4. Another injury, for which distresses may be taken, is
where a man finds beasts of a stranger wandering in his grounds, damage-
feasant; that is, doing him hurt or damage, by treading down his grass, or the
like; in which case the owner of the soil may detain them, till satisfaction be
made him for the injury he has thereby sustained. 5. Lastly, for several duties
and penalties inflicted by special acts of parliament (as for assessments made by
commissioners of sewers,(o) or for relief of the poor,) (p) remedy by distress
and sale is given; for the particulars of which we must have recourse to the
statutes themselves: remarking only, that such distresses(q) are partly analogous
to the ancient distress at common law, as being repleviable and the like; but
(3Q The thing itself taken by this process, as well as the process itself, is in our law-books very frequently
called a distress.
(k) Book 11, ch. 3. () Bro. Abr. tit. dietress, 15. (i) Co. Litt. 47. (n) Brownl. 36.
(o) Stat. 7 Ann. c. 10. (p) Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. (q) 1 Burr. 539.
(5) [As to distresses in general, see Gilbert on Distresses, by Hunt; Bradby on Dist.; Com.
Dig. Distress; Bac. Ab. Distress; Vin. Ab. Distress; 2 Saunders, index, Distress; Wilkinson
on Replevin.
Accepting a note of hand, and giving a receipt for the rent, does not, till payment, preclude
the landlord from distraining; and so if the landlord accept a bond; but a judgment,
obtained on either of such instruments, would preclude the right of distress. See Bull. N. P.
182. An agreement to take interest on rent in arrear, does not take away the right of distress.
2 Chit. R. 245. Where there are rents for which the party cannot distrain, although he may
have an assize, yet remedy may be had in equity. Per Comeyns, B. Exch. Trin. 5 and 6 Geo.
II; 1 Selw. N. P. 6th ed. 673. But where an estate has been let without in any way fixing the
amount of rent, the only remedy is by action.]
(6) [But to entitle a party to distrain there must be a rent due in the legal sense of that word.
One man may be in possession of another's house or land, with his consent, and may be bound to
render him such a sum for the use and occupation of it as a jury shall deem a proper equiva-
lent for the rent; but if there be no actual demise, nor any contract for a demise amounting
to as much, and no fixed rent has been agreed on or paid, the owner cannot distrain; for in
his avowry to an action of replevin for such distress he wouWl be bound to state an actual
tenancy and the definite terms of it, which it would be impossible to do under such a relation
as above supposed. Kegan v. Johnson, 2 Taunt: 148; Dunk v. Hunter, 5 B. and A. 322.]
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more resembling the common law process of execution, by seizing and selling
the goods of the debtor under a writ of fierifacias, of which hereafter.
2. Secondly; as to the things which may be distrained, or taken in distress,(7)
we may lay it down as a general rule that all chattels personal are liable to be
distrained, unless particularly protected or exempted. Instead, therefore, of
mentioning what things are distrainable, it will be easier to recount those which
are not so, with the reason of their particular exemptions.(r) And, 1. As every
thing which is distrained is presumed to be the property of the wrongdoer, it
will follow that such things wherein no man can have an absolute and valuable
[*8] property (as dogs, cats, rabbits, and *all animals ferw naturw) cannot be
distrained. Yet if deer (which are ferw naturc) are kept in a private
inclosure for the purpose of sale or profit, this so far changes their nature, by
reducing them to a kind of stock or merchandise, that they may be distrained
for rent. (s) 2. Whatever is in the personal use or occupation of any man, is for
the time privileged and protected from any distress; as an axe with which a
man is cutting wood, or a horse while a man is riding him. But horses, draw-
ing a cart, may (cart and all) be distrained for rent-arrere; and also, if a horse,
though a man be riding him, be taken damage-/easant, or trespassifig in
another's grounds, the horse (notwithstanding his rider) may be distrained and
led away to the pound.(t) (8) Valuable things in the way of trade shall not be liable
to distress. As a horse standing in a smith shop to be shoed, or in a common
inn; or cloth at a tailor's house; or corn sent to a mill or market. For all these
are protected and privileged for the benefit of trade; and are supposed in com-
mon presumption not to belong to the owner of the house, but to his cus-
tomers.(9) But, generally speaking, whatever goods and chattels the landlord
(r) Co. Litt. 47. (s) Davis v. Powel, C. B. Ird. 11 Geo. I. (t) 1 Sid. 440.
(7) [Besides the rules in the text, it is a maxim of law, that goods in the custody of the law
cannot be distrained; thus goods distrained, damage-feasant, cannot be distrained: Co. Litt.
47, a; so goods taken in execution: Willes, 131 ; but the goods so taken must be removed
from the premises within a reasonable time, or they will not be protected, 1 Price, 277; 1 M.
and S. 711 ;. however, growing corn, sold under a writ of fi. fa., cannot be distrained, unless
the purchaser allow it to remain uncut an unreasonable time after it is ripe: 2 B. and B.
362 : 5 Moore, 97, S. C. ; but goods, taken under a void outlawry, are liable to distress. 7 T.
R. 259. For the protection of landlords, by the 8 Ann. c. 14, s. 1, no goods taken in execu-
tion upon any premises demised can be removed until rent, not exceeding one year's arrear,
be paid. Only rent due at the time of the levy can be obtained under the act: 1 M. and S.
245; 1 Price, 274; but forehand rent, or rent stipulated to be paid in advance, may be
obtained. 7 Price, 690. If the sheriff remove the goods without payment of the rent, and
after notice and a formal demand of the rent, an action on the case lies against him. 3 Stra.
97; 3 B. and A. 440. But no specific and formal notice is necessary. 3 B. and A. 645; 4
Moore, 473; 2 B. and B. 67, S. C. The action lies, though part only of the goods be
removed: 4 Moore, 473 ; 2 B. and B. 67, S. C. ; but the landlord's consenting to the removal
waives his remedy. 3 Camp. 24. Instead of an action, the landlord may move the court out
of which the execution issued, that he may be paid what is due to him out of the money
levied, and in the sheriff's hands: Cas. Tem. Hardw. 255; 2 Wils. 140; and the court will
grant the motion, though the sheriff had no notice of the rent due till after the removal.
3 B. and A. 440.]
The county court act, 19 and 20 Vic. c. 108, contains a provision analogous to that of the
statute of Anne. It enacts that where goods in a tenement for which rent is due are taken in
execution under the warrant of a county court, the landlord may claim the rent due him by
delivering a notice to the bailiff making the levy, and such bailiff shall then, in making the
levy, distrain also for the rent so claimed. See Beard v. Knight, 8 E. and B. 865.]
(8) The court of king's bench, in Storey v. Robinson, 6 T. R. 138, decided, contrary to this
dictum, that such a distress could not be made, as it would lead to a breach of the peace. And
see Field v. Adames, 12 Ad. and Ell. 649; Bunch v. Kennington, 1 Q. B. 679.
As to what may and what may not be taken by distress, see Simpson v. Hartopp, Willes,
512, and the notes thereto, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 187.
(9) Goods of a principal in the hands of a factor are privileged from distress for rent due
from such factor to his landlord, on the ground that the rule of public convenience, out of
which the privilege arises, is within the exception of a landlord's general right to distrain,
and therefore that such goods re protected for the benefit of trade. 6 Moore Rep. 243; 3 B.
and B. 75, S. C. So goods landed at a wharf and consigned to a broker, as agent of the con-
signor, for sale, and placed by the broker in the wharfinger's warehouse for safe custody until
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finds upon the premises, whether they in fact belong to the tenant or a stranger,
are distrainable by him for rent: for otherwise a door would be open to infinite
frauds upon the landlord; and the stranger has his remedy over by action on
the case against the tenant, if by the tenant's default the chattels are distrained,
so that he cannot render them when called upon. With regard to a stranger's
beasts which are found on the tenant's land, the following distinctions are how-
ever taken. If they are put in by consent of the owner of the beasts, they are
distrainable immediately afterwards for rent-arrere by the landlord.(u) (10) So
also if the stranger's cattle break the fences, and commit a trespass by coming
on the land, they are distrainable immediately by the lessor for his tenant's
rent, as a punishment to the owner of the beasts for the wrong committed
through his negligence.(v) But if the lands were not *sufficiently fenced
so as to keep out cattle, the landlord cannot distrain them, till they have [*9]
been levant and couchant (levantes et cubantes) on the land; that is, have been
long enough there to have lain down and rose up to feed; which in general is
held to be one night at least :(11) and then the law presumes, that the owner
may have notice whether his cattle have strayed, and it is his own negligence
not to have taken them away. Yet, if the lessor or his tenant were bound to
repair the fences and did not, and thereby the cattle escaped into their grounds,
without the negligence or default of the owner; in this case, though the cattle
may have been le'ant and couchant, yet they are not distrainable for rent, till
actual notice is given to the owner that they are there, and he neglects to
remove them :(w) for the law will not suffer the landlord to take advantage of
his own or his tenant's wrong.(12) 4. There are also other things privileged
by the ancient common law; as a man's tools and utensils of his trade, the axe
of a carpenter, the books of a scholar, and the like: which are said to be privi-
leged for the sake of the public, because the taking them away would disable the
owner from serving the commonwealth in his station.(13) So, beasts of the
(u) Cro. Eliz. 549. (v) Co. Litt. 47. (w) Lutw. 1580.
an opportunity for selling them should occur, are not distrainable for rent due in respect of
the wharf and warehouse, as they were brought to the wharf in the course of trade. 1 Bing.
283. So goods carried to be weighed, even at a private beam, if in the way of trade, are
exempt; so is a horse that has carried corn to a mill to be ground, and during the grinding of
the corn is tied to the mill door. Cro. Eliz. 549, 596. Goods in a public fair are exempt irom
distress, unless for toll due from the owner. 2 Lutw. 1380. Goods in possession of a carrier
are also exempt, and this though the carrier be not a public one. 1 Salk. 249.]
Upon the subject of exemptions from distress the following American cases are referred to:
.Himely v. Wyatt, 1 Bay, 102; Phaelon v. McBride, id. 170; Youngblood v. Lowrey, 2 McCord,
89; Walker v. Johnson, 4 id. 552; Hoskins v. Paul, 4 Halst. 110; Brown v. Sims, 17 S. and R.
138; Stone v. Mathews, 7 Hill, 428; Connah v. Hale, 23 Wend. 462. These cases hold, gen-
erally, that wherever the tenant, in the regular course of his business, comes into possession
of the goods of his customers, they are not subject to distress for his rent. See Riddle v.
Welden, 5 Whart. 9.
Many of the United States have, by statute, abolished the landlord's remedy by distress.
(10) [Except where they are on the way to a distant market, and are put in to rest for the night,
in which case they are privileged for the public benefit. Tate v. Gleed, 2 Wms. Saund. 290, n. 7.]
(11) [Levant and couchant in this sense means, that the cattle must be lying down and rising
up on the premises for a night and a day, without pursuit made by the owner of them. Gilb.
Dis. by Hunt, 3d ed.47.]
(12) [In the case of Poole v. Longuevill, 2 Saund. 289, the contrary was determined, but
that case was overruled in 2 Lutw. 1580, and the result of the cases seems to be, that if a
stranger's beasts escape into another's land, by default of the owner of the beasts, as by
breaking the fences, otherwise sufficient, they may be distrained for rent immediately, with-
out being levant and couchant; but that if they escape there by default of the tenant of the
land, or fbr want of his keeping a sufficient fence, then they cannot be distrained for rent or
service of any kind till they have been levant and couchant, nor afterwards by a landlord for
rent on a lease, unless the owner of the beasts neglect or refuse, after actual notice, to remove
them within a reasonable time; but it is said, that such notice is not necessary where the dis-
tress is by the lord of the fee, or by the grantee of a rent-charge. 2 Lutw. 1573; Co. Litt.
47, b. 'n. 3; Gilb. Dis. by Hunt, 3d ed. 45; 2 Saund. 290, n. 7, 285, n. 4. See also Singleton v.
Williamson, 7 H. and N. 410.]
(13) [A stocking frame, (Wiles, 512), or a loom, (4 T. R. 565), being implements of trade,
cannot be distrained; but it must be observed, that utensils and implements of trade may be
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plough avaria caruew, and sheep, are privileged from distresses at common
law ;(x) while dead goods or other sorts of beasts, which Bracton calls satalla
otiosa, may be distrained. But as beasts of the plough may be taken in execu-
tion for debt, so they may be for distresses by statute, which partake of the nature
of executions.(y) And perhaps the true reason why these and the tools of a
man's trade were privileged at the common law, was because the distress was
then merely intended to compel the payment of the rent, and not as a satisfac-
tion for its non-payment: and therefore, to deprive the party of the instru-
ments and means of paying it, would counteract the very end of the distress.(z)
5. Nothing shall be distrained for rent, which may not be rendered again in as
good plight as when it was distrained: for which reason milk, fruit and the
[*10] like, cannot be distrained, a distress at *common law being only in the
nature of a pledge or security, to be restored in the same plight when the
debt is paid. So, anciently, sheaves or shocks of corn could not be distrained,
because some damage must needs accrue in their removal, but a cart loaded
with corn might; as that could be safely restored. But now by statute 2 W.
and M. c. 5, corn in sheaves or cocks, or loose in the straw, or hay in barns or
ricks, or otherwise, may be distrained, as well as other chattels. 6. Lastly,
things fixed to the freehold may not be distrained; as caldrons, windows,
doors and chimney-pieces: for they savour of the realty.(14) For this reason
also, corn growing could not be distrained; till the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19,
empowered landlords to distrain corn, grass or other products of the earth, and
to cut and gather them when ripe.(15)
Let us next consider, thirdly, how distresses may be taken, disposed of or
avoided. And, first, I must premise, that the law of distresses is greatly altered
within a few years last past. Formerly, they were looked upon in no other light
than as a mere pledge or security, for payment of rent or other duties, or satisfac-
tion for damage done. And so the law still continues with regard to distresses of
beasts taken damage-feasant, and for other causes, not altered by act of parlia-
ment; over which the distrainor has no other power than to retain them till satis-
faction is made. But distresses for rent-arrere being found by the legislature to
be the shortest and most effectual method of compelling the payment of such rent,
many beneficial laws for this purpose have been made in the present century;
which have much altered the common law, as laid down in our ancient writers.
In pointing out, therefore, the methods of distraining, I shall in general sup-
pose the distress to be made for rent; and remark, where necessary, the differ-.
ences between such distress, and one taken for other causes.
*In the first place then, all distresses must be made by day (16) unless
*11] in the case of damage-feasant; an exception being there allowed, lest
(x) Stat. 51 Hen. IlI, st. 4, de dietricnas scacearil. (y) 1 Burr. 589. (z) Ibid. 588.
distrained where they are not in actual use, and no other sufficient distress can be found on
the premises. Co. Litt, 47, a; 4 T. R. 565. This rule of exemption does not extend to cases
where a distress is given in the nature of an execution by any particular statute, as for poor
rates and the like: 3 Salk. 136; 1 Burr. 579; Lord Raym. 384; 1 Salk. 249; S. C.; nor where
the distress is for damage-feasant. Com. Dig. Distress, B. 4.]
(14) [Co. Litt. 47, b. This rule extends to such things as are essentially parts of the free-
hold, although for a time removed therefrom, as a millstone, removed to be picked. 4 T.
R. 567.1
(15) IThe act applies only to corn and other produce of the land which may become ripe
and are capable of being cut and laid up; therefore trees, shrubs and plants, growing on land
which the defendant had demised to the plaintiffs for a term, and which they had converted
into a nursery ground, and planted subsequently to the demise, were held not distrainable by
the former for rent. 2 Moore, 491; 8 Taunt. 431, S. C.; 3 Moore, 114, S. P.
To these heads of things not distrainable may be added, all goods in the custody of the
law, whether as being already distrained damage-feasant, or taken in execution. In this last
case, however, so long as they remain on the premises, the statute 8 Ann. c. 14, gives the land-
lord a beneficial lien on them, for which see post, p. 417.]
As to the exemption from distress of goods in the custody of the law, see Taylor's Land.
and Ten. 594, et seq.
(16) [The distress cannot be made till the day after the rent falls due, unless, indeed, there
be an agreement or local custom to the contrary. Gilb. Dist. 56, etc.; Iargrave's Co. Litt.
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the beasts should escape before they are taken.(a) And, when a person intends
to make a distress, he must, by himself or his bailiff, enter on the demised prem-
ises; formerly during the continuance of the lease, but now, (b) if the tenant
holds over, the landlord may distrain within six months after the determination
of the lease; provided his own title or interest, as well as the tenant's posses-
sion, continue at the time of the distress. If the lessor does not find sufficient
distress on the premises, formerly he could resort nowhere else; and, therefore,
tenants who were knavish made a practice to convey away their goods and
stock fraudulently from the house or lands demised, in order to cheat their
landlords. But now (c) the landlord may distrain any goods of his tenant,
carried off the premises clandestinely, wherever he finds them within thirty
days after, unless they have been bonafide sold for a valuable consideration: and
all persons privy to, or assisting in, such fraudultent conveyance, forfeit double
the value to the landlord. The landlord may also distrain the beasts of his
tenant, feeding upon any commons or wastes, appendant or appurtenant to the
demised premises. The landlord might not formerly break open a house, to
make a distress, for that is a breach of the peace. But when he was in the
house, it was held that he might break open an inner door; (d) and now (e) he
may, by the assistance of the peace-officer of the parish, break open in the day-
time any place, whither the goods- have been fraudulently removed and locked
up to prevent a distress; oath being first made, in case it be a dwelling-house,
of a reasonable ground to suspect that such goods are concealed therein.(17)
Where a man is entitled to distrain for an entire duty, he ought to distrain
for the whole at once; and not for part at one time, and part at another.(f)(18)
But if he distrains for the whole, and there is not sufficient on tie premises, or
he happens *to mistake in the value of the thing distrained, and so takes
an insufficient distress, he may take a second distress to complete his
remedy.(g)
Distresses must be proportioned to the thing distrained for. By the statute
of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, c. 4, if any man takes a great or unreasonable dis-
tress, for rent-arrere, he shall be heavily amerced for the same. As if (4) the
landlord distrains two oxen for twelve-pence rent; the taking of both is an
unreasonable distress; but, if there were no other distress nearer the value to
be found, he might reasonably have distrained one of them; but for homage,
fealty, or suit and service, as also for parliamentary wages, it is said that no dis-
tress can be excessive.(i) For as these distresses cannot be sold, the owner,
upon making satisfaction, may have his chattels again. The remedy for exces-
sive distresses is by a special action on the statute of Marlbridge, for an action
of trespass is not maintainable upon this account, it being no injury at the com-
mon law.(j)(19)
(a) Co. Litt. 142. (b) Stat. 8 Ann. c. 14. (c) Stat. 8 Ann. c. 14. 11 Geo. II, c. 19.
(d) Co. Litt. 161. Comberb. 17. (e) Stat. 11 Geo. II, c. 19. (f) 2 Lutw. 1532.
(g) Cro. Eliz. 13. Stat. 17 Car. I, c. 7. 1 Burr. 590. (h) 2 Inst. 107 .
(i) Bro. Abr. t. assise, 291, prerogative, 98. (j) 1 Ventr. 104. Fitzgibb. 85. 1 Burr. 590.
47, b. n.. 6. The distress must not be made after tender of payment of the entire rent due.
According to 8 Co. 147, a.; Gilb. Dist. by Hunt, 76, etc.; 3 Stark. 171; 1 Taunt. 261, tender
upon the land before the distress makes the distress tortious; tender after the distress, and
before the impounding, makes the detainer, and not the taking, wrongful; tender after im-
pounding makes neither the one nor the other wrongful; but in the case of a distress for
rent, upon the equity of the 2 W. and M. c. 5, a sale of the distress after tender of the rent and
costs, would be illegal.]
(17) [A landlord who enters on his tenant's premises to distrain, is justified in breaking an
outer door in the ordinary way in which other persons can do it when it is left so as to be
accessible to all who have occasion to go into the premises: Ryan v. Shilcock, 7 Exch. 72;
but he cannot break open an outer door of a stable, although not within the curtilage, to levy
a distress. Brown v. Glenn, 16 Q. B. 254. See further as to the mode of entry to distrain,
Hancock v. Austin, 14 C. B. N. S. 634; Nash v. Lucas, L. R. 2 Q. B. 590.]
(18) [If the cattle distrained die in the pound, the loss will fall on the party distrained on,
and not upon the distrainor. Burr. 1738; 1 Salk. 248: 11 East, 54.]
(19) [And see 2 Stra. 851; 3 Leon. 48. See exceptions, 1 Burr. 582; 1 H. Bla. 13; 9 East,
298. Itis no bar to this action, that between the distress and sale of the goods distrained, the
Vor. II.-2 9
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When the distress is thus taken, the next consideration is the disposal of it.
For which purpose the things distrained must in the first place be carried to
some pound, and there impounded by the taker. But, in their way thither,
they may be rescued by the owner, in case the distress was taken without cause,
or contrary to law: as if no rent be due; if they were taken upon the high-
way, or the like; in these cases the tenant may lawfully make rescue.(k) But
if they be once impounded, even though taken without any cause, the owner
may not break the pound and take them out; for they are then in the custody
of the law.(l)
A pound (parcus, which signifies any inclosure) is either pound-overt, that is,
open overhead; or pound-covert, that is, close. By the statute 1 and 2 P. and
M. c. 12, no distress of cattle can be driven out of the hundred where it is
['13] taken, *unless to a poitnd-overt within the same shire; and within three
miles of the place where it was taken. This is for the benefit of the ten-
ants, that they may know where to find and replevy the distress. And by stat-
ute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, which was made for the benefit of landlords, any person
distraining for rent may turn any part of the premises, upon which a distress is
taken, into a pound, pro hac vice, for securing of such distress. If a live dis-
tress, of animals, be impounded in a common pound-overt, the owner must take
notice of it at his peril; but if in any special pound-overt, so constituted for
this particular purpose, the distrainor must give notice to the owner: and in
both these cases, the owner, and not the distrainor, is bound to provide the
beasts with food and necessaries. But if they are put in a pound-covert, in a
stable or the like, the landlord or distrainor must feed and sustain them.(m) (20)
A distress of household goods, or other dead chattels, which are liable to be
stolen or damaged by weather, ought to be impounded in a pound-covert, else
the distrainor must answer for the consequences.
When impounded, the goods were formerly, as was before observed, only in
the nature of a pledge or security to compel the performance of satisfaction ; and
upon this account it hath been held, (n) that the distrainor is not at liberty
to work or use a distrained beast. And thus the law still continues with regard
to beasts taken damage-feasant, and distresses for suit or services; which must
remain impounded, till the owner makes satisfaction; or contests the right of
distraining, by replevying the chattels. To replevy (replegiare, that is to take
back the pledge) is, when a person distrained upon applies to the sheriff or his
officers, and has the distress returned into his own possession, upon giving good
security to try the right of taking it in a suit at law, and, if that be determined
against him, to return the cattle or goods once more into the hands of the dis-
trainor. This is called a replevin, of which more will be said hereafter. At
present I shall only observe, that, as a distress is at common *law only in
nature of a security for the rent or damages done, a replevin answers the
same end to the distrainor as the distress itself; since the party replevying gives
security to return the distress, if the right be determined against him.
This kind of distress, though it puts the owner to inconvenience, and is there-
fore a punishment to him, yet if lie continues obstinate and will make no satisfac-
tion or payment, it is no remedy at all to the distrainor. But for a debt due to the
crown, unless paid within forty days, the distress was always salable at common
(k) Co. Litt. 160, 161. (1) Co. Litt. 47. (m) Ibid. (n) Cro. Jac. 148.
parties came to an arrangement respecting the sale: 1 Bing. 401; 4 D. and R. 539; 2 B. and
C. 821, S. C.; and the action is sustainable though there was a tender of the rent before the
distress was made. 2 D. and R. 250. Where more rent is distrained for than is due, the
remedy is at common law, and is not founded on the 52 Hen. III, c. 4; nor on the 2 W. and
M. c. 5, . 5; Stra. 851. Where no rent is due, the owner of the goods distrained may, in an
action of trespass on the case, recover double the value of the goods and full costs. 2 W. andM[. sess. 1, C. 5, § 5.]
(20) This subject is covered by the statute 12 and 13 Vic. c. 92, amended by 17 and 18
Vic. c. 60.
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law. (o) And for an amercement imposed at a court-leet, the lord may also sell
the distress: (p) partly because, being the king's court of record, its process par-
takes of the royal prerogative; (q) but principally because it is in the nature of
an execution to levy a legal debt. And so, in the several statute-distresses
before mentioned, which are also in the nature of executions, the power of sale is
likewise usually given, to effectuate and complete the remedy. And, in like manner,
by several acts of parliament, (r) in all cases of distress for rent, if the tenant or
owner do not, within five days after the distress is taken, (21) and notice of the
cause thereof given him, replevy the same with sufficient security; the dis-
trainor, with the sheriff or constable, shall cause the same to be appraised by
two sworn appraisers, and sell the same towards satisfaction of the rent and
charges; rendering the overplus, if any, to the owner himself. And, by this
means, a full and entire satisfaction may now be had for rent in arrere, by the
mere act of the party himself, viz.: by distress, the remedy given at common
law; and sale consequent thereon, which is added by act of parliament.
Before I quit this article, I must observe, that the many particulars which
attend the taking of a distress, used formerly to make it a hazardous kind of
proceeding: for, if any *one irregularity was committed, it vitiated the
whole, and made the distrainors trespassers ab initio. (s) (22) But now t*5
by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, it is provided, that, for any unlawful act done,
the whole shall not be unlawful, or the parties trespassers ab initio : but that the
party grieved shall only have an action for the real damage sustained, and not
even that, if tender of amends is made before any action is brought.
VI. The seizing of heriots, when due on the death of a tenant, is also another
species of self-remedy; not much unlike that of taking cattle or goods in dis-
tress. As for that division of heriots, which is called heriot-service, and is only
a species of rent, the lord may distrain for this, as well as seize, but for heriot-
custom (which Sir Edward Coke says (t) lies only in prender, and hot in render)
the lord may seize the identical thing itself, but cannot distrain any other chat-
tel for it. (u) The like speedy and effectual remedy, of seizing, is given with
regard to many things that are said to lie in franchise; as waifs, wrecks,
estrays, deodands, and the like; all which the person entitled thereto may seize,
without the formal process of a suit or action. Not that they are debarred of
this remedy by action; but have also the other and more speedy one, for the
better asserting their property; the thing to be claimed being frequently of
such a nature, as might be out of the reach of the law before any action could
be brought.
These are the several species of remedies which may be had by the mere act of
the party injured. I shall next briefly mention such as arise from the joint act
of all the parties together. And these are only two, accord and arbitration.
(o Bro. Abr. t. distress, 71. (p) 8 Rep. 41. (q) Bro. Ibid. 12 Mod. 330.
r) 2 W. & M. c. 5. 8 Ann. c. 14. 4 Geo. II, c. 28. 11 Geo. 11, c. 19. (s) 1 Ventr. 37.
(t) Cop. J 25. (u) Cro. Eliz. 590. Cro. Car. 260.
(21) [The five days are reckoned inclusive of the day of sale; as if the goods are distrained
on the 1st, they must not be sold before the 6th. 1 H. Bla. 13. An action lies on the equity
of this act for selling within the five days. Scmb. id. If the distrainer continue in possession
more than a reasonable time beyond the five days, an action of case or trespass lies on the
equity of the statute. 11 East, 395; Stra. 717; 4 B. and A. 208; 1 B. and C. 145. Though
the act authorizes a sale after the five days, it does not take away the right to replevy after
the five days, in case the distress is not sold, but it would be otherwise after a sale. 5 Taunt.
451; 1 March, 135. By the consent of the tenant, the landlord may continue in possession
longer than the five days without incurring any liability; and his so continuing in possession
will not of itself create any presumption of collusion between him and the tenant to defeat an
execution. 7 Price, 690.]
(22) Generally, a party pursuing a remedy ex parte, which may result in depriving another
of his property, must pursue strictly the authority the law gives him. In Newsam v. Hart, 14
Mich. 233, it was held that, under a statute which authorized freeholders to take up estrays, a
freeholder could not justify the taking up of an estray for him by a third person without his
previous authorization, notwithstanding he had assumed to ratify the act.
Chap. 1.]
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I. Accord is a satisfaction agreed upon between the party injuring and the
party injured; which, when performed, is a bar of all actions upon this account.
[*16] As if a man contract *to build a house or deliver a horse, and fail in it;
Li this is an injury for which the sufferer may have his remedy by action
but if the party injured accepts a sum of money, or other thing, as a satisfaction,
this is a redress of that injury, and entirely takes away the action. (w) (23) By
(w) 9 Rep. 79.
(28) [The mere consent of a party to accept a satisfaction, without an actual satisfaction, is
not sufficient to discharge the other; the accord and satisfaction must be perfect, complete,
and executed, for were it otherwise, it would be only substituting one cause of action for
another, which might go on to any extent. 9 Rep. 79, b; 5 T. R. 141. Satisfaction must be
made to the whole of the original demand, and a party will not be discharged upon per
formance of a satisfaction to part of such demand, the residue remaining unperformed.
1 Taunt. 526 ; 5 East, 230. The performance of one of two things stipulated for by an accord is
nugatory. Lord Raym. 203; 3 Lev. 189. The accord and satisfaction must be certain; and accord
to pay a less sum on the same, or at a subsequent day, is not sufficient. 5 East, 230. So an
accord, that the defendant shall employ workmen in two or three days, is bad: 4 Mod. 88;
and performance of an uncertain accord will not aid the defect. 3 Lev. 189; Yelv. 124.
We have already seen, ante book 2, how far a contract may be varied, released, or discharged
by another contract. A deed before breach cannot be discharged by accord and satisfaction
without a deed: 1 Taunt. 428; Com. Dig. Pleader, 2 V. 8; but after breach accord and satis-
faction without deed, is a good plea, for there the satisfaction is of the breach, and not of the
deed. Com. Dig. Accord, A. 1 and C.; 7 East, 150; 1 J. B. Moore, 358, 460; Cro. Eliz. 46;
2 Wils. 86 ; 6 Rep. 43, b.
, The satisfaction must be a reasonable one. Generally speaking, the mere acceptance of a
less sum is not in law a satisfaction of a greater sum (5 East, 230), and this though an additional
security be given. 1 Stra. 426. An agreement between a debtor and creditor, that part of a
larger sum due should be paid by the debtor, and accepted by the creditor as a satisfaction for
the whole, might, under special circumstances, operate as a discharge of the whole; but then
the legal effect of such an agreement might be considered to be the same as if the whole debt
had been paid, and part had been returned as a gift to the party paying. Per Holroyd, J., 2
B. and C. 481. A debtor's assignment of all his effects to a trustee, to raise a fund for the
payment of a composition to his creditors, is a sufficient satisfaction: 2 T. R. 24; so if a third
person guarantees a payment of the less sum. 11 East, 390. So if a creditor, by his under-
taking to accept a composition, induce the debtor to part with his property to his creditors,
or induce other creditors to discharge the debtor to enter into a composition-deed, or deliver up
securities to him, such creditor would be bound by such undertaking. 2 Stark. Rep. 407; 2 M.
and S. 120; 1 Esp. 236. And where several creditors, with the knowledge of each other, agree
on the faith of each other's undertaking to give time to, or accept a composition from, a debtor,
the agreement will be binding on every creditor who is party to it. 3 Camp. 175; 2 M. and
S. 122; 16 Ves. 374. Payment and acceptance of a part of a debt before the day it falls due,
or at a place where the whole debt was not payable, in satisfaction of the whole, is a good
satisfaction: Co. Litt. 212, b; and so if the debtor give a chose in possession for a chose in
action (2 T. R. 24), as the gift of a horse or other property in specie. Co. Litt. 212, b. The
mere fulfilment of an act which a party is bound in law to do, is no satisfaction. Per Grose,
J., 5 East, 302. A release of an equity of redemption is no satisfaction. 2 Wils. 86. Confer-
ring a benefit to a third person at the debtor's request is sufficient. See Skin. Rep. 391.
The satisfaction should proceed from the party who wishes to avail himself of it; for when
it proceeds entirely from a stranger, it will be a nullity. See 5 East, 294; 1 Smith, 515; Cro.
Eliz. 541.
Accord and satisfaction by copartner, is a bar to any action against the other partners; 9
Rep. 79, b. ; so the acceptance of satisfaction from a joint tort-feasor discharges the other
wrongdoers (Sembl. 3 Taunt. 117), and accord and satisfaction to one of several co-plaintiffs,
will operate as a discharge from all. See 13 Edw. IV, 6; 5 Co. 117, b.]
To be good, an accord and satisfaction must be advantageous to the creditor; and it is upon
this ground that a receipt by a creditor of a part of his demand then due has been held no
answer to an action for the remainder, notwithstanding his agreement to receive it in satisfaction:
Watkinson v. Inglesby, 5 John . 386; Blanchard v. Noyes, 3 N. H. 518; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11
Vt. 60; Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Me. 362; Daniels v. Hatch, 1 N. J. 91 ; Eve v. Moseley, 2 Strobh. 203;
Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559. But it is otherwise if the claim is not liquidated, or is in
dispute. Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill, 406; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met. 551. Or if the debtor give a
negotiable note for part of the debt. Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. and W. 23. Or any chattel,
though of much less value than the amount of the debt. Jones v. Bullitt, 2 Lit. 49; Reed v.
Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273. Or the note of a third person. Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend. 66. Or pay
part before it is due. Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283. And in any other case it is a good accord
and satisfaction if the creditor receive some distinct benefit which he would not otherwise
have been entitled to. See Douglass v. White, 3 Barb. Ch. 621. And it has been held that,
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several late statutes (particularly 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case of irregularity in the
method of distraining, and 24 Geo. II, c. 24, in case of mistakes committed by
justices of the peace), even tender of sufficient amends to the party injured is a
bar of all actions, whether he thinks proper to accept such amends or no. (24)
II. Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters
in dispute, concerning any personal chattels or personal wrong, to the judgment
of two or more arbitrators; who are to decide the controversy: and if they do
not agree, it is usual to add, that another person be called in as umpire, (impe-
rator, or impar,)(x) to whose sole judgment it is then referred : or frequently
there is only one arbitrator originally appointed. This decision, in any of these
cases, is called an award. And thereby the question is as fully determined, and
the right transferred or settled, as it could have been by the agreement of the
parties, or the judgment of a court of justice.(y) But the right of real prop-
erty cannot thus pass by a mere award: (z) which subtilty in point of form
(for it is now reduced to nothing else) had its rise from feudal principles; for,
if this had been permitted, the land might have been aliened collusively with-
out the consent of the superior. Yet, doubtless, an arbitrator may now award a
conveyance or a release of land; and it will be a breach of the arbitration bond
to refuse compliance. For, though originally the submission to arbitration used
to be by word, or by deed, yet both of these being revocable in their nature, it
is now became the practice to enter into mutual bonds, with condition to stand
to the award or arbitration of the arbitrators *or umpire therein
named.(a)(25) And experience having shown the great use of these
(x) Whart. Angl. sacr. 1, 772. Nicols, Scot. Hist. lMhr. ch. 1, propoflnem.
(y) Brownl. 55. 1 Freem. 410. (z) 1 Roll. Abr. 242. 1 Lord Raym. 115.
(a) Append. No. III,§ 6.
where a vendee who has ordered goods from a manufacturer consents to receive them and waive
strict compliance with the contract, he is bound by this waiver, notwithstanding there was no
distinct consideration for it. Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266; and see Mon-
roe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 305 ; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330 ; Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282.
And of late the disposition of the courts has been to go very far in upholding the agreements
of parties for an adjustment of their controversies without litigation.
(24) [By several statutes (particularly 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case of irregularity in the method
of distraining, and 11 and 12 Vic. c. 44, in case of mistakes committed by justices of the peace),
a tender of amends to the party injured is a bar to the action, if the party thinks proper to
accept such tender. If the party injured does not accept the amends tendered, and the
jury, on the trial of the action, think the sum offered sufficient, their verdict must be for the
defendant. By the common law procedure act, 1852, section 70, the defendant in all actions
(except actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest or
prosecution, criminal conversation or debauchery of the plaintiff's daughter or servant), may
pay into court a sum of money by way of compensation or amends. And by statute 6 and 7
Vic. c. 96, s. 2, in an action for a libel contained in any newspaper or periodical publicalion,
the defendant may plead that it was inserted without malice or gross negligence, and that an
apology had been offered to be published. The defendant may with the plea pay money into
court as amends. By section 4, the offer of apology is admissible in evidence in mitigation
of damages.]
In some of the United States statutes will be found adding to the number of cases in which
tender of amends may be made, and in some a disposition has been manifested of late to per-
mit the defendant in any suit brought for the recovery of debt or damages, to make an offer
of such a sum as he is willing to allow judgment to pass for, and if the plaintiff declines to
accept, to give costs against him unless the verdict in his favor is larger than the offer.
(25) [A time should, in all cases, be mentioned within which the award is to be made; but
if no time be mentioned, the award should be made in a reasonable time. 2 Keb. 10, 20 ; 3 M.
and S. 145.
A court of chancery will not decree a specific performance: 19 Ves. 431 ; 6 Ves. 815; and
no action lies for not appointing an arbitrator: 2 B. and P. 13; but if a party has agreed not
to revoke, or has covenanted to perform an award, and the award be made, he will be liable
to an action for a breach of the agreement or covenant, if lie revoke or refuse to perform the
award: see 5 B. and A. 507; 1 D. and R. 106; 2 Chit. R. 316; 5 East, 266; and see 4 B. and
C. 103; and an attachment for a contempt of court sometimes lies, where the submission is a
rule of court. Cromnpt. Prac. 262; 1 Stra. 593 ; 7 East, 607.
With respect to the revocation of the arbitrator's authority, it is a rule of law, that every
species of authority, being a delegated power, although by express words made irrevocable, is
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peaceable and domestic tribunals, especially in settling matters of account, and
other mercantile transactions, which are difficult and almost impossible to be
adjusted on a trial at law; the legislature has now established the use of them,
as well in controversies where causes are depending, as in those where no action
is brought: enacting by statute 9 and 10 Win. III, c. 15, that all merchants
and others, who desire to end any controversy, suit, or quarrel, (for which there
is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in equity), may agree, that
their submission of the suit to arbitration or umpirage shall be made a rule
of any of the king's courts of record, and may insert such agreement in
their submission, or promise, or condition of the arbitration-bond: which
agreement being proved upon oath by one of the witnesses thereto, the court
shall make a rule that such submission and award shall be conclusive: and,
after such rule made, the parties disobeying the award shall be liable to be pun-
ished, as for a contempt of the court; unless such award shall be set aside, for
corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire, proved on oath
to the court, within one term after the award is made. And, in consequence
of this statute, it is now become a considerable part of the business of the
superior courts, to set aside such awards when partially or illegally made; or
to enforce their execution, when legal, by the same process of contempt, as is
awarded for disobedience to those rules and orders, which are issued by the
courts themselves.(26)
nevertheless in general revocable. See 8 Co. 82. A submission to arbitration may be revoked
by the act of God, by operation of law, or by the act of the parties.
The death of either or any of the parties before the award is delivered, in general vacates
the submission, unless it contain a stipulation to the contrary: see 1 Marsh. 366; 7 Taunt.
571; 1 Moore, 287, 5. C.; 2 B. and A. 894; but where all matters in difference in a cause are
referred' by order of nisi prius to arbitration, the death of one of the parties, at any time
before award made, is a revocation of the arbitrator's authority, and the court will set
aside an award made after his death; or, in other words, it should seem, if the cause of action
is referred, the death abates the action, but not so if other matters besides the cause of action
are referred. 3 D. and R. 608; 2 B. and A. 394.
If a feme-sole submit to arbitration, and marry before the award is delivered, such marriage
is in effect a revocation, without notice to the arbitrators: 2 Keb. 865; Jones, 388; Roll. Abr.
831 ; but the husband and wife may be sued on their bond for such revoking. 5 East, 266.
Bankruptey of one of the parties is no revocation. 2 Chit. Rep. 43 ; 4 B. and A. 250.
The death of the arbitrators, or one of them, will defeat the reference, unless there be a
clause in the submission to the contrary: see 4 Moore, 3; so if the arbitrators do not make
the award within the limited time, or they disagree, or refuse to act or intermeddle any fur-
ther. 1 Roll. Ab. 261 ; 2 Saund. 129 ; Tidd, 8th ed. 877.
The parties themselves, as we have just seen, may revoke the arbitrators' authority before
the award is made: the revocation must follow the nature of the submission; if the latter be
by parol, so may the revocation. 2 Keb. 64. If the submission be by deed, so must the revo-
cation. 8 Co. 72; and see T. Jones, 134. Notice of the revocation by the act of the parties
must be given to the arbitrators, in order to render it effectual. Roll. Abr. 331; Yin. Ab.
Authority, 13; and see 5 B. and A. 507.]
It has been very common of late to introduce into certain species of contract a clause
requiring the parties to submit to arbitration any disputes that may arise under them; but it
has been generally supposed these stipulations could not be enforced, because they ousted the
courts of jurisdiction. But recently an agreement not to bring suit until the damages were
adjusted by a committee, or by arbitration, has been sustained. Avery v. Scott, 8 Exch. 487;
S. C. in House of Lords, 5 H. L. Cas. 811 ; and see Russell v. Pellegrim, 6 El. and B1. 1020.
The statement above that the marriage of a feme-sole revokes a submission to arbitration is
probably not applicable in those states where the disabilities of coverture are removed and
the woman is allowed to act on her own behalf the same after marriage as before.
Although it is perhaps true that the bankruptcy of one of the parties will not revoke a
submission, yet the assignee would have the same power to revoke which the bankrupt pos-
sessed before the assignment. See Marsh v. Wood, 9 B. and C. 659.
(26) The common law procedure act, 1854, 'contains various provisions designed to give
full effect to an agreement to arbitrate, where the parties fail to select a sole arbitrator or
umpire, or where two are to be chosen and one party neglects or refuses to make choice. In
the first case an arbitrator or umpire may be chosen by a judge of one of the superior courts,
and in the other, the arbitrator who has been selected by one party may proceed as sole arbi-
trator. And if a reference is to two arbitrators, they may without special authority in the
submission, appoint an umpire, unless the terms of the submission forbid; and if they fail to
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CHAPTER II.
OF REDRESS BY THE MERE OPERATION OF LAW.
THE remedies for private wrongs, which are effected by the mere operation
of law, will fall within a very narrow compass; there being only two instances
of this sort that at present occur to my recollection: the one that of retainer,
where a creditor is made executor or administrator to his debtor; the other, in
the case of what the law calls a remitter.
I. If a person indebted to another makes his creditor or debtee his executor,
or if such a creditor obtains letters of administration to his debtor; in these
cases the law gives him a remedy for his debt, by allowing him to retain so
much as will pay himself, before any other creditors whose debts are of equal
degree.(a)(1) This is a remedy by the mere act of law, and grounded upon this
reason; that the executor cannot, without an apparent absurdity, commence a
suit against himself as a representative of the deceased, to recover that which
is due to him in his own private capacity: but having the whole personal estate
in his hands, so much as is sufficient to answer his own demand is, by operation
of law, applied to that particular purpose. Else, by being made executor,
*he would be put in a worse condition than all the rest of the world
besides. For, though a ratable payment of all the debts of the deceased, [*19
in equal degree, is clearly the most equitable method, yet as every scheme for a
proportionable distribution of the assets among all the creditors hath been
hitherto found to be impracticable, and productive of more mischiefs than it
would remedy; so that the creditor who first commences his suit is entitled to
a preference in payment; it follows that as the executor can commence no
suit, he must be paid the last of any, and, of course, must lose his debt in case
the estate of his testator should prove insolvent, unless he be allowed to retain
it. The doctrine of retainer is therefore the necessary consequence of that
other doctrine of the law, the priority of such creditor who first commences his
action. But the executor shall not retain his own debt, in prejudice to those
of a higher degree; for the law only puts him in the same situation, as if he
had sued himself as executor, and recovered his debt; which he never could be
supposed to have done, while debts of a higher nature subsisted. Neither shall
one executor be allowed to retain his own debt, in prejudice to that of his co-
executor in equal degree; but both shall be discharged in proportion.(b) Nor
shall an executor of his own wrong be in any case permitted to retain.(c)
II. Remitter is where he who hath the true property or jusproprietatis in
lands, but is out of possession thereof, and hath no right to enter without recov-
ering possession in an action, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him by
some subsequent, and of course defective, title; in this case he is remitted, or
sent back by operation of law, to his ancient and more certain title.(d) The
right of entry, which he hath gained by a bad title, shall be ipso facto annexed
to his own inherent good one: and his defeasible estate shall be utterly defeated
and annulled by the instantaneous act of law, without his participation or con-
sent.(e) As if.A disseizes B, that *is, turns him out of possession and
dies, leaving a son C ; hereby the estate descends to C the son of A, and
B is barred from entering thereon till he proves his right in an action; (2) now,
(a) 1 Roll. Abr. 922. Plowd. 543. See book II, page 511. (b) Viner. Abr. t. executors, D. 2.
(c) 5 Rep. 30. (d) Litt. § 659. (e) Co. Litt. 358. Cro. Jac. 489.
award, and fail to appoint an umpire, one may be appointed by a judge, The act also con-
tains provisions for expediting the award, and it empowers the court to set it aside in proper
cases. It also empowers the court, where the award directs possession of land to be deliv-
ered, to enforce the award by summary process, as it might a judgment in ejectment.
(1) This is not the law in the United States. Debts of equal degree are paid ratably, and
the executor in his accounting is allowed for no payment to himself beyond his just proportion.
(2) LB would not now be barred from entering by the descent of the estate to C : 3 and 4
Wm. IV, c. 27, 39; but the above passage may still serve as an illustration. The student
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if afterwards C, the heir of the disseizor, makes a lease for life to D, with
remainder to B, the disseizee for life, and D dies; hereby the remainder accrues
to B, the disseizee: who thus gaining a new freehold by virtue of the remainder,
which is a bad title, is by act of law remitted, or in of his former and surer
estate.(f) For he hath hereby gained a new right of possession, to which the
law immediately annexes his ancient right of property.
If the subsequent estate, or right of possession, be gained by a man's own act
or consent, as by immediate purchase, being of full age, he shall not be remitted.
For the taking such subsequent estate was his own folly, and shall be looked
upon as a waiver of his prior right.(g) Therefore it is to be observed, that to
every remitter there are regularly these incidents; an ancient right, and a new
defeasible estate of freehold, uniting in one and the same person; which
defeasible estate must be cast upon the tenant, not gained by his own act or
folly. The reason given by Littleton (h) why this remedy, which operates
silently, and by the mere act of law, was allowed, is somewhat similar to that
given in the preceding article; because otherwise he who hath right would be
deprived of all remedy. For as he himself is the person in possession of the
freehold, there is no other person against whom he can bring an action to
establish his prior right. And for this cause the law doth adjudge him in by
remitter; that is, in such plight as if he had lawfully recovered the same land
by suit. For, as Lord Bacon observes, (i) the benignity of the law is such, as
when, to preserve the principles and grounds of law, it depriveth a man of his
remedy without his own fault, it will rather put him in a better degree and con-
dition than in a worse. Nam quod remedio destituitur, ipsa re valet, si culpa
[*21] absit. But there shall be no *remitter to a right, for which the party
has no remedy by action: (k) as if the issue in tail be barred by the fine
or warrant (3) of his ancestor, and the freehold is afterwards cast upon him;
he shall not be remitted to his estate tail: (1) for the operation of the remitter
is exactly the same, after the union of the two rights, as that of a real action
would have been before it. As, therefore, the issue in tail could not by any
action have recovered his ancient estate, he shall not recover it by remitter.
And thus much for these extrajudicial remedies, as well for real as personal
injuries, which are furnished or permitted by the law, where the parties are so
peculiarly circumstanced, as not to make it eligible, or in some cases even pos-
sible, to apply for redress in the usual and ordinary methods to the courts of
public justice.
CHAPTER III.
OF COURTS IN GENERAL.
Tim next, and principal, object of our inquiries is the redress of injuries by
suit in courts : wherein the act of the parties and the act of law co-operate;
the act of the parties being necessary to set the law in motion, and the process
of the law being in general the only instrument by which the parties are ena-
bled to procure a certain and adequate redress.
And here it will not be improper to observe, that although in-the several cases
of redress by the act of the parties mentioned in a former chapter, (a) the law
(f) Finch. L. 194. Litt. § 683. (g) Co. Litt. 348, 350. (h) § 661. (i) Elem. r, 9.
(k) Co. Litt. 349. (1) Moor. 115. 1 Andr. 286. (a) Ch. 1.
will find the law concerning remitter ably investigated in the argument and judgment of the
court in the case of Doe d. Daniell v. Woodroffe, 10 M. and W. 608.]
(8) Estates tail are no longer barrable by these means. See statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 74, 14.
There is no remitter where the right is barred by the statute of limitations. See Doe v,
Woodroffe, 10 M. and W. 608; 15 id. 768; 2 H. L. Ca. 811.
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allows an extrajudicial remedy, yet that does not exclude the ordinary course of
justice: but it is only an additional weapon put into the hands of certain per-
sons in particular instances, where natural equity or the peculiar circumstances
of their situation require a more expeditious remedy, than the formal process
of any court of judicature can furnish. Therefore, though I may defend myself,
or relations, from external violence, I yet am afterwards entitled to an action
of assault and battery: though I may retake my goods, if I have a fair and
peaceable opportunity, this power of recaption does not debar me from my
action of trover or detinue: I may either enter on the lands, on which I have
a right of entry, or may demand possession by a real action: I may either abate
a nuisance by my own authority, or call upon the law to do it for me: I may
distrain for rent, or have an action of debt, at my own *option : if I do [*23]
not distrain my neighbor's cattle damage-feasant, I may compel him by
action of trespass to make me a fair satisfaction; if a heriot, or a deodand, be
withheld from me by fraud or force, I may recover it though I never seised it.
And with regard to accords and arbitrations, these, in their nature, being
merely an agreement or compromise, most indisputably suppose a previous
right of obtaining redress some other way; which is given up by such agree-
ment. But as to remedies by the mere operation of law, those are indeed given,
because no remedy can be ministered by suit or action, without running into
the palpable absurdity of a man's bringing an action against himself: the two
cases wherein they happen being such wherein the only possible legal remedy
would be directed against the very person himself who seeks relief.
In all other cases it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is
a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded. And in treating of these remedies by suit in courts, I
shall pursue the following method : first, I shall consider the nature and several
species of the courts of justice; and, secondly, I shall point out in which of these
courts, and in what manner, the proper remedy may be had for any private
injury; or, in other words, what injuries are cognizable, and how redressed, in
each respective species of courts.
First, then, of courts of justice. And herein we will consider, first, their
nature and incidents in general ; and then, the several species of them, erected
and acknowledged by the laws of England.
A court is defined to be a place wherein justice is judicially administered.(b)
And, as by our excellent constitution the sole executive power of the laws
is vested in the person of the king, it will follow that all courts of justice
which are *the medium by which he administers the laws, are derived [*24]
from the power of the crown.(c) For, whether created by act of par- 1 2
liament, or letters patent, or subsisting by prescription (the only methods by
which any courts of judicature (d) can exist), the king's consent in the two
former is expressly, and in the latter impliedly, given. In all these courts the
king is supposed in contemplation of law to be always present; but as that is
in fact impossible, he is there represented by his judges, whose power is only
an emanation of the royal prerogative.
For the more speedy, universal, and impartial administration of justice between
subject and subject, the law bath appointed a prodigious variety of courts, some
with a more limited, others with a more extensive, jurisdiction ; some constituted
to inquire only, others to hear and determine ; some to determine in the first
instance, others upon appeal and by way of review. All these in their turn will
be taken notice of in their respective places: and I shall therefore here only
mention one distinction, that runs throughout them all, viz. : that some of them
are courts of record, others not of record. A court of record is that, where the
acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memo-
rial and testimony: which rolls are called the records of the court, and are
of such high and supereminent authority, that their truth is not to be called
in question. For it is a settled rule and maxim that nothing shall be averred
(b) Co. Litt. 58., (c) See Book I, ch. 27. (Cd) Co. Litt. 260.
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against a record, nor shall any plea, or even proof, be admitted to the con-
trary. (e)(1) And if the existence of a record be denied, it shall be tried by
nothing but itself; that is, upon bare inspection whether there be any such
record or no; else there would be no end of disputes. But, if there appear
any mistake of the clerk in making up such record, the court will direct him
to amend it. All courts of record are the king's courts, in right of his crown
and royal dignity,(f) and therefore no other court hath authority to fine or
r,25] imprison ; so that the very erection *of a new jurisdiction with the power
t*25]of fine or imprisonment makes it instantly a court of record.(g) A court
not of record is the court of a private man ; whom the law will not intrust with any
discretionary power over the fortune or liberty of his fellow subjects. Such are
the courts-baron incident to every manor, and other inferior jurisdictions:
where the proceedings are not enrolled or recorded; but as well their existence
as the truth of the matters therein contained shall, if disputed, be tried and
determined by a jury. These courts can hold no plea of matters cognizable by
the common law, unless under the value of 40s. nor of any forcible injury
whatsoever, not having any process to arrest the person of the defend-
ant. (h) (2)
In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus,
and .judex: the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus,
or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it ; and the judex, or
judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the
law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to
ascertain and, by its officers, to apply the remedy. It is also usual in the
superior courts to have attorneys and advocates, or counsel, as assistants.
An attorney at law answers to the procurator, or proctor, of the civilians and
canonists.(i) And he is one who is put in the place, stead, or turn of another,
to manage his matters of law. Formerly every suitor was obliged to appear
in person to prosecute or defend his suit (according to the old Gothic con-
stitution),(k) unless by special license under the king's letters patent.(1) This
is still the law in criminal cases. (3) And an idiot cannot to this day appear
(e) Co. Litt. 260. (f) Finch, L. 231. (g) Salk. 200. i2 Mod. 388. (h) 2 Inst. 811.
(5) Pope Boniface VI, in 6 DecretaZ. 1. 3, t. 16, § 3, speaks of "procuratorfibus, qui in aliquibus partibus
attornati nuncupantur."
(k) Stiernhook de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 6. () F. N. B. 25.
(1) [This rule is subject to some exceptions; for in the case of a judgment signed on a
warrant of attorney given upon an unlawful consideration, or obtained by fraud, upon an
affidavit thereof, the court will afford relief upon a summary application. Dougl. 196;
Cowp. 727; 1 Hen. Bla. 75. And equity will relieve against a judgment obtained by fraud
or collusion. 1 Anst. 8; 3 Ves. and B. 42. And third persons who have been defrauded by
a collusive judgment may show such fraud, so as to prevent themselves from being prejudiced
by it. 2 Marsh. 392; 7 Taunt. 97; 13 Eliz. c. 5.]
A judgment is void if the court which assumed to render it had no jurisdiction. But
generally it is not competent to show a want of jurisdiction in opposition to the recitals in
the record. Whether, where a judgment rendered in one state is brought into controversy
in another, it is competent to show a want of jurisdiction in contradiction of the record, is
in dispute upon the authorities. See Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Hall v. Williams, 6
Pick. 232; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Norwood v.
Dodd, 24 Texas, 551, which allow such evidence, and Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Wilcox
v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512,
and Lincoln v. Tower, 4 McLean, 473, which exclude it.
(2) The courts not of record in the United States, like the superior courts, are the creat-
ures of statute, and are held by officers elected or appointed for the purpose. But they are
not in any proper sense the courts of private men, and some of them are vested with large
powers, and try cases in the common law mode, with jury. Courts of justices of the peace in
the several states are generally held not to be courts of record.
(3) [This is not universally so, for in prosecutions and informations for misdemeanors,
especially in the court of king's bench, a defendant may, and usually does, appear and plead
by his attorney or clerk in court.]
And now in England a full defence is allowed to be made by counsel in all cases of felony
See statute 6 and 7 Win. IV. c. 114. It is allowed also in the tUnited States in all cases, civil
and criminal.
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by attorney, but in person,(m) for he bath not discretion to enable him to
appoint *a proper substitute: and upon his being brought before the [*26]
court in so defenceless a condition, the judges are bound to take care
of his interests, and they shall admit the best plea in his behalf that any one
present can suggest.(n) But as in the Roman law, "cum olim in usa fuisset,
alterius nomine agqi non posse, sed, quia hoc non minimam incommoditatem
habebat, ceperunt homines per procuratores litigare,"(o) so with us upon the
same principle of convenience, it is now permitted in general, by divers ancient
statutes, whereof the first is statute Westm. 2 c. 10, that attorneys may be made
to prosecute or defend any action in the absence of the parties to the suit.
These attorneys are now formed into a regular corps; they ar6 admitted to the
execution of their office by the superior courts of Westminster-hall; and are in
all points officers of the respective courts of which they are admitted; and, as
they have many privileges on account of their attendance there, so they are
peculiarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges.(4) No
man can practice as an attorney in any of those courts, but such as is admitted
and sworn an attorney of that particular court: an attorney of the court of
king's bench cannot practice in the court of common pleas; nor vice versa. To
practice in the court of chancery it is also necessary to be admitted a solicitor
therein: and by the statute 22 Geo. II, c. 46, no person shall act as an attorney
at the court of quarter sessions, but such as has been regularly admitted in
some superior court of record. So early as the statute 4 Henry IV, c. 18, it was
enacted, that attorneys should be examined by the judges, and none admitted
but such as were virtuous, learned, and sworn to do their duty. And many
subsequent statutes (p) have laid them under farther regulations.(5)
(m) F. N. B. 27. (n) Bro. Abr. t. idiot, 1. (o) Inst. 4, tit. 10.
(p) 3 Jac. I, c. 7. 12 Geo. I, c. 29. 2 Geo. II, c. 23. 22 Geo. II, c. 46. 23 Geo. 11, c. 26.
(4) [An attorney is bound to use care, skill, and integrity, and if he be not deficient in any
of these essential requisites, lie is not responsible for any error or mistake arising in the
exercise of his profession. 4 Burr. 2061, and see 4 B. and A. 202. If he be deficient, and a
loss thereby arises to his client, he is liable to an action in damages: 2 Wils. 325; 1 Bing.
347; and in some cases, as we have above seen, the court of which he is an attorney will afford
a summary remedy. The judges will exercise their summary jurisdiction over the attorneys
of the several courts, not merely in the cases where they have been employed in the conduct
of suits, or any matter purely professional, but "whenever the employment is so connected
with professional character as to afford a presumption that their character formed the ground
of their employment." Thus, one attorney has been compelled to give up papers and deeds,
which have been placed in his hands as steward for the owner of the estates, to which they
refer; and another to pay over money which he had received when employed to collect the
effects of an intestate by the administrator, although he had never been employed by him to
prosecute or defend any suits in law or equity. Hughes v. Mayre, 3 T. R. 275; In re Aitkin,
4 B. and A. 47; Luxmore v. Lethbridge, 5 B. and A. 898.]
Upon the general power of the court to deal summarily with attorneys, see In re Austin et
al. 5 Rawle, 203; Matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 393.
(5) [The above statutes, with several others passed subsequently, have been repealed by 6
and 7 Vic. c. 73, and the laws relating to attorneys consolidated. In order to be admitted an
attorney, a person must have been bound by contract in writing to serve as clerk during five
years to a practicing attorney or solicitor, and have duly served accordingly; but one year
may be served with a barrister or certified special pleader, and one with the attorney's London
agent. Or if within four years previously, and within six years after his matriculation, he
has taken the degree of bachelor of arts, or within eight years of bachelor of laws, in one
of the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, Durham or London, the binding may be
for three years, and one of them may be served with the agent. Before admitting an attor-
ney the judges are required to examine and inquire touching his fitness and capacity to act
as such, and if satisfied thereof, they are -to administer to him an oath that lie will truly and
honestly demean himself in practice. For the purpose of facilitating this inquiry, eight or
more of them, including the three chiefs, may from time to time appoint examiners, and make
rules for conducting the examination.
By the same statute, an attorney of any one of the superior courts of law at Westminster
is entitled to be admitted in any other of these courts, or in any inferior court of England or
Wales, upon signing the roll of such other court, and thereupon to practice as an attorney
therein, in like manner as if he had been admitted an attorney of it.] See amendatory
statutes 14 an 15 Vic. c. 88; 23 and 21 Vic. c. 127.
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Of advocates, or (as we generally call them) counsel, there are two species oi
degrees; barristers, and serjeants. The former are admitted after a considerable
period of study, or at least standing, in the inns of court; (q) and are in our old
[*27] books *styled apprentices, apprenticii ad legern, being looked upon as
merely learners, and not qualified to execute the full office of an advo-
cate till they were sixteen years standing; at which time, according to Fortes-
cue, (r) they might be called to the state and degree of serjeants, or servientes
ad legem. How ancient and honourable this state and degree is, with the form,
splendour, and profits attending it, hath been so fully displayed by many learned
writers, (s) that it need *not be here enlarged on. I shall only observe, that ser-
jeants at law are bound by a solemn oath (t) to do their duty to their clients:
and that by custom (u) the judges of the courts of Westminster are always
admitted into this venerable order, before they are advanced to the bench; the
original of which was probably to qualify the puisne barons of the exchequer to
become justices of assize, according to the exigence of the statute of 14 Edw. III,
c. 16. From both these degrees some are usually selected to be his majesty's counsel
learned in the law; the two principal of whom are called his attorney, and solici-
tor general. The first king's counsel, under the degree of serjeant, was Sir
Francis Bacon, who was made so honoris causa, without either patent or fee; (w)
so that the first of the modern order (who are now the sworn servants of the
crown, with a standing salary) seems to have been Sir Francis North, afterwards
lord keeper of the great seal to King Charles II. (x) These king's counsel
answer, in some measure, to the advocates of the revenue, advocatifisci, among
the Romans. For they must not be employed in any cause against the crown
without special license; (6) in which restriction they agree with the advocates
of the fise: (y) but in the imperial law the prohibition was carried still further,
and perhaps was more for the dignity of the sovereign: for, excepting some
peculiar causes, the fiscal advocates were not permitted to be at all concerned
[*28] *in private suits between subject and subject. (z) A custom has of late
years prevailed of granting letters patent of precedence to such barristers
as the crown thinks proper to honour with that mark of distinction: whereby
they are entitled to such rank and pre-audience (a) as are assigned in their
respective patents; sometimes next after the king's attorney-general, but usually
next after his majesty's counsel then being. These (as well as the queen's attor-
ney and solicitor-general), (b) rank promiscuously with the king's counsel, and
together with them sit within the bar of the respective courts; but receive no
salaries, and are not sworn ; and therefore are at liberty to be retained in causes
against the crown. And all other serjeants and barristers indiscriminately (except
(q) See Book I, introduc. S 1. (r) De LL. c. 50.
(s) Fortesc. ibid. 10 Rep. pref. Dudg. Orig. Jurid. To which may be added a tract by the late Sergeant
Wynne, printed in 1765, entitled "Observations touching the antiquity and dignity of the degree of sergeant
at law."
(t) 2 Inst. 214. (u) Fortese. c. 50. (w) See his letters, 256.
(x) See his life by Rogers North, 37. (y) Cod. 2, 9, 1. (z) Ibid. 2, 7, 13.
(a) Pre-audience in the courts is reckoned of so much consequence, that it may not be amiss to subjoin a
sort table of the precedence which usually obtains among the practisers:
1. The king's premier serjeant (so constituted by special patent).(7)
2. The king's ancient serjeant, or the eldest among the king's serjeants.(7)
3. The king's advocate-general.
4. The king's attorney-general.(7)
5. The king's solicitor-general.(7)
6. The king's serjeants.
7. The king's counsel, with the queen's attorney and solicitor.
8. Serjeants at law.
9. The recorder of London.
10. Advocates of the civil law.
11. Barristers.
In the courts of exchequer two of the most experienced barristers, called the post-man and the tub-man (from
the places in which they sit) have also a precedence in motions.
(b) Seld. tit. hon. 1, 6, 7.
(6) The license to defend a prisoner is never refused, but some expense must be incurred in
obtaining it.
(7) [By the king's mandate, 14th Dec., 1811, the king's attorney and solicitor-general are
now to have place and audience before the king's premier serjeant.]
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in the court of common pleas, where only serjeants are admitted) (8) may take
upon them the protection and defence of any suitors, whether plaintiff or defend-
ant; who are therefore called their clients, like the dependents upon the ancient
Roman orators. Those indeed practiced gratis, for honour merely, or at most
for the sake of gaining influence: and so likewise it is established with us, (c)
that a counsel can maintain no action for his fees; which are given, not as
locatio vel conductio, but as quiddam honorarium; not as a salary or hire, but as
a mere gratuity, which a counsellor cannot demand without doing wrong to his
reputation: (d) (9) as is also laid down with regard to advocates in the civil
law, (e) whose honorarium was directed by a decree of the senate not to exceed
in any case ten thousand sesterces, *or about 801. of English money.(.f)(10) [*29]
And, in order to encourage due freedom of speech in the lawful defence
of their clients, and at the same time to give a check to the unseemly licen-
tiousness of prostitute and illiberal men (a few of whom may sometimes
insinuate themselves even into the most honourable professions), it hath been
holden that a counsel is not answerable for any matter by him spoken, relative
to the cause in hand, and suggested in his client's instructions; although it
should reflect upon the reputation of another, and even prove absolutely ground-
less: but if he mentions an untruth of his own invention, or even upon instruc-
tions if it be impertinent to the cause in band, he is then liable to an action
from the party iujured. (g) (11) And counsel guilty of deceit or collusion are
punishable by the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 28, with imprisonment for a
year and a day, and perpetual silence in the courts; a punishment still sometimes
inflicted for gross misdemeanors in practice. (h)
(c) Davis pref. 22. 1 Ch. Rep. 38. (d) Davis, 23. (e) If. 11, 6, 1.
(f) Tac. ann. 1. 11, 7. (g) Cro. Jac. 90. (A) Sir T. Raym. 376.
(8) [That is, in bank; for at trials at nisi prius in C. P. a barrister, who is not a serj eant, may
even lead a cause.]
And now by statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 54, all barristers have the same privileges in the court
of common pleas as the serjeants.
(9) [Upon the same principle a physician cannot maintain an action for his fees. 4 Term
Rep. 317.]
In the United States a counsellor is not only entitled to stipulate for a reasonable fee, but he
may recover upon the client's implied promise to pay a reasonable compensation. In the
state of New Jersey, however, the rule appears to be otherwise. Seeley v. Crane, 3 Green, 35;
Van Alter v. McKinney's Ex'rs, 1 Harrison, 236.
It has been held that if an attorney renders a bill on the understanding that it is to be imme-
diately paid, and the client disputes it, and compels its collection by legal proceedings, the
attorney is not bound by the bill rendered, but may recover what the evidence shows the ser-
vices to be reasonably worth. Romeyn v. Campau, 19 Mich.
Physicians also in the United States may recover upon an implied promise to pay reasonable
fees. See Ordrouaux Juris. of Med. 40.
(10) [The circumstances which led to this decree, as recorded by Tacitus, deserve to be men-
tioned. Samius, a Roman knight of distinction, having given Suilius a fee of three thousand
guineas to undertake his defence, and finding that he was betrayed by his advocate, ferio in
domo ejus incubuit; in consequence of this the senate insisted upon enforcing the Cincian
law, qua eavetur antiquitus, nequis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve accipiat.]
(11) [See the important case establishing the correctness of this position, Holt, C. N. P.
621; 1 B. and A. 232; 1 Saund. Rep. 130.]
See also McMillin v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178; Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 194; Ring v. Wheeler,
7 Cow. 725; Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v. Paine,
4 Wis. 358; Cooley Const. Lim. 443.
ORIGIN OF COURTS.
CHAPTER IV.
OF THE PUBLIC COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY.
WE are next to consider the several species and distinctions of courts of jus-
tice, which are acknowledged and used in this kingdom. And these are,'either
such as are of public and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm;
or such as as are only of a private and special jurisdiction in some particular
parts of it. Of the former there are four sorts; the universally established
courts of common law .and equity; the ecclesiastical courts; the courts mili-
tary; and courts maritime. And, first, of such public courts as are courts of
common law and equity.
The policy of our ancient constitution, as regulated and established by the
great Alfred, was to bring justice home to every man's door, by constituting as
many courts of judicature as there are manors and townships in the kingdom;
wherein injuries were redressed in an easy and expeditious manner, by the
suffrage of neighbours and friends. These little courts, however, communi-
cated with others of a larger jurisdiction, and those with others of a still
greater power; ascending gradually from the lowest to the supreme courts,
which were respectively constituted to correct the errors of the inferior ones,
and to determine such causes as, by reason of their weight and difficulty,
[,31] demanded a more solemn discussion. *The course of justice flowing in
*311large streams from the king' as the fountain, to his superior courts of
record; and being then subdivided into smaller channels, till the whole and
every part of the kingdom were plentifully watered and refreshed. An insti-
tution that seems highly agreeable to the dictates of natural reason, as well as
of more enlightened policy; being equally similar to that which prevailed in
Mexico and Peru before they were discovered by the Spaniards, and to that
which was established in the Jewish republic by Moses. In Mexico each town
and province had its proper judges, who heard and decided causes, except when
the point in litigation was too intricate for their determination; and then it was
remitted to the supreme court of the empire, established in the capital, and con-
sisting of twelve judges.(a) Peru, according to Garcilasso de Vega (an histor-
ian descended from the ancient Incas of that country), was divided into small
districts containing ten families each, all registered and under one magistrate;
who had authority to decide little differences and punish petty crimes. Five of
these composed a higher class of fifty families; and twvo of these last com-
posed another, called a hundred. Ten hundreds constituted the largest divi-
sion, consisting of a thousand families; and each division had its separate
judge or magistrate, with a proper degree of subordination.(b) In like
manner we read of Moses, that, finding the sole administration of justice
too heavy for him, he "chose able men out of all Israel, such as feared
God, men of truth, hating covetousness; and made them heads over the
people, rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers
of tens ; and they judged the people at all seasons; the hard causes they
brought unto Moses; but every small matter they judged themselves."(c)
These inferior courts, at least the name and form of them, still continue in our
legal constitution: but as the superior courts of record have in practice
obtained a concurrent original jurisdiction with these; and as there is, besides, a
power of removing plaints or actions thither from all the inferior jurisdictions;
[*32] upon these accounts (amongst others) it has happened that *these petty
tribunals have fallen into decay, and almost into oblivion; whether for
the better or the worse, may be matter of some speculation, when we consider
on the one hand the increase of expense and delay, and on the other the more
able and impartial decision, that follow from this change of jurisdiction.
(a) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxviii, 469. (b) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxix, 14. (c) Exod. c. 18.
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The order I shall observe in discoursing on these several courts, constituted
for the redress of civil injuries (for with those of a jurisdiction merely criminal
I shall not at present concern myself), will be by beginning with the lowest,
and those whose jurisdiction, though public and generally dispersed throughout
the kingdom, is yet, (with regard to each particular court) confined to very
narrow limits; and so ascending gradually to those of the most extensive ana
transcendent power.
I. The lowest, and at the same time the most expeditious, court of justice known
to the law of England, is the court of piepoudre, curia pedis pulverizati; so
called from the dusty feet of the suitors; or, according to Sir Edward Coke,(d)
because justice is there done as speedily as dust can fall from the foot ;-upon
the same principle that justice among the Jews was administered in the gate of
the city,(e) that the proceedings might be the more speedy, as well as public.
But the etymology given us by a learned modern ,writer(f) is much more
ingenious and satisfactory; it being derived, according to him, from pied
puldreaux, (a pedlar, in old French), and therefore signifying the court of such
petty chapmen as resort to fairs or markets. It is a court of record, incident
to every fair and market; of which the steward of him who owns or has the
toll of the market, is the judge; and its jurisdiction extends to administer jus-
tice for all commercial injuries done in that very fair or market, and not in any
preceding one. So that the injury must be done, complained of, heard, and
determined, within the compass of one and the same day, unless the fair con-
tinues longer. The court hath cognizance of *all matters of contract [*33]
that can possibly arise within the precinct of that fair or market; and
the plaintiff must make oath that the cause of action arose there.(g) From
this court a writ of error lies, in the nature of an appeal, to the courts at West-
minster ;(h) which are now also bound by the statute 19 Geo. III, c. 70, to issue
writs of execution, in aid of its process, after judgment, where the person or
effects of the defendant are not within the limits of this inferior jurisdiction;
which may possibly occasion the revival of thepractice and proceedings in these
courts, which are now in a manner forgotten. The reason of their original
institution seems to have been, to do justice expeditiously among the variety of
persons that resort from distant places to a fair or market; since it is
probable that no other inferior court might be able to serve its process, or exe-
cute its judgments, on both or perhaps either of the parties; and therefore
unless this court had been erected, the complainant must necessarily have
resorted, even in the first instance, to some superior judicature.
II. The court-baron is a court incident to every manor in the kingdom, to be
holden by the steward within the said manor. This court-baron is of two
natures: (i) the one is a customary court, of which we formerly spoke, (k) apper-
taining entirely to the copyholders, in which their estates are transferred by
surrender and admittance, and other matters transacted relative to their ten-
ures only. The other, of which we now speak, is a court of common law, and
it is the court of the barons, by which name the freeholders were sometimes
anciently called: for that it is held before the freeholders who owe suit and
service to the manor, the steward being rather the registrar than the judge.
These courts, though in their nature distinct, are frequently confounded together.
The court we are now considering, viz. : the freeholders' court, was composed
of the lord's tenants, who were the pares of each other, and were bound by their
feudal tenure to assist their lord in the dispensation of domestic justice. This
was formerly held every three weeks; and its most important business is to
determine, by writ of right, all controversies relating to the right of lands within
the manor. It may also hold plea of any personal actions, of debt, trespass on
the case, or the like, where the debt or damages do not *amount to forty [*34]
shillings : (1) which is the same sum, or three marks, that bounded the
jurisdiction of the ancient Gothic courts in their lowest instance, orfierding-
(a) 4 Inst. 272. (e) Ruth, c. 4. (f) Barrington's observat. on the stat. 837.
(q) Stat. 17 Edw. TV, c. 2. (A) Cro. Eliz. 773. (i) Co. Litt. 58.
&t) Book 2, ch. 4, ch. 6 and ch. 22. (1) Finch, 248.
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courts, so called, because four were instituted within every superior district or
hundred.(m) But the proceedings o'1 a writ of right may be removed into
the county court by a precept from the sheriff called a tolt, (n) "quia tollit atque
eximit causam e curia baronum."(o) (1) And the proceedings in all other actions
may be removed into the superior courts by the king's writs of pone, (p) or
accedas ad curian, according to the nature of the suit.(q) After judgment
given, a writ also of false judqment (r) lies to the courts at Westminster to
rehear and review the cause, and not a writ of error; for this is not a court of
record: and therefore in some of these writs of removal, the first direction
given is to cause the plaint to be recorded, recordari facias loquelam.III. A hundred-court is only a larger court-baron, being held for all the
inhabitants of a particular hundred instead of a manor.(2) The free suitors
are here also the judges, and the steward the registrar, as in the case of a court-
baron. It is likewise no court of record; resembling the former in all points,
except that in point of territory it is of greater jurisdiction.(s) This is said by
Sir Edward Coke to have been derived out of the county court for the ease of
the people, that they might have justice done to them at their own doors, with-
out any charge or loss of time; (t) but its institution was probably coeval with
that of hundreds themselves, which were formerly observed (u) to have been
introduced, though not invented, by Alfred, being derived from the polity of
the ancient Germans. The centeni, we may remember, were the principal
inhabitants of a district composed of different villages, originally in number a
[*3 5] hundred, but afterwards only *called by that name; (v) and who probably
gave the same denomination to the district out of which they were
chosen. Cosar speaks positively of the judicial power exercised in their
hundred-courts and courts-baron. "Principes regionum atque pagorum"
(which we may fairly construe, the lords of hundreds and manors), "inter suos
.us dicunt, controversiasque minuunt."(w) And Tacitus, who had examined
their constitution still more attentively, informs us not only of the authority
of the lords, but that of the centeni, the hundredors, or jury; who were taken
out of the common freeholders, and had themselves a share in the determina-
tion. "Eliguntur in conciliis et principes, qui jura per pagos vicosque red-
dunt: centeni singulis, ex plebe comites, consilium simul et auctoritas, adsunt."(x)
This hundred-court was denominated hcereda in the Gothic constitution.(y)
But this court, as causes are equally liable to removal from hence as from the
common court-baron, and by the same writs, and may also be reviewed by writ
of false judgment, is therefore fallen into equal disuse with regard to the trial
of actions.
IV. The county court(3) is a court incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff.
It is not a court of record, but may hold pleas of debt or damages under
(m) Stiernhook, de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 2. (n) F. N. B. 3, 4. See Appen. No. 1, 2. (o) 3 Rep. pref.
(p) See Append. No. I, § 3. (q) F. N. B. 4, 70. Finch, L. 444, 445. (r) F. N. B. 18.
(e) Finch, L. 243. 4 Inst. 267. (t) 2 Inst. 71. (u) Book I, p. 116.
(v) Genteni ex singulis pagis sunt, id que ipsum inter suos vocantur; el, quodprimo numerusfuit,jam nomn 6
honor est. Tac. de ncr. Germ. c. 6.
(w) De Bell. Gall. 1. 6, c. 22. (x) De Morih. German. c. 13. (y) Stiernhook, 1. 1, c. 2.
(1) Writs of right are now abolished. Statute 8 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.
(2) The courts-baron and hundred-court have long been obsolete as courts of civil jurisdiction.
(3) [The new county courts, so called in contradistinction to the county courts before men-
tioned, were established by the statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 95. They at first possessed jurisdiction
only for the recovery of debts, damages and demands, legacies and balances of partnership
accounts, where the sum sued for did not exceed 201. They were also charged with the power
of giving a landlord possession of premises where the tenant's term had determined, or he
had received proper notice to quit, in cases in which the rent did not exceed 501. annually, and
no fine had to be paid. By the statute 13 and 14 Vic. c. 61, their jurisdiction was extended to
actions where the amount did not exceed 501., and, if the litigants consented in writing, to
actions for any amount whatever. By this statute an appeal was also given against the decis-
ion of the judge on matter of law, but only in actions for sums above 201. No appeal lies
from his decision in matters of fact. The other statutes relating to this branch of the juris-
diction of these courts are the 12 and 13 Vic. c. 101, and 15 and 16 Vic. c. 54. They have no
COUNTY COURT.
the value of forty shillings.(z) Over some of which causes these inferior courts
have, by the express words of the statute of Gloucester, (a) a jurisdiction
totally exclusive of the king's superior courts. For in order to be entitled to
sue an action of trespass for goods before the king's justiciars, the plaintiff is
directed to make affidavit that the cause of action does really and bonafide
amount to 40s.; which affidavit is now unaccountably disused, (b) except in the
court of exchequer. The statute, also, 43 Eliz. c. 6, which gives the judges in
many personal actions, where the jury assess less damages than 40s., a power to
certify the same and *abridge the plaintiff of his full costs, was also meant [*36]
to prevent vexation by litigious plaintiffs; who, for purposes of mere
oppression, might be inclinable to institute suits in the superior courts for
injuries of a trifling value. The county court may also hold plea of many real
actions, and of all personal actions to any amount, by virtue of a special writ
called ajusticies; which is a writ empowering the sheriff for the sake of dis-
patch to do the same justice in his county court, as might otherwise be had at
Westminster;(c) The freeholders of the county are the real judges in this
court, and the sheriff is the ministerial officer. The great conflux of freeholders,
which are supposed always to attend at the county court (which Spelman calls
forum plebeitv justicite et tkeatrum comitive potestatis), (d) is the reason why
all acts of parliament at the end of every session were wont to be there pub-
lished by the sheriff; why all outlawries of absconding offenders are there pro-
claimed; and why all popular elections which the freeholders are to make, as
formerly of sheriffs and conservators of the peace, and still of coroners, verde-
rors, and knights of the shire, must ever be made in pleno comitatu, or in full
county court. By the statute 2 Edw. VI, c. 25, no county court shall be ad-
journed longer than for one month, consisting of twenty-eight days. And this
was also the ancient usage, as appears'from the laws of King lEdward the
elder; (e) "prwepositus (that is, the sheriff) ad quartam circiter septignanam
frequentem populi concionem celebrato :cuique jus dicito; litesque singulas
dirimito." In those times the county court was a court of great dignity and
splendour, the bishop and the earldorman (or earl), with the principal men of
the shire sitting therein to administer justice both in lay and ecclesiastical
causes.(f) But its dignity was much impaired, when the bishop was prohibited
and the earl neglected to attend it. And, in modern times, as proceedings are
removable from hence into the king's superior courts, by writ of pone or recor-
dari, (g) in the same manner as from *hundred-courts, and courts-baron ; [*37]
and as the same writ of false judgment may be had, in nature of a writ
of error; this has occasioned the same disuse of bringing actions therein.
(z) 4 Inst. 266. (a) 6 Edw. I, c. 8. (b) 2 Inst. 311.
(c) Finch, 318. F. N. B. 152. (d) Gloss. v. ceomitatus. (e) C. 11.
(f) LL. Eadgari. c. 5. (q) F. N. B. 70. Finch, 445.
jurisdiction, it may lie observed, unless the parties expressly consent in writing to that effect,
in actions in which the title to corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, or to any toll or fran-
chise, or in whichs the validity of any devise or bequest under a will or settlement, may come
in question. Actions brought for a malicious prosecution, for libel or slander, criminal con-
versation or seduction, or breach of promise of marriage, are expressly excluded.
The judges must be barristers of seven years standing. The judge decides all questions as
well of fact as of law, unless one or other of the parties to the action has demanded a jury, for
the trial of matters of fact, which in actions for sums above 51. may be obtained as of right,
and consists of five jurors summoned from the district where the court is holden. The court
is a court of record. It is held once a month. And to encourage parties to resort to this tri-
bunal, the plaintiff in the superior courts (in suits in which they have concurrent jurisdiction)
does not recover his costs in actions of contract where he recovers no more than 201., and in
actions of tort where lie recovers no more than 51., unless the judge of the superior court who
tries the cause certifies for costs, or it appears to the court that there was sufficient reason for
bringing the action in the superior court.]
Subsequent statutes, (19 and 20 Vic. c. 108; 28 and 29 Vic. c. 99 ; and 31 and 32 Vic. c. 71),
have still further enlarged the jurisdiction of these courts, and they now have equitable and
maritime jurisdiction, and also probate jurisdiction in certain cases.
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These are the several species of common law courts, which, though dispersed
universally throughout the realm, are nevertheless of a partial jurisdiction, and
confined to particular districts : yet communicating with, and as it were mem-
bers of, the superior courts of a more extended and general nature ; which are
calculated for the administration of redress, not in any one lordship, hundred,
or county only, but throughout the whole kingdom at large. Of which sort is,
V. The court of common pleas, or, as it is frequently termed in law, the court
of common bench.
By the ancient Saxon constitution, there was only one superior court of
justice in the kingdom; and that court had cognizance both of civil and spirit-
ual causes, viz.: the wittena-gemote, or general council, which assembled annu-
ally or oftener, wherever the king kept his Christmas, Easter, or Whitsuntide,
as well to do private justice as to consult upon public business. At the conquest
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was diverted into another channel; and the con-
queror, fearing danger front these annual parliaments, contrived also to separate
their ministerial power, as judges, from their deliberative, as counsellors to the
crown. He therefore established a constant court in his own hall, thence called
by Bracton,(h) and other ancient authors, aula regia, or aula regis. This court
was composed of the king's great officers of state resident in his palace, and usu-
ally attendant on his person: such as the lord high constable and lord mares-
chal, who chiefly presided in matters of honour and of arms; determining
according to the law military and the law of nations. Besides these, there were
the lord high steward, and lord great chamberlain; the steward of the house-
[ bold; the lord chancellor, whose peculiar *business it was to keep the
L31king's seal, and examine all such writs, grants, and letters, as were to pass
under that authority; and the lord high treasurer, who was the principal
adviser in all matters relating to the revenue. These high officers were assisted
by certain persons learned in the laws, who were called the king's justiciars or
justices; and by the greater barons of parliament, all of whom had a seat in the
aula regia, and formed a kind of court of appeal, or rather of advice, in matters
of great moment and difficulty. All these in their several departments trans-
acted all secular business both criminal and civil, and likewise the matters of
the revenue: and over all presided one special magistrate, called the chief jus-
ticiar, or cap italis justiciarius totius Anglie; who was also the principal minis-
ter of state, the second man in the kingdom, and by virtue of his office guardian
of the realm in the king's absence. And this officer it was, who principally
determined all the vast variety of causes that arose in this extensive jurisdic-
tion; and from the plenitude of his power grew at length both obnoxious to the
people, and dangerous to the government which employed him.(i)
This great universal court being bound to follow the king's household in all
his progresses and expeditions, the trial of common causes therein was found
very burthensome to the subject. Wherefore King John, who dreaded also the
power of the justiciar, very readily consented to that article which now forms
the eleventh chapter of magna carta, and enacts, "that cominunia placita
non sequantur curiam regis, sed teneantur in aliquo loco cero." This certain
place was established in Westminster-hall, the place where the aula regis origin-
ally sat, when the king resided in that city; and there it bath ever since con-
tinned. And the court being thus rendered fixed and stationary, the judges
became so too, and a chief with other justices of the common pleas was there-
upon appointed; with jurisdiction to hear and determine all pleas of land, and
injuries merely civil, between subject and subject. Which critical establishment
[*39] of this principal court of *common law, at that particular juncture
and that particular place. gave rise to the inns of court in its neigh-
bourhood; and thereby collecting together the whole body of the common law-
yers, enabled the law itself to withstand the attacks of the canonists and
civilians, who laboured to extirpate and destroy it.(j) This precedent was soon
after copied by King Philip the Fair in France, who about the year 1302 fixed
(A) 1. 3, fr. 1, c. 7. (i) Spelm. Gl. 331, 2, 3. Glib. Hist. C. P. Introdue. 17. (j) See book I, introduc. § 1.
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the parliament of Paris to abide constantly in that metropolis; which before
used to follow the person of the king wherever he went, and in which he
himself used frequently to decide the causes that were there depending; but all
were then referred to the sole cognizance of the parliament and its learned
judges.(k) And thus, also, in 1495 the emperor Maximilian I. fixed the imperial
chamber (which before always travelled with the court and household) to be
constantly held at Worms. from whence it was afterwards translated to Spire.(l)
The aula regia being thus stripped of so considerable a branch of its jurisdic-
tion, and the power of the chief justiciar being also considerably curbed by
many articles in the great charter, the authority of both began to decline apace
under the long and troublesome reign of King Henry III. And, in further pur-
suance of this example, the other several officers of the chief justiciar were
under Edward the First (who new-modelled the whole frame of our judicial
polity) subdivided and broken into distinct courts of judicature. A court of
chivalry was erected, over which the constable and mareschal presided; as did
the steward of the household over another, constituted to regulate the king's
domestic servants. The high steward, with the barons of parliament, formed
an august tribunal for the trial of delinquent peers; and the barons reserved to
themselves in parliament the right of reviewing the sentences of other courts in
the last resort. The distribution of common justice between man and man
was thrown into so provident an order, that the great judicial officers were
*made to form a check upon each other: the cburt of chancery issuing all *40
original writs under the great seal to the other courts; the common pleas I
being allowed to determine all causes between private subjects; the exchequer
managing the king's revenue; and the court of king's bench retaining all the
jurisdiction which was not cantoned out to other courts, and particularly the
superintendence of all the rest by way of appeal; and the sole cognizance of
pleas of the crown or criminal causes. For pleas or suits are regularly divided
into two sorts: pleas of the crown, which comprehend all crimes and misde-
meanors, wherein the king (on behalf of the public) is the plaintiff; and common
pleas, which include all civil actions, depending between subject and subject.
The former of these were the proper object of the jurisdiction of the court of
king's bench; the latter of the court of common pleas: which is a court of
record, and is styled by Sir Edward Coke(m) the lock and key of the common
law; for herein only can real actions, that is, actions which concern the right
of freehold or the realty, be originally brought: and all other, or personal pleas
between man and man, are likewise here determined; though in most of them
the king's bench has also a concurrent authority.(4)
The judges of this court are at present (n) four in number, (5) one chief and
three _puisn justices, created by the king's letters patent, who sit every day in
the four terms to hear and determine all matters of law arising in civil causes,
whether real, personal, or mixed and compounded of both. These it takes
cognizance of, as well originally, as upon removal from the inferior courts
before-mentioned. But a writ of error, in the nature of an appeal, lies from
this court into the court of king's bench.(6)
(k) Mod. Un. Hist. xxiii, 396. (1) Ibid. xxix, 467. (m) 4 Inst. 99.
(n) King James I, during the greater part of his reign, appointed five judges in the courts of king's bench
and common pleas, for the benefit of a casting voice in case of a difference in opinion, and that the circuits
might at all times be fully supplied with judges of the superior courts. And, in subsequent reigns, upon the
permanent indisposition of a judge, a fifth hath been sometimes appointed. Sir T. Raym. 475.
(4) [The jurisdiction of each court is so well established, that at this day the court of king's
bench cannot be authorized to determine a mere real action; so neither can the court of com-
mon pleas, to inquire of felony or treason. Hawk. b. 2. ch. 1. s. 4; Bac. Ab. Courts, A. The
king's bench, however, tries titles to land by the action of ejectment.]
(5) The number of the judges was afterwards changed to five, and by statute 31 and 32
Vic. c. 125, it is increased to six. And the writ of error, instead of being to the king's bench,
is to the judges of that court and the barons of the exchequer in the exchequer chamber, and
from their judgment to the house of lords.
(6) [This court is called the queen's bench in the reign of a queen, and during the protecto-
iate of Cromwell it was styled the upper bench.]
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[*411 *VI The court of king's bench (so called because the king used for-
merly to sit there in person,(o) the style of the court still being coram ipso
rege) is the supreme court of common law in the kingdom; consisting of a chief
justice and three puisnd justices, who are by their office the sovereign conserva-
tors of the peace, and supreme coroners of the land. Yet, though the king
himself used to sit in this court, and still is supposed so to do; he did not,
neither by law is he empowered (p) to, determine any cause or motion, but by
the mouth of his judges, to whom he hath committed his whole judicial
authority.(q) (7)
This court, which (as we have said) is the remnant of the aula regia, is not,
nor can be, from the very nature and constitution of it, fixed to any certain
place, but may follow the king's person wherever he goes: for which reason all
process issuing out of this court in the king's name is returnable "ubicunque
fuerimus in Anglia." It bath indeed, for some centuries past, usually sat at
Westminster, being an ancient palace of the crown ; but might remove with the
king to York or Exeter, if he thought proper to command it. And we find that,
after Edward I had conquered Scotland, it actually sat at Roxburgh. (r) And
this movable quality, as well as its dignity and power, are fully expressed by
Bracton, when he says that the justices of this court are "cap i t ales, generales,
perpetui, et ma/ores ; a latere regis residentes, qui omnium aliorum corrigere
tenentur inurias et errores." (s) And it is moreover especially provided in the
articuli super cartas,(t) that the king's chancellor, and the justices of his bench,
shall follow him, so that he may have at all times near unto him some that be
learned in the laws.
[*42] a, *The jurisdiction of this court is very high and transcendent. It keeps
all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may
either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit their progress
below. It superintends all civil corporations in the kingdom. It commands
magistrates and others to do what their duty requires, in every case where there
is no other specific remedy. It protects the liberty of the subject, by speedy
and summary interposition. It takes cognizance both of criminal and civil
causes; the former in what is called the crown-side or crown-office; the latter
in the plea-side of the court. The jurisdiction of the crown-side it is not our
present business to consider; that will be more properly discussed in the ensuing
book. But on the plea-side, or civil branch, it bath an original jurisdiction
and cognizance of all actions of trespass, or other injury alleged to be commit-
ted vi et armis; of actions of forgery of deeds, maintenance, conspiracy, deceit,
and actions on the case which allege any falsity or fraud: all of which savour
(o) 4 Inst. 73.
(p) See book I, ch. 7. The king used to decide causes in person in the aula regla. "In curia domini regis
ipse in propria ersona jura decernit." (Dial. de Seacch. 1. 1, t 4.) After its dissolution King Edward I fre-
quently sat in tte court of king's bench. (See the records cited, 2 Burr. 851.) And, in later times, James I
is said to have sat there in person, but was informed by his judges that he could not deliver an opinion.
(q) 4 Inst. 71. (r) M. 20. 21 Edw. I. Hale Hist. C. L. 200. (a) /. 3, V. 10. () 28 Edw. I, c. 5.
(7) [Lord Mansfield, in 2 Burr. 851, does not mean to say, nor do the records there cited
warrant the conclusion, that Edw. I actually sat in the king's bench. Dr. Henry, in his very
accurate history of Great Britain, informs us, that he has found no instance of any of our
kings sitting in a court of justice before Edw. IV. " And Edw. IV (he says), in the second
year of his reign, sat three days together, during Michaelmas term, in the court of king's
bench; but it is not said that he interfered in the business of the court; and as he was then a
very young man, it is probable that it was his intention to learn in what manner justice was
administered, rather than to act the part of a judge." 5 vol. 382. 4to. edit. Lord Coke says,
that the words in magna carta, c. 29, nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus nisi, &C.,
signify that we shall not sit in judgment ourselves, nor send our commissioners or judges to
try him. 2 Inst. 46. But that this is an erroneous construction of these words, appears from
a charter granted by King John in the 16th year of his reign, which is thus expressed: nec
super cos per vim vel per arma ibimus nisi per legem regni nostri vel per judicium parium suorum.
See Int. to BL. Mag. Ch. p. xiii. Statutes and charters in pari materia must be construed by
a reference to each other, and in the more ancient charter the meaning is clear, that the king
will not proceed with violence against his subjects, unless justified by the law of his kingdom,
or by a judgment of their peers.]
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of a criminal nature, although the action is brought for a civil remedy; and
make the defendant liable in strictness to pay a fine to the king, as well as
damages to the injured party.(u) The same doctrine is also now extended to all
actions on the case whatsoever: (w) but no action of debt or detinue, or other
mere civil action, can by the common law be prosecuted by any subject in this
court, by original writ out of chancery ;(x) (8) though an action of debt, given by
statute, may be brought in the king's bench as well as in the common pleas.(y)
And yet this court might always have held plea of any civil action (other than
actions real) provided the defendant was an officer of the court; or in the
custody of the marshal, or prison-keeper, of this court; for a breach of the
peace or any other offence.(z) And, in process of time, it began by a fiction to
hold plea of all personal actions whatsoever, and has continued to do so for
ages :(a) it being surmised that the defendant is arrested for *a supposed [*43]
trespass, which he never has in reality committed; and, being thus in the
custody of the marshal of this court, the plaintiff is at liberty to proceed against
him for any other personal injury: which surmise, of being in the marshal's
custody, the defendant is not at liberty to dispute.(b) And these fictions of
law, though at first they may startle the student, he will find upon further con-
sideration to be highly beneficial and useful; especially as this maxim is ever
invariably observed, that no fiction shall extend to work an injury ; its proper
operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might
result from the general rule of law.(e) So true it is, that in fictions /uris semper
subsistit cequitas.(d) In the present case, it gives the suitor his choice of more
than one tribunal, before which he may institute his action; and prevents the
circuity and delay of justice, by allowing that suit to be originally, and in the
first instance, commenced in this court, which, after a determination in another,
might ultimately be brought before it on a writ of error. (9)
For this court is likewise a court of appeal, into which may be removed by a
writ of error all determinations of the court of common pleas, and of all inferior
courts of record in England; and to which a writ of error lies also from the
court of king's bench in Ireland. (10) Yet even this so high and honourable
court is not the dernier resort of the subject; for, if he be not satisfied with any
determination here, he may remove it by writ of error into the house of lords, or
the court of exchequer chamber, as the case may happen, according to the nature
of the suit, and the manner in which it has been prosecuted. (11)
VII. The court of exchequer is inferior in rank not only to the court of king's
bench, but to the common pleas also: but I have chosen to consider it in this
order, on account of its double capacity, as a court of law and a court of equity
*also. It is a very ancient court of record, set up by William the Con- *44
queror, (e) as A part of the aula regia, (f) though regulated and reduced E* I
to its present order by King Edward I; (g) and intended principally to order
the revenues of the crown, and to recover the king's debts and duties. (k) It is
called the exchequer, scaccharium, from the checked cloth, resembling a chess-
(u) Finch, L. 198. 2 Inst. 23. Dyversitg de coartes c. bank le roy.
(w) F. N. B. 86, 92. 1 Lilly Pract. Reg. 503. (x) 4 Inst. 76. Trye's Jus Filizar. 101.
(y) Carth. 234. (z) 4 Inst. 71. (a) Ibid. 72.
(b) Thus, too, in the civil law; contra fictionem non admittiturprobatio: quid enim efliceret probatio veritatis,
ubi flctio adversus veritatem fingit. NYam fictio nihil aliud eat, quam legis adversus veritatem in re possibili ex
justa causa dispositio. (Gothofred. in 1f . 22, t. 3.)
(e) 3 Rep. 30. 2 Roll. Rep. 502. (d) 11 Rep. 51. Co. Litt. 150. (e) Lamb. Archeion. 24.
(f) Madox, hist. exch. 109. (g) Spelm. Gull. I, in cod. leg. vet. apud Wilkins. (h) 4 Inst. 103-116.
(8) This is not the present practice. See Tidd's Prac. 8th ed. 97.
(9) [But as there is no reason for doing that indirectly which may be done directly, it was
considered expedient to abolish this among other legal fictions (2 Win. IV, c. 39), and the mode
of commencing an action has for some time been, and is now, uniform in all the superior
courts.]
(10) This is now otherwise. Writs of error and appeals from this court are to the house of
lords of the United Kingdom.
(11) But now the appeal in all cases is to the judges of the common pleas and barons of the
exchequer in the exchequer chamber, and from their judgment to the house of lords.
Chap. 4]
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board, which covers the table there: and on which, when certain of the king's
accounts are made up, the sums are marked and scored with counters. It con-
sists of two divisions: the receipt of the exchequer, which manages the royal
revenue, and with which these Commentaries have no concern: and the court
or judicial part of it, which is again subdivided into a court of equity, and a
court of common law. (12)
The court of equity is held in the exchequer chamber before the lord treasurer,
the chancellor of the exchequer, the chief baron, and three puisni ones. (13)
These Mr. Selden conjectures (i) to have been anciently made out of such as
were barons of the kingdom, or parliamentary barons; and thence to have
derived their name; which conjecture receives great strength from Bracton's
explanation of magna carta, c. 14, which directs that the earls and barons be
amerced by their peers; that is, says he, by the barons of the exchequer.(k) The
primary and original business of this court is to call the king's debtors to account,
by bill filed by the attorney-general; and to recover any lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, any goods, chattels, or other profits or benefits, belonging to the
crown. So that by their original constitution the jurisdiction of the court of
common pleas, king's bench, and exchequer, was entirely separate and distinct:
the common pleas being intended to decide all controversies between subject
and subject; the king's bench to correct all crimes and misdemeanors that
amount to a breach of the peace, the king being then plaintiff, as such offences
are in open derogation of the jura regalia of his crown; and the exchequer to[*45] adjust *and recover his revenue, wherein the king also is plaintiff, as the
withholding and non-payment thereof is an injury to his jurafiscalia.
But, as by a fiction almost all sorts of civil actions are now allowed to be brought
in the king's bench, in like manner by another fiction all kinds of personal suits
may be prosecuted in the court of exchequer. For as all the officers and min-
isters of this court have, like those of other superior courts, the privilege of suing
and being sued only in their own court; so also the king's debtors and farmers,
and all accomptants of the exchequer, are privileged to sue and implead all
manner of persons in the same court of equity that they themselves are called
into. They have likewise privilege to sue and implead one another, or any
stranger, in the same kind of common law actions (where the personalty only
is concerned) as are prosecuted in the court of common pleas.
This gives original to the common law part of their jurisdiction, which was
established merely for the benefit of the king's accomptants, and is exercised by
the barons only of the exchequer, and not the treasurer or chancellor. The
writ upon which all proceedings here are grounded is called a quo minus: in
which the plaintiff suggests that he is the king's farmer or debtor, and that the
defendant hath done him the injury or damage complained of; quo minus suffi-
ciens existit, by which he is less able to pay the king his debt or rent. And
these suits are expressly directed, by what is called the statute of Rutland, (1)
(1) Tit. hon. 2, 5, 16. (k) . 3, tr. 2, c. 1, § 3. (1) 10 Edw. I, c. 11.
(12) [Though this court is inferior in rank as well to the court of common pleas as the king's
bench, and though in general a subject has a right to resort to either of the superior courts for
the redress of a civil injury, yet this court, having an original, and in many cases an exclusive
jurisdiction in fiscal matters, will not permit questions, in the decision of which the king's
revenue or his officers are interested, to be discussed before any other tribunal; and therefore,
if an action of trespass against a revenue officer, for his conduct in the execution of his office,
be brought in the court of C. P. or K. B., it may be removed into the office of pleas of this
court of exchequer. 1 Anstr. 205; Hardr. 176; Parker, 143; 1 Price, 206; 8 id. 584;
Manning's Exchequer Prac. 161, 164, n. On such occasions the court interposes on motion,
by ordering the proceeding to be removed into the office of pleas, which order operates by
way of injunction.]
(13) The equity jurisdiction of the exchequer, by statute 5 Vice. c. 5, was transferred to the
court of chancery, and it is now only a court of law and revenue. The fiction mentioned in
the text a few lines further on, by which it obtained jurisdiction, is now abolished, and nearly
every civil case may be brought in this court without resort to any such suggestion. The
number of the judges was increased to six by statute 31 and 32 Vie. c. 125.
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to be confined to such matters only as specially concern the king or his min-
isters of the exchequer. And by the articuli super cartas, (m) it is enacted,
that no common pleas be thenceforth holden in the exchequer contrary to the
form of the great charter. But now, by the suggestion of privilege, any person
may be admitted to sue in the exchequer as well as the king's accomptant. The
surmise of being debtor to the king, is therefore become matter of form and
mere words of course, and the court is open to all the nation equally. The same
holds with regard to the equity side of the court: for there auy person may file
*a bill against another upon a bare suggestion that he is the king's accomp- [*46]
tant; but whether he is so or not is never controverted. In this court
on the equity side, the clergy have long used to exhibit their bills for the non-
payment of tithes; in which case the surmise of being the king's debtor is no
fiction, they being bound to pay him their first fruits, and annual tenths. But
the chancery has of late years obtained a large share in this business.
An appeal from the equity side of this court lies immediately to the house of
peers; but from the common law side, in pursuance of the statute 31 Edw. III,
c. 12, a writ of error must be first brought into the court of exchequer chamber.
And from the determination there had, there lies, in the dernier resort, a writ of
error to the house of lords.(14)
VIII. The high court of chancery is the only remaining, and in matters of
civil property by much the most important of any, of the king's superior and
original courts of justice. It has its name of chancery, cancellaria, from the
judge who presides here, the lord chancellor or cancellarius; who, Sir Edward
Coke tells us, is so termed a cancellando, from cancelling the king's letters patent
when granted contrary to law, which is the highest point of his jurisdiction.(n) (15)
But the office and name of chancellor (however derived) was certainly known
to the courts of the Roman emperors: where it originally seems to have sig-
nified a chief scribe or secretary, who was afterwards invested with several
judicial powers, and a general superintendency over the rest of the officers of
the prince. From the Roman empire it passed to the Roman church, ever emu-
lous of imperial state; and hence every bishop has to this day his chancellor,
the principal judge of his consistory. And when the modern kingdoms of
Europe were established upon the ruins of the empire, almost every state pre-
served its chancellor, with different jurisdictions and dignities, according to their
different constitutions. But in all of them he seems to have had the supervi-
sion of all charters, letters, and such other public instruments of the crown, as
were authenticated in the most solemn manner: and, therefore, *when [*473
seals came in use, he had always the custody of the king's great seal. So L "7
that the office of chancellor, or lord keeper, (16) (whose authority by statute
5 Eliz. c. 18, is declared to be exactly the same), is with us at this day created
by the mere delivery of the king's great seal into his custody: (o) whereby he
becomes, without writ or patent, an officer of the greatest weigkt and power of
any now subsisting in the kingdom; and superior in point of precedency to
every temporal lord.(p) He is a privy counsellor by his office, (q) and, accord-
ing to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, (r) prolocutor of the house of lords by pre-
(m) 28 Edw. I, c. 4. (n) 4 Inst. 88. (o) Lamb. Archeon. 56. 1 Roll. Abr. 385.
(p) Stat. 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10.
(q) Selden, office of lord. chanc. § 8. (r) Of the office of lord chancellor, edit. 1651.
(14) The appeal is now to the judges of the king's bench and common pleas in the exche-
quer chamber, and from their judgment to the house of lords.
(15) [See also Gibb. Decl. and Fall, 2, 99, and 1 Camp. Lives of the Chancellors, 2, as to the
various derivations ascribed to the name.]
(16) [King Henry V had two great seals, one of gold, which he delivered to the bishop of
Durham, and made him lord chancellor; another of silver, which he delivered to the bishop.
of London to keep; and historians often confound chancellors and keepers: 1 Harr. Ch 68,
note; 4 Inst. 88; but, at this day there being but one great seal, there cannot be both a chan-
cellor and a lord'keeper of the great seal at one time, because both are but one office, as is
declared by the statute 5 Eliz. (4 Inst. 88), and the taking away the seal determines the oftlcc.
1 Sid. 338.]
Chap. 4.]
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scription. To him belongs the appointment of all justices of the peace through-
out the kingdom. Being formerly usually an ecclesiastic (for none else were
then capable of an office so conversant in writings), and presiding over the royal
chapel, (s) he became keeper of the king's conscience; visitor, in right of the
king, of all hospitals and colleges of the king's foundation : and patron of all
the king's livings under the value of twenty marks (t) per annum in the king's
books. He is the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics; and has
the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom. And all
this, over and above the vast and extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in
his judicial capacity in the court of chancery; wherein, as in the exchequer,
there are two distinct tribunals: the one ordinary, being a court of common
law; the other extraordinary, being a court of equity.
The ordinary legal court is much more ancient than the court of equity. Its
jurisdiction is to hold plea upon a scire facias to repeal and cancel the king's
letters patent, when made against law, or upon untrue suggestions; and to hold
plea of petitions, monstrans de droit, traverses of offices, and the like; when the
king hath been advised to do any act, or is put in possession of any lands or
goods, in prejudice of a subject's right.(u) On proof of which, as the king can
[*48] never *be supposed intentionally to do any wrong, the law questions not,
but he will immediately redress the injury; and refers that conscientious
task to the chancellor, the keeper of his conscience. It also appertains to this
court to hold plea of all personal actions, where any officer or minister of the
court is a party.(v) It might likewise hold plea (by scire facias) of partitions
of land in coparcenery,(w) and of dower,(x) where any ward of the crown was
concerned in interest, so long as the military tenures subsisted: as it now may
also do of the tithes of forest land, where granted by the king, and claimed by a
stranger against the grantee of the crown; (y) and of executions on statutes, or
recognizances in nature thereof, by the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6.(z) But if
any cause comes to issue in this court, that is, if any fact be disputed between
the parties, the chancellor cannot try it, having no power to summon a jury:
but must deliver the xecord propria rnanu into the court of king's bench, where
it shall be tried by the country, and judgment shall be there given thereon.(a) (17)
And when judgment is given in chancery upon demurrer or the like, a writ of
error in nature of an appeal lies out of this ordinary court into the court of
king's bench :(b) though so little is usually done on the common law side of
the court, that I have met with no traces of any writ of error(c) being actually
brought, since the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1572.
In this ordinary, or legal, court is also kept the officina .ustitice: out of which
all original writs that pass under the great seal, all commissions of charitable
(s) Madox. hist. of exch. 42.
(t) 38 Edw. III. 3 F. N. B. 35, though Hobart (214) extends this value to twenty pounds.
(u) 4 Rep. 54. (v) 4 Inst. 80. (w) Co. Litt. 171. F. N. B. 62.
(x) Bro. Abr. tit. dower, 66. Moor. 565. (y) Bro. Abr. tit. dismes. 10. (z) 2 Roll. Abr. 469.
(a) Cro. Jac. 12. Latch. 112.
(b) Year-book, 18 Edward II, 25. 17 Ass. 24. 29 Ass. 47. Dyer, 315. 1 Roll. Rep. 287. 4 Inst. 80.
(c) The opinion of Lord Keeper North, in 1682 (1 Vern. 131 ; 1 Equ. Cas. abr. 129), that no such writ of error
lay, and that an injunction might be issued against it, seems not to have been well considered.
(17) [It is important to confine this observation (which is not always done) to the common
law side of the court of chancery. Sitting as a judge of common law and trying causes
according to the rules of the common law, the lord chancellor cannot decide by himself a dis-
puted fact, and has no power of issuing process to the sheriff or other officer f )r summoning
a jury. But on the equity side of the court, where the jurisdiction of the lord chancellor is
placed entirely on other grounds than those of the common law, he is equally competent to
decide on disputed facts as on disputed law; and it is matter of discretion only when he either
orders or permits the parties to submit the trial of such fact to the cognizance of a jury. For
the manner in which this is done, see post, 452. According to the later precedents, when a
record comes into the king's bench from chancery, the chancellor does not deliver it proprit
9nanu, but sends it by the clerk of the petty bag. 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 128.]
Under the recent statute 25 and 26 Vic. c. 42, courts of equity are required to determine
questions of law in cases where formerly it was the practice to refer them to the courts of
law, and they may now summon juries for the determination of questions of fact in certain
cases. Statute 21 and 27 Vic. c. 27.
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uses, sewers, bankruptcy, idiotcy, lunacy, and the like, do issue; and for which
it is always open to the subject, who may there at any time demand and have,
ex debito justities, any writ that his occasions *may call for. These writs r*49]
(relating to the business of the subject) and the returns to them were,
according to the simplicity of ancient times, originally kept in a hamper in
hanaperio; and the others (relating to such matters wherein the crown is
immediately or mediately concerned) were preserved in a little sack or
bag, in parva baga: and thence hath arisen the distinction of the hanaper
office, and petty bay office, which both belong to the common law court in
chancery.But the extraordinary court, or court of equity, is now become the court of
the greatest judicial consequence. This distinction between law and equity, as
administered in different courts, is not at present known, nor seems to have ever
been known, in any other country at any time: (d) and yet the difference of one
from the other, when administered by the same tribunal, was perfectly familiar
to the Romans; (e) the jus prmtorium, or discretion of the prtetor, being distinct
from the leges, or standing laws,(f) but the power of both centred in one and
the same magistrate, who was equally intrusted to pronounce the rule of law,
and to apply it to particular cases, by the principles of equity. With us, too,
the aula regia, which was the supreme court of judicature, undoubtedly admin-
istered equal justice, according to the rules of both or either, as the case might
chance to require: and, when that was broken to pieces, the idea of a court of
equity, as distinguished from a court of law, did not subsist in the original plan
of partition. For, though equity is mentioned by Bracton(g) as a thing con-
trasted to strict law, yet neither in that writer, nor in Glanvil or Fleta, nor yet
in Britton (composed under the auspices and in the name of Edward I, and
*treating particularly of courts and their several jurisdictions), is there
a syllable to be found relating to the equitable jurisdiction of the court [*50]
of chancery. It seems, therefore, probable that, when the courts of law, pro-
ceeding merely upon the ground of the king's original writs, and confining
themselves strictly to that bottom, gave a harsh or imperfect judgment, the
application for redress used to be to the king in person, assisted by his privy
council (from whence, also, arose the jurisdiction of the court of requests,(h)
which was virtually abolished by the statute 16 Car. I, c. 10); and they were
wont to refer the matter either to the chancellor and a select committee, or by
degrees to the chancellor only, who mitigated the severity or supplied the defects
of the judgnients pronounced in the courts of law, upon weighing the circum-
stances of the case. This was the custom, not only among our Saxon ancestors,
before the institution of the aula regia,(i) but also after its dissolution, in the
reign of King Edward I;(k) and, perhaps, during its continuance, in that of
Henry II.()
In these early times, the chief judicial employment of the chancellor must
have been in devising new writs, directed to the courts of common law, to give
remedy in cases where none was before administered. And to quicken the dili-
gence of the clerks in the chancery, who were too much attached to ancient prece-
(d) The council of conscience, instituted by John III, king of Portugal, to review the sentence of all inferior
courts, and moderate them by equity (Mod. Un. Hist. xxii, 237), seems rather to have been a court of appeal.
(e) Thus, too, the parliament of Paris, the court of session in Scotland, and every other jurisdiction in
Europe, of which we have any tolerable account, found all their decisions as well upon principles of equity as
those of positive law. (Lord Kaims, histor. law tracts, I, 325, 330, princ. of equity, 44.)
(f) Thus Cicero: "Jam illis promisis, non esse standum, qui8 non videt, qucx coactus juis metu quce deceptus
dot promiserit ? quix quidem pleraque jurepretorio liberautur, nonnulla legibus." Offic. . i.
(g) 1. 2, c. 7, fol. 23.
(h) The matters cognizable in this court, immediately before its dissolution, were "almost all suits, that by
colour of equity, or supplication made to the prince, might be brought before him; but originally and properly
all poor men's suits, which were made to his majesty by supplication; and upon which they were entitled to
have right, without payment of any money for the same." (Smith's Commonwealth, b. 3, c.7.)
t(i) emo ad regem appellet pro aliqua lite, nisijue domi consequi non possit. ,ijus nimis severum sit, alleviatio
dsinde quacratur apud regem. LL. Edg. c. 2.
(k) Lambard. Arch ion. 51.
() Joannes Sarisburiensis (who died A. . 1182, 26 Hen. II), speaking of the chancellor's office in the verses
prefixed to his polycraticon, has these lines:
)ic est, qui leges regni eancellat iniquas
Et mandata pii principis xequa facit.
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dents, it is provided by statute, Westn. 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 24, that, "whensoever
from thenceforth in one case a writ shall be found in the chancery, and in a like
,*51] case, falling under the same right and requiring like remedy, *no prece-
*1 dent of a writ can be produced, the clerks in chancery shall agree in
forming a new one; and, if they cannot agree, it shall be adjourned to the next
parliament, where a writ shall be framed by consent of the learned in the law,(rn)
lest it happen for the future that the court of our lord the king be deficient in
doing justice to the suitors." And this accounts for the very great variety of
writs of trespass on the case to be met with in the register; whereby the suitor
had ready relief, according to the exigency of his business, and adapted t9 the
specialty, reason and equity of his very case.(n) Which provision (with a little
accuracy in the clerks of the chancery, and a little liberality in the judges, by
extending, rather than narrowing, the remedial effects of the writ), might have
effectually answered all the purposes of a court of equity;(o) except that of
obtaining a discovery by the oath of the defendant.
But when, about the end of the reign of King Edward III, uses of land were
introduced,(p) and, though totally discountenanced by the courts of common
law, were considered -as fiduciary deposits and binding in conscience by the
clergy, the separate jurisdiction of the chancery as a court of equity began to
be established;(q) and John Waltham, who was bishop of Salisbury and chan-
cellor to King Richard II, by a strained interpretation of the above-mentioned
statute of Westm. 2, devised the writ of subpoena, returnable in the court of chan-
cery only, to make the feoffee to uses accountable to his cestuy que use: which
process was afterwards extended to other matters wholly determinable at the
common law, upon false and fictitious suggestions; for which, therefore, the
chancellor himself is, by statute 17 Ric. II, c. 6, directed to give damages to the
[*52] party unjustly aggrieved. But as the *clergy, so early as the reign of
King Stephen, had attempted to turn their ecclesiastical courts into
courts of equity, by entertaining suits pro Icesione fidei, as a spiritual offence
against conscience, in case of non-payment of debts or any breach of civil
contracts ;(r) till checked by the constitutions of Clarendon,(s) which declared
that, "placita de debitis, quce fide interposita debentur, vel absque interpositione
fidei , sint i justitia regis :" therefore probably the ecclesiastical chancellors,
who then held the seal, were remiss in abridging their own new acquired juris-
diction; especially as the spiritual courts continued (t) to grasp at the same
authority as before in suits pro lwesione fidei, so late as' the fifteenth century,(u)
till finally prohibited by the unanimous concurrence of all the judges. How-
ever, it appears from the parliament rolls,(w) that, in the reigns of Henry IV
and V, the commons were repeatedly urgent to have the writ of subp6ena entirely
suppressed, as being a novelty devised by the subtlety of Chancellor Waltham,
against the form of the common law; whereby no plea could be determined,
unless by examination and oath of the parties, according to the form of the law
civil, and the law of holy church, in subversion of the common law. But
though Henry IV, being then hardly warm in his throne, gave a palliating
answer to their petitions, and actually passed the statute 4 Henry IV, C. 23,
whereby judgments at law are declared irrevocable unless by attaint or writ of
error, yet his son put a negative at once upon their whole application: and in
(i) A great variety of new precedents of writs, in cases before unprovided for, are given by this very statute
of Westm. 2.
(n) Lamb. Archelon. 61.
(o) This was the opinion of Fairfax, a very learned judge in the time of Edward the Fourth. "Le subpana
(says he) ne serroit my cy soventement use come il est ore, st nou8 attendomus tiels actions sur les cases, at main-
teinomus le jurisdiction de ceo court, et d'auter courts." (Year-book, 21 Edw. IV. 23.)
(p) See book II, ch. 20. (q) Spelm. Gloss. 106. 1 Lev. 242.
(r) Lord Lyttelt. Hen. II, b. 3, p. 361, note. (s) 10 IHen. II, c. 15. Speed. 458.
(t) In 4 Hen. IL, suits in court christian pro 76esione fidei upon temporal contracts were adjudged to be con-
trary to law. (Fitzh. Abr. t. Prohibition, 15.) But in the statute or writ of circumspecte agatis, supposed by
some to have issued 13 Edw. I, but more probably (3 Pryn. Rec. 336) 9 Edw. II, suits pro Iesione fidei were
allowed to the ecclesiastical courts; according to some ancient copies (Berthelet stat. anttq. London 1531 90 b,
3 Pryn. Rec. 336), and the common English translation of that statute, though in Lyndewode's copy (Prov. i. ,
t. 2), and in the Cotton MS. (Claud. D. 2), that clause is omitted.
(u) Year-book, 2 Hen. IV, 10. 11 Hen. IV, 88. 38 Hen. VI, 29. 20 Edw. IV, 10.
(w) Rot. Part. 4 Hen. IV, Nos. 78 and 110. 3 Hen. V, No. 46, cited in Prynne's abr. of Cotton's records,
410, 422, 424, 548. 4 Inst. 83. 1 Roll. Abr. 370, 371, 372.
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Edward IV's time, the process by bill and subpcena was become the daily prac-
tice of the court.(x)
*But this did not extend very far: for in the ancient treatise, entitled *
diversite des courtes,(y) supposed to be written very early in the sixteenth [*5]
century, we have a catalogue of the matters of conscience then cognizable by
subpoena in chancery, which fall within a very narrow compass. No regular
judicial system at that time prevailed in the court; but the suitor when he
thought himself aggrieved, found a desultory and uncertain remedy, according
to the private opinion of the chancellor, who was generally an ecclesiastic, or
sometimes (though rarely) a statesman: no lawyer having sat in the court of
chancery from the times of the chief justices Thorpe and Knyvet, successively
chancellors to King Edward III, in 1372 and 1373,(z) to the promotion of Sir
Thomas More by King Henry VIII, in 1530. After which the great seal was
indiscriminately committed to the custody of lawyers, or courtiers,(a) or church-
men,(b) according as the convenience of the times and the disposition of the
prince required, till Sergeant Puckering was made lord keeper in 1592; from
which time to the present the court of chancery has always been filled by a
lawyer, excepting the interval from 1621 to 1625, when the seal was intrusted to
Dr. Williams, then dean of Westminster, but afterwards bishop of Lincoln;
who had been chaplain to Lord Ellesmere, when chancellor.(c)
In the time of Lord Ellesmere (A. D. 1616) arose that notable dispute between
the courts of law and equity, set on foot by Sir Edward Coke, then chief justice
of the court of king's bench; whether a court of equity could give relief after
or against a judgment at the common law? This contest was so warmly
carried on, that indictments were preferred against the suitors, the solicitors,
the counsel, and even a master in chancery, for having incurred a prwrnunire,
by questioning in a court of equity a judgment in the court of king's bench,
obtained by gross fraud and imposition.(d) This matter being brought before
the king, was by him referred *to his learned counsel for their advice
and opinion; who reported so strongly in favour of the courts of [*54]
equity,(e) that his majesty gave judgment in their behalf; but not contented
with the irrefragable reasons and precedents produced by his counsel (for the
chief justice was clearly in the wrong, he chose rather to decide the question
by referring it to the plenitude of his royal prerogative.( f) Sir Edward Coke
submitted to the decision,(g) and thereby made atonement for his error: but
this struggle, together with the business of cornvmendamns (in which he acted a
very noble part) (h) and his controlling the commissioners of sewers,(i) were
the open and avowed causes,(k) first of his suspension and soon after of his
removal, from his office.
Lord Bacon, who succeeded Lord Ellesmere, reduced the practice of the
court into a more regular system; but did not sit long enough to affect any
considerable revolution in the science itself: and few of his decrees which
have reached us are of any great consequence to posterity. His successors, in
the reign of Charles I, did little to improve upon his plan: and even after the
(x) Rot. Parl. 14 Edw. IV, No. 33 (not 14 Edw. III, as cited 1 Roll. Abr. 370, &).
(y) Tit. Chancery, fol. 296. Rastell's edit. A. D. 1534. (z) Spelm. Gloss. 111. Dudg. chron. Ser. 50.
(a) Wriothesly, St. John, and Hatton. (b) Goodrick, Gardiner, and Heath.,
(c) Biog. Brit. 4278. (d) Bacon's Works, IV, 611, 612, 682.
(e) Whitelocke of parl. it. 390. 1 Chan. Rep. Append. 11.
(f) "For that it appertaineth to our princely office only to judge over all judges, and to discern and deter-
mine such differences as at any time may and shall arise between our several courts, touching their jurisdic-
tion, and the same to settle and determine, as we in our princely wisdom shall find to stand: most with our
honour," &c. (I Chanc. Rep. append. 26.)
(q) See the entry in the council book, 26 July, 1616. (Biogr. Brit. 1390.)
(h) In a cause of the bishop of Winchester, touching a commeedam, King James, conceiving that the matter
affected his prerogative, sent letters to the judges not to proceed in it till himself had been first consulted.
The twelve judges joined in a memorial to his majesty, declaring that their compliance would be contrarv to
their oaths and the law; but upon being brought before the king and council, they all retracted and promised
obedience in every such case for the future, except Sir Edward Coke, who said "that when the case happened,
he would do his duty." (Biogr. Brit. 1388.)
(t) See that article in chap. 6.
(k) See Lord Ellesmere's speech to Sir Henry Montague, the new chief justice, 15 Nov. 1616. (Moore's
reports, 828.) Though Sir Edward might probably have retained his seat, if, during his suspension, he would
have complimented Lord Villiers (the new favourite) with the disposal of the most lucrative office In his court.
(Biogr. Brit. 1391.)
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restoration the seal was committed to the earl of Clarendon, who had with-
drawn from practice as a lawyer near twenty years; and afterwards to the earl
of Shaftesbury, who (though a lawyer by education) had never practised at all.
Sir ileneage Finch, who succeeded in 1673, *and became afterwards earl
[*55]of Nottingham, was a person of the greatest abilities and most uncor-
rupted integrity; a thorough master and zealous defender of the laws and con-
stitution of his country; and endued with a pervading genius, that enabled him
to discover and to pursue the true spirit of justice, notwithstanding the embar-
rassments raised by the narrow and technical notions which then prevailed in
the courts of law, and the imperfect ideas of redress which had possessed the
courts of equity. The reason and necessities of mankind, arising from the
great change in property by the extension of trade and the abolition of military
tenures, co-operated in establishing his plan, and enabled him in the course of
nine years to build a system of jurisprudence and jurisdiction upon wide and
rational foundations; which have also been extended and improved by many
great men, who have since presided in chancery. And from that time to this
the power and business of the court have increased to an amazing degree.(18)
From this court of equity in chancery, as from the other superior courts, an
appeal lies to the house of peers. But there are these differences between appeals
from a court of equity, and writs of error from a court of law: 1. That the
former may be brought upon any interlocutory matter, the latter upon nothing
but a definitive judgment: 2. That on writs of error the house of lords pro-
nounces the judgment, on appeals it gives direction to the court below to
rectify its own decree.
IX. The next court that I shall mention is one that bath no original juris-
diction, but is only a court of appeal, to correct the errors of other jurisdic-
tions. This is the court of exchequer chamber; which was first erected by
statute 31 Edw. III, c. 12, to determine causes by writs of error from the com-
mon law side of the court of exchequer. And to that end it consists of the
lord chancellor and lord treasurer, taking unto them the justices of the king's
bench and common pleas. In imitation of which a second court of exchequer
chamber was erected by statute 27 Eliz. c. 8, consisting of the justices of the
common pleas, and the barons of the exchequer, before whom writs of error
[*56] may be brought to reverse judgments *in certain suits(l) originally begun
in the court of king's bench.(19) Into the court also of exchequer
() See chap. 25, page 411.
(18) Besides the chancellor there are three vice-chancellors; one being provided for by
statute 53 Geo. III, c. 24, and two were added by statute 5 Vic. c. 5. These judges are to
hear and determine all matters depending in the court of chancery-either as a court of law
or equity-subject to an appeal to the lord chancellor, or to the court of appeal in chancery
mentioned below.
The master of the rolls has long held a separate court of equity, and his jurisdiction,
which was for a long time in dispute, is now regulated by statute. Originally he was the
chief merely of the masters in chancery, whose functions were mainly ministerial, and the
decrees and orders made by him are final, except as they may be altered or set aside on appeal
to the lord chancellor, or to the court of appeal in chancery. By statute 15 and 16 Vic. c. 80,
the gradual abolition of -masters in chancery is provided for, and their functions are trans-
ferred to the judges and their chief clerks. By statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 94, the master of the
rolls is custodian of the public records.
By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 83, the court of appeal in chancery was created. It con-
sists of two lords justices, with whom the lord chancellor may be associated, or the court
may be held by him and either one of the lords justices, and by the two lords justices alone.
An appeal from either of the vice-chancellors or from the master of the rolls may be either
to this court or to the lord chancellor. The two lords justices, without the lord chancellor,
also constitute a court of appeal in bankruptcy, in which cases their judgment is final.
From the court of appeal in chancery an appeal lies to the house of lords. If when sitting
alone the lords justices differ in opinion, the decision appealed from stands affirmed.
By a recent act (30 and 31 Vic. c. 64), each of the lords justices may sit separately as a court
of appeal, for the purpose of hearing appeals from interlocutory orders.
(19) But now these courts are abolished, and the cou]rt of exchequer chamber, as it now
exists, is composed, for the puruose of hearing appeals from any one of the superior courts of
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chamber (which then consists of all the judges of the .three superior courts,
and now and then the lord chancellor also), are sometimes adjourned from the
other courts such causes, as the judges upon argument find to be of great weight
and difficulty, before any judgment is given upon them in the court below.(m)
From all the branches of this court of exchequer chamber, a writ of error
lies to
X. The house of peers, which is the supreme court of judicature in the
kingdom, having at present no original jurisdiction over causes, but only upon
appeals and writs of error, to rectify any injustice or mistake of the law, com-
mitted by the courts below. To this authority this august tribunal succeeded
of course upon the dissolution of the aula regia. For, as the barons of parlia-
ment were constituent members of that court; and the rest of its jurisdiction
was dealt out to other tribunals, over which the great officers who accompanied
those barons were respectively delegated to preside; it followed, that the right
of receiving appeals, and superintending all other jurisdictions, still remained
in the residue of that noble assembly, from which every other great court was
derived. They are therefore in all causes the last resort, from whose judgment
no farther appeal is permitted; but every subordinate tribunal must conform to
their determinations; the law reposing an entire confidence in the honour and
conscience of the noble persons who compose this important assembly, that (if
possible) they will make themselves masters of those questions upon which they
undertake to decide, and in all dubious cases refer themselves to the opinions
of the judges, who are summoned by writ to advise them; since upon their
decision all property must finally depend.(20)
Hitherto may also be referred the tribunal established by statute 14 Edw. III,
c. 5, consisting (though now out of use) of one prelate, two earls, and two
barons, who are to be chosen at every new parliament, to hear complaints of
grievances and delays of justice in the king's courts, and (with the advice of
the chancellor, treasurer and justices of both benches) to give directions for
remedying these *inconveniences in the courts below. This committee [*57]
seems to have been established, lest there should be a defect of justice for L -7
want of a supreme court of appeal, during any long intermission or recess of
parliament; for the statute farther directs, that if the difficulty be so great, that
it may not well be determined without assent of parliament, it shall be brought
by the said prelate, earls and barons, unto the next parliament, who shall finally
determine the same.
XI. Before I conclude this chapter, I must also mention an eleventh species
of courts, of general jurisdiction and use, which are derived out of, and act as
collateral auxiliaries to, the foregoing; I mean the courts of assize and nisi
prius.
These are composed of two or more commissioners, who are twice in every
year sent by the king's special commission all round the kingdom (except London
and Middlesex, where courts of nisi prius are holden in and after every term,
before the chief or other judge of the several superior courts; and except the
four northern counties, where the assizes are holden only once a year),(21) to try
(m) 4 Inst. 119. 2 Bust. 146.
law-the queen's bench, common pleas and exchequer-of the judges, or judges and barons, as
the case may be, of the other two courts.
(20) In practice the house of lords, when sitting to hear appeals, is composed only of the
"law lords," as they are called; that is, the peers who at the time hold judicial positions, or
who have heretofore held such positions. Every peer indeed has a right to be present and
participate, but it is a right which is not, and could not often with propriety be, asserted,
since few except the law lords have any such training as would fit them for the duties to be
performed. A quorum of peers must be present, but three is a quorum of the house of peers,
and two besides the chancellor would be sufficient to constitute this court. If those two
should chance to be lay members, and the decree under review be one made by the chancel-
lor himself, his own vote would affirm it, as the lay members would take no part. But usually
four or five law lords are present.
(21) But now the assizes here are held twice a year.
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by a jury of the respective counties the truth of such matters of fact as are
thfen under dispute in the courts of Westminster-hall. These judges of assize
came into use in the room of the ancient justices in eyre, justiciarii in itinere;
who were regularly established, if not first appointed, by the parliament of
Northampton, A. D. 1176, 22 Hen. II,(n) with a delegated power from the king's
great court, or aula regia, being looked upon as members thereof; and they
afterwards made their circuit round the kingdom once in seven years for the
purpose of trying causes. (o) They were afterwards directed by magna carta, c.
12, to be sent into every county once a year, to take (or receive the verdict of
the jurors or recognitors in certain actions, then called) recognitions or assizes;
the most difficult of which they are directed to adjourn into the court of com-
mon pleas to be there determined. The itinerant justices were sometimes mere
[*581 justices of assize or of dower, or of gaol-delivery, and the like; and *they
had sometimes a more general commission, to determine all manner of
causes, being constituted justiciarii ad oinnia placita: (p) but the present
justices of assize and nisi prius are more immediately derived from the statute
Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, which directs them to be assigned out of the king's
sworn justices, associating to themselves one or two discreet knights of each
county. By statute 27 Edw. I, c. 4, (explained by 12 Edw. II, c. 3,) assizes and
inquests were allowed to be taken before any one justice of the court in which
the plea was brought; associating to him one knight or other approved man of
the county. And, lastly, by statute 14 Edw. III, c. 16, inquests of nisi prius
may be taken before any justice of either bench (though the plea be not
depending in his own court), or before the chief baron of the exchequer, if he
be a man of the law ; or otherwise before the justices of assize, so that one of
such justices be a judge of the king's bench or common pleas, or the king's
seijeant sworn. They usually make their circuits in the respective vacations
after Hilary and Trinity terms; assizes being allowed to be taken in the holy
time of lent by consent of the bishops at the king's request, as expressed in
statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 51. And it was also usual during the times of
popery, for the prelates to grant annual licenses to the justices of assize to
administer oaths in holy times: for oaths being of a sacred nature, the logic of
those deluded ages concluded that they must be of ecclesiastical cognizance.(q)
The prudent jealousy of our ancestors ordained,(r) that no man of law should
be judge of assize in his own county, wherein he was born or doth inhabit ;(22)
and a similar prohibition is found in the civil law,(s) which has carried this
principle so far that it is equivalent to the crime of sacrilege, for a man to be
governor of the province in which he was born, or has any civil connexion. (t)
The judges upon their circuits now sit by virtue of five several authorities.
1. The commission of the peace. 2. A commission of oyer and terminer. 3. A
commission of general gaol-delivery. The consideration of all which belongs
properly *to the subsequent book of these Commentaries. But the
fourth commission is, 4. A commission of assize, directed to the justices
and seIjeants therein named, to take (together with their associates) assizes in
the several counties; that is, to take the verdict of a peculiar species of jury,
called an assize, and summoned for the trial of landed disputes, of which here-
(n) Seld. Jan. 1. 2, J 5. Spelm. Cod. 399.
(o) Co. Litt. 293.-Anno, 1261, justiciarii itinerantes venerunt apud Wigorniam in octavis S. Johannis bap-
tiste -et totus comitatus sos admittere recusavit, quod septem anni nondum erant elapsi, postquam justiciari
ibidem ultimo-sederunt. (Annal. Ecc. Wigorn. in Whart. Angl. saer. 1, 495.)
(p) Bract. 1. 3, tr. 1, c. 11.
(q) Instances hereof may be met with in the appendix to Spelman's original of the terms, and in Mr. Parker's
Antiquities, 209.
(r) Stat. 4 Edw. III, c. 2. 8 Ric. IT, c. 2. 33 Hen. yIII, c. 24. (s) -Ff. 1, 22, 3. (t) C. 9, 29, 4.
(22) [This restriction was construed to extend to every commission of the judges: but it
being found very inconvenient, the 12 Geo. II, c. 27, was enacted for the express purpose of
authorizing the commissioners of oyer and terminer, and of gaol-delivery, to execute their
commissions in the criminal courts within the counties in which they were born, or in which
they reside. See book 4, 271. This restriction, as to commissioners of assize and nisi prius,
was taken off by the 49 Geo. III, c. 91.]
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after. The other authority is, 5. That of nisi prius, which is a consequence
of the commission of assize,(u) being annexed to the office of those justices by
the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, and it empowers them to try all ques-
tions of fact issuing out of the courts of Westminster, that are then ripe for
trial by jury. These by the course of the courts (w) are usually appointed to
be tried at Westminster in some Easter or Michaelmas term, by a jury returned
from the county wherein the cause of action arises; but with this proviso, nisi
prius, unless before the day prefixed the judges of assize come into the county
in question. This they are sure to do in the vacations preceding each Easter
and Michaelmas term, which saves much expense and trouble. These commis-
sions are constantly accompanied by writs of association, in pursuance of the
statutes of Edward I and II, before mentioned; whereby certain persons (usu-
ally the clerk of assize and his subordinate officers) are directed to associate
themselves with the justices and serjeants, and they are required to admit the
said persons into their society, in order to take the assizes, &c.; that a sufficient
supply of commissioners may never be wanting. But, to prevent the delay of
justice by the absence of any of them, there is also issued of course a writ of
si non omnnes; directing that if all cannot be present, any two of them (a justice
or a serjeant being one) may proceed to execute the commission.
These are the several courts of common law and equity, which are of public
and general jurisdiction throughout the kingdom. And, upon the whole, we
cannot but admire the wise economy and admirable provision of our ancestors,
in settling the distribution of justice in a method so well calculated for cheap-
ness, expedition, and ease. By the constitution which they established, all
trivial debts, and injuries of small consequence, were to be recovered or re-
dressed in every *man's own county, hundred, or perhaps parish. Pleas of [*60]
freehold, and more important disputes of property, were adjourned to the
king's court of common pleas, which was fixed in one place for the benefit of
the whole kingdom. Crimes and misdemeanors were to be examined in a court
by themselves; and matters of the revenue in another distinct ju'isdiction.
Now indeed, for the ease of the subject and greater dispatch of causes, methods
have been found to open all the three superior courts for the redress of private
wrongs; which have remedied many inconveniences, and yet preserved the forms
and boundaries handed down to us from high antiquity. If facts are disputed,
they are sent down to be tried in the country by the neighbours; but the law,
arising upon those facts, is determined by the judges above: and, if they are
mistaken in point of law, there remain in both cases two successive courts of
appeal, to rectify such their mistakes. If the rigour of general rules does in
any case bear hard upon individuals, courts of equity are open to supply the
defects, but not sap the fundamentals, of the law. Lastly, there presides over
all one great court of appeal, which is the last resort in matters both of law
and equity; and which will therefore take care to preserve an uniformity and
equilibrium among all the inferior jurisdictions: a court composed of prelates
selected for their piety, and of nobles advanced to that honour for their personal
merit, or deriving both honour and merit from an illustrious train of ancestors:
who are formed by their education, interested by their property, and bound
upon their conscience and honour, to be skilled in the laws of their country.
This is a faithful sketch of the English juridical constitution, as designed by the
masterly hands of our forefathers, of which the great original lines are still
strong and visible; and, if any of its minuter strokes are by the length of time
at all obscured or decayed, they may still be with ease restored to their pristine
vigour: and that not so much by fanciful alterations and wild experiments (so
frequent in this fertile age), as by closely adhering to the wisdom of the ancient
plan, concerted by Alfred, and perfected by Edward I, and by attending to the spirit,
without neglecting the forms, of their excellent and venerable institutions.(23)
(u) Salk. 454. (w) See ch. 23, p. 353.
(23) The courts of the United States consist of the following:
1. The senate as a court of impeachment.
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CHAPTER V.
OF COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL, MILITARY AND MARITIME,
BESIDES the several courts which were treated of in the preceding chapter,
and in which all injuries are redressed, that fall under the cognizance of the
common law of England, or that spirit of equity which ought to be its con-
stant attendant, there still remain some other courts of a jurisdiction equally
public and general; which take cognizance of other species of injuries, of an
ecclesiastical, military and maritime nature; and therefore are properly distin-
guished by the title of ecclesiastical courts, courts military and courts maritime.
I. Before I descend to consider particular ecclesiastical courts, I must first of
all in general premise, that, in the time of our Saxon ancestors, there was no
2. The supreme court.
3. The circuit courts.
4. The district courts.
5. The court of claims.
6. The supreme court of the District of Columbia.
7. The territorial courts.
The court of impeachment derives its authority from article 1, section 3 of the constitu-
tion, and is sufficiently spoken of elsewhere. The judicial power generally is conferred
by article 3, section 2.
The supreme court has original jurisdiction of all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and of those to which a state shall be a party. It also has appellate
jurisdiction from the circuit court in civil cases, where the matter in dispute exceeds $2000,
and from the highest state court of each state, in any case where has been drawn in question
the validity of a treaty, or of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States,
and the decision of the state court has been against its validity; also where has been drawn
in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any state, on the
ground of its being repugnant to the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, and
the decision of the state court has been in favor of such state law or authority; also where
the decision of the state court has been against a right claimed under any clause of the con-
stitution of the United States, or under any treaty or statute of or commission held under the
United States; it has also appellate jurisdiction from the territorial courts where the amount
in dispute exceeds $1000, except from Washington territory, where it must exceed $2000;
and from the supreme court of the District of Columbia and from the court of claims, where
the amount in controversy exceeds $3000; and in any other case where the judgment or decree
may affect a constitutional question or furnish a precedent for a class of cases, the United
States may appeal without regard to the amount in controversy.
The United States circuit courts have original jurisdiction, concurrently with the state courts,
of all civil suits, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds $500, and
the United States is a plaintiff, or an alien is a party, or where the suit is between a citizen
of the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another state. They have exclusive
jurisdiction of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States,
except where specially otherwise provided; and concurrent jurisdiction with the district
courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein. Under the patent laws they have juris-
diction in equity to restrain infringements. They have also appellate jurisdiction from the
district courts where the matter in dispute exceeds $50.
The district courts have jurisdiction exclusively of the state courts, and concurrently with
the circuit courts, of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United
States, committed within their several districts or upon the high seas, where the punishment
is not capital. They have also exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, including seizures under the laws of impost, navigation or trade of the
United States; and of all seizures on land or water under the laws of the United States, and
of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under those laws. They have also jurisdic-
tion concurrently with the state courts and the circuit courts, of all cases where an alien sues
for a tort, only, in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States; also
of all suits at common law where the United States or any officer thereof, under the authority
of an act of congress, may sue; also exclusive of the state courts of all suits against consuls
or vice-consuls except for capital offences. These courts also have jurisdiction in bankruptcy
cases.
The territorial courts possess such powers as are specially conferred upon them by the acts
providing for their creation.
The supreme court of the District of Columbia is a court of general jurisdiction in law
and equity: any one of its judges may hold a district court with the powers of the other
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sort of distinction between the lay and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction: the county
court was as much a spiritual as a temporal tribunal: the rights of the church
were ascertained and asserted at the same time, and by the same judges, as the
rights of the laity. For this purpose the bishop of the diocese, and the alder-
man, or, in his absence, the sheriff of the county, used to sit together in the
county court, and had there the cognizance of all causes, as well ecclesiastical
as civil: a superior deference being paid to the bishop's opinion in spiritual
matters, and to that of the lay judges in temporal. (a) This union of power
was very advantageous to them both; the presence of the *bishop added *6
weight and reverence to the sheriff's proceedings; and the authority of [
the sheriff was equally useful to the bishop, by enforcing obedience to his
decrees in such refractory offenders, as would otherwise have despised the thun-
der of mere ecclesiastical censures.
But so moderate and rational a plan was wholly inconsistent with those views
of ambition that were then forming by the court of Rome. It soon became an
established maxim in the papal system of policy, that all ecclesiastical persons,
and all ecclesiastical causes, should be solely and entirely subject to ecclesiasti-
cal jurisdiction only: which jurisdiction was supposed to be lodged, in the first
place and immediately, in the pope, by divine indefeasible right and investiture
from Christ himself; and derived from the pope to all inferior tribunals. Hence
the canon law lays it down as a rule, that "sacer dotes a regibus honorandi
sunt, non judicandi;"(b) and places an emphatic reliance on a fabulous tale
which it tells of the emperor Constantine: that, when some petitions were brought
to him, imploring the aid of his authority against certain of his bishops,
accused of oppression and injustice, he caused (says the holy canon) the peti-
tions to be burnt in their presence, dismissing them with this valediction: "ite
et inter vos causas vestras discutite, quia dignurn non est ut nos judicemus
Deos." (c)
It was not, however, till after the Norman conquest that this doctrine was
received in England; when William I (whose title was warmly espoused by
the monasteries, which he liberally endowed, and by the foreign* clergy whom
he brought over in shoals from France and Italy, and planted in the best pre-
ferments of the English church), was at length prevailed upon to establish this
fatal encroachment, and separate the ecclesiastical court from the civil: whether
actuated by principles of bigotry, or by those of a more refined policy, in order
to discountenance the laws of King Edward, abounding with the spirit of Saxon
(a) Celleberrimo huic conventui episcopus et aldermannus inter sunto; quorum alter jura divina, alter humana
populum edoceto. LL. Eadgar. e. 5.
() Decret. part 2, cau. 11, qa. 1, e. 41. (c) Ibid.
district courts; and may also hold a criminal court for the trial of all crimes and offences
arising within the district. From the special terms held by one judge appeals may be taken
to the general term held by all or a quorum of all.
The court of claims has authority to hear and determine all claims founded upon any law
of congress or regulation of the executive department, or upon any contract, express or
implied, with the government of the United States, and all claims which may be referred to
it by congress; also all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, liquidated or unliquidated,
or other demands whatsoever on the part of the government, against any person making
claim against the government in said court.
The supreme court consists of one chief justice and eight associate justices, appointed by
the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, during good behavior.
There are nine judicial circuits, for each of which a circuit judge is appointed in like
manner and with the like tenure. The circuit courts are held by one justice of the supreme
court and the circuit judge, or by the latter and the district judge, or may be held by any one
of the three sitting alone. Where two sit together and disagree in opinion, the point of dis-
agreement is certified to the supreme court for its decision.
There is one district court for each state, and in some states two or more. Each district
has a district judge appointed in the same manner and for the same term as the justices of
the supreme court. The supreme court of the District of Columbia consists of four justices,
and the court of claims of five, with the like tenure. The territorial judges hold their offices
only during the pleasure of the president.
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[*63] liberty, is not altogether *certain. But the latter, if not the cause, was
undoubtedly the consequence, of this separation: for the Saxon laws were
soon overborne by the Norman justiciaries, when the county court fell into disre-
gard by the bishop's withdrawing his presence, in obedience to the charter of
the conqueror ;(d) which prohibited any spiritual cause from being tried in the
secular courts, and commanded the suitors to appear before the bishop only,
whose decisions were directed to conform to the canon law.(e)
King Henry the First, at his accession, among other restorations of the laws
of King Edward the Confessor, revived this of the union of the civil and eccle-
siastical courts.(f) Which was, according to Sir Edward Coke,(g) after the
great heat of the conquest was past, only a restitution of the ancient law of
England. This, however, was ill-relished by the popish clergy, who, under the
guidance of that arrogant prelate, Archbishop Anselm, very early disapproved
of a measure that put them on a level with the profane laity, and subjected
spiritual men and causes to the inspection of the secular magistrates: and,
therefore, in their synod at Westminster, 3 Hen. I, they ordained that no bishop
should attend the discussion of temporal causes ;(h) which soon dissolved this
newly effected union. And when, upon the death of King Henry the First,
[*64] *the usurper Stephen was brought in and supported by the clergy, we find
one article of the oath which they imposed upon him was, that ecclesiastical
persons and ecclesiastical causes should be subject only to the bishop's jurisdic-
tion.(i) And as it was about that time that the contest and emulation began
between the laws of England and those of Rome,(k) the temporal courts adher-
ing to the former, and the spiritual adopting the latter as their rule of proceed-
ing, this widened the breach between them, and made a coalition afterwards
impracticable; which probably would else have been effected at the general
reformation of the church.
In briefly recounting the various species of ecclesiastical courts, or, as they
are often styled, courts christian (curim christianitatis) I shall begin with the
lowest, and so ascend gradually to the supreme court of appeal.(0)
1. The archdeacon's court is the most inferior court in the whole ecclesiastical
polity. It is held, in the archdeacon's absence, before a judge appointed by him-
self, and called his official; and its jurisdiction is sometimes in concurrence
,with, sometimes in exclusion of, the bishop's court of the diocese. From hence,
however, by statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, an appeal lies to that of the bishop.
1. The consistory court of every diocesan bishop is held in their several cathe-
drals, for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes arising within their respective dio-
ceses. The bishop's chancellor, or his commissary, is the judge; and from his
sentence an appeal lies, by virtue of the same statute, to the archbishop of each
province respectively.
3. The court of arches is a court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of
[*65] Canterbury ; whereof the judge is called *the dean of the arches, because
he anciently held his court in the church of Saint Mary le 1ow (sancta
Maria de arcubus), though all the principal spiritual courts are now holden at
doctors' commons. His proper jurisdiction is only over the thirteen peculiar
parishes belonging to the archbishop in London; but the office of dean of the
arches having been for a long time united with that of the archbishop's prin-
(d) Hale list. C. L. 102. Selden, In Eadm. p. 6, 1. 24. 4 Inst. 259. Wilk. LL. Angl. Sax. 292.
(e) Nullus episcopus vel archidiaconus de legibus episcopalibus amplius in hundred placita teneant, twe causam,
quce ad regimen animarum pertinet, ad judicium secularium haminum adducant: sed quicunque secundum
episcopales leges, de quacunque causa el calpa interpellatsfuerit, a loain, quem ad hoc episcopus elegerit etnorninacecit, reniat; 54ique de caasa eel culpa sma resepondeat; et non secun dum hundred, sed secundum canones
et episcopales leges, rectum Deo et episcopo ma factat.
I l a et prce pio, t m as de c m itat 
a ant ad c aitatus t h ndreda, s tut fecerirt 
te rn oe regs Edw ardi.
(Cart. Hen. t in pelm. cod. et. lega. 
05.) And what is here obscurely hinted at, 
is fully expained by his
code of laws extant in the red hook of the exchequer, though in general but of doubtfuluthority. (Cap. .)
Generalia camitatuum placita ertis lois et vicibas teneautar. Intersint au/em episcapi, cam tes," &e." et a anturprima delbita rerce christianitatis jura, secanda regis placita, pastrema casse sin guloram dignis satsf atsani2h 5aleantur.
(q) 2 Inst. 70. (h) de episcopi srculartum placitoram afficiam uscipiant. Spelm. Cad. 801.
() Spelm. Cad. 310. (k) See Book I introd. 1.
(1) For further particulars, sea Burn's ecelerastlcal law, Wood's institute of the common law, and Oughton's
ordo Judichoram.
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cipal official, he now, in right of the last mentioned office (as doth also the official
principal of the archbishop of York), receives and determines appeals from the sen-
tences of all inferior ecclesiastical courts within the province. And from him
an appeal lies to the king in chancery (that is, to a court of delegates appointed
under the king's great seal), by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, as supreme head of
the English church, in the place of the bishop of Rome, who formerly exercised
this jurisdiction; which circumstance alone will furnish the reason why the
popish clergy were so anxious to separate the spiritual court from the temporal.
4. The court of peculiars is a branch of and annexed to the court of arches.
It has a jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed through the province of
Canterbury in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from the ordinary's
jurisdiction, and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesiastical causes,
arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions, are, originally, cognizable
by this court; from which an appeal lay formerly to the pope, but now by the
*statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, to the king in chancery. [*66]
5. The prerogative court is established for the trial of all testamentary
causes, where the deceased hath left bona notabilia within two different dioceses.
In which case the probate of wills belongs, as we have formerly seen, (m) to the
archbishop of the province, by way of special prerogative. And all causes
relating to the wills, administrations, or legacies of such persons are, originally,
cognizable herein, before a judge appointed by the archbishop, called the judge
of the prerogative court; from whom an appeal lies by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c.
19, to the king in chancery, instead of the pope, as formerly.
I pass by such ecclesiastical courts as have only what is called a voluntary,
and not a contentious, jurisdiction; which are merely concerned in doing or
selling what no one opposes, and which keep an open office-for that purpose (as
granting dispensations, licenses, faculties, hnd other remnants of the papal extor-
tions), but do not concern themselves with administering redress to any injury:
and shall proceed to,
6. The great court of appeal in all ecclesiastical causes, viz.: the court of
delegates, judices delegati, appointed by the king's commission under his great
seal, and issuing out of chancery, to represent his royal person, and hear all
appeals to him made by virtue of the before-mentioned statute of Henry VIII.
This commission is frequently filled with lords, spiritual and temporal, and
always with judges of the courts at Westminster, and doctors of the civil law.
Appeals to Rome were always looked upon by the English nation, even in the
times of popery, with an evil eye; as being contrary to the liberty of the sub-
ject, the honour of the crown, and the independence of the whole realm; and
were first introduced in very turbulent times in the sixteenth year of King
Stephen (A. D. 1151), at the same period (Sir Henry Spelman observes) that
the civil and canon laws were first imported into England.(n) But, in a few
years after, to obviate this growing practice, the constitutions made at Clarendon,
11 Hen. II, on account of the disturbances raised by Archbishop Becket and
other zealots of the holy see, expressly declare, (o) that appeals in causes eccle-
siastical ought to lie, from the archdeacon to the diocesan; from the diocesan
to the archbishop of the province; and from the archbishop to the king; and
are not to proceed any farther without special license from the crown. But the
unhappy advantage that was given in the reigns of King John, and his son
Henry the Third, to the encroaching *power of the pope, who was ever [*67]
vigilant to improve all opportunities of extending his jurisdiction hither,
at length riveted the custom of appealing to Rome in causes ecclesiastical so
strongly that it never could be thoroughly broken off, till the grand rupture
happened in the reign of Henry the Eighth; when all the jurisdiction usurped
by the pope in matters ecclesiastical was restored to the crown, to which it
originally belonged: so that the statute 25 Hen. VIII was but declaratory
of the ancient law of the realm.(p) But in case the king himself be party in
any of these suits, the appeal does not then lie to him in chancery, which would
(m) Book 11, ch. 32. (n) Cod. vet. leg, 315. (o) Chap. 8. (p) 4.;nst. 341.
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be absurd; but, by the statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, to all the bishops of the
realm, assembled in the upper house of convocation.(1)
7. A commission of review is a commission sometimes granted, in extraordi-
nary cases, to revise the sentence of the court of delegates ; when it is appre-
hended they have been led into a material error. This commission the king may
grant, although the statutes 24 and 25 Hen. VIII, before cited, declare the sen-
tence of the delegates definitive: because the pope as supreme head by the canon
law, used to grant such commission of review; and such authority as the pope
heretofore exerted is now annexed to the crown (q) by statutes 26 Hen. VIII,
c. 1, and 1 Eliz. c. 1. But it is not matter of right, which the subject may
demand, ex debito justitice; but merely a matter of favour, and which, there-
fore, is often denied.
These are now the principal courts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction : (2) none of
which are allowed to be courts of record; no more than was another much
more formidable jurisdiction, but now deservedly annihilated, viz.: the court
of the king's high commission in causes ecclesiastical. This court was erected
and united to the regal power (r) by virtue of the statute 1 Eliz. c. 1, instead of
a larger jurisdiction which had before been exercised under the pope's authority.
[,68] It was intended *to vindicate the dignity and peace of the church, by
[8 reforming, ordering, and correcting the ecclesiastical state and persons,
and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and
enormities. Under the shelter of which very general words, means were found
in that and the two succeeding reigns, to vest in the high commissioners extra-
ordinary and almost despotic powers, of fining and imprisoning; which they
exerted much beyond the degree of the offence itself, and frequently over offences
by no means of spiritual cognizance. For these reasons this court was justly
abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 11. And the weak and illegal attempt that
(q) Ibid. (r) 4 Inst. 324.
(1) The jurisdiction of the court of delegates has now been transferred to the judicial com-
mittee of the privy council. See note, p. 69, post.
(2) Very radical changes have recently been made in the jurisdiction of these courts. Under
statutes 20 and 21 Vic. c. 77, and 21 and 22 Vic. cc. 56 and 95, a distinct and separate probate
court has been organized, which exercises the powers in probate cases formerly possessed by
the ecclesiastical courts. The probate court is presided over by a single judge, who holds his
office during good behavior, and who must be an advocate of ten years standing, or a barrister
of fifteen years standing. One or more of the common law judges may sit with the probate
judge in holding the court, and under 21 and 22 Vic. c. 95, the judges of probate and admi-
ralty may sit for each other. The judge of the court of probate may send issues of fact for
trial to the courts of law, or he may try them with a jury in his own court. He has the usual
powers of courts of record over the practitioners in his court, and in proper cases he may
appoint receivers pendente lite. But he has no jurisdiction of suits for legacies or for the dis-
tribution of assets. In contentious causes an appeal lies to the house of lords. Wills are
either probated "in solemn form," in which case the parties interested are duly cited, and the
decision is conclusive as regards both real and personal property, or" in common form," in
which case parties may contest their validity whenever drawn in question afterwards, by
giving notice of their intention so to do. In cases of small estates, where the personal prop-
erty is sworn to be under 2001. and the real estate under 3001., the county court has jurisdic-
tion, with an appeal to the probate court. The formal business in probate cases is transacted
by registrars. There are forty district registries, each of which has its registrar appointed by
the judge of the probate court, and holding office during good behavior, and one principal
registry at London with four life registrars. The registrars must be attorneys or solicitors;
they cannot proceed in contentious causes, and in other cases they may refer difficult questions
to the judge for his decision.
Besides the loss of probate powers, jurisdiction of matrimonial causes was taken from the
ecclesiastical courts by statute 20 and 21 Vic. c. 85, and conferred upon the court for divorce
and matrimonial causes. Authority over cases of brawling, except between persons in holy
orders, was taken away by 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32; that over suits for defamation was abolished
by 18 and 19 Vic. c. 41; and that over proceedings to enforce church rates was taken away by
31 and 32 Vie. c. 109. The authority of these courts is now mainly confined to the examina-
tion of charges of heresy, of Immoral or scandalous conduct on the part of persons in holy
orders, and of irregularities in conducting the services of the church. The few other cases of
which they may take cognizance are unimportant, and need not be enumerated here.
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was made to revive it, during the reign of King James the Second, served only
to hasten that infatuated prince's ruin.
II. Next, as to the courts military. The only court of this kind known to,
and established by, the permanent laws of the land, is the court of chivalry,
formerly held before the lord high constable and earl marshal of England jointly,
but since the attainder of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, under Hen. VIII, and
the consequent extinguishment of the office of lord high constable, it hath
usually, with respect to civil matters, been held before the earl marshal only.(s)
This court, by statute 13 Ric. II, c. 2, hath cognizance of contracts and other
matters touching deeds of arms and war, as well out of the realm as within it.
And from its sentences an appeal lies immediately to the king in person.(t)
This court was in great reputation in the times of pure chivalry, and afterwards
during our connexions with the continent, by the territories which our princes
held in France: but is now grown almost entirely out of use, on account of
the feebleness of its jurisdiction, and want of power to enforce its judgments;
as it can neither fine nor imprison, not being a court of record.(u)
III. The maritime courts, or such as have power and jurisdiction to determine
all maritime injuries, arising upon the *seas, or in parts out of the reach [*69]
of the common law, are only the court of admiralty, and its courts of
appeal. The court of admiralty is held before the lord high admiral of England,
or his deputy, who is called the judge of the court.(3) According to Sir Henry
Spelman, (w) and Lambard, (x) it was first of all erected by King Edward the
Third. Its proceedings are according to the method of the civil law, like those
of the ecclesiastical courts; upon which account it is usually held at the same
place with the superior ecclesiastical courts, at doctors' commons in London. It
is no court of record, any more than the spiritual courts. From the sentences
of the admiralty judge an appeal always lay, in ordinary course, to the king in
chancery, as may be collected from statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, which directs
the appeal from the archbishop's courts to be determined by persons named in
the king's commission, "like as in case of appeal from the admiral-court." But
this is also expressly declared by statute 8 Eliz. c. 5, which enacts, that upon
appeal made to the chancery, the sentence definitive of the delegates appointed
by commission shall be final.
Appeals from the vice-admiralty courts in America, and our other planta-
tions and settlements, may be brought before the courts of admiralty in
England, as being a branch of the admiral's jurisdiction, though they may
also be brought before the king in council. (4) But in case of prize vessels,
taken in time of war, in any part of the world, and condemned in any courts of
(a) 1 Lev. 280. Show. Parl. cas. 60. (t) 4 Inst. 125. (u) 7 Mod. 127.
() Gloss. 13. (x) Archeion. 41.
(3) [The practice of the court of admiralty has been improved and its jurisdiction extended
by statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 65.]
(4) The judicial committee of the privy council is now the ultimate court of appeal in
admiralty cases, cases from the colonial courts and in ecclesiastical cases. This court is com-
posed of the president of the council, the lord chancellor, the chief justices of the queen's
bench and common pleas, the lord chief baron, the master of the rolls, the lords justices of
the court of appeal in chancery, the vice-chancellors, the chief judge of the court of bank-
ruptcy, judges and ex-judges of the court of probate and the court of admiralty, two
members who have been judges in India or the colonies, and two persons specially
designated by the crown. The archbishops and bishops are also members of this committee
in cases of criminal proceedings in ecclesiastical courts against clerks in holy orders. Four
members of this court constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. See Statutes 2 and
3 William IV, c. 92; 3 aud 4 William IV, c. 41, and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 38. The court may take tes-
timony anew on appeal, and in proper cases may send issues to a court of law for trial.
In addition to the courts here mentioned, a very important one has since been created,
for the hearing of appeals in criminal cases. It is composed of the judges of the superior
courts of common law, but five of them, including one of the chief justices or the chief
baron, constitutes a quorum. The hearings are upon a case made, and the court either
pronounces such judgment as the case requires, or remits the record with the proper direc-
tions to the court below.
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admiralty or vice-admiralty as lawful prize, the appeal lies to certain commis-
sioners of appeals consisting chiefly of the privy council, and not to judges
delegates. And this by virtue of divers treaties with foreign nations; by which
particular courts are established in all the maritime countries of Europe for
the decision of this question, whether lawful prize or not: (5) for this being a
question between subjects of different states, it belongs entirely to the law of
nations, and not to the municipal laws of either country to determine it. The
[701 original court to which this question is *permitted in England is thecourt of admiralty; (6) and the court of appeal is in effect the king's privy
council, the members of which are, in consequence of treaties, commissioned
under the great seal for this purpose. In 1748, for the more speedy determina-
tion of appeals, the judges of the courts of Wesminster-hall, though not privy
counsellors, were added to the commission then in being. But doubts being
conceived concerning the validity of that commission, on account of such
addition, the same was confirmed by statute 22 Geo. II, c. 3, with a proviso,
that no sentence given under it should be valid, unless a majority of the com-
missioners present were actually privy counsellors. But this did not, I appre-
hend, extend to any future commissions: and such an addition became indeed
totally unnecessary in the course of the war which commenced in 1756; since
during the whole of that war, the commission of appeals was regularly
attended and all its decisions conducted by a judge (7) whose masterly acquaint-
ance with the law of nations was known and revered by every state in
Europe. (y)
CHAPTER VI.
OF COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION.
IN the two preceding chapters we have considered the several courts, whose
jurisdiction is public and general; and which are so contrived that some or
other of them may administer redress to every possible injury that can arise in
the kingdom at large. There yet remain certain others, whose jurisdiction is
(y) See the sentiments of the president Montesquieu, and M. Vattel (a subject of the king of Prussia), on the
answer transmitted by the English court to his Prussian majesty's Exposition des motifs, &c. A. D. 1753.
(Montesquieu's letters, 5 Mar. 1753. Vattel's droit de gene, 1. 2, c. 7, § 84.)
(5) [And in order to give effect to this, the prize acts passed at the commencement of a war
usually provide, that ships and goods taken from the enemy, whether by the royal navy or
by privateers, must first be condemned in some court of admiralty as lawful prize, before any
right in point of solid enjoyment can accrue to the captors; and specific directions are pre-
scribed for duly proceeding to such sentence. See the 19 Geo. III, c. 67; 1 Wils. 229;
4 Rob. 55.]
(6) [This seems incorrect, for questions of this nature are tried in the prize court, which is
quite distinct from the admiralty court, otherwise called the instance court. The whole sys-
tem of litigation and jurisprudence in the prize court is peculiar to itself. See Dougl. 594.
The judge of the admiralty court, though also the judge of the prize court, is appointed by a
commission under the great seal, which enumerates particularly, as well as generally, every
object of his jurisdiction, but not a word of prize. See Dougl. 614. The judge of the prize
court is appointed, and the court authorized, by a commission under the great seal directed to
him, to will and require the court of admiralty, and the lieutenant and judge of the same
court, his surrogate or surrogates, and they are thereby authorized and required to proceed
upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prize and reprisals, of all ships and goods that
are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine according to the course of the admiralty and
the law of nations.]
(7) Lord Mansfield is the judge here referred to.
The national equity and admiralty courts of the United States are mentioned in the note to
page 60. The several states have no admiralty courts, and some of them have no separate
courts of equity, but equitable remedies are administered in the courts of law. Cognizance
of probate cases is in the state governments exclusively, and courts of probate jurisdiction
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private and special, confined to particular spots, or instituted only to redress
particular injuries. These are:
I. The forest courts, instituted for the government of the king's forests, in
different parts of the kingdom, and for the punishment of all injuries done to
the king's deer or venison, to the vert or greensward, and to the covert in which
such deer are lodged. These are the courts of attachments, of regard, of
sweinmote and of justice-seat. The court of attachments, wood-mote, or forty
days court, is to be held before the verderors of the forest once in every forty
days; (a) and is instituted to inquire into all offenders against vert and veni-
son; (b) who may be attached by their bodies, if taken with the mainour (or
mainoeuvre, a manu), that is, in the very act of killing venison, or stealing
wood, or preparing so to do, or by fresh and immediate pursuit after the act is
done; (c) else they must be attached by their goods. And in this forty days
court the foresters or keepers are to bring in their attachments, *or present- [*72]
ments de viridi et venatione; and the verderors are to receive the same, [*2
and to enroll them, and to certify them under their seals to the court of justice-
seat, or sweinmote: (d) for this court can only inquire of, but not convict
offenders. 2. The court of regard or survey of dogs, is to be holden every third
year, for the lawing or expeditation of mastiffs, which is done by cutting off
the claws and ball (or pelote) of the fore-feet, to prevent them from running
after deer. (e) No other dogs but mastiffs are to be thus lawed or expeditate
for none other were permitted to be kept within the precincts of the forest; it
being supposed that the keeping of these, and these only, was necessary for the
defence of a man's house. (f) 3. The court of sweinmote is to be holden before
the verderors, as judges, by the steward of the sweinmote, thrice in every
year, (g) the sweins or freeholders within the forest composing the jury. The
principal jurisdiction of this court is, first, to inquire into the oppressions and
grievances committed by the officers of the forest; "de super-onerationeforest-
ariorum, et aliorum ministrorum forestce; et de eorum oppressionibus populo
regis illatis ;" and, secondly, to receive and try presentments certified from the
court of attachments against offences in vert and venison. (h) And this court
may not only inquire but convict also, which conviction shall be certified to the
court of justice-seat under the seals of the jury; for this court cannot proceed
to judgment. (i) But the principal court is, 4. The court of justice-seat, which
is held before the chief justice in eyre, or chief itinerant judge, capitalis justi-
tiarius in itinere, or his deputy; to hear and determine all trespasses within
the forest, and all claims of franchises, liberties and privileges, and all pleas
and causes whatsoever therein arising. (k) It may also proceed to try pre-
sentments in the inferior courts of the forest, and to give judgment upon con-
viction of the sweinmote. And the chief justice may therefore, after present-
ment made, or indictment found, but *not before, (1) issue his warrant [*73]
to the officers of the forest to apprehend the offenders. It may be held [ J
every third year; and forty days' notice ought to be given of its sitting. This
court may fine and imprison for offences within the forest, (m) it being a court
of record: and therefore a writ of error lies from hence to the court of king's
bench, to rectify and redress any mal-administrations of justice; (n) or the
chief justice in eyre may adjourn any matter of law into the court of king's
bench. (o) These justices in eyre were instituted by King Henry II, A. D.
1184; (p) and their courts were formerly very regularly held; but the last
(a) Cart. deforest. 9 Hen. II, c. 8. (b) 4 Inst. 289. (o) Carth. 79.
(d) Cart. de forest. c. 16. (e) Ibid. c. 6. (f) 4 Inst. 508. (q) Cart. deforest. c. 8.
h) Stat. 34 Edw. I, c. 1. (i) 4 Inst. 289. (k) 4 Inst. 291.
(t) Stat. 1 Edw. IIJ, c. 8. 7 Ric. II, c. 4. (m) 4 Inst. 313. (n) Ibid. 297.
(o) Ibid. 295. (p) Hoveden.
exist in all the states under different names and with more or less extensive powers. In
some states they have complete jurisdiction of all questions of administration and distribu-
tion; to the exclusion of the courts of chancery; and in some, also, the equity jurisdiction in
the case of infants is transferred, with more or less modification, to these courts.
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court of justice-seat of any note was that holden in the reign of Charles I, before
the earl of Holland; the rigorous proceedings at which are reported by Sir
William Jones. After the restoration another was held, pro forma only, before
the earl of Oxford; (q) but since the PEra of the revolution in 1688, the forest
laws have fallen into total disuse, to the great advantage of the subject.
II. A second species of restricted courts is that of commissioners of sewers.(1)
This is a temporary tribunal, erected by virtue of a commission under the great
seal; which formerly used to be granted pro re nata at the pleasure of the
crown, (r) but now at the discretion and nomination of the lord chancellor, lord
treasurer, and chief justices, pursuant to the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5. Their
jurisdiction is to overlook the repairs of sea banks and sea walls; and the
cleansing of rivers, public streams, ditches, and other conduits, whereby any
waters are carried off: and is confined to such county or particular district as
the commission shall expressly name. The commissioners are a court of record,
and may fine and imprison for contempt; (s) and in the execution of their duty
may proceed by jury, or upon their own view, and may take order for the
[*74] removal of any annoyances, or the *safeguard and conservation of the
sewers within their commission, either according to the laws and customs
of Romney-marsh,(t) or otherwise at their own discretion. They may also
assess such rates, or scots, upon the owners of lands within their district, as
they shall judge necessary; and, if any person refuses to pay them, the com-
missioners may levy the same by distress of his goods and chattels; or they may,
by statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5, sell his freehold lands (and by the 7 Ann. c. 10,
his copyhold also), in order to pay such scots or assessments. But their conduct
is under the control of the court of king's bench, which will prevent or punish
any illegal or tyrannical proceedings. (it) And yet, in the reign of King James I
(8 November, 1616), the privy council took upon them to order, that no
action or complaint should be prosecuted against the commissioners, unless
before that board; and committed several to prison who had brought such
actions at common law, till they should release the same: and one of the reasons
for discharging Sir Edward Coke from his office of lord chief justice was for
countenancing those legal proceedings.(v) The pretence for which arbitrary
measures was no other than the tyrant's plea,(w) of the necessity of unlimited
powers in works of evident utility to the public, "the supreme reason above all
reasons, which is the salvation of the king's lands and people." But now it is
clearly held, that this (as well as all other inferior jurisdictions) is subject to the
discretionary coercion of his majesty's court of king's bench.(x)
III. The court of policies of assurance, when subsisting, is erected in pur-
suance of the statute 43 Eliz. c. 12, which recites the immemorial usage of
policies of assurance, "by means whereof it cometh to pass, upon the loss or
[*75] perishing *of any ship, there followeth not the undoing of any man, but
the loss lighteth rather easily upon many than heavy upon few, and rather
upon them that adventure not, than upon those that do adventure: whereby all
merchants, especially those of the younger sort, are allured to venture more
willingly and more freely: and that heretofore such assurers had used to stand
so justly and precisely upon their credits, as few or no controversies had arisen
thereupon; and if any had grown, the same had from time to time been ended
and ordered by certain grave and discreet merchants appointed by the lord mayor
of the city of London; as men, by reason of their experience, fittest to under-
stand and speedily decide those causes :" but that of late years divers persons
had withdrawn themselves from that course of arbitration, and had driven the
(q) North's Life of Lord Guilford, 45. (r) F. N. B. 113. (s) Sid. 145.
(t) Romney-marsh, in the county of Kent, a tract containing 24,000 acres, is governed by certain ancient and
equitable laws of sewers, composed by Henry de Bathe, a venerable judge in the reirn of King Henry the
Third; from which laws all commissioners of sewers in England may receive light and direction. (4 Inst. 276.)
(u) Cro. Jac. 336. (v) Moor, 825, 826. See page 55. (w) Milt. parad. lost, iv, 393.
x) 1 Vent. 66. Salk. 146.
(1) The law regarding these commissioners has since been materially altered. See statutes
3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 22, and 2. and 2.5 Vic. c. 133.
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assured to bring separate actions at law against each assurer: it therefore ena-
bles the lord chancellor yearly to grant a standing commission to the judge of
the admiralty, the recorder of London, two doctors of the civil law, two com-
mon lawyers, and eight merchants; any three of which, one being a civilian or
a barrister, are thereby, and by the statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 23, empowered
to determine in a summary way all causes concerning policies of assurance in
London, with an appeal (by way of bill) to the court of chancery. But the
jurisdiction being somewhat defective, as extending only to London, and to no
other assurances but those on merchandise,(y) and to suits brought by the
assured only, and not by the insurers,(z) no such commission has of late years
issued: but insurance causes are now usually determined by the verdict of a
jury of merchants, and the opinion of the judges in case of any legal doubts;
whereby the decision is more speedy, satisfactory, and final, though it is to be
wished that some of the parliamentary powers invested in these commissioners,
especially for the examination of witnesses, either beyond the seas or speedily
going out of the kingdom,(a) could at present be adopted by the courts of
Westminster-hall, without requiring the consent of parties.(2)
*IV. The court of the marshalsea, and the palace-court at Westminster, ,6]
though two distinct courts, are frequently confounded together. The [" 1
former was originally holden before the steward and marshal of the king's house,
and was instituted to administer justice between the king's domestic servants,
that they might not be drawn into other courts, and thereby the king lose their
service.(b) It was formerly held in, though not a part of, the aula regis; (c)
and, when that was subdivided, remained a distinct jurisdiction: holding plea
of all trespasses committed within the verge of the court, where only one of the
parties is in the king's domestic service (in which case the inquest shall be
taken by a jury of the country), and of all debts, contracts, and covenants,
where both of the contracting parties belong to the royal household; and then
the inquest shall be composed of men of the household only.(d) By the statute
of 13 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 3, (in affirmance of the common law),(e) the verge of the
court in this respect extends for twelve miles round the king's place of resi-
dence.(f ) And, as this tribunal was never subject to the jurisdiction of the chief
justiciary, no writ of error lay from it (though a court of record) to the king's
bench but only to parliament, (g) till the statutes of 5 Edw. 111, c. 2, and 10 Edw.
III, st. 2, c. 3, which allowed such writ of error before the king in his palace. But
this court being ambulatory, and obliged to follow the king in all his progresses, so
that, by the removal of the household, actions were frequently discontinued(h)
and doubts having arisen as to the extent of its jurisdiction,(i) King Charles I,
in the sixth year of his reign, by his letters patent, erected a new court of record,
called the curia palatti or palace-court, to be held before the steward of the
household and knight-marshal, and the steward of the court, *or his
deputy; with jurisdiction to hold plea of all manner of personal actions
whatsoever, which shall arise between any parties within twelve miles of his
majesty's palace at Whitehall.(k) The court is now held once a week, together
with the ancient court of marshalsea, in the borough of Southwark: and a
writ of error lies from thence to the court of king's bench. But if the cause is
of any considerable consequence, it is usually removed on its first commence-
ment, together with the custody of the defendant, either into the king's bench
or common pleas, by a writ of habeas corpus cum causa; and the inferior busi-
(y) St1. 166. (z) 1 Show. 896. (a) Stat. 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 22, § 3 and 4.
(b) 1 iBulstr. 211. (A) Flet. 1. 2, c. 2.
(d) Artic. sup. cart. 28 Edw. I, c. 3. Stat. 5 Edw. III, c. 2. 10 Edw. III, st. 2, c. 2. (e) 2 Inst. 548.
f By the ancient Saxon constitution, the pax regia, or privilege of the king's palace, extended from his
palace gate to the distance of three miles, three furlongs, three acres, nine feet, nine palms, and nine barley-
corns; as appears from a fragment of the textus Rqffenesi, cited in Dr. Hicke's diertat. epietol. 114.
(g) 1 Bulstr. 211. 10 Rep. 79. (A) F. N. B. 241. 2 Inst. 548. (i) 1 Bulstr. 208.
(k) 1 Sid. 180. Salk. 419.
(2) The courts at Westminster have now the power of ordering the examination of wit-
nesses who are abroad.
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ness of the court hath of late years been much reduced, by the new courts of
conscience erected in the environs of London; in consideration of which the
four counsel belonging to these courts had salaries granted them for their lives
by the statute 23 Geo. II, c. 27.
V. A fifth species of private courts of a limited, though extensive, jurisdic-
tion are those of the principality of Wales; which, upon its thorough reduction,
and the settling of its polity in the reign of Henry the Eighth,(1) were erected
all over the country; principally by the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26,
though much had before been done, and the way prepared by the statute of
Wales, 12 Edw. I, and other statutes. By the statute of Henry the Eighth
before-mentioned, courts-baron, hundred, and county courts are there established
as in England. A session is also to be held twice in every year in each county,
by judges (m) appointed by the king, to be called the great sessions of the
several counties in Wales: in which all pleas of real and personal actions shall
be held, with the same form of process and in as ample a manner as in the court
of common pleas at Westminster: (n) and writs of error shall lie from judg-
ments therein (it being a court of record) to the court of king's bench at West-
minster. But the ordinary original writs of process of the king's courts at
[,,8] Westminster do not run into the principality of Wales: (o) though *process
*78] of execution does; (p) as do also all prerogative writs, as writs of certiorari,
quo minus, mandamus, and the like.(q) And even in causes between subject
and subject, to prevent injustice through family factions or prejudices, it is held
lawful (in causes of freehold at least, and it is usual in all others) to bring an
action in the English courts, and try the same in the next English county
adjoining to that part of Wales where the cause arises,(r) and wherein the venue
is laid. But, on the other hand, to prevent trifling and frivolous suits, it is
enacted by statute 13 Geo. III, c. 51, that in personal actions, tried in any
English county, where the cause of action arose, and the defendant resides
in Wales, if the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten pounds, he shall
be nonsuited and pay the defendant's costs, unless it be certified by the
judge that the freehold or title came principally in question, or that the cause
was proper to be tried in such English county. And if any transitory action,
the cause whereof arose and the defendant is resident in Wales, shall be brougql
in any English county, and the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten
pounds, the plaintiff shall be nonsuited, and shall pay the defendant's costs,
deducting thereout the sum recovered by the verdict.(3)
VI. The court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster is another special juris-
diction, held before the chancellor of the duchy or his deputy, concerning
all matter of equity relating to lands holden of the king in right of the
duchy of Lancaster: (s) which is a thing very distinct from the county
palatine (which hath also its separate chancery, for sealing of writs, and the
like),(t) and comprises much territory which lies at a vast distance from it; as
particularly a very large district surrounded by the city of Westminster. The
proceedings in this court are the same as on the equity side in the courts
of exchequer and chancery; (a) so that it seems not to be a court of record;
and indeed it has been holden that those courts have a concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the duchy court, and may take cognizance of the same causes.(v)
[*79] *VII. Another species of private courts, which are of a limited local
jurisdiction, and have at the same time an exclusive cognizance of pleas,
(1) See Book I, introduc. § 4. (m) Stat. 18 Eliz. c. 8.
(n) See, for farther regulations of the practice of these courts, stat. 5 Eliz. c. 25. 8 Eliz. c. 20. 8 Geo. I, c.
25, § 6 6 Geo. II, c. 14. 13 Geo. III, c. 51.
(o) 2 Roll. Rep. 141. (p) 2 Bulstr. 156. 2 Saund. 193. Raym. 206. (q) Cro. Jac. 484.
(r) Vaugh. 413. Hardr. 66. (s) Hob. 77. 2 Lev. 24. () 1 Ventr. 257. (u) 4 Inst. 206.
(v) 1 Chan. Rep. 55. Toth. 145. ttardr. 171.
(3) These distinctions are now abolished, and by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and 1 Win. IV, c. 70,
14, 5 Vic. c. 33, § 2, and 8 Vic. c. 11, the administration of justice in Wales is in every
respect rendered uniform with that of England, and the writs of the superior courts of com-
mon law run into that principality.
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in matters both of law and equity,(w) are those which appertain to the coun-
ties palatine of Chester, Lancaster, and Durham, and the royal franchise of
Ely.(x) (4) In all these, as in the principality of Wales, the king's ordinary
writs, issuing under the great seal out of chancery, do not run ; that is they
are of no force. For as originally all Jura regalia were granted to the lords of
these counties palatine, they had of course the sole administration of justice, by
their own judges, appointed by themselves and not by the crown. It would
therefore be incongruous for the king to send his writ to direct the judge of
another's court in what manner to administer justice between the suitors. But
when the privileges of these counties palatine and franchises were abridged by
statute 27 Henry VIII, c. 24, it was also enacted that all writs and process
should be made in the king's name, but should be tested or witnessed in the
name of the owner of the franchise. Wherefore all writs, whereon actions are
founded, and which have current authority here, must be under the seal of the
respective franchises; the two former of which ate now united to the crown,
and the two latter under the government of their several bishops. And the
judges of assize, who sit therein, sit by virtue of a special commission from the
owners of the several franchises, and under the seal thereof; and not by the
usual commission under the great seal of England. Hither also may be referred
the courts of the cinque ports, or five most important havens, as they formerly
were esteemed in the kingdom, viz.: Dover, Sandwich, Romney, Hastings, and
Hythe; to which Winchelsea and Rye have been since added; which have
also similar franchises in many respects (y) with the counties palatine, and
particularly an exclusive jurisdiction (before the mayor and jurats of the ports),
in which exclusive jurisdiction the king's ordinary writ does not run. A writ
of error lies from the mayor and jnrats of each port to the lord warden of
the cinque ports, in his court of Shepway; and from the court of Shepway
to the king's *bench.(z) So likewise a writ of error lies from all the other *80]
jurisdictions to the same supreme court of judicature,(a) as an ensign
of superiority reserved to the crown at the original creation of the franchises.
And all prerogative writs (as those of habeas corpus, prohibition, certiorari
and mandamus) may issue for the same reason to all these exempt jnrisdic-
tions; (b) because the privilege, that the king's writ runs not, must be intended
between party and party, for there can be no such privilege against the king.(c)
VIII. The stannary courts in Devonshire and Cornwall, for the administra-
tion of justice among the tinners therein, are also courts of record, but of the
same private and exclusive nature. They are held before the lord warden and
his substitutes, in virtue of a privilege granted to the workers in the tin mines
there, to sue and be sued only in their own courts, that they may not be drawn
from their business, which is highly profitable to the public, by attending their
law-suits in other courts.(d) The privileges of the tinners are confirmed by a
charter, 33 Edw. I, and fully expounded by a private statute,(e) 50 Edw. III,
which has since been explained by a public act, 16 Car. I, c. 15. What relates
to our present purpose is only this: that all tinners and labourers in and about
the stanneries shall, during the time of their working therein bona fide, be-
privileged from suits of other courts, and be only impleaded in the stannary
court in all matters, excepting pleas of land, life, and member. No writ of error
lies from hence to any court, in Westminster-hall; as was agreed by all the
judges (f) in 4 Jac. I. But an appeal lies from the steward of the court to the
under-warden; and from him to the lord-warden; and thence to the privy
(w) 4 Inst. 213, 218. Finch, R. 452. (x) See Book I, introd. § 4. (y) 1 Sid. 166.
(z) Jenk. 71. Dyversyte des courtes, t. bank le roy. I Sid. 356.
(a) Bro. Abr. t. error, 74, 101. Davis. 62. 4 Inst. 38, 214, 218. (b) 1 Sid. 92. (c) Cro. Jac. 543.
(d) 4 Inst. 232. (e) See this at length in 4 lust. 232. f) 4 Inst. 231.
(4) [The counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham are now united to the crown (6 and
7 Win. IV, c. 19), while that of Chester has been, by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and 7 Win. IV,
c. 70, abolished, and that of Ely by statutes 6 and 7 Win. IV, c. 87, and 7 Win. IV, and
1 Vic. c 53, also extinguished.
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council of the prince of Wales, as duke of Cornwall,(g) when he hath had livery
or investiture of the same.(h) And from thence the appeal lies to the king him-
self, in the last resort.(i)(5)
[*81] *IX. The several courts within the city of London,( ) and other cities,
boroughs, and corporations throughout the kingdom, held by prescrip-
tion, charter, or act of parliament, are also of the same private and limited
species. It would exceed the design and compass of our present inquiries, if I
were to enter into a particular detail of these, and to examine the nature and
extent of their several jurisdictions. It may in general be sufficient to say,
that they arose originally from the favour of the crown to those particular dis-
tricts, wherein we find them erected, upon the same principle that hundred-
courts, and the like, were established; for the convenience of the inhabitants,
that they may prosecute their suits and receive justice at home: that, for the
most part, the courts at Westminster-hall have a concurrent jurisdiction with
these, or else a superintendency over them,(k) and are bound by the statute 19
Geo. III, c. 70, to give assistance to such of them as are courts of record, by
issuing writs of execution, where the person or effects of the defendant are not
within the inferior jurisdiction : and that the proceedings in these special
courts ought to be according to the course of the common law, unless other-
wise ordered by parliament; for though the king may erect new courts, yet he
cannot alter the established course of law.
But there is one species of courts, constituted by act of parliament, in the
city of London, and other trading and populous districts, which in their pro-
ceedings so vary from the course of common law, that they may deserve a more
particular consideration. I mean the courts of requests, or courts of conscience,
for the recovery of small debts. The first of these was established in London,
so early as the reign of Henry the Eighth, by an act of their common council;
which however was certainly insufficient for that purpose and illegal, till con-
firmed by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 15, which has since been explained and amended
by statute 14 Geo. II, c. 10. The constitution is this: two aldermen, and four
commoners, sit twice a week to hear all causes of debt not exceeding the
*value of forty shillings; which they examine in a summary way, by
the oath of the parties or other witnesses, and make such order therein
as is consonant to equity and good conscience. The time and expense of
obtaining this summary redress are very inconsiderable, which make it a great
benefit to trade; and thereupon divers trading towns and other districts have
obtained acts of parliament, for establishing in them courts of conscience upon
nearly the same plan as that in the city of London.
The anxious desire that has been shown to obtain these several acts, proves
clearly that the nation in general is truly sensible of the great inconvenience
arising from the disuse of the ancient county and hundred courts; wherein
causes of this small value were always formerly decided, with very little trouble
and expense to the parties. But it is to be feared that the general remedy which
of late hath been principally applied to this inconvenience (the erecting these
new jurisdictions) may itself be attended in time with very ill consequences:
as the method of proceeding therein is entirely in derogation of the common
law; as their large discretionary powers create a petty tyranny in a set of stand-
ing commissioners; and as the disuse of the trial by jury may tend to estrange
the minds of the people from that valuable prerogative of Englishmen, which
(g) Ibid. 230. (h) 3 Bulstr. 183. (i) Doddridge, Hist. of Cornw. 94.
(j) The chief of those in London are the sheriff's courts, holden before their steward or judge; from which
a writ of error lies to the court of hAstings, before the mayor, recorder, and sheriffs; and from thence to justices
appointed by the king's commission, who nsed to sit in the church of St. Martin le grand. (F. N. B. 32.) And
from the judgment of those justices a writ of error lies immediately to the house of lords.
(k) Salk. 144, 263.
(5) [As the law now is, from the decisions of the vice-warden, both in equity and at com-
mon law, an appeal lies to the lord-warden, assisted by two or more members of the judi-
cial committee of the privy council, or judges of equity, or courts of law at Westminster;
and every judgment of the lord-warden is subject to an appeal to the house of lords.]
52
Chap. 6.] UNIVERSITY COURTS. 82
has already been more than sufficiently excluded in many instances. How much
rather is it to be wished that the proceedings in the county and hundred courts
could again be revived, without burdening the freeholders with too frequent and
tedious attendances; and at the same time removing the delays that have insen-
sibly crept into their proceedings, and the power that either party has of
transferring at pleasure their suits to the courts at Westminster! And we may
with satisfaction observe, that this experiment has been actually tried, and has
succeeded, in the populous county of Middlesex; which might serve as an
example for others. For by statute 23 Geo. II, c. 33, it is enacted, 1. That a
special county court should be held at least once a month in every hundred of
the county of *Middlesex, by the county clerk. 2. That twelve free- [*83]
holders of that hundred, qualified to serve on juries, and struck by the
sheriff, shall be summoned to appear at such court by rotation; so as none shall
be summoned oftener than once a year. 3. That in all causes not exceeding the
value of forty shillings, the county clerk and twelve suitors shall proceed in a
summary way, examining the parties and witnesses on oath, without the formal
process anciently used: and shall make such order therein as they shall judge
agreeable to conscience. 4. That no plaints shall be removed out of this court,
by any process whatsoever; but the determination herein shall be final. 5. That
if any action be brought in any of the superior courts against a person resident
in Middlesex, for a debt or contract, upon the trial whereof the jury shall find
less than 40s. damages, the plaintiff shall recover no costs, but shall pay the
defendant double costs; unless upon some special circumstances, to be certified
by the judge who tried it. 6. Lastly, a table of very moderate fees is prescribed
and set down in the act; which are not to be exceeded upon any account what-
soever. This is a plan entirely agreeable to the constitution and genius of the
nation: calculated to prevent a multitude of vexatious actions in the superior
courts, and at the same time to give honest creditors an opportunity of recover-
ing small sums; which now they are frequently deterred from by the expense
of a suit at law: a plan which, one would think, wants only to be generally
known in order to its universal reception.
X. There is yet another species of private courts, which I must not pass over
in silence, viz.: the chancellor's courts in the two universities of England.(G)
Which two learned bodies enjoy the sole jurisdiction, in exclusion of the king's
courts, over all civil actions and suits whatsoever, when a scholar or privileged
person is one of the parties; excepting in such cases where the right of freehold
is concerned. And these, by the university charter, they are at liberty to try
and determine, either according to the common law of the land, or according to
their own local customs, at their discretion; which has generally led them to
carry on their process in a *course much conformed to the civil law, for [*84]
reasons sufficiently explained in a former book.(1)
These privileges were granted, that the students might not be distracted from
their studies by legal process from distant courts, and other forensic avocations.
And privileges of this kind are of very high antiquity, being generally enjoyed
by all foreign universities as well as our own, in consequence (I apprehend) of a
constitution of the Emperor Frederick, A. D. 1158.(m) But as to England in
particular, the oldest charter that I have seen, containing this grant to the
university of Oxford, was 28 Hen. III, A. D. 1244. And the same privileges were
confirmed and enlarged by almost every succeeding prince, down to King Henry
the Eighth; in the fourteenth year of whose reign, the largest and most exten-
(A) Book I, introd. § 1. (m) Cod. 4, tit. 13.
(6) [As the object of the privilege is, that students and others connected with the universi-
ties should not be distracted from the studies and duties to be there performed, the party
proceeded against must in general be a resident member of the university, and that fact must
be expressly sworn, or be collected from the affidavit. The privilege of Cambridge differs
from that of Oxford: in the former, it only extends to causes of action accruing in the town
and its suburbs; but in Oxford it extends to all personal causes arising anywhere. R. T.
Hardw. 241; 2 Wils. 406; Bac. Ab., Universities.]
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sive charter of all was granted. One similar to which was afterwards granted
to Cambridge, in the third year of Queen Elizabeth. "But yet, notwithstanding
these charters, the privileges granted therein, of proceeding in a course differen,
from the law of the land, were of so high a nature that they were held to be
invalid; for though the king might erect new courts, yet he could not alter the
course of law by his letters patent. Therefore, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
an act of parliament was obtained,(n) confirming all the charters of the two
universities, and those of 14 Hen. VIII and 3 Eliz. by name. Which blessed
act, as Sir Edward Coke entitles it,(o) established this high privilege without
any doubt or opposition: (p) or, as Sir Matthew Hale (q) very fully expresses
the sense of the common law and the operation of the act of parliament.
"Although King Henry the Eighth, 14 A. R. sui, granted to the university a
liberal charter, to proceed according to the use of the university, viz.: by a
course much conformed to the civil law, yet that charter had not been sufficient
to have warranted such proceedings without the help of an act of parliament.
[*85] And, therefore, in 13 Eliz. *ail act passed, whereby that charter was in
effect enacted; and it is thereby that at this day they have a kind of civil
law procedure, even in matters that are of themselves of common law cogni-
zance, where either of the parties is privileged."
This privilege, so far as it relates to civil causes, is exercised at Oxford in the
chancellor's court; the judge of which is the vice-chancellor, his deputy or
assessor. From his sentence an appeal lies to delegates appointed by the con-
gregation ; from thence to other delegates of the house of convocation; and if
they all three concur in the same sentence it is final, at least by the statutes of
the university,(r) according to the rule of the civil law.(s) But, if there be
any discordance or variation in any of the three sentences, an appeal lies in the
last resort to judges delegates appointed by the crown under the great seal in
chancery.(7)
I have now gone through the several species of private, or special courts, of
the greatest note in the kingdom, instituted for the local redress of private
wrongs; and must, in the close of all, make one general observation from Sir
Edward Coke: (t) that these particular jurisdictions, derogating from the general
jurisdiction of the courts of common law, are ever strictly restrained, and can-
not be extended farther than the express letter of their privileges will most
explicitly warrant.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE WRONGS.
WE are now to proceed to the cognizance of private wrongs; that is, to
consider in which of the vast variety of courts, mentioned in the three pre-
ceding chapters, every possible injury that can be offered to a man's person or
property is certain of meeting with redress.
The authority of the several courts of private and special jurisdiction, or of
what wrongs such courts have cognizance, was necessarily remarked as those
respective tribunals were enumerated; and therefore need not be here again
repeated; which will confine our present inquiry to the cognizance of civil
injuries in the several courts of public or general jurisdiction. And the order
in which I shall pursue this inquiry, will be by showing: 1. What actions may
(n) 13 Eliz. e. 29. (o) 4 Inst. 227. (p) Jenk. Cent. 2 pl. 88. Cent. 3, pl. 33. Hard. 504. Godbolt. 201.
(q) Hist. C. L. 33. (r) Mrt. 21, § 19. (8) Cod. 7, 70, 1. (t) 2 Inst. 548.
(7) [The privilege of the university of Oxford is fully stated in 1 Q. B. 952. In the Matter of
the clzneelor, &C.
54
Chap. 7.] JURISDICTION OF ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS. 86
be brought, or what injuries remedied, in the ecclesiastical courts. 2. What in
the military. 3. What in the maritime. And, 4. What in the courts of com-
mon law.
And, with regard to the three first of these particulars, I must beg leave not
so much to consider what hath at any time been claimed or pretended to belong
to their jurisdiction, by the officers and judges of those respective courts; but
what the common law allows and permits to be so. For these eccentrical tribu-
nals (which are principally guided by the rules of the imperial and canon laws),
as they subsist and are *admitted in England, not by any right of their [*87]
own,(a), but upon bare sufferance and toleration from the municipal laws,
must have recourse to the laws of that country wherein they are thus adopted, to
be informed how far their jurisdiction extends, or what causes are permitted, and
what forbidden, to be discussed or drawn in question before them. It mat-
ters not, therefore, what the pandects of Justinian, or the decretals of Gregory,
have ordained. They are here of no more intrinsic authority than the laws of
Solon and Lycurgus: curious perhaps for their antiquity, respectable for their
equity, and frequently of admirable use in illustrating a point of history. Nor
is it at all material in what light other nations may consider this matter of
jurisdiction. Every nation must and will abide by its own municipal laws;
which various accidents conspire to render different in almost every country in
Europe. We permit some kinds of suits to be of ecclesiastical cognizance,
which other nations have referred entirely to the temporal courts; as concern-
ing wills and successions to intestate's chattels; and perhaps we may, in our
turn, prohibit them from interfering in some controversies, which on the con-
tinent may be looked upon as merely spiritual. In short, the common law of
England is the one uniform rule to determine the jurisdiction of our courts:
and, if any tribunals whatsoever attempt to exceed the limits so prescribed
them, the king's courts of common law may and do prohibit them ; and in some
cases punish their judges.(b)
Having premised this general caution, I proceed now to consider,
I. The wrongs or injuries cognizable by the ecclesiastical courts. I mean
such as are offered to private persons or individuals; which are cognizable by
the ecclesiastical court, not for reformation of the offender himself or party
injuring (pro salute animce, as is the case with immoralities in general, when
unconnected with private injuries), but for the sake of the party injured, to
make him a satisfaction and redress for *the damage which he has sus-
tained. And these I shall reduce under three general heads; of causes 88]
pecuniary, causes matrimonial, and causes testamentary.
1. Pecuniary causes, cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts, are such as arise
either from the withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting some
act relating to the church, whereby some damage accrues to the plaintiff;
towards obtaining a satisfaction for which he is permitted to institute a suit in
the spiritual court.(1)
The principal of these is the subtraction or withholding of tithes from the
parson or vicar, whether the former be a clergyman or a lay appropriator.(c)
But herein a distinction must be taken: for the ecclesiastical courts have no
jurisdiction to try the right of tithes unless between spiritual persons; (d)
but in ordinary cases, between spiritual men and lay men, are only to compel
the payment of them, when the right is not disputed.(e) By the statute or
rather writ (f) of circumspecte agatis (g) it is declared that the court christian
shall not be "prohibited from holding plea, "si rector petat versus varochianos
a) See book I, introd. § 1. (b) Hal. Hist. C. L. e. 2. (c) Stat. 32 Hen. VII, c. 7.
d) 2 Roll. Abr. 309, 310. Bro. Abr. t. jurisdiction, 85. (e) 2 Inst. 364, 489, 490.
(f) See Barrington, 123. 3 Pryn. Ree. 336. (g) 13 Edw. I, st. 4, or rather 9 Edw. II.
(1) This jurisdiction became unimportant under the operation of statute 6 and 7 Win. IV,
c. 71, and subsequent statutes for the commutation of tithes. And the statute 31 and 32 Vic.
c. 109, takes away wholly the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to compel the payment
of church rates.
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oblationes et decimas debitas et consuetas :" so that if any dispute arises whether
such tithes be due and accustoned, this cannot be determined in the ecclesiasti-
cal court, but before the king's courts of the common law; as such question
affects the temporal inheritance, and the determination must bind the real
property. But where the right does not come into question, but only the fact,
whether or no the tithes allowed to be due are really subtracted or withdrawn,
this is a transient personal injury, for which the remedy may properly be had
in the spiritual court; viz.: the recovery of the tithes, or their equivalent. By
statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 13, it is enacted, that if any person shall carry off
his predial tithes (viz. : of corn, hay, or the like), before the tenth part *is
[* duly set forth, or agreement is made with the proprietor, or shall wil-
lingly withdraw his tithes of the same, or shall stop or hinder the proprietor of
the tithes or his deputy from viewing or carrying them away; such offender
shall pay double the value of the tithes, with costs to be recovered before the
ecclesiastical judge, according to the king's ecclesiastical laws. By a former
clause of the same statute, the treble value of the tithes, so subtracted or with-
held, may be sued for in the temporal courts, which is equivalent to the double
value to be sued for in the ecclesiastical. For one may sue for and recover
in the ecclesiastical courts the tithes themselves, or a recompense for them,
by the ancient law; to which the suit for the double value is superadded
by the statute. But as no suit lay in the temporal courts for the sub-
traction of tithes themselves, therefore the statute gave a treble forfeiture,
if sued fbr there; in order to make the course of justice uniform by giving
the same reparation in one court as in the other. (h) However, it now
seldom happens that tithes are sued for at all in the spiritual court; for if
the defendant pleads any custom, modus, composition, or other matter whereby
the right of tithing is called in question, this takes it out of the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical judges: for the law will not suffer the existence of such a
right to be decided by the sentence of any single, much less an ecclesiastical,
judge; without the verdict of a jury. But a more summary method than
either of recovering small tithes under the value of 40s., is given by statute 7
and 8 Win. III, c. 6, by complaint to two justices of the peace ; and, by another
statute of the same year, c. 34, the same remedy is extended to all tithes with-
held by Quakers under the value of ten pounds.(2)
Another pecuniary injury, cognizable in the spiritual courts, is the non-pay-
ment of other ecclesiastical dues to the clergy: as pensions, mortuaries, compo-
sitions, offerings and whatsoever falls under the denomination of surplice-fees,
for marriages or other ministerial offices of the church: all which injuries are
[*901 redressed by a decree for their actual *payment. Besides which, all offer-
*9 ings, oblations and obventions not exceeding the value of 40s. may be
recovered in a summary way before two justices of the peace. (i) But care
must be taken that these are real and not imaginary dues; for, if they be con-
trary to the common law, a prohibition will issue out of the temporal courts to
stop all suits concerning them. As where a fee was demanded by the minister
of the parish for the baptism of a child, which was administered in another
place; (k) this, however authorized by the canon, is contrary to common
right: for of common right, no fee is due to the minister even for performing
such branches of his duty, and it can only be supported by a special custom; (1)
but no custom can support the demand of a fee without performing them at all.
For fees also, settled and acknowledged to be due to the officers of the ecclesi-
astical courts, a suit will lie therein; but not if the right of the fees is at all
disputable; for then it must be decided by the common law. (m) It is also
said, that if a curate be licensed, and his salary appointed by the bishop, and he
be not paid, the curate has a remedy in the ecclesiastical court; (n) but, if he
(A) 2 Inst. 250. (i) Stat. 7 and S W. I1, c. 6. (k) Salk. 332.
(1) Ibid. 334. Lord Raym. 450, 1558. Fitz. 55. (m) 1 Ventr. 165. (n) 1 Burn. eccl. law, 438.
(2) See the preceding note.
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be not licensed, or bath no such salary appointed, or bath made a special agree-
ment with the rector, he must sue for a satisfaction at common law; (o) either
by proving such special agreement, or else by leaving it to a jury to give damages
upon a quantum meruit, that is, in consideration of what he reasonably deserved
in proportion to the service performed. (3)
Under this head of pecuniary injuries may also be reduced the several matters
of spoliation, dilapidations, and neglect of repairing the church and things
thereunto belonging; for which a satisfaction may be sued for in the ecclesi-
astical court.
Spoliation is an injury done by one clerk or incumbent to another, in taking
the fruits of his benefice without any *right thereunto, but under a pre- [*91]
tended title. It is remedied by a decree to account for the profits so [
taken. This injury, when the jus patronaltus or right of advowson doth not
come in debate, is cognizable in the spiritual court: as if a patron first presents
A to a benefice, who is instituted and inducted thereto; and then, upon pre-
tence of a vacancy, the same patron presents B to the same living, and he also
obtains institution and induction. Now, if the fact of the vacancy be disputed,
then that clerk who is kept out of the profits of the living, whichever it be,
may sue the other in the spiritual court for spoliation, or taking the profits
of his benefice. And it shall there be tried, whether the living were or were
not vacant : upon which the validity of the second clerk's pretensions must
depend. (p) But if the right of patronage comes at all into dispute, as if one
patron presented A, and another patron presented B, there the ecclesiastical court
hath no cognizance, provided the tithes sued for amount to a fourth part of the
value of the living, but may be prohibited at the instance of the patron by the
king's writ of indicavit. (q) So also if a clerk, without any colour of title, ejects
another from his parsonage, this injury must be redressed in the temporal courts:
for it depends upon no question determinable by the spiritual law (as plurality of
benefices or no plurality, vacancy or no vacancy), but is merely a civil injury.
For dilap idations, which are a kind of ecclesiastical waste, either voluntary,
by pulling down; or permissive, by suffering the chaucel, parsonage-house and
other buildings thereunto belonging to decay; an action also lies, either in the
spiritual court by the canon law, or in the courts of common law; (r) (4) and it
may be brought by the successor against the predecessor if living, or, if dead,
then against his executors. It is also said to be good cause of deprivation, if
the bishop, parson, vicar or other ecclesiastical person dilapidates the buildings,
or cuts down timber growing on the patrimony of *the church, unless
for necessary repairs: (s) and that a writ of prohibition will also lie [*92]
against him in the courts of common law. (t) By statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, if any
spiritual person makes over or alienates his goods with intent to defeat his suc-
cessors of their remedy for dilapidations, the successor shall have such remedy
against the alienee, in the ecclesiastical court, as if he were the executor of
his predecessor. And by statute 14 Eliz. c. 11, all money recovered for dilap-
idations shall within two years be employed upon the buildings, in respect
whereof it was recovered, on penalty of forfeiting double the value to the
crown.
(o) 1 Freem. 70. (p) F. N. B. 36.
(q) Circumapeete aqatga 13 Edw. I, st. 4, Artie. Cleri. 9 Edw. Ii, c. 2. P. N. B. 45.
(r) Cart. 224. 3 Lev. 268. (8) 1 Roll. Rep. 86. 11 Rep. 98. Godb. 259. (t) 3 Bulstr. 138. 1 Roll. Rep. 885.
(3) [Now a proceeding in the ecclesiastical court is the only remedy: for the statute 1 and 2
Vic. c. 106, § 83, re-enacting a similar provision of the 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 12 and 57 Geo. III, c.
99, gives to the bishop a power to summarily hear and determine any difference between the
incumbent of a benefice and his curate touching the stipend of the latter, and to enforce the
payment of it by monition and by sequestration of the profits of the benefice. And the 109th
section of the same statute, also re-enacting a similar provision of the 57 Geo. III, c. 99,
enacts that wherever jurisdiction is given to a bishop or archbishop under the provisions of
that act, all other and concurrent jurisdiction shall wholly cease.]
(4) The usual and more effectual remedy is in the courts of common law, by action on the
case. See Radcliffe v. D'Oyly, 2 T. R. 630.
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As to the neglect of reparations of the church, church-yard and the like, the
spiritual court has undoubted cognizance thereof; (it) and a suit may be
brought therein for non-payment of a rate made by the church-wardens for
that purpose. (5) And these are the principal pecuniary injuries, which are
cognizable, or for which suits may be instituted, in ecclesiastical courts.
2. Matrimonial causes, or injuries respecting the rights of marriage, are
another, and a much more undisturbed, branch of the ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion. Though, if we consider marriages in the light of mere civil contracts,
they do not seem to be properly of spiritual cognizance. (v) But the Romanists
having very early converted this contract into a holy sacramental ordinance,
the church of course took it under her protection, upon the division of the two
jurisdictions. And, in the bands of such able politicians, it soon became an
engine of great importance to the papal scheme of an universal monarchy over
Christendom. The numberless canonical impediments that were invented, and
occasionally dispensed with, by the holy see, not only enriched the coffers of
the church, but gave it a vast asceldant over princes of all denominations;
whose marriages were sanctified or reprobated, their issue legitimated or bastard-
ized, and the succession to their thrones established or rendered precarious,
[*931 according *to the humor or interest of the reigning pontiff: besides a
thousand nice and difficult scruples, with which the clergy of those ages
puzzled the understandings and loaded the consciences of the inferior orders of
the laity; and which could only be unravelled and removed by these their
spiritual guides. Yet, abstracted from this universal influence, which affords
so good a reason for their conduct, one might otherwise be led to wonder, that
the same authority, which enjoined the strictest celibacy to the priesthood,
should think them the proper judges in causes between man and wife. These
causes, indeed, partly from the nature of the injuries complained of, and partly
from the clerical method of treating them, (w) soon became too gross for the
modesty of a lay tribunal. And causes matrimonial are now so peculiarly
ecclesiastical, that the temporal courts will never interfere in controversies of
this kind, unless in some particular cases. As if the spiritual court do proceed
to call a marriage in question after the death of either of the parties; this the
courts of common law will prohibit, because it tends to bastardize and disin-
herit the issue; who cannot so well defend the marriage, as the parties them-
selves when both of them living might have done. (x)
Of matrimonial causes, one of the first and principal is, 1. Causa jactitationis
matrimonii; when one of the parties boasts or gives out that he or she is mar-
ried to the other, whereby a common reputation of their matrimony may ensue.
On this ground the party injured may libel the other in the spiritual court;
and, unless the defendant undertakes and makes out a proof of the actual mar-
riage, he or she is enjoined perpetual silence upon that head; which is the only
remedy the ecclesiastical courts can give for this injury. 2. Another species of
matrimonial causes was, when a party contracted to another brought a suit in
the ecclesiastical court to compel a celebration of the marriage in pursuance of
such contract; but this branch of causes is now cut off entirely by the act for
[*94] preventing clandestine marriages, 26 Geo. II, *c. 33, which enacts, that
for the future no suit shall be had in any ecclesiastical court, to compel a
celebration of marriage infacie ecclesie, for or because of any cohtract of mat-
rimony whatsoever. 3. The suit for restitution of conjugal rights is also another
species of matrimonial causes: which is brought whenever either the husband
or wife is guilty of the injury of subtraction, or lives separate from the other
without any sufficient reason; in which case the ecclesiastical jurisdiction will
(u) Circumspecte agatis. 5 Rep. 66. (v) Warb. alliance, 173.
(w) Some of the impurest books, that are extant in any language, are those written by the popish clergy on
the subjects of matrimony and divorce. (x) Inst. 614.
(5) A summary remedy before two justices of the peace is now given. See Rex . Milnrow,
5 N. and S. 248; Richards v. Dyke, 11 Law J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 275.
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compel them to come together again, if either party be weak enough to desire
it, contrary to the inclination of the other. 4. Divorces also, of which, and
their several distinctions, we treated at large in a former book, (y) are causes
thoroughly matrimonial, and cognizable by the ecclesiastical judge. If it
becomes improper, through some supervenient cause arising ex post favlo, that
the parties should live together any longer; as through intolerable cruelty,
adultery, a perpetual disease, and the like; this unfitness or inability for the
marriage state may be looked upon as an injury to the suffering party; and for
this the ecclesiastical law administers the remedy of separation, or a divorce a
mensa et thoro. But if the cause existed previous to the marriage, and was
such a one as rendered the marriage unlawful ab initio, as consanguinity, cor-
poral imbecility, or the like; in this case the law looks upon the marriage to
have been always null and void, being contracted infraudem legis, and decrees
hot only a separation from bed and board, but a vinculo matrimonii itself.
5. The last species of matrimonial causes is a consequence drawn from one of
the species of divorce, that a mensa et thoro; which is the suit for alimony, a
term which signifies maintenance: which suit the wife, in case of separation,
may have against her husband, if he neglects or refuses to make her an allow-
ance suitable to their station in life. This is an injury to the wife, and the
court christian will redress it by assigning her a competent maintenance, and
compelling the husband by ecclesiastical censures to pay it. But no alimony
will be assigned in case of a divorce for adultery on her part; for as that
amounts to a forfeiture of her *dower after his death, it is also a sufficient
reason why she should not be partaker of his estate when living.(6)
3. Testamentary causes are the only remaining species belonging to the eccle-
siastical jurisdiction; (7) which, as they are certainly of a mere temporal
nature, (z) may seem at first view a little oddly ranked among matters of a
spiritual cognizance. And, indeed, (as was in some degree observed in a former
book) (a) they were originally cognizable in the king's courts of common law,
viz.: the county courts; (b) and afterwards transferred to the jurisdiction of the
church, by the favour of the crown, as a natural consequence of granting to
the bishops the administration of intestates' effects.
This spiritual jurisdiction of testamentary causes is a peculiar constitution
of this island; for in almost all other (even in popish) countries all matters
testamentary are under the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate. And that this
privilege is enjoyed by the clergy in England, not as a matter of ecclesiastical
right, but by the special favour and indulgence of the municipal law, and as it
should seem by some public act of the great council, is freely acknowledged by
Lindewode, the ablest canonist of the fifteenth century. Testamentary causes,
he observes, belong to the ecclesiastical courts "de consuetudine Anglite, et super
consensu regio et suorum procerun in talibus ab antiquo concesso."(c) The same
was, about a century before, very openly professed in a canon of Archbishop
Stratford, viz.: that the administratioii of intestates' goods was "ab olim"
granted to the ordinary, "consensu regio et magnatum regni Angliw."(d) The
(y) Book I, ch. 15. (z) Warburt. alliance, 173. (a) Book. I, ch. 32.
(b) Hickes's Disser. Epistolar. p. 8, 58. (c) Provincial. 1. 3, t. 13, fol. 176. (d) Ibid. 1. 3, t. 38, fol. 263.
(6) Jurisdiction in matrimonial and divorce causes is now transferred to the divorce court,
created by statute 20 and 21 Vic. c. 85, and made perpetual by subsequent statutes. The
judge of probate, lord chancellor and judges of the superior common law courts compose this
court, but the judge of probate is the judge ordinary, and may sit alone. In addition to its
jurisdiction to declare marriages null and to divorce parties, this court also has cognizance of
actions for criminal conversation, which are not now allowed to be brought in the common
law courts. It has jurisdiction, also, of cases in which a declaration of legitimacy is sought.
In divorce cases it may give alimony, and make order concerning the care and custody of
children. Issues of fact may be ordered to be tried by jury in this court, or sent to a court of
common law for trial. An appeal lies from the judge ordinary to the full court, and from
the full court, on decrees for nullity of marriage or divorce, to the house of lords.
(7) This jurisdiction, considerably enlarged, is now vested in the court of probate. See
statutes 20 and 21 Vic. c. 77, and 21 and 22 Vic. cc. 56 and 95. See note to page 67, ante.
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constitutions of Cardinal Otliobon also testify, that this provision "olim a prte-
latis cum approbatione regis et baronuin dicitur emanasse."(e) And Arch-
bishop Parker, (f) in Queen Elizabeth's time, affirms in express words, that
originally in matters testamentary, " non ullam habebant episcopi authoritatem,
prceter earn quam a rege acceptam referebant. Jus testamenta probandi non
[*96] *habebant : administrationis potestatem cuique delegare non poterant."
At what period of time the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of testaments and
intestacies began in England, is not ascertained by any ancient writer: and
Lindewode (g) very fairly confesses, "cuius regis temporibus hoc ordinatum sit,
non reperio." We find it indeed frequently asserted in our common law books,
that it is but of late years that the church hath had the probate of wills. (h)
But this must only be understood to mean that it hath not always had this pre-
rogative: for certainly it is of very high antiquity. Lindewode, we have seen,
declares that it was "ab anliquo;" Stratford, in the reign of King Edward III,
mentions it as "ab olim ordinalum;" and Cardinal Othobon, in the 52 Hen. III,
speaks of it as an ancient tradition. Bracton holds it for clear law in the same
reign of Henry III, that matters testamentary belonged to the spiritual court. (i)
And, yet earlier, the disposition of intestates' goods "per visum ecclesice" was
one of the articles confirmed to the prelates by King John's magna carta.(j)
Matthew Paris also informs us that King Richard I ordained in Normandy
"quod distributio rerum que in testamento relinquuntur autoritate ecclesim
fiet." And even this ordinance, of King Richard, was only an introduction of
the same law into his ducal dominions, which before prevailed in this kingdom;
for in the reign of his father, Henry II, Glanvil is express, that "si quis aliquid
dixerit contra testamentum, placitum illud in curia christianitatis audiri debet
et terminari."(k) And the Scots book, called regiamn majestaten, agrees verba-
tim with Glanvil in this point.(l)
It appears that the foreign clergy were pretty early ambitious of this branch
*97] of power; but their attempts to assume *it on the continent were effect-
ually curbed by the edict of the Emperor Justin,(m) which restrained the
insinuation or probate of testaments (as formerly) to the office of the magister
census: for which the emperor subjoins this reason: "A bsurdum et enim clericis
est, immo etiam opprobriosum, si peritos se velint ostendere disceptationum esse
forensiuia." But afterwards, by the canon law,(n) it was allowed that the
bishop might compel, by ecclesiastical censures, the performance of a bequest to
pious uses. And, therefore, as that was considered as a cause quw secundum
canones et episcopales leges ad regimen animarum pertinuit, it fell within the
jurisdiction of the spiritual courts by the express words of the charter of King
William I, which separated those courts from the temporal. And afterwards,
when King Henry I, by his coronation-charter, directed that the goods of an
intestate should be divided for the good of his soul,(o) this made all intestacies
immediately spiritual causes, as much as a legacy to pious uses had been before.
This, therefore, we may probably conjecture, was the wra referred to by Strat-
ford and Othobon, when the king, by the advice of the prelates, and with the
consent of his barons, invested the church with this privilege. And, accord-
ingly, in King Stephen's charter it is provided that the goods of an intestate
ecclesiastic shall be distributed pro salute anime ej us, ecclesiwv consilio ; (p) which
latter words are equivalent to per visum ecclesice, in the great charter of King
John, before mentioned. And the Danes and Swedes (who received the rudi-
ments of christianity and ecclesiastical discipline from England about the
beginning of the twelfth century), have thence also adopted the spiritual cog-
nizance of intestacies, testaments, and legacies.(q)
(e) Cap. 23. (f) See 9 Rep. 88. (g) Fol. 263.
(h) Fitz. Abr. tit. testament, pl. 4. 2 Roll. Abr. 217. 9 Rep. 37. Vaugh. 207.
(i) 1. 5, de exeeptfonibus, e. 10. (j) Cap. 27, edit. Oxon. (k) 1. 7, c. 38. (1) 1. 2, c. 38.
(in) Cod. 1, , 41. (n) Decretal. 8, 26, 17. Gilb. Rep. 204, 205.
(o) Si quis baronum se hominum meoum-pecuniam suam non dederit vel dare dieposuerit, uxor sua, sive
Diberi, aut parentes et legitini horndes ejue, earn pro anima ejus dividant, s4ut eie meliwa visum fuert. (Text.
Rtoffens. e. 34, p. 51.)
(p) Lord Lyttlet. Hen. II, vol. i, 536. Hearne ad Gul. Neubr. 711. (q) Stiernhook, de jure Sueon. 1. 3, c. 8.
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This jurisdiction, we have seen, is principally exercised with us in the con-
sistory courts of every diocesan *bishop, and in the prerogative court of 9
the metropolitan, originally; and in the arches court and court of dele- I*8
gates, by way of appeal. It is divisible into three branches: the probate of
wills, the granting of administrations, and the suing for legacies. The two
former of which, when no opposition is made, are granted merely ex officio et
debito justitice, and are then the object of what is called the voluntary, and not
the contentious jurisdiction. But when a caveat is entered against proving the
will or granting administration, and a suit thereupon follows to determine either
the validity of the testament, or who hath a right to administer; this claim and
obstruction by the adverse party are an injury to the party entitled, and as such
are remedied by the sentence of the spiritual court, either by establishing the
will or granting the administration. Subtraction, the withholding or detaining
of legacies, is also still more apparently injurious, by depriving the legatees of
that right with which the laws of the land and the will of the deceased have
invested them: and, therefore, as a consequential part of testamentary juris-
diction, the spiritual court administers redress herein, by compelling the executor
to pay them. But in this last case the courts of equity exercise a concurrent
jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts, as incident to some other species of
relief prayed by the complainant; as to compel the executor to account for the
testator's effects, or assent to the legacy, or the like. For, as it is beneath the
dignity of the king's courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdictions,
the cause, when once brought there, receives there also its full determination.
These are the principal injuries for which the party grieved either must, or
may, seek his remedy in the spiritual courts. But before I entirely dismiss this
head, it may not be improper to add a short word concerning the method of
proceeding in these tribunals, with regard to the redress of injuries.
It must (in the first place) be acknowledged, to the honour of the spiritual
courts, that though they continue to this *day to decide many questions [*99]
which are properly of temporal cognizance, vet justice is in general so [*99]
ably and impartially administered in those trfbunals (especially of the superior
kind), and the boundaries of their power are now so well known and established,
that no material inconvenience at present arises from this jurisdiction still con-
tinuing in the ancient channel. And, should an alteration be attempted, great
confusion would probably arise, in overturning long-established forms, and new-
modelling a course of proceedings that has now prevailed for seven centuries.
The establishment of the civil law process in all the ecclesiastical courts was
indeed a masterpiece of papal discernment, as it made a coalition impracticable
between them and the national tribunals, without manifest inconvenience and
hazard. And this consideration had undoubtedly its weight in causing this
measure to be adopted, though many other causes concurred. The time when
the pandects of Justinian were discovered afresh, and rescued from the dust of
antiquity, the eagerness with which they were studied by the popish ecclesiastics,
and the consequent dissensions between the clergy and the laity of England,
have formerly (r) been spoken to at large. I shall only now remark upon those
collections, that their being written in the Latin tongue, and referring so much
to the will of the prince and his delegated officers of justice, sufficiently recom-
mended them to the court of Rome, exclusive of their intrinsic merit. To keep
the laity in the darkest ignorance, and to monopolize the little science, which
then existed, entirely among the monkish clergy, were deep-rooted principles of
papal policy. And, as the bishops of Rome, affected in all points to mimic the
imperial grandeur, as the spiritual prerogatives were moulded on the pattern of
the temporal, so the canon law process was formed on the model of the civil
law: the prelates embracing with the utmost ardour a method of judicial pro-
ceedings which was carried on in a language unknown to the bulk of the people,
which banished the intervention of a jury (that bulwark of *Gothic
liberty), and which placed an arbitrary power of decision in the breast of [*100]
a single man.
(r) Book I, introd. J 1.
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The proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts are therefore regulated according
to the practice of the civil and canon laws; or rather according to a mixture
of both, corrected and new-modelled by their own particular usages, and the
interposition of the courts of common law. For, if the proceedings in the
spiritual court be ever so regularly consonant to the rules of the Roman law,
vet if they be manifestly repugnant to the fundamental maxims of the munici-
pal laws, to which upon principles of sound policy the ecclesiastical process
ought in every state to conform(s) (as if they require two witnesses to prove a
fact, where one will suffice at common law); in such cases a prohibition will
be awarded against them.(t) But, under these restrictions, their ordinary
course of proceeding is; first, by citation, to call the party injuring before them.
Then, by libel, libellus, a little book, or by articles drawn out in a formal alle-
gation, to set forth the complainant's ground of complaint. To this succeeds
the defendant's answer upon oath, when, if he denies or extenuates the charge,
they proceed to proofs by witnesses examined, and their depositions taken down
in writing, by an officer of the court. If the defendant has any circumstances
to offer in his defence, he must also propound them in what is called his defen-sive allegation, to which he is entitled in his turn to the plaintiff's answer upon
oath, and may from thence proceed to proofs as well as his antagonist. The
canonical doctrine of purgation, whereby the parties were obliged to answer
upon oath to any matter, however criminal, that might be objected against
them (though long ago overruled in the court of chancery, the genius of the
English law having broken through the bondage imposed on it by its clerical
chancellors, and asserted the doctrines of judicial as well as civil liberty), contin-
ued to the middle of the last century to be upheld by the spiritual courts; when
the legislature was obliged to interpose, to teach them a lesson of similar mode-
[*101] ration. By the *statute of 13 Car. II, c. 12, it is enacted, that it shall
not be lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical judge, to tender or admin-
ister to any person whatsoever, the oath usually called the oath ex officio, or
any other oath whereby he may be compelled to confess, accuse, or purge him-
self of any criminal matter or thing, whereby he may be liable to any censure
or punishment. When all the pleadings and proofs are concluded, they are
referred to the consideration, not of a jury, but of a single judge; who takes
information by hearing advocates on both sides, and thereupon forms his inter-
locutory decree or definitive sentence at his own discretion: from which there
generally lies an appeal, in the several stages mentioned in a former chapter ;(u)
though if the same be not appealed from in fifteen days, it is final, by the stat-
ute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19.
But the point in which these jurisdictions are the most defective, is that of
enforcing their sentences when pronounced; for which they have no other pro-
cess but that of excommunication; which is des6ribed(v) to be twofold; the
less, and the greater excommunication. (8) The less is an ecclesiastical censure,
excluding the party from the participation of the sacraments: the greater pro-
ceeds farther, and excludes him not only from these, but also from the company
of all christians. But, if the judge of any spiritual court excommunicates a
man for a cause of which he hath not the legal cognizance, the party may have
(s) Warb. alliance, 179. (t) 2 Roll. Abr. 300, 302. (u) Chap. 5. (v) Co. Litt. 133.
(8) [The act, 58 Geo. III, c. 127, prohibits excommunication, and the writ de excommuni-
cato capiendo as a mode of enforcing performance or obedience to ecclesiastical orders and
decrees; and instead of the sentence of excommunication in those cases, the court is to pro-
bounce the defendant contumacious, and the ecclesiastical judge is to send his siqniftroavit in
the prescribed form to the chancery, from which a writ de contumace capiendo is to issue in the
prescribed form, and which is to have the same force as the ancient writ. There is a similar
act as to Ireland. 54 Geo. III, c. 68. In other cases, not of disobedience to the orders and
decrees of the court, there may be excommunication, and a writ de excommunicato capiendo
as heretofore. In the proceedings under this statute, it must clearly appear, that the eccle-
siastical court had jurisdiction, and that the form of proceedings has been duly observed.
5 Bar. and Al. 791; 3 Dowl. and R. 570.]
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an action against him at common law, and he is also liable to be indicted at the
suit of the king.(w)
Heavy as the penalty of excommunication is, considered in a serious light,
there are, notwithstanding, many obstinate or profligate men, who would des-
pise the hrutum fulmen of mere ecclesiastical censures, especially when pro-
nounced by a petty surrogate in the country, for railing or contumelious words,
for non-payment of fees, or costs, or for other trivial causes. The common
law therefore compassionately steps in to *the aid of the ecclesiastical [*1a2]
jurisdiction, and kindly lends a supporting hand to an otherwise totter-
ing authority. Imitating herein the policy of our British ancestors, among
whom, according to Caesar,(x) whoever were interdicted by the Druids from
their sacrifices, "in numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur: ab iis omnes
decedunt, aditum eorum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incom-
modi accipiant: neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honos ullus commu-
nicatur." And so with us by the common law an excommunicated person is
disabled to do any act that is required to be done by one that is probus et
legalis horno. He cannot serve upon juries, cannot be a witness in any court,
and, which is the worst of all, cannot bring an action, either real or personal,
to recover lands or money due to him.(y) Nor is this the whole: for if, within
forty days after the sentence has been published in the church, the offender does
not submit and abide by the sentence of the spiritual court, the bishop may
certify such contempt to the king in chancery. Upon which there issues out a
writ to the sheriff of the county, called, from the bishop's certificate, a signi-
ficavit; or from its effects a writ de excommunicato capiendo; and the sheriff
shall thereupon take the offender, and imprison him in the county gaol, till he
is reconciled to the church, and such reconciliation certified by the bishop;
upon which another'writ, de excommunicato deliberando, issues out of chancery
to deliver and release him. (z) This process seems founded on the charter of
separation (so often referred to) of William the Conqueror. "Si aliquis per
superbiant elatus ad justitiam epis copalem venire noluerit, vocetur semel,
secundo, et tertio: quod si nec sic ad emendationem venerit, excommuniceter; et,
si opus fuerit, ad hoc vindicaudum .fortitudo et justitia regis sive vicecomitis
adhibeatur." And in case of subtraction of tithes, a more summary and expe-
ditious assistance is given by the statutes of 27 Hen. VIII, c. 20, and 32 Hen.
VIII, c. 7, which enact, that upon complaint of any contempt or misbehaviour
to the ecclesiastical judge by the defendant in any suit for tithes, any privy
counsellor, or any *two justices of the peace (or. in case of disobedience
to a definitive sentence, any two justices of the peace), may commit [*103]
the party to prison without bail or mainprize, till he enters into a recognizance
with sufficient sureties to give due obedience to the process and sentence of the
court. These timely aids, which the common and statute laws have lent to the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, may serve to refute that groundless notion which
some are too apt to entertain, that the courts at Westminster-hall are at open var-
iance with those at doctors' commons. It is true that they are sometimes
obliged to use a parental authority, in correcting the excesses of these inferior
courts, and keeping them within their legal bounds; but, on the other hand,
they afford them a parental assistance in repressing the insolence of contuma-
cious delinquents, and rescuing their jurisdiction from that contempt, which for
want of sufficient compulsive powers would otherwise be sure to attend it.(9)
II. I am next to consider the injuries cognizable in the court military, or
court of chivalry. The jurisdiction of which is declared by statute 13 Ric. II,
(w) 2 Inst. 623. (x) De bello Gd1. 1. 6. (y) Litt. § 201. (z) F. N. B. 62.
(9) [The jurisdiction of these courts in cases of brawling, except as between persons in
holy orders, has been taken away by 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32, which has given power to justices
of the peace to fine or imprison persons found guilty of unlawfully interfering with any
clergyman in holy orders during the service, or of making disturbance in churches or chapels,
churchyards or burial grounds. And the jurisdiction to entertain suits for defamation was
abolished by 18 and 19 Vic. c. 41.]
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c. 2, to be this: "that it hath cognizance of contracts touching deeds of arms
or of war, out of the realm, and also of things which touch war within the
realm, which cannot be determined or discussed by the common law; together
with other usages and customs to the same matters appertaining." So that
wherever the common law can give redress, this court hath no jurisdiction
which has thrown it entirely out of use as to the matter of contracts, all such
being usually cognizable in the courts of Westminster-hall, if not directly, at
least by fiction of law: as if a contract be made at Gibraltar, the plaintiff may
suppose it made at Northampton; for the locality, or place of making it, is of
no consequence with regard to the validity of the contract.
The words, "other usages and customs," support the claim of this court,
1. To give relief to such of the nobility and gentry as think themselves aggrieved
in matters of honour; and 2. To keep up the distinction of degrees and
L.104] *quality. Whence it follows, that the civil jurisdiction of this court of
chivalry is principally in two points; the redressing injuries of honour,
and correcting encroachments in matters of coat-armour, precedency, and other
distinctions of families.
As a court of honour, it is to give satisfaction to all such as are aggrieved in
that point; a point of a nature so nice and delicate, that its wrongs and injuries
escape the notice of the common law, and yet are fit to be redressed somewhere.
Such, for instance, as calling a man a coward, or giving him the lie; for which,
as they are productive of no immediate damage to his person or property, no
action will liein the courts at Westminster: and yet they are such injuries as
will prompt every man of spirit to demand some honourable amends, which by
the ancient law of the land was appointed to be given in the court of chivalry.(a)
But modern resolutions have determined, that how much soever such a juris-
diction may be expedient, yet no action for words will at present lie therein.(b)
And it hath always been most clearly holden, (c) that as this court cannot med-
dle with any thing determinable by the common law, it therefore can give no
pecuniary satisfaction or damages, inasmuch as the quantity and determination
thereof is ever of common law cognizance. And, therefore, this court of chiv-
alry can at most only order reparation in point of honour; as, to compel the
defendant mendacium sibi ipsi imponere, or to take the lie that he has given
upon himself, or to make such other submission as the laws of honour may
require. (d) Neither can this court, as to the point of reparation in honour,
hold plea of any such word or thing, wherein the party is relievable by the courts
of common law. As if a man gives another a blow, or calls him thief or mur-
derer; for in both these cases the common law has pointed out his proper rem-
edy by action.
[*105] *As to the other point of its civil jurisdiction, the redressing of
encroachments and usurpations in matters of heraldry and coat-armour:
it is the business of this court, according to Sir Matthew Hale, to adjust the
right of armorial ensigns, bearings, crests, supporters, pennons, &c.; and also
rights of place or precedence, where the king's patent or act of parliament
(which cannot be overruled by this court) have not already determined it.
The proceedings in this court are by petition, in a summary way; and the
trial not by a jury of twelve men, but by witnesses, or by combat.(e) But as it
cannot imprison, not being a court of record, and as by the resolutions of the
superior courts it is now confined to so narrow and restrained a jurisdiction, it
has fallen into contempt and disuse. The marshalling of coat-armour, which
was formerly the pride and study of all the best families in the kingdom, is now
greatly disregarded; and has fallen into the hands of certain officers and attend-
ants upon this court, called heralds, who consider it only as a matter of lucre,
and not of justice: whereby such falsity and confusion have crept into their
records, (which ought to be the standing evidence of families, descents, and
coat-armour,) that, though formerly some credit has been paid to their testi-
a) Year-book, 37 Hen. VI, 21. Selden of duels, c. 10. Hal. Hist. C. L. 37.
) Salk. 533. 7 Mod. 125. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 4. (c) Hal. Hist. C. L. 37.
d) 1 Roll. Abr. 128. (e) Co. Litt. 261.
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mony, now even their common seal will not be received as evidence in any court
of justice in the kingdom.(f) But their original visitation books, compiled
when progresses were solemnly and regularly made into every part of the king-
dom, to inquire into the state of families, and to register such marriages and
descents as were verified to them upon oath, are allowed to be good evidence of
pedigrees.(g) And it is much to be wished that this practice of visitation at
certain periods were revived; for the failure of inquisitions post mortem, by the
abolition of military tenures, combined with the negligence of the heralds in
omitting their usual progresses, has rendered the proof of a modern descent,
*for the recovery of an estate, or succession to a title of honour, more
difficult than that of an ancient. This will be indeed remedied for
the future, with respect to claims of peerage, by a late standing order (h) of
the house of lords; directing the heralds to take exact accounts, and preserve
regular entries of all peers and peeresses of England, and their respective
descendants; and that an exact pedigree of each peer and his family shall, on
the day of his first admission, be delivered into the house by garter, the principal
king-at-arms. But the general inconvenience, affecting more private succes-
sions, still continues without a remedy.
III. Injuries cognizable by the courts maritime, or admiralty courts, are the
next object of our inquiries. These courts have jurisdiction and power to try
and determine all maritime causes; or such injuries, which, though they are in
their nature of common law cognizance, yet being committed on the high seas,
out of the reach of our ordinary courts of justice, are therefore to be remedied
in a peculiar court of their own. All admiralty causes must be therefore causes
arising wholly upon the sea, and not within the precincts of any county. (i)
For the statute 13 Ric. II, c. 5, directs that the admiral and his deputy shall
not meddle with any thing, but only things done upon the sea; and the statute
15 Ric. II, c. 3, declares that the court of the admiral hath no manner of cogni-
zance of any contract, or of any other thing, done within the body of any county,
either by land or by water; nor of any wreck of the sea: for that must be cast on
land before it becomes a wreck. (j) But it is otherwise ofthings.flotsam,.1etsam,
and ligan; for over them the admiral hath jurisdiction, as they are in and upon
the sea. (k) If part of any contract, or other cause of action, doth arise upon
the sea, and part upon the land, the common law excludes the admiralty court
from its jurisdiction; for, part belonging properly to one cognizance and
jart to another, the common or general law takes place of the particular. (1)
*Therefore, though pure maritime acquisitions, which are earned and [*107]
become due on the high seas, as seamen's wages, are one proper object
of the admiralty jurisdiction, even though the contract for them be made upon
land; (m) yet, in general, if there be a contract made in England, and to be
executed upon the seas, as a charter-party or covenant that a ship shall sail to
Jamaica, or shall be in such a latitude by such a day; or a contract made upon
the sea to be performed in England, as a bond made on shipboard to pay money
in London or the like; these kinds of mixed contracts belong not to the ad-
miralty jurisdiction, but to the courts of common law. (n) And indeed it hath
been farther holden, that the admiralty court cannot hold plea of any contract
under seal. (o) (10)
(/,) 2 Roll. Abr. 686. 2 Jon. 224. (y) Comb. 63. (A) 11 May, 1767.
(e) Co. Litt. 260. Rob. 79. (J) See book I, ch. 8. (k) 5 Rep. 106. (1) Co. Litt. 261.
(m) 1 Ventr. 146. (n) Hob. 12. Hal. Hist. C. L. 35. (o) Rob. 212.
(10) [The case cited scarcely warrants the text. For the admiralty has jurisdiction over an
hypothecation-bond, although it was executed on land and under seal. IMenetone v. Gibbons,
3 T. R. 267. Cases which are said to have determined the point mentioned in the text occurred
upon seamen's wages; over which the admiralty had undoubted jurisdiction, but in such it
was ruled that the special agreement took it away. See Howe v. Nappier, 4 Burr. 1950, cited
in and in effect overruled by Menetone v. Gibbons. The cases which have been mentioned in
addition to that cited from Hob. 212, and Howe v. Napier, are Day v. Searle, 2 Str. 968, and
Opy a. Addison, 12 Mod. 38; Salk 31, S. C. And it should upon the whole seem that when-
VoL. 1I.-9 C5
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And also, as the courts of common law have obtained a concurrent jurisdiction
with the court of chivalry with regard to foreign contracts, by supposing them
made in England; so it is no uncommon thing for a plaintiff to feign that a
contract, really made at sea, was made at the royal exchange, or other inland
place, in order to draw the cognizance of the suit from the courts of admiralty
to those of Westminster-hall. (p) This the civilians exclaim against loudly, as
inequitable and absurd; and Sir Thomas Ridley (q) hath very gravely proved it
to be impossible for the ship in which such cause of action arises to be really at
the royal exchange in Cornhill. But our lawyers justify this fiction, by alleging
(as before) that the locality of such contracts is not at all essential to the merits
of them; and that learned civilian himself seems to have forgotten how much
such fictions are adopted and encouraged in the Roman law: that a son killed
in battle is supposed to live forever for the benefit of his parents; (r) and that
by the fiction of postliminium and the lex Cornelia, captives, when freed from
bondage, were held to have never been prisoners, (s) and such as died in captivity
were supposed to have died in their own country. (t)
[* 108] *Where the admiral's court hath not original jurisdiction of the cause,though there should arise in it a question that is proper for the cogni-
zance of that court, yet that doth not alter nor take away the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the common law. (u) And so vice versa, if it bath jurisdiction of the
original, it bath also jurisdiction of all consequential questions, though prop-
erly determinable at common law. (v) Wherefore, among other reasons, a suit
for beaconage of a beacon standing on a rock in the sea may be brought in the
court of admiralty, the admiral having an original jurisdiction over beacons.(w)
In case of prizes also in time of War, between our own nation and another, or
between two other nations, (11) which are taken at sea, and brought into our
ports, the courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the same according to the law of nations. (x) (12)
(p) 4 Inst. 134. (q) View of the civil law, b. 3, p. 1, § 3. (r) Inst. 1, tit. 25.
(s) Ff. 49, 15, 12, § 6. (t) 8f. 49. 15, 18. (e) Comb. 462.
(v) 13 Rep. 53. 2 Lev. 25. Hard. 183. (w) 1 Si. 158. (x) 2 Show. 232. Comb. 444.
ever the admiralty court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, as in the hypothecation of a
ship, the mere seal upon land will not take it away. And now by statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 655, s. 6,
the court may in certain cases adjudicate on claims for services and repairs, although not on
the high seas; and by 9 and 10 Vic. c. 99, its jurisdiction in matters of wreck and salvage is
regulated.] The admiralty court act, of 1861, now regulates the procedure and practice of the
court.
In the United States the admiralty and prize jurisdiction is in the district courts of the
United States, and is very full and complete in civil cases. See 1 Kent, 353, et seq.; Conkling's
Treatise, part 3; Parsons on Maritime Law. Late decisions of the supreme court of the
United States seem to give these courts substantially the same jurisdiction in respect to the
great interior lakes which they possess in respect to the ocean.
The criminal jurisdiction of these courts is only such as by acts of congress is conferred
upon them: U. S. v. McGill, 4 Dall. 426; U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; U. S. a. Wiltberger,
5 id. 76; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320. These acts, however, are designed to confer juris-
diction of all cases properly cognizable in admiralty.
(11) This remark is not accurate. The validity of maritime captures must be determined in
a court of the captor's government, sitting either in his own country or in that of its ally.
Wheat. Int. Law, part 4, c. 2, § 13-16; Halleck Int. Law, 749, and authorities cited; 1 Kent, 103.
(12) Mr. Justice Coleridge calls attention to the fact that the author takes no notice of what
is very material, that there are, in fact, two courts: the admiralty court, or, more properly,
the instance court, of which he has hitherto been speaking, and the prize court. Both these
courts have, indeed, the same judge, but in the former he sits by virtue of a commission under
the great seal, which enumerates the objects of his jurisdiction, but specifies nothing relative
to prize; while in the latter he sits by virtue of a commission which issues in every war,
under the great seal of the lord high admiral, requiring the court of admiralty, and the
lieutenant and judge of the same court, "to proceed upon all and all manner of captures,
seizures, prizes and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be taken," &c.
Now by statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 65, the court of admiralty has jurisdiction of questions of
booty at war, and by statute 13 and 14 Vic. cc. 26 and 27, jurisdiction of questions relating to
the attack and capture of pirates. And by statutes 7 and 8 Vic. c. 2, and 12 and 13 Vic. c. 9ll,
offences committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty may be tried in the ordinary
criminal courts.
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The proceedings of the courts of admiralty bear much resemblance to those of
the civil law, but are not entirely founded thereon: and they likewise adopt and
make use of other laws, as occasion requires; such as the Rhodian laws and the
laws of Oleron. (y) For the law of England, as has frequently been observed,
doth not acknowledge or pay any deference to the civil law considered as such;
but merely permits its use in such cases where it judged its determinations
equitable, and therefore blends it, in the present instance, with other marine laws:
the whole being corrected, altered and amended by acts of parliament and com-
mon usage; so that out of this composition a body of jurisprudence is extracted,
which owes its authority only to its reception here by consent of the crown and
people. The first process in these courts is frequently by arrest of the defendant's
person; (z) and they also take recognizauces or stipulations of certain fidejus-
sors in the nature of bail, (a) and in case of default may *imprison both [*109]
them and their principal.(b) They may also fine and imprison for a con-
tempt in the face of the court. (c) And all this is supported by immemorial
usage, grounded on the necessity of supporting a jurisdiction so extensive; (d)
though opposite to the usual doctrines of the common law: these being no courts
of record, because in general their process is much conformed to that of the civil
law. (e)
IV. I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of the
common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark, that all possible
injuries whatsoever, that do not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either
the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals, are for that very reason within
the cognizance of the common law courts of justice. For it is a settled and
invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. The definition and
explication of these numerous injuries, and their respective legal remedies, will
employ our attention for many subsequent chapters. But before we conclude
the present, I shall just mention two species of injuries, which will properly fall
now within our immediate consideration: and which are, either when justice is
delayed by an inferior court that has proper cognizance of the cause; or, when
such inferior court takes upon itself to examine a cause and decide the merits
without a legal authority.
1. The first of these injuries, refusal or neglect of justice, is remedied either by
writ of procedendo, or of mandamus. A writ of procedendo ad .]udicium issues
out of the court of chancery, where judges of any subordinate court do delay the
parties; for that they will not give judgment, either on the one side or on the other,
when they ought so to do. In this case a writ of procedendo shall be awarded,
commanding them in the king's name to proceed to judgment; but without
specifying any particular judgment, for that (if erroneous) may *be set [*110]
aside in the course of appeal, or by writ of error or false judgment: and
upon farther neglect or refusal, the judges of the inferior court may be punished
for their contempt, by writ of attachment returnable in the king's bench or
common pleas. (f)
A writ of mandamus is, in general, a command issuing in the king's name
from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or
inferior court of judicature within the king's dominions, requiring them to do
some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and
duty, and which the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least
supposes, to be consonant to right and justice. It is a high prerogative writ, of
a most extensively remedial nature; and may be issued in some cases where the
injured party has also another more tedious method of redress, as in the case of
admission or restitution to an office; (13) but it issues in all cases where the
(y) Hale, Hist. C. L. 86. Co. Litt. 11. (z) Clerkeprax. our. adm. 13.
(a) Ibid. § 11. 1 Roll. Abr. 531. Raym. 78. Lord Raym. 1286. (6) 1 Roll. Abr. 531. Godb. 193, 260.
(C) 1 Ventr. 1. (d) 1 Keb. 552. (e) Bro. Abr. t. error, 177. VJ) F. N. B. 153, 154, 240.
(13) The writ of mandamus is only issued where there is a clear legal right, and the party
has no other remedy. Shipley v. _Mechanics' Bank, 10 Johns. 484; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616;
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party hath a right to have any thing done, and hath no other specific means of
compelling its performance. A mandamus therefore lies to compel the admis-
sion or restoration of the party applying to any office or franchise of a public
nature, whether spiritual or temporal; to academical degrees; to the use of a
meeting-house, &c.: it lies for the production, inspection, or delivery of public
books and papers; for the surrender of the regalia of a corporation; to oblige
bodies corporate to affix their common seal; to compel the holding of a court;
and for an infinite number of other purposes, which it is impossible to recite
minutely. But at present we are more particularly to remark, that it issues to
the judges of any inferior court, commanding them to do justice according to
the powers of their office, whenever the same is delayed. For it is the peculiar
business of the court of king's bench to superintend all inferior tribunals, and
therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers, with
which the crown or legislature have invested them: and this not only by
[*1111 restraining their excesses, but also by quickening *their negligence, and
obviating their denial of justice. A mandamus may therefore be had to
the courts of the city of London, to enter up judgment; (g) to the spiritual
courts to grant an administration, to swear a church-warden, and the like. This
writ is grounded on a suggestion, by the oath of the party injured, of his own
right, and the denial of justice below: whereupon, in order more fully to satisfy
the court that there is a probable ground for such interposition, a rule is made
(except in some general cases, where the probable ground is manifest) directing
the party complained of to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not
issue: and, if he shows no sufficient cause, the writ itself is issued, at first in
the alternative, either to do thus, or signify some reason to the contrary; to
which a return, or answer, must be made at a certain day. And, if the
inferior judge, or other person to whom the writ is directed, returns or signifies
an insufficient reason, then there issues in the second place aperemptory manda-
mus, to do the thing absolutely; to which no other return will be admitted, but
a certificate of perfect obedience and due execution of the writ. If the inferior
judge or other person makes no return, or fails in his respect and obedience, he
is punishable for his contempt by attachment. But, if he, at the first, returns
a sufficient cause, although it should be false in fact, the court of king's bench
will not try the truth of the fact upon affidavits ; but will for the present believe
him, and proceed no farther on the mandamus. But then the party injured
(g) Raym. 214.
People v. Judges of Oneida C. P., 21 Wend. 20; People v. Supervisors, 11 N. Y. 563; People v.
Judges of Branch C. C., 1 Doug. Mich. 319; St. Luke's Church v. Slack, 7 Cush. 226; James v.
Commissioners, 13 Penn. St. 72.
Its office is to compel the performance of a ministerial act, but not to control the exercise
of judicial discretion. Ferris v. Munn, 2 N. J. 161; Lamar v. Marshall, 21 Ala. 772; People v
Auditor General, 3 Mich. 427; Ex parte Davenport, 6 Pet. 661.
It cannot command an act to be done which, without the writ, the officer or court would
have no power to perform. Johnson v. Lucas, 11 Humph. 306; State v. Judge, &c., 15 Ala. 740.
It may compel an inferior court to take action, but cannot require it to come to any particular
conclusion. Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick. 242; People v. Inspectors, &c., 4 Mich. 187;
U. S. a. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42; Hoyt, ex pare, 13 Pet. 290; Elkins v. Athearn, 2 Denio, 191. But
where an inferior court takes unauthorized action it may be compelled by this writ to vacate it
if the party has no other remedy. Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 647; People v. Judges, &c.,
1 Cow. 576; Ten Eyck v. Farlee, 1 Harr. 269; People v. Judges, &c., 1 Doug. Mich. 434.
Though generally used to enforce the performance of public duties, it may also be resorted
to for the enforcement of private rights when withheld by public or corporate officers. People
v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328; Case v. Wresler, 4 Ohio, N. S. 561; Nourse v. Merriam, 8 Cush. 11 ;
Helm v. Swiggett, 12 Ind. 194. But in the case of neglected public duties, a private citizen
will not generally be permitted to move for this writ; the attorney general is the proper
relator. Sanger v. County Cm'rs, 25 Me. 291; Heffner v. Commonwealth, 28 Penn. St. 108;
Hamilton v. State, 3 Ind. 458; People v. Regents of University, 4 Mich. 98.
The supreme court of the United States issues this writ in cases falling within the federal
jurisdiction, and the supreme court of each state also issues it in proper cases. And in some
of the states inferior courts are allowed to issue the writ.
Chap. 7.] WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
may have an action against him for his false return, and (if found to be false by
the jury) shall recover damages equivalent to the injury sustained; together
with a peremptory mandamus to the defendant to do his duty.(14) Thus much
for the injury of neglect or refusal of justice.
2. The other injury, which is that of encroachment of jurisdiction, or calling
one coram non .udice, to answer in a court that has no legal cognizance of the
cause, is also a grievance, for which the common law has provided a remedy by
the writ of prohibition.
*A prohibition is a writ issuing properly only out of the court of king's
bench, being the king's prerogative writ; but, for the furtherance of justice, [*112]
it may now also be had in some cases out of the court of chancery, (h) common
pleas,(i)or exchequer, (k) (15) directed to thejudge and parties of a suit in any inferior
court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon stggestion,
that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does
not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court. This
writ may issue either to inferior courts of common law; as, to the courts of the
counties palatine or principality of Wales, if they hold plea of land or other
matters not lying within their respective franchises; (1) to the county-courts
or courts-baron, where they attempt to hold plea of any matter of the value of
forty shillings: (m) or it may be directed to the courts christian, the university
courts, the court of chivalry, or the court of admiralty, where they concern
themselves with any matter not within their jurisdiction; as if the first should
attempt to try the validity of a custom pleaded, or the latter a contract made or
to be executed within this kingdom. Or, if, in handling of matters clearly
within their cognizance, they transgress the bounds prescribed to them by the
laws of England, as wherb they require two witnesses to prove the payment of
a legacy, a release of tithes, (n) or the like; in such cases also a prohibition will
be awarded. For, as the fact of signing a release, or of actual payment, is not
properly a spiritual question, but only allowed to be decided in those courts,
because incident or accessory to some original question clearly within their
jurisdiction ; it ought therefore, where the two laws differ, to be decided not
according to the spiritual, but the temporal law; else the same question might
be determined different ways, according to the court in which the suit is depend-
ing: an impropriety, which no wise government can or ought to endure,
*and which is therefore a ground of prohibition. (16) And if either the [*113]
judge or the party shall proceed after such prohibition, an attachment
may be had against them, to punish them for the contempt, at the discretion of
(A) 1 P. Wms. 476. (1) Rob. 15. (A1) Palmer, 523. () Lord Raym. 1408.
(m) Finch, L. 451. (n) Cro. Eliz. 666. Rob. 188.
(14) [However, by statute 1 Wm. IV, c. 21 s. 3, the prosecutor may now in all cases of man-
damus (as he could by statute 9 Anne, c. 20, in certain special cases) plead to or traverse the
matters in any return, and proceed and obtain damages as in an action for a false return, with-
out the necessity of bringing such action as heretofore; and by section 6 the costs on all appli-
cations for mandamus are to be in the discretion of the court. And now by statute 6 and 7
Vic. c. 67, on such return being made, the person prosecuting the writ may object to the
validity of such return by way of demurrer, and thereupon the writ and return and the demurrer
shall be entered upon record, and proceedings shall be taken as upon a demurrer to pleadings;
and by section 2 upon judgment being given thereon, error may be brought for reversing the
same in like manner as in ordinary civil actions.]
(15) In the United States it may be issued by the supreme court to the United States dis-
strict courts when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. And in the
several states, the supreme court of the state may issue the writ in proper cases. As to the
cases in which it is proper generally, see Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 531; People v. Wayne
Circuit Court, 11 Mich. 393; State v. Nathan, 4 Rich. 513; Mayo v. James, 12 Grat. 17.
(16) [The temporal courts cannot take notice of the practice of ecclesiastical courts, or enter-
tain a question whether, in any particular cause admitted to be of ecclesiastical cognizance,
the practice has been regular. The only instances in which the temporal courts can interfere
by way of prohibiting any particular proceeding in an ecclesiastical suit, are those in which
something is done contrary to the general law of the land, or manifestly out of the jurisdiction
of the court. Ex parte Smyth, 3 A. and E. 724.]
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the court that awarded it; (o) and an action will lie against them, to repair
the party injured in damages.
So long as the idea continued among the clergy, that the ecclesiastical state
was wholly independent of the civil, great struggles were constantly maintained
between the temporal courts and the spiritual, concerning the writ of prohibi-
tion and the proper object of it; even from the time of the constitutions of
Clarendon, made in opposition to the claims of Archbishop Becket, in 10 Hen. II,
to the exhibition of certain articles of complaint to the king by Archbishop
Bancroft, in 3 Jac. I, on behalf of the ecclesiastical courts: from which, and
from the answers to them signed by all the judges of Westminster-hall, (p)
much may be collected concerning the reasons of granting and methods of pro-
ceeding upon prohibitions. A short summary of the latter is as follows: The
party aggrieved in the court below applies to the superior court, setting forth in
a suggestion upon record the nature and cause of his complaint, in being drawn
ad aliud examen, by a jurisdiction or manner of process disallowed by the laws
of the kingdom: upon which, if the matter alleged appears to the court to be
sufficient, the writ of prohibition immediately issues; commanding the judge
not to hold, and the party not to prosecute, the plea. (17) But sometimes the
point may be too nice and doubtful to be decided merely upon a motion: and
then, for the more solemn determination of the question, the party applying
for the prohibition is directed by the court to declare in prohibition; that is, to
prosecute an action, by filing a declaration, against the other, upon a supposi-
tion or fiction (which is not traversable) (q) that he has proceeded in the suit
below, notwithstanding the writ of prohibition. And if, upon demurrer and
argument, the court shall finally be of the opinion, that the matter suggested is
[*114] good and sufficient ground of *prohibition in point of law, then judg-
ment with nominal damages shall be given for the party complaining,
and the defendant, and also the inferior court, shall be prohibited from proceed-
ing any farther. On the other hand, if the superior court shall think it no com-
petent ground for restraining the inferior jurisdiction, then judgment shall be
given against him who applied for the prohibition in the court above, and a
writ of consultation shall be awarded; so called, because, upon deliberation and
consultation had, the judges find the prohibition to be ill-founded, and therefore
by this writ they return the cause to its original jurisdiction, to be there deter-
mined, in the inferior court. And, even in ordinary cases, the writ of prohi-
bition is not absolutely final and conclusive. For though the ground be a
proper one in point of law, for granting the prohibition, yet if the fact that
gave rise to it be afterwards falsified, the cause shall be remanded to the priorurisdiction. If, for instance, a custom be pleaded in the spiritual court; a pro-
hibition ought to go, because that court has no authority to try it: but, if the
fact of such a custom be brought to a competent trial, and be there found false,
a writ of consultation will be granted. For this purpose the party prohibited
may appear to the prohibition, and take a declaration, (which must always pur-
sue the suggestion), and so plead to issue upon it; denying the contempt and
traversing the custom upon which the prohibition was grounded; and if that
issue be found for the defendant, he shall then have a writ of consultation. The
(o) F. N. B. 40. (p) 2 Inst. 601-618. (q) Barn. Not. 4to, 148.
(17) [The general grounds for a prohibition to the ecclesiastical courts are, either a defect of
jurisdiction or a defect in the mode of trial. If any fact be pleaded in the court below, and
the parties are at issue, the court has no jurisdiction to try it, because it cannot proceed accord-
ing to the rules of the common law; and in such case a prohibition lies. Or where the spir-
itual court has no original jurisdiction, a prohibition may be granted even after sentence.
But where it has jurisdiction, and gives a wrong judgment, it is the subject-matter of appeal,
and not of prohibition. Lord Kenyon, 3 T. R. 4. But when a prohibition is granted after
sentence, the want of jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the proceedings of the spirit-
ual court. Id. Cowp. 422. See also 4 T. R. 382. See also 2 H. B. 69, 100; 3 East, 472. The
ancient practice as to the writ of prohibition has been much simplified and improved by stat-
ute 1 Win. IV, c. 21.]
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writ of consullation may also be, and is frequently, granted by the court with-
out any action brought; when, after a prohibition issued, upon more mature
consideration the court are of opinion that the matter suggested is not a good
and sufficient ground to stop the proceedings below. Thus careful has the law
been, in compelling the inferior courts to do ample and speedy justice; in
preventing them from transgressing their due bounds; and in allowing them
the undisturbed cognizance of such causes as by right, founded on the usage of
the kingdom or act of parliament, do properly belong to their jurisdiction.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, RESPECTING THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS.
THE former chapters of this part of our Commentaries having been employed
in describing the several methods of redressing private wrongs, either by the
mere act of the parties, or the mere operation of law; and in treating of the
nature and several species of courts; together with the cognizance of wrongs
or injuries by private or special tribunals, and the public ecclesiastical, military,
and maritime jurisdictions of this kingdom; I come now to consider at large,
and in a more particular manner, the respective remedies in the public and
general courts of common law, for injuries or private wrongs of any denomina-
tion whatsoever, not exclusively appropriated to any of the former tribunals.
And herein I shall, first, define the several injuries cognizable by the courts of
common law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particular injury:
and shall, secondly, describe the method of pursuing and obtaining these reme-
dies in the several courts.
First, then, as to the several injuries cognizable by the courts of common
law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particular injury. And, in
treating of these, I shall at present confine myself to such wrongs as may be
committed in the mutual intercourse between subject and subject; which the
king, as the fountain of justice, is officially bound to redress in the ordinary
forms of law: reserving such *injuries or encroachments as may occur *116]
between the crown and the subject, to be distinctly considered here- I
after, as the remedy in such cases is generally of a peculiar and eccentrical
nature.
Now, since all wrong may be considered as merely a privation of right, the
plain, natural remedy for every species of wrong is the being put in possession
of that right, whereof the party injured is deprived. This may either be effected
by a specific delivery or restoration of the subject-matter in dispute to the legal
owner; as when lands or personal chattels are unjustly withheld or invaded:
or, where that is not a possible, or at least not an adequate remedy, by making
the sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction in damages; as in case of assault, breach
of contract, &c.: to which damages the party injured has acquired an incom-
plete or inchoate right, the instant he receives the injury; (a) though such right
be not fully ascertained till they are assessed by the intervention of the law.
The instruments whereby this remedy is obtained (which are sometimes con-
sidered in the light of the remedy itself) are a diversity of suits and actions,
which are defined by the Mirror (b) to be "the lawful demand of one's right:"
or, as Bracton and Fleta express it, in the words of Justinian,(c) Jus prose-
quendi in .judicio quod alicui debetur.
The Romans introduced, pretty early, set forms for actions and suits in their
law, after the example of the Greeks; and made it a rule that each injury
(a) See book II, ch. 29. (b) C. 2, § 1. (c) Inst. 4, 6, pr.
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should be redressed by its proper remedy only. "A ctiones," say the pandects,
"compositce sunt, quibus inter se homines disceptarent: quas actiones ne Ipojiu-
lies prout vellet institueret, certas solennesque esse voluerunt."(d) The forms
of these actions were originally preserved in the books of the pontifical col-
lege, as choice and inestimable secrets; till one Cneius Flavius, the secreLary of
Appius Claudius, stole a copy and published them to the people.(e) The
[*117] *concealment was ridiculous: but the establishment of some standard
was undoubtedly necessary to fix the true state of a question of right;
lest in a long and arbitrary process it might be shifted continually, and be at
length no longer discernible. Or, as Cicero expresses it,(f) "sunt jura, sunt
.formulce, de omnibus rebus constitutce, ne quis aut in genere injuriw, aut
ratione actionis, errare possit. Expressw enim sunt ex uniuscuiusque damno,
dolore, incommodo, calamitate, injuria, publice a prwtore formuice, ad quas
privata lis accommodatur." And in the same manner our Bracton, speaking
of the original writs upon which all our actions are founded, declares them
to be fixed and immutable, unless by authority of parliament.(g) And all the
modern legislatures of Europe have found it expedient, from the same reasons,
to fall into the same or a similar method. With us in England the several
suits, or remedial instruments of justice, are from the subject of them dis-
tinguished into three kinds; actions personal, real and mixed.(1)
Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt or personal duty,
or damages in lieu thereof: and likewise, whereby a man claims a satisfaction
in damages for some injury done to his person or property. The former are
said to be founded on contracts, the latter upon torts or wrongs: and they are
the same which the civil law calls "actiones in personam, quce adversus eum
intenduntur, qui ex contractu vel delicto obligatus est aliquid dare vel con-
cedere."(h) Of the former nature are all actions upon debt or promises; of
the latter all actions for trespasses, nuisances, assaults, defamatory words, and
the like.
Real actions (or, as they are called in the Mirror,(i) feudal actions), which
concern real property only, are such whereby the plaintiff, here called the
demandant, claims title to have any lands or tenements, rents, commons, or
r*118] other *hereditaments, in fee-simple, fee-tail, or for term of life. By these
L1 1 0 Jactions formerly all disputes concerning real estates were decided; but
they are now pretty generally laid aside in practice, upon account of the great
nicety required in their management; and the inconvenient length of their
process: a much more expeditious method of trying titles being since intro-
duced by other actions personal and mixed.
Mixed actions are suits partaking of the nature of the other two, wherein
some real property is demanded, and also personal damages for a wrong sus-
tained. As, for instance, an action of waste: which is brought by him who hath
the inheritance, in remainder or reversion, against the tenant for life, who bath
committed waste therein, to recover not only the land wasted, which would make
it merely a real action ; but also treble damages, in pursuance of the statute of
Gloucester,(k) which is a personal recompense; and so both being joined
together, denominate it a mixed action.
Under these three heads may every species of remedy by suit or action in the
courts of common law be comprised. But in order effectually to apply the
remedy, it is first necessary to ascertain the complaint. I proceed, therefore,
now to enumerate the several kinds, and to inquire into the respective natures
(d) r'; 1, 2, 2, § 6. (e) Cie. pro Murana, § 1, de orat. 1. 1, c. 41. () Pro Qu. ?oscdo. § 8.
(g) nunt qutdam brevia formata super certis an us de curu, et de communt consilio totius regni ap.pro..ta
st concessa, quav quidem nudlatenus mutari poterint absque consensu et voluntate eorum. L. 5, de exceptonibus,
c. 17, § 2.
(h) Inst. 4, 6, 15. (1) C. 2, § 6. (k) 6 Edw. I, c. 15.
(1) All real and mixed actions are now abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, cc. 27, 36,
except actions for dower, quare impedit and ejectment, and a new proceeding in ejectment
was substituted for that form of action by the common law procedure act of 1852.
INJURIES AFFECTING PERSONAL SECURITY.
of all private wrongs, or civil injuries, which may be offered to the rights of
either a man's person or his property; recounting at the same time the respect-
ive remedies which are furnished by the law for every infraction of right. But
I must first beg leave to premise, that all civil injuries are of two kinds, the one
without force or violence, as slander or breach of contract; the other, coupled
with for;ce and violence, as batteries or false imprisonment. (1) Which latter
species savour something of the criminal kind, being always attended with some
violation of the peace; for which, in strictness of law, a fine ought to be paid
to the king, as *well as a private satisfaction to the party injured. (m) [*119]
And this distinction of private wrongs, into injuries with and without
force, we shall find to run through all the variety of which we are now to treat.
In considering of which, I shall follow the same method that was pursued with
regard to the distribution of rights: for as these are nothing else but an in-
fringement or breach of those rights, which we have before laid down and
explained, it will follow that this negative system of wrongs must correspond
and tally with the former positive system of rights. As, therefore, we divide (n)
all rights into those of persons and those of things, so we must make the same
general distribution of injuries into such as affect the rights of persons, and
such as affect the rights of property.
The rights of persons, we may remember, were distributed into absolute and
relative: absolute, which were such as appertained and belonged to private men,
considered merely as individuals, or single persons; and relative, which were
incident to them as members of society, and connected to each other by various
ties and relations. And the absolute rights of each individual were defined to
be the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of
private property, so that the wrongs or injuries affecting them must conse-
quently be of a corresponding nature.
I. As to injuries which affect the personal security of individuals, they are
either injuries against their lives, their limbs, their bodies, their health, or their
reputations.
1. With regard to the first subdivision, or injuries affecting the life of man,
they do not fall under our present contemplation; being one of the most atro-
cious species of crimes, the subject of the next book of our Commentaries. (2)
(/) Finch, L. 184. (m) Finch, L. 198. Jenk. Cent. 185. (n) See book I, ch. 1.
(2) [For injury to life, in general, cannot be the subject of a civil action; the civil remedy
being merged in the offence to the public. Therefore an action will not lie for battery of wife
or servant, whereby death ensued. Styles, 347; 1 Lev. 247; Yelv. 89, 90; 1 Ld. Raym. 839.
The remedy is by indictment for murder, or, formerly, by appeal, which the wife might have
for killing her husband, provided she married not again before or pending her appeal; or the
heir male for the death of his ancestor, and which differed principally from an indictment in
respect of its not being in the power of the king to pardon the offender without the appellor's
consent. See post, book 4, 312, 6; 5 Burr. 2643. But appeals of murder, treason, felony, and
other offences, were abolished by 59 Geo. III, c. 46, s. 1. In general, all felonies suspend the
civil remedies: Styles, 346, 347; and before conviction of the offender there is no remedy
against him at law or in equity: id; 17 Ves. 331; but after conviction and punishment on an
indictment of the party for stealing, the party robbed may support trespass or trover against
the offender. Styles, 347; Latch. 144; Sir Wm. Jones, 147; 1 Lev. 247; Bro. Ab. tit. Tres-
pass. And after an acquittal of the defendant, upon an indictment for a felonious assault
upon a party by stabbing him, the latter may maintain trespass to recover damages for the
civil injury, if it be not shown that he colluded in procuring such acquittal. 12 East, 409. In
some cases, by express enactment, the civil remedy is not affected by the criminality of the
offender.]
That no civil action will lie at the common law for causing the death of a human being,
see Whitford v. Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465; Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co., 1 Cush. 475; Ohio
and M. R. R. Co. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366; Eden v. L. and F. R. R. Co., 14 B. Monr. 204. But
where death does not at once ensue, a person entitled to the services of the person injured
may recover for the loss accruing between the injury and the death, and this recovery will not
be barred by the death. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.
And now, by statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93, whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
such wrongful act, neglect or default, as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action for damages, the person who would have been liable to
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*2, 3. The two next species of injuries, affecting the limbs or bodies
of individuals, I shall consider in one and the same view. And these
may be committed, 1. By threats and menaces of bodily hurt, through fear of
which a man's business is interrupted. A menace alone, without a consequent
inconvenience, makes not the injury: but to complete the wrong, there must be
both of them together. (o) The remedy for this is in pecuniary damages, to be
recovered by action of trespass vi et armis;(p) this being an inchoate, though
not an absolute violence. 2. By assault; which is an attempt or offer to beat
another, without touching him: as if one lifts up his cane, or his fist in a
threatening manner at another; or strikes at him, but misses him; this is an
assault, insultus, which Finch(q) describes to be "an unlawful setting upon one's
person." This also is an inchoate violence, amounting considerably higher than
bare threats; and, therefore, though no actual suffering is proved, yet the party
injured may have redress by action of trespass vi et armis ; wherein he shall
recover damages as a compensation for the injury. (3) 3. By battery; which is
the unlawful beating of another. The least touching of another's person wil-
fully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between differ-
ent degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage
of it; every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle
with it, in any the slightest manner. (4) And, therefore, upon a similar prin-
ciple the Cornelian law de injuriis prohibited pulsation as well as verberation;
distinguishing verberation, which was accompanied with pain, from pulsation,
which was attended with none. (r) But battery is, in some cases, justifiable or
lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent, or master, gives moderate
correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice. So also on the principle
of self-defence: for if one strikes me first, or even only assaults me, I may strike
in my own defence; and, if sued for it, may plead son assault demesne, or that
[*121] it was the plaintiff's *own original assault that occasioned it. So like-
wise in defence of my goods or possession, if a man endeavours to deprive
me of them, I may justify laying hands upon him to prevent him; and in case
(o) Finch, L. 22. (p) Regist. 104. 27 Ass. 11. 7 Edw. IV, 24.(q) Finch, L. 202. (r) -ly. 47, 10, 5.
such action may be sued by the executor or administrator, for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent, or child of the person deceased. The damages awarded are apportioned among the
persons for whose benefit the action is brought, as the jury may direct. Similar statutes have
been passed in the United States.
The English doctrine above stated in this note - that the civil reinedy for an injury by
a felony is suspended until the criminal remedy has been pursued - is generally held
inapplicable in the United States, where the duty of prosecuting for public offences is
devolved upon a public officer. See cases collected, 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 329, et seq.
(3) [An assault is an attempt or offer, accompanied by a degree of violence, to commit some
bodily harm, by any means calculated to produce the end, if carried into execution. Level-
ling a gun at another within a distance, from which, supposing it to have been loaded, the
contents might wound, is an assault. Bac. Ab. Assault, A. Abusive words alone cannot con-
stitute an assault, and indeed may sometimes so explain the aggressor's intent, as to prevent an
act, prima facie an assault, from amounting to such an injury; as when a man, during assize
time, in a threatening posture, half drew his sword from its scabbard, and said, if it were not
that it is assize time, I would run you through the body; this was held to be no assault, the
words explaining that the party did not mean any immediate injury. 1 Mod. 3; Bul. N. P. 15;
Vin. Ab. Trespass, A. 2. The intention as well as the act constitutes an assault. 1 Mod. 3,
case 13.]
(4) [A battery is an unlawful touching the person of another by the aggressor himself, or
any other substance put in motion by him. 1 Saund. 29, b. n. 1; id. 13 and 14, n. 3. Taking
a hat off the head of another is no battery. 1 Saund. 14. It must be either ooilfully com-
mitted, or proceed from want of due care: Stra. 596; Hob. 134; Plowd. 19; otherwise it is
damnum absque injuria, and the party aggrieved is without remedy: 3 Wils. 303; Bac. Ab.
Assault and Battery, B.; but the absence of intention to commit the injury constitutes no ex-
cuse, where there has been a want of due care. Stra. 596. Hob. 134. Plowd. 19. But if a
person unintentionally push against another in the street, or if without any default in the
rider a horse runs away and goes against another, no action lies. 4 Mod. 405. Every battery
includes an assault: Co. Litt. 253; and the plaintiff may recover for the assault only, though
he declares for an assault and battery. 4 Mod. 405.]
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he persists with violence, I may proceed to beat him away.(s) Thus, too, in the
exercise of an office, as that of churchwarden or beadle, a man may lay hands
upon another to turn him out of church, and prevent his disturbing the congre-
gation.(t) And, if sued for this or the like battery, he may set forth the whole
case, and plead that he laid hands upon him gently, molliter manus imposuit,
for this purpose. On account of these causes of justification, battery is defined
to be the unlawful beating of another; for which the remedy is, as for assault, by
action of trespass vi et armis: wherein the jury will give adequate damages.
4. By wounding; which consists in giving another some dangerous hurt, and is
only an aggravated species of battery. 5. By mayhem; which is an injury still
more atrocious, and consists in violently depriving another of the use of a
member proper for his defence in fight. This is a battery, attended with this
aggravating circumstance, that thereby the party injured is forever disabled
from making so good a defence against future external injuries, as he otherwise
might have done. Among these defensive members are reckoned not only arms
and legs, but a finger, an eye, and a fore tooth,(u) and also some others.(v) But
the loss of one of the jaw teeth, the ear, or the nose, is no mayhem at common
law; as they can be of no use in fighting. The same remedial action of tres-
pass vi et armis lies also to recover damages for this injury, an injury which
(when wilful) no motive can justify, but necessary self-preservation. If the
ear be cut off, treble damages are given by statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 6i though
this is not mayhem at common law. And here I must observe, that for these
four last injuries, assault, battery, wounding, and mayhem, an indictment may
be brought as well as an action; and frequently both are accordingly prose-
cuted; the one at the suit of the crown for the crime against the public; the
*other at the suit of the party injured, to make him a reparation in dam- [*122]
ages.(5)4. Injiries affecting a man's health (6) are where, by any unwholesome prac-
tices of another, a man sustains any apparent damage in his vigour or consti-
tution. As by selling him bad provisions or wine;(w) by the exercise of a
noisome trade, which infects the air in his neighbourhood;(x) or by the neglect
or unskilful management of his physician, surgeon, or apothecary. For it hath
been solemnly resolved,(y) that mala praxis is a great misdemeanor and offence
at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experiment or by neglect; because
it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician, and tends to the
patient's destruction. Thus, also, in the civil law,(z) neglect or want of skill in
physicians or surgeons, "culpce adnumerantur, veluti si medicus curationem
dereliquerit, male quempiam secuerit, aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit."
These are wrongs or injuries unaccompanied by force, for which there is a rem-
(s) I Finch, L. 203. (t) 1 Sid. 301. (u) Finch, L. 204. (v) I Hawk. P. C. 111.
(81) 1 Roll. Abr. 90. (x) 9 Rep. 52. Hutt. 135. (y/) Lord Raym. 214. (z) Inst. 4, 3, 6, 7.
(5) [The party injured may proceed by indictment and by action at the same time, and the
court will not compel him to stay proceedings in either. 1 Bos. and P. 191.]
(6) [The law implies a contract on the part of medical men, as well as those of other pro-
fessions, to discharge their duty in a skillful and attentive manner; and the law will grant
redress to the party injured by their neglect or ignorance, by an action on the case, as for a
tortious misconduct. 1 Saund. 312, n. 2; 1 Ld. Raym. 213, 214; Reg. Brevium, 205, 206; 2
Wils. 359; 8 East, 348. And in that case the surgeon could not recover any fees. Peake C. N. P.
59; see 2 New. Rep. 136. But, in the case of a physician whose profession is honorary, he is
not liable to an action: Peake C. N. P. 96, 123 ; 4 T. R. 317; though he may be punished by
the college of physicians. Com. Dig. tit. Physician; Yin. Ab. tit. Physician. If the party
employ a person as surgeon, knowing him not to be one, he has no civil remedy. 1 Hen. B.
161; Bac. Ab. Action on the Case, F; 2 Wils. 359; 8 East, 348.
With respect to the injuries to health as a consequence of a public nuisance, it seems that
if the injury be attributable to the inhabitants of a county, no action is sustainable. 2 T. R.
667; 9 Co. 112, b, 117, a. But if the special injury be occasioned by an individual, an action
lies. Bac. Ab. Action, on the Case; 1 Salk. 15, 16.]
In the United States the physician is entitled to recover compensation for his services, and
is also liable to an action on the case for any injury to his patient resulting from his negligence
or want of skill. Hill. on Torts, 238.
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edy in damages by a special action of trespass upon the case. This action of
trespass, or transgression, on the case, is an universal remedy, given for all per-
sonal wrongs and injuries without force; so called because the plaintiff's whole
case or cause of complaint is set forth at length in the original writ.(a) For
though, in general there are methods prescribed, and forms of actions previously
settled, for redressing those wrongs, which most usually occur, and in which the
very act itself is immediately prejudicial or injurious to the plaintiff's person or
property, as battery, non-payment of debts, detaining one's goods, or the like;
[*123] yet where *any special consequential damage arises, which could not be
foreseen and provided for in the ordinary course of justice, the party
injured is allowed, both by common law and the statute of Westm. 2, c. 24, to
bring a special action on his own case, by a writ formed according to the peculiar
circumstances of his own particular grievance.(b) For wherever the common
law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action ;(c) and,
therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a new method of remedy must be
pursued.(d) And it is a settled distinction,(e) that where an act is done which
is in itself an immediate injury to another's person or property, there the remedy
is usually by an action of trespass vi et armis; but where there is no act done,
but only a culpable omission; or where the act is not immediately injurious, but
only by consequence and collaterally; there no action of trespass vi et armis
will lie, but an action on the special case, for the damages consequent on such
omission or act..(7)
5. Lastly: injuries affecting a man's reputation or good name are, first, by
malicious, scandalous and slanderous words,(8) tending to his damage and dero-
(a) For example: "Rex vicecomiti salutem, Si A. fecerit te securum de clamore Suo =osequendo, tune pone per
vadium et salvos plegios B. quod sit coram justitariis nostris apud Westmonasterium in octais sancti Michaelis,
ostensurus quare cam idem B. ad dextrum oculum ipsius A. casualiter lasum bene et competenter curandum apud
S. pro quadam pecunice summa prne manibus soluta assumpsigset, idem B. curam suam circa oculum prodictum
tam neqligenter et improvide appomuit, quod idem A. defecta ipsius B. vifum oculi prcectIct! totaliter amisit, ad
damnum ipsius A. viintil librarum, ut dicit. Et habeas iWt nomina plegiorum et hoc breve. Teste meipso apud
Westmonasterium," &c. Registr. Brev. 105.
(b) See page 52. (c) I Salk. 20. 6 Mod. 54. (d) Cro. Jac. 478.
(e) 11 Mod. 180. Lord Raym. 1402. Stra. 635.
(7) [See the author's celebrated judgment in the case of Scott v. Shepherd, 2 B1. Rep. 892,
the principle of which has been since repeatedly recognized. No distinction arises from the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act; if one, turning round suddenly, were to knock another
down, whom he did not see, without intending it, no doubt, said Mr. J. Lawrence, the action
must be trespass vi et armis. Neither will it vary the case that, besides the immediate injury,
there is an ulterior consequential injury: for it is the former on which the action is supported;
the latter is merely an aggravation of the damages. Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593.]
(8) [With respect to an imputation of the guilt of some offence punishable as an infamous
crime, or with imprisonment; the accusation must be precise, or have such an allusion to
some prior transaction that the hearers of the slander must necessarily have understood that
the slanderer meant to impute the plaintiff's guilt of some punishable offence; for though the
rule of construing words in mitioi sensu is now exploded: 5 East, 463; Fitzg. 253; Bul. N. P.
4; 10 Mod. 198; yet an innuendo or construction cannot be given to words which they do not
necessarily import, either of themselves, independently of any other circumstances, or with
necessary reference to some other circumstances occurring at the time of the accusation.
6 T. R. 691; 4 Co. 17, b; 11 Mod. 99; 4 Esp. N. P. 218; 8 East, 427. On this account it is
not actionable to call a person "villain," " cheat," "rascal," "swindler," or "rogue," or to say
he is "forsworn," without a colloquium of some proceeding in a court of justice, in which the
party had been examined on oath. 6 T. R. 691; 2 H. Bla. 531; 2 Wils. 404, 87; 8 East, 428;
1 Bos. and Pul. 331; 2 Saund. 307 ; 4 Co. 15, b; 2 Ventr. 28; 2 Buls. 150; Holt's Law of Libel,
176. The term "forsworn " does not, in legal consideration, necessarily import perjury or
false swearing in a regular judicial proceeding, and consequently does not necessarily impute
to the party the guilt of having committed a punishable crime. 6 T. R. 694 ; 4 Co. 15 ; 2 Bulst.
150; Holt's Law of Libel, 176.]
But if either of the above expressions, not actionable in themselves, be accompanied by any
other circumstances tending to throw the imputation of a punishable crime on the party
accused, and be so understood by the hearers, they are actionable. 6 T. R. 694. So, on the
other hand, words prima facie importing a charge of guilt, as to call a person " thief," may be
qualified by the expressions and other circumstances, evincing that the accuser did not mean
to insinuate that the party bad been guilty of such crime, and in that case no action will be
sustainable; as, if the words be "you are a thief, for you stole my tree," the stealing of which
is not felony; or where the witnesses called to prove the slander, admit that they do not
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gation. As if a man maliciously and falsely utter any slander or false tale of
another; which may either endanger him in law, by impeaching him of some
heinous crime, as to say that a man hath poisoned another, or is perjured; (f)
or which may exclude him from society, as to charge him with having an infec-
(f) Finch, L. 185.
believe the defendant meant to impute that the plaintiff had been guilty of felony. Cro. Jac.
114; B. N. P. 5; Peake, N. P. 4; 4 Co. 19; Stra. 142; 2 Esp. R. 218; 2 New. R. 335.
The accusation of a mere intent, propensity or inclination to commit a crime, &c., is not
actionable, because it only imputes an inchoate immorality, and not the actual commission of
a crime for which the party accused could be punished. 4 Co. Rep. 16, b, 18, b; 4 Esp. R. 219;
Cro. Jac. 158; 1 Rol. Ab. 41; Freem. 46; 7 Taunt. 431; 4 Price. 46. But an accusation of
seducing another to commit a crime, as subornation of perjury, is actionable: 1 Rol. Ab. 41;
or of soliciting a servant to steal. 3 Wils. 186; 2 East, 5; but see Salk. 696.
A verbal imputation of the breach of any moral virtue, duty or obligation, such as chastity,
piety, &c. (which, though it may depreciate a person in the opinion of society, and subject
him to censure in the ecclesiastical court, does not expose him to punishment in the temporal
courts), is not actionable, 4 Taunt. 355; though if in writing, it will be otherwise. 3 Wils.
187. But when the accusation is partly of an offence punishable in the ecclesiastical courts,
and partly in the temporal, or where special damage has been sustained, the latter courts will
afford redress.
2. With respect to the imputation of having a contagious disorder. Man being formed for soci-
ety, and standing in almost constant need of the advice, comfort and assistance of his fellow-
creatures, it is highly reasonable that any words which import the charge of having a conta-
gious distemper, should be in themselves actionable, because all prudent persons will avoid
the company of a person having such a distemper. 2 Wils. 403, 404. The mere accusation of
having had a disease, is not actionable, because it alludes to a past disease. 2 T. R. 473, 474;
2 Stra. 1189.
3. As to slander affecting a person in his office or trust. When profit or emolument is attached
to them, any words which directly impute an unfitness, either in respect of morals or inability
to discharge the duty of the office, are actionable. 1 Salk. 695, 698; 2 Esp. 500; 5 Rep. 125;
1 Stra. 617; 2 Ld. Raym. 1369; 4 Rep. 16, a.; Bull. N. P. 4. But in an office merely honorary,
to which no profit, &c., is attached, a verbal accusation of incapacity, &c., is not actionable.
5 Co. Rep. 125; 4 Rep. 16, a.; Salk. 695, 698; 2 Esp. 500; 3 Wils. 177. In an office of trust and
emolument, an imputation of an intent or inclination to commit a criminal breach of duty, is
actionable, which is an exception to the before-mentioned rule. Salk. 695; 1 Stra. 617; 2 Ld.
Raym. 1369, 1480; 4 Rep. 16, a.; 3 Wils. 177; 2 Saund. 307; Cro. Jac. 839, b. 1, 9; Bull. N. P.
5; Holt's Law of Libel, 197. A verbal imputation, that the plaintiff gave to the commission-
ers of the admiralty 2001. for a warrant to be purser of a man-of-war, would be actionable,
as imputing a corruption of a public trust, and a crime in tempting to corruption. 5
Burr. 2699.
4. As to slander affecting a person in his trade, profession or occupation. Words which impute
the want of integrity or capacity, whether mental or pecuniary, in the conduct of a profes-
sion, trade, &c., in which the party is engaged, are actionable. Thus an action will lie for
accusing a clergyman of incontinence, &c., for which he may be deprived: 4 Co. 17; or a
barrister, attorney or artist of inability, inattention or want of integrity: 3 Wils. 187; 2 Bla.
R. 750; 3 Wils. 59; 7 Moore, 200; 3 Bro. and B. 297; 3 B. and A. 702; or a person in trade
(however inferior), (1 Lev. 115) of fraudulent or dishonorable conduct, or of being in insolvent
circumstances. Ld. Raym. 1480. And to say of one who carries on the business of a corn
vendor, "You are a rogue and swindling rascal, you delivered me 100 bushels of oats worse by
6s. a bushel than I bargained for,' is actionable, and entitles him to a verdict without proof of
special damage. 3 Bing. 104. But an action is not sustainable for saying a tradesman has
charged an exorbitant sum for his goods, &c., unless fraud be imputed, etc. Bac. Ab. tit.
Slander, B. 4. In all these cases the words are actionable, without proof of special damage,
because they have a certain tendency to injure the person accused. Bac. Ab. Slander, B. 4.
Words actionable in respect of special damage. The special damage sufficient to support an
action must be a certain actual loss (as of a particular marriage), or the acquaintance or
friendship of some specified person: 1 Rol. Ab. 36; 1 Lev. 261; 2 Bos. and Pul. 284; 1 Saund.
243; 3 B. and P. 372, 374, 376; 1 Taunt. 39; or where in consequence of the imputation of
incontinence, cast upon a dissenting preacher at a licensed chapel, the congregation refuse to
allow him to preach there any more, and discontinue the emolument they would otherwise
have given him, he may maintain an action for the consequential damage. 8 T. R. 130.
Probable damage has been in some instances declared sufficient, as to say to a father
of an heir apparent, that he is a bastard, in consequence whereof the father has declared a
design of disinheriting him, and does actually convey away the estate. 1 Rol. Ab. 38; Cro.
Jac. 213; sed vide 3 Wils. 188. Yet having incurred the danger of being turned out of doors
from the parents' displeasure, from calumnious imputation, is not sufficient. 1 Lev. 261; 1
Taunt. 39. The special damage must be incident and natural to the words spoken, and not
the consequence of the unlawful act of a third person. 8 East, 1.
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tious disease; or which may impair or hurt his trade or livelihood, as to call a
tradesman a bankrupt, a physician a quack, or a lawyer a knave.(g) Words
spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of the realm,
which are called scandalum magnatum, are held tobe still more heinous: (h)
(g) Ibid. 186. (A) 1 Ventr. 60.
II. FALSITY OF THE IMPUTATION. To render any imputation against the character actiona-
ble, it must be false: 5 Co. 125; 6 Hob. 253; and though the falsity of the imputation is in
general to be implied till the contrary be shown: 2 East, 436; 1 Saund. 242; yet the defend-
ant may, in any civil action, plead specially, though he cannot give in evidence under the
general issue, that the slanderous representation was true. Willes, 20; 1 Saund. 130. The
instance of a master making an unfavorable representation of his servant, upon an applica-
tion for his character, seems to be an exception, in that case there being a presumption from
the occasion of speaking, that the words were true. 1 T. R. 111; 3 Bos. and Pul. 587.
III. THE PUBLICATION. The sending a libel to the party libelled is a sufficient publication
to subject the libeller to an indictment, as tending to a breach of the peace. 2 Bla. Rep. 1038; 1
T. R. 110; 1 Saund. 132, n. 2; 4 Esp. N. P. 117; 2 Esp. 623; 2 East's Rep. 361; 2 Kel. 58; 2
Stark. 245. But it is essential to the support of an action, that there be a publication by the
defendant of the libel or words to a third person, and also that such person understood the
words in the sense the plaintiff wishes to establish, or that they necessarily have that meaning.
1 Rol. Ab. 74; Cro. Eliz. 857, 861; 1 Saund. 242, n. 3; 2 id. 307; Bac. Ab. Slander, D. If
A send a manuscript to the printer of a periodical work, and does not restrain the printing
and publishing it, and he print and publish it, A is liable as the publisher, and liable to an
action: 5 Dow. 201; and proof that the defendant knew that letters addressed to the plaintiff
were usually opened by his clerk, is evidence to go to a jury, of his intention that the libel
should be read by a third person, so as to amount to an actionable publication: 2 Stark. 63;
and proof of the delivery of a copy of a newspaper, containing a libel, to the stamp office, is
sufficient proof of publication. 4 B. and C. 35. Every copy of a libel sold by defendant is a
separate publication, and a separate offence. 1 Chitty R. 451.
IV. THE OCCASION. To render words actionable, they must be uttered without legal occa-
sion. On some occasions it is justifiable to utter slander of another, in others it is excusable,
provided it be uttered without express malice. It is justifiable for a barrister to use scandal-
izing expressions in support of his client's cause, and pertinent thereto. 1 Maule and Sel.
280; 1 Holt's Rep. 531; 1 B. and A. 232. And no false or scandalous matter contained in
articles of the peace exhibited to justices, or any other proceedings in a regular court of jus-
tice, where the court has jurisdiction (Dyer, 285 ; 4 Co. 14; Hol's L. L. 179), or before the
house of commons (1 Saund. 131-133, n. 1; 1 M. and S. 280 ; 3 Taunton, 456), will be actionable.
A petition or memorial, addressed by a tradesman to the secretary of war, complaining of the
conduct of a half-pay officer in not paying his debts, and stating the facts of his case bona
fide, is not actionable as a libel. And evidence showing the occasion of the writing, and his
belief of the facts stated, may be given under the general issue. 5 B. and A. 642 ; 1 Dow.
and Ry. 252. The declaration of a court-martial, that the charge of the prosecutor was
malicious and groundless, and that his conduct in falsely calumniating the accused, was highly
injurious to the service, will not subject the president to an action for a libel for having deliv-
ered such declaration, annexed to their sentence of acquittal of the officer accused, to the
judge advocate (2 N. R. 341) or to the commander-in-chief. It is a privileged communica-
tion, and cannot be produced in evidence, or an office copy thereof. 4 Moore, 563; 2 Bro.
and Bing. 130. But an order to a governor abroad to dismiss an officer does not, therefore,
authorize his publishing the grounds of dismissal. 3 Taunt. 456. A servant cannot main-
tain an action against his former master for words spoken or written, giving him a character,
even though the master make specific charges of fraud, unless the latter prove the falsehood
and malice of the charges. Bull. N. P. 8; 3 Esp. 201; 1 Camp. 267; 1 T. R. 110; 4 Burr.
2425. A master is not generally bound to prove the truth of the character he gives to a
servant, yet if he officiously state any trivial misconduct of the servant to a former master, in
order to prevent him giving a second character, and then himself, upon application, give the
servant a bad character, the truth of which he is not able to prove, an action is maintainable
against him. 3 B. and P. 587. So a letter written, or words spoken, to a father in relation to
some supposed fault of his children, are excusable. 2 Brownl. 151; 2 Burnl. E. L. 126, 779;
1 Vin. Ab. 540, 60. Or if the words are innocently read, as a story out of history: Cro. Jac.
91; or were spoken in a sense not defamatory: 4 Rep. 12; or confidentially, as a warning
against the mal-practices of another. 1 Camp. 267. The repeating or reading a libel out of
merriment, if malicious, is actionable: 9 Rep. 39; but if there be no malice, it is said to be
otherwise. Moore, 627; 9 Rep. 59. It is not libellous to ridicule a literary composition, or
the author of it, as far as he has embodied himself with his work ; and if he is not followed
into domestic life for purposes of personal slander, he cannot maintain an action for any dam-
age he may suffer in consequence of being thus rendered ridiculous. 1 Camp. 355 ; 1 Esp.
Rep. 28 and 194; Selwyn. N. P. 1044. So a fair comment on a public entertainment or per-
formance is lawful: 1 Esp. R. 28; but it is otherwise if the critic introduce facts and com-
ments, or abuse, not connected with the work, for the purpose of defaming the private char-
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and though they be such as would not be actionable in the case of a common
person, yet, when spoken in disgrace of such high and respectable characters,
they amount to an atrocious injury; *which is redressed by an action ['124]
on the case, founded on many ancient statutes;(i) as well on behalf of [
(i) Westm. 1. 3 Edw. T, c. 34. 2 Ric. II, c. 5. 12 Ric. Il. c. 11.
acter of the author. 1 Camp. 355; Selw. N. P. 1044; 3 Bing. R. 88. And where the slan-
derous comments are upon a petition to the house of commons, and likewise the petitioner,
the criticism is not privileged. 4 Bing. R. 88. The editor of a public newspaper is not jus-
tified in calumnious attacks on the private character of the editor of another newspaper.
2 Stark. 93.
With respect to the reports of judicial proceedings, &c. To publish a full, true, and entire
account of proceedings in courts of justice upon a trial, or in parliament, is not in general
libellous. 8 T. R. 268; 1 B. and P. 525; 7 Hob. 267; 7 East, 503. But a party will not be
justified in publishing conclusions unfavorable to another, which he draws himself from the
evidence delivered in a court of justice, instead of stating the evidence itself. 4 B. and A. 605.
Especially if such conclusion be calculated to produce a more unfavorable impression than
the original proceeding itself. 7 East, 493; 7 Moore, 200; 3 Brod. and B. 297; 3 B. and A. 702.
Nor can a correct account of the proceedings in a court of justice be published, if such account
contain matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or criminal tendency; and if it do, it is a ground
for a criminal information. 3 B. and A. 167. And the publication of the proceedings of a
court of law, containing matter defamatory of a person who is neither a party to the suit,
nor present at the time of the inquiry, seems to amount to a libel. 3 B. and A. 702 ; 7 East,
503; 1 M. and S. 278. And if the publication of proceedings before a coroner's inquest, or a
preliminary inquiry before a magistrate, however correct in the statement, contain libellous
matter of another, it is actionable. 3 B. and C. 583.
V. THE MALICE OR MOTIVE. Malice is also considered essential to the support of an action
for slanderous words. But malice is to be presumed until the contrary be proved: 4 B. and
C. 247, 585; 1 Saund. 242, n. 2; 1 T. R. 111, 544; 1 East, 563; 2 id. 436; 2 New. R. 335; Bul.
N. P. 8; except in those cases where the occasion prima facie excuses the publication: 4 B.
and C. 247; as in the before-mentioned instance of a master giving the character of his
servant, in which the plaintiff must prove express malice; or that the imputation was wholly
false, from which malice may be inferred. 1 T. R. 111; 3 B. and P. 587. But if the plaintiff
can prove that the defendant acted maliciously under the mask of the former excusable occa-
sions, an action is always sustainable. 3 B. and P. 587,150; 9 Rep. 59; 2 East, 426. And on
the same ground that a lunatic has been held liable to make compensation, civilly, for any
injury he may do (15 Vin. 160; 12 Mod. 332; 3 Rol. Ab. 547; Co. Litt. 247), it should seem
that when an injury has been sustained by the flippant and inconsiderate unfounded report of
another, though not malicious, an action is sustainable. In the case of written slander, the
intent is to be collected from the paper itself, unless explained by the mode of publication and
other circumstances; and the defendant must be presumed to intend that which his act is
likely to produce: 4 B. and A. 95; 4 B. and C. 247; and as to what constitutes malice, see
3 B. and C. 584; 2 B. and C. 257.
Secondly, Written slander. A libel, in its most extensive meaning, signifies any malicious
defamation, expressed either in printing, writing, pictures, or effigies. 5 Co. Rep. 125, 126;
1 Saund. 132, n. 2; 2 Camp. 511. The rules which we have noticed in respect to verbal slan-
der are, for the most part, applicable to libels; with the exception of one important distinc-
tion, that slanderous accusations, reduced into writing, are not the less actionable because not
imputing a crime punishable in the temporal courts; for any written slander, though merely
tending to render the party subject to disgrace, ridicule, or contempt, is actionable, though it
do not impute any definite crime, punishable in the temporal courts; as, to write that a person
is a swindler or hypocrite, or that a woman has been guilty of fornication, or that a man is an
itchy old toad. 1 B. and P. 331; 2 H. B1. 532; 2 Wils. 404; 1 T. R. 748; Hard. 470; 2 B. and
P. 748; Holt's Law of Libel, 212; 2 Salk. 697; 8.Holt Rep. 654; 4 Taunt. 355. So, an action
is sustainable for a libel imputing to a person gross want of feeling; as that, although he was
aware of the death of a person occasioned by his improperly driving a carriage, he had
attended a public ball in the evening of the same day. 1 Chitty R. 480; 2 B. and C. 678;
4 Dowl. and R. 230. This distinction proceeds from the difference between the degrees of
malignity, and the extent of the injury with respect to slander written or spoken; the former
being more deliberate, more capable of extensive circulation, and more permanent in its
injurious consequences, than the latter. 2 East, 430; Hard. 470, 472; Burr. 980; Fitzg. 253.
Another distinction between them is, that written slander is indictable, as tending to a breach
of the peace, whereas verbal is not indictable, unless against a magistrate in the execution of
his office: 1 Stra. 420; 2 id. 1157; Salk. 689, 698; Holt's Law of Lib. 169, and cases there
referred to; Holt's Rep. 654; or calculated to provoke a person to fight a duel.
As to SLANDER OF TITLE, see in general Vin. Ab. Slander of Title, pl. 16; 2 B. and C. 486.
The slander is actionable if a malicious motive be proved. 4 Burr. 2422. But to say that a
vender cannot make a good title, believing at the same time that he cannot, from a supposed
forfeiture of the estate, is not actionable. 3 Taunt. 246; see also 1 M. and S. 301. 639, 644.
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the crown, to inflict the punishment of imprisonment on the slanderer, as on
behalf of the party, to recover damages for the injury sustained. (9) Words also
tending to scandalize a magistrate, or person in a public trust, are reputed more
highly injurious than when spoken of a private man.(c) It is said, that for-
merly no actions were brought for words, unless the slander was such as (if
true) would endanger the life of the object of it.(l) But too great encourage-
ment being given by this lenity to false and malicious slanderers, it is now held
that, for scandalous words of the several species before-mentioned (that may
endanger a man by subjecting him to the penalties of the law, may exclude him
from society, may impair his trade, or may affect a peer of the realm, a magis-
trate, or one in public trust), an action on the case maybe bad, without proving
any particular damage to have happened, but merely upon the probability that
it might happen. But with regard to words that do not thus apparently, and
upon the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it
is necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have hap-
pened; which is called laying his action with a _per quod. As if I say that such
a clergyman is a bastard, he cannot for this bring any action against me, unless
he can show some special loss by it; in which case he may bring his action
against me, for saying he was a bastard, per quod he lost the presentation to such
a living.(m) In like manier, to slander another man's title, by spreading such
injurious reports as, if true, would deprive him of his estate (as to call the issue
in tail, or one who hath land by descent, a bastard), is actionable, provided any
special damage accrues to the proprietor thereby; as if he loses an opportunity
of selling the land.(n) But mere scurrility, or opprobrious words, which neither
in themselves import, nor are in fact attended with, any injurious effects, will
not support an action. So scandals, which concern matters merely spiritual, as
to call a *man heretic or adulterer, are cognizable only in the ecclesias-
*12 tical court;(o) unless any temporal damage ensues, which may be a
foundation for a per quod. Words of heat and passion, as to call a man a rogue
and rascal, if productive of no ill consequence, and not of any of the dangerous
species before-mentioned, are not actionable: neither are words spoken in a
friendly manner, as by way of advice, admonition, or concern, without any
tincture or circumstance of ill-will: for, in both these cases, they are not mali-
ciously spoken, which is part of the definition of slander.(p)(10) Neither (as
was formerly hinted) (q) are any reflecting words made use of in legal proceed-
ings, and pertinent to the cause in hand, a sufficient cause of action for slan-
der.(r) Also if the defendant be able to justify, and prove the words to be true,
no action will lie,(s) even though special damage hath ensued: for then it is no
slander or false tale. As if I can prove the tradesman a bankrupt, the physician
a quack, the lawyer a knave, and the divine a heretic, this will destroy their
(k) Lord Raym. 1369. () 2 Ventr. 28. (m) 4 Rep. 1'7. 1 Lev. 248. (n) Cro. Jac. 213. (ro. Eliz. 197.
(o) Noy. 64. 1 Freem. 277. (p) Finch, L. 186. 1 Lev. 82. Cro. Jac. 91. (q) Page 29.
(r) Dyer, 285. Cro. Jac. 90. (s) 4 Rep. 13.
No action will lie when the slanderer prevents the sale of the land by asserting a claim in
himself, though unfounded, unless it be knowingly bottomed in fraud. 4 Rep. 18.]
Upon this subject in general, see the recent work on libel and slander by Mr. Townsend,
where the authorities are very fully collected.
(9) This action is now obsolete
(10) [And now by statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 96 (amended by statute 8 and 9 Vic. c. 75), in any
action for defamation, the offer of an apology is admissible in evidence in mitigation of dam-
ages; and in an action against a newspaper for libel, the defendant may plead that it was
inserted without malice.]
The defendant in an action for slander may give in evidence under the general issue, in
mitigation of damages, any such facts as, without showing the truth of the charge, tend to
show that defendant believed it, and thus to rebut the presumption of malice. Wagner V.
Holbrunner, 7 Gill, 296; Scott v. McKinnish, 15 Ala. 662; Bisbey v. Shaw, 12 N. Y. 67 ; Hart
v. Reed, 1 B. Monr. 166; Farr v. Rasco, 9 Mich. 353; Chapman v. Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365 ;
Kennedy v. Dear, 6 Port. 90. As to damages in actions against publishers of newspapers, for
the publication of an article inserted bya subordinate, see Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 16
Mich. 447; Jones v. Mackie, Law Rep. 3 Ex. 1.
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respective actions: for though there may be damage sufficient accruing from it,
yet, if the fact be true, it is damnum absque iniuria ; and where there is no
injury, the law gives no remedy. And this is agreeable to the reasoning of the
civil law :(t) "Eum qui nocentem infamat, non est cequum et bonum ob earn rem
condemnari; delicta enim nocentium nota esse oportet et expedit."
A second way of affecting a man's reputation is by printed or written libels,
pictures, signs, and the like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous(u) light,
and thereby diminish his reputation. With regard to libels in general, there
are, as in many other cases, two remedies; one by indictment, and another by
action. The former for the public offence; for every libel has a tendency to the
breach of the peace, by provoking the person libelled to break it: which offence
is the same (in point of law) whether *the matter contained be true or [*126]
false; and therefore the defendant, on an indictment for publishing a
libel, is not allowed to allege the truth of it by way of justification.(w) (11)
But in the remedy by action on the case, which is to repair the party in damages
for the injury done him, the defendant may, as for words spoken, justify the
truth of the facts, and show that the plaintiff has received no injury at all.(x)
What was said with regard to words spoken, will also hold in every particular
with regard to libels by writing or printing, and the civil actions consequent
thereupon: but as to signs or pictures, it seems necessary always to shew, by
proper inuendos and averments of the defendant's meaning, the import and
application of the scandal, and that some special damage has followed; (12)
otherwise it cannot appear, that such libel by picture was understood to be lev-
elled at the plaintiff, or that it was attended with any actionable consequences.
A third way of destroying or injuring a man's reputation is by preferring
malicious indictments or prosecutions against him; (13) which, under the mask
(t) Ff. 47, 10, 18. (u) 2 Show. 314. 11 Mod. 99 (w) 5 Rep. 125. (x) Hob. 253. 11 Mod. 99.
(11). But now by statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 96, the defendant in any indictment or information
for libel may plead the truth of the matters charged, and also that it was for the public bene-
fit that the same should be published; and this plea, if sustained, constitutes a good defence,
but if not sustained, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider whether the guilt of the
defendant was aggravated or mitigated by the plea.
In the United States, by constitutional or statutory provisions, the truth is made a defence
to a criminal prosecution, if published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
(12) [To support an action for a libellous sign or picture, the learned judge says, it is neces-
sary to show, that some special damage has followed; but there is no ground for this opinion,
and a picture intending to make any one ridiculous is equally actionable as if the same effect
had been produced by any other mode of publication, though no damage can be proved.]
(13) [Malicious prosecutions are of a criminal or ciVil nature. To enable a party aggrieved
to support an action for a criminal prosecution, four circumstances must occur. Gilb. L. and
E. 185; 12 Mod. 208; 1 T. R. 493 to 551.
1. Falsehood in the charge.
2. Want of probable cause for instituting it.
3. Malice in the prosecutor.
4. Damage to the accused party.
1. It is essential that the falsehood of the charge should have been substantiated by a verdict,
or the decision of the court in which it is instituted, or by the proceedings having been other-
wise legally determined, befbre the party aggrieved commence his action for the injury sus-
tained. 2 T. R. 225; 1 Saund. 228; Bul. N. P. 11; 1 Esp. Rep. 79; Dougl. 215; Yelv. 116;
Hob. 267.
2dly. It is necessary that the prosecution should have been carried on without probable cause,
before an action can be brought against the prosecutor. 3 Dow. Rep. 160. It is a mixed
proposition of law and fact, whether there was probable cause, and whether the circumstances,
alleged to show it probable, are true, and existed as matter of fact. But whether or not, sup-
posing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law. 1 T. R. 520,
534; 5 Bul. N. P. 14; 4 Burr. 1974; 2 Bar. and C. 693; 5 Dow. and R. 107.
3dly. Malice also is essential to the support of this action; it is not, however, necessary in
all cases for the plaintiff to prove by positive evidence, that the defendant was actuated by
malice, but he may establish it by inference or collateral proof, and the plaintiff having estab-
lished want of probable cause, malice may thence be implied. 1 T. R. 455, 518; 9 East, 361;
1 Camp. 202, 204; Willes, 520. Malice is not to be inferred from the mere proof of the
plaintiffs acquittal for want of the prosecutor's appearing when called; 9 East, 361 ; or from
proof that the bill was returned not found. 1 Marsh. 12; 5 Taunt. 187; but see 4 Bar. and
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of justice and public spirit, are sometimes made the engines of private spite and
enmity. For this, however, the law has given a very adequate remedy in dama,.
ges, either by an action of conspiracy, (y) which cannot be brought but against
two at the least; or, which is the more usual way, by a special action on the
(y) Finch, L. 305.
Cres. 24. The defendant, however, may repel this presumptive evidence, by showing suffi-
cient grounds for suspicion in point of fact, or to induce him to suspect the guilt of the
Iarty accused. Cro. Jac. 193; Selw. N. P. 105; 1 Rol. Ab. 113; Gilb. L. and E. 189; 3 Dow
W 160.
4th. Damage. There are three descriptions of damages, either of which is sufficient to sup-
port an action, but one of them must be proved or the action will fail, viz. : 1st. To the person
by imprisonment. 2d. To the reputation by scandal. 3d. To the property by expense.
1st. To the person by imprisonment. 1st. Whenever imprisonment is occasioned by a mali-
cious, unfounded criminal prosecution, it is a sufficient damage to support an action, although
the detention might have been momentary, and the party released on bail.
2d. To the reputation by scandal. Most criminal prosecutions charge the party accused
with some breach of moral duty, and though, as observed by Chief Justice Holt (Hob. 266
when the court in which the proceeding is adopted has sufficient jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the unfounded proceeding cannot be treated as a libel in respect to the maxim executio
juris non habit injuriam; yet the party defamed may proceed by action for the maliciously
preferring such charge. Any charge which would be a libel if not preferred in the course of
legal proceeding, may be considered as sufficiently defamatory to enable the party to support
an action for malicious prosecution. But an indictment for a mere trespass, as an assault, does
not sufficiently scandalize the party accused to enable him, on the ground of injury to his
reputation, to support an action. 12 Mod. 210; Gilb. C. L. and E. 202; 2 B. and A. 494; 3
Dow. and R. 669.
3dly. To the property by expenses is sufficient ground for supporting an action. Jones v.
Gwynne, Gilb. L. and E. 185, 202.
The remedy for a malicious prosecution of regular proceedings, is invariably an action on
the case, and trespass cannot be sustained. Hob. 266.
Malicious proceedings of a civil nature are by malicious arrest, issuing a commission of
bankruptcy, &c. It seems before the statutes entitling the defendant in civil actions to costs
if the suit terminated in his favor, he might support an action against the plaintiff, if the
proceeding was malicious and without probable cause. Co. Litt. 161, n. 4, a. b. c. 162, (a); 3
Lev. 210; 2 Wils. 305; Styles, 379; Hob. 266; 4 Mod. 13, 14. But since the statute, 4 Jac. I. c.
3, which gives costs to a defendant in all actions in case of a nonsuit or verdict against the
plaintiff, and other statutes giving costs to defendant in other stages of the cause, it seems that
no action can be supported merely in respect of a civil suit maliciously instituted, except in
some cases under particular legislative provisions: 1 Salk. 14; and therefore no action is sus-
tainable for a vexatious ejectment. 1 B. and P. 205. But when the plaintiff in a civil action
has maliciously adopted a step not absolutely necessary for the ascertainment of his right, as
in the case of an unfounded arrest, or an arrest for too large a sum: 1 Lev. 275; or on one side
of an account: 3 B. and C. 139; (in any of which cases he might have proceeded in common
process) the party injured by such arrest may support an action. 2 Wils. 305. As it is neces-
sary the avenues of justice should not be narrowed, the courts do not encourage actions for
malicious suits: 2 Wils. 307; but as a civil suit is not, like a criminal prosecution, carried on
for the benefit of the public, less favor and indulgence is to be shown to a plaintiff who
maliciously arrests another, than to the prosecutor of an indictment. In order to sustain such
action, four points must concur, viz.:
1. Falsehood in the demand.
2. Want of probable cause.
3. Malice in the defendant.
4. Damage by arrest or imprisonment.
1. Falsehood in the demand. 1st. With regard to the falsehood in the demand, the rules
applicable to a criminal proceeding, equally affect a civil suit. 1 Salk. 1516; 2 T. R. 225; 1
Esp. Rep. 79; 14 East, 302; Selw. 106. If there be a set-off reducing the plaintiffs demand,
his maliciously inserting only one side of the account is actionable. 3 B. and C. 139. The suit
must have been decided by some legal means, before an action for a malicious action can be
commenced. I Esp. R. 80.
2dly. Want of probable cause, also, as in criminal proceedings, is necessary, and the same
rules prevail with regard to it. And though in point of fact an action may turn out to be
unfounded, yet if there were reasonable ground to apprehend that the sum for which the
party was arrested was due, no action can be supported. 3 Esp. R. 34. Where A arrested
B upon the advice of his special pleader, that he had a good cause of action, but afterwards
discontinued on being ruled to declare, and B brought an action for a malicious arrest, with-
out any reasonable or probable cause, it was held, that the reasonableness or probability of
the cause was a mixed question of law and fact for the jury to decide: and that, if they
believed the defendant acted bonafide upon the advice he had received, he was entitled to a
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case for a false and malicious prosecution. (z) In order to carry on the former
(which gives a reoompense for the danger to which the party has been exposed)
it is necessary that the plaintiff should obtain a copy of the record of his indict-
ment and acquittal; but, in prosecutions for felony, it is usual to deny a copy
of the indictment, where there is any, the least, probable cause to found such
prosecution upon. (a) For it would be a very great discouragement to the pub-
lic justice of the kingdom, if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of sus-
picion, were liable to be sued at law whenever their indictments miscarried.
*But an action on the case for a malicious prosecution may be founded [*127]
upon an indictment, whereon no acquittal can be had; as if it be rejected
by the grand jury, or be coram non judice, or be insufficiently drawn. For it is
not the danger of the plaintiff, but the scandal, vexation, and expense, upon
which this action is founded. (b) However, any probable cause for preferring it
is sufficient to justify the defendant.
II. We are next to consider the violation of the right of personal liberty.
This is effected by the injury of false imprisonment,(14) for which the law has
not only decreed a punishment, as a heinous public crime, but has also given a
private reparation to the party; as well by removing the actual confinement for
the present, as, after it is over, by subjecting the wrong-doer to a civil action, on
account of the damage sustained by the loss of time and liberty.
To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points requisite:
1. The detention of Lhe person : and 2. The unlawfulness of such detention.
Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a com-
mon prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining
one in the public streets.(c) Unlawful, or false, imprisonment consists in such
confinement or detention without sufficient authority: which authority may
arise either from some process from the courts of justice, or from some warrant
from a legal officer having power to commit, under his hand and seal, and express-
ing the cause of such commitment ;(d) or from some other special cause war-
ranted, for the necessity of the'thing, either by common law, or act of parlia-
ment; such as the arresting of a felon by a private person without warrant,
the impressing of mariners for the public service, or the apprehending of
waggoners for misbehaviour in the public highways.(e) False imprisonment
(z) F. N. B. 116. (a) Carth. 421. Lord Rayn. 253. () 10 Mod. 219, 220. Stra. 691.
(c) 2 Inst. 589. (d) Ibid. 52, 591. (e) Stat. 13 Geo. III, c. 78.
verdict, but if otherwise, they ought to find for the plaintiff. 2 B. and C. 693; 4 Dow. and
R. 107.
3dly. Malice in the defendant. Malice also is an essential requisite to the support of this
action. In ordinary cases, however, want of probable cause being proved, malice (as in crimi-
nal prosecutions) may be implied. 1 T. R. 545, 518; 9 East, 361; 3 Camp. 139. See further,
1 Bos. and Pul. 388; 2 id. 129; 4 B. and C. 21.
4thly. With respect to the damage necessary to the support of this action, it has already
been observed, that as a defendant is entitled to costs, his pecuniary interest is not, in legal
consideration, affected by a civil action, though indeed the costs allowed are rarely equal to
the expenditure incurred by a defence. His character also, as we have already seen, is not
affected, and the imprisonment of his person is therefore the only legal damage which entitles
him to compensation. An action on the case may be supported for maliciously issuing a
commission of bankruptcy, notwithstanding the specific remedy provided by the bankrupt
laws. Willes, 581; 2 Wils. 146; 3 Campb. 58. So also if the plaintiff in an action adopt an
irregular proceeding, as issuing a second ft. fa. pending the first. Hob. 205, 266; 1 Brownl. 12.
So a plaintiff is bound to accept from a defendant in custody under a ca. sa., the debt and
costs, when tendered, in satisfaction of his debt, and to sign an authority to the sheriff to dis-
charge the defendant out of custody, and an action on the case will lie against a plaintiff for
having maliciously refused so to do. And the refusal to sign the discharge is sufficient prinsa
fadie evidence of malice, in the absence of circumstances to rebut the presumption. 4 B. and
C. (26.]
(14) [But the merely giving charge of a person to a peace-officer, not followed by any
actual apprehension of the person, does not amount to an imprisonment, though the party to
avoid it attend at a police office. 1 Esp. Rep. 431; 2 New Rep. 211. The circumstance of
an imprisonment being committed under a mistake constitutes no excuse. 3 Wils. 309.]
As to false imprisonment, see 1 Hill. on Torts, 231, et seq.
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*128 also may arise by executing a lawful warrant or process at an *unlawful
time, as on a Sunday; §f) for the statute hath declared, that such service
or process shall be void.(15) This is the injury.. Let us next see the remedy:
which is of two sorts; the one removing the injury, the other making satisfaction
for it.
The means of removing the actual injury of false imprisonment are fourfold.
1. By writ of mainprize. 2. By writ of de odio et atia. 3. By writ de homine
replegiando. 4. By writ of habeas corpus.
1. The writ of mainprize, manucaptio, is a writ directed to the sheriff (either
generally, when any man is imprisoned for a bailable offence, and bail hath been
refused; or specially, when the offence or cause of commitment is not properly
bailable below), commanding him to take sureties for the prisoner's appearance,
usually called mainpernors, and to set him at large.(g) Mainpernors differ
from bail, in that a man's bail may imprison or surrender him up before the
stipulated day of appearance; mainpernors can do neither, but are barely sure-
ties for his appearance at the day: bail are only sureties, that the party be
answerable for the special matter for which they stipulate; mainpernors are
bound to produce him to answer all charges whatsoever.(h)
2. The writ de odio et atia was anciently used to be directed to the sheriff,
commanding him to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was com-
mitted upon just cause of suspicion, or merely propter odium et atiam, for
hatred and ill-will; and if upon the inquisition due cause of suspicion did not
appear, then there issued another writ for the sheriff to admit him to bail.
This writ, according to Bracton,(i) ought not to be denied to any man, it being
expressly ordered to be made out gratis, without any denial, by magna carta, c. 26,
[,19] and statute West. 2, 13 ]Vdw. I, c. 29. But the statute *of Gloucester, 6
[*129] Edw. I, c. 9, restrained it in the case of killing by misadventure or self-
defence, and the statute 28 Edw. III, c. 9, abolished it in all cases whatso-
ever: but as the statute 42 Edw. III, c. 1, repealed all statutes then in being,
contrary to the great charter, Sir Edward Coke is of opinion(k) that the writ
de odio et atia was thereby revived.
3. The writ de homine replegiando() lies to replevy a man out of prison or
out of the custody of any private person (in the same manner that chattels
taken in distress may be replevied, of which in the next chapter), upon giving
security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming to answer any charge
against him. And if the person be conveyed out of the sheriff's jurisdiction,
the sheriff may return that he is eloigned, elongatus; upon which a process
issues (called a capias in icithernam) to imprison the defendant himself, without
bail or mainprize,(m) till he produces the party. But this writ is guarded with
so many exceptions,(n) that it is not an effectual remedy in numerous instances,
especially where the crown is concerned. The incapacity therefore of these
three remedies to give complete relief in every case hath almost entirely anti-
quated them; and hath caused a general recourse to be had, in behalf of per-
sons aggrieved by illegal imprisonment, to
4. The writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the English law.
Of this there are various kinds made use of by the courts at Westminster, for
removing prisoners from one court into another for the more easy administra-
tion of justice. Such is the habeas corpus ad respondendum, when a man hath
a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior
court; in order to remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in
(f) Stat. 29 Car. 11, c. 7. Salk. 78. 5 Mod. 95.
(g) F. N. B. 250. 1 Hal. P. C. 141. Coke on Bail and Mainp. ch. 10.
(h) Coke on Bail and Mainp. ch. 3. 4 Inst. 179. (i) L. 3, tr. 2, c. 8. (k) 2 Inst. 43, 55, 315.
(1) F. N. B. 66. (m) Raym. 474.
(n) AVisi captue est per speciale proeceptum nostrum, vel capitalis justitiarii nostri, vel pro mote hominis, vel pro
foresta nostra, vel pro aliquo alio retto, quare secundum consuetudinem Anglice non sit replegiabilis. Begietr. 77
(15) [But the statute has excepted cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace, in which
the execution of a lawful warrant or process is allowed upon a Sunday.]
WRITS OF HABEAS CoRPUs.
the court above.(o) Such is that ad satisfaciendum, when a prisoner hath
*had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous [*130
to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with process of [*1301
execution.(p) Such also are those adprosequendum testificandum, deliberandum,
&c., which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prose-
cute or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction
wherein the fact was committed. Such is, lastly, the common writ ad facien-
dum et recipiendum, which issues out of any of the courts of Westminster-
hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to
remove the action into the superior court; commanding the inferior judges to
produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his
caption and detainer (whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas
corpus cum causa) to do and receive whatsoever the king's court shall consider
in that behalf. This is a writ grantable of common right, without any motion
in court,(q) and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below. But
in order to prevent the surreptitious discharge of prisoners, it is ordered by
statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 13, that no habeas corpus shall issue to remove any
prisoner out of any gaol, unless signed by some judge of the court out of
which it is awarded. And to avoid vexatious delays by removal of frivolous
causes, it is enacted by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 23, that, where the judge of an
inferior court of record is a barrister of three years' standing, no cause shall be
removed from thence by habeas corpus or other writ, after issue or demurrer
deliberately joined: that no cause, if once remanded to the inferior court by
writ of procedendo or otherwise, shall ever afterwards be again removed;
and that no cause shall be removed at all, if the debt or damages laid
in the declaration do not amount to the sum of five pounds. But an
expedient(r) having been found out to elude the latter branch of the statute,
by procuring a nominal plaintiff to bring another action for five pounds or
upwards (and then by the course of the court, the habeas corpus removed both
actions together), it is therefore enacted by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, that the
inferior *court may proceed in such actions as are under the value of [*131
five pounds, notwithstanding other actions may be brought against the [*131
same defendant to a greater amount. And by statute 19 Geo. III, c. 70, no
cause, under the value of ten pounds, shall be removed by habeas corpus, or
otherwise, into any superior court, unless the defendant so removing the same,
shall give special bail for payment of the debt and costs.
But the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is
that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining an-
other, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day
and cause of his caption and detention, adfaciendum, subiiciendum, el recipien-
dum, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such
writ shall consider in that behalf. (s) This is a high prerogative writ, and
therefore by the common law issuing out of the court of king's beich not only
in term-time, but also during the vacation, (t) (16) by afiat from the chief jus-
tice or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the king's domin-
ions; for the king is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of
any of his subjects is restrained, (u) wherever that restraint may be inflicted. If
it issues in vacation, it is usually returnable before the judge himself who awarded
it, and he proceeds by himself thereon; (v) unless the term shall intervene, and
then it may be returned in court. (w) Indeed, if the party were privileged in
the courts of common pleas and exchequer, as being (or supposed to be) an offi-
(o) 2 Mod. 198. (p) 2 Lilly Prac. Reg. 4. (q) 2 Mod. 306.
(r) Bohun. Instit. Lega, 85, edit. 1708. (s) St. Trials, viii, 142.
() The plures habeas corpus directed to Berwick in 43 Eliz. (cited Burr. 856), was teste'd die Jovis proxI' post
q&inden' Sancti Martini. It appears, by referring to the dominical letter of tflat year, that this quindena
( ov. 25) happened that year on a Saturday. The Thursday after was therefore the 30th of November- two
days after the expiration of the term.
(u) cro. Jac. 543. (v) Burr. 606. (w) Ibid. 460, 542, 606.
(16) [See Leonard Watson's Case, 9. Ad. and E. 731.]
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cer or suitor of the court, an habeas corpus ad subjiciendum might also by com-
mon law have been awarded from thence; (x) and, if the cause of imprison-
ment were palpably illegal, they might have discharged him: (y) but, if he
were committed for any criminal matter, they could only have remanded him,
or taken bail for his appearance in the court of king's bench (z) which occa-
sioned the common pleas for some time to discountenance such applications.
[*.2] But since the *mention of the king's bench and common pleas, as co-
ordinate in this jurisdiction, by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, it hath been
holden, that every subject of the kingdom is equally entitled to the benefit of
the common law writ, in either of those courts, at his option. (a) (17) It hath
also been said, and by very respectable authorities,(b) that the like habeas corpus
may issue out of the court of chancery in vacation; but upon the famous ap-
plication to Lord Nottingham by Jenks, notwithstanding the most diligent
searches, no precedent could be found where the chancellor had issued such a
writ, in vacation,(c) and therefore his lordship refused it.(18)
(x) 2 Inst. 55. 4 Inst. 290. 2 Hal. P. C. 141. 2 Ventr. 24. (y) Vangh. 155.
(z) Carter, 221. 2 Jon. 13. (a) 2 Mod. 198. Wood's Case, C. B. Hill. 11 Geo. HTI.
(b) 4 Inst. 182. 2 Hal. P. c. 147. (c) Lord Nott. MSS. Rep. July, 1676.
(17) [And now out of the court of exchequer. See 56 Geo. III, c. 100, s. 2.]
(18) [It was determined, after a very elaborate investigation of all the authorities by Lord
Eldon in Crowley's Case, that the lord chancellor can issue the writ of habeas corpus at com-
mon law in vacation, overruling the decision in Jenks's Case. See 2 Swanst. 1.
The benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, which was limited by the former acts to cases of
commitment or detainer for criminal, or supposed criminal, matter has been still further ex-
tended by the 59 Geo. III, c. 100, which enacts, that any one of the judges may issue a writ
of habeas corpus in vacation, returnable immediately, before himself or any other judge of
the same court in cases other than for criminal matter or for debt; and the non-observance of
such writ is to be deemed a contempt of court. But if the writ be awarded so late in the va-
cation that the return cannot be conveniently made before term, then it is to be made return-
able in court at a day certain. And if the writ be awarded late in term, it may be made
returnable in vacation in like manner. The act applies to Ireland as well as England, and the
writ may run into counties palatine, cinque ports, and privileged places, &c., Berwick-upon-
Tweed, and the isles of Guernsey, Jersey, or Man.
The writ of habeas corpus is the privilege of the British subject only, and therefore cannot
be obtained by an alien enemy, or a prisoner of war. See the case of 'the three Spanish sails
ors, 2 Blk. 1324 ; 2 Burr. 765. The relief in such cases is by application to the secretary at
war. On a commitment by either house of parliament for contempt or breach of privilege,
the courts at Westminster cannot discharge on a habeas corpus ; although on the return of
the writ such commitment should appear illegal; for they have no power to control the
privileges of parliament. 2 Hawk. c. 15, s. 73; 8 T. R. 314.
The writ of habeas corpus, whether at common law or under 31 Car. II, c. 2, does not issue as
a matter of course upon application in the first instance, but must be grounded on an affidavit,
upon which the court are to exercise their discretion whether the writ shall issue or not.
3 B. and A. 420; 2 Chitty R. 207. A habeas corpus cum causa does not lie to remove proceedings
from an inferior jurisdiction, into the court of K. B., unless it appears that the defendant is
actually or virtually in the custody of the court below. 1 B. and C. 513; 2 Dowl. and R.
722. The court of K. B. will grant a habeas corpus to the warden of the Fleet, to take a pris-
oner confined there for debt before a magistrate, to be examined from day to day respecting a
charge of felony or misdemeanor. 5 B. and A. 730. The court of exchequer will not grant
a habeas corpus to enable the defendant in an information, who is confined in a county gaol
for a libel under the sentence of another court, to attend at Westminster to conduct his de-
fence in person ;-the application should be made to the court by whom the defendant was
sentenced. 9 Price, 147. Nor will the court of K. B. grant a writ of habeas corpus to bring up
a defendant under sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor, to enable him to show cause in
person against a rule for a criminal information. 3 B. and A. 679, n. Where there are articles cf
separation between the husband and wife, if the husband afterwards confine her, she may have
a habeas corpus and be set at liberty. 13 East, 173, n. A habeas corpus will be granted in the
first instance, to bring up an infant who has absconded from his father and was detained by
a third person without his consent. 4 Moore, 366. The court will not grant a habeas corpus to
bring up the body of a feme-covert on an affidavit that she is desirous of disposing of her sep-
arate property, and that her husband will not admit the necessary parties, and that she is con-
fined by illness and not likely to live long; nor will they, under such circumstances, grant a
rule to show cause why the necessary parties should not be admitted to see her, for if there be
no restraint of personal liberty, the matter is only cognizable in a court of equity. 1 Chitty
R. 654. The conrt on affidavit, suggesting probable cause to believe that a helpless and ig-
norant female foreigner was exhibited for money without her consent, granted a rule on her
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In the king's bench and common pleas it is necessary to apply for it by mo-
tion to the court,(d) as in the case of all other prerogative writs (certiorari,
prohibition, madanius, &c.), which do not issue as of mere course, without
showing some probable cause why the extraordinary powerof the crown is called
into the party's assistance. For, as was argued by Lord Chief Justice Vaughan,(e)
"it is granted on motion, because it cannot be had of course; and there is,
therefore, no necessity to grant it; for the court ought to be satisfied that the
party hath a probable cause to be delivered." And this seems the more reason-
able. because (when once granted) the person to whom it is directed can return
no satisfactory excuse for not bringing up the body of the prisoner.(f) So that
if it issued of mere course, without showing to the court or judge some reasonable
ground for awarding it, a traitor or felon under sentence of death, a soldier or
mariner in the king's service, a wife, a child, a relation, or a domestic, confined for
insanity, or other prudential reasons, might obtain a temporary enlargement by
suing out habeas corpus, though sure to be remanded as soon as brought up to
the court. And, therefore, Sir Edward Coke, when chief justice, did not scruple,
in 13 Jac. I, to deny a habeas corpus to one confined by the court of admiralty
for piracy; there appearing, upon his own showing, sufficient grounds to
*confine him.(g) On the other hand, if a probable ground be shown, [,133]
that the party is imprisoned without just cause,(h) and therefore hath [13
a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which
"may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed,
or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of
the king, the privy council, or any other."(i)
In a former part of these Commentaries (k) we expatiated at large on the
personal liberty of the subject. This was shown to be a natural inherent right,
which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some
great and atrocious crime, and which ought not to be abridged in any case
without the special permission of law. A doctrine coeval with the first rudi-
ments of the English constitution, and handed down to us, from our Saxon
ancestors, notwithstanding all their struggles with the Danes, and the violence
of the Norman conquest: asserted afterwards and confirmed by the conqueror
himself and his descendants; and though sometimes a little impaired by the
ferocity of the times, and the occasional despotism of jealous or usurping
(d) 2 Mod. 306. 1 Lev. 1. (e) Bushel's Case, 2 Jon. 13. (.f) Cro. Jac. 543.
3 Bulstr. 27. See also 2 Roll. Rep. 1:38. (h) 2 Inst. 615.
Corn. Jour. 1 Apr. 1628. (k) Book I, ch. 1.
keepers to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue to bring her before the
court, and directed an examination before the coroner and attorney of the court, in the pres-
ence of the parties applying and applied against. Ex parte Hottentot Venus, 13 East, 195. The
writ will be granted to a military officer under arrest for charges of misconduct, if he be not
brought to trial pursuant to the articles of war, as soon as a court-martial can be conveniently
assembled, unless the delay is satisfactorily explained. 2 MI. and S. 428. The court will grant
a habeas corpus to bring up the body of a bastard child within the age of nurture, for the
purpose of restoring it to its mother, from whom it had been taken, first by fraud, and then by
force, without prejudice to the question of guardianship, which belongs to the lord chancellor.
7 East, 579. Where a prisoner is brought up under a habeas corpus issued at common law, he
may controvert the truth of the return by virtue of the 56 Geo. III, c. 100, § 4. 4 B. and C. 186.
Prisoner committed for manslaughter, upon the return of the habeas corpus was allowed to
give bail in the country, by reason of his poverty, which rendered him unable to appear with
bail in court. 6 M. and S. 108; 1 B. and A. 209; 2 Chit. Rep. 110.
With respect to the return. It seems sufficient to set forth, that the defendant is in custody
under the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction to inquire of the offence and pass
such sentence, without setting forth the particular circumstances necessary to warrant such a
sentence. 1 East, 306; 5 Dow. 199, 200. The court will not extend matter dehors the return,
in support of the sentence or proceeding against the prisoner: 2 M. and S. 226; nor go into
the merits, but decide upon the return of a regular conviction prima facie. 7 East, 876.
Where a defendant was committed by an ecclesiastical judge of appeal for contumacy in not
paying costs, and the significavit only described the suit to be "a certain cause of appeal and
complaint of nullity," without showing that the defendant was committed for a cause within
the jurisdiction of the spiritual judge, it was held, that the defendant was entitled to be dis-
charged on habeas corpus. 5 B. and A. 791; 1 Dowl. and Ry. 460.]
Chap. 8.]
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princes, yet established ol the firmest basis by the provisions of magna carla,
and a long succession of statutes enacted under Edward III. To assert an
absolute exemption from imprisonment in all cases, is inconsistent with every
idea of law and political society; and in the end would destroy all civil liberty,
by rendering its protection impossible: but the glory of the English law con-
sists in clearly defining the times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore,
and to what degree the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful. This it
is, which induces the absolute necessity of expressing upon every commitment
the reason for which it is made: that the court upon an habeas corpus may
examine into its validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may
discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner.
*134] *And yet, early in the reign of Charles I, the court of king's bench,[ relying on some arbitrary precedents (and those perhaps misunderstood)
determined (1) that they could not upon an habeas corpus either bail or deliver
a prisoner, though committed without any cause assigned, in case he was com-
mitted by the special command of the king, or by the lords of the privy
council. This drew on a parliamentary inquiry, and produced the petition of
right, 3 Car. I, which recites this illegal judgment, and enacts that no freeman
hereafter shall be so imprisoned or detained. But when, in the following
year, Mr. Selden and others were committed by the lords of the council, in
pursuance of his majesty's special command, under a general charge of "notable
contempts and stirring up sedition against the king and government," the
judges delayed for two terms (including also the long vacation) to deliver an
opinion how far such a charge was bailable. And when at length they agreed
that it was, they however annexed a condition of finding sureties for the good
behaviour, which still protracted their imprisohment, the chief justice, Sir
Nicholas Hyde, at the same time declaring, (m) that "if they were again
remanded for that cause, perhaps the court would not afterwards grant a
habeas corpus, being already made acquainted with the cause of the imprison-
ment." But this was heard with indignation and astonishment by every lawyer
present: according to Mr. Selden's own (n) account of the matter, whose
resentment was not cooled at the distance of four-and-twenty years.
These pitiful evasions gave rise to the statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, § 8, whereby
it is enacted, that if any person be committed by the king himself in person,
[*135] or by his privy *council, or by any of the members thereof, he shall have
granted unto him, without any delay upon any pretence whatsoever, a
writ of habeas corpus, upon demand or motion made to the court of king's
bench or common pleas ; who shall thereupon, within three court days after
the return is made, examine and determine the legality of such commitment,
and do what to justice shall appertain, in delivering, bailing, or remanding
such prisoner. Yet still in the case of Jenks, before alluded to,(o) who in 1676
was committed by the king in council for a turbulent speech at Guildhall,(p)
new shifts and devices were made use of to prevent his enlargement by law,
the chief justice (as well as the chancellor) declining to award a writ of habeas
corpus ad subiiciendum in vacation, though at last he thought proper to award
the usual writs ad deliberandum, &c., whereby the prisoner was discharged at
the Old Bailey. Other abuses had also crept into daily practice, which had
in some measure defeated the benefit of this great constitutional remedy. The
party imprisoning was at liberty to delay his obedience to the first writ, and
might wait till a second and a third, called an alias and a pluries, were issued,
before he produced the party; and many other vexatious shifts were practiced
to detain state-prisoners in custody. But whoever will attentively consider
the English history, may observe, that the flagrant abuse of any power, by the
crown or its ministers, has always been productive of a struggle; which either
(1) State Tr. vii, 136. (m) Ibid. 240.
(n) "Etiam judicum tune primarius, Ai illud faceremue, rescripti lits forensis, qui libertati8s personalis
omnimod vindex legitimus est fere solus, usum omnimodum palam pronuntiavit (sui semper similis) nobis per-
petuo in poeterum deneqandum. Quod, ut odiosissimum juris prodigim, sczentiorbus hic uiversis censtum."
(Vindie. Mar. claus, edit. A. D. 1653.)
(o) Page 132. (p) State Tr. vii, 471.
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discovers the exercise of that power to be contrary to law, or (if legal) restrains
it for the future. This was the case in the present instance. The oppression
of an obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus act. 31 Car.
II, c. 2, which is frequently considered as another magna carta (q) of the king-
dom; and by consequence and analogy has also in subsequent times reduced
the general method of proceeding on these writs (though not within the reach
of that statute, but issuing merely at the common law) to the true standard of
law and liberty.(19)
*The statute itself enacts, 1. That on complaint and request in writ- [*136]
ing by or on behalf of any person committed and charged with any
crime, (unless committed for treason or felony expressed in the warrant; or as
accessory, or on suspicion of being accessory, before the fact, to any petit-
treason or felony; or upon suspicion of such petit-treason or felony, plainly
expressed in the warrant; or unless he is convicted or charged in execution
by legal process), the lord chancellor or any of the twelve juages, in vacation,
upon viewing a copy of the warrant, or affidavit that a copy is denied, shall
(unless the party has neglected for two terms to apply to any court for his
enlargement) award a habeas corpus for such prisoner, returnable immediately
before himself or any other of the judges; and upon the return made shall
discharge the party, if bailable, upon giving security to appear and answer to
the accusation in the proper court of judicature. 2. That such writs shall be
indorsed, as granted in pursuance of this act, and signed by the person award-
ing them. 3. That the writ shall be returned and the prisoner brought up,
within a limited time according to the distance, not exceeding in any case
twenty days. 4. That officers and keepers neglecting to make due returns, or
not delivering to the prisoner or his agent within six hours after demand a
copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the custody of a prisoner from
one to another, without sufficient reason or authority (specified in the act), shall
for the first offence forfeit 1001., and for the second offence 2001., to the party
grieved, and be disabled to hold his office. 5. That no person once delivered
by habeas corpus, shall be recommitted for the same offence, on penalty of 5001.
6. That every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he requires it the
first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session of oyer and ter-
miner, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to bail: unless the
king's witnesses cannot be produced at that time: and if acquitted, or if not
indicted and tried in the second term, or session, he shall be discharged from
his imprisonment for such imputed offence: but that no person, after the
assizes shall be *open for the county in which he is detained, shall be [*137]
removed by habeas corpus, till after the assizes are ended; but shall be
left to the justice of the judges of assize. 7. That any such prisoner may
move for and obtain his habeas corpus, as well out of the chancery or ex-
chequer, as out of the king's bench or common pleas; and the lord chancellor
or judges denying the same, on sight of the warrant, or oath that the same
is refused, forfeit severally to the party grieved the sum of 5001. 8. That this
writ of habeas corpus shall run into the counties palatine, cinque ports, and
other privileged places, and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. 9. That no
inhabitant of England (except persons contracting, or convicts praying, to be
transported; or, having committed some capital offence in the place to which
they are sent), shall be sent prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or
any places beyond the seas, within or without the king's dominions; on pain
that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and assistants, shall forfeit to
(q) See book I, ch. 1.
(19) Mr. Hallam (Const. Hist. ch. xiii), gives a different account of the passing of the
habeas corpus act, and shows that the case of Jenks had very little to do with it. The act
conferred no new rights, but only furnished more complete means for enforcing those which
existed before. Hallam's Coust. Hist. ch. xiii; Beeching's Case, 4 B. and 0. 136; Matter of
Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.
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the party aggrieved a sum not less than 5001., to be recovered with treble costs;
shall be disabled to bear any office of trust or profit; shall incur the penalties
of prwmunire; and shall be incapable of the king's pardon.
This is the substance of that great and important statute: which extends (we
may observe) only to the case of commitments for such criminal charge, as can
produce no inconvenience to public justice by a temporary enlargement of the
prisoner: all other cases of unjust imprisonment being left to the habeas corpus
at common law. But even upon writs at the common law it is now expected
by the court, agreeable to ancient precedents (r) and the spirit of the act of
parliament, that the writ should be immediately obeyed, without waiting for
any alias or pluries; otherwise an attachment will issue. By which admirable
regulations, judicial as well as parliamentary, the remedy is now complete for
removing the injury of unjust and illegal confinement. A remedy the more
necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but
[*138] sometimes from the mere inattention of *government. For it frequently
happens in foreign countries (and has happened in England during tem-
porary suspensions (s) of the statute), that persons apprehended upon suspicion
have suffered a long imprisonment, merely because they were forgotten. (20)
The satisfactory remedy for this injury of false imprisonment is by an action
of trespass vi et armis, usually called an action of false imprisonment; which is
generally, and almost unavoidably, accompanied with a charge of assault and
battery also: and therein the party shall recover damages for the injury he has
received; and also the defendant is, as for all other injuries committed with
force, or vi et armis, liable to pay a fine to the king for the violation of the pub-
lic peace. (21)
III. With regard to the third absolute right of individuals, or that of private
property, though the enjoyment of it, when acquired, is strictly a personal right;
yet as its nature and original, and the means of its acquisition or loss, fell more
directly under our second general division, of the rights of things; and as, of
course, the wrongs that affect these rights must be referred to the corresponding
division in the present book of our Commentaries; I conceive it will be more
commodious and easy to consider together rather than in a separate view, the injuries
(r) Burr. 856. (s) See book I, page 136.
(20) [Besides the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpus in liberating the subject from illegal
confinement in a public prison, it also extends its influence to remove every unjust restraint of
personal freedom in private life, though imposed by a husband or a father; but when women
or infants are brought before the court by an habeas corpus, the court will only set them free
from an unmerited or unreasonable confinement, and will not determine the validity of a
marriage, or the right to the guardianship, but will leave them at liberty to choose where they
will go : and if there be any reason to apprehend that they will be seized in returning from
the court, they will be sent home under the protection of an officer. But if a child is too
young to have any discretion of its own, then the court will deliver it into the custody of its
parent, or the person who appears to be its legal guardian. See 3 Burr. 1434, where all the
prior cases are considered by Lord Mansfield.
If an equivocal return is made to an habeas corpus, the court will immediately grant an
attachment. 5 T. R. 89.]
As a general rule the protection of personal liberty in the United States is left to state juris-
dictions, and the highest court in each state, and the judges thereof, and generally some other
courts and judicial officers, are empowered to issue the writ of habeas corpus for that purpose.
The federal courts of record and the judges thereof have, however, a jurisdiction conferred
upon them in cases of imprisonment under pretence of federal authority, and also in certain
other cases of imprisonment, where the questions involved make the writ important to the
enforcement of some national authority, or are such as might involve the country in difficulty
with a foreign nation. See 1 Statutes at Large, 81; 4 id. 634; 5 id. 539. On this subject in
general the valuable treatise of Mr. Hurd on the writ of habeas corpus should be consulted.
The state courts may issue the writ in the case of confinement under federal authority, but
when return is made that the party is held under such authority, they cannot proceed further,
and the legality of the imprisonment must be determined by the federal tribunals. Ableman
v. Booth, 21 How. 506.
(21) [Since the common law procedure act, 1852, this fine to the king (for which formerly
judgment was awarded by the court as a matter of form) no longer appears in the judgment.]
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that may be offered to the enjoyment, as well as to the rights, of property. And
therefore I shall here conclude the head of injuries affecting the absolute rights
of individuals.
We are next to contemplate those which affect their relative rights; or such
as are incident to persons considered as members of society, and connected to
each other by various ties and relations; and, in particular, such injuries as may
be done to persons under the four following relations, husband and wife, parent
and child, guardian and ward, master and servant.
*I. Injuries that may be offered to a person, considered as a husband,
are principally three :(22) abduction, or taking away a man's wife; adultery,
or criminal conversation with her; and beating or otherwise abusing her. 1. As
to the first sort, abduction, or taking her away, this may either be by fraud and
persuasion, or open violence: though the law in both cases supposes force and
constraint, the wife having no power to consent; and therefore gives a remedy
by writ of ravishment, or action of trespass vi et armis, de uxore rapta et abducta.(t)
This action lay at the common law; and thereby the husband shall recover, not
the possession (u) of his wife, but damages for taking her away: and by statute
Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 13, the offender shall also be imprisoned two years, and
be fined at the pleasure of the king. Both the king and the husband may there-
fore have this action; (w) and the husband is also entitled to recover damages
in an action on the case against such as persuade and entice the wife to
live separate from him without a sufficient cause. (x) The old law was so
strict in this point, that if one's wife missed her way upon the road, it was not
lawful for another man to take her into his house, unless she was benighted
and in danger of being lost or drowned: (y) but a stranger might carry her
behind him on horseback to market to a justice of the peace for a warrant
against her husband, or to the spiritual court to sue for a divorce. (z) 2. Adultery,
or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime, left
by. our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts; yet, considered as a civil
injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction to the
husband for it by action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer, wherein
the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary. (23) But these
arc properly increased and diminished by circumstances; (a) as the rank and
fortune of the plaintiff and defendant; the relation or *connexion between E*140]
them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded on her previous
behaviour and character; and the husband's obligation by settlement or other-
wise to provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious.
In this case, and upon indictments for polygamy, a marriage in fact must be
proved; though generally, in other cases, reputation and cohabitation are suffi-
t) F. N. B. 89. (u) 2 Inst. 434. (w) Ibid. (x) Law of nisi prius, 18.
) Bro. Abr. t. trespass, 213, (z) Bro. Abr. 207, 440. (a) Law of niA prius, 26.
(22) [If the husband has parted with the right to the society of his wife, absolutely and per-
manently, it has been said that he cannot support an action for a supposed injury during the
separation; but if agreement to separate is only conditional, or temporary, it is otherwise.
5 T. R. 360; Peake Rep. 7; 6 East, 244; 2 Smith, 356. And if the husband has consented to
or facilitated the injury, he cannot sue. Bull. N. P. 27: 2 T. R. 116; 4 id. 655; 5 id. 360;
3 Wood. 246: volenti non fit injuria. So if the wife be suffered to live as a prostitute with the
privity of her husband, and the defendant has been thereby drawn in to commit the act of
which the husband complains, the action cannot be maintained: Bull. N. P. 27; Peake R. 39;
but if the husband is ignorant of her prostitution, then it goes only in mitigation of damages:
Bull. N. P. 27; as will his negligence or inattention to the conduct of his wife with the defend-
ant. 4 T. R. 651. So, according to Lord Kenyon's opinion, if the husband has himself been
guilty of incontinency, he cannot sue: 4 Esp. 16 ; but Lord Alvanley, in a subsequent case, was
of opinion that such conduct only affected the damages. 4 Esp. R. 237. The court will not
grant a new trial in an action for criminal conversation, merely because the damages appear
to them to be excessive (4 T. R. 651), although they have the power to do so. Ib. 659, n. (a).]
(23) [An action on the case may be brought, but trespass has been usually adopted. Cham-
berlain v. Hazlewood, 5 M. and W. 517.]
Mr. Greenleaf thinks the action on the case preferable. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 40, n.
Chap. 8.]
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cient evidence of marriage. (b) 3. The third injury is that of beating a man's
wife, or otherwise ill-using her; for which, if it be a common assault, battery,
or imprisonment, the law gives the usual remedy to recover damages, by action
of trespass vi et armis, which must be brought in the names of the husband and
wife jointly: but if the beating or other mal-treatment be very enormous, so
that thereby the husband is deprived for any time of the company and assistance
of his wife, the law then gives him a separate remedy by an action of trespass,
in nature of an action upon the case, for this ill-usage, per quod consortium
amisit; in which he shall recover a satisfaction in damages. (c)
II. Injuries that may be offered to a person considered in the relation of a
parent (24) were likewise of two kinds: 1. Abduction, or taking his children
away; and, 2. Marrying his son and heir without the father's consent, whereby
during the continuance of the military tenures he lost the value of his marriage.
But this last injury is now ceased, together with the right upon which it was
grounded; for, the father being no longer entitled to the value of the marriage,
the marrying his heir does him no sort of injury for which a civil action will lie.
As to the other, or abduction, or taking away the children from the father, that
is also a matter of doubt whether it be a civil injury or no; for, before the aboli-
tion of the tenure in chivalry, it was equally a doubt whether an action would
lie for taking and carrying away any other child besides the heir: some holding
that it would not, upon the supposition that the only ground or cause of action
was losing the value of the heir's marriage; and others holding that an action
would lie for taking away any of the children, for that the parent had an interest
in them all, to provide for their education. (d) If, therefore, before the abolition
[,*141] of these tenures it was an injury to the father to take *away the rest
of his children, as well as his heir (as I am inclined to think it was), it
still remains an injury, and is remediable by writ of ravishment, or action of
(b) Burr. 2057. (c) Cro. Jac. 501, 588. (d) Cro. Eliz. 770.
(24) The American authorities follow the English in holding that, in an action for debauching
the plaintiff's daughter, it is necessary to declare upon an injury to the plaintiff in the relation
of master and servant, and to give some evidence from which a loss of service may be implied.
Lee v. Hodges, 13 Grat. 726; McDaniel v. Edwards, 7 Ired. 4C8. If, therefore, the daughter at
the time of the seduction was actually in the service of another, as his indentured apprentice
or otherwise, the parent cannot maintain this action: South v. Denniston, 2 Watts, 474; Dain
v. Wyckoff, 7 N. Y. 191 ; Parker v. Meek, 3 Sneed, 29 ; unless the daughter was under age, and
was absent from home at the time with the consent of the parent,,and with the right on his
p art to recall her at any time. Martin v. Payne, 9 Johns, 387; Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459;
Mulvehall v. Millward, 11 N. Y. 343; Boyd v. Byrd, 8 Blackf. 113; Bolton v. Miller, 6 Ind.
262 ; Hornketh v. Barr, 8 S. and R. 36. Or unless she was in the service of the defendant, who
had employed her with the fraudulent purpose of seduction. Dain v. Wyckoff, 18 IN. Y. 45.
It is of no importance that the daughter is over twenty-one if she actually resides with her
father: Kelley v. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211; Vossel v. Cole, 10 Mo. 634; but if, being over age,
she is also not living with her father when the seduction takes place, he cannot bring the suit,
notwithstanding she returns to his house before her confinement. Kickleson v. Stryker, 10
Johns. 115. The recovery is therefore nominally based upon loss of services; but proof of
the slightest loss is sufficient: Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Geo. 603; and a loss of services will
be presumed if the plaintiff had a right to require them: Anderson v. Ryan, 3 Gilm. 583; and
the jury may give substantial damages to compensate for the parent's anxiety and sense
of disgrace: Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Geo. 603; Travis v. Barger, 24 Barb. 614; Dain v.
Wyckoff, 7 N. Y. 191; though these alone will not support the action. See Knight v. Wil-
cox, 14 N. Y. 414.
Thus it will be seen that the action is nominally for one thing, and the recovery in fact for
another; and the anomaly is so great that it has often been made the subject of comment by
courts. The New York cases upon this subject are particularly instructive. Compare espec-
ially Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459, with Bartley v. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 43. The legislation of
several of the states has relieved the law of some odium by authorizing suit to be brought in
these cases by the father, mother, or some other person for the benefit of the woman, and
without averment or proof of loss of service.
It follows, from what is above stated, that any one who at the time holds the legal relation
of master to the person seduced-whether parent, guardian or employer-or with whom she
lives, and for whom she performs services, whether for compensation agreed upon or not,
may maintain the action.
92
WRITS OF HABEAS CoRPus.
trespass vi et armis, defilio, vel filia, rapto vel abducto; (e) in the same manner
as the husband may have it, on account of the abduction of his wife.
III. Of a similar nature to the last is the relation of guardian and ward, and
the like actions mutatis mutandis, as are given to fathers, the guardian also has
for recovery of damages, when his ward is stolen or ravished away from him.(f)
And though guardianship in chivalry is now totally abolished, which was the
only beneficial kind of guardianship to the guardian, yet the guardian in socage
was always (g) and is still entitled to an action of ravishment, if his ward or
pupil be taken from him: but then he must account to his pupil for the dam-
ages which he so recovers.(h) And, as guardian in socage was also entitled at
common law to a writ of right of ward, de custodia terrwv et hweredis, in order
to recover the possession and custody of the infant, (i) so I apprehend that he
is still entitled to sue out this antiquated writ. But a more speedy and sum-
mary method of redressing all complaints relative to wards and guardians hath
of late obtained by an application to the court of chancery; which is the
supreme guardian, and has the superintendent jurisdiction of all the infants in
the kingdom. And it is expressly provided by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, that
testamentary guardians may maintain an action of ravishment or trespass, for
recovery of any of their wards, and also for damages to be applied to the use
and benefit of the infants.(k)
IV. To the relation between master and servant, and the rights accruing
therefrom, there are two species of injuries incident. The one is, retaining a
man's hired servant before his time is expired; the other is beating or confining
him in such a manner that he is not able to perform his work. As *to [*142
the first, the retaining another person's servant during the time he has E I
agreed to serve his present master; this, as it is an ungentlemanlike, so it is
also an illegal act. For every master has by his contract purchased for a val-
uable consideration the service of his domestics for a limited time; the invei-
gling or hiring his servant, which induces a breach of this contract, is therefore
an injury to the master; and for that injury the law has given him a remedy
by a special action on the case; and he may also have an action against the
servant for the non-performance of his agreement.() But, if the new master
was not apprized of the former contract, no action lies against him, (m) unless
he refuses to restore the servant, upon demand. The other point of injury, is
that of beating, confining, or disabling a man's servant, which depends upon
the same principle as the last ; viz.: the property which the master has by his
contract acquired in the labour of the servant. In this case, besides the remedy
of an action of battery or imprisonment, which the servant himself as an indi-
vidual may have against the aggressor, the master also, as a recompense for his
immediate loss, may maintain an action of trespass vi et armis; in which he
must allege and prove the special damage he has sustained by the beating of his
servant, per quod servitium amisit; (n) and then the jury will make him a pro-
portionable pecuniary satisfaction. And similar practice to which, we find also
to have obtained among the Athenians; where masters were entitled to an
action against such as beat or ill-treated their servants.(o) (25)
We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution
of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom: while
the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for
which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company,
care, or assistance of the superior, as the *superior is held to have in [*143]
those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or
injury. The wife cannot recover damages for beating her husband, for she hath
(e) F. N. B. 90. (f) Ibid. 139. (g) Ibid. (h) Hale on F. N. B. 139.
(i) F. N. B. 139. (k) 2 P. Wine. 108. (P F. N. B. 167. (m) Ibid. Winch. 51.
(n) 9 Rep. 113. 10 Rep. 330. (o) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.
(25) See note 24, p. 140.
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no separate interest in any thing during her coverture. The child bath no prop-
erty in his father or guardian; as they have in him, for the sake of giving him
education and nurture. Yet the wife or the child, if the husband or parent be
slain, have a peculiar species of criminal prosecution allowed them, in the nature
of a civil satisfaction; which is called an appeal, (26) and which will be con-
sidered in the next book. And so the servant, whose master is disabled, does
not thereby lose his maintenance or wages. He had no property in his master;
and if he receives his part of the stipulated contract, he suffers no injury, and
is therefore entitled to no action, for any battery or imprisonment which such
master may happen to endure.
CHAPTER IX.
OF INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.
IN the preceding chapter we considered the wrongs or injuries that affected
the rights of persons, either considered as individuals, or as related to each
other; and are at present to enter upon the discussion of such injuries as affect
the rights of property, together with the remedies which the law has given to
repair or redress them.
And here again we must follow our former division (a) of property into per-
sonal and real: personal, which consists in goods, money, and all other movable
chattels, and things thereunto incident; a property which may attend a man's
person wherever he goes, and from thence receives its denomination: and real
property, which consists of such things as are permanent, fixed, and immova-
ble; as lands, tenements, and hereditaments of all kinds, which are not annexed
to the person, nor can be moved from the place in which they subsist.
First then we are to consider the injuries that may be offered to the rights of
personal property; and, of these, first, the rights of personal property in pos-
session, and then those that are in action only.(b)
I. The rights of personal property in possession, are liable to two species of
injuries: the amotion or deprivation of that possession; and the abuse or dam-
age of the chattels, while the possession continues in the legal owner. The
former, or deprivation of possession, is also divisible into two branches; the
unjust and unlawful taking them away; and the unjust detaining them,
though the original taking might be lawful.
[*145] *1. And first of an unlawful taking. The right of property in all
external things being solely acquired by occupancy, as has been formerly
stated, and preserved and transferred by grants, deeds, and wills, which are a
continuation of that occupancy; it follows, as a necessary consequence, that
when I have once gained a rightful possession of any goods or chattels, either
by a just occupancy or by a legal transfer, whoever, either by fraud or force, dis-
possesses me of them, is guilty of a transgression against the law of society,
which is a kind of secondary law of nature. For there must be an end of all
social commerce between man and man, unless private possessions be secured
from unjust invasions: and, if an acquisition of goods by either force or fraud
were allowed to be a sufficient title, all property would soon be confined to the
most strong, or the most cunning; and the weak and simple-minded part of
mankind (which is by far the most numerous division) could never be secure
of their possessions.
(a) See book II, chap. 2. (b) Ibid. 25.
(26) The remedy by appeal was abolished by statute ,59 Geo. III, c. 46, and an action for
damages is now given by statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93. See note p. 119, ante.
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The wrongful taking of goods being thus most clearly an injury, the next
consideration is, what remedy the law of England has given for it. And this is,
in the first place, the restitution of the goods themselves so wrongfully taken,
with damages for the loss sustained by such unjust invasion; which is effected
by action of replevin, (1) an institution which the Mirror (c) ascribes to Glanvil,
chief justice to King Henry the Second. This obtains only in one instance
of an unlawful taking, that of a wrongful distress: and this, and the action
of detinue (of which I shall presently say more) are almost the only actions in
which the actual specific possession of the identical personal chattel is restored
to the proper owner. For things personal are looked upon by the law as of a
nature so transitory and perishable, that it is for the most part impossible either
to ascertain their identity, or to restore them in the same condition as when
they came to the hands of the wrongful possessor. And since it is a maxim
that "lex neminem cogit ad vana, seu impossibilia," it therefore *contents [*146]
itself in general with restoring, not the thing itself, but a pecuniary
equivalent to the party injured; by giving him a satisfaction in damages. But
in the case of a distress, the goods are from the first taking in the custody of the
law, and not merely in that of the distrainor; and therefore they may not only
be identified, but also restored to their first possessor, without any material
change in their condition. And being thus in the custody of the law, the tak-
ing them back by force is looked upon as an atrocious injury, and denominated a
rescous, for which the distrainor has a remedy in damages, either by writ of
rescous, (d) in case they are going to the pound, or by writ de parco fracto, or
pound-breach, (e) in case they were actually impounded. He may also, at his
option, bring an action on the case for this injury: and shall therein, if the
distress were taken for rent, recover treble damages. (f) The term rescous is
likewise applied to the forcible delivery of a defendant, when arrested, from the
officer who is carrying him to prison. In which circumstances the plaintiff has
a similar remedy by action on the case, or of rescous: (g) (2) or, if the sheriff
makes a return of such rescous to the court out of which the process issued, the
rescuer will be punished by attachment. (h)
An action of replevin, the regular way of contesting the validity of the trans-
action, is founded, I said, upon a distress taken wrongfully and without sufficient
cause: being a redelivery of the pledge, (i) or thing taken in distress, to the
owner; upon his giving security to try the right of the distress, and to restore
it if the right be adjudged against him (7') after which the distrainor may
keep it, till tender made of sufficient amends; but must then redeliver it to the
owner. (k) And formerly, when the party distrained upon intended to dispute
the right of the distresis, he had no other process by the old common law than
by a writ of replevin replegiarifacias; (1) which issued out of chancery, com-
manding the sheriff to deliver the distress to the owner, and *afterwards [,47]
to do justice in respect of the matter in dispute in his own county court. [1]
( )C. 2, § 6. (d) F. N. B. 101. (e) Ibd. 100. (f) Stat. 2 W. & M. Sess. 1, c. 5.
6 Mod. 211. (A) Cro. Jac. 419. Salk. 586. (4) See page 13. (j) Co. Litt. 145.
8 Rep. 147. (1) F. N. B. 68.
(1) Replevin is the universal remedy in the United States where chattels have been wrong-
fully taken or are wrongfully detained from the plaintiff, and he seeks to recover them in
specie instead of a satisfaction in damages. It is a statutory action, and the statutes are con-
siderably variant. The plaintiff must have either a general or a special property in the
chattels. Speaking generally we may say that the plaintiff is required to show his right by
affidavit when he sues out the writ; that the officer seizes the property, if to be found, and
delivers it to the plaintiff, on receiving bond with sureties for its return in case the action is
not sustained; t at if the plaintiff recovers in such cases, he takes judgment for any damages
he may have proved, while if the plaintiff is defeated, the defendant takes judgment either for
a return of the property, or for its value, together with such damages as he may have shown.
But if the officer does not find the property, so that it may be delivered to the plaintiff, the
case nevertheless proceeds to judgment, and if the plaintiff recovers, he may, at his option,
have the proper writ for its delivery in execution.
(2) The action of rescous has fallen into disuse, and it is usual now to bring an action on
the case.
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But this being a tedious method of proceeding, the beasts or other goods were
long detained from the owner, to his great loss and damage. (m) For which
reason the statute of Marlbridge (n) directs, that (without suing a writ out of
the chancery) the sheriff immediately, upon plaint to him made, shall proceed to
replevy the goods. And, for the greater ease of the parties, it is farther provided
by statute 1 P. and M. c. 12, that the sheriff shall make at least four deputies in
each county, for the sole purpose of making replevins. Upon application, there-
fore, either to the sheriff or one of his said deputies, security is to be given, in
pursuance of the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 2. 1. That the party replevy-
ing will pursue his action against the distrainor, for which purpose he puts in
plegios de prosequendo, or pledges to prosecute; and, 2. That if the right be
determined against him, he will return the distress again; for which purpose he
is also bound to find plegios de retorno habendo. Besides these pledges, the
sufficiency of which is discretionary and at the peril of the sheriff, the statute
11 Geo. II, c. 19, requires that the officer granting a replevin on a distress for
rent, shall take a bond with two sureties in a sum of double the value of the goods
distrained, conditioned to -prosecute the suit with effect and without delay,
and for return of the goods; which bond shall be assigned to the avowant or
person making cognizance, on request made to the officer; and, if forfeited, may
be sued in the name of the assignee. (3) And certainly as the end of all dis-
tresses is only to compel the party distrained upon to satisfy the debt or duty owing
from him, this end is as well answered by such sufficient sureties as by retain-
ing the very distress, which might frequently occasion great inconvenience to the
owner; and that the law never wantonly inflicts. The sheriff, on receiving such
security, is immediately, by his officers, to cause the chattels taken in distress to
be restored into the possession of the party distrained upon; unless the distrainor
claims a property in the goods so taken. For if, by this method of distress, the
[*148] distrainor *happens to come again into possession of his own property in
goods which before he had lost, the law allows him to keep them, with-
out any reference to the manner by which he thus has gained possession; being
a kind of personal remitter. (o) If, therefore, the distrainor claims any such
property, the party replevying must sue out a writ de proprietate probanda, in
which the sheriff is to try, by an inquest, in whom the property previous to the
distress subsisted. (p) And if it be found to be in the distrainor, the sheriff can
proceed no farther; but must return the claim of property to the court of king's
bench or common pleas, to be there farther prosecuted, if thought advisable, and
there finally determined. (q)
But if no claim of property be put in, or if (upon trial) the sheriff's inquest
determines it against the distrainor; then the sheriff is to replevy the goods
(making use of even force, if the distrainor makes resistance), (r) in case the
goods be found within his county. But if the distress be carried out of the
county, or concealed, then the sheriff may return that the goods, or beasts, are
eloigned, elongata, carried to a distance, to places to him unknown: and there-
upon the party replevying shall have a writ of capias in withernam, in vetito
(or more properly, repetito) nanio; a term which signifies a second or reciprocal
distress, (s) in lieu of the first which was eloigned. It is therefore a command
to the sheriff to take other goods of the distrainor, in lieu of the distress for-
merly taken, and eloigned or withheld from the owner. (t) So that there is now
distress against distress; one being taken to answer the other, by way of
reprisal, (u) and as a punishment for the illegal behaviour of the original dis-
(m) 2 Inst. 139. (n) 52 Hen. III, c. 21. (o) See page 19. (p) Finch, L. 316.
(q) Co. Litt. 145. Finch, L. 450. (r) 2 Inst. 193.
(s) Smith's Commonw. b. 3, c. 10. 2 Inst. 141. Hickes's Thesaur. 164. (t) F. N. B. 69, 73.
(u) In the old northern languages the word withernam is used as equivalent to reprisals. (Stiernhook, de jure
Sueon. 1. 1, . 10.)
(3) But now by statute 19 and 20 Vic. c. 108, the registrar of the county court of the district in
which the distress is taken may grant replevins; the replevisor giving such security as the
registrar may direct, that he will pursue his action against the distrainor, either in one of :he
superior courts of law, or in the county court.
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trainor. For which reason goods taken in withernam cannot be replevied till
the original distress is forthcoming. (v)
*But in common cases, the goods are delivered back to the party [
replevying, who is then bound to bring his action of replevin; which
may be prosecuted in the county court, be the distress of what value it may.(w)
But either party may remove it to the superior courts of king's bench or com-
mon pleas, by writ of recordari or pone; (x) the plaintiff at pleasure, the defendant
upon reasonable cause; (y) and also, if in the course of proceeding any right of
freehold comes in question, the sheriff can proceed no farther; (z) so that it is
usual to carry it up in the first instance to the courts of Westminster-hall. (4)
Upon this action brought, and declaration delivered, the distrainor, who is now
the defendant, makes avowry; that is, he avows taking the distress in his own
right, or the right of his wife; (a) and sets forth the reason of it, as for rent
arrere, damage done, or other cause: or else, if he justifies in another's right,
as his bailiff or servant, he is said to make cognizance; that is, he acknowledges
the taking, but insists that such taking was legal, as he acted by the com-
mand of one who had a right to distrain ; and on the truth and legal merits of
this avowry or cognizance the cause is determined. If it be determined for the
plaintiff, viz.: that the distress was wrongfully taken; he has already got his
goods back into his own possession, and shall keep them, and moreover recover
damages. (b) But if the defendant prevails, by the default or nonsuit of the
plaintiff, then he shall have a writ de retorno kabendo, whereby the goods or
chattels (which were distrained and then replevied) are returned again into his
custody; to be sold, or otherwise disposed of, as if no replevin bad been made.
And at the common law, the plaintiff might have brought another replevin,
and so in infinitum to the intolerable vexation of the defendant. Wherefore the
statute *of Westm. 2, c. 2, restrains the plaintiff, when nonsuited, from '
suing out any fresh replevin; but allows him a judicial writ, issuing out [*150]
of the original record, and called a writ of second deliverance, in order to have
the same distress again delivered to him, on giving the like security as before.
And, if the plaintiff be a second time nonsuit, or if the defendant has judgment
upon verdict or demurrer in the first replevin, he shall have a writ of return
irreplevisable; after which no writ of second deliverance shall be allowed. (c)
But in case of a distress for rent arrere, the writ of second deliverance is in
effect (d) taken away by statute 17 Car. II, c. 7, which directs that, if the
plaintiff be nonsuit before issue joined, then upon suggestion made on the
record in nature of an avowry or cognizance; or if judgment be given against
him on demurrer, then, without any such suggestion, the defendant may have a
writ to inquire into the value of the distress by a jury, and shall recover the
amount of it in damages, if less than the arrear of rent; or, if more, then so
much as shall be equal to such arrear, with costs; or, if the nonsuit be after
issue joined, or if a verdict be against the plaintiff, then the jury impannelled to
(v) Raym. 475. The substance of this rule composed the terms of that famous question, with which Sir
Thomas Moore (when a student on his travels) is said to have puzzled a pragmatical professor in the university
of Bruges in Flanders; who gave a universal challenge to dispute with any person in any science; in omn
scibili, et de quolibet eete. Upon which Mr. Moore sent him this question, "u/ru
m 
avera caruex, capta in vetito
namio, sint irreplegibilia," whether beasts of the plough, taken in witheam, are incapable of being replevied.
(Hoddesd. c. 5.)
(w) 2 Inst. 139. (x) Ibid. 23. (y) F. N. B. 69, 70. (z) Finch, L. 317.
(a) 2 Saund. 195. (b) F. N. B. 69. (c) 2 Inst. 340. (d) 1 Ventr. 64.
(4) [Now however, by statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 95, s. 119, all actions of replevin in cases of dis-
tress for rent in arrear or damage feasant shall be brought without writ in the new county
court, and (section 120) in the court holden for the district wherein the distress was taken. But
(section 121) in case either party declare to the court that the title to any hereditament, or to
any toll-market, fair, or franchise is in question, or that the rent or damage in respect of which
the distress was taken exceeds 201., and becomes bound, with two sureties, to prosecute the
suit without delay, and to prove that such title was in dispute, or that there was ground for
believing the rent or damage to exceed 201., then the action may be removed before any court
competent to try the same, which is done not by recordari, but by writ of certiorari, the new
county courts being courts of record, which the shiremotes were not.]
See also statute 19 and 20 Vic. c. 108, s. 67.
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try the cause shall assess such arrears for the defendant: and if (in any of these
cases) the distress be insufficient to answer the arrears distrained for, the
defendant may take a farther distress or distresses. (e) But otherwise, if, pend-
ing a replevin for a former distress, a man distrains again for the same rent or
service, then the party is not driven to his action of replevin, but shall have a
writ of recaption (f) and recover damages for the defendant the redistrainor's
contempt of the process of the law.
In like manner, other remedies for other unlawful takings of a man's goods
consist only in recovering a satisfaction in damages. And if a man takes the
goods of another out of his actual or virtual possession, without having a law-
ful title so to do, it is an injury; which, though it doth not amount to felony
unless it be done anino furandi, is nevertheless a transgression, for which an
[*151] action of trespass vi et armis *will lie; wherein the plaintiff shall not
recover the thing itself, but only damages for the loss of it.(5) Or, if
committed without force, the party may, at his choice, have another remedy in
damages by action of trover and conversion, of which I shall presently say more.
2. Deprivation of possession may also be by an unjust detainer of another's
goods, though the original taking was lawful. As if I distrain another's cattle
damage-feasant, and before they are impounded be tenders me sufficient
amends; now, though the original taking was lawful, my subsequent detain-
ment of them after tender of amends is wrongful, and he shall have an action of
replevin against me to recover them :(g) in which he shall recover damages only
for the detention and not for the caption, because the original taking was lawful.
Or, if I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it, this injury
consists in the detaining, and not in the original taking, and the regular method
for me to recover possession is by action of detinue.(h) In this action of
detinue it is necessary to ascertain the thing detained, in such manner as that it
may be specifically known and recovered. Therefore it cannot be brought for
money, corn, or the like; for that cannot be known from other money or corn;
unless it be in a bag or sack, for then it may be distinguishably marked. In
order, therefore, to ground an action of detinue, which is only for the detaining,
these points are necessary (i) 1. That the defendant came lawfully into posses-
sion of the goods, as either by delivery to him, or finding them; 2. That the
plaintiff have a property; 3. That the goods themselves be of some value; and,
4. That they be ascertained in point of identity. Upon this the jury, if they
find for the plaintiff, assess the respective values of the several parcels detained,
and also damages for the detention. And the judgment is conditional; that the
plaintiff recover the said goods, or (if they cannot be had) their respective
values, and also the damages for detaining them.(J) (6) But there is one disad-
(e) Stat. 17 Car. II, c. 7. (y.) F. N. B. 71. (g) F. N. B. 69. 3 Rep. 147. (A) F. N. B. 138.
(i) Co. Litt. 286. j) Co. Rntr. 170. Cro. Jac. 681.
(5) [In order to sustain trespass for taking goods, the actual or constructive possession must
be vested in the plaintiff at the time the act complained of was done. For instance, the lord
before seizure may bring the action against a stranger who should carry off an estray oi
wreck; for the iight of possession, and thence the constructive possession, is in him. So the
executor has the right immediately on the death of the testator, and the right draws after it a
constructive possession. 1. T. R. 480; 2 Saund. 47, in notes. See 1 Chitty on P1l. 4th ed. 151
to 159.]
To entitle one to maintain trespass de bonts asportate the taking must have been wrongful
and against the will of the plaintiff, but need not have been with actual force. Gibbs v.
Chase, 10 Mass. 125. If the plaintiff delivers the property to defendant under a fraudulent
purchase, he cannot, on discovery of the fraud, bring trespass. McCarty v. Vickery, 12 Johns.
848. And see Prince v. Puckett, 12 Ala. 832. But an officer who has rightfully taken posses-
sion of property by virtue of process may sometimes render himself a trespasser ab initio, by
abuse of his authority by any act of unlawful force. See 2 Greenl. Ev. § 615. And the same
is true of any person who abuses an authority the law confers upon him. See post, p. 213.
(6) In an action of detinue, if the plaintiff recovered, and the subject of the suit possessed
peculiar value so that a recovery of damages might not be an adequate remedy, the court of
equity sometimes interfered to compel specific delivery, but this is now unnecessary, as the
courts of common law possess the same power under the common law procedure act of 1854.
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vantage which attends this action; viz.: that the defendant is herein permitted
to wage his law, that is to *exculpate himself by oath,(c) and thereby [*152
defeat the plaintiff of his remedy: which privilege is grounded on the Il
confidence originally reposed in the bailee by the bailor, in the borrower by the
lender, and the like; from whence arose a strong presumptive evidence, that in
the plaintiff's own opinion the defendant was worthy of credit. But for this
reason the action itself is of late much disused, and has given place to the
action of trover.(7)
This action of trover(8) and conversion was in its original an action of tres-
pass upon the case, for recovery of damages against such person as had found
another's goods, and refused to deliver them on demand, but converted them to
his own use; from which finding and converting it is called an action of trover
and conversion. The freedom of this action from wager of law, and the less
degree of certainty requisite in describing the goods,(1) gave it so considerable
(k) Co. Litt. 295. () Salk. 654.
(7) Wager of law was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, s. 13, and since then the
action of detinue is said to be brought more frequently than formerly.
(8) [On the action of trover in general, see 1 Chitty's P1. 4th ed. 135 to 145. Absolute and
exclusive property, with actual possession, is not necessary; for a factor to whom goods have
been consigned, and who has never received them, may maintain such an action. 1 Bos. and
Pul. 47. But in order to maintain trover, the plaintiff must have a right of property (though
special and subject to the claims of others) and a right of immediate possession, (as the owner
has against a wrongdoer, where the goods have been delivered to a carrier): 7 T. R. 12; and
therefore where goods leased, as furniture with a house, have been wrongfully taken by the
sherifl in execution, the lessor cannot maintain trover against the sheriff pending the lease,
because till the term has expired he has no right of possession. Id. 9; 1 Ry and Mood. 99.
But the landlord may maintain trover against a purchaser of machinery taken out of a mill,
and afterwards sold under a fi. fa., by the sheriff, although the tenant's term has not expired.
5 B. and A. 826; 2 Dow. and Ry. 1. And against a mere wrongdoer the simple fact
of possession is usually sufficient evidence of ownership. 7 T. R. 397; 7 Taunt. 302; 4
East, 130; 5 Esp. R. 88. So bailees of goods (2 Bing. 173; Ld. Raym. 275; B. N. P. 33;
1 Mod. 31; Stra. 505), as carriers, consignees, pawnees, trustees (2 Saund. 47, a.), agisters
of cattle, one who borrows a horse to till his land (Bro. Tres. 67), and churchwardens (2 Stra.
852; 2 P. Wms. 126; 2 Saund. 47, c.), may maintain this action against any one who converts
the property. But a special property, which may be sufficient as against a stranger, gives no
right against one who has the general property. 1 T. R. 658. Where the sheriff under a
writ of fi. fa. against A, sells the goods of B, though by public sale, the purchaser is liable
to the latter in trover. 3 Stark. 130; 5 B. and A. 826; 2 Dowl. and R. 1 S. P. Where
A shipped goods by the order of, and for B in London, and shortly afterwards ascertained
that B had stopped payment, and he then indorsed and forwarded the bill of lading to the
plaintiff, directing him to take possession of the goods, held, that on the defendants' (the car-
rier's) refusal to deliver them to the plaintiff, he had a sufficient title to sue for them in trover.
2 Bing. 260. See also 5 M. and S. 350, as between vendor and assignee of factor to the
vendee. As between foreign merchant and pledgee of his consignee, see 5 Moore, 518.
A conversion seems to consist in any tortious act, by which the defendant deprives the
plaintiff of his goods, either wholly, or but for a time. 3 B. and A. 685. The mere abuse of
a chattel by a bailee is no conversion: Gil. L. Ev. 265, 2d ed. ; but if he use it contrary to the
design of the bailment, it is otherwise; as if a man lend his horse to go to York, and the
bailee go to Carlisle. 2 Bulst. 309. Mere nonfeasance is not a conversion: 2 B. and P. 438;
as that an agent employed to sell goods has neglected to sell them. If the goods come to the
hands of the defendant by delivery, finding, or bailment, a demand and refusal should be
proved at the trial, but in cases of tortious taking or actual conversion, proof of demand and
refusal is unnecessary. 1 Sid. 264. The ordinary presumptive proof of a conversion consists
in evidence of a demand of the goods by the plaintiff, and a refusal to deliver them by the
defendant: 6 Mod. 212; 6 East, 540; 5 id. 407; but the court cannot infer a conversion from
such proof, it must be found by the jury. 2 Mod. 242; 10 Coke, 57; 2 Roll. Ab. 693; 1 T. R.
478 ; Hob. 181. If the refusal be absolute, and there be no evidence to justify or explain it,
the jury ought to find a conversion. 1 Esp. R. 31; Clay. 122, pl. 114. But a qualified refusal,
as because the holder does not know to whom the goods belong: 1 Esp. R. 83; 2 Buls. 312;
Bull. N. P. 46; or that the claimant has not proved his right: 3 Camp. 215; or a servant refus-
ing to deliver them, without an order from his employers (5 B. and A. 247), or referring the
plaintiff to his master (id.), or a false assertion of a carrier, that he has delivered the goods:
1 Camp. 409 ; in all these cases the facts do not amount to a conversion.1
As to the meaning of conversion, see Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. and N. 296; Pillott V. Wil-
kinson, 2 H. and C. 72.
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an advantage over the action of detinue, that by a fiction of law actions of
trover were at length permitted to be brought against any man who had in his
possession, by any means whatsoever, the personal goods of another, and sold
them or used them without the consent of the owner, or refused to deliver them
when demanded. The injury lies in the conversion: for any man may take the
goods of another into possession, if he finds them; but no finder is allowed to
acquire a property therein, unless the owner be forever unknown: (m) and
therefore he must not convert them to his own use, which the law presumes him
to do, if he refuses them to the owner: for which reason such refusal alone is,
prima facie, sufficient evidence of a conversion.(n) The fact of the finding, or
trover, is therefore now totally immaterial: for the plaintiff needs only to sug-
gest (as words of form) that he lost such goods, and that the defendant found
them: and if he proves that the goods are his property, and that the defendant
had them in his possession, it is sufficient. But a conversion must be fully
proved: and then in this action the plaintiff shall recover damages, equal to the
value of the thing converted, but not the thing itself: which nothing will
recover but an action of detinue or replevin.
*As to the damage that may be offered to things personal, while in
*153] the possession of the owner, as hunting a man's deer, shooting his dogs,
poisoning his cattle, or in anywise taking from the value of any of his chattels,
or making them in a worse condition than before, these are injuries too obvious
to need explication. I have only therefore to mention the remedies given by the
law to redress them, which are in two shapes; by action of trespass vi et armis,
where the act is in itself immediately injurious to another's property, and there-
fore necessarily accompanied with some degree of force; and by special action
on the case, where the act is in itself indifferent, and the injury only consequen-
tial, and therefore arising without any breach of the peace. In both of which
suits the plaintiff shall recover damages, in proportion to the injury which he
proves that his property has sustained. And it is not material whether the
damage be done by the defendant himself, or his servants by his direction; for
the action will lie against the master as well as the servant. (o) And, if a man
keeps a dog or other brute animal, used to do mischief, as by worrying sheep, or
the like, the owner must answer for the consequences, if he knows of such evil
habit. (p) (9)
II. Hitherto of injuries affecting the right of things personal, in possession.
We are next to consider those which regard things in action only: or such rights
as are founded on, and arise from, contracts; the nature and several divisions
of which were explained in the preceding volume. (q) The violation, or non-
performance, of these contracts might be extended into as great a variety of
wrongs, as the rights which we then considered; but I shall now consider them
in a more comprehensive view, by here making only a twofold division of con-
tracts; viz., contracts express, and contracts implied; and pointing out the
injuries that arise from the violation of each, with their respective remedies.
Express contracts include three distinct species; debts, covenants, and pro-
mises.
(m) See book I, ch. 8; book II, ch. 1 and 26. (n) 10 Rep. 56. (o) Noy's Max. c. 44.
(p) Cro. Car. 254, 487. (q) See Book II, ch. 30.
(9) [As to what is evidence of knowledge, see 4 Camp. 198; 2 Stra. 1264; 2 Esp. 482. But
the owner is not answerable for the first mischief done by a dog, a bull or other tame animal.
Bull. N. P. 77; 12 Mod. 833; Ld. Raym. 608. Yet if he should carry his dog into a field,
where he himself is a trespasser, and the dog should kill sheep, this, though the first offence,
might be stated and proved as an aggravation of the trespass. Burr. 2092 ; 2 Lev. 172. If a
man sets traps in his own grounds, but baited with such strong-scented articles as allure the
neighboring dogs from the premises of the owners, or from the highways, the owner of a
Jog injured may maintain an action upon the case. 9 East, 227; but see Ilott v. Wilkes,
3 Bar. and Ald. 304.]
As to the liability of the owner of a vicious animal for an injury committed by him, see
Van Leuven v. Lyke, 4 Denio, 127; S. C., 1 N. Y. 515; Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500;
Earhart v. Youngblood, 27 Penn. St. 381.
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CRIGHTS IN ACTION: DEBT.
*1. The legal acceptation of debt is, a sum of money due by cer- [-154-
tain and express agreement: as, by a bond for a determinate sum;
a bill or note; a special bargain; or a rent reserved on a lease; where the quan-
tity is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation
to settle it. The non-payment of these is an injury, for which the proper
remedy is by action of debt, (r) to compel the performance of the contract and
recover the specifical sum due. (s) This is the shortest and surest remedy;
particularly where the debt arises upon a specialty, that is, upon a deed or
instrument under seal. So also, if I verbally agree to pay a man a certain price
for a certain parcel of goods, and fail in the performance, an action of debt lies
against me; for this is also a determinate contract: but if I agree for no settled
price, I am not liable to an action of debt, but a special action on the case,
according to the nature of my contract. And indeed actions of debt are now
seldom brought but upon special contracts under seal; wherein the sum due is
clearly and precisely expressed: for, in case of such an action upon a simple
contract, the plaintiff labours under two difficulties. First, the defendant has
here the same advantage as in an action of detinue, that of waging his law, or
purging himself of the debt by oath, if he thinks proper. (t) Secondly, in an
action of debt the plaintiff must prove the whole debt he claims, or recover
nothing at all. For the debt is one single cause of action, fixed and deter-
mined; and which, therefore, if the proof varies from the claim, cannot be
looked upon as the same contract whereof the performance is sued for. If, there-
fore, I bring an action of debt for 301., I am not at liberty to prove a debt of
201. and recover a verdict thereon; (u) any more than if I bring an action of
detinue for a horse, I can thereby recover an ox. For I fail in the proof of that
contract, which my action or complaint has alleged to be specific, express, and
determinate. (10) But in an action on the case, on what is called an indebitatus
assumpsit which is not brought to compel a specific performance of the contract,
but to recover damages for its *non-performance, the implied assump- [*1553
sit, and consequently the damages for the breach of it, are in their nature *15
indeterminate; and will therefore adapt and proportion themselves to the truth
of the case which shall be proved, without being confined to the precise demand
stated in the declaration. For if any debt be proved, however less than the
sum demanded, the law will raise a promise pro tanto, and the damages will of
course be proportioned to the actual debt. So that I may declare that the
defendant, being indebted to me in 301. undertook or promised to pay it, but
failed; and lay my damages arising from such failure at what sum I please: and
the jury will, according to the nature of my proof, allow me either the whole in
damages, or any inferior sum. And, even in actions of debt, where the contract
is proved or admitted, if the defendant can show that he has discharged any
part of it, the plaintiff shall recover the residue. (v)
The form of the writ of debt is sometimes in the debet and detinet, and some-
times in the detinet only: that is, the writ states, either that the defendant
owes and unjustly detains the debt or thing in question, or only that he unjustly
detains it. It is brought in the debet as well as detinet, when sued by one of
the original contracting parties who personally gave the credit, against the
other who personally incurred the debt, or against his heirs, if they are bound
to the payment; as by the obligee against the obligor, the landlord against the
tenant, &c. But, if it be brought by or against an executor for debt due to or
from the testator, this not being his own debt, shall be sued for in the detinet
only. (w) So also if the action be for goods, for corn, or a horse, the writ shall
be in the detinet only; for nothing but a sum of money, for which I (or my
(r) F. N. B. 119. (s) See Appendix, No. 17, § 1. (t) 4 Rep. 94.
(u) Bro. Ley gager, 93. Dyer, 219. 2 Roll. Abr. 706. 1 Show. 215.
(v) 1 Roll. Rep. 257. Salk. 664. (w) F. N. B. 119.
(10) [This is no longer the case, for it is now completely settled, that the plaintiff in an
action of debt may prove and recover less than the sum demanded in the writ. See Bla. R.
1221; 1 Hen. Bla. 249 , 11 East, 62.]
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ancestors in my name) have personally contracted, is properly considered as my
debt. And indeed a writ of debt in the detinet only, for goods and chattels, is
neither more nor less than a mere writ of detinue; and is followed by the very
same judgment. (x)
2. A covenant also contained in a deed, to do a direct act or to omit one, is
another species of express contracts, the violation or breach of which is a civil
injury. As if a man covenants to be at York by such a day, or not to exercise
[*156] a *trade in a particular place, and is not at York at the time appointed,
or carries on his trade in the place forbidden, these are direct breaches
of his covenant; and may be perhaps greatly to the disadvantage and loss of
the covenantee. (11) The remedy for this is by a writ of covenant; (y) which
directs the sheriff to command the defendant generally to keep his covenant
with the plaintiff (without specifying the nature of the covenant), or show
good cause to the contrary: and if he continues refractory, or the covenant is
already so broken that it cannot now be specifically performed, then the subse-
quent proceedings set forth with precision the covenant, the breach and the loss
which has happened thereby; whereupon the jxry will give damages in pro-
portion to the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and occasioned by such breach
of the defendant's contract.
There is one species of covenant, of a different nature from the rest; and
that is a covenant real, to convey or dispose of lands, which seems to be partly
of a personal and partly of a real nature. (z) For this the remedy is by a
special writ of covenant, for a specific performance of the contract concerning
certain lands particularly described in the writ. It therefore directs the sheriff
to command the defendant, here called the deforciant, to keep the covenant
made between the plaintiff and him concerning the identical lands in question:
and upon this process it is that fines of land are usually levied at common
law, (a) the plaintiff or person to whom the fine is levied, bringing a writ of
covenant, in which he suggests some agreement to have been made between him
and the deforciant, touching those particular lands, for the completion of which
he brings this action. And for the end of this supposed difference, the fine
or finalis concordia is made, whereby the deforciant (now called cognizor)
acknowledges the tenements to be the right of the plaintiff, now called the
cognizee. And moreover, as leases for years were formerly considered only as
contracts (b) or covenants for the enjoyment of rents and profits, and not as
[ he conveyance *of any real interest in the land, the ancient remedy for
the lessee, if ejected, was by a writ of covenant against the lessor, to
recover the term (if in being) and damages in case the ouster was committed
(x) East. Entr. 174. (y) F. N. B. 145. (z) Hal. on F. N. B. 146.
(a) See Book IIH, ch. 21. (b) Ibid. 9.
(11) [By an express covenant a man is bound to perform what he covenants at all events.
Thus, where in a lease there is an express unqualified covenant on the part of the tenant to
pay rent, he is obliged to pay it during the term, although the house be burned down and he
do not enjoy the use of it. Shudbrick v. Salmond, 3 Burr. 1637; Belfour v. Weston, 1 T. R.
810. This is certainly a great hardship to lessees, where they are not by the provisions of
their leases obliged to rebuild; and in such cases we accordingly find that recourse has been
had to a court of equity to obtain an injunction against the lessor proceeding at law for the
recovery of the rent; which has generally been granted on condition of the lessee surrendering
the lease. Cambden v. Morton, in Cane. E., 4 Geo. III, MS.; Selw. N. P. 472; Brown v.
Quilter, Amb. 619.
The covenantor is also answerable for even the act of God, as damage by lightning, &c.,
if he have not excepted it in his covenant. Brecknock and Abergavenny Canal Navigation
v. Pritchard, 6 T. R. 750.
It may not be unnecessary to point out a distinction between covenants in general and
those secured by a penalty or forfeiture. In the latter case the obligee has his election either
to bring an action of debt for the penalty or to proceed upon the covenant and recover in
damages more or less than the penalty, toties quoties; bet he cannot have recourse to both.
Lowe a. Peers, 4 Burr. 2228. See further on covenants, in Harg. and Butler's notes on
Co. Litt.]
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by the lessor himself: or if the term was expired, or the ouster was committed by
a stranger, claiming by an elder title, then to recover damages only. (c) (12)
No person could at common law take advantage of any covenant or condi-
tion, except such as were parties or privies thereto; and, of course, no grantee
(c) Bro. Abr. t. covenant, 33. F. N. B. 145.
(12) [The importance of the subject of the above paragraph requires that it should be more
fully noticed. With respect to the parties who may sue on a covenant: First, the covenantee
may sue the covenantor upon all lawful covenants, either expressed in the deed or implied by
law; upon the former in respect of the privity of contract created by the deed, and upon the
latter, in respect of the privity of estate in the thing in respect of which the law creates the
covenant. Bacheloure v. Gage, Sir W. Jones, 223; Anon., 1 Sid. 447; Auriol v. Mills, 4
T. R. 98.
For a personal thing the law does not create a covenant, and implied covenants are there-
fore confined to real property. Com. Dig. Covenant A. 4.
The covbnantee must be a party to the deed by which the covenant is created. Thus if a
deed, purporting to be made between two or more parties, contain a covenant expressed tobe
for the benefit of one not a party to it, and to be made with him, yet not he, but the party to
the deed, is the covenantee, and must sue upon it. Per Tindal, C. J., in Bushell v. Beavan,
I Bing. N. C. 120; Berkley v. Hardy, 5 B. and C. 355. And it is the same in covenants created
by deeds-poll, in which cases the person with whom a covenant is made becomes in fact a
party to the deed. Com. Dig., Fait, D. 1.
Secondly, in what cases the heir of the covenantee may sue. These are upon such
covenants as are quodammodo annexed or appurtenant to the land or other hereditament
which has descended to him, or, as it is usually expressed, which run with the land, and a
privity of contract is trinsferred from the covenantor to the heir in respect of the estate
descended. The expression running with the estate in the land is more correct than run-
ning with the land. Webb a Russel, 3 T. R. 393. For instance, the heir of a lessor, though
not named, may sue for the breach of a covenant to repair premises which have come to himas such. Lougher a. Williams, 2 Lay. 92 ; Glover a. Cope, Skin. 305.
Thirdly, when an executor may sue upon a covenant. Upon all covenants not running
with the land, and of which the heir cannot take advantage, the executor of the covenantee
must sue. 2 H. Bl.310; 3 T. H. 393,401 ; Coin. Dig. Covenant 1. The heir cannot take advant-
age of covenants annexed to a term of years ; for that does not descend to him, but passes to
the executor. And with respect to covenants annexed to the inheritance, if there has been a
breach of them in the lifetime of the testator, occasioning damages to his personal estate, the
executor is the proper party to sue. 2 Lev. 26; 1 M. and 5. 355; 1 Marsh. 107; 5 Taunt. 418;
4 M. and S. 53, 188.
Fourthly, the devisee of a reversion, and the legatee of a term, stand in the situation, the
one of an heir, the other of an assignee. Roe v. Hayley, 12 East, 464.
Fifthly, when the grantee or assignee may sue, of which there are two kinds, the grantee or
assignee of the reversion, and the assignee of the term. And first, as to the grantee or assignee
of the reversion. It seems that even at common law, the grantee of a reversion might take
advantage of a covenant in law, and the words in the text must not be taken to refer to such
covenants. Harper v. Burgh, 2 Lev. 206; Vyan v. Arthur, 1 B. and C. 415, per Bailey, J.
But upon expressed covenants, although annexed to the estate, and for its benefit, the better
opinion is, that the assignee of the reversion could not sue at common law. Thursby v. Plant,
1 W. Saund. 240, n. 3. His rights, in this respect, therefore, depend entirely upon the 32 Hen.
VIII, c. 34. Although the words of that statute are sufficiently general to include every cov-
enant upon which the lessor or grantor could sue, it was resolved in Spencer's Case, 5 Coke, 16,
and 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 22, that it extends only to covenants which touch or concern the
thing demised, and not to collateral covenants. The reason for this seems to have been, that
as the remedy by entry (Co. Litt. 215, b.) is confined to forfeitures by force of such conditions as
either are incident to the reversion, or for the benefit of the estate, the remedy by action should
be confined in like manner. And, indeed, if this construction had not heen adopted, he who
came to the reversion by grant, or assignment, would have been in a better position than he who
came to it by descent. The effect of the statute is to put the assignee of the reversion in the
same situation, and to give him the same remedy, as the heir had at common law. It creates
a privity of contract in respect of the estate which the assignee hath, and not merely a privity
of estate. Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 398. And, therefore, an action founded upon the statute
is transitory. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237. According to the preamble, it extends only to
reversions upon estates for life or years. Co. Litt. 215, a.; Matures v. Westwood, Cro. Eliz. 617.
And copyhold lands are within it. Glover v. Cope, 3 Lev. 327. As to who is a grantee or
assignee within its meaning, it has been held that a grantee of part of the reversion (as if the
reversion be granted for a term of years), is such: Attoe v. Hemings, 2 Bulstr. 281 ; Burton v.
Barclay, 7 Bing. 7.45 ; and so, also, is an assignee of the reversion in part of the premises.
Twynam a. Pickard, 2 B. and A. 105. But the assignee must have the same reversion as thelessor had at the time of granting the lease (Webb v. R sell, supr; Whitton v. Peacock,
2 Bing. N. C. 411), and muat claim through him. Thus, a lord who enters for a forfeiture can-
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or assignee of any reversion or rent. To remedy which, and more effectually to
secure to the king's grantees the spoils of the monasteries then newly dissolved,
the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, gives the assignee of a reversion (after notice of
such assignment) (d) the same remedies against the particular tenant, by entry
or action, for waste or other forfeitures, non-payment of rent, and non-perform-
ance of conditions, covenants and agreements, as the assignor himself might
have had; and makes him equally liable, on the other hand, for acts agreed to
be performed by the assignor, except in the case of warranty.
3. A promise is in the nature of a verbal covenant, and wants nothing but the
solemnity of writing and sealing to make it absolutely the same. If, therefore,
it be to do any explicit act, it is an express contract, as much as any covenant;
and the breach of it is an equal injury. The remedy indeed is not exactly
the same: since, instead of an action of covenant, there only lies an action upon
the case, for what is called the assumpsit or undertaking of the defendant; the
failure of performing which is the wrong or injury done to the plaintiff, the
damages whereof a jury are to estimate and settle. As if a builder promises,
undertakes, or assumes to Caims, that he will build and cover his house within
a time limited, and fails to do it; Caius has an action on the case against the
builder, for this breach of his express promise, undertaking or assumpsit; and
shall recover a pecuniary satisfaction for the injury sustained by such delay.(13)
So also in the case before-mentioned, of a debt by simple contract, if the debtor
(d) Co. Litt. 215. Moor. 876. Cro. Jac. 145.
not take advantage of the covenants. Co. Litt. 215, b.; Chaworth v. Phillips, Moore, 876.
Secondly, the assignee of the term may sue at common law, upon all covenants that run with
the land. Spencer's Case, 4th, 5th and 7th resolutions. And his action is by force of the
privity of estate, and the venue is therefore local. Stevenson v. Lambard, 2 East, 580.
Thus far of the persons who may sue upon a covenant; next, of those who may be sued there-
on. It is hardly necessary to observe, that the covenantor may be sued upon all his lawful
covenants by force of the privity of contract. And when he has covenanted for himself and
his heirs, the heir may be sued, but is only liable to the extent of the estate that has descended
to him. Bac. Ab. Heir and Ancestor, F.; Willes, 585. And the executor may also be sued,
between whom and the heir there is this difference, that whether the covenant does or does
not run with the land, the former is bound, although not named, unless it be such as in its
nature is determined by the death of the covenantor. Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz.
553. With respect to breaches committed since the death of the covenantor, the heir or execu-
tor may be sued as assignee of the reversion, or of the term, on such covenants as run with the
land, except that with respect to rent, the liability of the executor does not exceed what the
property yields. Tremeere v. Morison, 1 Bing. N. C. 97-99 ; Derisley v. Custance, 4 T. R. 75;
Tilney v. Norris, Carth. 519; 1 Ld. Raym. 453; Salk. 309, S. C.; 1 Bulstor. 23, per Fleming,
C. J. The situation of a devisee or legatee of the reversion, and a legatee of the term, is the
same with respect to being sued as to suing. Dyer, 257, a.; Com. Dig. Covenant, C. (2)
Lastly, the grantee or assignee of the reversion and the assignee of the term are liable to be
sued upon covenants that run with the land, with this distinction, that when the covenant
extends to a thing in esse, parcel of the demise, the assignee is bound, although not named;
but where it concerns a thinz not in esse at the time of making the demise, but to be done
thereafter, lie must be named. Spencer's Case, 1st and 2d resolutions.
Between the assignee of the reversion and the assignee of the term there is, however, this
difference, that the former is liable by force of the statute; the latter, at common law, by force
of privity of estate.
It only remains to notice what covenants run with the land. According to the 4th resolu-
lution in Spencer's Case, all implied covenants do so. But what express covenants, to use the
words in that case, "touch or concern the thing demised," is frequently a question of great
difficulty. To enumerate the various covenants that have been held to run with the land
would exceed the limits of this note, and the student is therefore advised to peruse the valu-
able note on this subject to 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 29. It should be added that it is ques-
tionable whether the statute extends to the assignee of the reversion of a term created by
writing, and not by a deed under seal. See Brydges v. Lewis, 11 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. 268.
The writ of covenant real was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.]
(13) [" It is worthy of remark, that the learned commentator has not either named,
described or even alluded to the consideration requisite to support an assumpsit; and what is
more remarkable, the example put by him in the text in order to illustrate the nature of the
action, is, in the terms in which it is there stated, a case of nudum pactum. See 1 Roll. Ab. 9,
1, 41; Doct. and Stud. 2, ch. 24; and 5 T. R. 143; that the promise will not lie for a mere
nonfeasance, unless the promise is founded on a consideration." Selw. N. P. 45.]
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promises to pay it and does not, this breach of promise entitles the creditor to
his action on the case, instead of being driven to an action of debt. (e) Thus
likewise a promissory note, or note of hand not under seal, to pay money at a
day certain, is an express assumpsit; and the payee at common law, or, by cus-
tom and act of parliament, the indorsee (f), may recover the value of the note
in damages, if it remains unpaid. Some agreements, indeed, though never so
expressly made, are deemed of so important a nature, that they ought not to
rest in verbal promise only, which cannot be proved but by the memory (which
sometimes will induce the perjury) of witnesses. To prevent which the statute
of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. II, c. 3, enacts, that in the five *follow-
ing cases no verbal promise shall be sufficient to ground an action upon,
but at the least some note or memorandum of it shall be made in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith: 1. Where an executor or admin-
istrator promises to answer damages out of his own estate. 2. Where a man
undertakes to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. 3. Where
any agreement is made, upon consideration of marriage. 4. Where any con-
tract or sale is made of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest
therein. 5. And lastly, where there is any agreement that is not to be per-
formed within a year from the making thereof. In all these cases a mere
verbal assumpsit is void. (14)
From these express contracts the transition is easy to those that are only
implied by law. Which are such as reason and justice dictate, and which there-
fore the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform ; and upon this
presumption makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-per-
formance.
Of this nature are, first, such as are necessarily implied by the fundamental
constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party. And
thus it is that every person is bound and hath virtually agreed to pay such
particular sums of money as are charged on him by the sentence, or assessed by
(e) 4 Rep. 94. (f) See book II, ch. 30.
(14) [These provisions in the statute have produced many decisions, both in the courts of
law and equity. See 3 Chitty's Com. L. per tot. It is now settled, that if two persons go to a
shop, and one order goods, and the other say, "If he does not pay I will," or "I will see you
paid," he is not bound unless his engagement is reduced into writing, in all such cases the
question is, who is the buyer, or to whom the credit is given, and who is the surety: and that
question, from all the circumstances, must be ascertained by the jury: for if the person for
whose use the goods are furnished be liable at all, any promise by a third person to discharge
the debt must be in writing, otherwise it is void. 2 T. R. 80; I. B1. Rep. 120; 1 Bos. and Pul.
158. Mutual promises to marry need not be in writing; the statute relates only to agreements
made in consideration of the marriage. A lease not exceeding three years from the making
thereof, and in which the rent reserved amounts to two-thirds of the improved value, is good
without writing; but all other parol leases or agreements for any interest in lands, have the
effect of estates at will only. Bull. N. P. 279. All declarations of trusts, except such as
result by implication of law, must be made in writing. 29 Car. II, c. 3, ss. 7 and 8. If a
promise depends upon a contingency, which may or may not fall within a year, it is not
within the statute; as a promise to pay a sum of money upon a death or marriage, or upon
the return of a ship, or to leave a legacy by will, is good by parol; for such a promise may
by possibility be performed within the year. 3 Burr. 1278; 1 Salk. 280; 3 id. 9, &c. Partial
performance within the year, where the original undertaking is that the whole is to extend
to a longer period, does not take the case out of the statute. 11 East, 142. But even a writ-
ten undertaking to pay the debt of another is void, unless a good consideration appears in the
writing; and the consideration, if any, cannot be proved by parol evidence. 5 East, 10. If
a growing crop is purchased without writing, the agreement, before part execution, may be
put an end to by parol notice. 6 East, 602. But a court of equity will decree a specific per-
formance of a verbal contract, when it is confessed by a defendant in his answer; or when
there has been a part performance of it. 8 Yes. Jun. 39, 378 and 712. If one party only
signs an agreement, he is bound by it; and if an agreement is by parol, brut it is agreed it
shall be reduced into writing, and this is prevented by the fraud of one of the parties, per-
formance of it will be decreed. 2 Bro. 564, 565, 566; see 3 Woodd. Lect. lvii. and Fon-
blanque Tr. of Eq. b. 1, c. 3, ss. 8 and 9, where this subject is fully and learnedly discussed.]
Upon the subject of this note in general, see Browne on Statute of Frauds. And as to
specific performance, see Story Eq. Juris. §§ 750 to 782.
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the interpretation of the law. For it is a part of the original contract, entered
into by all mankind who partake the benefits of society, to submit in all points
to the municipal constitutions and local ordinances of that state, of which each
individual is a member. Whatever, therefore, the laws order any one to pay,
that becomes instantly a debt, which he hath before-hand contracted to dis-
charge. And this implied agreement it is, that gives the plaintiff a right to
institute a second action, founded merely on the general contract, in order to
recover such damages or sum of money, as are assessed by the jury and
adjudged by the court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff in any
former action. So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against another
[*159] for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution *thereupon, he may
afterwards bring an action of debt upon this judgment,(g) and shall
not be put upon the proof of the original cause of action; but upon showing
the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law
immediately implies, that by the original contract of society the defendant hath
contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it. This method seems to have been
invented, when real actions were more in use than at present, and damages
were permitted to be recovered thereon; in order to have the benefit of a writ
of capias to take the defendant's body in execution for those damages, which
process was allowable in an action of debt (in consequence of the statute 25
Edw. III, c. 17), but not in an action real. Wherefore, since the disuse of those
real actions, actions of debt upon judgments in personal suits have been pretty
much discountenanced by the courts, as being generally vexatious and oppress-
ive by harassing the defendant with the costs of two actions instead of one.
On the same principle it is (of an implied original contract to submit to the
rules of the community whereof we are members), that a forfeiture imposed
by the by-laws and private ordinances of a corporation upon any that belong
to the body, or an amercement set in a court-leet or court-baron upon any of
the suitors to the court (for otherwise it will not be binding),(h) immediately
create a debt in the eye of the law: and such forfeiture or amercement, if
unpaid, work an injury to the party or parties entitled to receive it: for which
the remedy is by action of debt.(i)
The same reason may with equal justice be applied to all penal statutes,
that is, such acts of parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for transgressing
the provisions therein enacted. The party offending is here bound by the
fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and
pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires. The usual
[*160] application of this forfeiture is *either to the party aggrieved, or else to
any of the king's subjects in general. Of the former sort is the forfeit-
ure inflicted by the statute of Winchester (k) (explained and enforced by several
subsequent statutes) (1) upon the hundred wherein a man is robbed, which is
meant to oblige the hundredors to make hue and cry after the felon ; for if they
take him they stand excused. But otherwise the party robbed is entitled to
prosecute them by a special action on the case for damages equivalent to his
loss. And of the same nature is the action given by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22,
commonly called the black act, against the inhabitants of any hundred, in order
to make satisfaction in damages to all persons who have suffered by the offences
enumerated and made felony by that act. But more usually these forfeitures
created by statute are given at large to any common informer; or, in other
words, to any such person or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such
actions are called popular actions, because they are given to the people in
general.(m) Sometimes one part is given to the king, to the poor, or to some
public use, and the other part to the informer or prosecutor: and then the
suit is called a qui lam action, because it is brought by a person, "qui tam
pro domino rege, &c., quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur." If the king
therefore himself commences this suit, he shall have the whole forfeiture.(n)
(q) Roll. Abr. 600, 601. (h) Law of nisi prius, 167. (i) 5 Rep. 64. nob. 209.
(k) 13 Edw. I, c. 1. () 27 Eliz. c. 13. 29 Car. II, c. 7. 8 Geo. II, c. 16. 22 Geo. I, c. 24.
(m) See Book II, ch. 29. (n) 2 Hawk. P. C. 268.
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But if any one hath begun a qui tam, or popular, action, no other person can
pursue it: and the verdict passed upon the defendant in the first suit is a
bar to all others, and conclusive even to the king himself. This has fre-
quently occasioned offenders to procure their own friends to begin a suit,
in order to forestal, and prevent other actions: which practice is in some meas-
ure prevented by a statute made in the reign of a very sharp-sighted prince in
penal laws, 4 Hen. VII, c. 20, which enacts that no recovery, otherwise than by
verdict, obtained by collusion in an action popular, shall be a bar to any other
action prosecuted bonafide. A provision that seems borrowed from *the [,161]
rule of the Roman law, that if a person was acquitted of any accusa-
tion, merely by the prevarication of the accuser, a new prosecution might be
commenced against him.(o)
A second class of implied contracts are such as do not arise from the express
determination of any court, or the positive direction of any statute; but from
natural reason, and the just construction of law. Which class extends to all
presumptive undertakings or assumpsits; which though never perhaps actually
made, yet constantly arise from this general implication and intendment of the
courts of judicature, that every man hath engaged to perform what his duty or
justice requires. Thus,
1. If I employ a person to transact any business for me, or perform any work,
the law implies that I undertook or assumed to pay him so much as his labour
deserved. And if I neglect to make him amends, he has a remedy for this
injury by bringing his action on the case upon this implied assumpsit; wherein
he is at liberty to suggest that I promised to pay him so much as he reasonably
deserved, and then to aver that his trouble was really worth such a particular
sum, which the defendant has omitted to pay. But this valuation of his trouble
is submitted to the determination of a jury; who will assess such a sum in
damages as they think he really merited. This is called an assumpsit on a
quantum meruit.
2. There is also an implied assumpsit on a quantum valebat, which is very
similar to the former, being only where one takes up goods or wares of a trades-
man, without expressly agreeing for the price. There the law concludes that
both parties did intentionally agree, that the real value of the goods should be
paid; and an action on the case may be brought accordingly, if the vendee
refuses to pay that value.
*3. A third species of implied assumpsits is when one has had and [*162]
received money belonging to another, without any valuable consideration
given on the receiver's part: for the law construes this to be money had and
received for the use of the owner only; and implies that the person so receiving
promised and undertook to account for it to the true proprietor. And if he
unjustly detains it, an action on the case lies against him for the breach of such
implied promise and undertaking; and he will be made to repay the owner in
damages, equivalent to what he has detained in violation of such his promise.
This is a very extensive and beneficial remedy, applicable to almost every case
where the defendant has received money which ex equo et bono he ought to
refund. It lies for money paid by mistake or on a consideration which happens
to fail, or through imposition, extortion, or oppression, or where any undue
advantage is taken of the plaintiff's situation.(p)
4. Where a person has laid out and expended his own money for the use of
another, at his request, the law implies a promise of repayment, and an action
will lie on this assumpsit.(q)
5. Likewise, fifthly, upon a stated account between two merchants, or other
persons, the law implies that he against whom the balance appears has engaged
to pay it to the other; though there be not any actual promise. And from this
implication it is frequent for actions on the case to be brought, declaring that
the plaintiff and defendant had settled their accounts together, insimul compu-
tassent (which gives name to this species of assumpsit), and that the defendant
(o) Ff. 47, 15, 3. (p) Burr. 1012. (q) Carth. 446. 2 Keb. 99.
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engaged to pay the plaintiff the balance, but has since neglected to do it. But
if no account has been made up, then the legal remedy is by bringing a writ of
account, de computo ; (r) commanding the defendant to render a just account
[*163] to the plaintiff, *or show the court good cause to the contrary. In this
action, if the plaintiff succeeds, there are two judgments : the first is, that
the defendant do account (quod computet) before auditors appointed by the court;
and, when such amount is finished, then the second judgment is, that he do
pay the plaintiff so much as he is found in arrear. This action, by the old com-
mon law,(s) lay only against the parties themselves, and not their executors;
because matters of account rested solely on their own knowledge. But this
defect, after many fruitless attempts in parliament, was at last remedied by
statute 4 Ann. c. 16, which gives an action of account against the executors ana
administrators.(15) But, however, it is found by experience that the most
ready and effectual way to settle these matters of account is by bill in a court
of equity, where a discovery may be had on the defendant's oath, without rely-
ing merely on the evidence which the plaintiff may be able to produce. Where-
fore actions of account to compel a man to bring in and settle his accounts, are
now very seldom used; though when an account is once stated, nothing is more
common than an action upon the implied assumpsit to pay the balance.
6. The last class of contracts, implied by reason and construction of law,
arises upon this supposition, that every one who undertakes any office, employ-
ment, trust or duty, contracts with those who employ or entrust him, to perform
it with integrityr, diligence, and skill. And, if by his want of either of those
qualities any injury accrues to individuals, they have therefore their remedy in
damages by a special action on the case. A few instances will fully illustrate
this matter. If an officer of the public is guilty of neglect of duty, or a palpable
breach of it, of non-feasance or of mis-feasance; as, if the sheriff does not exe-
cute a writ sent to him, or if he wilfully makes a false return thereof; in both
these cases the party aggrieved shall have an action on the case, for damages to
be assessed by a jury. (t) If a sheriff or gaoler suffers a prisoner, who is taken
[*16 ] upon mesne process, (that *is, during the pendency of a suit) to escape,
he is liable to an action on the case. (u) But if, after judgment, a gaoler
or a sheriff permits a debtor to escape, who is charged in execution for a certain
sum; the debt immediately becomes his own, and he is compellable by action
of debt, being for a sum liquidated and ascertained, to satisfy the creditor his
whole demand: which doctrine is grounded(w) on the equity of the statute of
Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 11, and 1 Ric. II, c. 12. An advocate or attorney that
betray the cause of their client, or, being retained, neglect to appear at the trial,
by which the cause miscarries, are liable to an action on the case, for a repara-
tion to their injured client. (x) (16) There is also in law always an implied con-
tract with a common inn-keeper, to secure his guest's goods in his inn; with a
common carrier, or bargemaster, to be answerable for the goods he carries; with
a common farrier, that he shoes a horse well, without laming him; with a com-
(r) F. N. B. 116. (s) Co. Litt. 90. (t) Moor. 431. 11 Rep. 99. (u) Cro. Eliz. 625. Comb. 69.
(w) Bro. Abr. t. parliament, 19. 2 Inst. 882. (x) Finch, L. 188.
(15) And by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, an action may be maintained by or against the
personal representatives of any person deceased, for any wrong committed by or against
him, in respect of property, real or personal, within six calendar months before such person's
death, and any damages recovered against such representatives are made payable in the
regular order of administration.
(16) There is no implied undertaking on the part of an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor,
that the business he takes charge of shall be successful, or that his advice shall always be
sound and reliable. What he is responsible for is ordinary skill, diligence and care in the
exercise of his profession, having reference to the nature of the business he undertakes to do:
Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I. 242; Miller v. Wilson, 24 Penn. St. 114; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Geo. 144;
Clussman v. Merkel, 3 Bosw. 402; Walker v. Goodman, 21 Ala. 641; and for any failure to
exercise these, an action on the case may be maintained by his client against him. For the
rules of fairness and good faith which the law requires to be observed in this relation, see
Story Eq. Juris. § 310-313.
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mon tailor, or other workman, that he performs his business in a workmanlike
manner; in which, if they fail, an action on the case lies to recover damages for
such breach of their general undertaking. (y) (17) But if I employ a person to
transact any of these concerns, whose common profession and business it is not,
the law implies no such general undertaking, but, in order to charge him with
damages, a special agreement is required. Also, if an inn-keeper, or other
victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers, it is an implied
engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way; and upon this uni-
versal assumpsit an action on the case will lie against him for damages, if he
without good reason refuses to admit a traveller. (z) If any one cheats me with
false cards or dice, or by false weights and measures, or by selling me one com-
modity for another, an action on the case also lies against him for damages,
upon the contract which the law always implies, that every transaction is fair
and honest. (a)
In contracts likewise for sales, it is constantly understood that the seller
undertakes that the *commodity he sells is his own; (18) and if it proves [*165]
otherwise, an action on the case lies against him, to exact damages for
this deceit. In contracts for provisions, it is alway implied that they are whole-
some; and if they be not, the same remedy may be had. Also if he, that selleth
any thing, doth upon the sale warrant it to be good, the law annexes a tacit
contract to his warranty, that if it be not so, he shall make compensation to the
buyer: else it is an injury to good faith, for which an action on the case will lie
to recover damages. (b) The warranty must be upon the sale; for if it be made
after, and not at the time of the sale, it is a void warranty: (c) for it is then
made without any consideration; neither does the buyer then take the goods
upon the credit of the vendor. Also the warranty can only reach to things in
(y 11 Rep. 54. 1 Saund. 312. (z) 1 Ventr. 833. (a) 10 Rep. 56.
) F. N. B. 94. (c) Finch, L. 189.
(17) Upon these subjects, which are very broad, and embrace cases almost infinite in
variety, the reader will of course consult the elementary treatises on bailments, carriers, con-
tracts, &c.
(18) [A. warranty on the sale of a personal chattel, as to the right thereto, is generally
implied: 3 T. R. 57; Peake C. N. P. 94; Cro. Jac. 474; 1 Salk. 210; Doug. 18; but not as to
the right of real property. Dougl. 654; 2 B. and P. 13; 3 id. 166. Nor is a warranty of sound-
ness, goodness, or value of a horse, or other personalty, implied: 3 Campb. 351; 2 East, 314,
448; and if a ship be sold, with all faults, the vendor will not be liable to an action in respect
to latent defects which he knows of, unless he used some artifice to conceal them from the
purchaser. 3 Camp. 154, 506. But if it is the usage of the trade to specify defects, (as in case
of sales of drugs, if they are sea damaged) and none are specified, an implied warranty arises:
4 Taunt. 847; and a warranty may be implied from the production of a sample, in a parol.
sale by sample: 4 Camp. 22, 144, 169; 4 B. and A. 387; 3 Stark. 32 ; and see notes; and if the
bulk of the goods do not correspond with the sample, it would be a breach of the warranty.
If the contract describe the goods as of a particular denomination, there is an implied war-
ranty, that they shall be of a merchantable quality of the denomination mentioned in the con-
tract. 4 Camp. 144; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 393; 1 Stark. 504; 4 Taunt. 853; 5 B. and A. 240. In
all contracts for the sale of provisions, there is an implied contract that they shall be whole-
some. 1 Stark.-384; 2 Camp. 391; 3 id. 286. An implied warran:y arises in the sale of goods
where no opportunity of an inspection is given: 4 Camp. 144, 169; 6 Taunt. 108; and if
goods are ordered to be manufactured, a stipulation that they shall be proper is implied: 4
Camp. 144; 6 Taunt. 108; especially if for a foreign market. 4 Camp. 169; 5 Taunt. 108.
Where a horse has been warranted sound, any infirmity rendering it unfit for immediate use,
is an unsoundness. 1 Stark. 127. The question of unsoundness is for the opinion of a jury.
7 Taunt. 153. If not so stipulated, an action for the breach of warranty may be supported
without returning the horse, or even giving notice of the unsoundness, and although the pur-
chaser have resold the horse. 1 Hen. Bla. 17; 1 T. R. 136; 2 id. 745. But unless the horse
be returned as soon as the defect is discovered, or if the horse has been long worked, the pur-
chaser cannot recover back the purchase money on the count for money had and received:
1 T. R. 136: 5 East, 449; 7 id. 274; 2 Camp. 410; 1 New Rep. 260; and in all cases the ven-
dee should object within a reasonable time: 1 J. B. Moore, 166; and in these cases, or when
the purchaser has doctored the horse, he has no defence to an action by the vendor for the
price, but must proceed in a cross action on the warranty. 1 T. R. 136; 5 East, 449; 7 id.
274; 2 Camp. 410; 1 N. R. 260; 3 Esp. Rep. 82. 4 id. 95.]
As to implied warranties, see, further, note to book 2, p. 451.
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being at the time of the warranty made, and not to things infuturo: as, that
a horse is sound at the buying of him, not that he will be sound two years
hence. (19) But if the vendor knew the goods to be unsound, and hath used
any art to disguise them, (d) or if they are in any shape different from what he
represents them to be to the buyer, this artifice shall be equivalent to an express
warranty, and the vendor is answerable for their goodness. A general warranty
will not extend to guard against defects that are plainly and obviously the object
of one's senses, as if a horse be warranted perfect, and wants either a tail or an
ear, unless the buyer in this case be blind. But if cloth is warranted to be of
such a length, when it is not, there an action on the case lies for damages; for
that cannot be discerned by sight, but only by a collateral proof, the measuring
it. (e) Also if a horse is warranted sound, and he wants the sight of an eye,
though this seems to be the object of one's senses, yet as the discernment of such
defects is frequently matter of skill, it hath been held that an action on the case
lieth to recover damages for this imposition. (f)
Besides the special action on the case, there is also a peculiar remedy, entitled
[*1661 an action of deceit,(g) to give damages *in some particular cases of
fraud,(20) and principally where one man does any thing in the name of
another, by which he is deceived or injured;(h) as if one brings an action in
another's name, and then suffers a nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff becomes liable to
costs: or where one obtains or suffers a fraudulent recovery of lands, tenements,
or chattels, to the prejudice of him that hath right. As when by collusion the
attorney of the tenant makes default in a real action, or where the sheriff returns
that the tenant was summoned when he was not so, and in either case he loses
the land, the writ of deceit lies against the demandant, and also the attorney or
the sheriff and his officers; to annul the former proceedings, and recover back the
land.(i) It also lies in the cases of warranty before mentioned, and other personal
injuries committed contrary to good faith and honesty. (k) But an action on the
case, for damages, in the nature of a writ of deceit, is more usually brought upon
these occasions.(l) And indeed it is the only(m) remedy for the lord of a manor,
in or out of ancient demesne, to reverse a fine or recovery had in the king's
courts of lands lying within his jurisdiction; which would otherwise be thereby
turned into frank fee. And this may be brought by the lord against the parties
and cestuy que use of such fine or recovery; and thereby he shall obtain judg-
ment, not only for damages (which are usually remitted), but also to recover his
court, and jurisdiction over the lands, and to annul the former proceedings.(n)
Thus much for the non-performance of contracts express or implied; which
includes every possible injury to what is by far the most cosiderable species of
personal property, viz.: that which consists in action merely, and not in posses-
sion. Which finishes our inquiries into such wrongs as may be offered to per-
sonal property, with their several remedies by suit or action.
(d) 2 Roll. Rep. 5. (e) Finch, L. 189. (f) Salk. 211. (g) F. N. B. 95. (A) Law of nisiprius, 30.
(i) Booth, real actions, 251. East. Entr. 221, 222. See page 405. (k) F. N. B. 98.
() Booth, 253. Co. Entr. 8. (m) 3 Lev. 419. (n) Rast. Entr. 100, b. 3 Lev. 415. Lutw. 711, 749.
(19) [Lord Mansfield declared, in a case in which the sentence in the text was cited, "there
is no doubt but you may warrant a future event." Doug. 735.]
(20) This action was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, § 36.
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CHAPTER X.
OF INJURIES TO REAL PROPERTY; AND FIRST OF DISPOS-
SESSION, OR OUSTER OF THE FREEHOLD.
I C0ME now to consider such injuries as affect that species of property which
the laws of England have denominated real; as being of a more substantial
and permanent nature than those transitory rights of which personal chattels
are the object.
Real injuries, then, or injuries affecting real rights, are principally six: 1.
Ouster; 2. Trespass; 3. Nuisance; 4. Waste; 5. Subtraction; 6. Disturbance.
Ouster, or dispossession, is a wrong or injury that carries with it the amotion
of possession: for thereby the wrong-doer gets into the actual occupation of the
land or hereditament, and obliges him that hath a right to seek his legal remedy,
in order to gain possession, and damages for the injuries sustained. And such
ouster, or dispossession, may either be of the freehold, or of chattels real. Ouster
of the freehold is effected by one of the following methods: 1. Abatement;
2. Intrusion; 3. Disseisin; 4. Discontinuance; 5. Deforcement. All of which
in their order, and afterwards their respective remedies, will be considered in
the present chapter.
1. And first, an abatement is where a person dies seized of an inheritance,
and before the heir or devisee enters, a stranger *who has no right makes [*168]
entry, and gets possession of the freehold: this entry of him is called
an abatement, and he himself is denominated an abator.(a) It is to be observed
that this expression, of abating, which is derived from the French, and signifies
to quash, beat down, or destroy, is used by our law in three senses. The first,
which seems to be the primitive sense, is that of abating or beating down a
nuisance, of which we spoke in the beginning of this book ;(b) and in a like
sense it is used in statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 17; where mention is made of
abating a castle or fortress; in which case it clearly signifies to pull it down,
and level it with the ground. The second signification of abatement is that of
abating a writ or action, of which we shall say more hereafter: here it is taken
figuratively, and signifies the overthrow or defeating of such writ, by some fatal
exception to it. The last species of abatement is that we have now before us;
which is also a figurative expression to denote that the rightful possession or
freehold of the heir or devisee is overthrown by the rude intervention of a
stranger.
This abatement of a freehold is somewhat similar to an immediate occupancy
in a state of nature, which is effected by taking possession of the land the same
instant that the prior occupant, by his death, relinquishes it. But this, how-
ever agreeable to natural justice, considering man merely as an individual, is
diametrically opposite to the law of society, and particularly the law of England:
which, for the preservation of public peace, hath prohibited, as far as possible,
all acquisitions by mere occupancy: and hath directed that lands, on the death
of the present possessor, should immediately vest either in some person, expressly
named and appointed by the deceased, as his devisee; or, on default of such ap-
pointment, in such of his next relations as the law hath selected and pointed
out as his natural representative or heir. Every entry, therefore, of a mere
stranger by way of intervention between the ancestor and heir, or person next
entitled, which keeps the heir or devisee out of possession, is one of the highest
injuries to the right of real property.
*2. The second species of injury by ouster, or amotion of possession *169]
from the freehold, is by intrusion : which is the entry of a stranger, after [*19
a particular estate of freehold is determined, before him in remainder or rever-
sion. And it happens where a tenant for term of life dieth seised of certain
lands and tenements, and a stranger entereth thereon, after such death of the
(a) Finch, L. 195 (b) Page 5.
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tenant, and before any entry of him in remainder or reversion.(c) This entry
and interposition of the stranger differ from an abatement in this; that an
abatement is always to the prejudicc of the heir, or immediate devisee; an intru-
sion is always to the prejudice of him in remainder or reversion. For example;
if A dies seised of lands in fee-simple, and before the entry of B his heir, C
enters thereon, this is an abatement; but if A be tenant for life, with remainder
to B in fee-simple, and after the death of A, C enters, this is an intrusion. Also
if A be tenant for life on lease from B, or his ancestors, or be tenant by the
curtesy, or in dower, the reversion being vested in B ; and after the death of A,
C enters and keeps B out of possession, this is likewise an intrusion. So that
an intrusion is always immediately consequent upon the determination of a
particular estate ; an abatement is always consequent upon the descent or devise
of an estate in fee-simple. And in either case the injury is equally great to
him whose possession is defeated by this unlawful occupancy.
3. The third species of injury by ouster, or privation of the freehold, is by
disseisin. Disseisin is a wrongful putting out of him that is seised of the free-
hold.(d) The two former species of injury were by a wrongful entry where the
possession was vacant; but this is an attack upon him who is in actual posses-
sion, and turning him out of it. Those were an ouster from a freehold in law;
this is an ouster from a freehold in deed. Disseisin may be effected either in
[*170] corporeal inheritances, *or incorporeal. Disseisin of things corporeal,
as of houses, lands, &c., must be by entry and actual dispossession of the
freehold; (e) as if a man enters either by force or fraud into the house of
another, and turns, or at least keeps, him or his servants out of possession.
Disseisin of incorporeal hereditaments cannot be an actual dispossession : for
the subject itself is neither capable of actual bodily possession, or dispossession ;
but it depends on their respective natures, and various kinds; being in general
nothing more than a disturbance of the owner in the means of coming at, or
enjoying them. With regard to freehold rent in particular, our ancient law
books (f) mentioned five methods of working a disseisin thereof: 1. By enclos-
ure; where the tenant so encloseth the house or land, that the lord cannot come
to distrain thereon, or demand it: 2. Byforestaller, or lying in wait; when the
tenant besetteth the way with force and arms, or by menaces of bodily hurt
affrights the lessor from coming: 3. By rescous; that is, either by violently
retaking a distress taken, or by preventing the lord with force and arms from
taking any at all: 4. By replevin; when the tenant replevies the distress at such
time when his rent is really due: 5. By denial; which is when the rent being
lawfully demanded is not paid. All, or any of these circumstances amount to
a disseisin of rent; that is, they wrongfully put the owner out of the only pos-
session, of which the subject-matter is capable, namely, the receipt of it. But
all these disseisins of hereditaments incorporeal are only so at the election and
choice of the party injured; if, for the sake of more easily trying the right, he
is pleased to suppose himself disseised.(g) Otherwise, as there can be no actual
dispossession, he cannot be compulsively disseised of any incorporeal hereditament.
And so, too, even in corporeal hereditaments, a man may frequently suppose
himself to be disseised, when he is not so in fact, for the sake of entitling him-
self to the more easy and commodious remedy of an assize of novel disseisin
(which will be explained in the sequel of this chapter), instead of being
[*171] *driven to the more tedious process of a writ of entry.(h) The true
7 1 njury of compulsive disseisin seems to be that of dispossessing the ten-
ant, and substituting oneself to be the tenant of the lord in his stead; in order
to which in the times of pure feudal tenure the consent or connivance of the lord,
who upon every descent or alienation personally gave, and who therefore alone
could change, the seisin or investiture, seems to have been considered as neces-
sary. But when in process of time the feudal form of alienations wore off, and
the lord was no longer the instrument of giving actual seisin, it is probable that
C ) o. Litt. 277. F. N. B. 203, 204. (d) Co. Litt. 277. (e) Co. Litt. 181.
Finch, L. 165, 166. Litt. § 237, &c. (g) Litt. §§ 588, 589. (h) Hengh, parv. e. 7. 1 Burr. 110.
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the lord's acceptance of rent or service, from him who had dispossessed another,
might constitute a complete disseisin. Afterwards, no regard was had to the
lord's concurrence, but the dispossessor himself was considered as the sole dis-
seisor: and this wrong was then allowed to be remedied by entry only, without
any form of law, as against the disseisor himself; but required a legal process
against his heir or alienee. And when the remedy by assize was introduced
under Henry II, to redress such disseisins as had been committed within a few
years next preceding, the facility of that remedy induced others, who were
wrongfully kept out of the freehold, to feign or allow themselves to be disseised,
merely for the sake of the remedy.
These three species of injury, abatement, intrusion, and disseisin, are such
wherein the entry of the tenant ab initio, as well as the continuance of his pos-
session afterwards, is unlawful. But the two remaining species are where the
entry of the tenant was at first lawful, but the wrong consists in the detaining
of possession afterwards.
4. Such is, fourthly, the injury of discontinuance; (1) which happens when
he who hath an estate-tail, maketh a larger estate of the land than by law he is
entitled to do : (i) in which case the estate is good, so far as his power extends
who made it, but no farther. As if tenant in tail makes a feoffment in fee-
simple, or for the life of the feoffee, or in tail; all *which are beyond *1-
his power to make, for that by the common law extends no farther than [ 1721
to make a lease for his own life; in such case the entry of the feoffee is lawful
during the life of the feoffor ; but if he retains the possession after the death of
the feoffor, it is an injury, which is termed a discontinuance: the ancient legal
estate, which ought to have survived to the heir in tail, being gone, or at least
suspended, and for a while discontinued. For, in this case, on the death of the
alienors, neither the heir in tail, nor they in remainder or reversion expectant
on the determination of the estate-tail, (2) can enter on and possess the lands so
alienated. Also, by the common law, the alienation of a husband who was
seised in the right of his wife, worked a discontinuance of the wife's estate: till
the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28 provided, that no act by the husband alone shall
work a discontinuance of, or prejudice, the inheritance or freehold of the wife;
but that, after his death, she or her heirs may enter on the lands in question.
Formerly, also, if an alienation was made by a sole corporation, as a bishop or
dean, without consent of the chapter, this was a discontinuance.(j) But this
is now quite antiquated by the disabling statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 19, and 13 Eliz.
c. 10, which declare all such alienations absolutely void ab initio, and, there-
fore, at present no discontinuance can be thereby occasioned. (3)
(i) Finch, L. 190. (?) F. N. B. 194.
(1) [The term " discontinuance" is used to distinguish those cases where the party, whose free-
hold is ousted, can restore it by action only, from those in which he may restore it by entry.
Now things which lie in grant cannot either be devested or restored by entry. The owner
therefore of any thing which lies in grant has in no stage, and under no circumstances, any
other remedy but by action. The books often mention both disseisins and discontinuances of
incorporeal hereditaments, but these disseisins and discontinuances are only at the election of
the party, for the purpose of availing himself of the remedy by action. Co. Litt. 330, b. n.
But a disseisin or discontinuance of corporeal hereditaments necessarily operates as a dissei-
sin or discontinuance of all the incorporeal rights or incidents which the disseisee or discon-
tinuee has himself in, upon, or out of the land affected by the disseisin or discontinuance. lb.
382, a. n. 1. Conveyances by feoffment and livery, or by fine or recovery by tenant in tail
in possession, work a discontinuance; but if by covenant to stand seised to uses, under the
statute, lease and release, bargain and sale, they do not: Co. Litt. 330, a. n. 1 ; unless accom-
panied with a fine, as one and the same assurance in the two latter instances: 10 Co. 95; but
if the fine be a distinct assurance, it is otherwise. 2 Burr. 704. See ante, book 2, 301. See
further, Adams on Ejectment, 35, &c.; 2 Saund. index, Discontinuance; 2 D. and R. 373;
1 B. and C. 238.]
(2) This is no longer the law. See statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, § 89; also 8 and 9 Vic.
c. 106, § 4.
(3) And a discontinuance in any case would now appear to be impossible, since the statutes
mentioned in the last note, the second of which declares that a feoffient made after October 1,
1845, shall not have a tortious operation, so as to create an estate by wrong.
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5. The fifth and last species of injuries by ouster or privation of the freehold,
where the entry of the present tenant or possessor was originally lawful, but his
detainer has now become unlawful, is that by deforcement. This, in its most
extensive sense, is nornen generalissimum; a much larger and more compre-
hensive expression than any of the former: it then signifying the holding of
any lands or tenements to which another person hath a right.(k) So that this
includes as well an abatement, an intrusion, a disseisin, or a discontinuance, as
any other species of wrong whatsoever, whereby he that hath right to the free-
hold is kept out of possession. But, as contradistinguished from the former, it
[*173] is only such a detainer of the *freehold, from him that hath the right
of property, but never had any possession under that right, as falls
within none of the injuries which we have before explained. As in case where
a lord has a seignory, and lands escheat to him propter defectum sanguinis, but
the seisin of the lands is withheld from him; here the injury is not abatement,
for the right vests not in the lord as heir or devisee; nor is it intrusion, for it
vests not in him who bath the remainder or reversion; nor is it disseisin, for
the lord was never seised; nor does it at all bear the nature of any species of
discontinuance; but, being neither of these four, it is therefore a deforcement.(l)
If a man marries a woman, and during the coverture is seised of lands, and
alienes, and dies; is disseised, and dies; or dies in possession; and the alienee,
disseisor, or heir, enters on the tenements and doth not assign the widow her
dower; this is also a deforcement to the widow, by withholding lands to which
she hath a right.(m) In like manner, if a man lease lands to another for term
of years, or for the life of a third person, and the term expires by surrender,
effiux of time, or death of the cestuy que vie; and the lessee or any stranger,
who was at the expiration of the term in possession, holds over, and refuses to
deliver the possession to him in remainder or reversion, this is likewise a deforce-
ment.(n) Deforcements may also arise upon the breach of a condition in law:
as if a woman gives lands to a man by deed, to the intent that he marry her,
and he will not when thereunto required, but continues to hold the lands: this
is such a fraud on the man's part that the law will not allow it to devest the
woman's right of possession; though, his entry being lawful, it does devest
the actual possession, and thereby becomes a deforcement.(o) Deforcements
may also be grounded on the disability of the party deforced : as if an infant do
make an alienation of his lands, and the alienee enters and keeps possession
now, as the alienation is voidable, this possession as against the infant (or, in
case of his decease, as against his heir) is after avoidance wrongful, and, there-
[*174] fore, a deforcement.(p) The same happens, *when one of non-sane
memory alienes his lands or tenements, and the alienee enters and holds
possession; this may also be a deforcement.(q) Another species of deforcement
is, where two persons have the same title to land, and one of them enters and
keeps possession against the other: as where the ancestor dies seised of an estate
in fee-simple, which descends to two sisters as coparceners, and one of them
enters before the other, and will not suffer her sister to enter and enjoy her
moiety; this is also a deforcement. (r) Deforcement may also be grounded
on the non-performance of a covenant real: as if a man, seised of lands, cove-
nants to convey them to another, and neglects or refuses so to do, but continues
possession against him ; this possession, being wrongful, is a deforcement: (s)
whence, in levying a fine of lands, the persons against whom the fictitious
action is brought upon a supposed breach of covenant, is called the deforciant.(4)
And, lastly, by way of analogy, keeping a man by any means out of a freehold
office is construed to be a deforcement; though, being an incorporeal heredita-
(k) Co. Litt. 277. (1) F. N. B. 143. (m) id. 8, 147.
(n) Finch, L. 263. F.N.B. 201, 205, 6, 7. See book TI, ch. 9, p. 151. (o) F. N. B. 205.
(p) Finch, L. 264. F. N. B. 192. (q) Finch, ibid. F. N.B. 202.
(r) Finch, L. 293, 294. F. N. B. 197. (s) F. N. B. 146.
(4) This proceeding was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 74.
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ment, the deforciant has no corporeal possession. So that whatever injury
(withholding the possession of a freehold) is not included under one of the four
former heads, is comprised under this of deforcement.
The several species and degrees of injury by ouster being thus ascertained and
defined, the next consideration is the remedy; which is, universally, the restitu-
tion or delivery of possession to the right owner: and, in some cases, damages
also for the unjust amotion. The methods, whereby these remedies, or either
of them, may be obtained, are various.
.1. The first is that extrajudicial and summary one, which we slightly touched
in the first chapter of the present book, (t) of entry by the legal owner, when
another person, who hath no right, hath previously taken possession of lands or
tenements. In this case the party entitled may make a formal, but peaceable,
entry thereon, declaring that thereby he takes possession; which notorious act
of ownership is equivalent to a feudal investiture by the lord: (u) or he may enter
on any *part of it in the same county, declaring it to be in the name of *
the whole: (v) but if it lies in different counties he must make different [ *175
entries; for the notoriety of such entry or claim to the pares or freeholders of
Westmoreland, is not any notoriety to the pares or freeholders of Sussex. Also
if there be two disseisors, the party disseised must make his entry on both; or if
one disseisor has conveyed the lands with livery to two distinct feoffees, entry
must be made on both: (w) for as their seisin is distinct, so also must be the
act which devests that seisin. If the claimant be deterred from entering by
menaces or bodily fear, he may make claim, as near to the estate as he can, with
the like forms and solemnities: which claim is in force for only a year and a
day. (x) And this claim, if it be repeated once in the space of every year and
day (which is called continual claim), has the same effect with, and in all
respects amounts to, a legal entry. (y) Such an entry gives a man seisin, (z) or
puts into immediate possession him that hath right of entry on the estate, and
thereby makes him complete owner, and capable of conveying it from himself
by either descent or purchase. (5)
This remedy by entry takes place in three only of the five species of ouster,
viz.: abatement, intrusion, and disseisin; (a) for, as in these the original entry
of the wrongdoer was unlawful, they may therefore be remedied by the mere
entry of him who hath right. But, upon a discontinuance or deforcement, the
owner of the estate cannot enter, but is driven to his action: for herein the
original entry being lawful, and thereby an apparent right of possession being
gained, the law will not suffer that right to be overthrown by the mere act or
entry of the claimant. Yet a man may enter (b) on his tenant by sufferance:
for such tenant hath no freehold, but only a bare possession; which may be
defeated, like a tenancy at will, by the mere entry of the owner. But if the
owner thinks it more expedient to suppose or admit (c) such tenant to have
*gained a tortious freehold, he is then remediable by writ of entry, ad r.176
terminum qui prtvteriit. (6) [*176]
On the other hand, in case of abatement, intrusion, or disseisin, where entries
are generally lawful, this right of entry may be tolled, that is, taken away by
descent. Descents, which take away entries, (d) (7) are when any one, seised by
(t) See page 5. (u) See book II, ch. 14, p. 209. (v) Litt. J 417. (w) Co. Litt. 252.
(x) Litt. § 422. (y) Ibid. § 419, 423. (z) Co. Litt. 15. (a) Ibid. 237, 238.
(5) See book IIH, p. 150. (c) Co. Litt. 57. (d) Litt. J§ 385-413.
(5) [But now by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, s. 10, no person shall be deemed to have
been in possession of any land within the meaning of that act, merely by reason of having
made an entry thereon; and by section 11 no continual or other claim upon or near any land
shall preserve any right of making an entry. The distinction between the law as laid down
by Blackstone and the present law as to an entry is, that by the former a bare entry on land
was attended with a certain effect in keeping a right alive, whereas by the latter it has no effect
whatever unless there be a change of possession. When this takes place, the remedy by entry
is still in operation; when not, an entry is of no avail, and this remedy no longer exists.]
(6) The statute mentioned in the last note abolishes this proceeding.
(7) [The right of entry is no longer taken away by descent. Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27,
s. 39. This and the two following paragraphs are not applicable to the present state of the law.]
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any means whatsoever of the inheritance of a corporeal hereditament, dies;
whereby the same descends to his heir: in this case, however feeble the right of
the ancestor might be, the entry of any other person who claims title to the free-
hold is taken away; and he cannot recover possession against the heir by this
summary method, but is driven to his action to gain a legal seisin of the estate.
And this, first, because the heir comes to the estate by act of law, and not by
his own act; the law therefore protects his title, and will not suffer his posses-
sion to be devested, till the claimant hath proved a better right. Secondly,
because the heir may not suddenly know the true state of his title; and therefore
the law, which is ever indulgent to heirs, takes away the entry of such claimant
as neglected to enter on the ancestor, who was well able to defend his title; and
leaves the claimant only the remedy of an action against the heir. (e) Thirdly,
this was admiraby adapted to the military spirit of the feudal tenures, and tended
to make the feudatory bold in war; since his children could not, by any mere
entry of another, be dispossessed of the lands whereof he died seised. And,
lastly, it is agreeable to the dictates of reason and the general principles of
law.
For, in every complete title (f) to lands, there are two things necessary; the
possession or seisin, and the right or property therein : (g) or, as it is expressed
in Fleta, juris et seisince conyjunctio. (h) Now if the possession be severed from
the property, if A has the iis proprietatis, and B by some unlawful means has
gained possession of the lands, this is an injury to A; for which the law gives a
[*177] remedy, by putting *him in possession, but does it by different means
J according to the circumstances of the case. Thus, as B, who was him-
self the wrongdoer, and hath obtained the possession by either fraud or force,
bath only a bare or naked possession, without any shadow of right; A, therefore,
who bath both the right of property and the right of possession, may put an end to
his title at once, by the summary method of entry. But, if B the wrongdoer
dies seised of the lands, then B's heir advances one step farther towards a good
title: he hath not only a bare possession, but also an apparent jus possessionis,
or right of possession. For the law presumes, that the possession which is
transmitted from the ancestor to the heir, is a rightful possessioh, until the
contrary be shown: and therefore the mere entry of A is not allowed to evict
the heir of B; but A is driven to his action at law to remove the possession of
the heir, though his entry alone would have dispossessed the ancestor.
So that in general it appears, that no man can recover possession by mere
entry on lands, which another bath by descent. Yet this rule hath some excep-
tions (i) wherein those reasons cease, upon which the general doctrine is grounded;
especially if the claimant were under any legal disabilities, during the life of the
ancestor, either of infancy, coverture, imprisonment, insanity, or being out of
the realm : in all which cases there is no neglect or laches in the claimant, and
therefore no descent shall bar, or take away his entry. (k-) And this title of
taking away entries by descent, is still farther narrowed by the statute 32 Hen.
VIII, c. 33, which enacts that if any person disseises or turns another out of
possession, no descent to the heir of the disseisor shall take away the entry of him
that has a right to the land, unless the disseisor had peaceable possession five
years next after the disseisin. But the statute extendeth not to any feoffee or
donee of the disseisor, mediate or immediate: (1) because such a one by the gen-
r*178] nine feudal constitutions always came into the tenure solemnly *and with
the lord's concurrence, by actual delivery of seisin, that is, open and pub-
lic investiture. On the other hand, it is enacted by the statute of limitations,
21 Jac. I, c. 16, that no entry shall be made by any man upon lands, unless
within twenty years after his right shall accrue. And by statute 4 and 5 Ann.
c. 16, no entry shall be of force to satisfy the said statute of limitations, or to
(e) Co. Litt. 287. (f) See book II, ch. 13. (q) Mirror, c. 2, § 27. (h) L. 3, e. 15, § 5.
(i) See the particular cases mentioned by Littleton, b. 3, ch. 6, the principles of which are well explained in
Gilbert's law of tenures.
(k) Co. Litt. 246. (Z) Ibid. 256.
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avoid a fine levied of lands, unless an action be thereupon commenced within
one year after, and prosecuted with effect. (8)
Upon an ouster, by the discontinuance of tenant in tail, we have said that no
remedy by mere entry is allowed; but that, when tenant in tail aliens the lands
entailed, this takes away the entry of the issue in tail, and drives him to his
action at law to recover the possession. (in) For, as in the former cases, the
law will not suppose, without proof, that the ancestor of him in possession
acquired the estate by wrong; and therefore, after five years' peaceable possession,
and a descent cast, will not suffer the possession of the heir to be disturbed by
mere entry without action; so here the law will not suppose the discontinuor to
have aliened the estate without power so to do, and therefore leaves the heir in
tail to his action at law, and permits not his entry to be lawful. Besides, the
alienee, who came into possession by a lawful conveyance, which was at least
good for the life of the alienor, hath not only a bare possession, but also an
apparent right of possession; which is not allowed to be devested by the mere
entry of the claimant, but continues in force till a better right be shown, and
recognized by a legal determination. And something also, perhaps, in framing
this rule of law, may be allowed to the inclination of the courts of justice, to go
as far as they could in making estates-tail alienable, by declaring such aliena-
tions to be voidable only, and not absolutely void.
In case of deforcement, also, where the deforciant had originally a lawful
possession of the land, but now detains it wrongfully, he still continues to have
the presumptive prima *facie evidence of right; that is, possession law- [*179]
fully gained. Which possession shall not be overturned by the mere
entry of another; but only by the demandant's showing a better right in a
course of law.
This remedy by entry must be pursued according to statute 5 Ric. II, st. 1,
c. 8, in a peaceable and easy manner; and not with force or strong hand. For,
if one turns or keeps another out of possession forcibly, this is an injury of both
a civil and a criminal nature. The civil is remedied by immediate restitution;
which puts the ancient possessor in statu quo: the criminal injury, or public
wrong, by breach of the king's peace, is punished by fine to the king. For, by
the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, upon complaint made to any justice of the peace,
of a forcible entry, with strong hand, on lands or tenements; or a forcible
detainer after a peaceable entry; he shall try the truth of the complaint by jury,
and, upon force found, shall restore the possession to the party so put out: and
in such case, or if any alienation be made to defraud the possessor of his right
(which is likewise declared to be absolutely void), the offender shall forfeit, for
the force found, treble damages to the party grieved, and make fine and ransom
to the king. But this does not extend to such as endeavour to keep possession
manu forti, after three years' peaceable enjoyment of either themselves, their
ancestors, or those under whom they claim; by a subsequent clause of the same
statute, enforced by statute 31 Eliz. c. 11.
II. Thus far of remedies, where the tenant or occupier of the land hath gained
only a mere possession, and no apparent shadow of right. Next follow another
class, which are in use where the title of the tenant or occupier is advanced one
step nearer to perfection; so that he hath in him not only a bare possession,
which may be destroyed by a bare entry, but also an apparent right of possession,
which cannot be removed but by orderly course of law; in the process of which
(m) Ibid. 325.
(8) [However, by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, one period of limitation is established for all
lands and rents; and it is enacted by section 2, that after the 31st of December, 1833, no
person shall make an entry or bring an action to recover any land but within twenty years
next after the time at which the right to make such entry or bring such action shall have first
accrued to some person through whom he claims, or if such right shall not have accrued to
any person through whom he claims, then within twenty years next after the time at which
the right to make such entry or bring such action shall have first accrued to the person mak-
ing or bringing the same.]
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it must be shown, that though he hath at present possession, and, therefore, hath
rll *the presumptive right, yet there is a right of possession, superior to his,
8 residing in him who brings the action.
These remedies are either by a writ of entry, or an assize;(9) which are
actions merely possessory; serving only to regain that possession, whereof the
demandant (that is, he who sues for the land) or his ancestors have been unjustly
deprived by the tenant or possessor of the freehold, or those under whom he
claims. They decide nothing with respect to the right of property; only restor-
ing the demandant to that state or situation in which he was (or by law ought
to have been) before the dispossession committed. But this without any preju-
dice to the right of ownership: for, if the dispossessor has any legal claim, he
may afterwards exert it, notwithstanding a recovery against him in these pos-
sessory actions. Only the law will not suffer him to be his own judge, and either
take or maintain possession of the lands, until he bath recovered them by legal
means :(n) rather presuming the right to have accompanied the ancient seisin,
than to reside in one who had no such evidence in his favour.
1. The first of these possessory remedies is by writ of entry; which is that
which disproves the title of the tenant or possessor, by showing the unlawful
means by which he entered or continues possession.(o) The writ is directed to
the sheriff, requiring him to "command the tenant of the land that he render
(in Latin, prwcipe quod reddat) to the demandant the land in question, which
he claims to be his right and inheritance; and into which, as he saith, the said
tenant had not entry but by (or after) a disseisin, intrusion, or the like, made to
the said demandant, within the time limited by law for such actions; or that
upon refusal he do appear in court on such a day, to show wherefore he bath not
done it."(p) This is the original process, the prcecipe upon which all the rest
of the suit is grounded: wherein it appears that the tenant is required, either
[*181] to deliver *seisin of the lands, or to show cause why he will not. This
cause may be either a denial of the fact of having entered by or under
such means as are suggested, or a justification of his entry by reason of title in
himself or in those under whom he makes claim: whereupon the possession of
the land is awarded to him who produces the clearest right to possess it.
In our ancient books we find frequent mention of the degrees within which
writs of entry are brought. If they be brought against the party himself that
did the wrong, then they only charge the tenant himself with the injury; "non
habuit ingressum nisi per intrusionem quam ipse fecit." But if the intruder,
disseisor, or the like, has made any alienation of the land to a third person, or
it has descended to his heir, that circumstance must be alleged in the writ, for
the action must always be brought against the tenant of the land; and the
defect of his possessory title, whether arising from his own wrong or that of
those under whom he claims, must be set forth. One such alienation or descent
makes the first (q) degree, which is called the per, because then the form of a
writ of entry is this: that the tenant had not entry, but by the original wrong-
doer, who alienated the land, or from whom it descended to him: "non habuit
ingressum, nisi per Gulielmum, qui se in illud intrusit, et illud tenenti dirni-
sit."(r) A second alienation or descent makes another degree, called the per
and cui; because the form of a writ of entry, in that case, is, that the tenant
had not entry, but by or under a prior alienee, to whom the intruder demised it;
"non habuit ingressum nisi per Ricardum, cui Gulielmus illud dimisit, qui se
in illud intrusit."(s) These degrees thus state the original wrong, and the title
of the tenant who claims under such wrong. If more than two degrees (that
is, two alienations or descents) were past, there lay no writ of entry at the com-
(n) Mir. c. 4, § 24. (o) Finch, L. 261. (p) See book IT, Append. No. V, § 1.
(q) Finch, L. 262. Booth, indeed (of real actions, 172), makes the first degree to consist in the original wrong
done, the second in the per, and the third in the per and cui. But the difference is immaterial.
(r) Booth, 181. (s) Finch, L. 263. F. N. B. 203, 204.
(9) These writs were abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27, § 36.
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mon law. For, as it was provided, for the *quietness of men's inherit-
ances, that no one, even though he had the true right of possession, [*182]
should enter upon him who had the apparent right by descent or otherwise, but
he was driven to his writ of entry to gain possession; so, after more than two
descents or two conveyances were passed, the demandant, even though he had
the right both of possession and property, was not allowed this possessory action;
but was driven to his writ of right, a long and final remedy, to punish his neg-
lect in not sooner putting in his claim, while the degree subsisted, and for the
ending of suits, and quieting of all controversies.(t) But by the statute of
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, c. 30, it was provided, that when the number of alien-
ations or descents exceeded the usual degrees, a new writ should be allowed
without any mention of degrees at all. And, accordingly, a new writ has been
framed, called a writ of entry in the post, which only alleges the injury of fhe
wrongdoer, without deducing all the intermediate title from him to the tenant;
stating it in this manner: that the tenant had not entry unless after, or subse-
quent to, the ouster or injury done by the original dispossessor; "non habuit
ingressurn nisi post intrusionem quam Gulielmus in illud fecit;" and rightly
concluding, that, if the original title was wrongful, all claims derived from
thence must participate of the same wrong. Upon the latter of these writs it is
(the writ of entry sur disseisin in the post) that the form of our common recov-
eries of landed estates(u) is usually grounded; which, we may remember, were
observed in the preceding volume(v) to be fictitious actions brought against the
tenant of the freehold (usually called the tenant to the prcecipe, or writ of entry),
in which, by collusion, the demandant recovers the land.
This remedial instrument, or writ of entry, is applicable to all the cases of
ouster before-mentioned, except that of discontinuance by tenant in tail, and
some peculiar species of deforcements. Such is that of deforcement of dower,
by not assigning any dower to the widow within the time limited by *law- ;,1831
for which she has her remedy by writ of dower, unde nihil habet.(w). 83]
But if she be deforced of part only of her dower, she cannot then say that nihil
habet; and, therefore, she may have recourse to another action, by writ of right
of dower; which is a more general remedy, extending either to part or the
whole; and is (with regard to her claim) of the same nature as the grand writ
of right, whereof we shall presently speak, is with regard to claims in fee-sim-
ple.(x)(10) On the other hand, if the heir (being within age), or his guardian,
assign her more than she ought to have, they may be remedied by a writ of
admeasurement of dower.(y) But, in general, the writ of entry is the universal
remedy to recover possession, when wrongfully withheld from the owner. It
were, therefore, endless to recount all the several divisions of writs of entry,
which the different circumstances of the respective demandants may require,
and which are furnished by the laws of England :(z) being plainly and clearly
chalked out in that most ancient and highly venerable collection of legal forms,
the registrum oinnium brevium, or register of such writs as are suable out of
the king's courts, upon which Fitzherbert's natura brevium is a comment; and
(t) 2 Inst. 153. (u) See book If, Append. No. V. (v) Book II, ch. 21. (w) F. N. B. 147.
x) Ibid. 156. (y) F. N. B. 148. Finch, L. 314. Stat. Westm. 2. 13 Ed. I, c. 7.
(z) See Bracton, 1. 4, tr. 7, c. 6, § 4. Britton, c. 114, fol. 264. The most usual were, 1. The writs of entry sur
diseisin, and of intrusion, (F. N. B. 19, 203) which are brought to remedy either of those species of ouster.
2. The writs of dsm fuit infra ctate, a nd dum f it son compo8 mentis, (Ibid. i92, 202) which lie for a person
of full age, or one who hath recovered his nderstanding, after having (when nder age or insane) aliened hislands; or for the heirs of such alienor. 3. The writs of cue in vit , and cci ante divortium, (Ibid. i93, 204) for
a woman, when a widow or divorced, whose husband dring the coverture (ci in ita sa, ve cci ants divo-
tium, ipso contralicere nono tuit) hath allened her estate. 4. The writ at cummunem lepem, (Ibid. 207) for thereversioner, af er th  alie ation and death of e particular tenant for life. 5. The writs in cas3 proviso and
in cosnsimiti coss, (1 bid. 205, 206) which lay not ad commnem tegsm, but are given by stat. Gloc. 6 Edw. I, c. 7,a d Westm. 2. i Edw. I , for the reversioner after the alienation, but during the life, of the tenant indower or other tenant for life. 6. The writ ad terninum qui prceteriit (Ibi . 20) for the reversioner, when
the possession is withheld by the lessee or a stranger after the determintion of a lease for years. 7. The writ
causa matrinonit prcvocmct,(Ibid. 205) for a woman who giveth land to a man in fee or for life, to the intent
that he may marry her, and e doth not. And the like in case of other deforcements.
(10) Both those writs wure abolished by the common law procedure act, 1860, and a writ
of summons from th e common pleas substituted.
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[*184] in which every man who *is injured will be sure to find a method of
relief, exactly adapted to his own case, described in the compass of a few
lines, and yet without the omission of any material circumstance. So that the
wise and equitable provision of the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 24, for fram-
ing new writs when wanted, is almost rendered useless by the very great perfec-
tion of the ancient forms. And, indeed, I know not whether it is a greater
credit to our laws to have such a provision contained in them, or not to have
occasion, or at least very rarely, to use it.
In the time of our Saxon ancestors, the right of possession seems only to have
been recoverable by writ of entry,(a) which was then usually brought in the
county court. And it is to be observed, that the proceedings in these actions
were not then so tedious when the courts were held, and process issued from
and was returnable therein at the end of every three weeks, as they became aftei
the conquest, when all causes were drawn into the king's courts, and process
issued only from term to term: which was found exceedingly dilatory, being at
least four times as slow as the other. And hence, a new remedy was invented
in many cases to do justice to the people, and to determine the possession in the
proper counties, and yet by the king's judges. This was the remedy by assise,
which is called by statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 24, festinum remedium, in
comparison with that by a writ of entry; it not admitting of many dilatory
pleas and proceedings, to which other real actions are subject.(b)
2. The writ of assize is said to have been invented by Glanvil, chief justice to
Henry the Second; (c) and, if so, it seems to owe its introduction to the parlia-
ment held at Northampton, in the twenty-second year of that prince's reign;
when justices in eyre were appointed to go round the kingdom in order to take
these assizes: and the assizes themselves (particularly those of mort d'ancestor
and novel disseisin) were clearly pointed out and described.(d) As a writ of
r,1851 entry *is a real action (11) which disproves the title of the tenant by
185 showing the unlawful commencementof his possession; so an assize is
a real action, which proves the title of the demandant merely by showing his, or
his ancestor's, possession; (e) and these two remedies are in all other respects so
totally alike, that a judgment or recovery in one is a bar against the other; so
that, when a man's possession is once established by either of these possessory
actions, it can never be disturbed by the same antagonist in any other of them.
The word assize is derived by Sir Edward Coke (f) from the Latin assideo, to
sit together: and it signifies, originally, the jury who try the cause, and sit to-
gether for that purpose. By afigure it is now made to signify the court or juris-
diction, which summons this jury together by a commission of assize, or ad
assisas capiendas ; and hence the judicial assemblies held by the king's commis-
sion in every county, as well to take these writs of assize, as to try causes at nisi
prius, are termed in common speech the assizes. By another somewhat
similar figure, the name of assize is also applied to this action, for recovering pos-
session of lands; for the reason, saith Littleton, (g) why such writs at the begin-
ning were called assizes, was, for that in these writs the sheriff is ordered to
summon a jury, or assize; which is not expressed in any other original writ.(h)
This remedy, by writ of assize, is only applicable to two species of injury by
ouster, viz.: abatenent, and a recent or novel disseisin. If the abatement hap-
pened upon the death of the demandant's father or mother, brother or sister,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, the remedy is by an assize of mort d'ancestor,
or the death of one's ancestor. This writ directs the sheriff to summon a jury
(a) Gilb. Ten. 42. (b) Booth, 262. (e) Mirror, c. 2, J 25.
(c) 9. Si domrinus feodi negat hceredibus defuwnci saisinam ejusdem feodi, justitiarii domini regis faciant
inde fler, reco.gnitionem per xii legales homines, qualem saisinam defunctus inde habuit, die qua fuit vivus et
mortus; et, sicut recognitum fuerit, ita heredibus edus restituant. J 10. fustitiarii domini regis faciant fleri
recoqnitionem de dissaisinis factis super assisam, a tempore quo dominus rex venit in Angliam proximepost pacem
factam inter ipsum et regemfltium suum. (Spelm. Cod. 330.)
(e) Finch, L. 284. (V) 1 Inst. 153. (g) § 234. (A) Co. Litt. 159.
(11) [The writs of assize and entry are now abolished. See statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.]
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or assize who shall view the land in question, and recognize whether such an-
cestor was seized thereof on the day of his death, and whether the demandant
be the next heir: (i) soon after which the judges come down by the king's com-
mission to take the recognition of assize: when, if *these points are [*186]
found in the affirmative, the law immediately transfers the possession
from the tenant to the demandant. If the abatement happened on the death
of one's grandfather or grandmother, then an assize of mort d'ancestor no
longer lies, but a writ of ayle or de avo: if on the death of the great-grand-
father or great-grandmother, then a writ of besayle, or de proavo : but if it
mounts one degree higher, to the tresayle, or grandfather's grandfather, or if the
abatement happened upon the death of any collateral relation, other than those
before-mentioned, the writ is called a writ of cosinage, or de consanguineo. (k) (12)
And the same point shall be inquired of in all these actions ancestrel, as in an assize
of mort d'ancestor ; they being of the very same nature: (1) though they differ
in this point of form, that these ancestrel writs (like all other writs of precipe)
expressly assert a title in the demandant, (viz.: the seisin of the ancestor at his
death and his own right of inheritance), the assize asserts nothing directly, but
only prays an inquiry whether those points be so.(m) There is also another an-
cestrel writ, denominated a nuper obiit, to establish an equal division of the land
in question, where, on the death of an ancestor, who has several heirs, one
enters and holds the others out of possession.(n) But a man is not allowed to
have any of these actions ancestrel for an abatement consequent on the death of
any collateral relation, beyond the fourth degree; (o) though in the lineal ascent
he may proceed ad infinitum.(p) For there must be some boundary; else the
privilege would be universal, which is absurd: and therefore the law pays no re-
gard to the possession of a collateral ancestor, who was no nearer than the fifth
degree.
It was always held to be law, (q) that where lands were devisable in a man's
last will by the custom of the place, there an assise of mort d'ancestor did not
lie. For, where lands were so devisable, the right of possession could never be
determined by a process, which inquired only of these two points, the seisin of
the ancestor, and the heirship of the demandant. And hence it may be reason-
able to conclude, that when the *statute of wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, made [*187]
all socage lands devisable, an assize of mort d'ancestor no longer could
be brought of lands held in socage; (r) and that now, since the statute 12 Car.
II, c. 24 (which converts all tenures, a few only excepted, into free and common
socage), no assize of mort d'ancestor can be brought of any lands in the king-
dom, but that, in case of abatements, recourse must be properly had to the writs
of entry.
An assize of novel (or recent) disseisin is an action of the same nature with the
assize of mort d'ancestor before-mentioned, in that herein the demandant's posses-
sion must be shown. But it differs considerably in other points; particularly in
that it recites a complaint by the demandant of the disseisin committed in terms
of direct averment; whereupon the sheriff is commanded to reseize the land and
all the chattels thereon, and keep the same in his custody till the arrival of the
justices of assise (which in fact hath been usually omitted); (s) and in the
mean time to summon a jury to view the premises, and make recognition of
the assize before the justices.(t) At which time the tenant may plead either the
general issues nul tort, nul disseisin or any special plea. And if, upon the gen-
eral issue, the recognitors find an actual seisin in the demandant, and his sub-
sequent disseisin by the present tenant; he shall have judgment to recover his
seisin, and damages for the injury sustained: being the only case in which dam-
(i) F. N. B. 195. Finch, L. 290. (k) Finch, L. 266, 267.
(1) Stat. Westm. 2. 13 Edw. I, c. 20. (m) 2 Inst. 399. (n) F. N. B. 197. Finch, L. p93.
(o) Hale on F. N. B. 221. (p) Fitz. Abr. tit. co8inage, 15.
(q) Bracton, 1. 4, de asseis. nortis antecessoris, c. 13, § 3. F. N. B. 196. (r) See 1 Leon. 267.
(u) Bract. 187. Stat. Marlbr. c. 16. (w) 2 Inst. 83,84. (x) L. 4, c. 49. (y) 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2.
(12) All the writs mentioned were abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.
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ages were recoverable in any possessory action at the common law; (u) the ten
ant being in all other cases allowed to retain the intermediate profits of the land,
to enable him to perform the feudal services. But costs and damages were an-
nexed to many other possessory actions by the statutes of Marlberge, 52 Hen.
[*188] III, c. 16, and of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1. And *to prevent frequent and
vexatious disseisins, it is enacted by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III,
c. 3, that if a person disseised recover seisin of the land again by assize of n6vel
disseisin, and again be disseised of the same tenements by the same disseisor, he
shall have a writ of re-disseisin; and if he recover therein, the re-disseisor shall
be imprisoned; and by the statute of Marlberge, 52 Hen. III, c. 8, shall also
pay a fine to the king: to which the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 26, hath
superadded double damages to the party aggrieved. In like manner, by the
same statute of Merton, when any lands or tenements are recovered by assize of
mort d'ancestor, or other jury, or any judgment of the court, if the party be
afterwards disseised by the same person against whom judgment was obtained,
.he shall have a writ of post-disseisin against him; which subjects the post-dis-
seisor to the same penalties as a re-disseisor. The reason of all which, as given
by Sir Edward Coke,(w) is because such proceeding is a contempt of the king's
courts, and in despite of the law; or, as Bracton more fully expresses it,(x)
"talis qui ita convictus fuerit, dupliciter delinquit contra regem: quiafacit
disseisinam et roberiam contra pacem suam; et etiam ausu temerario irrita
facit ea, quce in curia domini regis rite acta sunt: et propter duplex delictum
merito sustinere debet pcenam duplicatam."
In all these possessory actions there is a time of limitation settled, beyond
which no man shall avail himself of the possession of himself or his ancestors,
or take advantage of the wrongful possession of his adversary. For, if he be
negligent for a long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to lend
him any assistance, to recover the possession merely, both to punish his neg-
lect (narn leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus, subveniunt), and also because
it is presumed that the supposed wrongdoer has in such a length of time pro-
cured a legal title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued. This time of
limitation by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 8, and Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I,
c. 39, was successively dated from particular eras, viz.: from the return of King
[.1 9] John from Ireland, and from the coronation, &c., of King Henry *the
*18]Third. But this date of limitation continued so long unaltered, that it
became indeed no limitation at all; it being above three hundred years from
Henry the Third's coronation to the year 1540, when the present statute of lim-
itations (y) was made. This, instead of limiting actions from the date of a par-
ticular event, as before, which in process of years grew absurd, took another and
more direct course, which might endure forever: by limiting a certain period,
as fifty years for lands, and the like period (z) for customary and prescriptive
rents, suits and services (for there is no time of limitation upon rents created
by deed, or reserved on a particular estate),(a) and enacting that no person
should bring any possessory action, to recover possession thereof merely upon
the seisin, or dlspossession of his ancestors, beyond such certain period.(13)
But this does not extend to services, which by common possibility may not
happen to become due more than once in the lord's or tenant's life; as fealty, and
the like.(b) And all writs, grounded upon the possession of the demandant him-
self, are directed to be sued out within thirty years after the. disseisin com-
plained of; for if it be an older date, it can with no propriety be called a fresh,
recent, or novel disseisin; which name Sir Edward Coke informs us was origin-
(s) Booth, 211. Bract. 4, 1, 19, § 7. (t) F. N. B. 177.
(z) So Berthelet'- original edition of the statute, A. D. 1540: and Cay's. Pickering's, and Ruffhead's editions,
examined with the record. Rastell's and other intermediate editions, which Sir Edward Coke (2 Inst. 95) and
other subsequent writers have followed, make it onlyforty years for rents, &c.
(a) 8 Rep. 65. (b) Co. Litt. 115.
(13) This is no longer the law; actions for the recovery of land or rent must now be
brought within twenty years after the right accrues. Statute 3 and 4 Win. IV. c. 27, s. 2.
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ally given to this proceeding, because the disseisin must have been since the last
eyre or circuit of the justices, which happened once in seven years, otherwise
the action was gone.(o) And we may observe,(d) that the limitation prescribed
by Henry the Second at the first institution of the assize of novel disseisin was
from his own return into England, after the peace made between him and the
young king, his son; which was but the year before.(14)
What has been here observed may throw some light on the doctrine of
remitter, which we spoke of in the second *chapter of this book; and [*190]
which we may remember was where one who hath right to lands, but is *10
out of possession, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him by some subse-
quent defective title, and enters by virtue of that title. In this case the law
remits him to his ancient and more certain right, and by an equitable fiction
supposes him to have gained possession in consequence, and by virtue thereof:
and this, because he cannot possibly obtain judgment at law to be restored to
his prior right, since he is himself the tenant of the land, and therefore hath
nobody against whom to bring his action. This determination of the law
might seem superfluous to an hasty observer; who perhaps would imagine, that
since the tenant hath now both the right and also the possession, it little signi-
fies by what means such possession shall be said to be gained. But the wisdom
of our ancient law determined nothing in vain. As the tenant's possession was
gained by a defective title, it was liable to be overturned by showing that defect
in a writ of entry; and then he must have been driven to his writ of right, to
recover his just inheritance: which would have been doubly hard, because, dur-
ing the time he was himself tenant, he could not establish his prior title by any
possessory action. The law therefore remits him to his prior title, or puts him
in the same condition as if he had recovered the land by writ of entry. With-
out the remitter, he would have had jus, et seisinam separate; a good right, but
a bad possession: now, by the remitter, he hath the most perfect of all titles,
juris et seisince eonjunctionem.
III. By these several possessory remedies the right of possession may be
restored to him that is unjustly deprived thereof. But the right of possession
(though it carries with it a strong presumption) is not always conclusive evi-
dence of the right of property, which may still subsist in another man. For,
as *one man may have the possession, and another the right of posses- [*191]
sion, which is recovered by these possessory actions; so one man may
have the right of possession, and so not be liable to eviction by any possessory
action, and another may have the right of property, which cannot be otherwise
asserted than by the great and final remedy of a writ of right, or such corres-
pondent writs as are in the nature of a writ of right.(15)
This happens principally in four cases: 1. Upon discontinuance by the alien-
ation of tenant in tail: whereby he who had the right of possession hath
transferred it to the alienee; and therefore his issue, or those in remainder or
reversion, shall not be allowed to recover by virtue of that possession, which the
tenant hath so voluntarily transferred. 2, 3. In case of judgment given against
either party, whether by his own default, or upon trial of the merits, in any
possessory action: for such judgment, if obtained by him who bath not the true
ownership, is held to be a species of deforcement; which, however, binds the
right of possession, and suffers it not to be ever again disputed, unless the right
of property be also proved. 4. In case the demandant, who claims the right, is
barred from these possessory actions by length of time and the statute of limi-
tations before-mentioned: for an undisturbed possession for fifty years ought
not to be devested by any thing, but a very clear proof of the absolute right of
(c) 1 Inst. 153. Booth, 210, (d) See page 184.
(14) For the present limitations to actions, see note, book 2, p. 264.
(15) [Now that the action of ejectment, which is founded upon a right of possession, is the
only mode of recovering land, this distinction is in effect destroyed. And not one of the four
cases that follow can now happen.]
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property. In these four cases the law applies the remedial instrument of either
the writ of right itself, or such other writs as are said to be of the same niure.
1. And first, upon an alienation by tenant in tail, whereby the estate-tail is
discontinued, and the remainder or reversion is by failure of the particular
estate displaced, and turned into a mere right, the remedy is by action of for-
medon (secundumformnam doni), which is in the nature of a writ of right,(e) and
is the highest action that tenant in tail can have.(f) For he cannot have an
absolute writ of right, which is confined only to such as claim in fee-simple: and
for that reason this writ of formedon was granted him by the statute de donis or
*Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 1, which is therefore emphatically called his writ
of right.(g) This writ is distinguished into three species: aformedon in
the descender, in the remainder, and in the reverter. A writ of formedon in the
descender lieth, where a gift in tail is made, and the tenant in tail alienes the
lands entailed, or is disseised of them, and dies; in this case the heir in tail
shall have this writ of formedon in the descender, to recover these lands so given
in tail against him who is then the actual tenant of the freehold. (h) In which
action the demandant is bound to state the manner and form of the gift in tail,
and to prove himself heir secundumformam doni. Aform edon in the remainder
lieth, where a man giveth lands to another for life or in tail, with remainder to
a third person in tail or in fee, and he who hath the particular estate dieth
without issue inheritable, and a stranger intrudes upon him in remainder and
keeps him out of possession.(i) In this case the remainder-man shall have his
writ of formedon in the remainder, wherein the whole form of the gift is stated,
and the happening of the event upon which the remainder depended. This
writ is not given in express words by the statute de donis; but is founded upon
the equity of the statute, and upon this maxim in law, that, if any one hath a
right to the land, he ought also to have an action to recover it. A formedon in
the reverter lieth, where there is a gift in tail, and afterwards by the death of
the donee or his heirs without issue of his body the reversion falls in upon the
donor, his heirs or assigns: in such case the reversioner shall have this writ to
recover the lands, wherein he shall suggest the gift, his own title to the rever-
sion minutely derived from the donor, and the failure of issue upon which his
reversion takes place.(k) This lay at common law, before the statute de donis,
if the donee aliened before he had performed the condition of the gift, by hav-
ing issue, and afterwards died without any.(1) The time of limitation in a
[*193] formedon by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 16, is twenty years; within *which space
of time after his title accrues, the demandant must bring his action, or
else he is forever barred.
2. In the second case; if the owners of a particular estate, as for life, in
dower, by the curtesy, or in fee-tail, are barred of the right of possession by
a recovery had against them through their default or non-appearance in a pos-
sessory action, they were absolutely without any remedy at the common law: as
a writ of right does not lie for any but such as claim to be tenants of the fee-
simple. Therefore the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 4, gives a new writ for
such persons, after their lands have been so recovered against them by default,
called a quod ei deforceat; which, though not strictly a writ of right, so far
partakes of the nature of one, as that it will restore the right to him who has
been thus unwarily deforced by his own default.(m) But, in case the recovery
were not had by his own default, but upon defence in the inferior possessory
action, this still remains final with regard to these particular estates, as at the
common law: and hence it is, that a common recovery (on a writ of entry in
the post) had, not by default of the tenant himself, but (after his defence made
and voucher of a third person to warranty) by default of such vouchee, is now
the usual bar to cut off an estate-tail.(n)
3, 4. Thirdly, in case the right of possession be barred by a recovery upon the
merits in a possessory action, or lastly by the statute of limitations, a claimant
(e; Finch, L. 267. (f) Co. Litt. 326. () F. N. B. 255. (A) Ibid. 211, 212. (1) Ibid. 217.
(k) Ibid. 219. 8 Rep. 88. ()Finch, L. 268. (m) F. N. B. 155. (n) See book II, ch. 21.
124
Chap. 10.] POSSESSORY ACTIONS. 193
in fee-simple may have a mere writ of right; which is in its nature the highest
writ in the'law,(o) and lieth only of an estate in fee-simple, and not for him who
hath a less estate. This writ lies concurrently with all other real actions, in
which an estate of fee-simple may be recovered: and it also lies after them,
being as it were an appeal to the mere right, when judgment hath been had as
to the possession in an inferior possessory *action. (p) But though a
writ of right may be brought, where the demandant is entitled to the [*194]
possession, yet it rarely is advisable to be brought in such cases; as a more
expeditious and easy remedy is had, without meddling with the property, by
proving the demandant's own, or his ancestor's, possession, and their illegal
ouster, in one of the possessory actions. But, in case the right of possession be
lost by length of time, or by judgment against the true owner in one of these
inferior suits, there is no other choice: this is then the only remedy that can be
had; and it is of so forcible a nature, that it overcomes all obstacles, and clears
all objections that may have arisen to cloud and obscure the title. And, after
issue once joined in a writ of right, the judgment is absolutely final; so that a
recovery had in this action may be pleaded in bar of any other claim or
demand.(q)
The pure, proper, or mere writ of right lies only, we have said, to recover
lands in fee-simple, unjustly withheld from the true proprietor. But there are
also some other writs which are said to be in the nature of a writ of right, be-
cause their process and proceedings do mostly (though not entirely) agree with
the writ of right: but in some of them the fee-simple is not demanded; and in
others not land, but some incorporeal hereditament. Some of these have been
already mentioned, as the writ of right of dower, of formedon, &c., and the
others will hereafter be taken notice of under their proper divisions. Nor is
the mere writ of right alone, or always, applicable to every case of a claim of
lands in fee-simple: for if the lord's tenant in fee-simple dies without heir,
whereby an escheat accrues, the lord shall have a writ of escheat,(r) which is in
the nature of a writ of right.(s) And if one of two or more coparceners de-
forces the other, by usurping the sole possession, the party aggrieved shall have a
writ of right, derationabiliparte,(t) which may be grounded on the *seisin
of the ancestor at any time during his life; whereas, in a nuper obiit k*95
(which is a possessory remedy) (u) he must be seised at the time of his death.
But, waiving these and other minute distinctions, let us now return to the gen-
eral writ of right.
This writ ought to be first brought in the court-baron(w) of the lord, of whom
the lands are holden; and then it is open orpatent: but if he holds no court, or
hath waived his right, remisit curim suam, it may be brought in the king's
courts by writ of prcecipe originally; (x) and then it is a writ of right close;(y)
being directed to the sheriff and not the lord. (z) Also, when one of the king's im-
mediate tenants in capite is deforced, his writ of right is called a writ of prcecipe in
capite (the improper use of which, as well as of the former prtecipe quia dorninus
remisit curium, so as to oust the lord of his jurisdiction, is restrained by magna
carta), (a) and, being directed to the sheriff, and originally returnable in the
king's courts, is also a writ of right close.(b) There is likewise a little writ of
right close, secundum consuetudinem manerii, which lies for the king's tenants
in ancient demesne,(c) and others of a similar nature,(d) to try the right of their
lands and tenements in the court of the lord exclusively.(e) But the writ of
right patent itself may also at any time be removed into the county court, by
writ of tolt,(f) and from thence into the king's courts by writ of pone(g) or re-
cordari facias, at the suggestion of either party that there is a delay or defect
of justice.(h)
() F. N. B. 1. (p) Ibid. 1, 5. (q) Ibid. 6. Co. Litt. 158.
(r) F. N. B. 143. (s) Booth, 135. (t) F. N. B. 9. (u) See page 186.
iv) Append. No. I, § 1. (x) F. N. B. 2. Finch, L 313. (y) Booth, 91.
(z) Append. No. I, § 4. (a) C. 24. (b) F. N. B. 5. (c) See book 11, ch. 6.
(d) Kitchen, tit. copyhold.
(e) Bracton, 1. 1, c. 11, 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 9, and tr. 3, c. 13, § 9. Old Tenur. t. tenir en socage. Old N. B. t. garde, and
t. briefe de recto claus. F. N. B. 11.
V) Append. No. I, § 2. (g) Ibid. § 3. (h) F. N. B. 3, 4.
POSSESSORY ACTIONS.
In the progress of this action,(i) the demandant must allege some seisin of
the lands and tenements in himself, or else in some person under whom he
[*196] claims, and then derive the right *from the person so seised to himself;
to which the tenant may answer by denying the demandant's right, and
averring that he has more right to hold the lands than the demandant has to de-
mand them: and this right of the tenant being shown, it then puts the demand-
ant upon the proof of his title: in which, if he fails, or if the tenant hath shown
a better, the demandant and his heirs are perpetually barred of their claim; but
if he can make it appear that his right is superior to the tenant's, he shall re-
cover the land against the tenant and his heirs forever. But even this writ of
right, however superior to any other, cannot be sued out at any distance of time.
For by the ancient law no seisin could be alleged by the demandant, but from
the time of Henry the First ;(k) by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 8,
from the time of Henry the Second; by the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edward I,
c. 39, from the time of Richard the First; and now, by statute 32 Henry VIII,
c. 2, seisin in a writ of right shall be within sixty years. So that the possession
of lands in fee-simple uninterruptedly, for threescore years, is at present a suf-
ficient title against all the world; and cannot be impeached by any dormant
claim whatsoever.(16)
I have now gone through the several species of injury by ouster and dis-
possession of the freehold, with the remedies applicable to each. In consid-
ering which I have been unavoidably led to touch upon such obsolete and
abstruse learning, as lies intermixed with, and alone can explain the reason
of, those parts of the law which are now more generally in use. For, without
contemplating the whole fabric together, it is impossible to form any clear
idea of the meaning and connection of those disjointed parts which still form
a considerable branch of the modern law; such as the doctrine of entries and
remitter, the levying of fines, and the suffering of common recoveries. Neither
indeed is any considerable part of that, which I have selected in this chapter
[*197] from among the venerable monuments of our ancestors, so *abso-
lutely antiquated as to be out of force, though the whole is certainly out
of use : there being but very few instances for more than a century past of
prosecuting any real action for land by writ of entry, assize, formedon, writ of
right, or otherwise. The forms are indeed preserved in the practice of common
recoveries; but they are forms and nothing else; for which the very clerks that
pass them are seldom capable to assign the reason. But the title of lands is
now usually tried in actions of e/ectment or trespass; of which in the following
chapters.(17)
(t) Append. No. I, § 5. (k) Glanv. . 2, c. 3. Co. Litt. 114.
(16) [This is far from being universally true; for an uninterrupted possession for sixty years
will not create a title where the claimant or demandant had no right to enter within that time;
as where an estate in tail, for life, or for years, continues above sixty years, still the reversioner
may enter and recover the estate; the possession must be adverse, and Lord Coke says, "it
has been resolved, that although a man has been out of possession of land for sixty years,
yet if his entry is not tolled he may enter and bring any action of his own possession; and if
his entry be congeable, and he enter, he may have an action of his own possession." 4 Co. 11, b.]
(17) [The real actions mentioned in this chapter are now abolished, and the title to lands is
now always tried, as it was usually in the time of Blackstone, byan action of ejectment or of
trespass.]
Real and mixed actions, except ejectment, are now almost universally abolished or become
obsolete in the United States, and ejectment is the usual remedy to try title to lands. The
proceedings in that action have also, by statute been divested of all useless forms, and made
perfectly simple.
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CHAPTER XI.
OF DISPOSSESSION, OR OUSTER OF CHATTELS REAL.
HAVING in the preceding chapter considered with some attention the several
species of injury by dispossession or ouster of the freehold, together with the
regular and well-connected scheme of remedies by actions real, which are given
to the subject by the common law, either to recover the possession only, or else
to recover at once the possession, and also to establish the right of property;
the method which I there marked out leads me next to consider injuries by
ouster of chattels real; that is, by amoving the possession of the tenant from
an estate by statute-merchant, statute-staple, recognizance in the nature of it,
or elegit; or from an estate for years.
I. Ouster, or amotion of possession, from estates held by statute, recognizance,
or elegit is only liable to happen by a species of disseisin, or turning out of the
legal proprietor, before his estate is determined by raising the sum for which it
is given him in pledge. And for such ouster, though the estate be merely a
chattel interest, the owner shall have the same remedy as for an injury to a free-
hold; viz., by assize of novel disseisin.(a) (1) But this depends upon the
several statutes, which *create these respective interests,(b) and which r,199]
expressly provide and allow this remedy in case of dispossession. Upon [* 9
which account it is that Sir Edward Coke observes,(c) that these tenants are
said to hold their estates ut liberum tenementum, until their debts are paid:
because by the statutes they shall have an assize, as tenants of the freehold
shall have; and in that respect they have the similitude of a freehold.(d)
II. As for ouster, or amotion of possession from an estate for years; this
happens only by a like kind of disseisin, ejection, or turning out, of the tenant
from the occupation of the land during the continuance of his term. For this
injury the law has provided him with two remedies, according to the circum-
stances and situation of the wrongdoer: the writ of ejectione firmce; which
lies against any one, the lessor, reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger
who is himself the wrongdoer and has committed the injury complained of:
and the writ of quare ejecit infra terminum; which lies not against the
wrongdoer or ejector himself, but his feoffee or other person claiming under
him. These are mixed actions, somewhat between real and personal; for therein
are two things recovered, as well restitution of the term of years, as damages
for the ouster or wrong.
1. A writ then of ejectione flrmw, or action of trespass in ejectment,(2) lieth
where lands or tenements are let for a term of years, and afterwards the lessor,
reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger, doth eject or oust the lessee of his
term.(e) In this case he shall have his writ of ejection to call the defendant to
answer for entering on the lands so demised to the plaintiff for a term that is
not yet expired, and ejecting him.( ') And by this writ the plaintiff shall
recover back his term, or the remainder of it, with damages.
*Since the disuse of real actions, this mixed proceeding is become the [*2001
common method of trying the title to lands or tenements. It may not J
therefore be improper to delineate, with some degree of minuteness, its history,
the manner of its process, and the principles whereon it is grounded.
(a) F. N. B. 178.
(b) Stat. Westm. 2. 13 Edw. I, c. 18. Stat. de mercatoribus, 27 Edw. iM, c. 9. Stat. 28 Hen. VIII, c. 6, 9.
(c) 1 Inst. 48. (d) See book II, ch. 10. (e) F. N. B. 220. (f) See Appendix, No. II, § 1.
(1) The assize of novel disseisin is now abolished, and ejectment is the present remedy.
(2) [In general ejectment will lie to recover possession of any thing whereon an entry can
be made, and whereof the sheriff can deliver possession. But an ejectment cannot be main-
tained for things that lie merely in grant, not capable of being delivered in execution, as an
advowson, common in gross: Cro. Jac. 146; a piscary: Id., Cro. Car. 492; 8 Mod. 277; 1
Brownl. 142; contra, per Ashurst, J. 1 T. R. 361.]
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We have before seen, (g) that the writ of covenant, for breach of the contract
contained in the lease for years, was anciently the only specific remedy for
recovering against the lessor a term from which he had ejected his lessee,
together with damages for the ouster. But if the lessee was ejected by a stranger,
claiming under a title superior (h) to that of the lessor, or by a grantee of the
reversion (who might at any time by a common recovery have destroyed the
term),(i) though the lessee might still maintain an action of covenant against
the lessor, for non-performance of his contract or lease, yet he could not by any
means recover the term itself. If the ouster was committed by a mere stranger,
without any title to the land, the lessor might indeed by a real action recover
possession of the freehold, but the lessee had no other remedy against the ejector
but in damages, by a writ of ejectione firmr, for the trespass committed in
ejecting him from his farm. (ki) But afterwards, when the courts of equity
began to oblige the ejector to make a specific restitution of the land to the
party immediately injured, the courts of law also adopted the same method of
doing complete justice; and, in the prosecution of a writ of ejectment, intro-
duced a species of remedy not warranted by the original writ nor prayed by
[*2nl] the declaration (which are *calculated for damages merely, and are silent
*201],as to any restitution), viz.: a judgment to recover the term, and a writ of
possession thereupon.(l) This method seems to have been settled as early as the
reign of Edward IV ; (m) though it hath been said (n) to have first begun under
Henry VII, because it probably was then first applied to its present principal
use, that of trying the title to the land. (3)
The better to apprehend the contrivance, whereby this end is effected, we
must recollect that the remedy by ejectment is, in its original, an action brought
by one who hath a lease for years, to repair the injury done him by dispossession.
In order therefore to convert it into d method of trying titles to the freehold, it
was first necessary that the claimant do take possession of the lands, to em-
power him to constitute a lessee for years, that may be capable of receiving this
injury of dispossession. For it would be an offence, called in our law mainte-
nance (of which in the next book), to convey a title to another, when the grantor
is not in possession of the land; and indeed it was doubted at first, whether this
occasional possession, taken merely for the purpose of conveying the title, excused
the lessor from the legal guilt of maintenance. (o) When, therefore, a person,
who hath right of entry into lands, determines to acquire that possession, which
is wrongfully withheld by the present tenant, he makes (as by law he may) a
formal entry on the premises; and being so in the possession of the soil, he
there, upon the land, seals and delivers a lease for years to some third person or
lessee: and, having thus given him entry, leaves him in possession of the prem-
ises. This lessee is to stay upon the land, till the prior tenant, or he who had
the previous possession, enters thereon afresh and ousts him; or till some other
person (either by accident or by agreement beforehand) comes upon the land, and
r*202] turns him *out or ejects him. For this injury the lessee is entitled to
his action of ejectment against the tenant, or this casual ejector, which-
ever it was that ousted him, to recover back his term and damages. But where
this action is brought against such a casual ejector as is before mentioned, and
not against the very tenant in possession, the court will not suffer the tenant to
(g Seepage 157. (h) F. N. B. 145. (i) See book I, ch. 9.
P. 6, ctc. IT Ejectione firame n'est qus un aclion de trespass en son, nature, et le plaintiff ne recovera son
terme gue est a venir, nient plus que en trespass homs recovera damages pur trespass nient fait, saes afeser; saes
it convient a suer par action de covenant al comen ley a recoverer son terme: quod tota curia concesit. Et per
Belknap, la comen ley est, lou home est ousts de son terme par estranger, it avera ejections firme versus cesty que
luy ouste; et sit soit ousts par son lessor, briefe de covenant; et si par lessee on grantee de reversion briefe de
covenant versus son lessor, et countera especial count, &c. (Fitz. Abr. t. eject. firm. 2.) See Bract. 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 36.
(1) See Append. No. IT, § 4, propefin..
(m) 7 Edw. IV, 6. Per Fairfax; 8i home port ejectione firm, se plaintiff recovera son terme qui est arere, i
bien come in quars ejecit infra termlnum; et, A nul sot arrere, donques tout in damages. (Bro. Abr. t. uare
ejecit infra terminum, 6.)
(n) V. N. B. 220. (o) I Ch. Rep. Append. 39.
(3) See on this subject the note to Doe d. Poole v. Errington, 1 A. and E. 756.
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lose his possession without any opportunity to defend it. Wherefore it is a
standing rule, that no plaintiff shall proceed in ejectment to recover lands
against a casual ejector, without notice given to the tenant in possession (if any
there be), and making him a defendant if he pleases. And, in order to main-
tain the action, the plaintiff must, in case of any defence, make out four points
before the court; viz., title, lease, entry, and ouster. First, he must show a good
title in his lessor, which brings the matter of right entirely before the court,
then, that the lessor, being seized or possessed by virtue of such title, did make
him the lease for the present term; thirdly, that he, the lessee or plaintiff, did
enter or take possession in consequence of such lease; and then, lastly, that the
defendant ousted or ejected him. Whereupon he shall have judgment to
recover his term and damages; and shall, in consequence, have a writ of Posses-
sion, which the sheriff is to execute by delivering him the undisturbed and
peaceable possession of his term.
This is the regular method of bringing an action of ejeetment, in which the
title of the lessor comes collaterally and incidentally before the court, in order to
show the injury done to the lessee by this ouster. This method must be still
continued in due form and strictness, save only as to the notice to the tenant.
whenever the possession is vacant, or there is no actual occupant of the premises;
and also in some other cases. But, as much trouble and formality were found
to attend the actual making of the lease, entry, and ouster, a new and more
easy method of trying titles by writ of ejectment, where there is any actual tenant or
occupier of the premises in dispute, was invented somewhat more than a century
ago, by the lord chief justice, Rolle, (p) who then sat in the court of upper bench;
so called during the exile of King Charles the *Second. This new method [*203]
entirely depends upon a string of legal fictions; no actual lease is made,
no actual entry by the plaintiff, no actual ouster by the defendant; but all are
merely ideal, for the sole purpose of trying the title. To this end, in the pro-
ceedings (q) a lease for a term of years is stated to have been made, by him who
claims the title, to the plaintiff who brings the action, as by John Rogers to
Richard Smith, which plaintiff ought to be some real person, and not merely an
ideal fictitious one who hath no existence, as is frequently though unwarrantably
practised; (r) it is also stated that Smith, the lessee, entered; and that the
defendant William Stiles, who is called the casual ejector, ousted him; for which
ouster he brings this action. As soon as this action is brought, and the com-
plaint fully stated in the declaration, (s) Stiles, the casual ejector, or defendant,
sends a written notice to the tenant in possession of the lands, as George
Saunders, informing him of the action brought by Richard Smith, and trans-
mitting him a copy of the declaration; withal assuring him that he, Stiles the
defendant, has no title at all to the premises, and shall make no defence; and
therefore advising the tenant to appear in court and defend his own title: other-
wise he, the casual ejector, will suffer judgment to be had against him; and
thereby the actual tenant, Saunders, will inevitably be turned out of possession.(t)
On receipt of this friendly caution, if the tenant in possession does not within a
limited time apply to the court to be admitted a defendant in the stead of Stiles,
he is supposed to have no right at all; and, upon judgment being had against
Stiles the casual ejector, Saunders the real tenant will be turned out of posses-
sion by the sheriff.
But, if the tenant in possession applies to be made a defendant, it is allowed
him upon this condition; that he enter into a rule of court (u) to confess, at
the trial of the cause, three of the four requisites for the maintenance of the
plaintiff's action; viz.: the lease of Rogers, the lessor, the entry of Smith,
*the plaintiff, and his ouster by Saunders himself, now made the defend- [*204]
ant instead of Stiles: which requisites being wholly fictitious, should L ~04]
the defendant put the plaintiff to prove them, he must of course be nonsuited
for want of evidence; but by such stipulated confession of lease, entry, and
(p) Styl Pract. Reg. 108 (edit. 1657). (q) See Append. No. T., 1, 2. (r) 6 Mod. M09
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ouster, the trial will now sta-pd upon the merits of the title only. This done,
the declaration is altered by inserting the name of George Saunders instead of
William Stiles, and the cause goes down to trial under the name of Smith (the
plaintiff), on the demise of Rogers (the lessor), against Saunders, the new
defendant. And therein the lessor of the plaintiff is bound to make out a clear
title, otherwise his fictitious lessee cannot obtain judgment to have possession
of the land for the term supposed to be granted. but, if the lessor makes out
his title in a satisfactory manner, then judgment and a writ of possession shall
go for Richard Smith, the nominal plaintiff, who by this trial has proved the
right of John Rogers, his supposed lessor. Yet, to prevent fraudulent recov-
eries of the possession, by collusion with the tenant of the land, all tenants are
obliged by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, on pain of forfeiting three years' rent, to
give notice to their landlords, when served with any declaration in ejectment:
and any landlord may by leave of the court be made a co-defendant to the
action, in case the tenant himself appears to it; or, if he makes default, though
judgment must be then signed against the casual ejector, yet execution shall be
stayed, in case the landlord applies to be made a defendant, and enters into the
common rule; a right, which indeed the landlord had long before the provision
of this statute; (v) in like manner as (previous to the statute of Westm. 2, c. 3)
if in a real action the tenant of the freehold made default, the remainder-man
or reversioner had a right to come in and defend the possession ; lest, if judg-
ment were had against the tenant, the estate of those behind should be turned
to a naked right.(w)(4) But, if the new defendants, whether landlord or ten-
ant, or both, after entering into the common rule, fail to appear at the trial, and
to confess lease, entry, and ouster, the plaintiff, Smith, must indeed be there
nonsuited, for want of proving those requisites; but judgment will in the end
be entered against the casual ejector Stiles; for the condition on which Saund-
ers, or his landlord, was admitted a defendant is broken, and, therefore, the
[*205] plaintiff is put again in the *same situation as if he never had appeared
at all; the consequence of which (we have seen) would have been, that
judgment would have been entered for the plaintiff, and the sheriff, by virtue
of a writ for that purpose, would have turned out Saunders, and delivered pos-
session to Smith. The same process, therefore, as would have been had, pro-
vided no conditional rule had been ever made, must now be pursued as soon as
the condition is broken.(5)
(v) Styl. Pract. Reg. 108, 111, 265. 7 Mod. 70. Salk. 257. Barr, 1801. (w) Bracton, 1. 5, c. 10, § 14.
(4) As to who may defend as landlord under this statute, see 4 T. R. 122; 8 id. 645; 6 Bing.
613; Bull. N. P. 95; Selw. N. P. 10th ed. 722.
(5) [New proceedings for the recovery of land have been created by the common law pro-
cedure act, 1852, and the former action of ejectment has given way altogether to the new
procedure. The form of action which has been abolished was valuable in this respect: that
it allowed no questions to be raised except that of title. If the person who brought the
action had a right to possession, he was entitled to recover without regard to whether the
person in possession; or who took defence to the action, had ousted him or not. The new
action is also an action for the recovery of the land, without regard to any other claim which
may exist between the parties.
An action of ejectment is now commenced by the issue of a writ directed to the person in
possession by name, and to all persons entitled to defend the possession of the property
claimed, which property must be described in the writ with reasonable certainty. The writ
must state the names of all the persons in whom the title is alleged to be, and it commands
the persons to whom it is directed, to appear, within sixteen days after service, in the court
from which it issued, to defend the possession of the property sued for, or such part thereof as
they may think fit. It must also contain a notice that in default of appearance they will be
turned out of possession.]
In the United States ejectment is now generally commenced by filing declaration or com-
plaint against the party in possession, setting forth, in general terms, that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to the possession of the premises, describing the same, and that he claims the same in fee-
simple (or otherwise, as the case may be), and that the defendant unlawfully withholds the
same. A copy of this declaration or complaint is served on the defendant, and unless he
pleads or answers to it within the time prescribed by statute or rule of court, judgment may
pass against him by default. In some states parties not in possession, but who claim rights in
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The damages recovered in these actions, though formerly their only intent,
are now usually (since the title has been considered as the principal question)
very small and inadequate; amounting commonly to one shilling, or some other
trivial sum. In order, therefore, to complete the remedy, when the possession
has been long detained from him that had the right to it, an action of trespass
also lies, after a recovery in ejectment, to recover the mesne profits which the
tenant in possession has wrongfully received.(6) Which action maybe brought
in the name of either the nominal plaintiff in the ejectment, or his lessor,
against the tenant in possession: whether he be made party to the ejectment, or
suffers judgment to go by default.(x) In this case the judgment in ejectment
is conclusive evidence against the defendant, for all profits which have accrued
since the date of the demise stated in the former declaration of the plaintiff;
but if the plaintiff sues for any antecedent profits, the defendant may make a
new defence.(7)
Such is the modern way of obliquely bringing in question the title to lands
and tenements, in order to try it in this collateral manner; a method which is
now universally adopted in aImost every case. It is founded on the same prin-
ciple as the ancient writs of assize, being calculated to try the mere possessory
title to an estate; and hath succeeded to those real actions, as being infinitely
more convenient for attaining the end of justice; because the form of the
proceeding being entirely fictitious, it is wholly in the power of the court to
direct the application of that fiction, so as to prevent fraud and chicane, and
eviscerate the very truth of the title. The writ of ejectment and its nominal
parties (as was resolved by all the *judges) (y) are "judicially to be con- [*206]
sidered as the fictitious form of an action, really brought by the lessor
of the plaintiff against the tenant in possession: invented, under the control
and power of the court, for the advancement of justice in many respects; and
to force the parties to go to trial on the merits, without being entangled in the
nicety of pleading on either side."(8)
But a writ of ejectment is not an adequate means to try the title of all
estates; for on those things whereon an entry cannot in fact be made, no entry
shall be supposed by any fiction of -the parties. Therefore an ejectment will
not lie of an advowson, a rent, a common, or other incorporeal heredita-
ment: (z) except for tithes in the hands of lay appropriators, by the express
purview of statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 7, which doctrine hath since been extended
by analogy to tithes in the hands of the clergy: (a) nor will it lie in such cases,
where the entry of him that hath right is taken away by descent, discontinu-
ance, twenty years' dispossession, or otherwise.
(x) Burr. 668. (y) Mich. 82, Geo. II. Burr. 668. (z) Brownl. 129. Cro. Car. 492. Stra. 54.
(a) Cro. Car. 301. 2 Lord Raym. 789.
the premises, are allowed to be made co-defendants, and in others, ejectment may be brought
to try conflicting rights when the premises are not occupied at all. In general, means are
prescribed by which the defeated party in the action can have a second trial as of right. If
the plaintiff succeeds, he is allowed to have damages assessed by a proceeding in the same
suit.
And in many of the states statutes will be found allowing the defendant, who has been in
possession claiming title, to recover of the successful plaintiff the value of his improvements
or " betterments" in certain classes of cases.
(6) This subject is covered by the common law procedure act, 1852.
(7) [The defendant may plead the statute of limitations, and by that means protect himself
from the payment of all mesne profits, except those which have accrued within the last six
years. Bull. N. P. 88.]
(8) [Actions of ejectment, as has been observed, have succeeded to those actions called pos-
sessory actions; but an inconvenience was found to result from them which did not follow
from real actions, to which it has been found necessary to apply a remedy. Real actions
could not be brought twice for the same thing; but a person might bring as many ejectments
as he pleased; which rendered the rights of parties subject to endless litigation. To remedy
this, therefore, when two or more verdicts have been had upon the same title, and to the
satisfaction of the court, the courts of equity will now grant a perpetual injunction to
restrain the party from bringing any further ejectment.' See Barefoot v. Fry, Bunb. 158, pl.
228; Selw. N. P. 780.]
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This action of ejectment is, however, rendered a very easy and expeditious
remedy to landlords whose tenants are in arrear, by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28,
which enacts; that every landlord, who bath by his lease a right of re-entry in
case of non-payment of rent, when half a year's rent is due, and no sufficient
distress is to be had, may serve a declaration in ejectment on his tenant, or fix
the same upon some notorious part of the premises, which shall be valid, with-
out any formal re-entry or previous demand of rent. And a recovery in such
ejectment shall be final and conclusive, both in law and equity, unless the rent
and all costs be paid or tendered within six calendar months afterwards.
2. The writ of quare ejecit infra terminum lieth, by the ancient law, where
[*207] the wrongdoer or ejector is not himself in * possession of the lands, but
another who claims under him. As where a man leaseth lands to an-
other for years, and, after, the lessor or reversioner entereth, and maketh a
feoffment in fee, or fdr life, of the same lands to a stranger: now the lessee can-
not bring a writ of ejectione firmce or ejectment against the feoffee: because he
did not eject him, but the reversioner; neither can he have any such action to
recover his term against the reversioner, who did oust him; because he is not
now in possession. And upon that account this writ was devised, upon the
equity of the statute Westm. 2, c. 24, as in a case where no adequate remedy was
already provided. (b) And the action is brought against the feoffee for defore-
ing, or keeping out, the original lessee, during the continuance of his term ;
and herein, as in the ejectment, the plaintiff shall recover so much of the term
as remains; and also shall have actual damages for that portion of it, whereof
he has been unjustly deprived. But since the introduction of fictitious ousters,
whereby the title may be tried against any tenant in possession (by what means
soever le acquired it), and the subsequent recovery of damages by action of
trespass for mesne profits, this action is fallen into disuse. (9)
CHAPTER XIL
OF TRESPASS.
IN the two preceding chapters we have considered such injuries to real prop-
erty, as consisted in an ouster, or amotion of the possession. Those which
remain to be discussed are such as may be offered to a man's real property with-
out any amotion from it.
The second species, therefore, of real injuries, or wrongs that affect a man's
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, is that of trespass. Trespass, in its largest
and most extensive sense, signifies any transgression or offence against the law
of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live; whether it relates to
a man's person, or his property. Therefore beating another is a trespass; for
which (as we have formerly seen) an action of trespass vi et armis in assault
and battery will lie; taking or detaining a man's goods are respectively tres-
passes; for which an action of trespass vi et armis, or on the case in trover and
conversion, is given by the law: so also non-performance of promises or under-
takings is a trespass, upon which an action of trespass on the case in assumpsit
is grounded: and, in general, any misfeasance, or act of one man whereby
another is injuriously treated or damnified, is a transgression or trespass in its
largest sense; for which we have already seen (a) that whenever the act itself
is directly and immediately injurious to the person or property of another,
(b) F. N. B. 198. (a) See page 1M8.
(9) It was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, s. 36.
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*and therefore necessarily accompanied with some force, an action of [*209]
trespass vi et armis will lie; but, if the injury is only consequential, a
special action of trespass on the case may be brought. (1)
But in the limited and confined sense in which we are at present to consider
it, it signifies no more than an entry on another man's ground without a lawful
authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.
For the right of meum and tuum, or property in lands, being once established,
it follows as a necessary consequence, that this right must be exclusive; that is,
that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil;
every entry therefore thereon, without the owner's leave, and especially if con-
trary to his express order, is a trespass or transgression. The Roman laws seem
to have made a direct prohibition necessary, in order to constitute this injury;
"qui alienumfundum ingreditur, potest a domino, si is prceviderit, prohiberi ne
ingrediatur."(b) But the law of England, justly considering that much incon-
venience may happen to the owner, before he has an opportunity to forbid the
entry, has carried the point much farther, and has treated every entry upon
another's land (unless by the owner's leave, or in some very particular cases), as
an injury or wrong, for satisfaction of which an action of trespass will lie; but
determines the quantum of that satisfaction, by considering how far the offence
was wilful or inadvertent, and by estimating the value of the actual damage
sustained.
Every unwarrantable entry on another's soil the law entitles a trespass by
breaking his close: the words of the writ of trespass commanding the defend-
ant to show cause quare clausum querentis fregit. For every man's land is,
in the eye of the law, enclosed and set apart from his neighbour's: and that
either by a visible and material fence, as one field is divided from another by a
hedge; or by an ideal, invisible boundary, *existing only in the contem- [*210]
plation of law, as when one man's land adjoins to another's in the
same field. And every such entry or breach of a man's close carries necessarily
along with it some damage or other; for, if no other special loss can be assigned,
yet still the words of the writ itself specify one general damage, viz.: the tread-
ing down and bruising his herbage.(c)(2)
(b) Ist. 2, 1, 12. (e) F. N. B. 87, 88.
(1) [See these distinctions fully considered, 1 Chitty on P1. 115 to 122, and 149 to 172. The
distinctions between actions of trespass vi et armis for an immediate injury, and actions of
trespass upon the case for a consequential damage, are frequently very subtle: see the sub-
ject much considered in 2 Bi. Rep. 892. In a case where an action of trespass viet armis was
brought against the defendant for throwing a lighted squib in a public market, which fell
upon a stall, the owner of which, to defend himself and his goods, took it up and threw it to
another part of the market, where it struck the plaintiff and put out his eye; the question
was much discussed, whether the person injured ought to have brought an action of trespass
vi et armis, or an action upon the case; and one of the four judges strenuously contended
that it ought to have been an action upon the case. But I should conceive, that the question
was more properly this, viz.: whether an action of trespass vi et armis lay against the origi-
nal or the intermediate thrower, or whether the act of the second thrower was involuntary,
(which seems to have been the opinion of the jury), or wilful and mischievous, and if so,
whether the first thrower alone ought not to have been answerable for the consequences.
For if A throws a stone at B, which, after it lies quietly at his foot, B takes up and throws
again at C, it is presumed that C has his action against B only; but if it is thrown at B,
and B, by warding it off from himself, gives it a different direction, in consequence of which
it strikes C, in that case, it is wholly the act of A, and B must be considered merely as an
inanimate object, which may chance to divert its course. In the case of Leame v. Bray,
8 East, 598, it was decided, that if one man drives a carriage, being on the wrong side of the
road, against another carriage, though unintentionally, the action ought to be trespass vi et
armis, and the court declare generally, that if the injurious act be the immediate result of
the force originally applied by the defendant, and the plaintiff be injured by it, it is the sub-
ject of an action of trespass vi et avmis by all the cases both ancient and modern.]
(2) [In an action of trespass for entering the grounds of another person, and sporting over
them, the jury may take into consideration, in determining their verdict, not only the actual
damage sustained by the plaintiff, but 'ircumstances of aggravation and insult on the part of
the defendant. Merest v. Harvey, 1 Marsh. 139 ; 5 Taunt. 442.]
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One must have a property (either absolute or temporary) in the soil, and
actual possession by entry, to be able to maintain an action of trespass; or, at
least, it is requisite that the party have a lease and possession of the vesture
and herbage of the land.(d)(3) Thus, if a meadow be divided annually among
the parishioners by lot, then after each person's several portion is allotted, they
may be respectively capable of maintaining an action for the breach of their
several closes :(e) for they have an exclusive interest and freehold therein for the
time. But before entry and actual possession, one cannot maintain an action
of trespass, though he hath the freehold in law.(f) And therefore an heir, be-
fore entry, cannot have this action against an abator; though a disseisee might
have it against the disseisor, for the injury done by the disseisin itself, at which
time the plaintiff was seised of the land: but he cannot have it for any act done
after the disseisin, until he hath gained possession by re-entry, and then he may
well maintain it for the intermediate damage done; for after his re-entry the
law, by a kind of just postlininii, supposes the freehold to have all along con-
tinued in him.(g) Neither, by the common law, in case of an intrusion or de-
foreement, could the party kept out of possession sue the wrongdoer by a mode
of redress which was calculated merely for injuries committed against the land
while in the possession of the owner. But now by the statute 6 Anne, c. 18, if
a guardian or trustee for any infant, a husband seised jure uxoris, or a person
having any estate or interest determinable upon a life or lives, shall, after the
[*211] *determination of their respective interests, hold over and continue in
possession of the lands or tenements, without the consent of the person
entitled thereto, they are adjudged to be trespassers; and any reversioner or re-
mainder-man, expectant on any life-estate, may once in every year, by motion to
the court of chancery, procure the cestuy que vie to be produced by the tenant
to the land, or may enter thereon in case of his refusal or wilful neglect. And
by the statutes of 4 Geo. II, c. 28, and 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case, after the deter-
mination of any term of life, lives, or years, any person shall wilfully hold over
the same, the lessor or reversioner is entitled to recover by action of debt, either
at the rate of double the annual value of the premises, in case he himself hath
demanded and given notice in writing to the tenant to deliver the possession;
or else double the usual rent, in case the notice of quitting proceeds from the
tenant himself, having power to determine his lease, and he afterwards neglects
to carry that notice into due execution.
(d) Dyer, 285. 2 Roll. Abr. 549. (e) Cro. Eliz. 421. (f) 2 Roll. Abr. 553. (g) 11 Rep. 5.
(3) [As to the possession and title essential, see Chitty on P1. 159 to 166. An exclusive in-
terest in the crop, without an interest in the soil, is sufficient to sustain an action of trespass.
3 Burr. 1826; Bro. Abr. Tres. 273; Bull. N. P. 85. But possession, actual or constructive,
must be proved. 1 East, 244; 4 Taunt. 547; 6 East, 602. Trespass will not lie for entering a
pew or seat, because the plaintiff has not the exclusive possession, the possession of the church
being in the parson. 1 T. R. 430. If trees are excepted in the lease, the land whereon they
grow is necessarily excepted also, consequently the landlord may maintain trespass for break-
ing his &iose, if the tenant cut down the trees. Selw. N. P. 1287. Where two fields are sepa-
rated by a hedge and ditch, the hedge prima facie belongs to the owner of the field in which
the ditch is not. If there is a ditch on each side, the ownership of the hedge must be proved
by acts of ownership. Id. 1288. A person may cut his ditch to the edge of his own land,
but if he goes beyond he is a trespasser on his neighbor's land, though he may cut as wide as
he pleases on his own land. 3 Taunt. 138.]
To entitle one to maintain trespass he must have possession: Mather v. Ministers, &c.;
3 S. and R. 509; Wheeler v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn. 225; unless the lands are wild or vacant, in
which case the party having title has sufficient constructive possession for the purposes of this
suit. Goodrich v. Hathaway, 1 Vt. 485; Van Rennselaer v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Johns. 377. See
Gardner v. Heart, 1 N. Y. 528. In other cases it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show title;
but every unwarrantable entry upon a peaceable possession is a trespass. Palmer v. Aldridge,
16 Barb. 131; Wells v. Howell, 19 Johns. 385. And one who uses the highway for purposes
other than those for which the public easement exists, is liable in trespass to the owner of
the fee. Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H 36; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick. 357; Adams v. Rivers, 11
Barb. 390. If lands are occupied by a tenant, he, and not the lessor, must bring trespass against
a stranger for unlawful disturbance of the possession. Campbell v. Arnold, 1 Johns. 511.
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A man is answerable for not only his own trespass, but that of his cattle also:
for, if by his negligent keeping they stray upon the land of another, (and much
more if he permits, or drives them on,) and they there tread down his neighbor's
herbage, and spoil his corn or his trees, this is a trespass for which the owner
must answer in damages, and the law gives the party injured a double remedy
in this case; by permitting him to distrain the cattle thus damage-feasant, or
doing damage, till the owner shall make him satisfaction: or else by leaving
him to the common remedy in foro contentioso, by action. And the action that
lies in either of these cases of trespass committed upon another's land, either by
a man himself or his cattle, is the action of trespass vi et armis; whereby a man
is called upon to answer, quare vi et armis clausum ipsius A apud Bfregit, et
blada ipsius A ad valentiam centum solidorum ibidem nuper crescentia cum
quibusdam averiis depastus fuit, conculcavit, et consumpsit, &c.: (h) for the
law always couples the idea of force with that of intrusion upon the property
of another. And herein, if any unwarrantable act of the *defendant or [*21.
his beasts in coming upon the land be proved, it is an act of trespass 2]
for which the plaintiff must recover some damages; such, however, as the jury
shall think proper to assess.
In trespasses of a permanent nature, where the injury is continually renewed,
(as by spoiling or consuming the herbage with the defeiidant's cattle), the decla-
ration may allege the injury to have been committed by continuation from one
given day to another (which is called laying the action with a continuando), and
the plaintiff shall not be compelled to bring separate actions for every day's
separate offence.(i) But where the trespass is by one or several acts, each of
which terminates in itself, and being once done cannot be done again, it cannot
be laid with a continuando; yet if there be repeated acts of trespass committed,
(as cutting down a certain number of trees), they may be laid to be done, not
continually, but at divers days and times within a given period.(k) (4)
In some cases trespass is justifiable; or rather entry on another's land or
house shall not in those cases be accounted trespass: as if a man comes thither
to demand or pay money, there payable; or to execute, in a legal manner, the
process of the law. Also a man may justify entering into an inn or public
house, without the leave of the owner first specially asked ; because when a man
professes the keeping such inn or public house, he thereby gives a general
license to any person to enter his doors. So a landlord may justify entering to
distrain for rent; a commoner to attend his cattle, commoning on another's
land; and a reversioner, to see if any waste be committed on the estate; for the
apparent necessity of the thing.(1) Also it hath been said, that by the common
law and custom of England, the poor are allowed to enter and glean upon
another's ground after the harvest, without *being guilty of trespass:( m)
which humane provision seems borrowed from the Mosaical law.(n) (5)
(A) Registr. 94. (i) 2 Roll. Abr. 545. Lord Raym. 240.
(k) Salk. 638, 639. Lord Raym. 823. 7 Mod. 152. () 8 Rep. 146.
(in) Glib. Ev. 253. Trials per pals, ch. 15, p. 438.
() Levit. c. 19, v. 9, and c. 23, v. 22. Dent. c. 24, v. 19, &c.
(4) [The latter mode prevails in modern practice, and the form or declaring with a continu-
ando has grown obsolete. Under the statement that the defendant, on a day named, and on
divers other days and times between that day and the commencement of the suit, trespassed,
the plaintiff may prove any number of trespasses within those limits, though none are specified
except those on the earliest day named. 1 Stark. R. 351.]
(5) [Two actions of trespass have been brought in the common pleas against gleaners, with
an intent to try the general question, viz.: whether such a right existed. In the first, the
defendant pleaded that he, being a poor, necessitous, and indigent person, entered the plaint-
iff's close to glean; in the second, the defendant's plea was as before, with the addition that
he was an inhabitant legally settled within the parish: to the plea in each case there was a
general demurrer. Mr. J. Gould delivered a learned judgment in favor of gleaning, but the
other three judges were clearly of opinion, that his claim had no foundation in law; that the
only authority to support it was an extrajudicial dictum of Lord Hale; that it was a practice
incompatible with the exclusive enjoyment of property, and was productive of vagrancy, and
many mischievous consequences. 1 H. B1. Rep. 51, 53, n. (a).]
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In like manner the common law warrants the hunting of ravenous beasts of
prey, as badgers and foxes, in another man's land; because the destroying such
creatures is said to be profitable to the public.(o) (6) But in cases where a man
misdemeans himself, or makes an ill use of the authority with which the law
intrusts him, he shall be accounted a trespasser ab initio: (p) as if one comes
into a tavern and will not go out in a reasonable time, but tarries there all night
contrary to the inclinations of the owner; this wrongful act shall affect and
have relation back even to his first entry, and make the whole a trespass.(q)
But a bare nonfeasance, as not paying for the wine he calls for, will not make
him a trespasser: for this is only a breach of contract, for which the taverner
shall have an action of debt or assumpsit against him.(r) So if a landlord dis-
trained for rent, and wilfully killed the distress, this by the common law made
him a trespasser ab initio: (s) and so indeed would any other irregularity have
done, till the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, which enacts, that no subsequent irregu-
larity of the landlord shall make his first entry a trespass; but the party injured
shall have a special action of trespass or on the case, for the real specific injury
sustained, unless tender of amends hath been made. But still, if a reversioner,
who enters on pretence of seeing waste, breaks the house, or stays there all
night; or if the commoner who comes to tend his cattle, cuts down a tree; in
these and similar cases, the law judges that he entered for this unlawful pur-
pose, and therefore, as the act which demonstrates such his purpose is a trespass,
he shall be esteemed a trespasser ab initio.(t) So also in the case of hunting
the fox or the badger, a man cannot justify breaking the soil, and digging him
[*214] ?ut of his earth: for though the law warrants the hunting of such nox-
ious animals for the public good, yet it is held(u) that such things must
be done in an ordinary and usual manner; therefore, as there is an ordinary
course to kill them, viz., by hunting, the court held that the digging for them
was unlawful.
A man may also justify in an action of trespass, on account of the freehold
and right of entry being in himself; and this defence brings the title of the
estate in question. This is therefore one of the ways devised, since the disuse
of real actions, to try the property of estates; though it is not so usual as that
by ejectment, because that, being now a mixed action, not only gives damages
for the ejection, but also possession of the land; whereas in trespass, which is
merely a personal suit, the right can be only ascertained, but no possession
delivered; nothing being recovered but damages for the wrong committed.
. In order to prevent trifling and vexatious actions of trespass, as well as other
personal actions, it is(inter alia) enacted by statutes 43 Eliz. c. 6, and 22 and 23
Car. II, c. 9, § 136, that where the jury, who try an action of trespass, give less
damages than forty shillings, the plaintiff shall be allowed no more costs than
damages, unless the judge shall certify under his hand that the freehold or title
of the land came chiefly in question. But this rule now admits of two excep-
tions more, which have been made by subsequent statutes. One is by statute 8
and 9 Win. III, c. 11, which enacts, that in all actions of trespass, wherein it shall
appear that the trespass was wilful and malicious, and it be so certified by the
judge, the plaintiff shall recover full costs. Every trespass is wilful, where the
defendant has notice, and is especially forewarned not to come on the land; as
every trespass is malicious, though the damage may not amount to forty shil-
[*215] lings, where the intent of the defendant plainly appears to *be to harass
and distress the plaintiff. The other exception is by statute 4 and 5 W.
(o) Cro. Jac. 321. (p) Finch, L. 47. Cro. Jac. 148. (q) 2 Roll. Abr. 561. (r) 8 Rep. 147.
(8) Finch, L. 47. (t) 8 Rep. 146. (u) Cro. Jac. 821.
(6) The law was otherwise declared by Lord Ellenborough in Earl of Essex V. Capel (2
Chit. Game Law, 1381), with the qualification, however, that there may be such a public nuis-
ance by a noxious animal as may justify the running him to his earth. In the case of animals
chased for sport or game, merely, it is clear that one cannot justify going upon the lands of
another in pursuit without his license. Sutton v. Moody, 1 Ld. Raym. 251; Deane v. Clayton,
7 Taunt. 534; Hume v. Oldacre, 1 Stark. 351.
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and M. c. 23, which gives full costs against any inferior tradesman, apprentice,
or other dissolute person, who is convicted of a trespass in hawking, hunting,
fishing, or fowling, upon another's land. Upon this statute it has been adjudged,
that if a person be an inferior tradesman, as a clothier for instance, it matters
not what qualification he may have in point of estate; but, if he be guilty of
such trespass, he shall be liable to pay full costs.(w) (7)
CHAPTER XIII.
OF NUISANCE.
A THIRD species of real injuries to a man's lands and tenements, is by
nuisance. Nuisance, nocumentum, or annoyance, signifies any thing that work-
eth hurt, inconvenience or damage. And nuisances are of two kinds : public or
common nuisances, which affect the public, and are an annoyance to all the king's
subjects: for which reason we must refer them to the class of public wrongs, or
crimes and misdemeanors: and private nuisances, which are the objects of our
present consideration, and may be defined, anything done to the hurt or annoy-
ance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another.(a) We will there-
fore, first, mark out the several kinds of nuisances, and then their respective
remedies.
I. In discussing the several kinds of nuisances, we will consider, first, such
nuisances as may affect a man's corporeal hereditaments, and then those that
may damage such as are incorporeal.
1. First, as to corporeal inheritances. If a man builds a house so close to
mine that his roof overhangs my roof, and throws the water off his roof upon
mine, this is a nuisance for which an action will lie.(b) Likewise to erect a
house or other building so near to mine, that it obstructs my ancient
*lights and windows, is a nuisance of a similar nature.(c) But in this [*217-
latter case it is necessary that the windows be ancient; that is, have sub- * 1 "
sisted there a long time without interruption; otherwise there is no injury done.
For he hath as much right to build a new edifice upon his ground as I
have upon mine; since every man may erect what he pleases upon the upright
or perpendicular of his own soil, so as not to prejudice what has long been
enjoyed by another; and it was my folly to build so near another's ground.(d) (1)
Also if a person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the house of
another, that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwhole-
some,(2) this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him of the use and
benefit of his house.(e) A like injury is, if one's neighbour sets up and exercises
any offensive trade; as a tanner's, a tallow-chandler's, or the like; for though these
are lawful and necessary trades, yet they should be exercised in remote places;
for the rule is, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcdas:" this therefore is an
actionable nuisance.(f) (3) So that the nuisances which affect a man's dwelliny
(w) Lord Raym. 149. (a) Finch, L. 188. (b) F. N. B. 184. (c) 9 Rep. 58.
(d) Cro. Eliz. 118. Salk. 459. (e) 9 Rep. 58. (f) Cro. Car. 510.
(7) The statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 23, is now repealed. The statutes previously men-
tioned are also now repealed, and new provisions substituted.
(1) Mr. Washburn says there is a strong tendency of the law in America against allowing a
right of light and air to be acquired as an easement by mere enjoyment, however long con-
tinued. See the cases and statutes referred to by him in 2 Washb. Real Prop. 62,et seq., and in
his work on easements. And see note vol. 2, p. 395.
(2) See White's Case, 1 Burr. 338; Howard a. Lee, 3 Sandf. 281; Cropsey v. Murphy, 1
Hilt. 126;1 Whalen v. Keith, 35 Mo. 87.
(3) See Catlin v. Valentine, 9 Paige, 575; Dargan v. Waddill, 9 Ired. 244; Peck v. Elder, 3
Sandf. 126; Hackney v. State, 8 Ind. 492.
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may be reduced to these three: 1. Overhanging it; which is also a species of
trespass, for cu/us est solum, ejus est usque ad clum : 2. Stopping ancient
lights: and, 3. Corrupting the air with noisome smells: for light and air are
two indispensable requisites to every dwelling.(4) But depriving one of a mere
matter of pleasure, as of a fine prospect by building a wall, or the like: this, as
it abridges nothing really convenient or necessary, is no injury to the sufferer,
and is therefore not an actionable nuisance.(g)
As to nuisance to one's lands : if one erects a smelting-house for lead so
near the land of another, that the vapour and smoke kill his corn and grass,
and damage his cattle therein, this is held to be a nuisance.(h) And by con-
sequence it follows, that if one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet
being done in that place necessarily tends to the damage of another's property,
[*218] it is a nuisance: for it is incumbent on *him to find some other place
to do that act, where it will be less offensive. So also, if my neighbour
ought to scour a ditch, and does not, whereby my land is overflowed, this is an
actionable nuisance.(i)
With regard to other corporeal hereditaments: it is a nuisance to stop or
divert water that uses to run to another's meadow (5) or mill; (k) to corrupt
or poison a water-course, by erecting a dye-house or a lime-pit for the use of
trade, in the upper part of the stream; (1) or in short to do any act therein that
in its consequences must necessarily tend to the prejudice of one's neighbour.
So closely does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel moral-
ity, of "doing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves."
2. As to incorporeal hereditaments, the law carries itself with the same
equity. If I have a way, annexed to my estate, across another's land, and he
obstructs me in the use of it, either by totally stopping it, or putting logs
across it, or ploughing over it, it is a nuisance: for in the first case I cannot
enjoy my right at all, and in the latter I cannot enjoy it so commodiously as
I ought.(m) Also, if I am entitled to hold a fair or market, and another person
sets up a fair or market so near mine that he does me a prejudice, it is a nui-
sance to the freehold which I have in my market or fair.(n) But in order to
make this out to be a nuisance, it is necessary, 1. That my market or fair be
the elder, otherwise the nuisance lies at my own door. 2. That the market be
erected within the third part of twenty miles from mine. For Sir Matthew
Hale(o) construes the dieta, or reasonable day's journey mentioned by Bracton,(p)
to be twenty miles; as indeed it is usually understood, not only in our own
law,(q) but also in the civil(r) from which we probably borrowed it. So that
[*29] if the new market be not within seven miles of the old one, it is no *nui-
sance: for it is held reasonable that every man should have a market
within one-third of a day's journey from his own home; that the day being
divided into three parts, he may spend one part in going, another in returning,
and the third in transacting his necessary" business there. If such market or
fair be on the same day with mine, it is prima facie a nuisance to mine, and
there needs no proof of it, but the law will intend it to be so; but if it be on
any other day, it may be a nuisance; though whether it is so or not, cannot be
intended or presumed, but I must make proof of it to the jury. If a ferry is
(g) 9 Rep. 58. (h) 1 Roll. Abr. 89. (i) Hale on P. N. B. 427. (k) F. N. B. 184.
(O 9 Rep. 59. 2 Roll. Abr. 141. (m) F. N. B. 183. 2 Roll. Abr. 140. (n) F. N. B. 184. 2 Roll. Abr. 140.
(o) Hale on F. N. B. 184. (p) L. 4, c. 46. (q) 2 Inst. 567. (r) Ff. 2, 11, 1.
(4) See Smith v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517. Or corrupting the water which is used for ordi-
nary family purposes. Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala. 214. And noises on adjoining premises may
constitute such an impediment to the enjoyment of one's property as to entitle him to treat
them as a nuisance. Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 311. Or a dog which comes upon one's premi-
ses, and barks or howls about them by day or night. Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354.
(5) [After twenty years' uninterrupted enjoyment of a spring of water, an absolute right
to it is gained by the occupier of the close in which it issues above ground; and the owner
of an adjoining close cannot lawfully cut a drain whereby the supply of water by the spring
is diminished. Balston v. Bensted, 1 Campb. 463. And see Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208.] See
also Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528; Earl v. De Hart, 1 Beas. 280.
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erected on a river, so near another ancient ferry as to draw away its custom, it
is a nuisance to the owner of the old one. For where there is a ferry by pre-
scription, the owner is bound to keep it always in repair and readiness for the
ease of all the king's subjects; otherwise he may be grievously amerced: (s) it
would be therefore extremely hard, if a new ferry were suffered to share his
profits, which does not also share his burthen. But where the reason ceases,
the law also ceases with it: therefore it is no nuisance to erect a mill so near
mine, as to draw away the custom, unless the miller also intercepts the water.
Neither is it a nuisance to set up any trade, or a school, in a neighbourhood or
rivalship with another: for by such emulation the public are like to be gainers;
and, if the new mill or school occasion a damage to the old one, it is damnum
absque injuria.(t)
II. Le us next attend to the remedies, which the law has given for this injury
of nuisance. And here I must premise that the law gives no private remedy
for any thing but a private wrong. Therefore no action lies for a public or
common nuisance, but an indictment only: because, the damage being common
to all the king's subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it; or
if he could, it would be extremely hard, if every subject in the kingdom were
allowed to harass the offender with separate actions. For this reason, no person,
natural or corporate, can have an action for a public nuisance, or punish it;
but only the king in his public *capacity of supreme governor, and pater- [*220]
familias of the kingdom.(u) Yet this rule admits of one exception;
where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of
the king's subjects, by a public nuisance; in which case he shall have a private
satisfaction by action. As if, by means of a ditch dug across the public way,
which is a common nuisance, a man or his horse suffer any injury by falling
therein; there for this particular damage, which is not common to others, the
party shall have his action.(w) (6) Also if a man hath abated, or removed, a
nuisance which offended him (as we may remember it was stated in the first
chapter of this book, that the party injured hath a right to do), in this case
he is entitled to no action.(x) For he had choice of two remedies; either with-
out suit, by abating it himself, by his own mere act and authority; or by suit,
(s) 2 Roll. Abr. 140. (t) Hale on F. N. B. 184. (u) 'augh. 841, 842.
(w) Co. Litt. 56. 5 Rep. 73. (x) 9 Rep. 55.
(6) [But the particular damage in this case must be direct, and not consequential, as by
being delayed in a journey of importance. Bull. N. P. 26; Carthew. 194 And if the plaint-
iff has not acted with ordinary care and skill, with a view to protect himself from the mis-
chief,.he cannot recover. 11 East, 60; 2 Taunt. 814. It is upon the same principle that
parties, suffering special damage by a public nuisance, are entitled, under 5 W. and M. c. 11, s.
8, to receive their expenses in prosecuting an indictment against the party guilty of the
nuisance. See 16 East, 196 ; Willes, 71 ; Cro. Eliz. 664. If a party living in the neighbor
hood, and who has been in the habit of passing to and fro on a highway, is obliged by a
nuisance thereto to take a more circuitous route in his transit to and from the nearest market
town to his house, it is a private injury, for which he may sue as well as indict. 8 I. and S.
472. So, being delayed four hours by an obstruction in a highway, and being thereby prevented
from performing the same journey, as many times in a day as if the obstruction had not existed,
is a sufficient injury to entitle a party to sue for the obstruction. 2 Bingh. 288. So,'if the
nuisance prevent the plaintiff navigating his barges on a public navigable creek, and compel
him to convey his goods out of the same over a great distance of land, it is actionable. 4 X.
and 6. 101. But the mere obstruction of the plaintiff in his business (1 Esp. N. P. C. 148; 4
il. and S. 103), or delaying him a little while in a journey (Carth. 191), is not such a damage
as will entitle the party to his action; the damages ought to be direct, not consequential.
Carth. 191.
There are also various other injuries which partake of both a criminal and civil nature, for
which both an indictment as well as an action will lie, as for a forcible entry, enticing away
a servant, using false weights, disobeying an order of justices, extortion, or for a libel, &c.]
To entitle one to maintain an action for private damages in a case of public nuisance, it is
not sufficient that he be incommoded in the same manner as the rest of the public, but he
must sustain some private and peculiar injury and specific damage. Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow.
609; Lansing v. Smith, 8 id. 146. But several persons may have an action for injuries which
each suffers in respect to his own rights, where such injury is additional to the general incon-
vience of the public. Scott v. Bay, 8 Md. 431.
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in which he may both recover damages, and remove it by the aid of the law:
but, having made his election of one remedy, he is totally precluded from the
other.
The remedies by suit are, 1. By action on the case for damages; in which the
party injured shall only recover a satisfaction for the injury sustained; but can-
not thereby remove the nuisance. Indeed every continuance of a nuisance is
held to be a fresh one; (y) and therefore a fresh action will lie, and very exem-
plary damages will probably be given, if, after one verdict against him, the
defendant has the hardiness to continue it. Yet the founders of the law of Eng-
land did not rely upon probabilities merely, in order to give relief to the injured.
They have therefore provided two other actions; the assize of nuisance, and the
writ of quodpermittat prosternere : which not only give the plaintiff satisfaction
for his injury past, but also strike at the root and remove the cause itself, the
nuisance that occasioned the injury. These two actions, however, can only be
brought by the tenant of the freehold; so that a lessee for years is confined to
his action upon the case. (z) (i)
[*2211 *2. An assize of nuisance is a writ: wherein it is stated that the party
injured complains of some particular fact done, ad nocumentum liberi
tenementi sui, and therefore commanding the sheriff to summon an assize, that
is, a jury, and view the premises, and have them at the next commission of
assizes, that justice may be done therein: (a) and, if the assize is found for the
plaintiff, he shall have judgment of two things: 1. To have the nuisance abated;
and, 2. To recover damages. (b) Formerly an assize of nuisance only lay against
the very wrongdoer himself, who levied or did the nuisance; and did not lie
against any person to whom he had alienated the tenements, whereon the nui-
sance was situated. This was the imm@diate reason for making that equitable
provision in statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 24, for granting a similar writ, in.
casu consimili, where no former precedent was to be found. The statute enacts,
that "de cwetero non recedant querentes a curia domini regis, pro eo quod tene-
mentum transfertur de uno in alium;" and then gives the form of a new writ
in this case: which only differs from the old one in this, that, where the assize
is brought against the very person only who levied the nuisance, it is said "quod
A (the wrongdoer) in Juste levavit tale nocumentum;" but, where the lands are
aliened to another person, the complaint is against both; "quod A (the wrong-
doer) et B (the alienee) levaverunt." (c) For every continuation, as was before
said, is a fresh nuisance; and therefore the complaint is as well grounded against
the alienee who continues it, as against the alienor who first levied it.
3. Before this statute, the party injured, upon any alienation of the land
wherein the nuisance was set up, was driven to his quod permittatprosternere,
which is in the nature of a writ of right, and therefore subject to greater
delays. (d) This is a writ commanding the defendant to permit the plaintiff to
[*222] abate, quod permittat prosternere, the nuisance complained of; *and
unless he so permits, to summon him to appear in court, and show cause
why he will not. (e) And this writ lies as well for the alienee of the party first
injured, as against the alienee of the party first injuring; as hath been deter-
mined by all the judges. (f) And the plaintiff shall have judgment herein to
abate the nuisance, and to recover damages against the defendant.
Both these actions, of assize of nuisance, and of quodpermittat prosternere,
are now out of use, and have given way to the action on the case; in which,
as was before observed, no judgment can be had to abate the nuisance, but only
(y) 2 Leon. pl. 129. Cro. Eliz. 402. (z) Finch, L. 289. (a) F. N. B. 183. (b) 9 Rep. 55.
(c) Ibid. (d) 2 Inst. 405. (e) F. N. B. 124. (f) 5 Rep. 100, 101.
(7) Both are now abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.
In the United States the remedy to recover damages for a private injury by either public or
private nuisance, is by action on the case. The preventive remedy, is by writ of injunction
from the courts of equity. A party does not bar himself of an action for damages by abating
the nuisance. Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Gleason v. Gary, 4 Conn. 418.
to recover damages. (8) Yet, as therein it is not necessary that the freehold
should be in the plaintiff and defendant respectively, as it must be in these real
actions, but it is maintainable by one that hath possession only, against another
that hath like possession, the process is therefore easier: and the effect will be
much the same, unless a man has a very obstinate as well as an ill-natured
neighbour: who had rather continue to pay damages than remove his nuisance.
For in such a case, recourse must at last be had to the old and sure remedies,
which will effectually conquer the defendant's perverseness, by sending the
sheriff with his posse comitatus, or power of the county, to level it.
CHAPTER XIV.
OF WASTE.
THE fourth species of injury, that may be offered to one's real property is by
waste, or destruction in lands and tenements. What shall be called waste was con-
sidered at large in a former book, (a) as it was a means of forfeiture, and thereby
of transferring the property of real estates. I shall therefore here only beg leave
to remind the student, that waste is a spoil and destruction of the estate, either
in houses, woods, or lands; by demolishing not the temporary profits only, but
the very substance of the thing, thereby rendering it wild and desolate; which
the common law expresses very significantly by the word vastum: and that this
vastum, or waste, is either voluntary, or permissive; the one by an actual and
designed demolition of the lands, woods, and houses; the other arising from
mere negligence, and want of sufficient care in reparations, fences, and the like.
So that my only business is at present to show to whom this waste is an injury;
and, of course, who is entitled to any, and what, remedy by action.
I. The persons who may be injured by waste, are such as have some interest
in the estate wasted; for if a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple, (1) with-
out any incumbrance or charge on the premises, he may commit whatever waste
his *own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable r,224]
or accountable for it to any one. And, though his heir is sure to be the [24
sufferer, yet nemo est hawres viventis; no man is certain of succeeding him, as
well on account of the uncertainty which shall die first, as also because he has it
in his power to constitute what heir he pleases, according to the civil law notion
of an hAtres natus and an hceres factus: or, in the more accurate phraseology
of our English law, he may aliene or devise his estate to whomever he thinks
proper, and by such alienation or devise may disinherit his heir at law. Into
whose hands soever therefore the estate wasted comes, after a tenant in fee-sim-
ple, though the waste is undoubtedly damnurn, it is damnum absque inuria.
One species of interest, which is injured by waste, is that of a person who has
a right of common in the place wasted; especially if it be common of estovers,
or a right of cutting and carrying away wood for house-bote, plough-bote, &c.
Here, if the owner of the wood demolishes the whole wood, and thereby destroys
all possibility of taking estovers, this is an injury to the commoner, amounting
to no less than a disseisin of his common of estovers, if he chooses so to consider
(a) See book II, ch. 18.
(8) This action may be brought by a reversionor where the nuisance affects injuriously his
reversionary interest. Jackson v. Pesked, 1 M. and S. 234; Alston v. Scales, 9 Bing. 3; Bid-
dlesford v. Onslow, 3 Lev. 209; Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ad. and El. 40.
(1) [A tenant in fee-tail has the same uncontrolled and unlimited power in committing waste,
as a tenant in fee-simple, unless expressly restrained from committing waste by the terms of
the deed or will under which he claims.]
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it; for which he has his remedy to recover possession and damages by assize, if
entitled to a freehold in such common; but if he has only a chattel interest,
then he can only recover damages by an action on the case for this waste and
destruction of the woods, out of which his estovers were to issue. (b)
But the most usual and important interest, that is hurt by this commission
of waste, is that of him who hath the remainder or reversion of the inheritance,
after a particular estate for life or years in being. Here, if the particular tenant
(be it the tenant in dower or by curtesy, who was answerable for waste at the
common law, (c) or the lessee for life or years, *who was first made liable
by the statutes of Marlbridge (d) and of Gloucester), (e) if the particular
tenant, I say, commits or suffers any waste, it is a manifest injury to him that
has the inheritance, as it tends to mangle and dismember it of its most desirable
incidents and ornaments, among which timber and houses may justly be reck-
oned the principal. To him therefore in remainder or reversion, to whom the
inheritance appertains in expectancy, (f) the law hath given an adequate
remedy. For he, who hath the remainder for life only, is not entitled to sue
for waste; since his interest may never perhaps come into possession, and then
he hath suffered no injury. Yet a parson, vicar, archdeacon, prebendary, and
the like, who are seized in right of their churches of any remainder or reversion,
may have an action of waste; for they, in many cases, have for the benefit of the
church and of the successors a fee-simple qualified: and yet, as they are not seized
in their own right, the writ of waste shall not say, ad ex hceredationem ipsus, as
for other tenants in fee-simple; but ad exhceredationem ecclesic, in whose right
the fee-simple is holden. (g)
II. The redress for this injury of waste is of two kinds; preventive, and cor-
rective: the former of which is by writ of estrepement, the latter by that of
waste. (2)
1. Estrepement is an old French word, signifying the same as waste or extir-
pation: and the writ of estrepement lay at the common law, after judgment
obtained in any action real, (h) and before possession was delivered by the sheriff;
to stop any waste which the vanquished party might be tempted to commit in
lands, which were determined to be no longer his. But as in some cases the
demandant may be justly apprehensive, that the tenant may make waste or
estrepenient pending the suit, well knowing the weakness of his title, therefore
the statute of Gloucester (i) gave another writ of estrepement, pendente placito,
[*226] commanding the sheriff firmly *to inhibit the tenant "ne faciat vastum
velestrepementumpendenteplacito dicto indiscusso."(k) And, by virtue
of either of these writs the sheriff may resist them that do, or offer to do, waste;
and, if otherwise he cannot prevent them, he may lawfully imprison the wasters,
or make a warrant to others to imprison them: or, if necessity require, he may
take the posse comitatus to his assistance. So odious in the sight of the law is
waste and destruction. (1) In suing out these two writs this difference was for-
merly observed; that in actions merely possessory, where no damages are
recovered, a writ of estrepement might be had at any time pendente lite, nay
even at the time of suing out the original writ, or first process: but in an action
where damages were recovered, the demandant could only have a writ of
estrepement, if he was apprehensive of waste after verdict had; (m) for, with
regard to waste done before the verdict was given, it was presumed the jury
would consider that in assessing the quantum of damages. But now it seems
to be held, by an equitable construction of the statute of Gloucester, and in
advancement of the remedy, that a writ of estrepement, to prevent waste, may
be had in every stage, as well of such actions wherein damages are recovered, as
(b) F. N B. 59. 9 Rep. 112. (C) 2 Inst. 299. (d) 52 Hen. ITT, c. 23. (e) 6 Edw. I, c. 5.
(f) Co. Litt 53. (y) Ibid. 341. (h) 2 Inst. 328. (i) 6 Edw. I, c. 13. (k) Registr. 77.
(1) 2 Inst. 329. (m) F. N. B. 60, 61.
(2) Both these writs are now abolished. The remedy to recover damages is by action on the
case, and to recover possession is by ejectment.
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of those wherein only possession is had of the lands; for peradventure, saith
the law, the tenant may not be of ability to satisfy the demandant his full dam-
ages. (n) And therefore now, in an action of waste itself, to recover the place
wasted and also damages, a writ of estrepement will lie, as well before as after
judgment. For the plaintiff cannot recover damages for more waste than is
contained in his original complaint; neither is he at liberty to assign or give in
evidence any waste made after the suing out of the writ: it is therefore reason-
able that he should have this writ of preventive justice, since he is in his present
suit debarred of any farther remedial. (o) If a writ of estrepement, forbidding
waste, be directed and delivered to the tenant himself, as it may be, and he
afterwards proceeds to commit waste, an action may be carried on upon the
*foundation of this writ; wherein the only plea of the tenant can be'
non fecit vastum contra prohibitionem: and, if upon verdict it be found *21
that he did, the plaintiff may recover costs and damages, (p) or the party may
proceed to punish the defendant for the contempt: for, if after the writ directed
and delivered to the tenant or his servants, they proceed to commit waste,
the court will imprison them for this contempt of the writ. (q) - But not so, if
it be directed to the sheriff, for then it is incumbent upon him to prevent the
estrepement absolutely, even by raising theposse comitatus, if it can be done no
other way.
Besides this preventive redress at common law, the courts of equity, upon bill
exhibited therein, complaining of waste and destruction, will grant an injunc-
tion in order to stay waste, until the defendant shall have put in his answer, and
the court shall thereupon make further order. Which is now become the most
usual way of preventing waste.
2. A writ of waste (3) is also an action, partly founded upon the common law,
and partly upon the statute of Gloucester; (r) and may be brought by him who
hath the immediate estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder against the
tenant for life, tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, or tenant for years. This
action is also maintainable in pursuance of statute (s) Westm. 2, by one tenant
in common of the inheritance against another, who makes waste in the estate
holden in common. The equity of which statute extends to joint-tenants, but
not to coparceners; because by the old law coparceners might make partition,
whenever either of them thought proper, and thereby prevent future waste, but
tenants in common and joint tenants could not; and therefore the statute gave
them this remedy, compelling the defendant either to make partition, and take
the place wasted to his own share, or to give security not to commit any farther
waste. (t) But these tenants in common and joint-tenants are *not liable
to the penalties of the statute of Gloucester, which extends only to such [*228]
as have life-estates, and do waste to the prejudice of the inheritance. The
waste however must be something considerable; for if it amount only to twelve
pence, or some such petty sum, the plaintiff shall not recover in an action of
waste: nam de minimis non curat lex. (u)(4)
This action of waste is a mixed action; partly real, so far as it recovers land;
and partly personal, so far as it recovers damages. For it is brought for both
(n) Ibid. 61. (o) 5 Rep. 115. (p) Moor. 100. (q) Hob. 85. (r) 6 Edw. I, c. 5.
(s) 13 Edw. I, c. 22. (t) 2 Inst. 403, 404. (u) Finch, L. 29.
(3) This writ, before it was abolished, had almost entirely fallen into disuse, having given
way to the more simple proceeding by special action on the case. And this action may be
brought not only in those cases in which a writ of waste might formerly have been maintained,
but also in any other case where by the wrongful act or default of a party in possession an
-injury occurs to the rights of one entitled to succeed hin, in the possession. A purchaser at a judicial
sale, where the defendant had a right of redemption, may maintain this action, after his title
becomes absolute, against one who had previously, but after the sale, committed waste on the
premises. Thomas v. Crofut, 14 N. Y. 474 ; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 184.
n(4) See this maxim illustrated in Broom's Legal Maxims, 106. Generally the smallness of
injury will not preclude the maintenance of an action: Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 154; but
the difficulty in drawing a precise line between what is and what is not waste in all cases, is
sufficient reason for taking no notice of slight injuries.
Chap. 1.
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those purposes; and, if the waste be proved, the plaintiff shall recover the thing
or place wasted, and also treble damages by the statute of Gloucester. The writ of
waste calls upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he hath committed
waste and destruction in the place named, ad exhceredationem, to the disinheri-
son of the plaintiff. (w) And if the defendant makes default, or does not appear
at the day assigned him, then the sheriff is to take with him a jury of twelve
men, and go in person to the place alleged to be wasted, and there inquire of the
waste done, and the damages; and make a return or report of the same to the
court, upon which report the judgment is founded. (x) For the law will not
suffer so heavy a judgment, as the forfeiture and treble damages, to be passed
upon a mere default, without full assurance that the fact is according as it is
stated in the writ. But if the defendant appears to the writ, and afterwards
suffers judgment to go against him by default, or upon a nihil dicit (when he
makes no answer, puts in no plea, in defence), this amounts to a confession of
the waste; since having once appeared, he cannot now pretend ignorance of the
charge. Now, therefore, the sheriff shall not go to the place to inquire of the
fact, whether any waste has, or has not been committed; for this is already
ascertained by the silent confession of the defendant: but he shall only, as in
defaults upon other actions, make inquiry of the quantum of damages.(y) The
defendant, on the trial, may give in evidence any thing that proves there was no
waste committed, as that the destruction happened by lightning, tempest, the
king's enemies, or other inevitable accident. (z) But it no is defence to say, that
a stranger did the waste, for against him the plaintiff hath no remedy: though
the defendant is entitled to sue such stranger in an action of trespass vi et armis,
and shall recover the damages he has suffered in consequence of such unlawful
act. (a) (5)
When the waste and damages are thus ascertained, either by confession, verdict,
or inquiry of the sheriff, judgment is given in pursuance of the statute of
Gloucester, c. 5, that the plaintiff shall recover the place wasted; for which he has
immediately a writ of seisin, provided the particular estate be still subsisting
(for, if it be expired, *there can be no forfeiture of the land), and also
that the plaintiff shall recover treble the damages assessed by the jury,
which he must obtain in the same manner as all other damages, in actions
personal and mixed, are obtained, whether the particular estate be expired, or
still in being.
CHAPTER XV.
OF SUBTRACTION.
SUBTRACTION, which is the fifth species of injuries affecting a man's real
property, happens when any person who owes any suit, duty, custom, or service
to another, withdraws or neglects to perform it. It differs from a disseisin, in
that this is committed without any denial of the right, consisting merely of non-
performance; that strikes at the very title of the party injured, and amounts to
an ouster or actual dispossession. Subtraction, however, being clearly an injury,
is remediable by due course of law: but the remedy differs according to the
(w) F. N. B. 55. (x) Poph. 24. (y) Cro. Eliz. 18, 290.
(z) Co. Litt. 53. (a) Law of nisiprilus, 120.
(5) But one having a vested interest in reversion, may maintain a special action on the case
against a stranger who commits waste to the injury of the inheritance. Randall v. Cleveland,
6 Conn. 328; Elliot v. Smith, 2 N. H. 430; Chase v. Hazleton, 7 id. 171; Ripka v. Sergeant,
7 W. and S. 1. The tenant may also sue for the injury to his possession. Id. Or the land-
lord may hold the tenant responsible for the injury by the stranger. Fay v. Brewer, 3 Pick. 203.
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nature of the services, whether they be due by virtue of any tenure, or by
custom only.
I. Fealty, suit of court, and rent, are duties and services usually issuing and
arising ratione tenurce, being the conditions upon which the ancient lords
granted out their lands to their feudatories; whereby it was stipulated that they
and their heirs should take the oath of fealty or fidelity to their lord, which was
the feudal bond, or commune vinculum, between lord and tenant; that they
should do suit, or duly attend and follow the lord's courts, and there from time
to time give their assistance, by serving on juries, either to decide the property
of their neighbours in the court-baron, or correct their misdemeanors in the
court-leet; and, lastly, that they should yield to the lord certain annual stated
returns, in military attendance, in provisions, in arms, in matters of ornament
or pleasure, in rustic employments or *pradial labours, or (which is in-
star omnium) in money, which will provide all the rest; all which are
comprised under the one general name of reditus, return, or rent. And the
subtraction or non-observance of any of these conditions, by neglecting to swear
fealty, to do suit of court, or to render the rent or service reserved, is an injury
to the freehold of the lord, by diminishing and depreciating the value of his
seigniory.
The general remedy for all these is by distress; and it is the only remedy at
the common law for the first two of them. The nature of distresses, their inci-
dents and consequences, we have before more than once explained :(a) it may
here suffice to remember, that they are a taking of beasts, or other personal
property, by way of pledge to enforce the performance of something due from
the party distrained upon. And for the most part it is provided that distresses
be reasonable and moderate; but in the case of distress for fealty or suit of court,
no distress can be unreasonable, immoderate, or too large :(b) for this is the only
remedy to which the party aggrieved is entitled, and, therefore, it ought to be
such as is sufficiently compulsory; and, be it of what value it will, there is no
harm done, especially as it cannot be sold or made away with, but must be re-
stored immediately on satisfaction made. A distress of this nature, that has no
bounds with regard to its quantity, and may be repeated from time to time,
until the stubbornness of the party is conquered, is called a distress infinite ;
which is also used for some other purposes, as in summoning jurors, and the like.
Other remedies for subtraction of rents or services are, 1. By action of debt,
for the breach of this express contract, of which enough has been formerly said.
This is the most usual remedy, when recourse is had to any action at all for the
recovery of pecuniary rents, to which species of render almost all free services
are now reduced, since the abolition of the military tenures. But for a free-
hold rent, reserved on *a lease for life, &c., no action of debt lay by the [*232]
common law, during the continuance of the freehold out of which it
issued ;(c) for the law would not suffer a real injury to be remedied by an action
that was merely personal. However, by the statutes 8 Ann. c. 14, and 5 Geo.
III, c. 17, actions of debt may now be brought at any time to recover such free-
hold rents. 2. An assize of mort d' ancestor or novel disseisin will lie of rents
as well as of lands ;(d) if the lord, for the sake of trying the possessory right,
will make it his election to suppose himself ousted or disseised thereof. This is
now seldom heard of; and all other real actions to recover rents, being in the
nature of writs of right, and therefore more dilatory in their progress, are en-
tirely disused, though not formally abolished by law.(1) Of this species how-
ever is, 3. The writ de consuetudinibus et servitiis, which lies for the lord
against his tenant, who withholds from him the rents and services due by cus-
tom, or tenure, for his land.(e) This compels a specific payment or perform-
(a) See pages 6, 148. (b) Finch, L. 285. (c) 1 Roll. Abr. 595.
(d) F. N.B. 195. (e) IMid. 151.
(1) It is since abolished by statute 8 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.
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ance of the rent or service; and there are also others, whereby the lord shall
recover the land itself in lieu of the duty withheld. As, 4. The writ of cessa-
vit; which lies by the statutes of Gloucester, 6 Edward I, c. 4, and of Westm.
2, 13 Edw. I, cc. 21 and 41, when a man who holds lands of a lord by rent or
other services, neglects or ceases to perform his services for two years together;
or where a religious house hath lands given it, on condition of performing some
certain spiritual service, as reading prayers or giving alms, and neglects it; in
either of which cases, if the cesser or neglect have continued for two years, the
lord or donor and his heirs shall have a writ of cessavit to recover the land it-
self, eo quod tenens in faciendis servitiis per biennium jam cessavi.(f) In
like manner, by the civil law, if a tenant who held lands upon payment of rent
or services, or "Jure empityleutico," neglected to pay or perform them per totum
triennium, he might be ejected from such emphyteutic lands.(g) But by the
statute of Gloucester, the cessavit does not lie for lands let upon fee-farm rents,
unless they have lain fresh and uncultivated for two years, and there be
[*233] *not sufficient distress upon the premises; or unless the tenant hath so
enclosed the land that the lord cannot come upon it to distrain.(h) For
the law prefers the simple and ordinary remedies, by distress or by the actions
just now mentioned, to this extraordinary one of forfeiture for a cessavit: and
therefore the same statute of Gloucester has provided farther, that, upon tender
of arrears and damages before judgment and giving security for the future
performance of the services, the process shall be at an end, and the tenant shall
retain his land; to which the statute of Westm. 2, conforms, so far as may
stand with convenience and reason of law.(i) It is easy to observe, that the
statute(k) 4 Geo. II, c. 28 (which permits landlords, who have a right of re-entry
for non-payment for rent, to serve an ejectment on their tenants, when half a
year's rent is due, and there is no sufficient distress on the premises), is in some
measure copied from the ancient writ of cessavit: especially as it may be satis-
fied and put an end to in a similar manner, by tender of the rent and costs
within six months after. And the same remedy is, in substance, adopted by
statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, § 16, which enacts that, where any tenant at rack-rent
shall be one year's rent in arrear, and shall desert the demised premises, leaving
the same uncultivated or unoccupied, so that no sufficient distress can be had:
two justices of the peace (after notice affixed on the premises for fourteen days
without effect) may give the landlord possession thereof, and thenceforth the
lease shall be void. 5. There is also another very effectual remedy, which takes
place when the tenant, upon a writ of assize for rent, or on a replevin, disowns
or disclaims his tenure, whereby the lord loses his verdict: in which case the lord
may have a writ of right, sur disclaimer, grounded on this denial of tenure; and
shall, upon proof of the tenure, recover back the land itself so holden, as a pun-
ishment to the tenant for such his false disclaimer.(l) This piece of retaliating
justice, whereby the tenant who endeavours to defraud his lord is himself de-
[-234] prived of the estate, as it evidently proceeds upon feudal principles, *so
it is expressly to be met with in the feudal constitutions :(m) "vasallus,
qui abnegavit feudum ejusve conditionem, exspoliabitur."
And, as on ihe one hand the ancient law provided these several remedies to
obviate the knavery and punish the iv gratitude of the tenant, so on the other
hand it was equally careful to redress the oppression of the lord; by furnishing,
1. The writ of ne injuste vexes; (n) which is an ancient writ founded on that
chapter (o) of magqna carta which prohibits distresses for greater services than
are really due to the lord ; being itself of the prohibitory kind, and yet in the
nature of a writ of right.(p) It lies where the tenant in fee-simple and his an-
cestors have held of the lord by certain services; and the lord bath obtained
seisin of more or greater services, by the inadvertent payment or performance of
them by the tenant himself. Here the tenan-t cannot in an awowry avoid the
lord's possessory right, because of the seisin given by his own hands; but is
(f) Ibid. 20. (g) Cod. 4, 66 2. (h) F. N. B. 209. 2 Inst. 298. (i) 2 Inst. 401, 460.
(k) See page 206. () Finch, h. 270, 271. (m) Feud. 1. 2, t. 26.
(7) F. N. B. 10. (o) C. 10. (p) Booth, 126.
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driven to this writ, to devest the lord's possession, and establish the mere right
of property, by ascertaining the services, and reducing them to their proper
standard. But this writ does not lie for tenant in tail; for he may avoid such
seisin of the lord, obtained from the payment of his ancestors, by plea to an
avowry in replevin.(q) 2. The writ of mesne, de medio; which is also in the
nature of a writ of right, (r) and lies, when upon a subinfeudation the mesne,
or middle lord,(s) suffers his under-tenant, or tenant paravail, to be distrained
upon by the lord paramount, for the rent due to him from the mesne lord.(t)
And in such case the tenant shall have judgment to be quitted (or indemnified)
by the mesne lord; and if he makes default therein, or does not appear origin-
ally to the tenant's writ, he shall be forejudged of his mesnalty, and the tenant
shall hold immediately of the lord paramount himself.(u) (2)
*II. Thus far of the remedies for subtraction of rents or other ser- [*235]
vices due by tenure. There are also other services due by ancient cus-
tom and prescription only. Such is that of doing suit to another's mill: where
the persons, resident in a particular place, by usage time out of mind, have been
accustomed to grind their corn at a certain mill; and afterwards any of them
go to another mill, and withdraw their suit (their secta a sequendo) from the
ancient mill. This is not only a damage, but an injury to the owner; because
this prescription might have a very reasonable foundation; viz.: upon the erec-
tion of such mill by the ancestors of the owner for the convenience of the in-
habitants, on condition, that when erected, they should all grind their corn there
only. And for this injury the owner shall have a writ de secta ad molendin um,
(w) commanding the defendant to do his suit at that mill, quam ad illudfacere
debet, et solet, or show good cause to the contrary: in which action the valid-
ity of the prescription may be tried, and if it be found for the owner, he shall
recover damages against the defendant.(x) In like manner, and for like rea-
sons, the register (y) will inform us, that a man may have a writ of secta ad
furnum, secta ad torrale, et ad omnia alia huu smodi; for suit due to his fur-
num, his public oven or bake-house; or to his torrale, his kiln, or malt-house;
when a person's ancestors have erected a convenience of that sort for the bene-
fit of the neighbourhood, upon an agreement (proved by immemorial custom)
that all the inhabitants should use and resort to it when erected. But besides
these special remedies for subtractions, to compel the specific performance of
the service due by custom; an action on the case will also lie for all of them, to
repair the party injured in damages. And thus much for the injury of sub-
traction.
(q) F. N. B. 11. 2 Inst. 21. (r) Booth, 136. (s) See book II, ch, 5, pp. 59, 60. (t) F. N. B. 135.
(u) 2 Inst. 374. (w) F. N. B. 123. (x) Co. Entr. 461. (y) FoL. 153.
(2) The several writs here mentioned were formally abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV,
c. 27. They were before not the usual remedies for these wrongs. An action on the case
might have been maintained by the tenant at the common law against the landlord for dis-
training for more rent than was due: Taylor Land. and Ten., §, 729, et seq. ; and if the tenant
through any error or mistake paid to the landlord more than was due, he might recover it back in
an action for money had and received to his use, as paid without consideration. For the gen-
eral principle in these cases, see Union Bank v. Bank of U. S., 3 Mass. 74; Bank of Commerce
v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230; Little v. Derby, 7 Mich. 325. And if an under-tenant is dis-
trained upon, or is compelled in order to protect his own interest to pay rent to the original
landlord, he is entitled to treat the payment as one made to the use of the mesne tenant, and
may deduct it from his own rent, or recover it back from the mense tenant if nothing was
owing to him. As to the obligation of the mesne tenant to indemnify the under-tenant gen-
erally, see Taylor Land. and Ten., , 738.
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CHAPTER XVI.
OF DISTURBANCE.
THE sixth and last species of real injuries is that of disturbance; which is usually
a wrong done to some incorporeal hereditament, by hindering or disquieting the
owners in their regular and lawful enjoyment of it.(a) I shall consider five sorts
of this injury, viz.: 1. Disturbance of franchises. 2. Disturbance of common.
3. Disturbance of ways. 4. Disturbance of tenure. 5. Disturbance of patronage.
I. Disturbance of franchises happens when a man has the franchise of hold-
ing a court-leet, of keeping a fair or market, of free-warren, of taking toll, of
seizing waifs or estrays, or, (in short) any other species of franchise whatsoever;
and he is disturbed or incommoded in the lawful exercise thereof. As if
another by distress, menaces, or persuasions, prevails upon the suitors not to
appear at my court; or obstructs the passage to my fair or market; or hunts in my
free-warren; or refuses to pay me the accustomed toll; or hinders me from
seizing the waif or estray, whereby it escapes or is carried out of my liberty; in
every case of this kind, all which it is impossible here to recite or suggest, there
is an injury done to the legal owner; his property is damnified; and the profits
arising from such his franchise are diminished. To remedy which, as the law has
r*2 3 7i given no other writ, he is *therefore entitled to sue for damages by a special
action on the case: or, in case of toll, may take a distress if he pleases.(b)
II. The disturbance of common comes next to be considered; where any act
is done, by which the right of another to his common is incommoded or dimin-
ished. This may happen, in the first place, where one who hath no right of
common, puts his cattle into the land; and thereby robs the cattle of the com-
moners of their respective shares of the pasture. Or if one, who bath a right
of common, puts in cattle which are not commonable, as hogs and goats;
which amounts to the same inconvenience. But the lord of the soil may (by
custom or prescription, but not without) put a stranger's cattle into the com-
mon; (c) and also, by a like prescription for common appurtenant, cattle that
are not commonable may be put into the common. (d) The lord also of the
soil may justify making burrows therein, and putting in rabbits, so as they do
not increase to so large a number as totally to destroy the common. (e) But in
general, in case the beasts of a stranger, or the uncommonable cattle of a com-
moner, be found upon the land, the lord or any of the commoners may distrain
them damage-feasant: (f) or the commoner may bring an action onl the case
to recover damages, provided the injury done be any thing considerable: so that
he may lay his action with a per quod, or allege that thereby he was deprived
of his common. But for a trivial trespass the commoner has no action: but the
lord of the soil only, for the entry and trespass committed. (g)
Another disturbance of common is by surcharging it; or putting more cattle
therein than the pasture and herbage will sustain, or the party hath a right to
do. In this case he that surcharges does an injury to the rest of the owners, by
[*238] depriving them of their respective portions, or at least *contracting
them into a smaller compass. This injury by surcharging can, properly
speaking, only happen, where the common is appendant or appurtenant,(h) and
of course limitable by law; or where when in gross, it is expressly limited and
certain; for when a man bath common in gross, sans nombre, or without
stint, he cannot be a surcharger. However, even where a man is said to have
common without stint, still there must be left sufficient for the lord's own
beasts; (i) for the law will not suppose that, at the original grant of the common,
the lord meant to exclude himself. (1)
(a) Finch, L. 187. (b) Cro. Eliz. 558. (c) 1 Roll. Abr. 396.
(d) Co. Litt. 122. (e) Cro. Eliz. 876. Cro. Jac. 195. Lutw. 108. (f) 9 Rep. 112.
(g) Ibid. (A) See book II, ch. 3. (i) 1 Roll. Abr. 399.
(1) lThe modern doctrine upon this subject is somewhat different, for it is now held, that a
prescription for a sole and several pasture, &c., in exclusion of the owner of the soilfcr the
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The usual remedies for surcharging the common, are either by distraining so
many of the beasts as are above the number allowed, or else by an action of
trespass, both which may be had by the lord: or lastly, by a special action on
the case for damages; in which any commoner may be plaintiff. (j) But the
ancient and most effectual method of proceeding is by writ of admeasurement of
pasture. This lies either where a common appurtenant or in gross is certain as
to number, or where a man has common appendant or appurtenant to his land,
the quantity of which common has never yet been ascertained. In either of
these cases, as well the lord, as any of the commoners, is entitled to this writ of
admeasurement; which is one of those writs that are called vicontiel, (k) being
directed to the sheriff, (vicecomiti) and not to be returned to any superior court,
till finally executed by him. It recites a complaint that the defendant hath
surcharged, superoneravit, the common: and therefore commands the sheriff to
admeasure and apportion it; that the defendant may not have more than
belongs to him, and that the plaintiff may have his rightful share. And upon
this suit all the commoners shall be admeasured, as well those who have not, as
those who have surcharged the common; as well the plaintiff as the defendant.(l)
The execution of this writ must be by a jury of twelve men, who are upon their
*oaths to ascertain, under the superintendence of the sheriff, what and [*239]
how many cattle each commoner is entitled to feed. And the rule for
this admeasurement is generally understood to be, that the commoner shall not
turn more cattle upon the common, than are sufficient to manure and stock
the land to which his right of common is annexed; or, as our ancient law ex-
pressed it, such cattle only as are levant and couchant upon his tenement: (m)
which being a thing uncertain before admeasurement, has frequently, though
erroneously, occasioned this unmeasured right of common to be called a com-
mon without stint, or sans nombre; (n) a thing which, though possible in law,(o)
does in fact very rarely exist.
If, after the admeasurement has thus ascertained the right, the same defendant
surcharges the common again, the plaintiff may have a writ of second surcharge,
de secunda superoneratione, which is given by the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I,
c. 8, and thereby the sheriff is directed to inquire by a jury, whether the defend-
ant has in fact again surcharged the common contrary to the tenure of the last
admeasurement: and if he has, he shall then forfeit to the king the super-
numerary cattle put in, and also shall pay damages to the plaintiff.(p) This pro-
cess seems highly equitable: for the first offence is held to be committed through
mere inadvertence, and therefore there are no damages or forfeiture on the first
writ, which was only to ascertain the right which was disputed: but the second
offence is a wilful contempt and injustice; and therefore punished very properly
with not only damages, but also forfeiture. And herein the right, being once settled,
is never again disputed; but only the fact is tried, whether there be any second
surcharge or no: which gives this neglected proceeding a great advantage over
the modern method, by action on the case, wherein the quantum of common
belonging to the defendant must be proved upon every fresh trial, for every
repeated offence.
*There is yet another disturbance of common, when the owner of the [*240]
land, or other person, so encloses or otherwise obstructs it, that the com-
(j) Freem. 273. (k) 2 Inst. 369. Finch, L. 314. () F. N. B. 125. (m) Bro. Abr. tit. prescriplion, 28.
(n) Hardr. 117. (o) Lord Raym. 407. (p) F. N. B. 126. 2 Inst. 370.
wwle year is good: 2 Lev. 2; Pollexf. 13; 1 Mod. 74; for it does not exclude the lord from
all the profits of the soil, as he is entitled -to the mines, trees, and quarries. And though a
man cannot prescribe to have common eo nomine for the whole year in exclusion of the lcrd,
(1 Lev. 268; 1 Vent. 395), still the lord may, by custom, be restrained to a qualified right of
common during a part of the year. Yelv. 129. And it is said the lord may be restrained,
together with the commoners, from using the common at all during a part of the year. 1 Saund.
353, n. (2). See also 2 H. Bl. 4. And it is said to have been clearly held that the commoners
may prescribe to have common in exclusion of the lord for a part of the year. 2 Roll. Abr.
267. L. pl. 1.]
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moner is precluded from enjoying the benefit to which he is by law entitled.
This may be done, either by erecting fences, or by driving the cattle off the
land, or by ploughing up the soil of the common. (q) Or it may be done by
erecting a warren therein, and stocking it with rabbits in such quantities, that they
devour the whole herbage, and thereby destroy the common. For in such case,
though the commoner may not destroy the rabbits, yet the law looks upon this
as an injurious disturbance of his right, and has given him his remedy by action
against the owner. (r) This kind of disturbance does indeed amount to a dis-
seisin, and if the commoner chooses to consider it in that light, the law has given
him an assize of novel-disseisin, against the lord, to recover the possession of his
common. (s) Or it has given a writ of quod permittat, against any stranger, as
well as the owner of the land, in case of such a disturbance to the plaintiff as
amounts to a total deprivation of his common; whereby the defendant shall be
compelled to permit the plaintiff to enjoy his common as he ought: (t) But if
the commoner does not choose to bring a real action to recover seisin, or to try
the right, he may, (which is the easier and more usual way) bring an action on
the case for his damages, instead of an assize or a quodpermittat. (u) (2)
There are cases, indeed, in which the lord may enclose and abridge the com-
mon ; for which, as they are no injury to any one, so no one is entitled to any
remedy. For it is provided by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 4, that the
lord may approve, that is, enclose and convert to the uses of husbandry (which
is a melioration or approvement,) any waste grounds, woods, or pastures, in
which his tenants have common appendant to their estates; provided he leaves
[*241] *sufficient common to his tenants, according to the proportion of their
land. And this is extremely reasonable: for it would be very hard if the
lord, whose ancestors granted out these estates to which the commons are
appendant, should be precluded from making what advantage he can of the rest
of his manor; provided such advantage and improvement be no way derogatory
from the former grants. The statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 46, extends this
liberty of approving, in like manner, against all others that have common appur-
tenant, or in gross, as well as against the tenants of the lord, who have their
common appendant; and farther enacts, that no assize of novel-disseisin, for
common, shall lie against a lord for erecting on the common any windmill,
shee-phouse, or other necessary buildings therein specified: which, Sir Edward
Coke says, (w) are only put as examples; and that any other necessary improve-
ments may be made by the lord, though in reality they abridge the common,
and make it less sufficient for the commoners.(3) And, lastly, by statutes 29
Geo. II, c. 36, and 31 Geo. II, c. 41, it is particularly enacted, that any lords of
wastes and commons, with the consent of the major part, in number and value,
of the commoners, may enclose any part thereof, for the growth of timber and
underwood.(4)
III. The third species of disturbance, that of ways, is very similar in its
nature to the last: it principally happening when a person, who hath a right
to a way over another's grounds, by grant or prescription, is obstructed by
enclosures, or other obstacles, or by ploughing across it; by which means he
cannot enjoy his right of way, or, at least, not in so commodious a manner as
(q) Cro. Eliz. 198. (r) Cro. Jac. 195. (8) F. N. B. 179. (t) Finch, L. 275. F. N. B. 123.
(u) Cro. Jac. 195. (w) 2 Inst. 476.
(2) These real actions having been abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, the action on
the case is now the only remedy.
(3) [The cultivation of common lands, and the enclosure and management of them, are now
carried on under private acts of parliament, subject to, and adopting the regulations laid down
in, the 13 Geo. III, c. 81, and 41 Geo. III, c. 109, which are incorporated into all special enclos
ure acts.]
(4) The statute last mentioned was amended by statutes 1 and 2 Geo. IV, c. 23 ; 6 and 7
Win. IV, c. 115; and 3 and 4 Vic. c. 31; under which, lords of wastes and commons, with
the consent of two-thirds in number and value of the commoners, may enclose any part
thereof for the growth of timber and underwood.
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he might have done. If this be a way annexed to his estate, and the obstruc-
tion is made by the tenant of the land, this brings it to another species of
injury; for it is then a nuisance, for which an assize will lie, as mentioned in a
former chapter.(x) But if the right of way, thus obstructed by the tenant, be
only in gross (that is, annexed to a man's person and unconnected with any
lands or *tenements), or if the obstruction of a way belonging to an [*24
house or land is made by a stranger, it is then in either case merely a [ J
disturbance: for the obstruction of a way in gross is no detriment to any
lands or tenements, and therefore does not fall under the legal notion of a
nuisance, which must be laid, ad nocumentum liberi tenementi; (y) and the
obstruction of it by a stranger can never tend to put the right of way in dis-
pute: the remedy, therefore, for these disturbances is not by assize or any real
action, but by the universal remedy of action on the case to recover damages.(z)
IV. The fourth species of disturbance is that of disturbance of tenure, or
breaking that connexion which subsists between the lord and his tenant, and
to which the law pays so high a regard, that it will not suffer it to be wantonly
dissolved by the act of a third person. To have an estate well tenanted is an
advantage that every landlord must be very sensible of; and, therefore, the
driving away of a tenant from off his estate is an injury of no small conse-
quence. So that if there be a tenant at will of any lands or tenements, and a
stranger, either by menaces and threats, or by unlawful distresses, or by fraud and
circumvention, or other means, contrives to drive him away, or inveigle him to
leave his tenancy, this the law very justly construes to be a wrong and injury
to the lord, (a) and gives him a reparation in damages against the offender by
a special action on the case.(5)
V. The fifth and last species of disturbance, but by far the most considerable,
is that of disturbance of patronage; which is an hindrance or obstruction of a
patron to present his clerk to a benefice.
This injury was distinguished at common law from another species of injury,
called usurpation; which is an absolute ouster or dispossession of the patron,
and happens when a stranger, that hath no right, presenteth a clerk, and he is
thereupon *admitted and instituted.(b) In which case, of usurpation, [*243]
the patron lost by the common law not only his turn of presentingpro
hac vice, but also the absolute and perpetual inheritance of the advowson, so
that he could not present again upon the next avoidance, unless in the mean
time he recovered his right by a real action, viz.: a writ of right of advowson.(c)
The reason given for his losing the present turn, and not ejecting the usurper s
clerk, was that the final intent of the law in creating this species of property
being to have a fit person to celebrate divine service, it preferred the peace of
the church (provided a clerk were once admitted and instituted) to the right
of any patron whatever.(6) And the patron also lost the inheritance of his
advowson, unless he recovered it in a writ of right, because by such usurpation
he was put out of possession of his advowson, as much as when by actual entry
and ouster he is disseised of lands or houses; since the only possession, of which
an advowson is capable, is by actual presentation and admission of one's clerk.
(0r c. 18, p. 218. (y) F. N. B. 183. (z) Hale on F. N. B. 185. Lutw. 111, 119.
(a) Hal. Anal. c. 40. 1 Roll. Abr. 108. (b) Co. Litt. 277. (c) 6 Rep. 49.
(5) [This species of disturbance is perhaps unknown at the present day.]
(6) [And this preference of the peace of the church to the litigated rights of patrons, was
held to prevail in all cases without any regard to infancy, coverture, or any such like disa-
bility of the patron. For it was a maxim of the common law, " that he who came in by
admission and institution, came in by a judicial act, and the law presumes that the bishop who
has the care of the souls of all within his diocese, for which he shall answer at his fearful
and final account (in respect of which he ought to keep and defend them against all heretics,
and schismatics, and other ministers of the devil), will not do or assent to any wrong to be
done to their patronages, which is of their earthly possession ; but if the church be litigious,
that he will inform himself of the truth by a jure patronatus, and so do right." 6 Coke, 49.]
The writ of right of advowson was abolished with other real actions
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As, therefore, when the clerk was once instituted (except in the case of the king,
where he must also be inducted) (d) the church became absolutely full; so the
usurper by such plenarty, arising from his own presentation, became in fact
seized of the advowson: which seisin it was impossible for the true patron to
remove by any possessory action, or other means, during the plenarty or fulness
of the church; and when it became void afresh, he could not then present,
since another had the right of possession. The only remedy, therefore, which
the patron had left, was to try the mere right in a writ of right of advowson;
which is a peculiar writ of right, framed for this special purpose, but in every
other respect corresponding with other writs of right: (e) and if a man recov-
ered therein, he regained the possession of his advowson, and was entitled to
present at the next avoidance.(f) But in order to such recovery he must allege
a presentation in himself or some of his ancestors, which proves him or them
to have been once in possession: for, as a grant of the advowson, during the
[*244] fulness of the church, conveys *.no manner of possession for the present,
therefore, a purchaser, until he hath presented, hath no actual seisin
whereon to ground a writ of right.(g) Thus stood the common law.
But, bishops in ancient times, either by carelessness or collusion, frequently
instituting clerks upon the presentation of usurpers, and thereby defrauding
the real patrons of their right of possession, it was in substance enacted by
statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 5, § 2, that if a possessory action be brought
within six months after the avoidance, the patron shall (notwithstanding such
usurpation and institution) recover that very presentation; which gives back to
him the seisin of the advowson. Yet still, if the true patron omitted to bring
his action within six months, the seisin was gained by the usurper, and the
patron, to recover it, was driven to the long and hazardous process of a writ
of right. To remedy which it was farther enacted by statute 7 Ann. c. 18, that
no usurpation shall displace the estate or interest of the patron, or turn it to a
mere right; but that the true patron may present upon the next avoidance, as
if no such usurpation had happened. So that the title of usurpation is now
much narrowed, and the law stands upon this reasonable foundation: that if a
stranger usurps my presentation, and I do not pursue my right within six
months, I shall lose that turn without remedy, for the peace of the church, and
as a punishment for my own negligence; but that turn is the only one I shall
lose thereby. Usurpation now gains no right to the usurper, with regard to
any future avoidance, but only to the present vacancy: it cannot indeed be
remedied after six months are past; but, during those six months, it is only a
species of disturbance.
Disturbers of a right of advowson may, therefore, be these three persons:
the pseudo-patron, his clerk, and the ordinary; the pretended patron, by pre-
senting to a church to which he has no right, and thereby making it litigious
[*245] or disputable; the, clerk, by demanding or obtaining institution *which
tends to and promotes the same inconvenience; and the ordinary, by
refusing to admit the real patron's clerk, or admitting the clerk of the pre-
tender. These disturbances are vexatious and injurious to him who hath the
right: and, therefore, if he be not wanting to himself, the law (besides the writ
of right of advowson, which is a final and conclusive remedy) hath given him
two inferior possessory actions for his relief; an assize of darrein presentment,
and a writ of quare impedit; in which the patron is always the plaintiff, and
not the clerk. For the law supposes the injury to be offered to him only, by
obstructing or refusing the admission of his nominee; and not to the clerk,
who hath no right in him till institution, and of course can suffer no injury.
1. An assize of darrein presentment, or last presentation, lies when a man, or
his ancestors, under whom he claims, have presented a clerk to a benefice, who
is instituted; and afterwards upon the next avoidance a stranger presents a
clerk, and thereby disturbs him that is the real patron. In which case the
patron shall have this writ(h) directed to the sheriff to summon an assize or
(d) Ibid. (e) F. N. B. 30. (f) Ibid. 36. (q) 2 Inst. 357. (A). F. N. B. 31.
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jury, to inquire who was the last patron that presented to the church now
vacant, of which the plaintiff complains that he is deforced by the defendant:
and, according as the assize determines that question, a writ shall issue to the
bishop; to institute the clerk of that patron, in whose favour the determination
is made, and also to give damages, in pursuance of statute Westm. 2, 13
Edw. I, c. 5. This question, it is to be observed, was before the statute 7 Ann.
before mentioned, entirely conclusive, as between the patron or his heirs and a
stranger: for, till then, the full possession of the advowson was in him who pre-
sented last and his heirs: unless, since that presentation, the clerk had been
evicted within six months, or the rightful patron had recovered the advowson in
a writ of right; which is a title superior to all others. But that statute having
given a right to any person to bring a quare impedit, and to recover (if his title
be good) notwithstanding the last presentation, by whomsoever *made; *246]
assizes of darrein presentment, now not being in any wise conclusive,
have been totally disused, as indeed they began to be before; a quare impedit
being more general, and therefore a more usual action. For the assize of dar-
rein presentment lies only where a man has an advowson by descent from his
ancestors; but the writ of quare impedit is equally remedial whether a man
claims title by descent or by purchase.(i)
2. I proceed therefore, secondly, to inquire into the nature(k) of a writ of
quare impedit, now the only action used in case of the disturbance of patron-
age: and shall first premise the usual proceedings previous to the bringing of
the writ.(7)
Upon the vacancy of a living, the patron, we know, is bound to present within
six calendar months,(l) otherwise it will lapse to the bishop. But if the presen-
tation be made within that time, the bishop is bound to admit and institute the
clerk, if found sufficient;(m) unless the church be full, or there be notice of any
litigation. For if any opposition be intended, it is usual for each party to enter
a caveat with the bishop, to prevent his institution of his antagonist's clerk.
An institution after a caveat entered is void by the ecclesiastical law; (n) but
this the temporal courts pay no regard to, and look upon a caveat as a mere
nullity.(o) But if two presentations be offered to the bishop upon the same
avoidance, the church is then said to become litigious; and, if nothing farther
be done the bishop may suspend the admission of either, and suffer a lapse to
incur. Yet if the patron or clerk on either side request him to award a jus
patronatus, he is bound to do it. A fus patronatus is a commission from the
bishop, directed usually to his chancellor and others of competent learning:
who are to summon a jury of six clergymen and six laymen, to inquire into and
examine who is the *rightful patron; (p) and if, upon such inquiry made [*247]
and certificate thereof returned to the commissioners, he admits and L 24J
institutes the clerk of that patron whom they return as the true one, the bishop
secures himself at all events from being a disturber, whatever proceedings may
be had afterwards in the temporal courts.
The clerk refused by the bishop may also have a remedy against him in the
spiritual court, denominated a duplex querela: (q) which is a complaint in the
nature of an appeal from the ordinary to his next immediate superior; as from
a bishop to the archbishop, or from an archbishop to the delegates; (8) and if
the superior court adjudges the cause of refusal to be insufficient, it will grant
institution to the appellant.
Thus far matters may go on in the mere ecclesiastical course; but in contested
presentations they seldom go so far: for, upon the first delay or refusal of the
(i) 2 Inst. 355. (k) See Boswell's Case, 6 Rep. 48. (1) See book I, ch. 18. (m) See book I, ch. 11.
(n) 1 Burn. 207. (o) 1 Roll. Rep. 191. (p) 1 Burn. 16, 17. (q) Ibid. 118.
(7) This writ was expressly excepted in statutes 8 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, which abolished
rcal and mixed actions generally; but it was finally abolished by the common law procedure
act, 1860, and a writ of summons from the common pleas substituted.
(8) [Now to the judicial committee of the privy council.]
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bishop to admit his clerk, the patron usually brings his writ of quare impedit
against. the bishop, for the temporal injury done to his property, in disturbing
him in his presentation. And, if the delay arises from the bishop alone, as upon
pretence of incapacity, or the like, then he only is named in the writ; but if
there be another presentation set up, then the pretended patron and his clerk
are also joined in the action; or it may be brought against the patron and clerk,
leaving out the bishop; or against the patron only. But it is most advisable to
bring it against all three: for if the bishop be left out, and the suit be not
determined till the six months are past, the bishop is entitled to present by
lapse; for he is not party to the suit;(r) but, if he be named, no lapse can
possibly accrue till the right is determined. If the patron be left out, and the
writ be brought only against the bishop and the clerk, the suit is of no effect,
and the writ shall abate; (s) for the right of the patron is the principal question
[*248] in the cause.(t) If the *clerk be left out, and has received institution
before action brought (as is sometimes the case), the patron by this suit
may recover his right of patronage, but not the present turn; for he cannot
have judgment to remove the clerk, unless he be made a defendant, and party
to the suit, to hear what he can allege against it. For which reason, it is the
safer way to insert all three in the writ.
The writ of quare impedit(u) commands the disturbers, the bishop, the
pseudo-patron, and his clerk, to permit the plaintiff to present a proper person
(without specifying the particular clerk) to such a vacant church, which per-
tains to his patronage; and which the defendants, as he alleges, do obstruct;
and unless they so do, then that they appear in court to show the reason why
they hinder him.
Immediately on the suing out of the quare impedit, if the plaintiff suspects
that the bishop will admit the defendant's or any other clerk, pending the suit,
he may have a prohibitory writ, called a ne admittas;(w) which recites the con-
tention begun in the king's courts, and forbids the bishop to admit any clerk
whatsoever till such contention be determined. And if the bishop doth, after
the receipt of this writ, admit any person, even though the patron's right may
have been found in a jure patronatus, then the plaintiff, after he has obtained
judgment in the quare impedit, may remove the incumbent, if the clerk of a
stranger, by a writ of scire facias :(x) and shall have a special action against the
bishop, called a quare incumbravit;(9) to recover the presentation, and also sat-
isfaction in damages for the injury done him by incumbering the church with a
clerk, pending the suit, and after the ne admittas received.(y) But if the bishop
has incumbered the church by instituting the clerk, before the ne admittas
issued, no quare incumbravit lies: for the bishop bath no legal notice, till the
[*249] writ of ne admittas is served upon *him. The patron is therefore left to
his quare impedit merely; which, as was before observed, now lies (since
the statute of Westm. 2) as well upon a recent usurpation within six months
past, as upon a disturbance without any usurpation had.
In the proceedings upon a quare impedit, the plaintiff must set out his title
at length, and prove itt least one presentation in himself, his ancestors, or those
under whom he claims; for he must recover by the strength of his own right,
and not by the weakness of the defendant's :(z) and he must also show a disturb-
ance before the action brought.(a) Upon this the bishop and the clerk usually
disclaim all title: save only, the one as ordinary, to admit and institute; and
the other as presentee of the patron, who is left to defend his own right. And
upon failure of the plaintiff in making out his own title, the defendant is put
upon the proof of his, in order to obtain judgment for himself, if needful.
But if the right be found for the plaintiff, on the trial, three farther points are
also to be inquired: 1. If the church be full, and, if full, then of whose presen-
(r) Cro. Jac. 98. (8) Hob. 316. (t) 7 Rep. 25. (u) F. N. B. 32. (w) iSd. 3.
(X) 2 Sid. 93. (y) F. N. B. 48. (z) Vaugh. 7, 8. (a) Hob. 199.
(9) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wi. IV, c. 27.
tation: for if it be of the defendant's presentation, then the clerk is removable
by writ brought in due time. 2. Of what value the living is: and this in order
to assess the damages which are directed to be given by the statute of Westm. 2.
3. In case of plenarty upon an usurpation, whether six calender (b) months
have passed between the avoidance and the time of bringing the action: for
then it would not be within the statute, which permits an usurpation to be
devested by a quare impedit, brought infra tempus semestre. So that plenarty
is still a sufficient bar in an action of quare impedit, brought above six months
after the vacancy happens; as it was universally by the common law, however
early the action was commenced.
If it be found that the plaintiff hath the right, and hath commenced his
action in due time, then he shall have *judgment to recover the pre- [*250]
sentation; and, if the church be full by institution of any clerk, to
remove him: unless it were filled pendente lite by lapse to the ordinary, he not
being party to the suit; in which case the plaintiff loses his presentation pro
hac vice, but shall recover two years' full value of the church from the defend-
ant, the pretended patron, as a satisfaction for the turn lost by his disturbance;
or in case of insolvency, the defendant shall be imprisoned for two years.(c)
But if the church remains still void at the end of the suit, then whichever
party the presentation is found to belong to, whether plaintiff or defendant,
shall have a writ directed to the bishop ad admittendum clericum,(d) reciting
the judgment of the court, and ordering him to admit and institute the clerk
of the prevailing party; and, if upon this order he does not admit him, the
patron may sue the bishop in a writ of quare non admissit,(e) and recover ample
satisfaction in damages.
Besides these possessory actions there may be also had (as hath before been
incidentally mentioned) a writ of riqht of advowson,(10) which resembles other
writs of right: the only distinguishing advantage now attending it being, that
it is more conclusive than a quare impedit; since to an action of quare impedit
a recovery had in a writ of right may be pleaded in bar.
There is no limitation with regard to the time within which any actions
touching advowsons are to be brought; at least none later than the times of
Richard I, and Henry III: for by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 5, the statute of limita-
tions, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, is declared not to extend to any writ of right of advow-
son, quare impedit, or assize of darrein presentment or jus patronatus. And
this upon very good reason: because it may very easily happen that the title to
an advowson may not come in question, nor the right have opportunity to be
tried, within sixty years; which is the longest period of limitation assigned by
the statute of Henry VIII. For Sir Edward Coke (f) tells us, that there was
a parson of one of his *churches, that had been incumbent there above *251
fifty years; nor are instances wanting wherein two successive incum- [ 5
bents have continued for upwards of a hundred years.(g) Had, therefore, the
last of these incumbents been the clerk of a usurper, or had he been presented
by lapse, it would have been necessary and unavoidable for the patron, in case
of a dispute, to have recurred back above a century; in order to have shown a
clear title and seisin by presentation and admission of the prior incumbent.
But though, for these reasons, a limitation is highly improper with respect only
to the length of time; yet, as the title of advowson is, for want of some limita-
tion, rendered more precarious than that of any other hereditament (especially
since the statute of Queen Anne hath allowed possessory actions to be brought
upon any prior presentation, however distanit), it might not perhaps be amiss if
a limitation were established with respect to the number of avoidances; or,
(b) 2 Inst. 361. (c) Stat. Westm. 2; 13 Edw. I, c. 5, § 3. (d) F. N. B. 38.
(e) Ibid. 47. (V) 1 Inst. 115.
(q) Xwo successive incumbents of the rectory of Chelsfield-cum-Farnborough, in Kent, continued one hun-
dred and one years, of whom the former was admitted in 1650, the latter in 1700, and died in 1751.
(10) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.
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rather, if a limitation were compounded of the length of time and the number
of avoidances together: for instance, if no seisin were admitted to be alleged
in any of these writs of patronage, after sixty years and three avoidances were
past.(11)
In a writ of quare impedit, which is almost the only real action that remains
in common use, and also in the assize of darrein presentment, and writ of right,
the patron only, and not the clerk, is allowed to sue the disturber. But, by
virtue of several acts of parliament,(h) there is one species of presentations, in
which a remedy, to be sued in the temporal courts, is put into the hands of the
clerks presented, as well as of the owners of the advowson. I mean the pre-
sentation to such benefices as belong to Roman Catholic patrons; which, accord-
ing to their several counties, are vested in and secured to the two universities
of this kingdom. And particularly by the statute of 12 Ann., st. 2, c. 14, s. 4,
a new method of proceeding is provided, viz.: that, besides the writs of quare
impedit, which the universities, as patrons, are entitled to bring, they, or their
clerks, may be at liberty to file a bill *in equity against any person pre-
senting to such livings, and disturbing their right of patronage, or his
cestuy que trust, or any other person whom they have cause to suspect; in order
to compel a discovery of any secret trusts for the benefit of papists, in evasion
of those laws whereby this right of advowson is vested in those learned bodies;
and also (by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 17) to compel a discovery whether any
grant or conveyance, said to be made of such advowson, were made bonafide to
a protestant purchaser, for the benefit of protestants, and for a full considera-
tion; without which requisites, every such grant and conveyance of any advow-
son or avoidance is absolutely null and void. This is a particular law, and
calculated for a particular purpose: but in no instance but this does the common
law permit the clerk himself to interfere in recovering a presentation of which he
is afterwards to have the advantage. For, besides that he has (as was before
observed) no temporal right in him till after institution and induction; and, as
he therefore can suffer no wrong, is consequently entitled to no remedy; this
exclusion of the clerk from being plaintiff seems also to arise from the very
great honour and regard which the law pays to his sacred function. For it looks
upon the cure of souls as too arduous and important a task to be eagerly sought
for by any serious clergyman; and, therefore, will not permit him to contend
openly at law for a charge and trust which it presumes he undertakes with dif-
fidence.
But when the clerk is in full possession of the benefice, the law gives him the
same possessory remedies to recover his glebe, his rents, his tithes, and other
ecclesiastical dues, by writ of entry, assize, ejectment, debt, or trespass (as the
case may happen), which it furnishes to the owners of lay property. Yet he
shall not have a writ of right, nor such other similar writs as are grounded upoir
the mere right; because he hath not in him the entire fee and right; (i) but he
is entitled to a special remedy called a writ of juris utrum, which is sometimes
[*253] styled the parson's writ of right,(k) *being the highest writ which he
can have.(l)(12) This lies for a parson or a prebendary at common law,
(h) Stat. 3 Jsc. I, c. 5. 1 W. and M. c. 26. 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 14. 11 Geo. IT, c. 17.
() F. N. B. 49. (k) Booth, 221. (1) F. N. B. 48.
(11) [This alteration in the law recommended by the learned commentator has recently been
carried into effect by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, by which (section 30) it is enacted that
no advowson shall be recovered after three incumbencies occupying a period of sixty years
adverse possession: incumbencies after lapse are to be reckoned within the period, but not
incumbencies after promotion to bishoprics (section 31); and no advowson shall be recovered
after one hundred years adverse possession, although three incumbencies have not elapsed.
Section 33.]
The statute 6 and 7 Vie. c. 54, applies the same period of limitations to a quare impedit or
any other action or suit to enforce a right in a bishop as patron to collate to or bestow any
ecclesiastical benefice.
(12) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.
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and for a vicar by statute 14 Edw. III, c. 17, and is in the nature of an assize,
to inquire whether the tenements in question are frankalmoign belonging to the
church of the demandant, or else the lay fee of the tenant.(m) And thereby
the demandant may recover lands and tenements belonging to the church,
which were alienated by the predecessor; or of which he was disseised; or
which were recovered against him by verdict, confession, or default, without
praying in aid of the patron and ordinary; or on which any person has intruded
since the predecessor's death.(n) But since the restraining statute of 13
Eliz. c. 10, whereby the alienation of the predecessor, or a recovery suffered by
him of the lands of the church, is declared to be absolutely void, this remedy is
of very little use, unless where the parson himself has been deforced for more
than twenty years ;(o) for the successor, at any competent time after his acces-
sion to the benefice, may enter, or bring an ejectment.
CHAPTER XVII.
OF INJURIES PROCEEDING FROM, OR AFFECTING, THE
CROWN.
HAVING in the nine preceding chapters considered the injuries, or private
wrongs, that may be offered by one subject to another, all of which are redressed
by the command and authority of the king, signified by his original writs
returnable in the several courts of justice, which thence derive a jurisdiction
of examining and determining the complaint; I proceed now to inquire into
the mode of redressing those injuries to which the crown itself is a party:
which injuries are either where the crown is the aggressor, and which, therefore,
cannot, without a solecism, admit of the same kind of remedy ;(a) or else is the
sufferer, and which then are usually remedied by peculiar forms of process, ap-
propriated to the royal prerogative. In treating, therefore, of these, we will
consider, first, the manner of redressing those wrongs or injuries which a sub-
ject may suffer from the crown, and then of redressing those which the crown
may receive from a subject.
I. That the king can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle
of the English constitution: meaning only, as has formerly been observed,(b)
that, in the first place, whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs
is not *chargeable personally on the king; nor is he, but his ministers, [*255
accountable for it to the people: and, secondly, that the prerogative
of the crown extends not to do any injury: for, being created for the benefit
of the people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice.(c) Whenever therefore it
happens, that, by misinformation, or inadvertence, the crown hath been induced
to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie
against the sovereign,(d) (for who shall command the king ?) (e) yet the law
hath furnished the subject with a decent and respectful mode of removing that
invasion, by informing the king of the true state of the matter in dispute: and,
as it presumes that to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in
the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders
to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.
The distance between the sovereign and his subjects is such, that it rarely can
happen that any personal injury can immediately and directly proceed from the
prince to any private man; and, as it can so seldom happen, the law in decency
supposes that it never will or can happen at all; because it feels itself incapable
(at) Registrar, 32. (n) F. N. B. 48, 49. (o) Booth, 221.
(a) Bro. Abr. tit. petition, 12; tit. prerogative, 2. (t) Book I, ch. 7, pp. 243-246.
(c) Plowd. 487. (d) Jenkins, 78. (e) Finch, L. 83.
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of furnishing any adequate remedy, without infringing the dignity and destroy-
ing the sovereignty of the royal person, by setting up some superior power with
authority to call him to account. The inconveniency therefore of a mischief
that is barely possible, is (as Mr. Locke has observed) (f) well recompensed by
the peace of the public and security of the government, in the person of the
chief magistrate being set out of the reach of coercion. But injuries to the
rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown without the inter-
vention of its officers; for whom the law in matters of right entertains no
respect or delicacy, but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors or
misconduct of those agents, by whom the king has been deceived, and induced
to do a temporary injustice.(1)
[*2561 *The common law methods of obtaining possession or restitution from
the crown, of either real or personal property, are, 1. By petition de
droit, or petition of right: which is said to owe its original to King Edward
the First. (g) 2. By monstrans de droit, manifestation or plea of right: both of
which may be preferred or prosecuted either in the chancery or exchequer.(h)
The former is of use, where the king is in full possession of any hereditaments
or chattels, and the petitioneF suggests such a right as controverts the title of
the crown, grounded on facts disclosed in the petition itself; in which case he
must be careful to state truly the whole title of the crown, otherwise the peti-
tion shall abate: (i) and then, upon this answer being endorsed or underwritten
by the king, soit droit fait alpartie (let right be done to the party),(J) a com-
mission shall issue to inquire of the truth of this suggestion: (k) after the
return of which, the king's attorney is at liberty to plead in bar; and the meril s
shall be determined upon issue or demurrer, as in suits between subject and
subject. Thus, if a disseisor of lands, which are holden of the crown, dies
seized without any heir, whereby the king is primafacie entitled to the lands,
and the possession is cast on him either by inquest of office, or by act of law
without any office found; now the disseissee shall have remedy by petition of
right, suggesting the title of the crown, and his own superior riglt before the
disseisin made.(1) But where the right of the party, as well as the right of the
crown, appears upon record, there the party shall have monstrans de droit,
which is putting in a claim of right grounded on facts already acknowledged
and established, and praying the judgment of the court, whether upon those
facts the king or the subject hath the right. As if, in the case before supposed,
the whole special matter is found by an inquest of office (as well the disseisin,
as the dying without any heir), the party grieved shall have monstrans de droit
r,25 at the common law.(m) But as this seldom happens, and *the remedy
*27] by petition was extremely tedious and expensive, that by monstrans was
much enlarged and rendered almost universal by several statutes, particularly
36 Edw. III, c. 13, and 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 8, which also allow inquisitions of
office to be traversed or denied, wherever the right of a subject is concerned,
except in a very few cases.(n) These proceedings are had in the petty-bag
office in the court of chancery: and, if upon either of them the right be deter-
mined against the crown, the judgment is, quod manus domini regis amoveantur
et possessio restituatur petenti, salvo .jure domini reqis; (o) which last clause is
always added to judgments against the king,(p) to whom no laches is ever
imputed, and whose right (till some late statutes) (q) was never defeated by any
limitation or length of time. And by such judgment the crown is instantly
out of possession; (r) so that there needs not the indecent interposition of his
own officers to transfer the seisin from the king to the party aggrieved.(2)
(f) On Govt. p. 2, § 205. (g) Bro. Abr. tit. prerogative. 2. Fitz. Abr. tit. error, S.
Skin. 609. (i) Finch, L. 256 (j) Stat. Tr. vii, 104. (k) Skin. 608. Rast. Entr. 461.
(1) Bro. Abr. tit. petition, 20. 4 Rep. 58. (m) 4 Rep. 55. (n) Skin. 608. (o) 2 Inst. 695. Rast. Entr. 468.
(p) Finch, L. 460. (q) 21 Jac. I, c. 2. 9 Geo. III, c. 16. (r) Finch, L. 459.
(1) See notes to the Banker's Case, Broom Const. Law, 234, and cases cited.
(2) The proceedings here mentioned are inapplicable in the United States. If the rights
of a citizen are invaded by an officer of either the state or general government, he is generally
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II. The mothods of redressing such injuries as the crown may receive from
the subject are,
1. By such usual common-law actions, as are consistent with the royal pre-
rogative and dignity. As therefore the king, by reason of his legal ubiquity,
cannot be disseised or dispossessed of any real property which is once vested in
him, he can maintain no action which supposes a dispossession of the plaintiff;
such as an assize or an ejectment: (s) but he may bring a quare impedit,(t)
which always supposes the complainant to be seized or possessed of the advow-
son: and he may prosecute this Writ, like every other by him brought, as well
An the king's bench (u) as the common pleas, or in whatever court he pleases.
So, too, he may bring an action of trespass for taking away his goods.; but such
actions are not usual (though in strictness maintainable) for breaking his close,
or other injury done upon his soil or possession.(w) It would be equally
tedious *and difficult, to run through every minute distinction that r,258]
might be gleaned from our ancient books with regard to this matter; nor *28
is it in any degree necessary, as much easier and more effectual remedies are
usually obtained by such prerogative modes of process, as are peculiarly confined
to the crown.
2. Such is that of inquisition or inquest of office: which is an inquiry made by
the king's officer, his sheriff, coroner, or escheator, virtute officii, or by writ to
them sent for that purpose, or by commissioners specially appointed, concerning
any matter that entitles the king to the possession of lands or tenements, goods
or chattels. (x) This is done by a jury of no determinate number; being either
twelve, or less, or more. As, to inquire, whether the king's tenant for life died
seized, whereby the reversion accrues to the king: whether A, who held imme-
diately of the crown, died without heirs; in which case the land belongs to the
king by escheat: whether B be attainted of treason; whereby his estate is
forfeited to the crown: whether C, who has purchased lands, be an alien; which
is another cause of forfeiture: whether D be an idiot a nativitate; and therefore,
together with his lands, appertains to the custody of the king; and other questions
of like import, concerning both the circumstances of the tenant, and the value
or identity of the lands. These inquests of office were more frequently in prac-
tice than at present, during the continuance of the military tenures amongst us:
when, upon the death of every one of the king's tenants, an inquest of office was
held, called an inquisitio post mortem, to inquire of what lands he died seized,
who was his heir, and of what age, in order to entitle the king to his marriage,
wardship, relief, primer-seisin, or other advantages, as the circumstances of the
case might turn out. To superintend and regulate these inquiries, the court
of wards and liveries was instituted, by statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 46, which was
abolished at the restoration of King Charles the Second, together with the op-
pressive tenures upon which it was founded.
(s) Bro. Abr. tit. prerogative, 89. (t) F. N. B. 32. (u) Dyversyte des courtes, c. bank le roy.
(w) Bro. Abr. tit. prerog. 130. F. X. B. 90. Year-book, 4 Hen. IV, 4. (x) Finch, L. 323, 324, 325.
entitled to maintain against such officer the action which would be suitable if he were a
private citizen merely; though if the officer is proceeding under legislative authority in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, the citizen, if the proceedings are regular, and a
proper remedy is given him by statute, must follow that remedy. But where it is found nec-
essary to proceed against the government itself, it becomes important to see whether the
government has made provision by law for suits against itself or not. A sovereignty is not
suable in its own courts except by its permission, and some of the states make provision by
statute for such suits, and some do not. Where they do not, and provide no other remedy,
the citizen must appeal to the legislature for redress. And this is so in case of persons not
citizens, for the federal courts are no longer open to suits on behalf of individuals against
states. Const: of U. S., 11th amendment. And claims upon the general government for
redress-except such as are cognizable by the U. S., Court of Claims-must be presented to
congress. See U. S. v. McLemore, 4 How. 286; Hill v. U. S. 9 How. 386.
The proceedings on behalf of a subject to obtain redress from the crown are simplified
and made more effective by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 34, which gives the party a trial in the
proper court of law or equity, upon an issue made up substantially as in a suit between indi-
viduals.
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[*259] *With regard to other matters, the inquests of office still remain inforce, and are taken upon proper occasions; being extended not only to
lands, but also to goods and chattels personal, as in the case of wreck, treasure-
trove, and the like; and especially as to forfeitures for offences. For every jury
which tries a man for treason or felony, every coroner's inquest that sits upon a
feod de se, or one killed by chance-medley, is not only with regard to chattels,
but also as to real interests, in all respects an inquest of office: and if they find
the treason or felony, or even the flight of the party accused (though innocent),
the king is thereupon, by virtue of this office found, entitled to have his for-
feitures; and also, in the case of chance-medley, he or his grantees are entitled,
to such things by way of deodand, as have moved to the death of the party.
These inquests of office were devised by law, as an authentic means to give
the king his right by solemn matter of record; without which he in general
can neither take nor part from any thing.(y) For it is a part of the liberties
of England, and greatly for the safety of the subject, that the king may not
enter upon or seize any man's possessions upon bare surmises without the
intervention of a jury.(z) It is however particularly enacted by the statute 33
Hen. VIII, c. 20, that, in case of attainder for high treason, the king shall have
the forfeiture instantly, without any inquisition of office. And, as the king
hath (in general) no title at all to any property of this sort before office found,
therefore by the statute 18 Hen. VI, c. 6, it was enacted, that all letters patent
or grants of lands and tenements before office found, or returned into the
exchequer, shall be void. And by the bill of rights at the revolution, I W. and
M. st. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures
of particular persons before conviction (which is here the inquest of office) are
illegal and void; which indeed was the law of the land in the reign of Edward
the Third.(a)
[*260] *With regard to real property, if an office be found for the king, it
puts him in immediate possession, without the trouble of a formal entry
provided a subject in the like case would have had a right to enter; and the
king shall receive all the mesne or intermediate profits from the time that his
title accrued.(b) As, on the other hand, by the articuli super cartas,(c) if the
king's eseheator or sheriff seize lands into the king's hand without cause, upon
taking them out of the king's hand again, the party shall have the mesne profits
restored to him.
In order to avoid the possession of the crown, acquired by the finding of
such office, the subject may not only have his petition of right, which discloses
new facts not found by the office, and his monstrans de droit, which relies on
the facts as found: but also he may (for the most part) traverse or deny the
matter of fact itself, and put it in a course of trial by the common law process
of the court of chancery: yet still, in some special cases, he hath no remedy
left but a mere petition of right.(d) These traverses as well as the monstrans
de droit, were greatly enlarged and regulated for the benefit of the subject, by
the statutes before mentioned, and others.(e) And in the traverses thus given
by statute, which came in the place of the old petition of right, the party
traversing is considered as the plaintiff; (f) and must therefore make out his
own title, as well as impeach that of the crown, and then shall have judgment
quod manus domini regis amoveantur, &e.
3. Where the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent,
which ought not to be granted,(g) or where the patentee hath done an act that
[*261] amounts to a forfeiture of *the grant,(h) the remedy to repeal the patent
is by writ of scire facias in chancery.(i) This may be brought either
on the part of the king in order to resume the thing granted; or, if the grant
be injurious to a subject, the king is bound of right to permit him (upon his
petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in a scire facias.(k)
(y) Ibid. 82. (z) Glib. Hist. Exch. 132. Rob. 347. (a) 2 Inst. 48.
(b) Finch, L. 325, 326. (e) 28 Edw. I, st. 3, c. 19. (d) Finch, L. 324.
(e) Stat. 34 Edw. I, c. 13. 36 Edw. m, c. 13. 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 8. (f) Law of Nisi Prius, 201, 202.
(g) See Book H, ch. 21. (A) Dyer, 198. (i) 3 Ley. 220. 4 Inst. 88. (k) 2 Ventr. 344.
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And so also, if upon office untruly found for the king. he grants the land over
to another, he who is grieved thereby, and traverses the office itself, is entitled
before issue joined to a scire facias against the patentee, in order to avoid the
grant.(l) (3)
4. An information on behalf of the crown, filed in the exchequer by the
king's attorney-general, is a method of suit for recovering money or other chat-
tels, or for obtaining satisfaction in damages for any personal wrong(m) com-
mitted in the lands or other posse.ssions of the crown. It differs from an infor-
mation filed in the court of king's bench, of which we shall treat in the next
book; in that this is instituted to redress a private wrong, by which the property
of the crown is affected; that is calculated to punish some public wrong, or
heinous misdemeanor in the defendant. It is grounded on no writ under seal,
but merely on the intimation of the king's officer, the attorney-general, who
"gives the court to understand and be informed of" the matter in question:
upon which the party is put to answer, and trial is had, as in suits between
subject and subject. The most usual informations are those of intrusion and
debt: intrusion, for any trespass committed on the lands of the crown,(n) as
by entering thereon without title, holding over after a lease is determined, taking
the profits, cutting down timber, or the like; and debt, upon any contract for
moneys due to the king, or for any forfeiture due to the crown upon the breach
of a penal statute. This is most commonly used to recover forfeitures occa-
sioned by transgressing those laws which are enacted for the establishment
*and support of the revenue; others, which regard mere matters of [*62J
police and public convenience, being usually left to be enforced by com-
mon informers, in the qui tam informations or actions, of which we have for-
merly spoken.(o) But after the attorney-general has informed upon the breach
of a penal law, no other information can be received.(p) There is also an
information in rem, when any goods are supposed to become the property of the
crown, and no man appears to claim them, or to dispute the title of the king.
As anciently in the case of treasure-trove, wrecks, waifs, and estrays, seized by
the king's officer for his use. Upon such seizure, an information was usually
filed in the king's exchequer, and thereupon a proclamation was made for the
owner (if any) to come in and claim the effects; and at the same time there
issued a commission of appraisement to value the goods in the officer's hands;
after the return of which, and a second proclamation had, if no claimant
appeared, the goods were supposed derelict, and condemned to the use of the
crown.(q) And when, in later times, forfeitures of the goods themselves, as
well as personal penalties on the parties, were inflicted by act of parliament for
transgressions against the laws of the customs and excise, the same process was
adopted in order to secure such forfeited goods for the public use, though the
offender himself had escaped the reach of justice.
5. A writ of quo warranto is in the nature of a writ of right for the king,
against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by
what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right.(r) It
lies also in case of non-user or long neglect of a franchise, or mis-user or abuse
of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he
exercises such a franchise, having nver had any grant of it, or having forfeited
it by neglect or abuse.(4) This was originally returnable before the king's
(0 Bro. Abr. tit. scire facia8, 69, 185. (m) Moor. 375. (n) Cro. Jac. 212. 1 Leon. 48. Savil. 49.
(o) See page 162. (p) nardr. 201. (q) Gilb. Htit. of Exch. c. 13. (r) Finch, L. 322. 2 Inst. 282.
(3) This remedy is still retained, and is resorted to in the United States; the writ generally
issuing from the highest court of law in the state. See in general Tidd. Pr. 1090, et seq.
(4) [It must not be forgotten, that, although it is said the writ of quo warranto lies against
him who claims or usurps any office, a limitation is implied by the fact that it is in the nature
of a writ of right for the king. Upon this principle, when an application was made for a quo
warranto information, to try the validity of an election to the office of churchwarden, Lord
Kenyon said, that this was not an usurpation on the rights or prerogatives of the crown, for
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[*263] justices at Westminster;(s) but afterwards only *before the justices in
eyre, by virtue of the statutes of quo warranto, 6 Edw. I, c. 1, and 18
Edw. I, st. 2 ;(t) but since those justices have given place to the king's tempo-
rary commissioners of assize, the judges on the several circuits, this branch of
the statutes hath lost its effect ;(u) and writs of quo warranto (if brought at all)
must now be prosecuted and determined before the king's justices at Westmin-
ster. And in case of judgment for the defendant, he shall have an allowance
of his franchise; but in case of judgment for the king, for that the party is
entitled to no such franchise, or bath disused or abused it, the franchise is either
seized into the king's hands, to be granted out again to whomever he shall
please; or, if it be not such a franchise as may subsist in the hands of the
crown, there is merely judgment of ouster, to turn out the party who
usurped it.(w)
The judgment on a writ of quo warranto (being in the nature of a writ of
right) is final and conclusive, even against the crown. (x) Which, together with
the length of its process, probably occasioned that disuse into which it is now
fallen, and introduced a more modern method of prosecution, by information
filed in the court of king's bench by the attorney-general, in the nature of a
writ of quo warranto; wherein the process is speedier, and the judgment not
quite so decisive. This is properly a criminal method of prosecution, as well to
punish the usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him,
or seize it for the crown; but hath long been applied to the mere purposes of
trying the civil right, seizing the franchise or ousting the wrongful possessor;
the fine being nominal only.
During the violent proceedings that took place in the latter end of the reign
of King Charles the Second, it was, among other things, thought expedient to
new-model most of the corporation-town's in the kingdom; for which purpose
[*264] many of those *bodies were persuaded to surrender their charters, and
informations in the nature of quo warranto were brought against others,
upon a supposed, or frequently a real, forfeiture of their franchises by neglect
or abuse of them. And the consequence was, that the liberties of most of
them were seized into the hands of the king, who granted them fresh charters
with such alterations as were thought expedient; and, during their state of
anarchy, the crown named all their magistrates. This exertion of power, though
perhaps in summo jure it was for the most part strictly legal, gave a great and
just alarm; the new-modelling of all corporations being a very large stride
towards establishing arbitrary power; and, therefore, it was thought necessary,
at the revolution, to bridle this branch of the prerogative, at least so far as
regarded the metropolis, by statute 2 W. and M. c. 8, which enacts that the
franchises of the city of London shall never hereafter be seized or forejudged
for any forfeiture or misdemeanor whatsoever.
This proceeding is, however, now applied to the decision of corporation dis-
putes between party and party, without any intervention of the prerogative, by
virtue of the statute 9 Ann. c. 20, which permits an information, in nature of
quo warranto, to be brought with leave of the court, at the relation of any
person desiring to prosecute the same (who is then styled the relator), against
any person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any franchise or
office in any city, borough, or town corporate; provides for its speedy determin-
ation; and directs that, if the defendant be convicted, judgment of ouster
(as well as a fine) may be given against him, and that the relator shall pay or
receive costs according to the event of the suit.(5)
(s) Old Nat. Brev. fol. 107, edit. 1534. (t) 2 Inst. 498. Rast. Entr. 540. (u) 2 Inst. 498.
(w) Cro. Jac. 259. 1 Show. 280. (x) I Sid. 86. 2 Show. 47. 12 Mod. 225.
which only the old writ of quo warranto lay; and that an information in nature of a quo
warranto could only be granted in such cases. 4 T. R. 381. See also 2 Stra. 1196; Bott. pl.
107. And the writ was also refused in a case of forfeiture of a recorder's place. 2 Stra. 819.]
(5) [The court of king's bench, having a discretionary power of granting informations in the
nature of quo warranto, had long ago established a general rule to guide their discretion, viz.:
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6. The writ of mandamus (y) is also made by the same statute, 9 Ann. c.
20, a most full and effectual remedy, in the first place, for refusal of admission
where a person is entitled to an office or place in any such corporation; and,
secondly, for wrongful removal,when a person is legally possessed. *These *2,,.
are injuries, for which, though redress for the party interested may be [*265]
had by assize, or other means, yet as the franchises concern the public, and may
affect the administration of justice, this prerogative writ also issues from the
court of king's bench; commanding, upon good cause shown to the court, the
party complaining to be admitted or restored to his office. And the statute re-
quires, that a return be immediately made to the first writ of mandamus; which
return may be pleaded to or traversed by the prosecutor, and his antagonist may
reply, take issue, or demur, and the same proceedings may be bad, as if an ac-
tion on the case had been brought, for making a false return: and, after judg-
ment obtained for the prosecutor, he shall have a peremptory writ of manda-
mus to compel his admission or restitution; which latter (in case of an action)
is effected by a writ of restitution. (z) So that now the writ of mandamus, in
cases within this statute, is in the nature of an action; whereupon the party.
applying and succeeding may be entitled to costs, in case it be the franchise of!
citizen, burgess, or freeman; (a) and also, in general, a writ of error may be
had thereupon.(b)
This writ of mandamus may also be issued, in pursuance of the statute 11
Geo. I, c. 4, in case within the regular time no election shall be made of the
mayor or other chief officer of any city, borough, or town corporate, or (being
made) it shall afterwards become void; requing the electors to proceed to
election, and proper courts to be held for admitting and swearing in the magis-
trates so respectively chosen.(6)
(y) See page 110. (z) 11 Rep. 79. (a) Stat. 12 Geo. Il, c. 21. (b) 1 P. Wms. S51.
not to allow in any case an information in the nature of quo warranto against any person
who had been twenty years in the possession of his franchise: see 4 Bufr. 1962; but having
reason to consider this too extensive a limit, they resolved upon a new rule, viz. not to allow
such an information against any person who had been six years inpossession. 4 T. R. 284. The
legislature, however, thinking this too sudden a change in the, practice of the court, and be-
cause it did not extend to informations filed by the attorney-general, enacted, by 32 Geo. III, c.
58, that to any information in the nature of quo warranto, for the exercise of any corporate
office or franchise, the defendant might plead that he had benoIn' possession of, or had xe-
cuted, the office for six years or more. And by section 3, no %defendant shall be affecte.Otby,
any defect in the title of the person from whom he derive4.his right and title, if that peson,
had been in the undisturbed exercise of his office or franchise sit years previous to ,thq , ling
of the information, A title to one office, which is a qualification to holdanother, tsht with-0
in th is clau se. 2 M . an d S . 71.] .. . . .... - , , I I I. ' .9
By statutes 7 Win. IV, 1 Vic. c. 78, and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 89, the applicftion to'dip. 'otirt in
the case of one claiming to ekercisb thd office of mayor, hldefman or buwgess, in :any. boryth
within the municipal corporation act, must be made within twelve months after the election
of the defendant, or the time at which he became disqualified.
In the United States the proceeding to try an alleged usurpation of an office or franchise'
is by an information in the nature of a quo warranto, or some statutory substitute to which the
same principles are applicable. .V
(6) [Besides the cases arising in corporations, writs of mandamus have been granted to ad-
mit prebendaries (Stra. 159); an apparator general (Stra. 897); parish clerks (Say.,R 4 159;
Cowp. 371); and sextons (2 Lev. 18; 1 Vent. 143). So to admit scavengers, &c. 4b.'2 T.'R.
181) ; to restore a schoolmaster of a grammar-school founded by the crown. (Strd.'58). So to
restore a member of an university who had been improperly suspended from his degrees. 1 In
like manner a mandamus will lie to compel a dean and chapter to fill up a vacancy among
canons residentiary: 1 T. R. 652; so to the ecclesiastical court: 1 Ventr. 115; so to grant
the probate of a will to an executor: 1 Ventr. 335; so a mandamus lies to the judge of the
prerogative court of Canterbury to grant adminjstztiowo the.husoan~otel&wife'.4state,
when the husband has done nothing to depart from his right. Stra. 891, 1118. A mandamus
will lie to justices to fiominate overseets nfthl ,,puor;althoflgh thie tme mentioned'in, the 43
Eliz. has expired. Stra. 1123. So to appoint a surveyor of .the highways where the justices
had not appointed at the time, mentioned in'tle statute 13 Geo. III, c. 78 : 4 East, 132 ; so to
sign and allow a poor's rate, absolute in the first instance: Say. R. 160; so to admit a copy-
holdr, d'rected-to the lord of the manor: 2 T., R.J.27, 484; 6 Eaat 431 ; so also to the lrd
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We have now gone through the whole circle of civil injuries, and the redress
which the laws of England have anxiously provided for each. In which the
student cannot but observe that the main difficulty which attends their discus-
sion arises from their great variety, which is apt at our first acquaintance to
breed a confusion of ideas, and a kind of distraction in the memory: a diffi-
[*266] culty not a little increased *by the very immethodical arrangement
in which they are delivered to us by our ancient writers, and the
numerous terms of art in which the language of our ancestors has obscured
them. Terms of art there will unavoidably be in all sciences; the easy con-
ception and thorough comprehension of which must depend upon the frequent
and familiar use; and the more subdivided any branch of science is, the more
terms must be used to express the nature of these subdivisions, and mark out
with sufficient precision the ideas they are meant to convey. But I trust that
this difficulty, however great it may appear at first view, will shrink to nothing
upon a nearer and more frequent approach; and, indeed, be rather advan-
tageous than of any disservice, by imprinting on the student's mind a clear and
distinct notion of the nature of these several remedies. And, such as it is, it
arises principally from the excellence of our English laws; which adapt their
redress exactly to the circumstances of the injury, and do not furnish one and
the same action for different wrongs, which are impossible to be brought within
one and the same description: whereby every man knows what satisfaction he
is entitled to expect from the courts of justice, and as little as possible is left in
the breast of the judges, whom the law appoints to administer, and not to pre-
scribe, the remedy. And I may venture to affirm that there is hardly a possible
injury, that can be offered either to the person or property of another, for which
the party injured may not find a remedial writ, conceived in such terms as are
properly and singularly adapted to his own particular grievance.
In the several personal actions which we have cursorily explained, as debt,
trespass, detinue, action on the case, and the like, it is easy to observe how
plain, perspicuous and simple the remedy is, as chalked out by the ancient com-
mon law. In the methods prescribed for the recovery of anded and other
permanent property, as the right is more intricate, the feudal, or rather Norman
remedy, by real actions, is somewhat more complex and difficult, and attended
with some delays. And since, in order to obviate those difficulties, and retrench
[*267] those *delays, we have permitted the rights of real property to be drawn
into question in mixed or personal suits, we are (it must be owned)
obliged to have recourse to such arbitrary fictions and expedients, that, unless
we had developed their principles, and traced out their progress and history,
our present system of remedial jurisprudence (in respect of landed property)
would appear the most intricate and unnatural that ever was adopted by a free
and enlightened people.
But this intricacy of our legal process will be found, when attentively con-
sidered, to be one of those troublesome, but not dangerous evils, which have
their root in the frame of our constitution, and which, therefore, can never be
cured, without hazarding every thing that is dear to us. In absolute govern-
ments, when new arrangements of property and a gradual change of manners
have destroyed the original ideas on which the laws were devised and estab-
lished, the prince by his edict may promulge a new code, more suited to the
present emergencies. But when laws are to be framed by popular assemblies,
even of the representative kind, it is too herculean a task to begin the work of
legislation afresh, and extract a new system from the discordant opinions of more
than five hundred counsellors. A single legislator, or an enterprising sovereign,
to hold and the burgesses to attend a court, to present the conveyances of burgage tenements.
1 Wils. 283; 1 Blk. Rep. 60; Bull. N. P. 200.
It is a general rule that a mandamus does not lie unless the party applying has no other
specific legal remedy. 1 T. R. 404; 3 id. 652. See Doug. 526.]
As to the cases in which mandamus will lie generally, see supra, p. 110, note.
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a Solon or Lycurgus, a Justinian or a Frederick, may at any time form a con-
cise, and perhaps an uniform, plan of justice: and evil betide that presump-
tuous subject who questions its wisdom or utility. But who, that is acquainted
with the difficulty of new-modelling any branch of our statute laws (though
relating but to roads or to parish settlements), will conceive it ever feasible to
alter any fundamental point of the common law, with all its appendages and
consequents, and set up another rule in its stead? When, therefore, by the
gradual influence of foreign trade and domestic tranquillity, the spirit of our
military tenures began to decay, and at length the whole structure was removed,
the judges quickly perceived that the forms and delays of the old feudal actions
(guarded with their several outworks of essoins, vouchers, aid-prayers, and a
hundred other formidable intrenchments) were ill-suited to that *more
simple and commercial mode of property which succeeded the former, [28
and required a more speedy decision of right, to facilitate exchange and alien-
ation. Yet they wisely avoided soliciting any great legislative revolution in the
old established forms, which might have been productive of consequences more
numerous and extensive than the most penetrating genius could foresee; but
left them as they were, to languish in obscurity and oblivion, and endeavoured,
by a series of minute contrivances, to accommodate such personal actions as
were then in use to all the most useful purposes of remedial justice: and where,
through the dread of innovation, they hesitated at going so far as perhaps their
good sense would have prompted them, they left an opening for the more liberal
and enterprising judges, who have sat in our courts of equity, to show them
their error by supplying the omissions of the courts of law. And, since the
new expedients have been refined by the practice of more than a century, and
are sufficiently known and understood, they in general answer the purpose of
doing speedy and substantial justice, much better than could now be effected
by any great fundamental alterations. The only difficulty that attends them
arises from their fictions and circuities: but, when once we have discovered the
proper clue, that labyrinth is easily pervaded. Our system of remedial law
resembles an old Gothic castle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for
a modern inhabitant. The moated ramparts, the embattled towers, and the
trophied halls, are magnificent and venerable, but useless, and therefore neg-
lected. The inferior apartments, now accommodated to daily use, are cheerful
and commodious, though their approaches may be winding aid difficult.
In this part of our disquisitions, I however thought it my duty to unfold, as
far as intelligibly I could, the nature of these real actions, as well as of personal
remedies. And this not only because they are still in force, still the law of the
land, though obsolete and disused; and may, perhaps, in their turn, be here-
after, with some necessary corrections, called out again into common use; but
also because, as a sensible *writer has well observed,(c) "whoever con- [*269]
siders how great a coherence there is between the several parts of the law,
and how much the reason of one case opens and depends upon that of another,
will, I p resume, be far from thinking any of the old learning useless, which will
so much conduce to the perfect understanding of the modern." And, besides,
I should have done great injustice to the founders of our legal constitution, had
I led the student to imagine that the remedial instruments of our law were
originally contrived in so complicated a form as we now present them to his
view: had I, for instance, entirely passed over the direct and obvious remedies
by assizes and writs of entry, and only laid before him the modern method of
prosecuting a writ of ejectment.
(c) Hawk. Abr. Co. Itt. pref.
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CHAPTER XVIII.
OF THE PURSUIT OF REMEDIES BY ACTION; AND
FIRST, OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT.
HAVING, under the head of redress by suit in courts, pointed out in the pre-
ceeding pages, in the first place, the nature and several species of courts of
justice, wherein remedies are administered for all sorts of private wrongs; and,
in the second place, shown to which of these courts in particular application
must be made for redress, according to the distinction of injuries, or, in other
words, what wrongs are cognizable by one court, and what by another; I pro-
ceeded, under the title of injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, to
define and explain the specifical remedies by action, provided for every possible
degree of wrong or injury; as well such remedies as are dormant and out of use,
as those which are in every day's practice, apprehending that the reason of one
could never be clearly comprehended without some acquaintance with the other:
and I am now, in the last place, to examine the manner in which these several
remedies are pursued and applied, by action in the courts of common law; to
which I shall afterwards subjoin a brief account of the proceedings in courts ofequity.
equity. *In treating of remedies by action at common law, I shall confine my-
self to the modern method of practice in our courts of judicature. For,
though I thought it necessary to throw out a few observations on the nature of
real actions, however at present disused, in order to demonstrate the coherence
and uniformity of our legal constitution, and that there was no injury so obsti-
nate and inveterate, but which might in the end be eradicated by some or other
of those remedial writs; yet it would be too irksome a task to perplex both my
readers and myself with explaining all the rules of proceeding in those obsolete
actions, which are frequently mere positive establishments, the forma etfigura
judicii, and conduce very little to illustrate the reason and fundamental
grounds of the law. Wherever I apprehend they may at all conduce to this end,
I shall endeavour to hint at them incidentally.
What, therefore, the student may expect in this and the succeeding chapters,
is an account of the method of proceeding in and prosecuting a suit upon any
of the personal writs we have before spoken of, in the court of common pleas at
Westminster, that being the court originally constituted for the prosecution of
all civil actions. It is true that the courts of king's bench and exchequer, in
order, without intrenching upon ancient forms, to extend their remedial influ-
ence to the necessities of modern times, have now obtained a concurrent
jurisdiction and cognizance of very many civil suits: but, as causes are therein
conducted by much the same advocates and attorneys, and the several courts
and their judges have an entire communication with each other, the methods
and forms of proceeding are in all material respects the same in all of them.
So that, in giving an abstract or history (a) of the progress of a suit through
[*272] the court of common pleas, we *shall at the same time give a general
1*2"21 account of the proceedings of the other two courts; taking notice,
however, of any considerable difference in the local practice of each. And the
same abstract will, moreover, afford us some general idea of the conduct of a
(a) In deducing this history the student must not expect authorities to be constantly cited, as practical
knowledge is not so much to be learned from any hooks of law as from experience and attendance on the
courts. The compiler must therefore be frequently obliged to rely upon his own observations,-which in
general he hath been studious to avoid where those of any other might be had. To accompany and illustrate
these remarks, such gentlemen as are designed for the profession will find it necessary to peruse the books of
entries, ancient and modern, which are transcripts of proceedings that have been had in some particular actions.
A book or hwo of technical learning will also be found very convenient, from which a man of liberal education
and tolerable understanding may glean pro re nata as much as is sufficient for his purpose. These books of
practice, as they are called, are all pretty much on a level in point of composition and solid instruction, so that
that which bears the latest edition is usually the best. But Gillert's History and Practice of the Court of Common
Pleas is a book of a very different stamp; and though (like the rest of his posthumous works) it has suffered
most grossly by ignomrant or careless transcribers, yet it has traced out the reason of many parts of our modern
practice, from the feudal institutions and the primitive construction of our courts, in a most clear and ingenious
manner.
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cause in the inferior courts of common law, those in cities and boroughs, or in
the court-baron, or hundred, or county court: all which conform (as near as
may be) to the example of the superior tribunals, to which their causes may
probably be, in some stage or other, removed.
The most natural and perspicuous way of considering the subject before us,
will be (I apprehend) to pursue it in the order and method wherein the proceed-
ings themselves follow each other; rather than to distract and subdivide it by
any more logical analysis. The general therefore and orderly parts of a suit are
these; 1. The original writ: 2. The process: 3. The pleadings: 4. The issue
or demurrer: 5. The trial: 6. The judgment and its incidents: 7. The proceed-
ings in nature of appeals: 8. The execution.
First, then, of the original, or original writ; (1) which is the beginning or
foundation of the suit. When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it
worth his while to demand satisfaction for it, he is to consider with himself, or
take advice, what redress the law has given for that injury; *and there- [*273]
upon, is to make application or suit to the crown, the fountain of all
justice, for that particular specific remedy which he is determined or advised
to pursue. As, for money due on bond, an action of debt; for goods detained
without force, an action of detinue or trover; or, if taken with force, an action
of trespass vi et armis; or to try the title of lands, a writ of entry or action of
trespass in ejectment; or for any consequential injury received, a special action
on the case. To this end he is to sue out, or purchase by paying the stated fees,
an original, or original writ, from the court of chancery, which is the officina
justitie, the shop or mint of justice, wherein all the king's writs are framed.
It is a mandatory letter from the king in parchment, sealed with his great seal,(b)
and directed to the sheriff of the county wherein the injury is committed or
supposed so to be, requiring him to command the wrongdoer, or party accused,
either to do justice to the complainant, or else to appear in court, and answer
the accusation against him. Whatever the sheriff does in pursuance of this
writ, he must return or certify to the court of common pleas, together with the
writ itself: which is the foundation of the jurisdiction of that court, being the
king's warrant for the judges to proceed to the determination of the cause.
For it was a maxim introduced by the Normans, that there should be no proceed-
ings in common pleas before the king's justices without his original writ;
because they held it unfit that those justices, being only the substitutes of the
crown, should take cognizance of any thing but what was thus specially referred
to their judgment. (c) However, in small actions below the value of forty shil-
lings, which are brought into the court baron or county court, no royal writ is
necessary; but the foundation of such suits continues to be (as in the times of
the Saxons) not by original writ, but by plaint; (d) that is, by a private memo-
rial tendered in open court to the judge, wherein the party injured sets forth his
cause of action; and the judge is bound of common right to administer justice
therein, without any special *mandate from the king. Now, indeedeven the royal writs are held to be demandable of common right, on pay [*274J
ing the usual fees: for any delay in the granting them, or setting an unusual or
exorbitant price upon them, would be a breach of magna carta, c. 29, "nulli
vendemus nulli negabimus, aut differemus, Justitiam vel rectum."
Original writs are either optional or peremptory; or, in the language of our
lawyers, they are either a prcecipe, or a si te fecerit securum. (e) The prcecipe
is in the alternative, commanding the defendant to do the thing required,
or show the reason wherefore he hath not done it.(f) The use of this writ is
where something certain is demanded by the plaintiff, which it is incum-
bent on the defendant himself to perform; as, to restore the possession of land,
(b) Finch, L. 237. (c) Flet. L 2, c. 34. (d) Mirr. c. 2, § 3.
(e) Finch, L. 257. (f) Append. No. M, J 1.
(1) This writ is no longer in use: a simpler proceeding by summons from the court in
which the suit is to be brought having been substituted.
272Chap. 18.]
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to pay a certain liquidated debt, to perform a specific covenant, to render an
account, and the like: in all which cases the writ is drawn up in the form of a
prcecipe or command, to do thus, or show cause to the contrary; giving the
defendant his choice, to redress the injury, or stand the suit. The other species
of original writs is called a sifecerit te securum, from the words of the writ;
which directs the sheriff to cause the defendant to appear in court, without any
option given him, provided the plaintiff gives the sheriff security effectually to
prosecute his claim. (g) This writ is in use, where nothing is specifically de-
manded, but only a satisfaction in general: to obtain which, and minister
complete redress, the intervention of some judicature is necessary. Such are
writs of trespass, or on the case, wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued
for in certain, but only damages to be assessed by a jury. For this end, the
defendant is immediately called upon to appear in court, provided the plaintiff
gives good security of prosecuting his claim. Both species of writs are tested,
or witnessed in the king's own name; "witness ourself at Westminster," or
wherever the chancery may be held.
*The security here spoken of, to be given by the plaintiff for prosecut-
[*275] ing his claim, is common to both writs, though it gives denomination
only to the latter. The whole of it is at present become a mere matter of form:
and John Doe and Richard Roe are always returned as the standing pledges
for this purpose. The ancient use of them was to answer for the plaintiff, who
in case he brought an action without cause, or failed in the prosecution of it
when brought, was liable to an amercement from the crown for raising a false
accusation; and so the form of judgment still is. (h) In like manner, as by
the Gothic constitutions no person was permitted to lay a complaint against
another, "nisi sub scriptura aut specificatione trium testium, quod actionern
velletpersequi;"(i) and as by the laws of Sancho I, king of Portugal, damages
were given against a plaintiff who prosecuted a groundless action.(k)
The day on which the defendant is ordered to appear in court, and on which
the sheriff is to bring in the writ and report how far he has obeyed it, is called
the return of the writ: it being then returned by him to the king's justices at
Westminster. And it is always made returnable at the distance of at least fif-
teen days from the date or teste, that the defendant may have time to come up
to Westminster, even from the most remote part of the kingdom; and upon some
day in one of the four terms in which the court sits for the dispatch of business.
These terms are supposed by Mr. Selden(l) to have been instituted by William
the Conqueror: but Sir Henry Spelman hath clearly and learnedly shown, that
they were gradually formed from the canonical constitutions of the church ;
being indeed no other than those leisure seasons of the year, which were not
occupied by the great festivals or fasts, or which were not liable to the general
avocations of rural business.
[7 *Throughout all Christendom, in very early times, the whole year
*276] was one continual term for hearing and deciding causes. For the
Christian magistrates, to distinguish themselves from the heathens, who were
extremely superstitious in the observation of their dies fasti et nefasti, went
into a contrary extreme, and administered justice upon all days alike. Till at
length the church interposed and exempted certain holy seasons from being
profaned by the tumult of forensic litigations. As, particularly, the time of
advent and Christmas, which gave rise to the winter vacation; the time of
lent and caster, which created that in the spring; the time of pentecost,
which produced the third; and the long vacation, between midsummer and
Michaelmas, which was allowed for the hay-time and harvest. All Sundays
also, and some particular festivals, as the days of the purification, ascension, and
some others, were included in the same prohibition: which was established by
a canon of the church, A. D. 517, and was fortified by an imperial constitution
of the younger Theodosius, comprised in the Theodosian code.(m)
nd. No. I, § 1. (h) Finch, L. 189, 252. (i) Stiernhook de jure Goth. 1. 3, c. 7.
,()M U.. Hist. xxii, 45. (1) Jan. Angl. 1. 2, § 9. (m) Spelman of the Terms.
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Afterwards, when our own legal constitution came to be settled, the com-
mencement and duration of our law terms were appointed with an eye to those
canonical prohibitions; and it was ordered by the laws of King Edward the
Confessor,(n) that from advent to the octave of the epiphany, from septuagesima
to the octave of easter, from the ascension to the octave of pentecost, and from
three in the afternoon of all Saturdays till Monday morning, the peace of God
and of holy church shall be kept throughout all the kingdom. And so
extravagant was afterwards the regard that was paid to these holy times, that
though the author of the Mirror (o) mentions only one vacation of any con-
siderable length, containing the months of August and September, yet Britton
is express,(p) that in the reign of King Edward the First no secular plea could
be held, nor any man sworn on the *evangelists,( q) in the times of
advent, lent, pentecost, harvest, and vintage, the days of the great [277]
litanies, and all solemn festivals. But he adds, that the bishops did nevertheless
grant dispensations (of which many are preserved in Rymer'sfeodera), (r) that
assizes and juries might be taken in some of these holy seasons. And soon
afterwards a general dispensation was established by statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw.
I, c. 51, which declares, that "by the assent of all the prelates, assizes of novel
disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and darrein presentment, shall be taken in advent,
septuagesima, and lent; and that at the special request of the king to the
bishops." The portions of time, that were not included within these prohibited
seasons, fell naturally into a fourfold division, and, from some festival day that
immediately preceded their commencement, were denominated the terms of St.
Hlilary, of Easter, of the holy Trinity, and of St. Michael: which terms have
been since regulated and abbreviated by several acts of parliament; particularly
Trinity term by statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 21, and Michaelmas term by statute 16
Car. I, c. 6, and again by statute 24 Geo. II, c. 48.(2)
There are in each of these terms stated days called days in bankc, dies in
banco: that is, days of appearance in the court of common bench. They are
generally at the distance of about a week from each other, and have reference
to some festival of the church. On some one of these days in bank all original
writs must be made returnable; and therefore they are generally called the
returns of that term: whereof every term has more or less, said by the Mirror(s)
to have been originally fixed by King Alfred, but certainly settled as early as
the statute of 51 Hen. III, st. 2. But though many of the return days are fixed
upon Sundays, yet the court never sits to receive these returns till the Monday
after : (t) and therefore no proceedings can be held, or judgment can be given,
or supposed to be given, on the Sunday.(u)
*The first return in every term is, properly speaking, the first day in *278]
that term: as, for instance, the octave of St. Hilary, or the eighth day L 278]
inclusive after the feast of that saint: which falling on the thirteenth of January,
the octave therefore or first day of Hilary term is the twentieth of January.
And thereon the court sits to take essoigns, or excuses, for such as do not appear
according to the summons of the writ: wherefore this is usually called the
essoign day of the term. But on every return-day in the term, the person sum-
moned has three days of grace, beyond the day named in the writ, in which to
make his appearance; and if he appears on the fourth day inclusive, quarto die
post, it is sufficient. For our sturdy ancestors held it beneath the condition of
a freeman to appear, or to do any other act, at the precise time appointed. The
feudal law therefore always allowed three distinct days of citation, before the
(n) C. 3, de temporibus et diebu8 pacI8. (o) C. 3, § S. (p) C. 53. (q) See page 59.
(r) Temp. Hen. I, passim. (8) C. 5, § 1. (t) Registr. 19. Salk. 627. 6 Mod. 250.
(u) 1 Jon. 156. Swan & Broome, B. R. Mich. 5 Geo. Ila, et in Doam. Proc. 1766.
(2) Now Hilary term begins the 11th and ends the 31st day of January; Easter term begins
the 15th day of April and ends the 8th day of May; Trinity term begins the 22d day of May
and ends the 12th day of June; and Michaelmas term begins the 2d and ends the 25th day
of November. See statutes 11 Geo. IV and 1 Win. IV, c. 70; and 1 Win. IV sess 2, c. 3, s. 2.
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defendant was adjudged contumacious for not appearing; (v) preserving in this
respect the German custom, of which Tacitus thus speaks: (w) "illud ex libertate
vitium, quod non sitnul nec jussi conveniunt; sed et alter et tertius dies cuncta-
tione co-euntium absumitur." And a similar indulgence prevailed in the Gothic
constitution: "illud enim nimice liber tatis indicium, concessa toties impunitas
non parendi; nec enim trinis judicii concessibus pcenam perditce causce contumax
rneruit." (x) Therefore, at the beginning of each term, the court does not
usually (y) sit for dispatch of business till the fourth or appearance day, as in
Hilary term on the twenty-third of January; and in Trinity term, by statute 32
Hen. VIII, c. 21, not till the fifth day, the fourth happening on the great popish
festival of Corpus Christi; (z) which days are therefore called and set down in
the almanacks as the first days of the term, and the court also sits till the quarto
die post or appearance day of the last return, which is therefore the end, of each
of them. (3)
CHAPTER XIX.
OF PROCESS.
THE next step for carrying on the suit, after suing out the original, is called
the process; being the means of compelling the defendant to appear in court.
This is sometimes called original process, being founded upon the original writ;
and also to distinguish it from gnesne or intermediate process, which issues, pend-
ing the suit, upon some collateral interlocutory matter; as to summon juries,
witnesses, and the like. (a) Mesne process is also sometimes put in contradis-
tinction to final process, or process of execution; and then it signifies all such
process as intervenes between the beginning and end of a suit.
But process, as we are now to consider it, is the method taken by the law to
compel a compliance with the original writ, of which the primary step is by
giving the party notice to obey it. This notice is given upon all real prwecipes,
and also upon all personal writs for injuries not against the peace, by summons;
which is a warning to appear in court at the return of the original writ, given
to the defendant by two of the sheriff's messengers called summoners, either in
person or left at his house or land; (b) in like manner as in the civil law the
first process is by personal citation, in Jus vocando. (c) This warning on the
land is given, in real actions, by erecting a white stick or wand on the defend-
ant's grounds (d) (which stick or wand among the northern nations is called the
[*280] baculus *nunciatorius) ; (e) and by statute 31 Eliz. c. 3, the notice must
also be proclaimed on some Sunday before the door of the parish church.
If the defendant disobeys this verbal monition, the next process is by writ of
attachment or pone, so called from the words of the writ, (f) "pone per vadium
et salvos plegios, put by gage and safe pledges A B the defendant,". &c. This is
a writ not issuing out of chancery, but out of the court of common pleas, being
(v) Feud. 1. 2, t. 22. (w) De Mor. Germ. c. 11. (x) Stiernhook de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 6.(y) See i Bulstr. 85.
(z) See Spelman on the Terms, ch. 17. Note, that if the feast of St. John the Baptist, or midsummer-day,
falls on the morrow of Corpus Christi day, (as it did A. D. 1614, 1698 and 1709, and will again A. D. 1791,) Trinity
full term then commences, and the courts sit on that day, though in other years it is no juridical day. Yet, in
1702, 1713 and 1724, when midsummer-day fell upon what was regularly the last day of the term, the courts did
not then sit, but it was regarded like a Sunday, and the term was prolonged to the twenty-fifth of June.
Rot. C. B. Bunb. 176.
(a) Finch, L. 4.36. (b) Ibid. 344, 352. (c) Ff. 2, 4, 1. (d) Dalt. of Sher. c. 31.
(e) Stiernh. de jure Sueon. 1. 1, c. 6. (f) Appendix, No. Il, J 2.
(3) The whole practice of the superior courts has since been greatly simplified and improved
by statute and rules of court. The statutes on which the practice now mainly depends are
the common law procedure acts of 1852, 1854 and 1860, and the summary procedure on bills
of exchange act, 1855. See note, p. 280, infra. A
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grounded on the non-appearance of the defendant at the return of the original
writ; and thereby the sheriff is commanded to attach him, by taking gage, that
is, certain of his goods, which he shall forfeit if he doth not appear; (g) or by
making him find safe pledges or sureties who shall be amerced in case of his non-
appearance. (h) This is also the first and immediate process, without any previ-
ous summons, upon actions of trespass vi et armis, or for other injuries, which
though not forcible are yet trespasses against the peace, as deceit and conspiracy;(i)
where the violence of the wrong requires a more speedy remedy, and therefore
the original writ commands the defendant to be at once attached, without any
precedent warning. (j) (1)
If, after attachment, the defendant neglects to appear, he not only forfeits this
security, but is moreover to be farther compelled by writ of distringas,(k) or dis-
tress infinite; which is a subsequent process issuing from the court of common
pleas, commanding the sheriff to distrain the defendant from time to time, and
continually afterwards, by taking his goods and the profits of his lands, which
are called issues, and which by the common law he forfeits to the king if he
doth not appear. (1) But now the issues may be sold, if the court shall so direct,
in order to defray the reasonable costs of the plaintiff. (m) (2) In like
*manner by the civil law, if the defendant absconds, so that the citation
is of no effect, " mittitur adversarius in possessionem bonorum ejus." (n) -
And here by the common, as well as the civil law, the process ended in case
of injuries without force: the defendant, if he had any substance, being graduall y
stripped of it all by repeated distresses, till he rendered obedience to the king s
writ; and, if he had no substance, the law held him incapable of making satis-
faction, and therefore looked upon all further process as nugatory. And besides,
upon feudal principles, the person of a feudatory was not liable to be attached
for injuries merely civil, lest thereby his lord should be deprived of his personal
(q) Finch, L. 845. Lord Raym. 278. (A) Dalt. of Sher. c. 32. (i) Finch, L. 305, 352.
(j) Appendix No. ii, § 1. (k) Appendix, No. I1, § 2. () Finch, L. 352.
(m) Stat. 10 deo. ifi, c. 50. (n) lf. 2, 4, 19.
(1) [A considerable change was made by statute 2 Win. IV, c. 39, in the mode of commenc-
ing personal actions. In these the use of the original writ was abolished, and the process in
all such actions, in cases where it was not intended to hold the defendant to bail, or to proceed
against a member of parliament, according to the provisions of the bankrupt laws, it was
enacted should be according to the form contained in a schedule to the act, and which process
was thenceforth to issue from either of the superior courts, and to be called a writ of sum-
mons. In every such writ and copy thereof the place and county of the residence, ,or sup-
posed residence, of the party defendant was to be mentioned, and every such writ was to be
served in the manner heretofore and in the county therein mentioned; and the person serving
the same was required to endorse on the writ the day of the month and week of the service
thereof. The provisions as to writs of summons of the statute 2 Win. IV, c. 39, were extended
by statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110, to all personal actions in her majesty's superior courts of law at
Westminster; but the process or writ of summons in personal actions is now regulated by the
common law procedure act, 1852, which provides a form of writ similar to that given by the
statute 2 Win. IV, c. 49, except that no county need be mentioned therein, while it is specially
provided that the defendant may be served in any county. This writ is directed to the defend-
ant, whom it commands that, within eight days after the service of the writ on him, inclusive
of the day of such service, he do cause an appearance to be entered for him in the court in
which the action is brought, in an action at the suit of the plaintiff, and requires the defendant
to take notice that in default of his doing so the plaintiff may proceed to judgment and exe-
cution. The writ is tested, i. e., witnessed in the name of the chief justice or chief baron, or, in
case of vacancy, of a senior puisne judge of the court out of which it issues, and dated on the
day on which it issued. A memorandum is subscribed to it, directing its execution within six
months from the day of its date, after which period it ceases to be of force unless renewed.
The defendant may apply to set it aside, if served after the six months; if it cannot be served
within that period, the plaintiff may have it renewed from time to time, until service be effected.]
(2) [The proceeding by distringas and outlawry is abolished by the "common law procedure
act, 1852," and now if the defendant keeps out of the way, or personal service of the writ can-
not be effected, the plaintiff must still use reasonable efforts to serve the defendant; and upon
an affidavit showing such efforts to have been made, and either that the writ has come to
the defendant's knowledge, or that he wilfully evades service of it, and that he has not appeared
to the writ, the plaintiff can obtain an order from the court or a judge authorizing him to pro-
ceed as if personal service had been effected.]
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services. But, in case of injury accompanied with force, the law, to punish the
breach of the peace, and prevent its disturbance for the future, provided also a
process against the defendant's person in case he neglected to appear upon the
former process of attachment, or had no substance whereby to be attached; sub-
jecting his body to imprisonment by the writ of capias ad respondendumn. (o)
But this immunity of the defendant's person, in case of peaceable though fraudu-
lent injuries, producing great contempt of the law in indigent wrongdoers, a
capias was also allowed to arrest the person, in actions of account, though no
breach of the peace be suggested, by the statutes of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, c.
23, and Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 11, in actions of debt and detinue, by statute 25
Edw. III, c. 17, and in all actions on the case, by statute 19 Hen. VII, c. 9.
Before which last statute a practice had been introduced of commencing the suit
by bringing an original writ of trespass quare clausum fregit, for breaking the
plaintiff's close vi et armis; which by the old common law subjected the defend-
ant's person to be arrested by writ of capias : and then afterwards, by conniv-
ance of the court, the plaintiff might proceed to prosecute for any other less
forcible injury. This practice (through custom rather than necessity, and for
[*282] saving some trouble and expense, in suing out a special original *adapted
to the particular injury) still continues in almost all cases, except
in actions of debt; though now, by virtue of the statutes above cited and others,
a capias might be had upon almost every species of complaint.
If therefore the defendant being summoned or attached makes default, and
neglects to appear; or if the sheriff returns a nihil, or that the defendant hath noth-
ing whereby he may be summoned, attached, or distrained; the capias now
usually issues: (p) being a writ commanding the sheriff to take the body of
the defendant if he may be found in his bailiwick or county, and him safely to
keep, so that he may have him in court on the day of the return, to answer to
the plaintiff of a plea of debt or trespass, &c., as the case may be. This writ,
and all other subsequent to the original writ, not issuing out of chancery, but
from the court into which the original was returnable, and being grounded on
what has passed in that court in consequence of the sheriff's return, are called
judicial, not original writs; they issue under the private seal of that court, and
not under the great seal of England; and are tested, not in the king's name,
but in that of the chief (or, if there be no chief, of the senior) justice only.
And these several writs, being grounded on the sheriff's return, must respect-
ively bear date the same day on which the writ immediately preceding was
returnable.
This is the regular and ordinany method of process. But it is now usual in
practice, to sue out the capias in the first instance, upon a supposed return of
the sheriff; especially if it be suspected that the defendant, upon notice to the
action, will abscond; and afterwards a fictitious original is drawn up, if the
party is called upon so to do, with a proper return thereupon, in order to give the
proceediirgs a colour of regularity. When this capias is delivered to the sheriff, he
by his under-sheriff grants a warrant to his inferior officers or bailiffs, to execute
it on the defendant. And, if the sheriff of Oxfordshire (in which county the in-
jury is supposed to be committed and the action is laid) cannot find the defend-
[*0001 ant in his jurisdiction, *he returns that he is not found, non est inventus
t"'- in his bailiwick: whereupon another writ issues, called a testatum
capias, (q) directed to the sheriff of the county where the defendant is supposed
to reside, as of Berkshire, reciting the former writ, and that it is testified, testa-
turn est, that the defendant lurks or wanders in his bailiwick, wherefore he is
commanded to take him, as in the former capias. But here, also, when the action
is brought in one county, and the defendant lives in another, it is usual, for sav-
ing trouble, time, and expense, to make out a testatumn capias at the first; sup-
posing not only an original, but also a former capias, to have been granted
which in fact never was. And this fiction being beneficial to all parties, is
readily acquiesced in and is now become the settled practice; being one among
(o) 3 Rep. 12. (p) Appendix, No. III, j 2.
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many instances to illustrate that maxim of law, that in fictione. urts consistit
wvquitas. (3)
But where a defendant absconds, and the plaintiff would proceed to an out-
lawry against him, an original writ must then be sued out regularly, and after
that a capias. And if the sheriff cannot find the defendant upon the first writ
of capias, and returns a non est inventus, there issues out an alias writ, and after
that a pluries, to the same effect as the former: (r) only after these words "we
command you," this clause is inserted, "as we have formerly," or, "as we have
often commanded you :"-" sicut alias," or "sicut pluries, prec ipimus." And, if
a non est inventus is returned upon all of them, then a writ of exigent or exigi
facias may be sued out, (s) which requires the sheriff to cause the defendant to
be proclaimed, required, or exacted, in five county courts successively, to render
himself; and if he does, then to take him as in a capias : but if he does not
appear, and is returned quinto exactus, he shall then be outlawed by the coro-
ners of the county. Also by statutes 6 Hen. VIII, c. 4, and 31 Eliz. c. 3, whether
the defendant dwells within the same or another county than that wherein the
exigent is sued out, *a writ of proclamation (t) shall issue out at the same [*284]
time with the exigent, commanding the sheriff of the county, wherein the
defendant dwells, to make three proclamations thereof in places the most notori-
ous, and most likely to come to his knowledge, a month before the outlawry
shall take place. Such outlawry is putting a man out of protection of the law,
so that he is incapable to bring an action for redress of injuries; and it is also
attended with a forfeiture of all one's goods and chattels to the king. And
therefore, till some time after the conquest, no man could be outlawed but for
felony; but in Bracton's time, and somewhat earlier, process of outlawry was
ordained to lie in all actions for trespasses vi et armis. (u) And since his days, by
a variety of statutes (the same which allow fhe writ of capias before mentioned),
process of outlawry doth lie in divers actions that are merely civil; provided
they be commenced by original and not by bill. (v) If after outlawry the defend-
ant appears publicly, he may be arrested by a writ of capias utlagatum, (w) and
committed till the outlawry be reversed. Which reversal may be had by
the defendant's appearing personally in court or by attorney, (x) (though in the
king's bench he could not appear by attorney, (y) till permitted by statute 4 and
5 W. and M., c. 18); and any plausible cause, however slight, will in general be
sufficient to reverse it, it being considered only as a process to compel an appear-
ance. But then the defendant must pay full costs, and put the plaintiff in the
same condition, as if he had appeared before the writ of exigi facias was awarded.
Such is the first process in the court of common pleas. In the king's bench
they may also (and frequently do) proceed in certain causes, particularly in
actions of ejectment and trespass, by original writ, with attachment and capias
thereon; (z) returnable, not at Westminster, where the common pleas are now
fixed, in consequence of magna carta, but "ubicunque fuerimus in.Anglia,"
wheresoever the king shall then be in *England; the king's bench being [*28.]
removable into any part of England at the pleasure and discretion of the
crown. But the more usual method of proceeding therein is without any
original, but by a peculiar species of process entitled a bill of Middlesex: and
therefore so entitled, because the court now sits in that county; for if it sate in
Kent, it would then be a bill of Kent. (a) For though, as the justices of this
court have, by its fundamental constitution, power to determine all offences and
trespasses, by the common law and custom of the realm, (b) it needed no original
(r) Ibid. (s) Ibid. (t) Ibid. (u) Co. Litt. 128. (v) 1 Sid. 159.
(w) Appendix, No. III, § 2. (x) 2 Roll. Rep. 490. Regul. C B., A. n. 1654, c. 13.
(y) cro. Jac. 616. Salk. 496. (z) Appendix, No. II, § 1.
(a) Thus, when the court sate at Oxford by reason of the plague, Mich. 1665, the process was by bill of Oxford.
8hire. Trye's Jus. Filizar. 101.
(b) Bro. Abr. tit. Oyer and Terminer, 8.
(3) Arrest upon mesne process was almost entirely abolished by statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110.
See also statutes 14 and 15 Vic. c. 52, 32 and 33 Vic. c. 62, and note (8) p. 289, post.
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writ from the crown to give it cognizance of any misdemeanor in the county
wherein it resides; yet, as by this court's coming into any county, it immediately
superseded the ordinary administration of justice by the general commissions of
eyre and of oyer and terminer, (c) a process of its own became necessary within
the county where it sate, to bring in such persons as were accused of committing
any forcible injury. The bill of Middlesex(d) (which was formerly always
founded on a plaint of trespass quare clausum fregit, entered on the records of
the court) (e) is a kind of capias, directed to the sheriff of that county, and com-
manding him to take the defendant, and have him before our lord the king at
Westminster on a day prefixed, to answer to the plaintiff of a plea of trespass.
For this accusation of trespass it is, that gives the court of king's bench juris-
diction in other civil causes, as was formerly observed; since when once the
defendant is taken into custody of the marshal, or prison-keeper of this court,
for the supposed trespass, he being then a prisoner of this court, may here be
prosecuted for any other species of injury. Yet, in order to found this jurisdic-
tion, it is not necessary that the defendant be actually the marshal's prisoner;
[*280] for as soon as he appears, or puts in bail, to the *process, he is deemed
by'so doing to be in such custody of the marshal, as will give the court
a jurisdiction to proceed. (f) And, upon these accounts, in the bill or process
a complaint of trespass is always suggested, whatever else may be the real cause
of action. This bill of Middlesex must be served on the defendant by the
sheriff, if he finds him in that county; but, if he returns "non est inventus,"
then there issues out a writ of latitat, (g) to the sheriff of another county, as
Berks; which is similar to the testatum capias in the common pleas, and recites
the bill of Middlesex and the proceedings thereon, and that it is testified that
the defendant "latitat et discurrit," lurks and wanders about in Berks; and
therefore commands the sheriff to take him, and have his body in court on the
day of the return. But, as in the common pleas the testatum capias may be
sued out upon only a supposed, and not an actual, preceding capias; so in the
king's bench a latitat is usually sued out upon only a supposed, and not an
actual, bill of Middlesex. So that, in fact, a latitat may be called the first
process in the court of king's bench, as the testatum capias is in the common
pleas. Yet, as in the common pleas, if the defendant lives in the county wherein
the action is laid, a common capias suffices; so in the king's bench, likewise, if
he lives in Middlesex, the process must still be by bill of Middlesex only.
In the exchequer the first process is by writ of quo minus, in order to give
the court a jurisdiction over pleas between party and party. In which writ (h)
the plaintiff is alleged to be the king's farmer or debtor, and that the defendant
hath done him the injury complained of; quo minus sufficiens existit, by which
he is the less able to pay the king his rent, or debt. And upon this the defend-
ant may be arrested as upon a capias from the common pleas.
Thus differently do the three courts set out at first, in the commencement of
a suit, in.order to entitle the two courts of king's bench and exchequer to hold
plea in causes between subject and subject, which by the original constitution
of Westminster-hall they were not empowered to do. Afterwards, when the
cause is once drawn into the respective courts, the method of pursuing it is
[*287] pretty much the same in all of them. *If the sheriff has found the
defendant upon any of the former writs, the capias latitat, &c., he was
anciently obliged to take him into custody, in order to produce him in court
upon the return, however small and minute the cause of action might be. For,
not having obeyed the original summons, he had shown a contempt of the court,
and was no longer to be trusted at large. But when the summons fell into
disuse, and the capias became in fact the first process, it was thought hard to
imprison a man for a contempt which was only supposed: and therefore in com-
mon cases by the gradual indulgence of the courts (at length authorized by
statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, which was amended by 5 Geo. II, c. 27, made perpetual
()Bro. Abr. tit Jzr~diction, 66. 3 Inst. 27. (d) Appendix, No. III, %3. (e) Trye's Jus Fizar. 98
) 4 Inst. 72. (9) Appendix, No. IH, § 3. () Ibid. § 4.
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by 21 Geo. II, c. 3, and extended to all inferior courts by 19 Geo. III, c. 70), the
sheriff or proper officer can now only personally serve the defendant with the
copy of the writ or process, and with notice in writing to appear by his attorney
in court to defend this action, which in effect reduces it to a mere summons.
And if the defendant thinks proper to appear upon this notice, his appearance
is recorded, and he puts in sureties for his future attendance and obedience;
which sureties are called common bail, being the same two imaginary persons
that were pledges for the plaintiff's prosecution, John Doe and Richard Roe.
Or, if the defendant does not appear upon the return of the writ, or within four
(or, in some cases, eight) days after, the plaintiff may enter an appearance for him,
as if he had really appeared; and may file common bail in the defendant's
name, and proceed thereupon as if the defendant had done it himself.
But if the plaintiff will make affidavit, or assert upon oath, that the cause of
action amounts to ten pounds or upwards, then he may arrest the defendant,
and make him put in substantial sureties for his appearance, called special bail.
In order to which, it is required by statute 13 Car. II, st. 2, c. 2, that the true
cause of action should be expressed in the body of the writ or process: else no
security can be taken in a greater sum than 401. This statute (without any
such intention in the makers) had like to have ousted the king's bench of
*all its jurisdiction over civil injuries Without force; for, as the bill of
Middlesex was framed only for actions of trespass, a defendant could not [*288]
be arrested and held to bail thereupon for breaches of civil contracts. But to
remedy this inconvenience, the officers of the king's bench devised a method
of adding what is called a clause of ac etiam to the usual complaint of trespass:
the bill of Middlesex commanding the defendant to be brought in to answer the
plaintiff of a plea of trespass, and also to a bill of debt: (i) the complaint of
trespass giving cognizance to the court, and that of debt authorizing the arrest.
In imitation of which, Lord Chief Justice North a few years afterwards, in ordel
to save the suitors of his court the trouble and expense of suing out special
originals, directed that in the common pleas, besides the usual complaint of
breaking the plaintiff's close, a clause of ac etiam might be also added to the
writ of capias, containing the true cause of action; as, "that the said Charles
the defendant may answer to the plaintiff of a plea of trespass in breaking his
close: and also, ac etiam, may answer him, according to the custom of the court,
in a certain plea of trespass upon the case, upon promises, to the value of twenty
pounds," &c. (j) The sum sworn to by the plaintiff is marked upon the back
of the writ; and the sheriff, or his officer the bailiff, is then obliged actually to
arrest or take into custody the body of the defendant, and, having so done, to
return the writ with a cepi corpus endorsed thereon.
An arrest must be by corporal seizing or touching the defendant's body; (4)
after which the bailiff may justify breaking open the house in which he is (5)
to take him: otherwise he has no such power; but must watch his opportunity
to arrest him. For every man's house is looked upon by the law to be his castle
(i, Trye's Jus Filizar. 102. Appendix, No. 111, § 8.
(j) Lilly's.Pract. Reg. tit. ac etiam. North's Life of Lord Guilford, 99. This work is strongly recommended
to the student's perusal.
(4) [But this does not seem to be absolutery necessary, for if a bailiff come into a room and
tell the defendant he arrests him, and lock the door, it is sufficient. C. T. Hardw. 301 ; 2
New, Rep. 211; Bull. N. P. 82. Bare words, however, will not constitute an arrest. 1 Ry.
and M. 26. It is sufficient that the officer have the authority, be near, and acting in the
arrest, without being the person who actually arrests. Cowp. 65.
If the defendant be wrongfully taken without process (2 Anst. 461; 1 N. R. 135), or after
it is returnable (2 H. Bla. 29), he cannot be lawfully detained in custody under subsequent
process at the suit of the same plaintiff, though he may at the suit of third persons. 2 B. and
A. 743; 1 Chit. Rep. 579. S. C.]
(5) [This appears to be stated too extensively; it is the defendant's own dwelling which by
law is said to be his castle; for if he be in the house of another, the bailiff or sheriff may
break and enter it to effect his purpose, but he ought to be very certain that the defendant be,
at the time of such forcible entry, in the house. See Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246.]
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of defence and asylum, wherein he should suffer no violence.(6) Which princi-
ple is carried so far in the civil law that for the most part not so much as a
common citation or summons, much less an arrest, can be executed upon a man
[*289] within his own walls.(k) Peers of the realm, members *of parliament,
and corporations are privileged from arrests; and of course from out-
lawries.(l) And against them the process to enforce an appearance must be by
summons and distress infinite,(m) instead of a capias. Also clerks, attorneys,
and all other persons attending the courts of justice (for attorneys, being officers
of the court, are always supposed to be there attending), are not liable to be
arrested by the ordinary process of the court, but must be sued by bill (called
usually a bill of privilege) as being personally present in court.(n)(7) Clergy-
men performing divine service, and not merely staying in the church with a
fraudulent design, are for the time privileged from arrests, by statutes 50 Edw. III,
c. 5, and 1 Rie. II, c. 16, as likewise members of convocation actually attending
thereon, by statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 1. Suitors, witnesses, and other persons,
necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested
during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and
returning.(8) And no arrest can be made in the king's presence, nor within
(k) .Ff. 2, 4, 18-21. () Whitlock of Par. 206, 207. (m) See page 280.
(n) Bro. Abr. tit. bille, 29. 12 Mod. 163.
(6) [A bailiff before he has made the arrest cannot break open an outer door of a house;
but if he enter the outer door peaceably, he may then break open the inner door, though it
be the apartment of a lodger, it the owner himself occupies part of the house. Cowp. 1; 2
Moore, 207; 8 Taunt. 250, S. C. But if the whole house be let in lodgings, as each lodging
is then considered a dwelling-house, in which burglary may be stated to have been commit-
ted, it has been supposed that the door of each apartment would be considered an outer door,
which could not be legally broken open to execute an arrest. Cowp. 2. But to justify break-
ing open an inner door belonging to a lodger, admittance must be first demanded, unless
defendant is in the room. 3 B. and P. 223; 4 Taunt. 619. And the breaking open an inner
door of a stranger cannot be justified on a suspicion that defendant is in the room. 5 Taunt.
765, 6th ed. 246.]
(7) [These privileges are allowed not so much for the benefit of attorneys as their clients:
2 Wils. 44; 4 Burr. 211; 3 Doug. 381; and are therefore confined to attorneys who practice.
2 Wils. 232; 4 Burr. 2113; 2 Bla. Rep. 1086; 1 Bos. and Pul. 4; (2 Lutw. 1667, contra); or at
least have practiced within a year; for it is a rule that such attorneys as have not been attend-
ing their employment in the king's bench for the space of a year, unless hindered by sickness,
be not allowed their privilege of attorneys. 2 M. and S. 605.]
(8) The law of arrest has been greatly modified in England by the statutes abolishing arrest
and imprisonment for debt except in a few specified cases (the one now in force being 32 and
83 Vic. c. 62), and also in the United States by constitutional and statutory provisions for the
same purpose. But as arrests in civil suits are still allowed in some cases, we refer here to a
few of the cases in which an exemption from arrest, on general principles, can still be claimed.
Thus, ambassadors accredited to a foreign country, and their servants, while passing through
the country to enter upon their duties, are privileged: Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. and C. 554;
Holbrook v. Henderson, 4 Sandf. 619; members of congress and of state legislatures, while in
attendance upon the body to which they belong, or upon any of its committees, and for a
reasonable time before and after to go and return: Cush. Leg. Assemb., part 3, ch. 2; members
of state conventions: Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. 296; electors, attending an election, or awaiting
the counting of the votes: Swift v. Chamberlain, 3 Conn. 537; parties and attorneys, while
attending court during the trial, or hearing of the causes in which they are interested or
employed, and while waiting for the same to be reached on the docket: Clark v. Grant, 2
Wend. 257; McNiel's Case, 6 Mass. 245; Vincent v. Watson, 1 Rich. 194; Wilson v. Nettleton,
12 Ill. 61 ; witnesses, in attendance on court or other judicial or legislative tribunal: Bours v.
Tuckerman, 7 Johns. 538; Ex parte Edme, 9 S. and R. 147; Sanford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381;
In re Dickerson, 3 Harr. 517; Norris v. Beach, 2 Johns. 294; Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 997;
jurors, attending court in the performance of their duties: Brooks v. Chesley, 4 H. and McH.
295; bail, attending to justify: Rimmer v. Green, 1 M. and S. 638: bankrupts and insolvents
duly discharged, as to all the demands covered by the discharge: Wilson v. Kemp, 3 M. and
S. 595; Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 260. And in all these cases where the privilege is given by
the law for the purpose of attendance at some particular place in a special character, it covers
the stay and a reasonable time for going and returning: Randall V. Gurney, 3 B. and A. 252;
Childerston a. Barrett, 11 East, 439; Clark v. Grant, 2 Wend. 257; but if the party goes out of
his way on other business he loses his privilege. Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 260.
The privilege will not prevent the service of process, which only requires common bail:
Hunter v. Cleveland, 1 Brev. 167; Hopkins v. Coburn, 1 Wend. 292; Catlett v. Morton, 4
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the verge of his royal palace,( o) nor in any place where the king's justices are
actually sitting. The king hath moreover a special prerogative (which indeed
is very seldom exerted, (p) that he may by his writ of protection privilege a
defendant from all personal, and many real, suits for one year at a time, and no
longer; in respect of his being engaged in his service out of the realm.(q) And
the king also by the common law might take his debtor into his protection, so
that no one might sue or arrest him till the king's debts were paid: (rY but by
the statute 25 Edw. III, st. 5, c. 19, notwithstanding such protection, another
creditor may proceed to judgment against *him, with a stay of execution' [*290]
till the king's debt be paid ; unless such creditor will undertake for the
king's debt, and then he shall have execution for both. And lastly, by statute
29 Car. II, c. 7, no arrest can be made, nor process served, upon a Sunday, ex-
cept for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.(9)
When the defendant is regularly arrested, he must either go to prison, for
safe custody: or put in special bail to the sheriff.(10) For the intent of the
arrest being only to compel an appearance in court at the return of the writ,
that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains his person, or takes
sufficient security for his appearance, called bail (from the French word bailler,
to deliver), because the defendant is bailed, or delivered to his sureties, upon
their giving security for his appearance: and is supposed to continue in their
friendly custody instead of going to gaol. The method of putting in bail to
the sheriff is by entering into a bond or obligation, with one or nore sureties,
not fictitious persons, as in the former case of common bail, but real, substan-
tial, responsible bondsmen), to insure the defendant's appearance at the return
of the writ; which obligation is called the bail bond.(s)(11) The sheriff, if he
pleases may let the defendant go without any sureties; but that is at his own
peril: for, after once taking him, the sheriff is bound to keep him safely, so as
to be forthcoming in court; otherwise an action lies against him for an
escape.(12) But on the other hand, he is obliged, by statute 23 Hen. VI, c. 10,
to take (if it be tendered) a sufficient bail-bond: and by statute 12 Geo. I, c.
29, the sheriff shall take bail for no other sum than such as is sworn to by the
plaintiff, and endorsed on the back of the writ.
Upon the return of the writ, or within four days after, the defendant must
appbear according to the exigency of the writ. This ippearance is effected by
putting in and justifying bail to the action; which is commonly called putting
in bail above. If this be not done, and the bail that were taken by *the [*291
sheriff below are responsible persons, the plaintiff may take an assign- t 1
ment from the sheriff of the bail-bond (under the statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16),
(o) See book IV, 276. The verge of the palace of Westminster extends, by stat. 28 Hen. VIII, c. 12, from
Charing Cross to Wesminster hall.
(p) Sir Edward Coke informs us ( In st. 131) that herein "he could say nothing of his own experience; for
albeit Queen Elizabeth maintained many wars, yet she granted few or no protections: and her reason was that
he was no fit subject to be employed in her service, that was subject to other men's actions, lest she might be
thought to delay justice." But King William, in 1692, granted one to Lord Cutts, to protect him from being
outlawed by his tailor (3 Lev. 3321): which is the last that appears upon our books.
(q) Finch, L. 454. 3 Lev. 332. (r) F. N. B. 28. Co. Litt. 131. (s) Appendix, No. II, § 5.
Litt. 122; Le Grand v. Bedinger, 4 Monr. 540; nor the service of a common summons or
declaration, on which no bail is taken. Case v. Rorabacker, 15 Mich. 537.
(9) This statute extends not only to process properly so called, but also to all notices on
which rules are made; and hence it has been held that service of notice of plea filed on a
Sunday, is void: 8 East, 547; Tidd. Prac. 218; Field v. Park, 20 Johns. 140. But after a
negligent escape the defendant may be retaken on Sunday. 2 Ld. Raym. 1028; 2 Salk. 626;
Tidd. Prac. 218.
(10) The statute 43 Geo. III, c. 46, allowed a deposit of money instead of bail. See Tidd
Prac. 8th ed. 226.
(11) [An agreement by a third person with a sheriff's officer to put in good bail, &c. (1 T. R.
418), or an attorney's undertaking to the office for defendant's appearance (7 T. R. 109), or to
give bail bond in due time, are void, and no action lies on it; but if given to the plaintiff in
the action, it is valid. 4 East, 568.]
(12) [Sheriff cannot sue defendant fir money paid, when he has discharged him out of
custody on mesne process, without a bail bond, and has, in consequence of his non-appear
ance, been obliged to pay debt and costs. 8 East, 171.]
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and bring an action thereupon against the sheriff's bail. But if the bail, so
accepted by the sheriff, be insolvent persons, the plaintiff may proceed against
the sheriff himself, by calling upon him, first, to return the writ (if not already
done), and afterwards to bring in the body of the defendant. And, if the sher-
iff does not then cause sufficient bail to be put in and perfected above, he will
himself be responsible to the plaintiff.
The Vail above, or bail to the action, must be put in either in open court, or
before one of the judges thereof; or else, in the country, before a commissioner
appointed for that purpose by virtue of the statute 4 W. and M. c. 4, which
must be transmitted to the court. These bail, who must at least be two in
number, must enter into a recognizance (t) in court or before the judge or com-
missioner, in a sum equal (or in some cases double) to that which the plaintiff
hath sworn to; whereby they do jointly and severally undertake, that if the
defendant be condemned in the action he shall pay the costs and condemna-
tion, or render himself a prisoner, or that they will pay it for him: which
recognizance is transmitted to the court in a slip of parchment entitled a bail
piece.(u) And, if excepted to, the bail must be perfected, that is, they must
Justify themselves in court, or before the commissioner in the country, by
swearing themselves housekeepers, and each of them to be worth the full sum
for which they are bail, after payment of all their debts. This answers in some
measure to the stipulatio or satisdatio of the Roman laws (v) which is mutually
given by each litigant party to the other: by the plaintiff, that he will prosecute
his suit, and pay the costs if he loses his cause; in like manner as our law still
requires nominal pledges of prosecution from the plaintiff: by the defendant,
that he shall continue in court, and abide the sentence of the judge, much like
our special bail; but with this difference, that the.fide-jussores were there abso-
[*292] lutely bound judicatum solvere, to see the costs and condemnation *paid
at all events: whereas our special bail may be discharged, by surrender-
ing the defendant into custody, within the time allowed bylaw; for which pur-
pose they are at all times entitled to a warrant to apprehend him.(w)(13)
Special bail is required (as of course) only upon actions of debt, or actions on
the case in trover or for money due, where the plaintiff can swear that the cause
of action amounts to ten pounds: but in actions where the damages are pre-
carious, being to be assessed ad libitum by a jury, as in actions for words, eject-
ment, or trespass, it is very seldom possible for a plaintiff to swear to the amount
of his cause of action; and therefore no special bail is taken thereon, unless by
a judge's order or the particular directions of the court, in some peculiar species
of injuries, as in cases of mayhem or atrocious battery; or upon such special
circumstances as make it absolutely necessary that the defendant should be
kept within the reach of justice. Also in actions against heirs, executors, and
administrators, for debts of the deceased, special bail is not demandable; for the
(t) Ibid. (u) Ibid. (v) Inst. 1. 4, t. 11. Ff. 1. 2, t. 8. (w) Show. 202. 6 Mod. 231.
(13) [And the bail may render the defendant in their discharge, even after judgment; and
they may take him on a Sunday: 6 Mod. 231 ; but see 2 Bla. R. 1273 ; or during his examina-
tion before commissioners of bankrupt: 1 Atk. 238; 5 T. R. 210; or going into a court of
justice: 1 Sel. Prac. 180; 3 Stark. 132; 1 D. and R. M. P. C. 20; and they may justify enter-
ing the house of a stranger (the outer door being open) to take the defendant though he be
not in the house: 2 Hen. Bla. 120; and if the defendant is in custody, either in a civil action
or upon a criminal charge, they may in K. B. have a writ of habeas corpus to bring him up to
the court, to be surrendered in their discharge. 7 T. R. 226. When the principal is taken,
one of the bail, it is said, must always remain with him: 1 Sel. Pr. 180; but a third person
may assist in the taking and detaining defendant, though the bail do not continue present
3 Taunt. 425.]
The bail are the keepers of their principal, and they may arrest him on the bail piece wher
ever they can find him, even though not within the jurisdiction of the court in which bail was
taken. Anon. Show. 214; Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216. And
this right they may exercise by agent as well as in person: Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145;
Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 8I; and they may break doors, if necessary, to make the arrest.
Read v. (ase, 4 Conn. 166 ; Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
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action is not so properly against them in person, as against the effects of the
deceased in their possession. But special bail is required even of them, in
actions for a devastavit, or wasting the goods of the deceased; that wrong being
of their own committing.
Thus much for process ; which is only meant to bring the defendant into
court, in order to contest the suit, and abide the determination of the law.
When he appears either in person as a prisoner, or out upon bail, then follow
the pleadings between the parties, which we shall consider at large in the next
chapter.
CHAPTER XX.
OF PLEADING.
PLEADINGS are the mutual altercations between the plaintiff and defendant;
which at present are set down and delivered into the proper office in writing,
though formerly they were usually put in by their counsel ore tenus, or viva
voce, in court, and then minuted down by the chief clerks, or prothonotaries;
whence in our old law French the pleadings are frequently denominated the
parol. (1)
(1) [Pleading is the statement in a logical and legal form of the facts which constitute the
plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant's ground of defence; it is the formal mode of
alleging on the record that which would be the support, or the defence, of the party in evi-
dence. Per Buller, J., 3 T. H. 159; Dougl. 278. "It is (as also observed by the same learned
judge, in Dougl. Rep. 159), one of the first principles of pleading, that there is only occasion
to state facts, which must be done for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to
declare the law arising upon those facts, and of apprising the opposite party of what is meant
to be proved, in order to give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it." And see the
observations of Lord C. J. De Grey, Cowp. 682. From this it will be seen, that the science of
special pleading may be considered under two heads: 1. The facts necessary to be stated.
2. The mode of stating them. In these considerations, the reader must be contented with a
general outline of the law upon the subject.
1st. THE FACTS NECESSARY TO BE STATED. No more should be stated than is essential to
constitute the cause of complaint, or the ground of defence. Cowp. 683; 1 Lord Ray. 171.
And facts only should be stated, and not arguments or inferences, or matter of law. Cowp.
684; 5 East, 275. The party can only succeed on the facts, as they are alleged and
proved.
There are various facts which need not be stated, though it may be essential that they should
be established in evidence, to entitle the party pleading to succeed.
Thus there are facts of which the court will, from the nature of its office, take notice without
their being stated: as when the king came to the throne (2 Lord Raym. 794), his privileges,
(id. 980), proclamations, &c.: 1 Lord Raym. 282. 2 Camp. 44. 4 M. and S. 532; but private
orders of council, pardons, and declarations of war, &c., must be stated. 2 Litt. Bac. Reg.
803; 3 M. and S. 67; 11 Ves. 292; 3 Camp. 61, 67. The time and place of holding parliaments,
and their course of proceedings, need not be stated: 1 Lord Raym. 343, 210; 1 Saund.
131; but their journals must. Lord Ray. 15; Cowp. 11. Public statutes, and the facts they
ascertain: 1 T. R. 145; Com. Dig. Pleader, c. 76; the ecclesiastical, civil, and marine laws
(Bro. Quare Impedit, pl. 12; Lord Ray. 338), need not be stated, but private acts (Lord Ray.
381; Dougl. 97), and foreign (2 Cart. 273; Cowp. 174), and plantation and forest (2 Leon.
209) laws, must. Common law rights, duties, and general customs, customs of gavelkind, and
borough English (Dougl. 150; Lord Ray. 175, 1542; Carth. 83; Co. Litt. 175; Lord Raym.
1025; Cro. Car. 561), need not be stated: but particular local customs must. 1 Rol. Rep.
509 ; 9 East, 185; Stra. 187, 1187; Dougl. 387. The almanac is part of the law of the land,
and the courts take notice thereof, and the days of the week, and of the movable feasts, and
terms. Dougl. 380; Salk. 269; 1 Roll. Ab. 524, c. pl. 4; 6 Mod. 81; Salk. 626. So the
division of England into counties will be noticed without pleading (2 Inst. 557; Marsh. 124),
but not so of a less division (id.), nor of Ireland. 1 Chit. Rep. 28, 32; 3 B. and A. 801 ; S. C.,
2 D. and R. 15; 1 B. and C. 16, S. C. The court will take judicial notice of the incorporated
towns, of the extent of ports, and the river Thames. Stra. 469; 1 A1. Bla. 356. So it will
take notice of the meaning of English words and terms of art, according to their ordinary
acceptation: 1 Rol. Ab. 86, 525; also of the names and quantities of legal weights and mea-
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The first of these is the declaration, narratio, or count, anciently called the
tale; (a) in which the plaintiff sets forth his cause of complaint at length, being
indeed only an amplification or exposition of the original writ upon which his
action is founded, with the additional circumstances of time and place, when
and where the injury was committed. But we may remember, (b) that in the
king's bench, when the defendant is brought into court by bill of Middlesex,
(a) Appendix, No. II, § 2; No. III,§ 6. (b) See pages 285, 288.
sures: I Rol. Ab. 525; also courts will take notice of their own course of proceedings (1 T. R.
118; 2 Lev. 176), and of those of the superior courts (2 Co. Rep. 18; Cro. Jac. 67), the privi-
leges they confer on their officers (Lord Ray. 869, 898), of courts of general jurisdiction, and
the course of proceedings therein; as the court of exchequer in Wales, and the counties pala-
tine: 1 Lord Raym. 154; 1 Saund. 73; but the courts are not bound, ex officio, to take notice
who were, or are the judges of another court at Westminster: 2 Andr. 74; Stra. 1226; nor
are the superior courts, ex officio, bound to notice the customs, laws, or proceedings of inferior
courts of limited jurisdiction (1 Roll. Rep. 105; Lord Raym. 1334; Cro. Eliz. 502), unless indeed
in courts of error. Cro. Car. 179.
Where the law presumes a fact, as that a person is innocent of a fraud or crime, or that a
transaction is illegal, it need not be stated. 4 M. and S. 105 ; 2 Wils. 147 ; Co. Lit. 78, b. ; I
B. and A. 463.
Matter which should come more properly from the other side, as it is presumed to lie more
in the knowledge of the other party, or is an answer to the charge of the party pleading, need
not be stated, unless in pleas of estoppel and alien enemy; but this rule must be acted upon
with caution; for if the fact in any way constitutes a condition precedent, to enable the party
to avail himself of the charge stated in his pleading, such fact should be stated. Com. Dig.
Pleader, c. 81; 1 Leon. 18; 2 Saund. 62, b.; 4 Camp. 20; 11 East, 638; and see cases 1 Chit.
on P1. 206; Stephen, 354.
Though the facts of a case must be stated in pleading, it is not necessary to state that which
is a mere matter of evidence of such fact. 9 Rep. 9, b.; 9 Edw. III, 5, b. 6, a.; Willes, 130;
Raym. 8.
And though the general rule is, that facts only are to be stated, yet there are some instances
in which the statement in the pleading is proper, though it does not accord with the real facts,
the law allowing a fiction, as in ejectment, trover, detinue, &c. 2 Burr. 667; 1 N. R. 140.
No fact that is not essential to substantiate the pleading should be stated. The statement
of immaterial or irrelevant matter is not only. censurable on the ground of expense; but fre-
quently affords an advantage to the opposite party, either as the ground of a variance, or as
rendering it incumbent on the party pleading to adduce more evidence than would otherwise
have been necessary; though, indeed, if the matter unnecessarily stated be wholly foreign and
impertinent to the cause, so that no allegation whatever on the subject was necessary, it will
be rejected as surplusage, it being a maxim that utile per inutile non vitiatur. See cases, &c.,
in Chit. on P. 208, 209, 210. Besides this, the pleading must not state two or more thcts, either
of which would of itself, independently of the other, constitute a sufficient ground of action or
defence. Co. Litt. 304, a.; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 33, E. 2; 1 Chit. on P1. 208.
2dlv. THE MODE OF STATSNG FACTS. The facts should be stated logically, in their natural
order; as, on the part of the plaintiff, his right, the injury and consequent damage; and these,
with certainty, precision, and brevity. The facts, as stated, must not be insensible or repug-
nant, nor ambiguous or doubtful in meaning, nor argumentative, nor in the alternative, nor by
way of recital, but positive, and according to their legal effect and operation. Dougl. 666,667;
1 Chit. on P1. 211; Stephen, 378 to 405.
Certainty signifies a clear and distinct statement, so that it may be understood by the oppo-
site party, by the jury, who are to ascertain the truth of such statement, and by the court,
who are to give judgment. Cowp. 682; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 17. Less certainty is requisite,
when the law presumes that the knotledge of the facts is peculiarly in the opposite party;
and so when it is to be presumed that the party pleading is not acquainted with minute cir-
cumnstances. 13 East, 112 ; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 26; 8 East, 85. General statements of facts
admitting of almost any proof, are objectionable: 1 1. and S. 441; 3 id. 114; but where a
subject comprehends mutiplicity of matter, there, in order to avoid prolixity, general pleading
is allowed. 2 Saund. 411, n. 4; 8 T. R. 462.
In the comstruction of facts stated in pleading, it is a general rule, that every thing shall be
taken most strongly against the party pleading: 1 Saund. 259, n. 8; or rather, if the meaning
of the words be equivocal, they shall be construed most strongly against the party pleading
them: 2 H. Bla. 530; for it is to be intended, that every person states his case as favorably
to himself as possible: Co. Litt. 20, 36; but the language is to have a reasonable intendment
and construction: Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 25; and if the sense be clear, mere exceptions ought
not to be regarded: 5 East, 529; and where an expression is capable of different meanings,
that shall be taken which will support the aierment, and not the other which would defeat it.
4 Taunt. 492; 5 East, 257. After verdict, affrexpression should be construed in such sense as
would sustain the verdict. 1 B. and C. 297.]
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upon a supposed trespass, in order to give the court a jurisdiction, the plaintiff
may declare in whatever action, or charge him with whatever injury, he thinks
proper; unless he has held him to bail by a special ac etiain, which the plaintiff
is then bound to pursue. And so also, in order to have the benefit of a cap ias
to secure the defendants' person, it was the ancient practice, and is therefore
still warrantable in the common *pleas, to sue out a writ of trespass [*29
quare clausurn fregit, for breaking the plaintift's close: and when the
defendant is once brought in upon this writ, the plaintiff declares in whatever
action the nature of his true injury may require; as in an action of covenant,
or on the case for breach of contract, or other less forcible transgression: (c)
unless, by holding the defendant to bail on a special ac etiam, he has bound
himself to declare accordingly. (2)
In local actions, where possession of land is to be recovered, or damages for
an actual trespass, or for waste, &c., affecting land, the plaintiff must lay his
declaration or declare his injury to have happened in the very county and place
that it really did happen ;(3) but in transitory actions, for injuries that might
have happened anywhere, as debt, detinue, slander, and the like, the plaintiff
may declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial must be had in that
county in which the declaration is laid. Though, if the defendant will make
affidavit that the cause of action, if any, arose not in that but in another county,
the court will direct a change of the venue, or visne (that is, the vicinia, or
neighbourhood, in which the injury is declared to be done), and will oblige the
plaintiff to declare in the other county; unless he will undertake to give mate-
rial evidence in the first. For the statutes 6 Ric. II, c. 2, and 4 Hen. IV, c. 18,
having ordered all writs to be laid in their proper counties, this, as the judges
conceived, empowered them to change the venue, if required, and not to insist
rigidly on abating the writ: which practice began in the reign of James the
First.(d) And this power is discretionally exercised, so as to prevent, and not
to cause, a defect of justice. Therefore, the court will not change the venue to
any of the four northern counties, previous to the spring circuit; because there
the assizes are holden only once a year, at the time of the summer circuit. And
it will sometimes remove the venue from the proper jurisdiction (especially of
a narrow and limited kind), upon a suggestion, duly supported, that a fair and
impartial trial cannot be had thereiu.(e)
(c) 2 Ventr. 259.
(d) Rastall, tit. Dette, 184, b. Fitz. Abr. tit. Briefe, 18. Salk. 670. Trye's Jus. hMiz. 231. Styl. Pract. Reg.
(edit. 1657) 331.
(e) Stra. 874, Mylock v. Saladine. Trin. 4 Geo. III, B. R.
(2) [And even then, the plaintiff will only lose the benefit of the bail, and the court will not
set aside the proceedings. 7 T. R. 80; 8 id. 27; 5 Moore, 483; 6 T. R. 363.
The declaration should in other respects correspond with the process, as in the names and
numbers of the parties, the character or right in which they sue or are sued; but as, accord-
ing to the present practice of the courts, oyer of the writ cannot be craved, and a variance
between the writ and declaration cannot in any case be pleaded in abatement: 1 Saund. 318;
3 B. and P. 395; and as there are several instances in which the court will not set aside the pro-
ceedings on account of a variance between the writ and declaration (6 T. R. 364), many of the
older decisions are no longer applicable in practice. But if the defect appear on the face of
the declaration, the plaintiff may plead in abatement, or demur accordingly. As to these gen
eral requisites, see 1 Chit. on Pl. 222 to 229.]
(3) [Actions for every kind of injury to real property are local, as for nuisances, waste, &c.,
unless there be some contract between the parties, on which to ground the action. 1 Taunt.
879; 11 East, 226. And if the land be out of this kingdom, the plaintiff has no remedy in
the English courts, if there be a court of justice to resort to where the land is situate. 4 T. R.
503; 1 Stra. 646; Cowp. 180; 6 East, 598. Where an injury has been caused in one county to
land, &c., in another, or when the action is founded upon two or more material facts, which
took place in different counties, the venue may be laid in either. 2 Taunt. 252, overruling 2
Campb. 266; 7 Co. 1; 3 Leon. 141; 7 T. R. 583; 1 Chit. on P1. 242.
In an action upon a lease for the non-payment of rent, or other breach of covenant, when
the action is founded on the pricity of contraet, it is transitory; but not so when the action is
founded on the prieity of estate. 3 T. R. 394; 3 Co. 23; 1 Saund. 237; Tidd, 431; 1 Chit.
244 to 246.]
The power of changing the venue was extended by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, f 22, to
local actions.
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[*295] *It is generally usual, in actions upon the case, to set forth several
cases by different counts in the same declaration; so that, if the plaintiff
fails in the proof of one, he may succeed in another.(4) As, in an action on
the case upon an assurnsit for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff usually
counts or declares, first, upon a settled and agreed price between him and the
defendant; as that they bargained for twenty pounds: and lest he should fail
in the proof of this, he counts likewise upon a quantum valebant; that the
defendant bought other goods, and agreed to pay him so much as they were
reasonably worth; and then avers that they were worth other twenty pounds;
and so on in three or four different shapes;(5) and at last concludes with
declaring, that the defendant had refused to fulfil any of these agreements,
whereby he is endamaged to such a value. And if he proves the case laid in
any one of his counts, though he fails in the rest, he shall recover proportion-
able damages. This declaration always concludes with these words: "And
thereupon he brings suit," &c.," indeproducit sectam," &c.(6) By which words,
suit or secta (a sequendo), were anciently understood the witnesses or followers
of the plaintiff.(f) For, in former times, the law would not put the defendant
to the trouble of answering the charge, till the plaintiff had made out at least
a probable case.(g) But the actual production of the suit, the secta, or fbi-
lowers, is now antiquated, and hath been totally disused, at least ever since the
reign of Edward the Third, though the form of it still continues.
At the end of the declaration are added also the plaintiff's common pledges
of prosecution, John Doe and Richard Roe,(7) which, as we before observed,(h)
are now mere names of form; though formerly they were of use to answer to
the king for the amercement of the plaintiff, in case he were nonsuited, barred
of his action, or had a verdict or judgment against him.(i) For, if the plaintiff
neglects to deliver a declaration for two terms after the defendant appears, or is
guilty of other delays or defaults against the rules of law in any subsequent
[*296] *stage of the action, he is adjudged not to foll,w or pursue his remedy
as he ought to do, and thereupon a nonsuit, or non prosequiter, is en-
tered; and he is said to be nonpros'd.(S) And for thus deserting his complaint,
(k) Seld. on Fortesc. c. 21. (g) Bract. 400. Ftet. 1. 2, c. 63.
(h) See page 274. (i) 3 Bulstr. 275. 4 Inst. 180.
(4) But several counts for the same cause of action are not now allowed, as a general rule,
and the court, on motion, may order them stricken out. Beg. Gen. Trin. T. 1853.
(5) [The variations should be substantial; for if the different counts be so similar that the
same evidence would support each of them, and be of any considerable length, and vex-
atiously inserted, the court would, on application, refer it to the master for examination, and to
strike out the redundant counts; and in gross cases direct the costs to be paid by the attorney.
1 N. R. 289; Rep. T. Hardw. 129. And as to striking out superfluous counts, see Tidd, 8th
ed. 667, 648. In 2 Bing, 412, nine counts were allowed in an action for slander, though the
words used werd very few. See 1 Chit. on P1. 350, 351, 352, as to the insertion of several
counts. There must be no misjoinder of different counts; and, in order to prevent the con-
fusion which might ensue, if different forms of action, requiring different pleas and different
judgments, were allowed to be joined in one action, it is a general rule, that actions in form
ex contracta cannot be joined with those in form ex delicto. Thus, assumpsit and debt (2
Smith, 618; 3 id. 114), or assumpsit and an action on the case, as for a tort, cannot be joined: 1
T. R. 276, 277; 1 Vent. 366; Carth. 189; nor assumpsit with trover: 2 Lev. 101; 3 id. 99;
1 Salk. 10; 3 Wils. 354; 6 East, 335; 2 Chitty R. 343; nor trover with detinue. Willes, 118;
1 Chit. on P1. 182. Debt and detinue may, however, be joined, although the judgments be
different. 2 Saund. 117. And see further, as to what is a misjoinder, 1 Chit. on P1. 199.
Unless the subsequent count expressly refers to the preceding, no defect therein will be aided
by such preceding count. Bac. Ab. Pleas and Pleader, 16, 1.]
(6) [It does not so conclude in actions against attorneys and other officers of the court, but
thus: " and therefore he prays relief, &c." Andr. 247; Barnes, 3, 167.
In actions at the suit of an executor or administrator, immediately after the conclusion, to
the damage, &c., and before the pledges, a profert of the letters testamentary, or letters of
administration, should be made. Bac. Ab. Executor, C; Dougl. 5, in notes. But omission is
aided, unless defendant demur specially. 4 Ann. c. 16, § 1.]
(7) This form was not essential (3 T. R. 157), and it is now obsolete.
(8) [But unless the defendant take advantage of the plaintiff's neglect, by signing such judg-
ment, the plaintiff may deliver his declaration at any time within a year next after the return
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after making a false claim or complaint (pro falso clarnore suo), he shall not
only pay costs to the defendant, but is liable to be amerced to the king. A
retraxit differs from a nonsuit, in that the one is negative, and the other posi-
tive: the nonsuit is a mere default and neglect of the plaintiff, and therefore he
is allowed to begin his suit again, upon payment of costs; but a retraxit is an
open and voluntary renunciation of his suit in court, and by this he forever
loses his action. A discontinuance is somewhat similar to a nonsuit; for when
a plaintiff leaves a chasm in the proceedings, f his cause, as by not continuing
the process regularly from day to day, and time to time, as he ought to do, the
suit is discontinued, and the defendant is no longer bound to attend: but the
plaintiff must begin again, by suing out a new original, usually paying costs to
his antagonist. Anciently, by the demise of the king, all suits depending in
his courts were at once discontinued, and the plaintiff was obliged to renew the
process, by suing out a fresh writ from the successor; the virtue of the former
writ being totally gone, and the defendant no longer bound to attend in con-
sequence thereof; but, to prevent the expense as well as delay attending this
rule of law, the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 7, enacts, that by the death of the king
no action shall be discontinued; but all proceedings shall stand good as if the
same king had been living.
When the plaintiff hath stated his case in the declaration, it is incumbent on
the defendant within a reasonable time to make his defence, and to put in a plea;
else the plaintiff will at once recover judgment by default, or nihil dicit of the
defendant.
Defence, in its true legal sense, signifies not a justification, protection, or guard,
which is now its popular signification; but merely an opposing or denial (from
the French verb defender) of the truth or validity of the complaint. It is the con-
testatio litis of the civilians : a general assertion that the plaintiff hath no ground
of action, which assertion is afterwards extended *and maintained in his [*297]
plea. For it would be ridiculous to suppose that the defendant comes
and defends (or, in the vulgar acceptation, justifies) the force and injury, in one
line, and pleads that he is not guilty of the trespass complained of, in the next.
And therefore, in actions of dower, where the demandant doth not count of any
injury done, but merely demands her endowment, (k) and in assizes of land,
where also there is no injury alleged, but merely a question of right stated for
the determination of the recognitors or jury, the tenant makes no defence. (1)
In writs of entry, (m) where no injury is stated in the count, but merely
the right of the demandant and the defective title of the tenant, the tenant
comes and defends or denies his right, jus suum; that is (as I understand it,
though with a small grammatical inaccuracy), the right of the demandant, the
only one expressly mentioned in the pleadings, or else denies his own right to
be such, as is suggested by the count of the demandant, And in writs of
right, (n) the tenant always comes and defends the right of the demandant and
his seisin,jus prcedicti S. et seisinam ipsius (o) (or else the seisin of his ancestor,
upon which he counts, as the case may be), and the demandant may reply, that
the tenant unjustly defends his, the demandant's, right, and the seisin on which
he counts. (p) All which is extremely clear, if we understand by defence an op-
position or denial, but it is otherwise inexplicably difficult. (q)
The courts were formerly very nice and curious with respect to the nature of
the defence, so that if no defence was made, though a sufficient plea was pleaded,
the plaintiff should recover judgment: (r) and therefore the book entitled
noue narrationes or the new talys, (s) at the end of almost every count, narra-
(k) Rastal, Ent. 234. () Booth of Real Actions, 118. (i) Book I, Appendix, No. V, § 2.
(n) Appendix, No. I, § 5. (o) Co. Entr. 182. (p) 2ro. Nar. 230, edit. 1534.
(q) The true reason of this, says Booth (on Real Actions, 94, 112), I could never yet find; so little did he
understand of principles!
(r) Co. Litt. 127. (s) Edit. 1534.
of the writ. 3 T. R. 123; 5 id. 35; 7 id. 7; sed vide 2 N. R. 404. As to when the defendant is
entitled to, and how he should sign, a judgment of, and costs on non pros., see Tidd, 8th ed.,
index, tit. Non Pros.]
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tio, or tale, subjoins such defence as is proper for the defendant to make. For
a general defence or denial was not prudent in every situation, since thereby the
propriety of the writ, the competency of the plaintiff, and the cognizance of the
[*298] court were allowed. By defending the force and injury, *the defendant
waived all pleas of misnomer ;(t) and by defending the damages, all excep-
tions to the person of the plaintiff; and by defending either the one or the other
when and where it should behove him, he acknowledged the jurisdiction of the
court. (u) But of late years these niceties have been very deservedly dis-
countenanced :(w) though they still seem to be law, if insisted on. (x)
Before defence made, if at all, cognizance of the suit must be claimed or de-
manded; when any person or body corporate hath the franchise, not only of holding
pleas within a particular limited jurisdiction, but also of the cognizance of pleas :
and that, either without any words exclusive of other courts, which entitles the
lord of the franchise, whenever any suit that belongs to his jurisdiction is com-
menced in the courts at Westminster, to demand the cognizance thereof: or with
such exclusive words, which also entitle the defendant to plead to the jurisdiction
of the court.(y) Upon this claim of cognizance, if allowed, all proceedings shall
cease in the superior court, and the plaintiff is left at liberty to pursue his remedy
in the special jurisdiction. As, when a scholar, or other privileged person, of the
universities of Oxford or Cambridge, is impleaded in the courts at Westminster,
for any cause of action whatsoever, unless upon a question of freehold. (z) In
these cases, by the charters of those learned bodies, confirmed by act of parlia-
ment, the chancellor or vice-chancellor may put in a claim of cognizance;
which, if made in due time and form, and with due proof of the facts alleged, is
regularly allowed by the courts. (a) It must be demanded before full defence is
made (b) or imparlance prayed ; for these are a submission to the jurisdiction
of the superior court, and the delay is a laches in the lord of the franchise: and
it will not be allowed, if it occasions a failure of justice, (c) or if an action be
brought against the person himself, who claims the franchise, unless he hath
also a power in such case of making another judge.(d) (9)
[*299] *After defence made, the defendant must put in his plea. But, before
he defends, if the suit is commenced by capias or latitat, without any
special original, he is entitled to demand one imparlance,(e) or licentia loquendi;
and may, before he pleads, have more time granted by consent of the court; to
see if he can end the matter amicably without farther suit, by talking with the
plaintiff: a practice which is (f) supposed to have arisen from a principle of
(t) Theloal. dig. 1. 14, c. 1, p. 857.
(u) En la defence soat iV choses entendantz; per tant quii defende tort et force, home doyt entendre quil se exese
de tort a lay urm ys per counte, et fait se partie ai ple' et per tant quit defende lee damages, il affrm le partie able
destre respondu; et per tant quil defende on et quant d devera, ii accepte la poiar de court de coau8tre ou trier lear
ple. lMod. tenend. cur. 408, edit. 1534. See also Co. Litt. 127.
(w) Salk. 217. Lord Raym. 282. (x) Carth. 230. Lord Raym. 217.
(y) 2 Lord Raym. 86. 10 Mod. 126. (z) See page 83. (a) Hardr. 505.
(b) Rast. 128, &c. (c) 2 Ventr. .363.
(d) Hob. 87. Year-book, M. 8 Hen. VI, 20. In this latter case the chancellor of Oxford claimed cognizance
of an action of trespass brought against himself, which was disallowed, because he should not be judge in his
own cause. The argument used by Serjeant Rolfe on behalf of the cognizance is curious and worth transcrib-
ang Jeo bous dirai an fable. En aen temps fait un pape, et avit fail n grand offence, et is cardinals
undreat a lay et disoyent a lay, "peccasti:" et il dit, "jadica me;" ei its di. yent, "non posramus, quia caput
eS ecclesiae: Jadeca teepsam. . el laposlot dlt, "jadwo me cremari;" et fast combascus; ef apras fail un .saincl.
uEt in ceo cs ilfauit son jage denmene, et bssjal a'esl pess inconvenient queuan leonse soil jage densene.
(e) Appendix, No. In, § 5. f) Gib. Hist. Cor. P1.35.
(9) [But a party may waive, and preclude himself from taking, any objection to a decision
on this account: for if a defendant agree to refer the matter to the plaintiff, he cannot object
to the award that the plaintiff was judge in his own cause. Thus in Matthew v. Ollerton, 4
Mod. 226; Comb. 218; Hard. 44, which was an action of debt upon an award, and a verdict
for the plaintiff; and, upon its being moved in arrest of judgment, the exception taken was,
that the matter in difference was referred to the plaintiff himself, who made an award. &d
non allocatur. And the case of Serjeant Hards was remembered by Dolben, justice, viz.: The
serjeant took a horse from my lord of Canterbury's bailiff, for a deodand, and the archbishop
brought his action; and it coining to a trial at the assizes in Kent, the serjeant, by rule of
court, referred it to the archbishop, to set the price of the horse, which was done accordingly;
and the serjeant afterwards moved the court to set aside the award for the reason now offered,
but it was denied by Lord Hale and per totain curiam.]
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religion, in obedience to that precept of the gospel, "agree with thine adversary
quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him."(g) And it may be observed that
this gospel precept has a plain reference to the Roman law of the twelve tables,
which expressly directed the plaintiff and defendant to make up the matter,
while they were in the way, or going to the prmetor,- in via, rem utipacunt
orato. There are also many other previous steps which may be taken by a
defendant before he puts in his plea. He may, in real actions, demand a view
of the thing in question, in order to ascertain its identity and other circum-
stances. He may crave oyer (h) of the writ, or of the bond, or other speciality
upon which the action is brought: that is, to hear it read to him; the general-
ity of defendants in the times of ancient simplicity being supposed incapable
to read it themselves, whereupon the whole is entered verbatim upon the record,
and the defendant may take advantage of any condition or other part of it, not
stated in the plaintiffs declaration.(10) *In real actions also the tenant [*3001
may pray in aid, or call for assistance of another, to help him to plead,
because of the feebleness or imbecility of his own estate. Thus a tenant for
life may pray in aid of him that hath the inheritance in remainder or reversion;
and an incumbent may pray in aid of the patron and ordinary: that is, that
they shall be joined in the action, and help to defend the title. Voucher also
is the calling in of some person to answer the action, that hath warranted the
title to the tenant or defendant. This we still make use of in the form of com-
mon recoveries, (i) which are grounded on a writ of entry; a species of action
that we may remember relies chiefly on the weakness of the tenant's title, who
therefore vouches another person to warrant it. If the vouchee appears, he is
made defendant instead of the voucher: but, if he afterward makes default,
recovery shall be had against the original defendant; and he shall recover over
an equivalent in value against the deficient vouchee. In assizes, indeed, where
the principal question is, whether the demandaut or his ancestors were or were
not in possession till the ouster happened, and the title of the tenant is little
(if at all) discussed, there no voucher is allowed; but the tenant may bring a
writ of warrania charite against the warrantor, to compel him to assist him
with a good plea or defence, or else to render damages and the value of the land,
if recovered against the tenant.(') In many real actions also, (k) brought by
or against an infant under the age of twenty-one years, and also in actions of
debt brought against him, as heir to any deceased ancestor, either party may
suggest the nonage of the infant, and pray that the proceedings may be deferred
till his full age; or (in our legal phrase) that the infant may have his age, and
that the parol may demur, (11) that is, that the pleadings may be stayed; and
then they shall not proceed till his full age, unless it be apparent that he can-
not be prejudiced thereby.(!) But, by the statutes of Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 46,
and of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 2, in writs of entry sur disseisin in some par-
ticular cases, and in actions ancestral brought by *an infant, the parol [*301]
shall not demur: otherwise he might be deforced of his whole property, *31
and even want a maintenance till he came of age. So likewise in a writ of
dower the heir shall not have his age; for it is necessary that the widow's claim
be immediately determined, else she may want a present subsistence.(m) Nor
shall an infant patron have it in a quare impedit, (n) since the law holds it
necessary and expedient that the church be immediately filled.
When these proceedings are over, the defendant must then put in his excuse
or plea. Pleas are of two sorts; dilatory pleas, and pleas to the action. Dilatory
(g) Miatt. v. 25. (A) Appendix, No. III, § 6. (i) Book IT, Appendix, No. V, § 2. (J") F. N. B. M.
(k) Dyer, 137. (1) Finch, L. 360. (m) 1 Roll. Abr. 137. (n) Ibid. 139.
(10) [But now a defendant is not allowed oyer of the writ. 1 B. and P. 646; 3 id. 395;
7 East, 383. As to the demand and giving of oyer, and the manner of setting out deeds, &e.,
therein, see 1 Saund. 9. (1), 289, (2); 2 id. 9. (12, 13), 46. (7). 366. (1). 405. (1). 410. (2); Tidd, 8th
ed. 635 to 638, and index, tit. Oyer ; 1 Chit. on P1. 369 to 375.]
(11) But now the parol may not demur in actions, suits or other proceedings against infants.
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pleas are such as tend merely to delay or put off the suit, by questioning the
propriety of the remedy, rather than by denying the injury: pleas to the action
are such as dispute the very cause of suit. The former cannot be pleaded after
a general imparlance, which is an acknowledgment of the propriety of the
action. For imparlances are either general, of which we have before spoken,
and which are granted of course; or special, with a saving of all exceptions to
the writ or count, which may be granted by the prothonotary; or they may
be still more special, with a saving of all exceptions whatsoever which are
granted at the discretion of the court.(o)
1. Dilatory pleas are, 1. To the jurisdiction of the court: alleging, that it
ought not to hold plea of this injury, it arising in Wales or beyond sea; or
because the land in question is of ancient demesne, and ought only to be
demanded in the lord's court, &c. 2. The disability of the plaintiff, by reason
whereof he is incapable to commence or continue the suit; as, that he is an
alien enemy, outlawed, excommunicated, attainted of treason or felony, under a
prmnunire, not in rerum natura (being only a fictitious person), an infant, a
feme-covert, or a monk professed.(12) 3. In abatement, which abatement is either
[*302] of the *writ or the count, for some defect in one of them; as by misnam-
ing the defendant, which is called a misnomer; giving him a wrong addi-
tion, as esquire instead of knight; or other want of form in any material
respect. (13) Or, it may be, that the plaintiff is dead; for the death of either
party is at once an abatement of the suit. (14) And in actions merely personal,
(o) 12 Mod. 529.
(12) [As to this plea, see 1 Chit. on P1. 387, 388. Whenever the subject-matter of the plea
or defence is, that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action at any time, in respect of the sup-
posed cause of action, it may, and usually should, be pleaded in bar; but matter which usually
defeats the present proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forever precluded, should
in general be pleaded in abatement. 4 T. R. 227. Some matters may be pleaded either in
abatement or bar; as outlawry for felony, alien enemy, or attainder, &c. Bac. Ab. Abatement,
N.; Com. Dig. Abatement, K.
The defendant may also plead in abatement, his, or her, own personal disability; as in case
of coverture, when the husband ought to have been joined. 3 T. R. 627; Bac. Ab. Abate-
ment, .]
(13) [Pleas in abatement to the writ, are so termed rather from their effects, than from their
being strictly such pleas; for as oyer of the writ can no longer be craved, no objection can be
taken by plea to matter which is merely contained in the writ. 3 B. and P. 399; 1 B. and P.
645. But if the mistake in the writ be carried also into the declaration, or rather if the declara-
tion, which is presumed to correspond with the writ or bill, be incorrect in respect of some
extrinsic matter, it is then open to the defendant to plead in abatement to the writ or bill :
1 B. and P. 648; and as to such pleas, see 1 Chit. on P1. 390 to 394. Consequently, a misnomer
of the defendant, or giving him a wrong addition, or other want of form in the writ, unless it
be contained in the declaration, is not now pleadable in abatement. See 1 Saund. 318, n. 3;
3 B. and P. 395. And the defendant, to take advantage of any defect in the writ, should in
general, before appearance, move to set it aside for irregularity. 1 B. and P. 647; 5 Moore, 168.
But now the writ itself may be amended; and further restrictions have by the common
law procedure act, 1852, been imposed on pleas in abatement, in addition to those previously
imposed by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 42. By that statute (section 8), Do plea in abatement
for the non-joinder of any person as a co-defendant shall be allowed unless it shall be stated
in such plea that such person is resident within the jurisdiction of the court, and unless the
place of residence of such person shall be stated with certainty -in an affidavit verifying the
plea. And by section 11 no plea in abatement for a misnomer shall be allowed in any personal
action; but in all cases in which a misnomer would, but for that act, have been pleadable,
the defendant may cause the declaration to be amended at the cost of the plaintiff, by insert-
ing the right name upon a judge's summons founded on an affidavit of the right name. And
by section 12, in all actions upon bills of exchange or promissory notes, or other written instru-
ments, the parties to which are designated by the initials or some contraction of the Christian
or first names, it is sufficient in every affidavit to hold to bail, and in the process or declaration
to designate such persons by the same initial letter or contraction of the Christian or first name.]
(14) [But now by the common law procedure act, 1852, an action shall no longer abate by
the death of either party, but may be continued by the legal representative of a sole plaintiff, on
his entering (by leave of the court) a suggestion of the plaintiff's death on the record; or by a
surviving plaintiff when the cause of action survives; or against the legal representatives of
a defendant.]
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arising ex delicto, for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant, as
trespass, battery, and slander, the rule is that actiopersonalis moritur cum per-
sona; (p) and it never shall be revived either by or against the executors or
other representatives. For neither the executors of the plaintiff have received,
nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any
manner of wrong or injury. (15) But in actions arising ex contractu, by breach
of promise and the like, where the right descends to the representatives of the
plaintiff, and those of the defendant have assets to answer the demand, though
the suits shall abate by the death of the parties, yet they may be revived against
or by the executors: (q) being indeed rather actions against the property than
the person, in which the executors have now the same interest that their testator
had before.
These pleas to the jurisdiction, to the disability, or in abatement, were for-
merly very often used as mere dilatory pleas, without any foundation of truth,
and calculated only for delay; but now by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, no dilatory
plea is to be admitted, without affidavit made of the truth thereof, or some
probable matter shown to the court to induce them to believe it true. And
with respect to the pleas themselves, it is a rule, that no exception shall be
admitted against a declaration or writ, unless the defendant will in the same plea
give the plaintiff a better; (r) that is, show him how it might be amended, that
there may not be two objections upon the same account. Neither, by statute 8
and 9 Win. III, c. 31, shall any plea in abatement be admitted in any suit for
partition of lands; nor shall the same be abated by reason of the death of any
tenant.
*All pleas to the jurisdiction conclude to the cognizance of the court: [*303]
praying "judgment, whether the court will have further cognizance of 3]
the suit;" pleas to the disability conclude to the person; by praying "judg-
ment, if the said A, the plaintiff, ought to be answered;" and pleas in abatement
(when the suit is by original) conclude to the writ or declaration; by praying
"judgment of the writ, or declaration, and that the same may be quashed," cas-
setur, made void, or abated; but, if the action be by bill, the plea must pray
"judgment of the bill," and not of the declaration; the bill being here the
original, and the declaration only a copy of the bill.
When these dilatory pleas are allowed, the cause is either dismissed from that
jurisdiction; or the plaintiff is stayed till his disability be removed; or he is
obliged to sue out a new writ, by leave obtained from the court :(s) or to amend
and new frame his declaration. But when on the other hand they are overruled
as frivolous, the defendant has judgment of respondent ouster, or to answer over
in some better manner. It is then incumbent on him to plead,
2. A plea to the action; that is, to answer to the merits of the complaint. This
is done by confessing or denying it.
A confession of- the whole complaint is not very usual, for then the defend-
ant would probably end the matter sooner; or not plead at all, but suffer judg-
ment to go by default. Yet sometimes, after tender and refusal of a debt, if
the creditor harasses his debtor with an action, it then becomes necessary for
the defendant to acknowledge the debt, and plead the tender; adding, that he
has always been ready, tout tenps prist, and still is ready, uncore prist, to dis-
charge it: for a tender by the debtor and refusal by the creditor will in all
cases discharge the costs, (t) but not the debt itself; though in some particular
(p) 4 Inst. 315. (q) March. 14. (r) Brownl. 139. (8) Co. Entr. 271. (t) 1 Ventr. 21.
(15) [By statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, an action of trespass or trespass on the case may be
maintained by the executors or administrators of any deceased person for injury to his real
estate in his lifetime, if such injury were committed within six calendar months before death,
and the action brought within one year after the time of the death; and an action of trespass
or trespass on the case may also be maintained against executors or administrators for wrongs
committed by the deceased to another's property, real or personal, such injury having been
committed within six months of the death, and the action brought within six months after
administration taken.]
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[*304] cases the creditor will totally lose his money.(u)(16) *But frequentlythe defendant confesses one part of the complaint (by a cognovit actio-
nem in respect thereof), and traverses or denies the rest: in order to avoid the
expense of carrying that part to a formal trial, which he has no ground to liti-
(t) Litt. § 338. Co. Litt. 209.
(16) [As questions relative to the tender of a debt or money are of so frequent occurrence,
we will consider the respective rules and decisions under the following heads: 1st. What is a
good tender. 2d. In what cases it may be made. And lastly, the effect and advantages gained
by it: and how these may be superseded.
1. WHAT IS A GOOD TENDER. It is a general rule, that in order to constitute a good legal
tender, the party should not only be ready to pay, and make an actual offer of the sum due,
but actually produce the same, unless such production be dispensed with by the express
declaration of the creditor that he will not accept it, or by some equivalent act. 10 East, 101;
5 Esp. R. 48; 3 T. R. 684; Peake C. N. P. 88; 1 Cromp. 152; 2 NI. and S. 86; 7 Moore, 59.
If the plaintiff do not object to receive the money, it is not sufficient for the defendant to
prove that he had the money with him, and held it in a bag under his arm, he ought to have
laid it down for him. Id; Bull. N. P. 157; 6 Esp. 46. If A says, I am not aware of the exact
balance, but if any be due I am ready to pay it, this is no tender. 15 East, 428.
With respect to the nature of the money tendered, it should be in the current coin of the
realm, and not in bank notes; and see the 56 Geo. Il, c. 68, s. 11, by which gold coin is
declared the only legal tender. But a tender in bank notes is good, unless particularly objected
to on that account at the time. 3 T. R. 554; 2 B. and P. 526. So is a tender of foreign coin
made current here by royal proclamation. 5 Rep. 114, b. So is a tender of provincial bank
notes, or a draft on a banker, unless so objected to. Peake N. P. 3d ed. 237; Tidd, 8th ed. 187,
n. f. It seems, that as any money coined at the mint upon which there is the king's stamp is
good, and that all such money is good in proportion to its value, without a proclamation, such
money would be a good tender. 2 Salk. 446.
With respect to the amount of the sum tendered, it should in general be an offer of the specific
sum due, unqualified by any circumstance wchatever; and therefore tendering a larger sum, and
making cross demand, is insufficient. 2 D. and R. 305. A tender of 201. in bank notes, with
a request to pay the difference over fifteen guineas, is not a good tender as to the fifteen
guineas, though it would have been otherwise if the tender had been in guineas. 3 Campb.
70; 1 id. 181; 6 Taunt. 336. But a tender of a larger sum generally is good. 5 Rep. 114; 8
T. R. 683; sed vid. 2 Esp. 711. And a tender of a larger sum, and asking change, is good,
provided the creditor do not object to it on that account, but only demands a larger sum.
6 Taunt. 336; Peake C. N. P. 88; 2 Esp. c. 711; 3 Campb. 70; and see 1 Gow C. N. P. 121.
A tender of a sum to A, including both a debt due to A, B, and C, and also a debt due to C, is
a good tender of the debt due to the three: 3 T. R. 683; and if several creditors, to whom
money is due in the same right, assemble for the purpose of demanding payment, a tender of
the gross sum, which they all refuse on account of the insufficiency of the amount, is good.
Peake C. 88; 2 T. R. 414.
To constitute a good tender, it must be an unconditional one in payment of the debt; and
therefore where a tender of payment was made, accompanied With a protestation against the
right of the party to receive it, it was held insufficient. 3 Esp. 91. So is a tender accom-
panied with the demand of a receipt in full: 5 Esp. Rep. 48; 2 Campb. 21; sed rid. Peake C. 179;
Stark. on Evid part 4, 1392, n. (g); or upon condition that it shall be received as the whole of
the balance due: 4 Campb. 156; or that a particular document shall be given up to be can-
celled. 2 Campb. 21. To constitute a good tender of stock, the buyer must be called on
opening the books (1 Stra. 533), and the defendant must do all in his power to make it good.
1 Stra. 504.
It is no answer to a plea of tender that the plaintiff had, before the tender, instructed his
attorney to sue out the writ, and that the attorney had applied before the tender for the writ
which was afterwards sued out: 8 T. R. 629; and if the plaintiff brings his action, and dis-
continues it, and commences another, a tender before the latter action is good. 1 Moore, 200.
Any party, being an agent of the debtor, may tender the money. 2 -M. and S. 86.
With respect to the persons to ihom the tender should be made, it will suffice if it be to the
creditor or any authorized agent. 1 Camupb. 477. Tender to an attorney, authorized to issue
out a writ, &c., is good. Dougl. 623. And a tender to an agent has been held good, although
the principal had previously prohibited the agent from receiving the money if offered, the
principal having put his business into the hands of his attorney. 5 Taunt. 307; 1 Marsh. 55,
S. C. A bailiff, who makes a distress, cannot delegate his authority; therefore a tender to his
agent is insufficient: 6 Esp. 95 ; and a tender to of one several creditors is a tender to all. 3 T.
R. 683.
2. IN WHAT CASES A TENDER MAY BE MADE WITH EFFECT. In general, a tender can only
be made with effect in cases where the demand is of a liquidated sum, or of a sum capable of
liquidation by computation. See 2 Burr. 1120. Therefore a tender cannot be pleaded to an
action for general damages upon a contract: 1 Vent. 356; 2 Bla. Rep. 837; 2 B. and P. 234;
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gate. A species of this sort of confession is thepayment of money into court :(v)
which is for the most part necessary upon pleading a tener, and is itself a kind
of tender to the plaintiff; by paying into the hands of the proper officer of the
court as much as the defendant acknowledges to be due, together with the costs
(v) Styl. Pract. Reg. (edit. 1657) 201. 2 Keb. 555. Salk. 596.
3 id. 14; or in covenant, unless for the payment of money: 7 Taunt. 486; 1 Moore, 200; S. C.;
5 Mod. 18; 1 Lord Raym. 566; 12 Mod. 376; 2 H. Bla. 837; or for a tort: 2 Stra. 787, 906
7 T. R. 335; or trespass. 2 Wils. 115. It cannot be pleaded to an action for dilapidations:
8 T. R. 47; Stra. 909; or for not repairing: 2 Salk. 596; or against a carrier forgoods spoiled,
though the tender should be of the invoice price: 2 B. and P. 234; or for not delivering goods
at a certain price per ton: 3 B. and P. 14; or in an action for a false return: 7 T. R. 335; or
for mesne profits. 2 Wils. 115. But in assumpsit against a carrier for not delivering goods,
the defendant having advertised that he would not be answerable for any goods beyond the
value of 201., unless they were entered and paid for accordingly, a tender of the 201. would, it
seems, be available. 1 H. Bla. 299. So a tender may be made with effect to a demand,
for navigation: 7 T. R. 36; 1 Stra. 142; or in an action for principal and interest due on
bonds for payment of moneys by instalments. 3 Burr. 1370. So the penalty of a bond may
with effect be tendered. 2 Bla. 1190. So the arrears of a bond for- 401., payable by 51. per
annum. 2 Stra. 814. So a tender may with effect be made in covenant for rent, or for the
advanced rent of 51. per acre for ploughing meadow grounds. 2 H. Bla. 837; 7 Taunt. 486;
1 Moore, 200 S. C.; and vide 2 Salk. 596. So also on a policy of insurance: 19 Geo. II, c. 37,
, 7 ; 2 Taunt. 317; or in debt for penalty for exercising trade contrary to 5 Eliz. c. 4: 1 Burr.
i21; or for penalty on game laws, being actions popular, and not qui tam. 2 H. Bla. 1052;
2 Stra. 1217. Where a party has wrongfully possessed himself of goods, no tender of freight
is necessary in order to enable the party to maintain the action. 2 T. R. 285.
Justices of the peace, and in like manner excise and custom-house officers, and surveyors of
highways, are enabled by several statutes to tender amends for any thing done by them in the
execution of their offices. Also by the 21 Jac. I, c. 16, § 5, in case of involuntary trespasses,
tender of amends may be made.
Lastly, As TO TUE EFFECT OF A TENDER, AND TIE ADVANTAGES ACQUIRED BY IT. It should
in the first place be observed that the debtor is liable for the non-performance of his contract
if the money be not paid at the time agreed upon; the mere tendering the money afterward
is not sufficient to discharge him from such liability; it goes only in mitigation of damages;
though indeed if a jury should find that no damages were sustained by reason of the defend-
ant not tendering the money at the time agreed upon, the defendant would defeat the action
by the tender afterward. See Salk. 622; 8 East, 168; 1 Lord Raym. 254; 7 Taunt. 486. The
tender of money due on a promissory note, accompanied with a demand of the note, stops
the running of interest. 3 Campb. 296; 8 East, 168; 4 Leon. 209. The tender, if pleaded,
admits the contract and facts stated in the declaration. 3 Taunt. 95 ; Peake, 15; 2 T. R. 275 ;
4 id. 579. If, therefore, the defendant's liability is to be disputed, a tender should not be
pleaded. So if there be a special count, and the defendant mean to deny it, the tender should
be pleaded to the other counts only: see Tidd, 8th ed. 676 ; and if there be any doubt as to
the sufficiency of the tender, it is not advisable to plead it, but more expedient to pay the
amount into court upon the common rule; for if the defendant should not succeed in prov-
ing the tender, he will have to pay all the costs of the trial; whereas if the money be paid
into court, and the plaintiff cannot prove more due, he will be liable to pay all costs subse-
quent to the time of paying the money into court. If the sum tendered be not sufficient, and
the plaintiff should succeed on the general issue, the plaintiff would still be entitled to the
costs of the issue on the plea of tender. 5 East, 282; 5 Taunt. 660. If the defendant bring
money into court on a plea of tender, the plaintiff may take it out, though he deny the tender.
1 B. and P. 332. The plaintiff, it seems, can gain no advantage by not taking the money out
of court; and it has been said, that if the plaintiff will not take the money, but takes issue
on the tender, and it is found against him, the defendant shall have it. 1 B. and P. 334,
note a.; Lord Raym. 642: 2 Stra. 1027. If the plaintiff should succeed, on the trial, in prov-
ing a larger sum to be due than that tendered, though that sum be below 40s., yet the plaint-
iff will be entitled to costs. Dougl. 448.
A tender, not being equivalent to payment itself, and only suspending the plaintiff's rem-
edy (2 T. R. 27), its effect may be superseded by prior or a subsequent demand and refusal, to
pay the precise sum tendered. 1 Campb. 181; 5 B. and A. 630. A subsequent demand of a
larger sum will not suffice: id. ; or a subsequent demand, accompanied by another demand
of another sum not due. 1 Esp. 115; 7 Taunt. 213. Such demand should be made by a per-
son authorized to'give the debtor a discharge. 1 Campb. 478, n. ; 1 Esp. 115. A demand
made by the clerk of the plaintiffs attorney, who was an entire stranger to defendant, is
insufficient. 1 Campb. 478. A subsequent application to one of two joint debtors, and a
rfuisal, is sufficient. 1 Stark. 323; 4 Esp. 93; Noy, 135; Vin. Ab. Evid. T. B. 97. Delivering
a letter at defendant's house to a clerk, who returned with an answer that the debt should be
settled, is prima facie evidence of a demand. 1 Stark. 323. A prior demand, and refusal, is
an answer to the plea of tender. 8 East, 168; 1 Saund. 33, n. 2; Bull. N. P. 156 ; 1 Campb. 478]
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hitherto incurred, in order to prevent the expense of any farther proceedings.
This may be done upon what is called a motion; which is an occasional appli-
cation to the court by the parties or their counsel, in order to obtain some rule
or order of court, which becomes necessary in the progress of a cause ; and it is
usually grounded upon an affidavit (the perfect tense of the verb affido), being
a voluntary oath before some judge or officer of the court, to evince the truth
of certain facts, upon which the motion is grounded: though no such affidavit
is necessary for payment of money into court.(17) If after the money paid in,
the plaintiff proceeds in his suit, it is at his own peril: for, if he does not prove
more due than is so paid into court, he shall be nonsuited and pay the defend-
ant costs; but he shall still have the money so paid in, for that the defendant
has acknowledged to be his due.(18) In the French law the rule of practice is
grounded upon principles somewhat similar to this; for there, if a person be sued
for more than he owes, yet he loses his cause if he doth not tender so much as
he really does owe.(w) To this head may also be referred the practice of what is
called a set-off: whereby the defendant acknowledges the justice of the plaint-
iff's demand on the one hand; but on the other sets up a demand of his own,
to counterbalance that of the plaintiff, either in the whole or in part: as, if the
plaintiff sues for ten pounds due on a note of hand, the defendant may set off
nine pounds due to himself for merchandise sold to the plaintiff, and in case
he pleads such set-off, must pay the remaining balance in court. This answers
[*305] *very nearly to the compensatio or stoppage, of the civil law, (x) and
depends on the statutes 2 Geo. II, c. 22, and 8 Geo. II, c. 24, which
enact, that where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and defendant,
one debt may be set against the other, and either pleaded in bar or given in
evidence upon the general issue at the trial; which shall operate as payment,
and extinguish so much of the plaintiff's demand.(19)
(w) Sp. L. b. 6, e. 4. (x) .F. 16, 2, 1.
(17) By the common law procedure act of 1852, the defendant in any action, except for
assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, or
debauching the plaintiff's daughter or servant, may pay into court, by leave of the court or a
judge, a sum of money by way of compensation. The statutes 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93, and 27
and 28 Vic. c. 95, extend the right to actions for compensation to the family of a person
killed by accident, and under statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 96, a plea of apology and payment into
court is allowed in certain actions for libel.
(18) [The effect of the payment of money into court is nearly similar to that of a tender.
Tidd, 8th ed. 676. This is the only case where a party is bound by the payment of money:
2 T. R. 645; and though paid in by mistake, the court will not order it to be restored to
defendant; though perhaps in a case of fraud they would. 2 B. and P. 392.]
(19) [But in such case, notice must be given at the time of pleading the general issue; and
as to the mode of setting off, see 1 Chit. on Pl. 4th ed. 494 to 497.
In some cases, this plea or notice is unnecessary, as where the defendant's demand is more
in the nature of a deduction than a set-off. Thus a defendant is in all cases entitled to retain
or claim by way of deduction, all just allowances or demands accruing to him, or payments
made by him, in respect of the same transaction or account which forms the ground of action:
this is not a set-off, but rather a deduction. See 1 Bla. Rep. 651 ; 4 Burr. 2133, 2221. And
where demands originally cross, and not arising out of the same transaction, have by subse-
quent express agreement been connected, and stipulated to be deducted or set-off against
each other, the balance is the debt, and the only sum recoverable by suit without any special
plea of set-off, though it is advisable in most cases, and necessary when the action is on a
specialty, to plead it. 5 T. R. 135; 3 id. 599; 3 Taunt. 76; 2 id. 170. In actions at the suit
of assignees of bankrupts, a set-off need not be pleaded or given notice of: 1 T. R. 115,
116; 6 id. 58, 59; though the practice is so to plead, or give notice of such set-off.
It may be important here also to observe, that these acts were passed more for the benefit
of the defendants than the plaintiffs, and are not imperative; so that a defendant may have
his right to set off, and bring a cross action for the debt due to him from the plaintiff; 2 Camp.
594; 5 Taunt. 148; though he cannot safely arrest. 3 B. and Cres. 139. And where the
defendant is not prepared at the time the plaintiff sues him to prove the set-off, it is best rot
to avail himself of it, for if the defendant should attempt but not succeed on the trial in
proving the set-off, he could not afterwards sue for the amount; and a party cannot bring an
action for what he has succeeded in setting off in a former suit against him; though if the
set-off were more than sufficient to cover the plaintiff's demand in the former action, the
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Pleas, that totally deny the cause of complaint, are either the general issue,
or a special plea, in bar.
1. The general issue, or general plea, is what traverses, thwarts, and denies
at once the whole declaration; without offering any special matter whereby to
defendant therein might then maintain an action for the surplus. 3 Esp. Rep. 104. Though
the defendant does not avail himself of the set-off, intending to bring a cross action, the
plaintiff may defeat it by taking a verdict for the whole sum he proves to be due to him,
subject to be reduced to the sum really due on the balance of accounts, if the defendant will
afterwards enter into a rule not to sue for the debt intended to be set off; or he may take a
verdict for the smaller sum, with a special indorsement on the postea, as a foundation for the
court to order a stay of proceedings, if an action should be brought for the amount of the set-
off. 1 Campb. 252.
The demand, as well of the plaintiff as of the defendant, must be a debt. A set-off is not
allowed in an action for uncertain damages, whether in assumpsit, covenant, or for a tort,
trover, detinue, replevin, or trespass. Bull N. P. 181; 3 Campb. 329; 4 T. R. 512; 1 Bla. Rep.
394; 2 id. 910.
The only cases in which a set-off is allowed are in assumpsit, debt, and covenant for the
non-payment of money, and for which an action of debt or indebitatus might be sustained:
2 Bla. Rep. 911; or where a bond in a penalty is given for securing the payment of money
on an annuity: 2 Burr. 820; or at least stipulated damages. 2 T. R. 32. The demand to be
set off, also, must not be for unliquidated damages, although incurred by a penalty. 1 Bla.
Rep. 394; 6 T. R. 488; 1 Taunt. 137; 2 Burr. 1024; 2 Bla. Rep. 910; 1 Taunt. 137; 5 B. and
A. 92; 3 Campb. 329; Peake Rep. 41; 6 Taunt. 162; 1 Marsh. 514, S. C.; 2 Brod. and B. 89;
1 M. and S. 499; 5 id. 539, &c. See cases in 1 Chit. on Pl. 4th ed. 486, 487; Stark. on Evid.
1312, part 4. The defendant's bringing an action, or obtaining a verdict for a debt, is no
waiver of the right to set off the debt. 2 Burr. 1229; 8 T. R. 186. And a judgment may be
pleaded by way of set-off, though a writ of error be depending upon it: 3 T. R. 188, in notes;
but not so after plaintiff is taken in execution. 5 M. and S. 103. The debt to be set off must
be a legal and subsisting demand; an equitable debt will not suffice. See 16 East, 36, 136; 7
id. 173. A demand barred by the statute of limitations cannot be set off. 2 Stra. 1271 ; Peake
Rep. 121; Bull. N. P. 180. An attorney cannot set off his bill for business done in court,
unless he has previously, and in a reasonable time to be taxed, delivered a bill signed. 1 Esp.
C. 449. But it is not necessary that a month should intervene bbtween the delivery of the bill
and the trial. Id.
The debt sought to be recovered and that to be set off, must be mutual, and due in the
same right: therefore a joint debt cannot be set off against a separate demand, nor a separate
debt against a joint one (2 Taunt. 178; Montague, 28; 6 M. and S. 489), unless it be soexpressly agreed betwseen all the parties: 2 Taunt. 170 ; and a debt on a joint and several
bond of several persons, may be set off to an action brought by only one of the obligors. 2
T. R. 32. A defendant sued for his own debt, may set off a debt due to him as surviving
partner: 6 T. R. 493 ; 6 id. 582; and in an action brought by an ostensible and a dormant partner,
the defendant may set off a debt due from the ostensible partner alone. 2 Esp. C. 469; 7 T.
R. 861, n. S. C.; see Peake, 196; 12 Yes. 846; 11 id. 27; id. 617; 16 East, 130. A debt due to
a man in right of his wife, cannot be set off in an action against him on his own bond. Bul.
N. P. 179. A debt due from a wife dum sola, cannot be set-off in an action brought by the
husband alone, unless the defendant has made himself individually liable. 2 Esp. C. 594. A
debt from an executor in his own right, cannot be set off against a debt to the testator (3 Atk.
691), though the executor is residuary legatee. Id. So a debt which accrued to the defend-
ant in the lifetime of the testator, cannot be set off against a debt that accrued to the executor
even in that character after the testator's death. Bull. N. P. 180; Willes, 103,106.
Questions of difficulty frequently arise in cases of set-off, where the agent of a party deals
as principal. The rule in these cases is, that if an agent, dealing for a principal, but conceal-
ing that principal, delivers goods in his own name, the person contracting with him has a
right to consider him as the principal; and though the real principal may appear and sue,
yet the purchaser may in such case set off any claim he has against the agent. 7 T. R. 360;
1 M. and S. 576; 2 Marsh. 501; Holt C. N. P. 124. But a debt due from a broker cannot be
set off, in an action by the principal against the purchaser to recover the price of goods sold
by the broker, not disclosing his name. 2 B. and A. 137. And if an agent sells goods as
his own, or has a lien upon them, and does not part with the goods unless the purchaser
expressly agrees to pay him, the purchaser, in an action brought against him by such agent
for the price of the goods, cannot set off a debt due from the owner to the purchaser. 2 Chit.
R. 387; 7 T. R. 859. But if an agent deliver goods without payment, and thereby parts
with his lien, the purchaser may, in an action by the agent, set off a debt due from the princi-
pal. 7 Taunt. 243. And where an auctioneer had sold to the defendant the goods of A as
the goods of B, it was held that this was such a fraud that defendant might set off a debt
due to him from B against the price of the goods of A. Id. ; 1 J. B. Moore, 178. As to set-
off in actions, by or against assignees of bankrupts, see 1 Chit. on P1. 492 to 494; Stark. on
Evid. part 4, 106.
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evade it. As in trespass either vi et armis, or on the case, non culpabilis, not
guilty; (y) in debt upon contract, nihil debet, he owes nothing; in debt on bond,
non est factum, it is not his deed; on an assumpsit, non assumpsil, he made no
such promise. Or in real actions, nul tort, no wrong done; nul disseisin, no
disseisin; and in a writ of right, the mise or issue is, that the tenant has more
right to hold than the demandant has to demand. These pleas are called the
general issue, because by importing an absolute and general denial of what is
alleged in the declaration, they amount at once to an issue: by which we mean
a fact affirmed on one side and denied on the other.
Formerly the general issue was seldom pleaded, except when the party meant
wholly to deny the charge alleged against him. But when he meant to dis-
tinguish away or palliate the charge, it was always usual to set forth the partic-
ular facts in what is called a special plea; which was originally intended to
apprise the court and the adverse party of the nature and circumstances of the
defence, and to keep the law and the fact distinct. And it is an invariable
rule, that every defence which cannot be thus specially pleaded, may be given
[*306] in evidence upon the general issue at the trial. But the science *of special
pleading having been frequently perverted to the purposes of chicane
and delay, the courts have of late in some instances, and the legislature in
many more, permitted the general issue to be pleaded, which leaves every thing
open, the fact, the law, and the equity of the case: and have allowed special
matter to be given in evidence at the trial. And though it should seem as if
much confusion and uncertainty would follow from so great a relaxation of the
strictness anciently observed, yet experience has shown it to be otherwise;
especially with the aid of a new trial, in case either party be unfairly surprised
by the other.
2. Special pleas, in bar of the plaintiff's demand, are very various, according
to the circumstances of the defendant's case. As, in real actions, a general
release or a fine, both of which may destroy and bar the plaintiff's title. Or, in
personal actions, an accord, arbitration, conditions performed, nonage of the
defendant, or some other fact which precludes the plaintiff from his action. (z)
Ajustfication is likewise a special plea in bar; as in actions of assault and
battery, son assault demesne, that it was the plaintiff's own original assault;
in trespass, that the defendant did the thing complained of in right of some
office which warranted him so to do; or, in an action of slander, that the
plaintiff is really as bad a man as the defendant said he was.
Also, a man may plead the statutes of limitation (a) in bar; (20) or the time
limited by certain acts of parliament, beyond which no plaintiff can lay his
(y) Appendix, No. II, § 4. (z) Ibid. No. IlI, § 6. (a) See pages 188, 196.
Wherever by a contract mutual duties and obligations are laid upon two parties, and one
sues for a breach by the other, the defendant may meet the demand by a counter-claim for a
breach of duty by the plaintiff. This is called recoupment. 2 Pars. on Con. 247. It differs
from set-off, in that the damages recouped must grow out of a breach of the same contract
on which suit is brought: Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171; Stow v. Yarwood, 14 Ill. 424:
also in that the damages may be unliquidated, and the defence may be made in cases of tort,
provided the tort springs from violation of contract. Stow v. Yarwood, supra.
If the defendant's damages exceed the claim established by the plaintiff, the action will
thereby be defeated, but the defendant cannot have judgment for the excess. Britton v.
Turner, 6 N. H. 481; Ward v. Fellers, 3 Mich. 281.
(20) [The statute does not begin to run till the cause of action is complete, and the party is
capable of suing on it. Cro. Car. 139; 1 Lev. 48; Salk. 442; 1 Bla. Rep. 354. No action lies
against a consignee of goods for not accounting and returning the goods undisposed of, until
demand, and therefore the statute does not begin to run until the time when demand is made.
1 Taunt. 572. The statute begins to operate only from the time when a bill of exchange or
promissory note, &c., is due, and not from the date: 1 H. B. 631; 5 B. and A. 212; and no debt
accrues on a bill payable at sight, until it be presented for payment. 2 Taunt. 323. The statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of a note payable on demand. 1 Ves. 344; 2 Selw.
4th ed. 131, 339; Cro. Eliz. 548; and see Chitty on Bills, 6th ed. 373. Where a payee
of a bill of exchange was dead at the time the bill became due, it was held that the
statute did not begin to run until letters of administration were taken out: 5 B. and
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cause of action. This, by the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, in a writ of right, is
sixty years: in assizes, writs of entry, or other possessory actions real, of the
seisin of one's ancestors, in lands; and either of their seisin, or one's own, in
rents, suits, and services, fifty years: and in actions real for lands grounded
A. 212; Skin. 555; but where the cause of action is complete in the lifetime of the testator,
then the statute begins to run from that time, and not from the granting of the probate.
Willes, 27. Where a breach of a contract is attended with special damage, the statute
runs from the time of the breach, which is the gist of the action, and not from the time
it was discovered: 3 B. and A. 628, 288; 4 Moore, 508; 2 Brod. and B. 73, S. C.; or the
damage arose. 5 B. and A. 204. If there is mutual credit between two parties, though the
items on both sides are above six years old, with the exception of one item on each side, which
are just within the period, this is sufficient to take the whole out of the statute, for every new
item and credit in an account given by one party to the other is an admission of there being
some unsettled account between them. 6 T. R. 189; 2 Saund. 127, a. n. (6). But where all
the items are on one side, so that the account is not mutual, as, for instance, in an account
between a tradesman and his customer, the last item which happens to be within six years,
will not draw after it those which are of a longer standing. Bull. N. P. 149.
The exception in the statute, respecting merchants' accounts, extends only to those cases
where there are mutual and reciprocal accounts and demands between two persons, and
where such accounts are current and open, and not to accounts stated between them: 2 Ves.
400; Bull. N. P. 149; Sir W. Jones, 401; 1 Sid. 465; 1 Vent. 89; for no other actions are
excepted but actions of account. Carth. 226; 1 Show. 341, S. C.; 2 Saund. 127, a; 2 Mod. 812,
and 1 id. 70; 1 Lev. 298; 4 Mod. 105; Peake, 121; 1 Vern. 456; 2 id. 276. It has been con-
sidered, that by the effect of the above exception, there can be no limitation to a merchant's
open and unsettled account; this opinion however appears erroneous, and if there is no item
in the account, or acknowledgment of the debt, within six years, the statute will take effect;
but as we have before seen, if even the last item of the account is within six years, that pre-
serves all the preceding items of debt and credit from the operation of the statute: 6 Ves. 580.
15 id. 198; 18 id. 286; 2 id. 200, acc.; sed ride opinion of Lord Hardwicke mentioned in 19 id.
185; 6 T. R. 189, 192, cont.; and from these decisions it appears, that merchants' accounts
stand not upon better grounds, in regard to the statute, than other parties.
The object of this statute was to protect individuals against forgotten claims of so obso-
lete a nature that the evidence relating to the contract might probably be no longer to be found,
and therefore might lead to perjury. It proceeds also upon the supposition that the debtor
has paid, but after a lapse of time may have lost his voucher. See 5 M. and S. 76, per
Bayley, J.; 3 B. and A., per Abbott, J. In cases, therefore, where there is an acknowledgment
of the debtor or contractor, to prove the existence of the debt or obligation, or an express prom-
ise to pay or perform the same, the statute will not operate to protect him, notwithstanding
the lapse of six years, or more, since the cause of the action may have accrued. But, if a cause
of action arising from the breach of a contract to do an act at a specific time, be once barred
by the statute, a subsequent acknowledgment by the party that he broke the contract will
not, it seems, take the case out of the statute : 2 (amp. 160 ; and see Peake's Evid. 205 ; 5
Moore, 105; 2 B. and C. 372, S. C.; 5 B. and A. 204; 3 id. 288 ; and a subsequent acknowledg-
ment of a trespass will not take the case out of the act. 1 B. and A. 92; 2 Chit. Rep.
249, S. C.
The slightest acknowledgment has been held sufficient: 2 Burr. 1099; Bull. N. P. 149;
Cowp. 548; as where the debtor exclaimed to the plaintiff, "What an extravagant bill you
have delivered me!" Peake, N. P. 93. So where the defendant met a man in a fair, and said
that he went there to avoid the plaintiff, to whom he was indebted, this was held to save the
statute. Loft. 86. In an action by an administrator, an agreement for a compromise executed
between intestate and defendant, wherein the existence of the debt sued for was admitted,
was deemed sufficient to take the case out of the statute. 9 Price, 122. It is sufficient to
prove, that a demand being made by a seaman on the owner of a ship for wages, which had
accrued during an embargo, he said, "if others paid he should do the same." 4 Camp. 185.
A promise, "if there should be any mistake, it should be rectified," referring to payments
actually made, is sufficient. 2 B. and C. 149; 3 D. and R. 522, S. C.: sed queere. And it makes
no difference whether the acknowledgment be accompanied with a promise or refusal to pay;
a bare acknowledgment is sufficient. 16 East, 420; 2 Burr. 1099; 5 M. and S. 75; 2.B. and
Cres. 154. The construction of an ambiguous letter or declaration of a defendant, on being
served with a writ, or requested to pay a debt, neither admitting or denying it, is strong inti-
mation that it is an acknowledgment, since, if the defendant knew he owed nothing, he
would have declared so. 2 T. R. 760; 1 Bing. 266. Where the original agreement is in
writing, in order to take the case out of the statute of frauds, a subsequent promise, or admis-
sion of the liability to perform such agreement, need not be in writing to take the case out of
the statute of limitations. 1 B. and A. 690. An acknowledgment after action brought is
good. Selw. N. P. tit. Limitations; Burr. 1099. The admission to a third person is sufficient.
3 B. and A. 141; Loft. 86; 2 B. and C. 154.
On the other hand, where the defendant said, "the executor always promised not to distress
me," this was held no evidence of a promise to the testator, to take the case out of the statute:
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upon one's own seisin or possession, such possession must have been within
thirty years. By statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 5, this limitation does not extend to
[*307] any suit for advowsons, upon reasons given in a *former chapter.(b)
But by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 2, a time of limitation was extended to
(b) See page 250.
6 Taunt. 210; so a declaration, "I cannot afford to pay my new debts, much more my old
ones," is insufficient: 4 D. and R. 179; and so where in assumpsit by an attorney to recover
his charges, relative to the grant of an annuity, evidence that the defendant said, " he thought it
had been settled when the annuity was granted, but that he had been in so much trouble since
that he could not recollect any thing about it," is not a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt
to save the statute, notwithstanding proof that plaintiff's bill was not paid when the annuity
was granted. 1 J. B. Moore, 340; 7 Taunt. 608, S. C. The referring plaintiff to the defend-
ant's attorney, who, he added, was in possession of his determination and ability, is not an
admission that any thing is due: 1 New Rep. 20; and where a defendant, on being applied to
by the plaintiff's attorney for the payment of the debt, wrote in answer, "that he would wait
on the plaintiff when he should be able to satisfy him respecting the misunderstanding which
had occurred between them," this was holden not sufficient to take the case out of the statute:
Holt C. N. P. 380; and see 4 Esp. 184; 5 id. 81; a declaration, " I will see my attorney, and
tell him to do what is right," is insufficient. 3 D. and R. 267. Payment of money into court,
on a special count, will not save the operation of the statute: 3 B. and C. 10; 4 D. and
R. 632, S. C.; it only admits the debt to the amount paid in. Id. Bunb. 100.
Where the defendant, an executor, who was sued for money had and received from his
testator, was proved to have said, "I acknowledge the receipt of the money, but the testatrix
gave it to me," it was held insufficient: Bull. N. P. 148; and so where the aefendant, on being
applied to for payment of a debt, said, "you owe me more money; I have a set-off against it."
2 B. and A. 759. Where a party, on being asked for the payment of his attorney's bill,
admitted that there had been such a bill, but stated that it had been paid to the deceased part-
ner of the attorney, who had retained the amount out of the floating balance in his hands, it
seems, that, in order to take the case out of the statute, evidence is inadmissible to show that
the bill had never, in fact, been paid in this manner. 4 B. and A. 568. In all cases, unless the
defendant actually acknowledge that the debt or obligation did originally exist, the statute
will not be avoided. 4 Maule and S. 457; 2 Camp. 160.
The acknowledgment of one partner, to bind the other, must be clear and explicit; and,
therefore, it is not sufficient, in order to take a case out of the statute, in an action on a prom-
issory note, to show a payment, by a joint maker of a note, to the payee within six years, so
as to throw it upon the defendant to show that the payment was not made on account of the
note. 1 Stark. 488.
Where one of two joint drawers of a bill of exchange became bankrupt, and under his
commission the indorsees proved a debt (beyond the amount of the bill) for goods sold, &c.,
and they exhibited the bill as a security they then held for their debt, and afterwards received
a dividend; it was held, that, in an action by the indorsees of the bill against the solvent part-
ner, the statute of limitations was a good defence, although the dividend had been paid by the
assignees of the bankrupt partner within six years. 1 B. and A. 463; and see 1 B. and C.
248; 2 D. and R. 363, S. C. So where A and B made a joint and several promissory note,
and A died, and, ten years after his death, B paid interest on the note, it was holden, in an
action thereon against the executors of A, that the payment of interest by B did not take the
case out of the statute, so as to make the executors liable. 2 B. and C. 23; 3 D. and R. 200,
S. C. An acknowledgment by an accommodation acceptor, within six years, of his liability
to the payee, is not sufficient to take the case out of the statute, for the drawer. 3 Stark. 186.
It is enacted, by 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, that, in actions of debt or upon the case, grounded upon
any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only should be deemed sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of
the enactments of the statutes of limitations, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof,
unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing to
be signed by the party chargeable thereby. And that, where there shall be two or more joint
contractors, or executors or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, exec-
utor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactments, or either of them, so as to
be chargeable, in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made
and signed by any other or others of them. The act not to alter the effect of any payment of
any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever. And in actions to be commenced
against two or more such joint contractors, or executors or administrators, if it shall appear
at the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred by either of the said recited acts, or
this act, as to one or more of such joint contractors, or executors or administrators, shall nev-
ertheless be entitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a
new acknowledgment or premise, or otherwise, judgment may be given, and costs allowed,
for the plaintiff, as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover; and for
the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff.
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the case of the king, viz., sixty years precedent to 19 Feb. 1623; (c) but, this
becoming ineffectual by effilux of time, the same date of limitation was fixed by
statute 9 Geo. III, c. 16, to commence and be reckoned backwards, from the time
of bringing any suit or other process, to recover the thing in question; so that
a possession for sixty years is now a bar even against the prerogative, in deroga-
tion of the ancient maxim " nullum tempus occurit regi." By another statute,
21 Jac. I, c. 16, twenty years is the time of limitation in any writ of formedon;
and by a consequence, twenty years is also the limitation in every action of eject-
ment, for no ejectment can be brought, unless where the lessor of the plaintiff
is entitled to enter on the lands, (d) and by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 16, no entry
can be made by any man, unless within twenty years after his right shall
accrue. (21) Also, all actions of trespass (quare clausum fregit, or otherwise),
detinue, trover, replevin, account, and case (except upon accounts between mer-
chants), debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent, are limited by the statute last
mentioned to six years after the cause of action commenced: and actions of assault,
menace, battery, mayhem, and imprisonment, must be brought withinfour years,
and actions for words within two years, after the injury committed. (22) And by
statute 31 Eliz. c. 5, all suits, indictments, and informations upon any penal stat-
utes, where any forfeiture is to the crown alone, shall be sued within two years;
and where the forfeiture is to a subject, or to the crown and a subject, within one
year after the offence committed, (23) unless where any other time is specially
limited by the statute. Lastly, by statute 10 Win. III, c. 14, no writ of error,
scire facias, or other suit, shall be brought to reverse any judgment, fine or re-
covery, for error, unless it be prosecuted within twenty years. (24) The use of
these statutes of limitation is to preserve the peace of the kingdom, and to pre-
vent those innumerable perjuries which might ensue if a man were allowed to
(c) 8 Inst. 189. (d) See page 206.
By section 2, that, if defendant in action on simple contract shall plead in abatement to the
effect that any other person ought to be jointly sued, and issue be joined on such plea, and it
should appear at the trial that the action could not, by reason of the said recited acts, or the
present act, be maintained against the other person named in such plea, the issue joined on
such plea should be found against the party pleading the same.
By section 3, no endorsement or memorandum of payment made after the 1st of January,
1829, upon any promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on behalf of the party
to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment, so as
to take the case out of the operation of either of the said statutes.
By section 4, said recited acts and the present act shall apply to the case of any debt on
simple contract, by way of set-off on the part of any defendant, either by plea, notice, or
otherwise.
By section 8, no memorandum or other writing made necessary by the act shall be deemed
to be an agreement within the meaning of the stamp acts.]
(21) Some important modifications of the statutes limiting the time for the commence-
ment of suit, were made by statutes 3 and 4 Win. IV, cc. 27, 42. Actions for the recovery
of lands or rents are required by these statutes to be brought within twenty years, with
a saving of cases of persons under disability, who are allowed ten years after the disability
ceases, but not to exceed forty years in all. Personal actions, generally, are required
to be brought within six years after the right accrues, but suits in trespass, for assault and
battery, must be brought within four years, and suits for verbal slander within two years.
Actions upon specialties may be brought at any time within twenty years. Actions against
justices, constables, &c., for any thing done in the execution of their office, must be brought
within six calendar months.
The statute 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, commonly called Lord Tenterden's act, has been re-enacted
in its main features in many of the American states. As to the defence of the statute gene-
rally, and what is sufficient to take a case out of it, see 2 Pars. on Cout. 341 et seq.
(22) In this, as well as in the subsequent statutes, there was a saving in the case of persons
under disability.
(23) [Where the forfeiture is to the crown and a subject, a common informer must sue
within one year, and the crown may prosecute for the whole penalty, at any time within two
years after that year ended.]
Penal actions at the suit of the party aggrieved must now be brought within two years after
the wrong done. Statute 8 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42.
(24) The time for bringing error is now limited to six years, by the common law procedure
act, 1852.
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bring an action for any injury committed at any distance of time. Upon both
[,308] these accounts the law, *therefore, holds, that "interest reipubliec ut sit
finis litium :" and upon the same principle the Athenian laws in gene-
ral prohibited all actions where the injury was committed .five years before the
complaint was made. (e) If, therefore, in any suit, the injury or cause of action
happened earlier than the period expressly limited by law, the defendant may
plead the statutes of limitations in bar: as upon an assumpsit, or promise to pay
money to the plaintiff, the defendant may plead non assumpsit infra sex annos;
he made no such promise within six years; which is an effectual. bar to the
complaint. (25)
An estoppel is likewise a special plea in bar; which happens where a man hath
done some act, or executed some deed, which estops or precludes him from aver-
ring any thing to the contrary. As if tenant for years (who hath no freehold)
levies a fine to another person. Though this is void as to strangers, yet it shall
work as an estoppel to the cognizor; for if he afterwards brings an action to
recover these lands, and his fine is pleaded against him, he shall thereby be
estopped from saying that he had no freehold at the time, and therefore was
incapable of levying it.
The conditions and qualities of a plea (which, as well as the doctrine of
estoppels, will also hold equally, mutatis mutandis, with regard to other parts
of pleading), are, 1. That it be single and containing only one matter; for
duplicity begets confusion. But by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, a man, with
leave of the court, may plead two or more distinct matters or single pleas; as,
in an action of assault and battery, these three, not guilty, son assault demesne,
and the statute of limitations. 2. That it be direct and positive, and not argu-
mentative. 3. That it have convenient certainty of time, place and persons.
4. That it answer the plaintiff's allegations in every material point. 5. That it
be so pleaded as to be capable of trial.(26)
[.309] *Special pleas are usually in the affirmative, sometimes in the negative;
but they always advance some new fact not mentioned in the declaration;
and then they must be averred to be true in the common form,-" and this he
is ready to verify." This is not necessary in pleas of the general issue; those
always containing a total denial of the facts before advanced by the other party,
and therefore putting him upon the proof of them.
It is a rule in pleading, that no man be allowed to plead specially such a plea
as amounts only to the general issue, or a total denial of the charge; but in
such case he shall be driven to plead the general issue in terms, whereby the
whole question is referred to a jury. But if the defendant, in an assize or action
of trespass, be desirous to refer the validity of his title to the court rather than
the jury, he may state his title specially, and at the same time give colour to the
plaintiff, or suppose him to have an appearance or colour of title, bad indeed in
(e) Pott. Ant. b. i, c. 21.
(25) In the case of promises, a new promise, or an unqualified acknowledgment of liability,
will be sufficient to keep alive the demand for the full period allowed by the statute in which
to bring suit; but now, by Lord Tenterden's act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, such promise or acknowl-
edgment is ineffectual unless in writing.
(26) [In addition to these qualities, it should be observed, that every plea in bar must be
adapted to the nature of the action, and conformable to the count: Co. Litt. 303, a, 285, b;
Bac. Ab. Pleas, I, per tot.; 1 Rol. Rep. 216; must answer the whole declaration or count, or,
rather, all that it assumes in the introductory part to answer, and no more: Co. Litt. 303, b;
Com. Dig. Pleader, E. 1, 36; 1 Saund. 28; 2 B. and P. 427; 3 id. 174; must admit or confess
the fact it justifies: 3 T. R. 298; 1 Salk. 394; Carth. 380; 1 Saund. 28; must be certain: Com.
Dig. tit. Pleader, E. 5, &c.; and must be true, and not too large. Hob. 295; Bac. Ab. tit.
Pleas, G. 4. For more particular information as to these qualities, see 1 Chit. on P1. 451 to
463; as to their forms and particular parts, see id. 467 to 477.
The same rules which prevail in the construction and allowance of a declaration, do so in
the case of pleas in bar. See ante, 289, notes. If the plea be bad in part, it is so for the
whole. Com. Dig. Pleader, E. 36; 3 T. R. 376; 3 B. and P. 174; 1 Saund. 337. The rules as
to surplusage in a declaration here also prevail.]
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point of law, but of which the jury are not competent judges. As if his own
true title be, that he claims by feoffment, with livery from A, by force of which
he entered on the lands in question, he cannot plead this by itself, as it amounts
to no more than the general issue, nul tort, nul disseisin, in assize, or not guilty
in an action of trespass. But he may allege this specially, provided he goes
farther and says, that the plaintiff claiming by colour of a prior deed of feoffment
without livery, entered; upon whom he entered; and may then refer himself
to the judgment of the court which of these two titles is the best in point of
law. (J) (27)
When the plea of the defendant is thus put in, if it does not amount to an
issue or total contradiction of the declaration, but only evades it, the plaintiff
may plead again, and reply to the defendant's plea: either traversing it; that
is, totally denying it; as, if in an aceion of debt upon bond the defendant pleads
solvit ad diem, that he paid the money when *due, here the plaintiff in [*310]
his replication may totally traverse this plea, by denying that the defend-
ant paid it: or, he may allege new matter in contradiction to the defendant's
plea; as when the defendant pleads no award made, the plaintiff may reply and
set forth an actual award, and assign a breach; (g) or the replication may con-
fess and avoid the plea, by some new matter or distinction consistent with the
plaintiff's former declaration; as, in an action for trespassing upon land whereof
the plaintiff is seized, if the defendant shows a title to the land by descent, and
that therefore he had a right to enter, and gives colour to the plaintiff, the plaint-
iff may either traverse and totally deny the fact of the descent; or he may con-
fess and avoid it, by replying, that true it is that such descent happened, but
that since the descent the defendant himself demised the lands to the plaintiff
for term of life. (28) To the replication the defendant may rejoin, or put
in an answer called a rejoinder. The plaintiff may answer the rejoinder by a
sur-rejoinder; upon which the defendant may rebut; and the plaintiff answer
him by a sur-rebutter. Which pleas, replications, rejoinders, sur-rejoinders,
rebutters, and sur-rebutters, answer to the exceptio, replicatio, duplicatio, tripli-
catio, and quadruplicatio of the Ronan laws. (h)
The whole of this process is denominated the pleading; in the several stages
of which it must be carefully observed, not to depart or vary from the title or
defence, which the party has once insisted on. For this (which is called a
departure in pleading) might occasion endless altercation. Therefore the repli-
cation must support the declaration, and the rejoinder must support the plea,
without departing out of it. As in the case of pleading no award made, in con-
sequence of a bond of arbitration, to which the plaintiff replies, setting forth an
actual award; now the defendant cannot rejoin that he hath performed this
award, for such rejoinder would be an entire departure from his original plea,
which alleged that no such award was made: therefore he has now no other
(f) Dr. & Stud. 2, c. 53. (g) Appendix, No. III, § 6. (h) Inst. 4, 14. Bract. 1. 5, tr. 5, e. 1.
(27) [But this form of pleading is now abolished, and other facilities for referring questions
of title directly to the court are given by the common law procedure act, 1852.]1 (28) [As to the several replications in general, see 1 Chit. on P1. 4th ed. 500 to 518; and as to
their forms and parts in particular, id. 518 to 555. The general qualities of a replication are,
that it must answer the plea, and answer so much of it as it professes to answer, or it will be
a discontinuance: Coin. Dig. tit. Pleader, F. 4, W. 2; 1 Saund. 338; and it must answer the
plea directly, not argumentatively: 10 East, 205; it must not depart from the declaration.
2 Saund. 84, a. n. 1; Co. Litt. 304, a.; 2 Wils. 98; see 1 Chit. on P1. 556 to 560. It must be
certain, and it is said that more certainty is requisite in a replication than a declaration,
though certainty to a common intent is in general sufficient: Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 17; 12
East, 263; and lastly, it must not be double, or, in other words, contain two answers to the
same plea: 10 East, 73; 2 Camp. 176, 177; Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 16; and the plaintiff cannot
reply double under the 4 Ann. c. 16 (Fortes. 335), unless in replevin : 2 B. and P. 368, 376;
and more particularly as to these qualities, see 1 Chit. on P1. 556 to 562. An entire replication
bad in part is bad for the whole. Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 25; 3 T. R. 376; 1 Saund. 28, n. 3.]
Under -the common law procedure act, 1852, there may be several replications, rejoinders,
&c., by leave of the court.
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['311] *choice, but to traverse the fact of the replication, or else to demur upon
the law of it.
Yet in many actions the plaintiff, who has alleged in his declaration a general
wrong, may in hig replication, after an evasive plea by the defendant, reduce
that general wrong to a more particular certainty, by assigning the injury afresh
with all its specific circumstances in such manner as clearly to ascertain and
identify it, consistently with his general complaint; which is called a new or
novel assignment. As if the plaintiff in trespass declares on a breach of his close
m D; and the defendant pleads that the place where the injury is said to have
happened is a certain close of pasture in D, which descended to him from B
his father, and so is his own freehold; the plaintiff may reply and assign
another close in D, specifying the abuttals and boundaries, as the real place of
the injury. (i)
It hath previously been observed(k) that duplicity in pleading must be avoided.
Every plea must be simple, entire, connected, and confined to one single point:
it must never be entangled with a variety of distinct, independent answers to
the same matter; which must require as many different replies and introduce a
multitude of issues upon one and the same dispute. For this would often
embarrass the jury, and sometimes the court itself, and at all events would
greatly enhance the expense of the parties. Yet it frequently is expedient to
plead in such a manner as to avoid any implied admission of a fact, which can-
not with propriety or safety be positively affirmed or denied. And this may be
done by what is called a protestation ; whereby the party interposes an oblique
allegation or denial of some fact, protesting (by the gerund protestando) that
such a matter does or does not exist: and at the same time avoiding a direct
affirmation or denial. Sir Edward Coke hath defined(l) a protestation (in the
[*312] pithy dialect of that age) to be "an exclusion of a conclusion." *For
the use of it is, to save the party from being concluded with respect to
some fact or circumstance, which cannot be directly affirmed or denied without
falling into duplicity of pleading; and which yet, if he did not thus enter his
protest, he might be deemed to have tacitly waived or admitted. Thus, while
tenure in villenage subsisted, if a villein had brought an action against his lord,
and the lord was inclined to try the merits of the demand, and at the same time
to prevent any conclusion against himself that he had waived his signiory; he
could not in this case both plead affirmatively that the plaintiff was his villein,
and also take issue upon the demand; for then his plea would have been double,
as the former alone would have been a good bar to the action: but he might
have alleged the villenage of the plaintiff, by way of protestation, and then have
denied the demand. By this means the future vassalage of the plaintiff was
saved to the defendant, in case the issue was found in his (the defendant's)
favor: (m) for the protestation prevented that conclusion, which would other-
wise have resulted from the rest of his defence, that he had enfranchised the
plaintiff; (n) since no villein could maintain a civil action against his lord. So
also if a defendant, by way of inducement to the point of his defence, alleges
(among other matters) a particular mode of seisin or tenure, which the plaint-
iff is unwilling to admit, and yet desires to take issue on the principal point of
the defence, he must deny the seisin or tenure by way of protestation, and then
traverse the defensive matter. So, lastly, if an award be set forth by the plaint-
iff, and he can assign a breach in one part of it (viz., the non-payment of a sum
of money), and yet is afraid to admit the performance of the rest of the award,
or to aver in general a non-performance of any part of it, lest something should
appear to have been performed: he may save to himself any advantage he might
hereafter make of the general non-performance, by alleging that by protestation;
and plead only the non-payment of the money. (o) (29)
(i) Bro. Abr. tit. trespas, 205, 284. (k) Page 808. (1) 1 Inst. 124. (m) Co. Litt. 126.
(n) See book II, ch. 6, p. 94. (o) Appendix, No. 111, S 6.
(29) [No protestation is now required, or allowed indeed, in any pleading; but either party
is entitled to the same advantage as if protestation had been made.]
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*In any stage of the pleadings, when either side advances or affirms [*313]
any new matter, he usually (as was said) avers it to be true; "and this
he is ready to verify." On the other hand, when either side traverses or denies
the facts pleaded by his antagonist, he usually tenders an issue, as it is called;
the language of which is different according to the party by whom the issue is
tendered; for if the traverse or denial comes from the defendant, the issue is
tendered in this manner, "and of this he puts himself upon the country,"
thereby submitting himself to the judgment of his peers :(p) but if the traverse
lies upon the plaintiff he tenders the issue, or prays the judgment of the peers
against the defendant in another form; thus: "and this he prays may be in-
quired of by the country."
But if either side (as, for instance, the defendant) pleads a special negative
plea; not traversing or denying any thing that was before alleged, but disclosing
some new negative matter; as, where the suit is on a bond, conditioned to per-
form an award, and the defendant pleads, negatively, that no award was made,
he tenders no issue upon this plea; because it does not yet appear whether the fact
will be disputed, the plaintiff not having yet asserted the existence of any award;
but when the plaintiff replies, and sets forth an actual specific award, if then
the defendant traverses the replication, and denies the making of any such
award, he then, and not before, tenders an issue to the plaintiff. For when in
the course of pleading they come to a point which is affirmed on one side, and
denied on the other, they are then said to be at issue; all their debates being at
last contracted into a single point, which must now be determined either in
favor of the plaintiff or of the defendant.
CHAPTER XXI.
OF ISSUE AND DEMURRER.
IssuE, exilus, being the end of all the pleadings, is the fourth part or stage
of an action, and is either upon matter of law, or matter of fact.
An issue upon matter of law is called a demurrer: and it confesses the facts
to be true, as stated by the opposite party; but denies that, by the law arising
upon those facts, any injury is done to the plaintiff, or that the defendant has
made out a legitimate excuse; according to the party which first demurs,
demoratur, rests or abides upon the point in question. As, if the matter of the
plaintiff's complaint or declaration be insufficient in law, as by not assigning
any sufficient trespass, then the defendant demurs to the declaration: if, on
the other hand, the defendant's excuse or plea be invalid, as if he pleads that
he committed the trespass by authority from a stranger, without making out
the stranger's right; here the plaintiff may demur in law to the plea: and so
on in every other part of the proceedings, where either side perceives any
material objection in point of law, upon which he may rest his case.
The form of such demurrer is by averring the declaration or plea, the replica-
tion or rejoinder, to be insufficient *in law to maintain the action or the
defence; and therefore praying judgment for want of sufficient matter [*315
alleged.(a) Sometimes demurrers are merely for want of sufficient form in the
writ or declaration. But in case of exceptions to the form or manner of plead-
ing, the party demurring must, by statutes 27 Eliz. c. 5, and 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16,
set forth the causes of his demurrer, or wherein he apprehends the deficiency to
consist.(1) And upon either a general, or such a special demurrer, the opposite
(p) Ibid. No. II, S 4. (a) Appendix, No. III, § 6.
(1) [Either party may demur, when the preceding pleadings of his adversary are defective.
A demurrer has been defined to be, a declaration that the party demurring will go no further,
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party must aver it to be sufficient, which is called a joinder in demurrer,(b)
and then the parties are at issue in point of law. Which issue in law, or de-
murrer, the judges of the court before which the action is brought must de-
termine.
An issue of fact is where the fact only, and not the law, is disputed. And
when he that denies or traverses the fact pleaded by his antagonist has tendered
the issue, thus: "and this he prays may be inquired of by the country ;" or,
"and of this he puts himself upon the country ;" it may immediately be sub-
joined by the other party, "and the said A. B. doth the like." Which done,
the issue is said to be joined, both parties having agreed to rest the fate of the
cause upon the truth of the fact in question.(c) And this issue of fact
must, generally speaking, be determined, not by the judges of the court, but
by some other method; the principal of which methods is that by the country,
per pais, (in Latin per patriam,) that is, by jury. Which establishment of dif-
ferent tribunals for determining these different issues is in some measure agree-
able to the course of justice in the Roman republic, where the judices ordinarit
determined only questions of fact, but questions of law were referred to the de-
cisions of the centumnviri.(d)
But here it will be proper to observe, that during the whole of these proceed-
ings, from the time of the defendant's appearance in obedience to the king's
[*316] writ, it is necessary *that both the parties be kept or continued in court
from day to day, till the final determination of the suit. For the court
can determine nothing, unless in the presence of both the parties, in person or
by their attorneys, or upon default of one of them, after his original appearance
and a time prefixed for his appearance in court again. Therefore, in the course
of pleading, if either party neglects to put in his declaration, plea, replication,
rejoinder, and the like, within the times allotted by the standing rules of the
court, the plaintiff, if the omission be his, is said to be nonsuit, or not to follow
and pursue his complaint, and shall lose the benefit of his writ: or, if the
negligence be on the side of the defendant, judgment may be had against him,
for such his default. And, after issue or demurrer joined, as well as in some
of the previous stages of proceeding, a day is continually given, and entered
upon the record, for the parties to appear on from time to time, as the exigence
of the case may require. The giving of this day is called the continuance, be-
cause thereby the proceedings are continued without interruption from one
adjournment to another. If these continuances are omitted, the cause is there-
by discontinued, and the defendant is discharged sine die, without a day, for
this turn: for by his appearance in court he has obeyed the command of the
king's writ; and, unless he be adjourned over to a day certain, he is no longer
bound to attend upon that summons; but he must be warned afresh, and the
whole must begin de novo.(2)
Now it may sometimes happen, that after the defendant has pleaded, nay
even after issue or demurrer joined, there may have arisen some new matter,
which it is proper for the defendant to plead; as that the plaintiff, being a feme-
sole, is since married, or that she has given the defendant a release, and the
like: here, if the defendant takes advantage of this new matter, as early as he pos-
(b) Ibid. (c) Ibid. No. rI, § 4. (d) Cic. de Orator. 1. 1, c. 88.
because the other has not shown sufficient matter against him. 5 Mod. 132; Co. Litt. 71, b.
When the pleading is defective in substance, a general demurrer will suffice; but where the
objection is to theform, the demurrer must be special. Bac. Ab. Pleas, N. 5. A special de-
murrer must not merely show the kind of fault, but the specific fault complained of.]
The common law procedure act, 1852, put an end to special demurrers, substituting for them
a controlling power, vested in the court or a judge, to amend or strike out pleadings on the
application of the opposite party, if they were so framed as to prejudice, embarass, or delay
the fair trial of the action; and as to needless and fictitious averments, the act swept them
away altogether.
(2) [But these continuances are now become mere matter of form, and may be entered at
any time to make the record complete.]
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sibly can, viz.: at the day given for his next appearance, he is permitted to plead
it in what is called a plea of puis darrein continuance, or since the last adjourn-
ment.(3) For it would be unjust to exclude him *from the benefit of [,31ql
this new defence, which it was not in his power to make when he pleaded " "7
the former. But it is dangerous to rely on such a plea, without due considera-
tion; for it confesses the matter which was before in dispute between the
parties.(e) And it is not allowed to be put in, if any continuance has intervened
between the arising of this fresh matter and the pleading of it: for then the
defendant is guilty of neglect, or laches, and is supposed to rely on the merits
of his former plea. Also it is not allowed after a demurrer is determined, or
verdict given; because then relief may be had in another way, namely, by writ
of audita querela, of which hereafter. And these pleas puis darrein continu-
ance, when brought to a demurrer in law or issue of fact, shall be determined in
like manner as other pleas.
We have, said, that demurrers, or questions concerring the sufficiency of the
matters alleged in the pleadings, are to be determined by the judges of the
court, upon solemn argument by counsel on both sides, and to that end a de-
murrer-book is made up, containing all the proceedings at length, which are
afterwards entered on record; and copies thereof, called paper-books, are de-
livered to the judges to peruse. The record(f) is a history of the most material
proceedings in the cause entered on a parchment roll, and continued down to
the present time; in which must be stated the original writ and summons, all
the pleadings, the declaration, view or oyer prayed, the imparlances, plea, repli-
cation, rejoinder, continuances, and whatever farther proceedings have been
had; all entered verbatim on the roll, and also the issue or demurrer, and joinder
therein.
These were formerly all written, as indeed all public proceedings were, in
Norman or law French,(4) and even the arguments of the counsel and decisions
of the court were in the same barbarous dialect. An evident and shameful
badge, it must be owned, of tyranny and foreign servitude; being *intro- [*318]
duced under the auspices of William the Norman, and his sons: where-
by the ironical observation of the Roman satirist came to be literally verified,
that " Gallia causidicos docuitfacunda Britannos."(g) This continued till the
reign of Edward III; who, having employed his arms successfully in subduing
the crown of France, thought it unbeseeming the dignity of the victors to use
any longer the language of a vanquished country. By a statute, therefore,
passed in the thirty-sixth year of his reign,(h) it was enacted, that for the future
all pleas should be pleaded, shown, defended, answered, debated, and judged in
the English tongue; but be entered and enrolled in Latin. In like manner as
Don Alonso X, King of Castile (the great-grandfather of our Edward III),
obliged his subjects to use the Castilian tongue in all legal proceedings ;(i) and
as, in 1286, the German language was established in the courts of the empire.(k)
And perhaps if our legislature had then directed that the writs themselves,
which are mandates from the king to his subjects to perform certain acts, or to
appear at certain places, should have been framed in the English language, ac-
cording to the rule of our ancient law,(l) it had not been very improper. But
the record or enrollment of those writs and the proceedings thereon, which was
calculated for the benefit of posterity, was more serviceable (because more dur-
able) in a dead and immutable language than in any flux or living one. The
(e) Cro. Eliz. 49. (f) Appendix, No. II, § 4; No. III,§ 2. (g) Ju. xv, 111. (h) C. 15.
(i) Mod. Un. Hist. xx, 211. (k) Ibid. xxix, 235. (1) Mirr. c. 4, § 2.
(3) [This plea, though treated in some respects as a dilatory plea, the court cannot refuse to
receive: 2 Wils. 157; 3 T. R. 554; 1 Marsh. 280; 5 Taunt. 333; 1 Stark. 62; but it must be
verified on oath before it is filed. Freem. 252; 1 Stra. 493; 2 Smith's Rep. 396. It may be
pleaded at nisi prius as well as in bank; but cannot be amended after the assizes are over.
Yclv. 181; Freem. 252; Bul. N. P. 309. See further, 1 Chitty on P1. 4th ed., 569 to 573.]
See also Stephen on Pleading, 63-66; Gould on Pleading, ch. vi.
(4) [This is disputed, with great reason, by Mr. Serjeant Stephen (Pleading, Appendix, p. xxii),
who thinks that the record was always in Latin.]
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practisers, however, being used to the Norman language, and therefore imagin-
ing they could express their thoughts more aptly and more concisely in that than
in any other, still continued to take their notes in law-French: and, of course,
when those notes came to be published, under the denomination of reports,
they were printed in that barbarous dialect; which, joined to the additional
terrors of a Gothic black letter, has occasioned many a student to throw away his
Plowden and Littleton, without venturing to attack a page of them. And yet
in reality, upon a nearer acquaintance, they would have found nothing very
[,319 formidable in the language; which differs in its grammar *and orthog-
*1] raphy as much from the modern French, as the diction of Chaucer and
Gower does from that of Addison and Pope. Besides, as the French and Nor-
man languages were concurrently used by our ancestors for several centuries
together, the two idioms have naturally assimilated, and mutually borrowed
from each other: for which reason the grammatical construction of each is so
very much the same, that I apprehend an Englishman (with a week's prepara-
tion) would understand the laws of Normandy, collected in their grand cous-
tumier, as well, if not better, than a Frenchman bred within the walls of Paris.
The Latin, which succeeded the French for the entry and enrollment of pleas,
and which continued in use for four centuries, answers so nearly to the English
(oftentimes word for word) that it is not at all surprising it should generally be
imagined to be totally fabricated at home, with little more art or trouble, than
by adding Roman terminations to English words. Whereas in reality it is a
very universal dialect, spread throughout all Europe at the irruption of the
northern nations, and particularly accommodated and moulded to answer all
the purposes of the lawyer with a peculiar exactness and precision. This is
principally owing to the simplicity, or (if the reader pleases) the poverty and
baldness of its texture, calculated to express the ideas of mankind just as they
arise in the human mind, without any rhetorical flourishes, or perplexed orna-
ments of style; for it may be observed that those laws and ordinances, of public
as well as private communities, are generally the most easily understood, where
strength and perspicuity, not harmony or elegance of expression, have been
principally consulted in compiling them. These northern nations, or rather
their legislators, though they resolved to make use of the Latin tongue in pro-
mulging their laws, as being more durable and more generally known to their
conquered subjects than their own Teutonic dialects, yet (either through choice
or necessity) have frequently intermixed therein some words of a Gothic original,
[*3201 which is, more or less, the case in every country *of Europe, and, there-
fore, not to be imputed as any peculiar blemish in our English legal
Latinity.(m) The truth is, what is generally denominated law-Latin is in reality
a mere technical language, calculated for eternal duration, and easy to be ap-
prehended both in present and future times; and on those accounts best suited
to preserve those memorials which are intended for perpetual rules of action.
The rude pyramids of Egypt have endured from the earliest ages, while the
more modern and more elegant structures of Attica, Rome, and Palmyra, have
sunk beneath the stroke of time.
As to the objection of locking up the law in a strange and unknown tongue,
this is of little weight with regard to records which few have occasion to read
but such as do, or ought to, understand the rudiments of Latin. And, besides,
it may be observed of the law-Latin, as the very ingenious Sir John Davis(n)
observes of the law-French, "that it is so very easy to be learned, that the meanest
wit that ever came to the study of 4he law doth come to understand it almost
perfectly in ten days without a reader."
It is true, indeed, that the many terms of art, with which the law abounds, are
sufficiently harsh when Latinized (yet not more so than those of other sciences),
(m) The following sentence, "Si quis ad battalia carte maa exierit, if any one goes out of his own court to
fight," &c., may raise a smile in the student as a flaming modern Anglicism; but he may meet with it, among
others of the same stamp, in the laws of the Burgondians on the continent, before the end of the fifth century.
Add. 1, c 5, § 2.
(n) Pref. Rep.
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and may, as Mr. Selden observes,(o) give offence "to some grammarians of
squeamish stomachs, who would rather choose to live in ignorance of things
the most useful and important, than to have their delicate ears wounded by the
use of a word unknown to Cicero, Sallust, or the other writers of the Augustan
age." Yet this is no more than must unavoidably happen when things of mod-
ern use, of which the Romans had no idea, and consequently no phrases to
express *them, come to be delivered in the Latin tongue. It would ['321]
puzzle the most classical scholar to find an appellation, in his pure
Latinity for a constable, a record, or a deed of feoffment; it is therefore to be
imputed as much to necessity, as ignorance, that they were styled in our forensic
dialect constabularius, recordum, and feoffamentum. Thus, again, another
uncouth word of our ancient laws (for I defend not the ridiculous barbarisms
sometimes introduced by the ignorance of modern practisers), the substantive
murdrum, of the verb murdrare, however harsh and unclassical it may seem,
was necessarily framed to express a particular offence; since no other word in
being, occidere, interficere, necare, or the like, was sufficient to express the inten-
tion of the criminal, or quo animo the act was perpetrated ; and therefore by no
means came up to the notion of murder at present entertained by our law, viz.:
a killing with malice aforethought.
A similar necessity to this produced a similar effect at Byzantium, when the
Roman laws were turned into Greek for the use of the oriental empire: for,
without any regard to Attic elegance, the lawyers of the imperial courts made
no scruple to translate fidei commissarios, (,eM'xo eaoapeou;; (p) cubiculum,
xovj3ovxeeoy ;(q) filium-familias, 7aeaa-ata2ea ' (r) repudium, pjeroo8eov ;(s) com-
promissum, XO/Arpop.1o0 ;(t) reverentia et obsequium, peveperca xat oja3 xooov ;(u)
and the like. They studied more the exact and precise import of the words
than the neatness and delicacy of. their cadence. And my academical readers
will excuse me for suggesting, that the terms of the law are not more numerous,
more uncouth, or more difficult to be explained by a teacher, than those of logic,
physics, and the whole circle of Aristotle's philosophy, nay even of the politer
arts of architecture and its kindred studies, or the science of rhetoric itself.
Sir Thomas More's famous legal question(w) contains in it nothing more dif-
ficult than the *definition which in his time the philosophers currently [*322]
gave of their materia prima, the groundwork of all natural knowledge; 2]
that it is " neque quid, neque quantum, neque quale, neque aliquid eorum quibus
ens determinatur;" or its subsequent explanation by Adrian Heereboord, who
assures us(x) that "materia prima non est corpus, neque per formam corpore-
itatis, neque per simplicein essentiam: est tamen ens, et quidam substantia,
licet incompleta ; habetque actum ex se entitativum, et simul est potentia sub-
jectiva." The law, therefore, with regard to its technical phrases, stands upon
the same footing with other studies, and requests only the same indulgence.
This technical Latin continued in use from the time of its first introduction,
till the subversion of our ancient constitution under Cromwell; when, among
many other innovations in the law, some for the better and some for the worse,
the language of our records was altered and turned into English. But, at the
restoration of King Charles, this novelty was no longer countenanced; the
practisers finding it very difficult to express themselves so concisely or signifi-
cantly in any other language but the Latin. And thus it continued without
any sensible inconvenience till about the year 1730, when it was again thought
proper that the proceedings at law should be done into English, and it was
accordingly so ordered by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 26. This provision was made,
according to the preamble of the statute, that the common people might have
knowledge and understanding of what was alleged or done for and against them
in the process and pleadings, the judgment and entries in a cause. Which
purpose has, I fear, not been answered; being apt to suspect that the people are
now, after many years' experience, altogether as ignorant in matters of law as
o) Pref. ad Eadmer. (p) Nov. 1, c. 1. (q) Nov. 8, edict. Constantinop.
r) Nov. 117, c. 1. (a) Ibid. c. 8. (t) Ibid. 82, c. 11. (u) Ibid. 7S, c. I.
w) See page 149. (x) Philosoph. Natural, e. 1, § 28, &c.
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before. On the other hand, these inconveniences have already arisen from the
alteration; that now many clerks and attorneys are hardly able to read, much
less to understand, a record even of so modern a date as the reign of George the
,[323] First. And it has much enhanced the expense of *all legal proceed-
ings: for since the practisers are confined (for the sake of the stamp
duties, which are thereby considerably increased) to write only a stated number
of words in a sheet; (5) and as the English language, through the multitude of
its particles, is much more verbose than the Latin; it follows that the number
of sheets must be very much augmented by the change.(y) The translation
also of technical phrases, and the names of writs and other process, were found
to be so very ridiculous (a writ of nisi prius, quare impedit, fieri facias, habeas
corpus, and the rest, not being capable of an English dress with any degree of
seriousness) that in two years' time it was found necessary to make a new act,
6 Geo. II, c. 14; which allows all technical words to continue in the usual lan-
guage, and has thereby almost defeated every beneficial purpose of the former
statute.
What is said of the alteration of language by the statute 4 Geo. II, c. 26, will
hold equally strong with respect to the prohibition of using the ancient immu-
table court hand in writing the records or other legal proceedings; whereby
the reading of any record that is fifty years old is now become the object of
science, and calls for the help of an antiquarian. But that branch of it, which
forbids the use of abbreviations, seems to be of more solid advantage, in deliver-
ing such proceedings from obscurity: according to the precept of Justinian ;(z)
"ne per scripturam aliqua fiat inposterum dubitatio, jubemus non per siglorum
captiones et compendiosa enigmata ejusdem codicis textum conscribi, sedper litera-
rum consequentiam explanari concedimus." But to return to our demurrer.
When the substance of the record is completed, and copies are delivered to
the judges, the matter of law upon which the demurrer is grounded is upon
solemn argument determined by the court, and not by any trial by jury; and
*judgment is thereupon accordingly given. As in an action of trespass,
[*324] if the defendant in his plea confesses the fact, but justifies it causa
venationis, for that he was hunting; and to this the plaintiff demurs, that is, he
admits the truth of the plea, but denies the justification to be legal: now, on
arguing this demurrer, if the court be of opinion, that a man may not justify
trespass in hunting, they will give judgment for the plaintiff; if they think
that he may, then judgment is given for the defendant. Thus is an issue in
law, or demurrer, disposed of.
An issue of fact takes up more form and preparation to settle it; for here the
truth of the matters alleged must be solemnly examined and established by
proper evidence in the channel prescribed by law. To which examination of
facts, the name of trial is usually confined, which will be treated of at large in
the two succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER XXII.
OF THE SEVERAL SPECIES OF TRIAL.
THE uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally adopted, and
has so long been the standing theme of wit and good humour, that he who
should attempt to refute it would be looked upon as a man who was either
(y) For instance, these three words, "secundumfonnam statuti," are now converted into seven, "according
to the form of the statute."
(z) De concep. digest. § 13.
(5) [This law' is now abolished in England.]
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incapable of discernment himself, or else meant to impose upon others. Yet it
may not be amiss, before we enter upon the several modes whereby certainty is
meant to be obtained in our courts of justice, to inquire a little wherein this
uncertainty, so frequently complained of, consists; and to what causes it owes
its original.
It hath sometimes been said to owe its original to the number of our mu-
nicipal constitutions, and the multitude of our judicial decisions; (a) which
occasion, it is alleged, abundance of rules that militate and thwart with each
other, as the sentiments or caprice of successive legislatures and judges have
happened to vary. The fact of multiplicity is allowed; and that thereby the
researches of the student are rendered more difficult and laborious; but that,
with proper industry, the result of those inquiries will be doubt and indecision,
is a consequence that cannot be admitted. People are apt to be angry at the
want of simplicity in our laws: they mistake variety for confusion, and com-
plicated cases for contradictory. *They bring us the examples of [*326]
arbitrary governments, of Denmark, Muscovy, and Prussia; of wild and
uncultivated nations, the savages of Africa and America; or of narrow domes-
tic republics, in ancient Greece and modern Switzerland; and unreasonably
require the same paucity of laws, the same conciseness of practice, in a nation
of freemen, a polite and commercial people, and a populous extent of territory.
In an arbitrary despotic government, where the lands are at the disposal of
the prince, the rules of succession or the mode of enjoyment, must depend upon
his will and pleasure. Hence there can be but few legal determinations relat-
ing to the property, the descent, or the conveyance of real estates; and the
same holds in a stronger degree with regard to goods and chattels, and the
contracts relating thereto. Under a tyrannical sway trade must be continually
in jeopardy, and of consequence can never be extensive: this therefore puts an
end to the necessity of an infinite number of rules, which the English merchant
daily recurs to for adjusting commercial differences. Marriages are there usually
contracted with slaves; or at least women are treated as such: no laws can be
therefore expected to regulate the rights of dower, jointures, and marriage set-
tlements. Few also are the persons who can claim the privileges of any laws;
the bulk of those nations, viz., the commonalty, boors, or peasants, being merely
villeins and bondmen. Those are therefore left to the private coercion of their
lords, are esteemed (in the contemplation of these boasted legislators) incapable
of either right or injury, and of consequence are entitled to no redress. We
may see, in these arbitrary states, how large a field of legal contests is already
rooted up and destroyed.
Again; were we a poor and naked people, as the savages of America are,
strangers to science, to commerce, and the arts as well of convenience as of
luxury, we might perhaps be content, as some of them are said to be, to refer
all disputes to the next man we met upon the road, and so put a short end
*to every controversy. For in a state of nature there is no room for [*327
municipal laws; and the nearer any nation approaches to that state the
fewer they will have occasion for. When the people of Rome were little better
than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or
twelve tables; but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law
increased in the same proportion; and swelled to that amazing bulk which it
now occupies, though successively pruned and retrenched by the emperors
Theodosius and Justinian.
In like manner we may lastly observe, that, in petty states and narrow terri-
tories, much fewer laws will suffice than in large ones, because there are fewer
objects upon which the laws can operate. The regulations of a private family
are short and well known; those of a prince's household are necessarily more
various and diffuse.
The causes therefore of the multiplicity of the English laws are, the extent
of the country which they govern; the commerce and refinement of its inhabi-
(a) See the preface to Sir John Davies's Reports, wherein many of the following topics are discussed more at large.
205
Chap. 2.
327 THE MODES OF TRIAL. [Book III.
tants; but, above all, the liberty and property of the subject. , These will
naturally produce an infinite fund of disputes, which must be terminated in a
judicial way; and it is essential to a free people, that these determinations be
published and adhered to; that their property may be as certain and fixed as
the very constitution of their state. For though in many other countries every
thing is left in the breast of the judge to determine, yet with us he is only to
declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law. Hence a multitude
of decisions, or cases adjudged, will arise; for seldom will it happen that any
one rule will exactly suit with many cases. And in proportion as the decisions
of courts of judicature are multiplied, the law will be loaded with decrees, that
may sometimes (though rarely) interfere with each other: either because suc-
ceeding judges may not be apprized of the prior adjudication; or because they
may think differently from their predecessors; or because the same arguments
[*32 8] did not occur formerly as at *present; or, in fine, because of the natural
imbecility and imperfection that attends all human proceedings. But
wherever this happens to be the case in any material point, the legislature is
ready, and from time to time, both may, and frequently does, intervene to
remove the doubt; and, upon due deliberation had, determines by a declaratory
statute how the law shall be held for the future.
Whatever instances, therefore, of contradiction or uncertainty may have been
gleaned from our records, or reports, must be imputed to the defects of human
laws in general, and are not owing to any particular ill construction of the
English system. Indeed, the reverse is most strictly true. The English law is
less embarrassed with inconsistent resolutions and doubtful questions, than any
other known system of the same extent and the same duration. I may instance
in the civil law: the text whereof, as collected by Justinian and his agents, is
extremely voluminous and diffuse; but the idle comments, obscure glosses, and
jarring interpretations grafted thereupon, by the learned jurists, are literally
without number. And these glosses, which are mere private opinions of
scholastic doctors (and not like our books of reports, judicial determinations of
the court), are all of authority sufficient to be vouched and relied on: which
must needs breed great distraction and confusion in their tribunals. The same
may be said of the canon law; though the text thereof is not of half the
antiquity with the common law of England; and though the more ancient any
system of law is, the more it is liable to be pexplexed with the multitude of
judicial decrees. When, therefore, a body of laws, of so high antiquity as the
English, is in general so clear and perspicuous, it argues deep wisdom and fore-
sight in such as laid the foundations, and great care and circumspection in such
as have built the superstructure.
But is not (it will be asked) the multitude of law-suits, which we daily see
and experience, an argument against the clearness and certainty of the law
[*329] itself? By no means: for *among the various disputes and controversies
which are daily to be met with in the course of legal proceedings, it is
obvious to observe how very few arise from obscurity in the rules or maxims of
law. An action shall seldom be heard of, to determine a question of inheri-
tance, unless the fact of the descent be controverted. But the dubious points
which are usually agitated in our courts, arise chiefly from the difficulty there
is of ascertaining the intention of individuals, in their solemn dispositions of
property; in their contracts, conveyances, and testaments. It is an object,
indeed, of the utmost importance in this free and commercial country, to lay as
few restraints as possible upon the transfer of possessions from hand to hand,
or their various designations marked out by the prudence, convenience, neces-
sities, or even by the caprice, of their owners: yet to investigate the intenlin
of the owner is frequently matter of difficulty, among heaps of entangled con-
veyances or wills of a various obscurity. The law rarely hesitates in declaring
its own meaning; but the judges are frequently puzzled to find out the meaning
of others. Thus the powers, the interest, the privileges, and the properties of a
tenant for life, and a tenant in tail, are clearly distinguished and precisely set-
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tled by law: but what words in a will shall constitute this or that estate, has
occasionally been disputed for more than two centuries past, and will continue
to be disputed as long as the carelessness, the ignorance, or singularity of
testators shall continue to clothe their intentions in dark or new-fangled
expressions.
But, notwithstanding so vast an accession of legal controversies, arising from
so fertile a fund as the ignorance and wilfulness of individuals, these will bear
no comparison in point of number to those which are founded upon the dis-
honesty, and disingenuity of the parties: by either their suggesting complaints
that are false in fact, and thereupon bringing groundless actions; or by their
denying such facts as are true, in setting up unwarrantable defences; Ex facto
oritur jus : if therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law which
arises from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial. *And, in order [*330]
to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact, and establish the
truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of probation or trial, which the
law of the country has ordained for a criterion of truth and falsehood.
These modes of probation or trial form in every civilized country the great
object of judicial decisions. And experience will abundantly show, that above
a hundred of our law-suits arise from disputed facts, for one where the law is
doubted of. About twenty days in the year are sufficient in Westminster-hall,
to settle (upon solemn argument) every demurrer, or other special point of law
that arises throughout the nation: but two months are annually spent in decid-
ing the truth of facts, before six distinct tribunals, in the several circuits of
England: exclusive of Middlesex and London, which afford a supply of causes
much more than equivalent to any two of the largest circuits.
Trial, then, is the examination of the matter of fact in issue: of which there
are many different species, according to the difference of the subject, or thing to
be tried: of all which we will take a cursory view in this and the subsequent
chapter. For the law of England so industriously endeavours to investigate truth
at any rate, that it will not confine itself to one, or to a few, manners of trial;
but varies its examination of facts according to the nature of the facts them-
selves: this being the one invariable principle pursued, that as well the best
method of trial, as the best evidence upon that trial which the nature of the case
affords, and no other, shall be admitted in the English courts of justice.
The species of trials in civil cases are seven. By record; by inspection, or
examination ; by certificate ; by witnesses ; by wager of battle; by wager of
law and by jury.
I. First then of the trial by record. This is only used in one particular
instance: and that is where a matter of record *is pleaded in any action, r*33l]
as a fine, a judgment, or the like; and the opposite party pleads, "nu [l L*3
tiel record," that there is no such matter of record existing: upon this, issue is
tendered and joined in the following form, "and this he prays may be inquired
of by the record, and the other doth the like;" and hereupon the party pleading
the record has a day given him to bring it in, and proclamation is made in court
for him to "bring forth the record by him in pleading alleged, or else he shall
be condemned;" and, on his failure, his antagonist shall have judgment to
recover. The trial, therefore, of this issue is merely by the record; for, as Sir
Edward Coke(b) observes, a record or enrolment is a monument of so high a
nature, and importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded that
there is no such record, it shall not receive any trial by witness, jury, or other-
wise. but only by itself. Thus, titles of nobility, as whether earl or no earl,
baron or no baron, shall be tried by the king's writ or patent only, which is
matter of record. (c) Also in case of an alien, whether alien friend or enemy,
shall be tried by the league or treaty between his sovereign and ours; for every
league or treaty is of record. (d) And also, whether a manor be to be held in
ancient demesne or not, shall be tried by the record of domesday in the king's
exchequer.
(b) 1 Inst. 117, 260. (c) 6 Rep. 53. (d) 9 Rep. 31.
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II. Trial by inspection, or examination, is when, for the greater expedition of
a cause, in some point or issue, being either the principal question or arising
collaterally out of i4, but being evidently the object of sense, the judges of the
court, upon the testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point in dispute.
For, where the affirmative or negative of a question is matter of such obvious
determination, it is not thought necessary to summon a jury to decide it; who
are properly called in to inform the conscience of the court in respect of dubious
facts: and therefore when the fact, from its nature, must be evident to the court
either from ocular demonstration or other irrefragable proof, there the law
departs *from its usual resort, the verdict of twelve men, and relies on
the judgment of the court alone. As in case of a suit to reverse a fine
for non-age of the cognizor, or to set aside a statute or recognizance entered
into by an infant; here, and in other cases of the like sort, a writ shall issue to
the sheriff; (e) commanding him that he constrain the said party to appear,
that it may be ascertained by the view of his body by the king's justices, whether
he be of full age or not; "ut per aspectum corporis sui constare poterit Justi-
ciar is nostris, si prwdictus A sit plence etatis necne." (f ) If, however, the
court has, upon inspection, any doubt of the age of the party (as may frequently
be the case), it may proceed to take proofs of the fact; and, particularly, may
examine the infant himself upon an oath of voire dire, veritatem dicere, that is,
to make true answer to such questions as the court shall demand of him: or
the court may examine his mother, his godfather, or the like. (g)
In like manner if a defendant pleads in abatement of the suit that the plaint-
iff is dead, and one appears and calls himself the plaintiff, which the defendant
denies: in this case the judges shall determine by inspection and examination,
whether he be the plaintiff or not. (h) Also if a man be found by a jury an
idiot a nativitate, he may come in person into the chancery before the chancel-
lor, or be brought there by his friends, to be inspected and examined, whether
idiot or not: and if, upon such view and inquiry, it appears he is not so, the
verdict of the jury, and all the proceedings thereon, are utterly void and instantly
of no effect. (i)
Another instance in which the trial by inspection may be used, is when upon
an appeal of mayhem, the issue joined is whether it be mayhem or no mayhem,
this shall be decided by the court upon inspection; for which purpose they may
[*333] *call in the assistance of surgeons. ( j) (1) And, by analogy to this, in
an action of trespass for mayhem, the court (upon view of such mayhem
as the plaintiff has laid in his declaration, or which is certified by the judges
who tried the cause to be the same as was given in evidence to the jury) may
increase the damages at their own discretion; (k) as may also be the case upon
view of an atrocious battery. (1) But then the battery must likewise be alleged
so certainly in the declaration, that it may appear to be the same with the bat-
tery inspected.
Also, to ascertain any circumstances relative to a particular day past, it hath
been tried by an inspection of the almanac by the court. Thus, upon a writ of
error from an inferior court, that of Lynn, the error assigned was that the judg-
ment was given on a Sunday, it appearing to be on 26 February, 26 Eliz., and
upon inspection of the almanacs of that year, it was found that the 26th of Feb-
ruary in that year actually fell upon a Sunday: this was held to be a sufficient
trial, and that a trial by a jury was not necessary, although it was an error in
fact; and so the judgment was reversed. (m) But, in all these cases, the judges,
if they conceive a doubt, may order it to be tried by jury.
(e) 9 Rep. 31.
(f) This question of non-age was formerly, according to Glanvill (1. 13, c. 15), tried by a jury of eight men,
though now it is tried by inspection.
(q) 2 Roll. Abr. 573. (A) 9 Rep. 30. (i) Ibid. 3t. (J) 2 Roll. Abr. 578.
(k) 1 Sid. 108. () HIardr. 408. (m) Cro. Eliz. 227.
(1) [All appeals of mayhem are now abolished. 59 Geo. III, c. 46.]
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III. The trial by certificate is allowed in such cases, where the evidence of
the person certifying is the only proper criterion of the point in dispute. For,
when the fact in question lies out of the cognizance of the court, the judges
must rely on the solemn averment or information of persons in such a station,
as affords them the most clear and competent knowledge of the truth. As
therefore such evidence (if given to a jury) must have been conclusive, the law,
to save trouble and circuity, permits the fact to be determined upon such certifi-
cate merely. Thus, 1. If the issue be whether A was absent with the king in
his army out of the realm in time of war, this shall be tried(n) by the certificate
of the mareschal of *the king's host in writing under his seal, which shall [*334]
be sent to the justices. 2. If, in order to avoid an outlawry, or the like,
it was alleged that the defendant was in prison, ultra mare, at Bourdeaux, or in
the service of the mayor of Bourdeaux, this should have been tried by the certifi-
cate of the mayor; and the like of the captain of Calais. (o) But when this was
law, (p) those towns were under the dominion of the crown of England. And
therefore, by a parity of reason, it should now hold that in similar cases, arising
at Jamaica or Minorca, the trial should be by certificate from the governor of
those islands. We also find(q) that the certificate of the queen's messenger, sent
to summon home a peeress of the realm, was formerly held a sufficient trial of
the contempt in refusing to obey such summons. 3. For matters within the
realm, the customs of the city of London shall be tried by the certificate of the
mayor and aldermen, certified by the mouth of their recorder; (r) upon a sur-
mise from the party alleging it, that the custom ought to be thus tried: else it
must be tried by the country. (s) As, the custom of distributing the effects of
freemen deceased; of enrolling apprentices; or that he who is free of one trade
may use another; if any of these or other similar points come in issue. But
this rule admits of an exception, where the corporation of London is party, or
interested, in the suit; as in an action brought for a penalty inflicted by the
custom; for there the reason of the law will not endure so partial a trial; but
this custom shall be determined by a jury, and not by the mayor and aldermen,
certifying by the mouth of their recorder. (t) 4. In some cases the sheriff of
London's certificate shall be the final trial: as if the issue be, whether the defend-
ant be a citizen of London or a foreigner, (u) in case of privilege pleaded to be
sued only in the city courts. Of a nature somewhat similar to which is the
trial of the privilege of the university, when the chancellor claims cognizance
of the cause, because one of the parties is a *privileged person. In this
case, the charters confirmed by act of parliament, direct the trial of the [35
question, whether a privileged person or no, to be determined by the certificate
and notification of the chancellor under seal; to which it hath also been usual
to add an aidavit of the fact: but if the parties be at issue between themselves,
whether A is a member of the university or no, on a plea of privilege, the trial
shall be then by jury, and not by the chancellor's certificate: (v) because the
charters direct only that the privilege be allowed on the chancellor's certificate,
when the claim of cognizance is made by him, and not where the defendant
himself pleads his privilege: so that this must be left to the ordinary course of
determination. 5. In matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as marriage, and, of
course, general bastardy; and also excommunication and orders, these, and other
like matters, shall be tried by the bishop's certificate. (w) As if it be pleaded in
abatement, that the plaintiff is excommunicated, and issue is joined thereon; or
if a man claims an estate by descent, and the tenant alleges the demandant to be
a bastard; or if on a writ of dower, the heir pleads no marriage; or if the issue
in a quare impedit be, whether or no the church be full by institution; all these
being matters of mere ecclesiastical cognizance, shall be tried by certificate from
the ordinary. But in an action on the case for calling a man bastard, the
defendant having pleaded in justification that the plaintiff was really so, this
nl Litt. § 102. (o) 9 Rep. 31. (p) 2 Roll. Abr. 583. (q) Dyer, 176, 177.
Co. Litt. 74. 4 Burr. 248. (8) Bro. Abr. tit.trial, p1. 96. (t) Hob. 85.
Co. Litt 74. (v) 2 Roll. Abr. 583. (w) Co. Litt. 74. 2 Lev. 250.
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was directed to be tried by a jury: (x) because, whether the plaintiff be found
either a general or special bastard, the justification will be good; and no ques-
tion of special bastardy shall be tried by the bishop's certificate, but by a jury.(y)
For a special bastard is one born before marriage, of parents who afterwards
intermarry: which is bastardy by our law, though not by the ecclesiastical. It
would therefore be improper to refer the trial of that question to the bishop;
13361 who, whether the child be born before or after marriage, will be *sure to
33 return or certify him legitimate. (z) Ability of a clerk presented, (a)
admission, institution and deprivation of a clerk, shall also be tried by certificate
from the ordinary or metropolitan, because of these he is the most competent
judge: (b) but induction shall be tried by a jury, because it is a matter of pub-
lic notoriety, (c) and is likewise the corporal investiture of the temporal profits.
Resignation of a benefice may be tried in either way; (d) but it seems most
properly to fall within the bishop's cognizance. 6. The trial of all customs and
practice of the conirts shall be by certificate from the proper officers of those
courts respectively; and, what yeturn was made on a writ by the sheriff or
under-sheriff, shall be only tried by his own certificate. (e) And thus much for
those several issues, or matters of fact, which are proper to be tried by certificate.
IV. A fourth species of trial is that by witnesses, per testes, without the inter-
vention of a jury.(2) This is the only method of trial known to the civil law;
in which the judge is left to form in his own breast his sentence upon the credit
of the witnesses examined: but it is very rarely used in our law, which prefers
the trial by jury before it in almost every instance. Save only that when a
widow brings a writ of dower, and the tenant pleads that the husband is not
dead; this, being looked upon as a dilatory plea, is, in favour of the widow, and
for greater expedition, allowed to be tried by witnesses examined before the
judges: and so, saith Finch, (f) shall no other case in our law. But Sir Edward
Coke(g) mentions some others: as to try whether the tenant in a real action was
duly summoned, or the validity of a challenge to a juror: so that Finch's observ-
ation must be confined to the trial of direct and not collateral issues. And in
every case Sir Edward Coke lays it down, that the affirmative must be proved by
two witnesses at the least.(3)
[*337] *V. The next species of trial is of great antiquity, but much disused;
though still in force, if the parties choose to abide by it;(4) I mean the
trial by wager of battle. This seems to have owed its original to the military
spirit of our ancestors, joined to a superstitious frame of mind: it being in the
nature of an appeal to Providence, under an apprehension and hope (however
presumptuous and unwarrantable) that heaven would give the victory to him
who had the right. The decision of suits by this appeal to the God of battles
is by some said to have been invented by the Burgundi, one of the northern or
German clans that planted themselves in Gaul. And it is true, that the first
written injunction of judiciary combats that we meet with is in the laws of
Gundebald, A. D. 501, which are preserved in the Burgundian code. Yet it
does not seem to have been merely a local custom of this or that particular
tribe, but to have been the common usage of all those warlike people from the
earliest times.(h) And it may also seem from a passage in Velleius Patercu-
lus,(i) that the Germans, when first they became known to the Romans, were
wont to decide all contests of right by the sword: for when Quintilius Varus
(x) Hob. 179. (y) Dyer, 79. (z) See Introd. to the Great Charter, edit. Oxon. sub anno 1233.
a) See book I, ch. 11. (b) 2 Inst. 632. Show. Par]. c. 88. 2 Roll. Abr. 583, &c.
(c) Dyer, 228. (d) 2 Roll. Abr. 583. (e) 9 Rep. 31. (jf) L. 423. (g) 1IJnst. 6.
(h) Seld. of Duels, c. 5. (i) L. 2, c. 118.
(2) [By numerous local acts for the recovery of small debts, the claim of a creditor may be
sustained by his own oath without the intervention of a jury.]
(3) [In courts of law, in general, it suffices to prove a fact by one witness. In courts of
equity it is sometimes otherwise, and two witnesses are required. Vide post, ch. 27, and notes.]
(4) Appeals of murder, treason, felony, &c., as well as wager of battle, were abolished by
statute 59 Geo. III, c. 46. See, as to wager of battle, book iv, p. 346, n.
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endeavoured to introduce among them the Roman laws and method of trial, it
was looked upon (says the historian) as a "novitas incognitwe disciplinw, ut solita
armis decerni .jure terminarentur." And among the ancient Goths in Sweden
we find the practice of judiciary duels established upon much the same footing
as they formerly were in our own country.(j)
This trial was introduced into England among other Norman customs by
William the Conqueror; but was only used in three cases, one military, one
criminal, and the third civil. The first in the court-martial, or court of chiv-
alry and honour;(k) the second in appeals of felony,Q) of which we shall speak
in the next book; and the third upon issue joined in a *writ of right, *38
the last and most solemn decision of real property. For in writs of [
right the jus proprietatis, which is frequently a matter of difficulty, is in ques-
tion; but other real actions being merely questions of the jus possessionis,
which are usually more plain and obvious, our ancestors did not in them appeal
to the decision of Providence. Another pretext for allowing it, upon these
final writs of right, was also for the sake of such claimants as might have the
true right, but yet, by the death of witnesses, or other defect of evidence, be
unable to prove it to a jury. But the most curious reason of all is given in the
Mirror,(m) that it is allowable upon warrant of the combat between David for
the people of Israel of the one party, and Goliah for the Philistines of the other
party: a reason which Pope Nicholas I very seriously decides to be inconclu-
sive.(n) Of battle therefore on a writ of right,(o) we are now to speak; and
although the writ of right itself, and of course this trial thereof, be at present
much disused; yet, as it is law at this day, it may be matter of curiosity, at
least, to inquire into the forms of this proceeding, as we may gather them from
ancient authors.(p)
The last trial by battle that was waged in the court of common pleas at West-
minster (though there was afterwards (q) one in the court of chivalry in 1631;
and another in the county palatine of Durham(r) in 1638) was in the thirteenth
year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1571, as reported by Sir James Dyer:(s) and
was held in Tothill-fields, Westminster, "non sine magna juris consultorurn
perturbatione," saith Sir Henry Spelman,(t) who was himself a witness of the
ceremony. The form, as appears from the authors before cited, is as follows:
When the tenant in a writ of right pleads the general issue, viz.: that he
hath more right to hold, than the *demandant hath to recover; and r,3393
offers to prove it by the body of his champion, which tender is L3
accepted by the demandant; the tenant in the first place must produce his
champion, who by throwing down his glove as a gage or pledge, thus wages or
stipulates battle with the champion of the demandant; who, by taking up the
gage or glove, stipulates on his part to accept the challenge. The reason why it
is waged by champions, and not by the parties themselves, in civil actions, is
because, if any party to the suit dies, the suit must abate and be at an end for
the present; and therefore no judgment could be given for the lands in question,
if either of the parties were slain in battle: (u) and also that no person might claim
an exemption from this trial, as was allowed in criminal cases, where the battle
was waged in person.
A piece of ground is then in due time set out, of sixty feet square, enclosed
with lists, and on one side a court erected for the judges of the court of common
pleas, who attend there in their scarlet robes; and also a bar is prepared for the
learned serjeants at law. When the court sits, which ought to be by sunrising,
proclamation is made for the parties, and their champions; who are introduced
by two knights, and are dressed in a coat of armour, with red sandals, bare-legged
from the knee downwards, bareheaded, and with bare arms to the elbows. The
weapons allowed them are only batons, or staves of an ell long, and a four-cor-
(j) Stiernh. de jure Sueon. 1. 1, c. 7. (k) Co. Litt. 261. () 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 45. (i) C. 8, J 28.
(n) Decret. part. 2, cans. 2, qu. 5, c. 22. (o) Appendix, No. I, 5.
Ganvil, 1. 2, c. 3. Vet. Nat. Brev. fol. 2. Nov. Nar. tit. Droit, patent, fol. 221 (edit. 1584), Year-book
29Edw. In, c. 12. Finch, L. 421. Dyer, 301. 2 Inst. 247.
(q) Rushw. Coll. vol. 2, part 2, fol. 112. 19 Riym. 822. (r) Cro. Car. 512. (8) Dyer, 301.
(t) Gloss. 102. (u) Co. Litt. 294. .Dyversytg des eourtes, 304.
Chap. 22.] 337
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nered leather target; so that death very seldom ensued this civil combat. In
the court military indeed they fought with sword and lance, according to Spel-
man and Rushworth; as likewise in France only villeins fought with the buckler
and baton, gentlemen armed at all points. And upon this and other circum-
stances, the president Montesquien (v) hath with great ingenuity not only
deduced the impious custom of private duels upon imaginary points of honour,
but hath also traced the heroic madness of knight-erranty, from the same origi-
nal of judicial combats. But to proceed.
[*340] l*When the champions, thus armed with batons, arrive within the
lists or place of combat, the champion of the tenant takes his adversary
by the hand, and makes oath that the tenements in dispute are not the right of
the demandant; and the champion of the demandant, then taking the other by
the hand, swears in the same manner that they are: so that each champion is,
or ought to be, thoroughly persuaded of the truth of the cause he fights for.
Next an oath against sorcery and enchantment is to be taken by both the cham-
pions, in this or a similar form; "hear this, ye justices, that I have this day
neither eat, drank, nor have upon me, neither bone, stone, ne grass; nor any
enchantment, sorcery, or witchcraft, whereby the law of God may be abased, or
the law of the devil exalted. So help me God and his saints."
The battle is thus begun, and the combatants are bound to fight till the stars
appear in the evening: and, if the champion of the tenant can defend himself
till the stars appear, the tenant shall prevail in his cause; for it is sufficient for
him to maintain his ground, and make it a drawn battle, he being already in
possession; but, if victory declares itself for either party, for him is judgment
finally given. This victory may arise, from the death of either of the champi-
ons: which indeed hath rarely happened; the whole ceremony, to say the
truth, bearing a near resemblance to certain rural athletic diversions, which are
probably derived from this original. Or victory is obtained, if either champion
proves recreant, that is, yields, and pronounces the horrible word of craven; a
word of disgrace and obloquy, rather than of any determinate meaning. But a
horrible word it indeed is to the vanquished champion: since as a punishment
to him for forfeiting the land of his principal by pronouncing that shameful
word, he is condemned, as a recreant, amittere liberem legem, that is, to become
infamous, and not to be accounted liber et legalis homo; being supposed by the
event to be proved forsworn, and therefore never to be put upon a jury or
admitted as a witness in any cause.
[*3411 *This is the form of a trial by battle; a trial which the tenant, or
defendant in a writ of right, has it in his election at this day to demand;
and which was the only decision of such writ of right after the conquest, till
Henry the Second, by consent of parliament, introduced the grand assize, (w) (5)
a peculiar species of trial by jury, in concurrence therewith; giving the tenant
his choice of either the one or the other. Which example, of discountenancing
these judicial combats, was imitated about a century afterwards in France, by
an edict of Louis the Pious, A. D. 1260, and soon after by the rest of Europe.
The establishment of this alternative, Glanvil, chief justice to Henry the Second,
and probably his adviser herein, considers as a most noble improvement, as in
fact it was, of the law. (x)
VI. A sixth species of trial is by wager of law, (6) vadiato legis, as the forego-
ing is called wager of battle, vadiato duelli: because, as in the former case, the
(V)Sp. L. b. 28, c. 20, 22. (w) Appendix, No. I, 1 6.
(d) Est autem magna asslsa regale quodfam beneficium, clementia principis, de concilio procerum, populas in-
dultum; quo vitce hominum, et status integritati tam salubriter consulitur, ut, retinendo quod quis possidet in libero
tenemento sali, duelli casum declinare possint homines ambignum. Ac per hoo cotingit, insperats et prcmature
mortis ultimum evadere suppliciurn, el sallem perennis infanice oprobrium illius infesti et inverecundi verbi, quad
in ore victi turpiter sonat, consecutivum. Ex cequitate item maxima prodita eet legalis ista institutio. Juy enim,
quad post multas et longas dilationes vix evincitur per duellum, per beneficium istius constituionis commodius et
acceleratius expeditur. L. 2, c. 7.
(5) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 42.
(6) Wager of law was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42. See an account of it in
"Superstition and Force," by H. C. Lea, p. 13.
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defendant gave a pledge, gage, or vadium, to try the cause by battle; so here he
was to put in sureties or vadois, that at such a day he will make his law, that is,
take the benefit which the law has allowed him. (y) For our ancestors consid-
ered, that there were many cases where an innocent man, of good credit, might
be overborne by a multitude of false witnesses; and therefore established this
species of trial, by the oath of the defendant himself, for if he will absolutely
swear himself not chargeable, and appears to be a person of reputation, he shall
go free and forever acquitted of the debt, or other cause of action.
*This method of trial is not only to be found in the codes of almost all [*341]
the northern nations, that broke in upon the Roman empire, and estab-
lished petty kingdoms upon its ruins; (z)but its original may also be traced as far
back as the Mosaical law. "If a man deliver unto his neighbour an ass, or an
ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no
man seeing it; then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath
not put his hand unto his neighbour's goods; and the owner of it shall accept
thereof, and he shall not make it good." (a) We shall likewise be able to discern
a manifest resemblance, between this species of trial, and the canonical purga-
tion of the popish clergy, when accused of any capital crime. The defendant or
person accused was in both cases to make oath of his own innocence, and to
produce a certain number of compurgators, who swore they believed his oath.
Somewhat similar also to this is the sacramentum decisionis, or the voluntary
and decisive oath of the civil law; (b) where one of the parties to the suit, not
being able to prove his charge, offers to refer the decision of the cause to the
oath of his adversary; which the adversary was bound to accept, or tender the
same proposal back again; otherwise the whole was taken as confessed by him.
But though a custom somewhat similar to this prevailed formerly in the city of
London, (c) yet in general the English law does not thus, like the civil, reduce
the defendant, in case he is in the wrong, to the dilemma of either confession or
perjury: but is indeed so tender of permitting the oath to be taken, even upon
the defendant's own request, that it allows it only in a very few cases, and in
those it has also devised other collateral remedies for the party injured, in which
the defendant is excluded from his wager of law.
*The manner of waging and making law is this. He that has waged, [*3431
or given security, to make his law, brings with him into court eleven of
his neighbours: a custom, which we find particularly described so early as in
the league between Alfred and Guthrun the Dane; (d) for by the old Saxon con-
stitution every man's credit in courts of law depended upon the opinion which
his neighbours had of his veracity. The defendant, then standing at the end of
the bar, is admonished by the judges of the nature and danger of a false oath.(e)
And if he still persists, he is to repeat this or the like oath: "hear this, ye jus-
tices, that I do not owe unto Richard Jones the sum of ten pounds, nor any
penny thereof, in manner and form as the said Richard hath declared against
me. So help me God." And thereupon his eleven neighbours, or compurga-
tors, shall avow upon their oaths, that they believe in their consciences that he
saith the truth; so that himself must be sworn de fidelitate, and the eleven de
credulitate. (f) It is held indeed by later authorities, (g) that fewer than eleven
compurgators will do: but Sir Edward Coke is positive that there must be this
number; and his opinion not only seems founded upon better authority, but
also upon better reason: for, as wager of law is equivalent to a verdict in the
defendant's favour, it ought to be established by the same or equal testimony,
namely, by the oath of twelve men. And so indeed Glanvil expresses it, (h)
"jurabit duodecima manu :" and in 9 Henry III, when a defendant in an action
of debt waged his law, it was adjudged by the court "quod defendat se duo-
decima monu."(i) Thus, too, in an author of the age of Edward the First, (k)
we read, "adjudicabitur reus ad legem suam duodecima manu." And the ancient
( C) co. Litt. 2 5. (z) Sp. L. b. 28, c. 13. Stiernh. de jure ,ueon. 1. 1, e. 9. Feud. 1. 1, t. 4, 10, 28.
a) Exod. xxii, 10. (b) Cod. 4, 1, 12. (c) Bro. Abr. tit. ley gager, 77.
(d) Cap. 3. Wilk. LL. Antl. S'ax. (e) Salk. 682. (f) Co. Litt. 295. (g) 2 Ventr. 171.
(A) L. 1, c. 9. (1) Fitz. Abr. tit. ley, 78. (k) Henghaa magna, c. 5.
Chap. 220.]
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treatise, entitled, Diversite des courts, expressly confirms Sir Edward Coke's
opinion.[(3 It must be however observed, that so long as the custom continued
[*344] of producing the secta, the suit, or witnesses to give probability to the
plaintiff's demand (of which we spoke in a former chapter), the defendant was
not put to wage his law unless the secta was first produced, and their testimony
was found consistent. To this purpose speaks magna carta, c. 28. "Nullus
ballivus de cwvteroponat aliquem ad legem manifestam," (that is, wager of battle),
"nec ad juramentum," (that is, wager of law), "simplici loquela sua," (that is,
merely by his count or declaration), "sine testibus fidelibus ad hoc inductis."
Which Fleta thus explains: (m) "si petens sectamn produxerit, et concordes in-
veniantur, tunc reus poterit vadiare legem suam contra petentem et contra sectam
suan prolatam; sed si secta variabilis inveniatur, extunc non tenebitur legem
vadiare contra sectam illam." It is true, indeed, that Fleta expressly limits the
number of compurgators to be only double to that of the secta produced; "ut
si duos vel tres testes produxerit ad probandum, opertet quod defensio fiat per
quatuor vel per sex; itaquod pro quolibet teste duos producat juratores, usque
ad duodecim :" so that, according to this doctrine, the eleven compurgators were
only to be produced, but not all of them sworn, unless the secta consisted of six.
But though this might possibly be the rule till the production of the secta was
generally disused, since that time the duodecima manus seems to have been gen-
erally required.(n)
In the old Swedish or Gothic constitution, wager of law was not only per-
mitted, as it still is in criminal cases, unless the fact be extremely clear against
the prisoner;(o) but was also absolutely required, in many civil cases; which an
author of their own(p) very justly charges as being the source of frequent per-
jury. This, he tells us, was owing to the popish ecclesiastics, who introduced
this method of purgation from their canon law; and, having sown a plentiful
[*345] crop of oaths *in all judicial proceedings, reaped afterwards an ample
harvest of perjuries: for perjuries were punished in part by pecuniary
fines, payable to the coffers of the church. But with us in England wager of law
is never required; and is then only admitted, where an action is brought upon
such matters as may be supposed to be privately transacted between the parties,
and wherein the defendant may be presumed to have made satisfaction without
being able to prove it. Therefore it is only in actions of debt upon simple con-
tract, or for amercement,(7) in actions of detinue, and of account, where the
debt may have been paid, the goods restored, or the account balanced, without
any evidence of either: it is only in these actions, I say, that the defendant is
admitted to wage his law :(q) so that wager of law lieth not, when there is any
specialty (as a bond or deed), to charge the defendant, for that would be can-
celled, if satisfied; but when the debt groweth by word only: nor doth it lie in
an action of debt, for arrears of an account, settled by auditors in a former
action.(r) And by such wager of law (when admitted) the plaintiff is perpetu-
ally barred; for the law, in the simplicity of the ancient times, presumed that
no one would forswear himself for any worldly thing.(s) Wager of law, how-
ever, lieth in a real action, where the tenant alleges he was not legally summoned
to appear, as well as in mere personal contracts.(t)
A man outlawed, attainted for false verdict, or for conspiracy or perjury, or
otherwise become infamous, as by pronouncing the horrible word in a trial by
battle, shall not be permitted to wage his law. Neither shall an infant under
the age of twenty-one, for he cannot be admitted to his oath; and, therefore,
(1) 11 covint aver' oue luy xi maynz de jurer oue luy, se. que liz entendre en lour consciens que il di4oyt voler.
Fol. 305, edit. 1534.
(m) L. 2, c. 63. (n) Bro. Abr. tit. ley gager, 9. (o) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxiii, 22.
(p) Stiernhook, de jure Sueon. 1. 1, c. 9. (q) Co. Litt. 295. (r) 10 Rep. 103.
(s) Co. Litt. 295. (t) Finch, L. 423.
(7) [In a court not of record; for if the amercement were imposed by a court of record,
the defendant could not wage his law. Co. Litt. 295, a.]
Chap. 22.] THE MODES OF T IAL.
on the other hand, the course of justice shall flow equally, and the defendant,
where an infant is plaintiff, shall not wage his law. But a feme-covert, when
joined with her husband, may be admitted to wage her law, and an alien shall
do it in his own language.(u)
*It is moreover a rule, that where a man is compellable by law to do [*3461
any thing, whereby he becomes creditor to another, the defendant in 6]
that case shall not be permitted to wage his law: for then it would be in the
power of any bad man to run in debt first, against the inclinations of his creditor,
and afterwards to swear it away. But where the plaintiff hath given voluntary
credit to the defendant, there he may wage his law; for, by giving him such
credit, the plaintiff has himself borne testimony that he is one whose character
may be trusted. Upon this principle it is, that in an action of debt against a
prisoner by a gaoler for his victuals, the defendant shall not wage his law: for
the gaoler cannot refuse the prisoner, and ought not to suffer him to perish for
want of sustenance. But otherwise it is for the board or diet of a man at
liberty. In an action of debt brought by an attorney for his fees, the defend-
ant cannot wage his law, because the plaintiff is compellable to be his attorney.
And so, if a servant be retained according to the statute of laborers, 5 Eliz. c. 4,
which obliges all single persons of a certain age, and not having other visible
means of livelihood, to go out to service; in an action of debt for the wages of
such a servant, the master shall not wage his law, because the plaintiff was
compellable to serve. But it had been otherwise, had the hiring been by special
contract, and not according to the statute.(v)
In no case where a contempt, trespass, deceit, or any injury with force is
alleged against the defendant, is he permitted to wage his law:(w) for it is im-
possible to presume he has satisfied the plaintiff his demand in such cases,
where damages are uncertain and left to be assessed by a jury. Nor will
the law trust the defendant with an oath to discharge himself, where the private
injury is coupled as it were with a public crime, that of force and violence;
which would be equivalent to the purgation oath of the civil law, which ours
has so justly rejected.
*Executors and administrators, when charged for the debt of the de- [*347]
ceased, shall not be admitted to wage their law :(x) for no man can with
a safe conscience wage law of another man's contract; that is, swear that he
never entered into it, or, at least, that he privately discharged it. The king
also has his prerogative; for, as all wager of law imports a reflection on the
plaintiff for dishonesty, therefore there shall be no such wager on actions brought
by him.(y) And this prerogative extends and is communicated to his debtor
and accomptant; for, on a writ of quo minus in the exchequer for a debt on
simple contract, the defendant is not allowed to wage his law.(z)
Thus the wager of law was never permitted, but where the defendant bore a
fair and unreproachable character; and it also was confined to such cases
where a debt might be supposed to be discharged or satisfaction made in private,
without any witnesses to attest it: and many other prudential restrictions
accompanied this indulgence. But at length it was considered, that (even under
all its restrictions) it threw too great a temptation in the way of indigent or
profligate men; and therefore by degrees new remedies were devised, and new
forms of action were introduced, wherein no defendant is at liberty to wage his
law. So that now no plaintiff need at all apprehend any danger from the hardi-
ness of his debtor's conscience, unless he voluntarily chooses to rely on his
adversary's veracity, by bringing an obsolete, instead of a modern action. There-
fore one shall hardly hear at present of an action of debt brought upon a simple
contract; that being supplied by an action of trespass on the case for the breach
of a promise or assumpsit; wherein, though the specific debt cannot be recov-
ered, yet damages may, equivalent to the specific debt. And this being an action
of trespass, no law can be waged therein. So instead of an action of detinue to
(U Co. Litt. 295. (v) Ibid. (w) Ibid. Raym. 286.
(x) Finch, L. 424. (y) Ibid. 523. (z) Co. Litt. 295.
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recover the very thing detained, an action of trespass on the case in trover and con-
1*348] version is usually brought; wherein, though the horse or other specific
chattel cannot be had, yet the defendant shall pay damages for the conver-
sion equal to the value of the chattel; and for this trespass also no wager of law is
allowed. In the room of actions of account, a bill in equity is usually filed:
wherein, though the defendant answers upon his oath, yet such oath is not con-
clusive to the plaintiff: but he may prove every article by other evidence, in
contradiction to what the defendant has sworn. So that wager of law is quite
out of use, being avoided by the mode of bringing the action; but still it is not
out of force. And therefore, when a new statute inflicts a penalty, and gives an
action of debt for recovering it, it is usual to add, in which no wager of law
shall be allowed: otherwise an hardy delinquent might escape any penalty of
the law, by swearing he had never incurred, or else had discharged it.
These six species of trials, that we have considered in the present chapter,
are only had in certain special and eccentrical cases; where the trial by the
country, per pais, or by jury, would not be so proper or effectual. In the next
chapter we shall consider at large the nature of that principal criterion of truth
in the law of England.
CHAPTER XXIII.
OF THE TRIAL BY JURY.
THE subject of our next inquiries will be the nature and method of the trial
by jury; called also the trial per pais, or by the country : a trial that hath been
used time out of mind in this nation, and seems to have been coeval with the first
civil government thereof. Some authors have endeavoured to trace the original
of juries up as high as the Britons themselves, the first inhabitants of our island;
but certain it is that they were in use among the earliest Saxon colonies, their
institution being ascribed by Bishop Nicholson (a) to Woden himself, their
great legislator and captain. Hence it is, that we may find traces of juries in
the laws of all those nations which adopted the feudal system, as in Germany,
France, and Italy; who had all of them a tribunal composed or twelve good
men and true, "boni homines," usually the vassals or tenants of the lord, being
the equals or peers of the parties litigant; and, as the lord's vassals judged
each other in the lord's courts, so the king's vassals, or the lords themselves,
judged each other in the king's court.(b) In England we find actual mention
of them so early as the laws of King Ethelred, and that not as a new invention(c.)
Stiernhook(d) ascribes the invention of the jury, which in the Teutonic
language is denominated nembda, to Regner, king of Sweden and Denmark,
who was cotemporary with our King Egbert. Just as we are apt to impute
[*3501 the invention of this, and some *other pieces of juridical polity, to thesuperior genius of Alfred the Great; to whom, on account of his having
done much, it is usual to attribute every thing; and as the tradition of ancient
Greece placed to the account of their own Hercules whatever achievement was
performed superior to the ordinary prowess of mankind. Whereas the truth
seems to be, that this tribunal was universally established among all the
northern nations, and so interwoven in their very constitution, that the earliest
accounts of the one give us also some traces of the other.(1) Its establishment
(a) De jure Saxonum, p. 12. (b) Sp. L. b. 30, c. 18. Capitul. Ludd. pii. A. D. 819, c. 2.
(c) Wilk. LL. Angl. Sax. 117. (d) De jure Sueonum, 1. 1, c. 4.
(1) [The Athenians, according to Sir Wm. Jones, had trials by jury. Sir Win. Jones on
Bailment, 74.]
For an account of trial by jury among the northern nations, see History of Trial by Jury,
by William Forsyth.
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however and use, in this island, of what date soever it be, though for a time
greatly impaired and shaken by the introduction of the Norman trial by battle,
was always so highly esteemed and valued by the people, that no conquest, no
change of government, could ever prevail to abolish it. In magna carta it is
more than once insisted on as the principal bulwark of our liberties; but
especially by chapter 29, that no freeman shall be hurt in either his person or
property; "nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrwe." A
privilege which is couched in almost the same words with that of the emperor
Conrad, two hundred years before: (e) "nemo beneficium suum perdat, nisi
secundum consuetudinem antecessorum nostrorum et per judicium parium
suorum." And it was ever esteemed, in all countries, a privilege of the highest
and most beneficial nature.
But I will not misspend the reader's time in fruitless encomiums on this method
of trial; but shall proceed to the dissection and examination of it in all its
parts, from whence indeed its highest encomium will arise; since, the more it
is searched into and understood, the more it is sure to be valued. And this is a
species of knowledge most absolutely necessary for every gentleman in the king-
dom: as well because he may be frequently called upon to determine in this
capacity the rights of others, his fellow-subjects: as because his own property,
his liberty, and his life, depend upon maintaining, in its legal force, the consti-
tutional trial by jury.
*Trials by jury in civil causes are of two kinds; extraordinary and [*351]
ordinary. The extraordinary I shall only briefly hint at, and confine
the main of my observations to that which is more usual and ordinary.
The first species of extraordinary trial by jury is that of the grand assize, which
was instituted by King Henry the Second in parliament, as was mentioned in the
preceding chapter, by way of alternative offered to the choice of the tenant or
defendant in a writ of right, instead of the barbarous and unchristian custom of
duelling. For this purpose a writ de magna assisa eligenda is directed to the
sheriff, (f) to return four knights, who are to elect and choose twelve others to
be joined with them, in the manner mentioned by Glanvil; (g) who, having
probably advised the measure itself, is more than usually copious in describing
it; and these, all together, form the grand assize, or great jury, which is to try
the matter of right, and must now consist of sixteen jurors. (h) (2)
Another species of extraordinary juries, is the jury to try an attaint; which
is a process commenced against a former jury, for bringing in a false verdict: (3)
of which we shall speak more largely in a subsequent chapter. At present I
shall only observe, that this jury is to consist of twenty-four of the best men in
the county, who are called the grand jury in the attaint, to distinguish them
from the first or petit jury; and these are to hear and try the goodness of the
former verdict.
With regard to the ordinary trial by jury in civil cases, I shall pursue
the same method in considering it, that I set out with in explaining the
nature of prosecuting actions in general, viz.: by following the order and
course of the proceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way
of treating it.
*When, therefore, an issue is joined, by these words, "and this the [352]
said A prays may be inquired of by the country," or, "and of this he puts [32
himself upon the country,-and the said B does the like," the court awards a writ
of venire facias upon the roll or record, commanding the sheriff "that he cause
to come here on such a day, twelve free and lawful men, liberos et legales homines,
of the body of his county, by whom the truth of the matter may be better known,
and who are neither of kin to the aforesaid A, nor the aforesaid B, to recognize
(e) LL. Longob. 1. 3, t. 8, 1. 4. (f) F. N. B. 4. (g) L. 2, c. 11, 21. (A) Finch, L, 412. 1 Leon. 30.
(2) [As the writ of right has been abolished, this mode of trial can no longer be resorted to.]
(3) Abolished by 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, s. 60.
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the truth of the issue between the said parties."(i) And such writ was accord-
ingly issued to the sheriff.
Thus the cause stands ready for a trial at the bar of the court itself; for all
trials were there anciently had, in actions which were there first commenced;
which then never happened but in matters of weight and consequence, all trifling
suits being ended in the court-baron, hundred or county courts: and indeed all
causes of great importance or difficulty are still usually retained upon motion,
to be tried at the bar in the superior courts. But when the usage began to
bring actions of any trifling value in the courts of Westminster-hall, it was
found to be an intolerable burthen to compel the parties, witnesses, and jurors,
to come from Westmoreland, perhaps, or Cornwall, to try an action of assault at
Westminster. A practice therefore very early obtained, of continuing the cause
from term to term, in the court above, provided the justices in eyre did not pre-
viously come into the county where the cause of action arose; (j) and if it
happened that they arrived there within that interval, then the cause was
removed from the jurisdiction of the justices at Westminster to that of the
justices in cyre. Afterwards, when the justices in eyre were superseded by the
modern justices of assize (who came twice or thrice in the year into the several
counties, ad capiendus assisas, to take or try writs of assize, of nort d'ancestor,
[*353] novel disseisin, nuisance, *and the like), a power was superadded by
statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, to these justices of assize to try
common issues in trespass, and other less important suits, with direction to
return them (when tried) into the court above, where alone the judgment should
be given. And as only the trial, and not the determination of the cause, was
now intended to be had in the court below, therefore the clause of nisi prius
was left out of the conditional continuances before mentioned, and was directed
by the statute to be inserted in the writs of venirefacias; that is, "that the
sheriff should cause the jurors to come to Westminster (or wherever the king's
court should be held) on such a day in Easter and Michaelmas terms; nisiprius,
unless before that day the justices assigned to take assizes shall come into his
said county." By virtue of which the sheiff returned his jurors to the court of
the justices of assize, which was sure to be held in the vacation before Easter and
Michaelmas terms; and there the trial was had.
An inconvenience attended this provision: principally because, as the sheriff
made no return of the jury to the court at Westminster, the parties were ignorant
who they were till they came upon the trial, and therefore were not ready with
their challenges or exceptions. For this reason, by the statute 42 Edw. III,
c. 11, the method of trials by nisiprius was altered; and it was enacted that no
inquests (except of assize and gaol delivery) should be taken by writ of nisi
prius, till after the sheriff had returned the names of the jurors to the court
above. So that now in almost every civil cause the clause of nisiprius is left
out of the writ of venire facias, which is the sheriff's warrant to warn the jury:
and is inserted in another part of the proceedings, as we shall see presently.
For now the course is, to make the sheriff's venire returnable on the last return
of the same term wherein issue is joined, viz.: Hilary or Trinity terms; which, from
the making up of the issues therein, are usually called issuable terms. And he
returns the names of the jurors in a panel (a little pane, or oblong piece of parch-
[*354] ment) annexed to the writ. This jury *is not summoned, and therefore,
not appearing at the day, must unavoidably make default. For which
reason a compulsive process is now awarded against the jurors, called in the
common pleas a writ of habeas corpora juratorum., and in the king's bench -
distringas, commanding the sheriff to have their bodies or to distrain them by
their lands and goods, that they may appear upon the day appointed. The entry
therefore on the roll or record is,(k) "that the jury is respited, through defect
of the jurors, till the first day of the next term, then to appear at Westminster;
(I) Appendix, No. I, § 4.
(j) Semper dabitur dies partibus a justiciariie de batwo, gub tali conditione, "nisi justiciarii itinerantes prlu8
venerint ad parte8 las." Bract. 1. 3, tr. 1, e. 11, § 8.
(k) Appendix, No. II, § 4.
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unless before that time, viz.: on Wednesday the 4th of March, the justices of our
lord the king, appointed to take assizes in that county, shall have come to Ox-
ford, that is, to the place assigned for holding the assizes." And thereupon the
writ commands the sheriff to have their bodies at Westminster on the said first
day of next term, or before the said justices of assize, if before that time they
come to Oxford, viz.: on the 4th of March aforesaid. And, as the judges are
sure to come and open the circuit commissions on the day mentioned in the
writ, the sheriff returns and summons the jury to appear at the assizes, and there
the trial is had before the justices of assize and nisi prius: among whom (as
hath been said) (1) are usually two of the judges of the courts of Westminster,
the whole kingdom being divided into six circuits,(4) for this purpose. And thus
we may observe that the trial of common issues, at nisiprius, which was in its
original only a collateral incident to the original business of the justices of
assize, is now, by the various revolutions of practice, become their principal
civil employment: hardly any thing (5) remaining in use of the real assizes but
the name.
If the sheriff be not an indifferent person; as if he be a party in the suit, or
be related either by blood or affinity to either of the parties, he is not then trusted
to return the jury, but the venire shall be directed to the coroners, who in this,
as in many other instances, are the substitutes of the sheriff, to execute process
when he is deemed an improper person. If any exception lies to the coroners,
the venire shall be directed to two clerks of the court, or two persons of the
county *named by the court, and sworn.(m) And these two, who are [*35
called elisors, or electors, shall indifferently name the jury, and their
return is final; no challenge being allowed to their array.
Let us now pause awhile, and observe (with Sir Matthew Hale) (n) in these
first preparatory stages of the trial, how admirably this constitution is adapted
and framed for the investigation of truth, beyond any other method of trial in
the world. For, first, the person returning the jurors is a man of some fortune
and consequence; that so he may be not only the less tempted to commit wilful
errors, but likewise be responsible for the faults of either himself or his officers:
and he is also bound by the obligation of an oath faithfully tb execute his duty.
Next, as to the time of their return: the panel is returned to the court upon the
original venire, and the jurors are to be summoned and brought in many weeks
afterwards to the trial, whereby the parties may have notice of the jurors, and
of their sufficiency or insufficiency, characters, connections, and relations, that
so they may be challenged upon just cause; while at the same time by means
of the compulsory process (of distringas or habeas corpora) the cause is not
like to be retarded through defect of jurors. Thirdly, as to the place of their
appearance; which in causes of weight and consequence is at the bar of the
court; but in ordinary cases at the assizes, held in the county where the cause
of action arises, and the witnesses and jurors live: a provision most excellently
calculated for the saving of expense to the parties. For though the preparation
of the causes in point of pleading is transacted at Westminster, whereby the
order and uniformity of proceeding is preserved throughout the kingdom, and
multiplicity of forms is prevented; yet this is no great charge or trouble, one
attorney being able to transact the business of forty clients. But the trouble-
some and most expensive attendance is that of jurors and witnesses at the trial;
which, therefore, is brought home to them in the country where most of them
inhabit. Fourthly, the persons before *whom they are to appear, and [*356]
before whom the trial is to be held, are the judges of the superior court,
() See page 59. (m) Fortese. de Laud. LL. e. 25. Co. Litt. 158. (n) list. C. L. c. 12.
(4) Now seven.
(5) [These several writs, generally called the "jury process," are now, however, abolished,
and the jurors are summoned by the sheriff for the commission day, in virtue of a precept
issued to him for that purpose by the judges of assize; a panel of the jurors so summoned
being made and kept in the sheriff's office, for inspection, seven days befbre the commission
day, and a copy of it annexed to the record. Com. Law Proc. Act, 1852.]
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if it be a trial at bar; or the judges of assize, delegated from the courts at West-
minster by the king, if the trial be held in the country: persons, whose learning
and dignity secure their jurisdiction from contempt, and the novelty and very
parade of whose appearance have no small influence upon the multitude. The
very point of their being strangers in the county is of infinite service, in pre-
venting those factions and parties which would intrude in every cause of mo-
ment, were it tried only before persons resident on the spot, as justices of the
peace, and the like. And the better to remove all suspicion of partiality, it was
wisely provided by the statutes 4 Edw. III, c. 2, 8 Ric. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen.
VIII, c. 24, that no judge of assize should hold pleas in any county wherein he was
born or inhabits. (6) And as this constitution prevents party and faction from
intermingling in the trial of right, so it keeps both the rule and the adminis-
tration of the laws uniform. These justices, though thus varied and shifted
at every assizes, are all sworn to the same laws, have had the same education,
have pursued the same studies, converse and consult together, communicate their
decisions and resolutions, and preside in those courts which are mutually con-
nected and their judgments blended together, as they are interchangeably courts
of appeal or advice to each other. And hence, their administration of justice
and conduct of trials are consonant and uniform; whereby that confusion
and contrariety are avoided, which would naturally arise from a variety of
uncommunicating judges, or from any provincial establishment. But let us
now return to the assizes.
When the general day of trials is fixed, the plaintiff or his attorney must
bring down the record to the assizes, and enter it with the proper officer, in
order to its being called on in course. If it be not so entered, it cannot be
tried; therefore it is in the plaintiffs breast to delay any trial by not carrying
down the record: unless the defendant, being fearful of such neglect in the
plaintiff, and willing to discharge himself from the action, will himself under-
[*3571 take to bring on *the trial, giving proper notice to the plaintiff. Which
proceeding is called the trial by proviso; by reason of the clause then
inserted in the sheriff's venire, viz., "proviso, provided that if two writs come to
your hands (that' is, one from the plaintiff and another from the defendant),
you shall execute only one of them." But this practice hath begun to be dis-
used, since the statute 14 Geo. II, c. 17, which enacts, that if, after issue joined,
the cause is not carried down to be tried according to the course of the court,
the plaintiff shall be esteemed to be nonsuited, and judgment shall be given for
the defendant as in case of a nonsuit. In case the plaintiff intends to try the
cause, he is bound to give the defendant (if he lives within forty miles of Lon-
don) eight days' notice of trial; and, if he lives at a greater distance, then
fourteen days' notice, in order to prevent surprise: and if the plaintiff then
changes his mind, and does not countermand the notice six days before the
trial, he shall be liable to pay costs to the defendant for not proceeding to trial,
by the same last-mentioned statute. The defendant, however, or plaintiff, may,
upon good cause shown to the court above, as upon absence or sickness of a
material witness, obtain leave upon motion to defer the trial of the cause till the
next assizes.(7)
But we will now suppose all previous steps to be regularly settled, and the
cause to be called on in court. The record is then handed to the judge, to
peruse and observe the pleadings, and what issues the parties are to maintain
and prove, while the jury is called and sworn. To this end the sheriff returns
his compulsive process, the writ of habeas corpora, or distringas, with the panel
of jurors annexed, to the judge's officer in court. The jurors contained in the
(6) This is no longer the law.
(7) This statute, so far as relates to judgment as in case of a nonsuit, is repealed by the
common law procedure act, 1852, which however provides a mode in which a plaintiff, who
unreasonably delays his suit, may be forced to proceed to trial, or have judgment for costs
against him.
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panel are either special or common jurors. Special juries were originally intro-
duced in trials at bar, when the causes were of too great nicety for the dis-
cussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was suspected of partiality,
though not upon such apparent cause as to warrant an exception to him. He
is in such cases, upon motion in court and a rule granted thereupon, to attend
the prothonotary or other proper officer with his freeholder's book; and the
officer is to take *indifferently forty-eight of the principal freeholders in [,358]
the presence of the attorneys on both sides: who are each of them to
strike off twelve, and the remaining twenty-four are returned upon the panel.
By the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, either party is entitled upon motion to have a
special jury struck upon the trial of any issue, as well at the assizes as at bar;
he paying the extraordinary expense, unless the judge will certify (in pursuance
of the statute 24 Geo. II, c. 18) that the cause required such special jury.
A common jury is one returned by the sheriff according to the directions of
the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, which appoints that the sheriff or officer shall not
return a separate panel for every separate cause, as formerly; but one and the
same panel for every cause to be tried at the same assizes containing not less
than forty-eight, nor more than seventy-two jurors: and that their names, being
written on tickets, shall be put into a box or glass; and when each cause is
called, twelve of these persons, whose names shall be first drawn out of the box,
shall be sworn upon the jury, unless absent, challenged, or excused; or unless
a previous view of the messuages, lands, or place in question, shall have been
thought necessary by the court (o) in which case six or more of the jurors,
returned to be agreed on by the parties, or named by a judge or other proper
officer of the court, shall be appointed by special writ of habeas corpora or dis-
tringas to have the matters in question shown to them by two persons named in
the writ; and then such of the jury as have had the view, or so many of
them as appear, shall be sworn on the inquest previous to any other jurors.
These acts are well calculated to restrain any suspicion of partiality in the
sheriff, or any tampering with the jurors when returned.(8)
As the jurors appear, when called, they shall be sworn, unless challenged by
either party. Challenges are of two sorts; challenges to the array, and chal-
lenges to the polls.
*Challenges to the array are at once an exception to the whole panel, [*351
in which the jury are arrayed or set in order by the sheriff in his return;
and they may be made upon account of partiality or some default in the sheriff,
or his under officer who arrayed the panel.(9) And generally speaking, the
same reasons that, before the awarding the venire, were sufficient to have
directed it to the coroners or elisors, will be also sufficient to quash the array,
when made by a person or officer of whose partiality there is any tolerable
ground of suspicion. Also, though there be no personal objection against the
sheriff, yet if he arrays the panel at the nomination, or under the direction, of
either party, this is good cause of challenge to the array. Formerly, if a lord
of parliament had a cause to be tried, and no knight was returned upon the
jury, it was a cause of challenge to the array : (p) but an unexpected use having
been made of this dormant privilege by a spiritual lord,(q) it was abolished by
statute 24 Geo. II, c. 18. But still, in an attaint, a knight must be returned on
the jury.(r) Also, by the policy of the ancient law, the jury was to come de
(o) Stat. 4 Anne. c. 16. (p) Co. Litt. 156. Seld. on Baronage, il, 11.
(q) K. vs. Bishop of Worcester, M. 28 Geo. II, B. R. (r) Co. Litt. 156.
(8) [The qualification of both common and special jurymen is now regulated by statute 6
Geo. V, c. 50, by which all other acts are repealed.]
(9) Upon a challenge to the array, if the facts are denied the court appoints triers, and if
they pronounce the cause of challenge unfounded, it is overruled. If the facts are admitted,
the court passes upon their sufficiency, and either quashes the panel or overrules the chal-
lenge. Gardner v. Turner, 9 Johns. 260. In the United States it is believed that an objection
which would be good as a challenge to the array, is generally raised by motion to quash or
set aside the panel.
Chalp.2.
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vicineto, from the neighbourhood of the vill or place where the cause of action
was laid in the declaration: and therefore some of the jury were obliged to be
returned from the hundred in which such vill lay; and if none were returned,
the array might be challenged for defect of hundredors. Thus the Gothic jury,
or nembda, was also collected out of every quarter of the country: "binos,
trinos, vel etiam senos, ex singulis territorii quadrantibus."(s) For living in the
neighbourhood, they were properly the very county, or pais, to which both
parties had appealed; and were supposed to know beforehand the characters of
the parties and witnesses, and therefore they better knew what credit to give
to the facts alleged in evidence. But this convenience was overbalanced by another
very natural and almost unavoidable inconvenience; that jurors, coming out of
[*360] the immediate neighbourhood, would be apt *to intermix their prejudices
and partialities in the trial of right. And this our law was so sensible
of, that it for a long time has been gradually relinquishing this practice; the
number of necessary hundredors in the whole panel, which, in the reign of
Edward III, were constantly six,(t) being in the time of Fortescue(u) reduced
to four. Afterwards, indeed, the statute 35 Hen. VIII, c. 6, restored the ancient
number of six, but that clause was soon virtually repealed by statute 27 Eliz. c.
6, which required only two. And Sir Edward Coke (v) also gives us such a
variety of circumstances, whereby the courts permitted this necessary number
to be evaded, that it appears they were heartily tired of it. At length, by statute
4 and 5 Ann. c. 6, it was entirely abolished upon all civil actions, except upon
penal statutes; and upon those, also, by the 24 Geo. II, c. 18, the jury being
now only to come de corpore comitatus, from the body of the county at large,
and not de vicineto, or from the particular neighbourhood.(10) The array by
the ancient law may also be challenged, if an alien be party to the suit, and,
upon a rule obtained by his motion to the court for a jury de medietate linguw,
such a one be not returned by the sheriff, pursuant to the statute 28 Edw. III,
c. 13, enforced by 8 Hen. VI, c. 29, which enact, that where either party is an
alien born, the jury shall be one-half denizens, and the other aliens (if so many
be forthcoming in the place), for the more impartial trial; a privilege indulged
to strangers in no other country in the world; but which is as ancient with us
as the time of King Ethelred, in whose statute de monticolis Wallis (then
aliens to the crown of England), cap. 3, it is ordained, that "duodeni legales
homines, quorum sex Walli et sex Angli erunt, Anglis et Wallisjus dicunto."
But where both parties are aliens, no partiality is to be presumed to one more
than another; and therefore it was resolved soon after the statute 8 Hen. VI,(w)
that where the issue is joined between two aliens (unless the plea be had before
the mayor of the staple, and thereby subject to the restrictions of statute 27
Edw. 11, st. 2, c. 8), the jury shall all be denizens. And it now might be a
[*3611 question, how far the *statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25 (before referred to), hath
in civil causes undesignedly abridged this privilege of foreigners, by the
positive directions therein given concerning the manner of impanelling jurors,
and the persons to be returned in such panel. So that (unless this statute is
to be construed by the same equity which the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 29, declared
to be the rule of interpreting the statute 2 Hen. V, st. 2, c. 3, concerning the
landed qualifications of jurors in suits to which aliens were parties) a court
might perhaps hesitate whether it has now a power to direct a panel to be returned
de meditate linguwv, and thereby alter the method prescribed for striking a
special jury, or balloting for common jurors.(11)
Challenges to the polls, in capita, are exceptions to particular jurors; and
seem to answer to the recusatiojudicis in the civil and canon laws; by the con-
(s) Stiernhook, de Jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 4. (t) Glib. Hist. C. P. c. 8. (u) De Laud. LM. c. 25.
(V) I Inst. 157. (w) Year-book, 21 Hen. VI, 4.
(10) [See an excellent note, Co. Lit. 125, a. b. note 2.]
(11) [From the enactments of the statute 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, and especially section 47 thereof, it
would seem that a jury de medietate tingum is now allowed only upon trials for felony or mis-
demeanor.]
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stitutions of which a judge might be refused upon any suspicion of partiality.(x)
By the laws of England, also, in the times of Bracton (y) and Fleta, (z) a judge
might be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held
that judges and justices cannot be challenged. (a) For the law will not suppose
a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer im-
partial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and
idea. And should the fact at any time prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of
the law will not presume beforehand, there is no doubt but that such misbe-
haviour would draw down a heavy censure from those to whom the judge is
accountable for his conduct.
But challenges to the polls of the jury (who are judges of fact) are reduced to
four heads by Sir Edward Coke; (b) propter honoris respectum; propter defectum;
propter affectum; and propter delictum.
1. Propter honoris respectum; as if a lord of parliament be empanelled on a
jury, he may be challenged by either party, or he may challenge himself.
*2. Propter defectum; as if a juryman be an alien born, this is defect ['362]
of birth; if he be a slave or bondman, this is defect of liberty, and he
cannot be liber et legalis homo. Under the word homo, also, though a name
common to both sexes, the female is however excluded, propter defectum sexus:
except when a widow feigns herself with child, in order to exclude the next
heir, and a suppositions birth is suspected to be intended; then upon the writ
de ventre inspiciendo, a jury of women is to be impanelled to try the question,
whether with child or not. (c) But the principal deficiency is defect of estate
sufficient to qualify him to be a juror. This depends upon a variety of statutes.
And, first, by the statute of West. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 38, none shall pass on juries in
assizes within the county, but such as may dispend 20s. by the year at the least;
which is increased to 40s. by the statutes 21 Edw. I, st. 1, and 2 Hen. V, st. 2,
c. 3. This was doubled by the statute 27 Eliz. c. 6, which requires in every such
case the jurors to have estate of freehold to the yearly value of 41. at the least.
But, the value of money at that time decreasing very considerably, this qualification
was raised by the statute 16 and 17 Car. II, c. 3, to 201. per annum, which being
only a temporary act, for three years, was suffered to expire without renewal, to
the great debasement of juries. However, by the statute 4 and 5 W. and M.
c. 24, it was again raised to 101. per annum in England, and 61. in Wales, of
freehold lands or copyhold; which is the first time that copyholders (as such)
were admitted to serve upon juries in any of the king's courts, though they had
before been admitted to serve in some of the sheriff's courts, by statutes 1 Ric.
III, c. 4, and 9 Hen. VII, c. 13. And, lastly, by statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, any
leaseholder for the term of five hundred years absolute, or for any term determin-
able upon life or lives, of the clear yearly value of 201. per annum over and above
the rent reserved, is qualified to serve upon juries. (12) When the jury is de
medietate lingute, that is, one moiety of the English tongue or nation, and the
other of any foreign one, no want of lands shall be *cause of challenge [*363]
to the alien; for, as lie is incapable to hold any, this would totally defeat [ 6
the privilege. (d)
3. Jurors may be challenged propter affectum, for suspicion of bias or partial-
ity. This may be either a principal challenge, or to the favour. A principal
challenge is such, where the cause assigned carries with it prima facie evident
marks of suspicion, either of malice or favour: as, that a juror is of kin to either
(m) Cod. 8, 1, 16. Decretal. 1. t. 28, c. 86. (y) L. 5, c. 15. (z) L. 6, c. 87. (a) Co. Litt. 294.
(b) 1 lnst. 156. (c) Cro. Eiz. 566. (d) See stat. 2 Hen. V, st. 2, c. 3. 8 Hen. VI, c. 29.
(12) [A juror must be twenty-one years old, and if above sixty, he is exempted, though not
disqualified from serving. He must also possess freehold or copyhold property, held by lease
for twenty-one years or longer, of the annual value of twenty pounds, or occupy a house con-
taining not less than fifteen windows. In London, the occupation of a house, shop, or place
of business within the city, or the possession of real or personal property of the value of 1001.
constitutes a qualification. 6 and 7 Geo. IV, c. 50.]
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party within the ninth degree; (e) that he has been arbitrator on either side;
that he has an interest in the cause; that there is an action depending between
him and the party; that he has taken money for his verdict; that he has
formerly been a juror in the same cause; that he is the party's master,
servant, counsellor, steward, or attorney, or of the same society or corporation
with him: all these are principal causes of challenge; which, if true, cannot
be overruled, for jurors must be omni exceptione majores. Challenges to the
favour, are where the party hath no principal challenge: but objects only
some probable circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance and the like; (f)
the validity of which must be left to the determination of triors, whose office
it is to decide whether the juror be favourable or unfavourable. The triors,
in case the first man called be challenged, are two indifferent persons named by
the court; and if they try one man and find him indifferent, he shall be sworn ;
and then he and the two triors shall try the next; and when another is found
indifferent and sworn, the two triors shall be superseded, and the two first sworn
on the jury shall try the rest. (g) (13)
4. Challenges propter delictum, are for some crime or misdemeanor, that affects
the juror's credit and renders him infamous. As for a conviction of treason,
felony, perjury, or conspiracy; or if for some infamous offence he bath received
[*364] judgment of the pillory, tumbrel, or the like; or to be branded, *whipt,
or stigmatized; or if he be outlawed or excommunicated, or bath been
attainted of false verdict, prcemunire, or forgery; or, lastly, if he bath proved
recreant when champion in the trial by battle, and thereby hath lost his liberam
legem. A juror may himself be examined on oath of voir dire, veritatem dicere,
with regard to such causes of challenge as are not to his dishonour or discredit;
but not with regard to any crime, or any thing which tends to his disgrace or
disadvantage. (h)
Besides these challenges, which are exceptions against the fitness of jurors,
and whereby they may be excluded from serving, there are also other causes, to
be made use of by the jurors themselves, which are matter of exemption;
whereby their service is excused, and not excluded. As, by statute West. 2, 13
Edw. I, c. 38, sick and decrepit persons., persons not commorant in the county,
and men above seventy years old; and by the statute of 7 and 8 Win. III, c. 32,
infants under twenty-one. This exemption is also extended by divers statutes,
customs, and charters, to physicians and other medical persons, counsel, attor-
neys, officers of the courts, and the like; all of whom, if impanelled, must
show their special exemption. Clergymen are also usually excused, out of favour
and respect to their function: but, if they are seized of lands and tenements,
they are, in strictness, liable to be impanelled in respect of their lay-fees, unless
they be in the service of the king or of some bishop: "in obsequio domini regis,
vel alicuJus episcopi." (i) (14)
If, by means of challenges, or other cause, a sufficient number of unexcep-
tionable jurors doth not appear at the trial, either party may pray a tales. A
(e) Finch, L. 401.
(f) In the nembda, or jury of the ancient Goths, three challenges only were allowed to the favour, bt the
principal challenges were indefinite. " Licebat palam excipere, et semper ex probabili causa tres repudiari-
etiam piues ex causa pregnanti et manifesta." Stiernhook, 1. 1, c. 4.
(g) Co. Litt. 158. (A) Tbid. 158, b. (i) F. N. B. 166. Reg. Brev. 179.
(13) [The question of challenge to the array, and incidentally to the polls and triors, under-
went much discussion in The King v. Edmonds, 4 B. and A. 476].
The whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Freeman a. People, 4 Denio, 9,
to which the reader is referred. As to what opinion formed or expressed by a juror will be
sufficient ground for challenge to the favor, see 1 Burr's trial, 416; Osiander's Case, 3 Leigh,
785; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 307; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 499; Smith v. Eames,
3 Scam. 78; Bradford v. State, 15 Ind. 351; Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224.
The practice upon challenges varies so much in different states, that the American reader
will expect to consult and be guided by the book of practice in use in his own state.
As to disqualification from relationship, see Den v. Clark, Coxe, 444; Paddock v. Wells, 2
Barb. Ch. 332; Hasceig v. Tripp, 19 Mich.
(14) Clergymen, Roman Catholic priests, and dissenting ministers, are now excused.
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tales is a supply of such men as are summoned upon the first panel, in order to
make up the deficiency. For this purpose, a writ of decem tales, octo tales, and
the like, was used to be issued to the sheriff at common law, and must be still
so done at a trial at bar, if the jurors make default. But at the assizes, or
nisi prius, by virtue of the statute 35 Hen. VIII, c. 6, and other subsequent
*statutes, the judge is empowered, at the prayer of either party, to award [*3651
a tales de circumstantibus(j)(15) of persons present in court, to be I
joined to the other jurors, to try the cause; who are liable, however, to the
same challenges as the principal jurors. This is usually done, till the legal
number of twelve be completed; in which patriarchal and apostolical number
Sir Edward Coke(k) hath discovered abundance of mystery.(l)
When a sufficient number of persons impanelled, or tales-men, appear, they
are then separately sworn, well and truly to try the issue between the parties,
and a true verdict to give according to the evidence; and hence they are denom-
inated the jury, jurata, and jurors, so. juratores.
We may here again observe, and, observing, we cannot but admire, how scru-
pulously delicate, and how impartially just, the law of England approves itself,
in the constitution and frame of a tribunal thus excellently contrived for the
test and investigation of truth; which appears, most remarkably, 1. In the
avoiding of frauds and secret management, by electing the twelve jurors out
of the whole panel by lot. 2. In its caution against all partiality and bias, by
quashing the whole panel or array, if the officer returning is suspected to be
other than indifferent; and repelling particular jurors, if probable cause be
shown of malice or favour to either party. The prodigious multitude of excep-
tions or challenges allowed to jurors, who are the judges of fact, amounts nearly
to the same thing as was practised in the Roman republic, before she lost her
liberty: that the select judges should be appointed by the praTtor, with the
mutual consent of the parties. *Or, as Tully(m) expresses it: "nemi- [*366]
nem voluerunt majores nostri, non modo de existimatione cujusquam,
sed ne pecuniaria quidem de re minima, esse judicem: nisi qui inter adver-
sarios convenissit."
Indeed, these selecti judices bore, in many respects, a remarkable resemblance
to our juries: for they were first returned by the prmtor: de decuria senatoria
conscribuntur; then their names were drawn by lot, till a certain number was
completed: in urnam sortito mittuntur, ut de pluribus necessarius numerus
confici posset: then the parties were allowed their challenges: post urna per-
mittitur accusatori, ac reo, ut ex illo numero rejiciant quos putaverint sibi, aut
inimicos, aut ex aliqua re incommodos fore: next they struck what we call a
tales; rejectione celebrata, in eorum locum qui rejecti fuerunt subsortiebatur
prwtor alios, quibus ille judicum legitimus numerus compleretur; lastly, the
judges, like our jury, were sworn; his perfectis, jurabant in leges judies, ut
obstricti religione judicarent.(n)
The jury are now ready to hear the merits; and, to fix their attention the
closer to the facts which they are impanelled and sworn to try, the pleadings
are opened to them by counsel on that side which holds the affirmative of the
question in issue. For the issue is said to lie, and proof is always first required,
(J) Appendix, No. I, J 4. (k) 1 Inst. 155.
(0 Pausanias relates that at the trial of Mars, for murder, in the court denominated Areopagus from that
incident, he was acquitted by a jury composed of twelve pagan deities. And Dr. Hickes, who attributes the
introduction of this number to the Normans, tells us that among the inhabitants of Norway, from whom the
Normans, as well as the Danes, were descended, a great veneration was paid to the number twelve: "nihil
sanctius, nihil antiquius fuit; perinde ac se in ipeo hoc numro secreta quadam esset religio." Dissert. Epistolar.
49. Spelm. Gloss. 329.
(m) Po Cluentio, 48.
(n) Ascon. in Cic. Ver. 1, 6. A learned writer of our own, Dr. Pettingal, hath shown in an elaborate work
(published A. D. 1769) so many resemblances between the 8 o the Greeks, the judices selecti of the
Romans, and the juries of the English, that he is tempted to conclude that the latter are derived from the
former.
(15) In general, no writ is issued for this purpose in the United States, but the rourt, by
order, directs the sheriff to summon from the bystanders the necessary number of talesmen to
fill the panel.
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upon that side which affirms the matter in question: in which our law agrees
with the civil;(o) "ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; curn per rerurn
naturarn factum-negantis probatio nulla .sit." The opening counsel briefly
informs them what has been transacted in the court above; the parties, the
nature of the action, the declaration, the plea, replication, and other proceed-
ings, and, lastly, upon what point the issue is joined, which is there set down to
be determined. Instead of which,(p) formerly the whole record and process
,*367] of the pleadings was read to *them in English by the court, and the
matter in issue clearly explained to their capacities. The nature of the
case, and the evidence intended to be produced, are next laid before them by
counsel also on the same side: and when their evidence is gone through, the
advocate on the other side opens the adverse case, and supports it by evidence;
and then the party which began is heard by way of reply.
The nature of my present design will not permit me to enter into the num-
berless niceties and distinctions of what is, or is not, legal evidence to a jury.(q)
I shall only, therefore, select a few of the general heads and leading maxims,
relative to this point, together with some observations on the manner of giving
evidence.
And, first, evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascer-
tains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the
other; and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point. Therefore,
upon an action of debt, when the defendant denies his bond by the plea of non
est factum, and the issue is, whether it be the defendant's deed or no; he cannot
give a release of this bond in evidence: for that does not destroy the bond, and
therefore does not prove the issue which he has chosen to rely upon, viz., that
the bond has no existence.
Again; evidence in the trial by jury is of two kinds, either that which is
given in proof, or that which the jury may receive by their own private knowl-
edge. The former, or proofs (to which in common speech the name of evidence
is usually confined), are either written, or parol, that is, by word of mouth.
Written proofs, or evidence, are, 1. Records; and 2. Ancient deeds of thirty
years standing, which prove themselves; (16) but 3. Modern deeds; and 4.
,*368] Other *writings, must be attested and verified by parol evidence of wit-
nesses. And the one general rule that runs through all the doctrine of
trials is this, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit of shall
always be required, if possible to be had; bat if not possible, then the best
(o) 7f. 22, 3. 2. Cod. 4, 19, 23. (p) Fortese. c. 26.
(q) This is admirably well performed in Lord Chief-baron Gilbert's excellent treatise of evidence,-a work
which it is impossible to abstract or abridge, without losing some beauty and destroying the chain of the
whole, and which hath lately been engrafted into a very useful work, The Introduction to the Law of Nisi
Prius. 4to. 1767.
(16) [The same rule applies to wills thirty years old. 4 T. R. 709, note. This rule is laid
down in books of evidence without sufficient explanation of its principle, or of the extent of
its application. There seems to be danger in permitting a deed to be read merely because it
bears date above thirty years before its production, and in requiring no evidence, where a
forgery may be committed with the least probability of detection. Chief Baron Gilbert lays
down, that where possession has gone agreeably to the limitations of a deed bearing date
thirty years ago, it may be read without any evidence of its execution, though the subscrib-
ing witnesses be still living. Law of Ev. 94. For such possession affords so strong a pre-
sumption in favor of the authenticity of the deed, as to supersede the necessity of any other
proof of the validity of its origin, or of its due execution. The court of king's bench have
determined that the mere production of a parish certificate, dated above thirty years ago,
was sufficient to make it evidence, without giving any account of the custody from which it
was extracted. 5 T. R. 259.]
Upon this subject see 1 Greenl. Ev. . 21, 142-145, 570; 1 Stark. Ev. 93, 523; and especially
Phillips's Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards, vol. 2, 475-480. It is much safer to say in these
cases, and is much nearer strict accuracy, not that the deed proves itself, but that its authentic-
ity may be presumed from the circumstances; such as the long acquiescence of parties interested
to dispute it, and who must be supposed to have satisfied themselves originally that the con-
veyance was effectual. But these circumstances are to be proved like other facts.
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evidence that can be had shall be allowed. (17) For if it be found that there is
any better evidence existing than is produced, the very not producing it is a
presumption that it would have detected some falsehood that at present is con-
cealed. Thus, in order to prove a lease for years, nothing else shall be admitted
but the very deed of lease itself, if in being: but if that be positively proved
to be burnt or destroyed (not relying on any loose negative, as that it cannot be
found, or the like), then an attested copy may be produced; or parol evidence
be given of its contents. So, no evidence of a discourse with another will be
admitted, but the man himself must be produced; yet in some cases (as in
proof of any general customs, or matters of common tradition or repute), the
courts admit of hearsay evidence, or an account of what persons deceased have
declared in their lifetime: but such evidence will not be received of any par-
ticular facts.(18) So, too, books of account, or shop-books, are not allowed of
(17) [No rule of law is more frequently cited, and more generally misconceived, than this.
It is certainly true when rightly understood; but it is very limited in its extent and applica-
tion. It signifies nothing more than that, if the best legal evidence cannot possibly be pro-
duced, the next best legal evidence shall be admitted. Evidence may be divided into primary
and secondary: and the secondary evidence is as accurately defined by the law as the primary.
But in general the want of better evidence can never justify the admission of hearsay, inter-
ested witnesses, or the copies of copies, &c. Where there are exceptions to general rules,
these exceptions are as much recognized by the law as the general rule; and where bounda-
ries and limits are established by the law for every case that can possibly occur, it is immate-
rial what we call the rule, and what the exception.
Some of the numerous cases which are found even in modem books may be cited for
illustration and in confirmation of the text and note.
If the subscribing witness be living and within the jurisdiction of the court, he must be
called to prove the execution; or if he cannot be found, and that fact be satisfactorily
explained, proof of his handwriting will be sufficient evidence of the execution. Barnes v.
Trompowsky, 7 T. R. 266. And the witness of the execution is necessary; acknowledgment
of the party who executed the deed cannot be received. Johnson v. Mason, 1 Esp. 89. At
least only as secondary evidence. Call, Bart. v. Dunning, 4 East, 53. And acknowledgment
to a subscribing witness by an obligor of a bond that he has executed it, is sufficient. Powell
v. Blackett, 1 Esp. 97; and see Grellier v. Neale, Peake, 146. But a mere bystander may not
be received to supply the absence of the subscribing witness (McCraw v. Gentry 3 Campb.
232), or only as secondary evidence. See the next case. If the apparent attesting witness
deny that he saw the execution, secondary evidence is admissible; that is to say, the hand-
writing of the obligor, &c., may be proved. Ley v. Ballard, 3 Esp. 173, n. And, as a general
rule, it seems that wherever a subscribing witness appears to an instrument, note, &c., be
must be called or his absence explained. See Higgs v. Dixon, 2 Stark. 180; Breton v. Cope,
Peake, 31.]
See upon the rule requiring the best evidence, 1 Stark. Ev. 641-649; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 82, et seq.
(18) [It is a general rule that the mere recital of a fact, that is, the mere oral assertion or
written entry by an individual, that a particular fact is true, cannot be received in evidence.
But the objection does not apply to any public documents made under lawful authority, such
as gazettes, proclamations, public surveys, records, and other memorials of a similar descrip-
tion, and whenever the declaration or entry is in itself a fact, and is part of the res gest.
Stark. on Evid. pt. 1, 46, 47. But it is to be carefully observed, that neither the declarations,
nor any other acts of those who are mere strangers, or, as is usually termed, any res inter alios
acta, is admissible in evidence against any one, as affording a presumption against him in the
way of admission, or otherwise. Id. 51.
In cases of customs and prescriptive rights, hearsay or traditional evidence is not admitted
until some instances of the custom or exercise of the right claimed are first proved. The
declarations of parents respecting their marriage, and the legitimacy of their children, are
admitted, after their decease, as evidence. And hearsay is also received respecting pedigrees
and the death of relations abroad. Bull. N. P. 294; 2 Esp. 784. What has been said in con-
versation in the hearing of any party, if not contradicted by him, may be given in evidence;
for not being denied, it amounts to a species of confession. See 3 T. R. 707, where the sub-
ject of hearsay evidence is much discussed.
The court of king's bench has decided, that a father's declaration of the place of the birth
of his son is not evidence after the father's death. 8 East, 539. But it would not, probably,
be difficult to prove, that this is of the nature of pedigree, and ought to be admitted, as the
father's declaration of the time of his son's birth, which has always been legal evidence.-
In criminal cases, the declarations of a person, who relates, in extremis, or under an appre-
hension of dying, the cause of his death, or any other material circumstance, may be admit-
ted in evidence; for the mind in that awful state is presumed to be under as great a religious
obligation to disclose the truth, as is created by the administration of an oath. But declara-
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themselves to be given in evidence for the owner; but a servant who made the
entry may have recourse to them to refresh his memory; and, if such servant
(who was accustomed to make those entries) be dead, and his hand be proved,
the book may be read in evidence: (r) for as tradesmen are often under a neces-
sity of giving credit without any note or writing, this is therefore, when accom-
panied with such other collateral proofs of fairness and regularity, (s) the best evi-
dence that can then be produced. However, this dangerous species of evidence is
not carried so far in England as abroad; (t) where a man's own books of accounts,
by a distortion of the civil law (which seems to have meant the same thing as
[*369] is practised with us),(u) with the suppletory oath of *the merchant,
amount at all times to full proof.(19) But as this kind of evidence, even
thus regulated, would be much too hard upon the buyer at any long distance
of time, the statute 7 Jac. I, c. 12 (the penners of which seem to have imagined
that the books of themselves were evidence at common law), confines this
species of proof to such transactions as have happened within one year before
the action brought; unless between merchant and merchant in the usual inter-
course of trade. For accounts of so recent a date, if erroneous, may more
easily be unravelled and adjusted.(20)
With regard to parol evidence, or witnesses; it must first be remembered that
there is a process to bring them in by writ of subptena ad testificandum: which
commands them, laying aside all pretences and excuses, to appear at the trial on
pain of 1001. to be forfeited to the king; to which the statute 5 Eliz. c. 9, has
added a penalty of 101. to the party aggrieved, and damages equivalent to the
loss sustained by want of his evidence. But no witness, unless his reasonable
expenses be tendered him, is bound to appear at all; nor, if he appears, is he
bound to give evidence till such charges are actually paid him; except he resides
within the bills of mortality, and is summoned to give evidence within the same.
This compulsory process, to bring in unwilling witnesses, and the additional
terrors of an attachment in case of disobedience, are of excellent use in the
(r) Law of Nisi Prius, 266. (s) Salk. 285. (t) Gail. observat. 2, 20, 23.
(u) Instrumen-ta domestica, seu privata testatio, seu adnotatio, si non alis quo ue admini cUis adjuventur. ad
probationem sola non suciunt. Cod. 4, 19, 5. Nam exemplo perniciosum est, ut e sriptura credatur, qua unus-
quisque sibi adnotatione propr-a deitorem constituit. Ibid. o. 7.
tions of a deceased person ought not to be received, unless the court is satisfied, from the cir-
cumstances of the case, that they were made under the impression of approaching dissolu-
tion. Leach's Cases, 400. But the declarations of a feltn at the place of execution cannot be
received, as he is incompetent to give evidence upon oath; and the situation of a dying man
is only thought equivalent to that of a competent witness, when he is sworn. Id. 276.]
The testimony of a witness given on a former trial, where the parties had an opportunity to
examine him, may be received if the witness is dead, or is out of the jurisdiction, or insane
and unable to testify, or if he has been summoned and is kept away by the adverse party.
1 Greenl. Ev. , 163, and cases cited.
(19) A party's own books of account may be given in evidence in his own favor to prove
the accounts upon them, after preliminary proof that they were regularly kept as such, and
are books of original entries ; that the party kept no clerk, or, if he kept any, giving sufficient
reason for not producing him; that some of the articles charged were actually delivered; and
by proving also, from other persons who have dealt with him, that he keeps fair and honest
accounts. But they are not very satisfactory evidence, and wherever from the nature of the
case there must be witnesses who can give direct testimony concerning the account, the party
will be required to produce them before giving his books in evidence. See Yosburgh v.
Thaver, 12 Johns. 461; Cogswell v. Dolliver, 2 Mass. 217; Thomas v. Dyott, 1 Nott and McC.
186; Sickles v. Mather, 20 Wend. 72; Burnham v. Adams, 5 Vt. 313; Jackson v. Evans, 8
Mich. 476; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 118, and notes. If any thing suspicious appears in the books when
presented to the court, they will be excluded. Churchman v. Smith, 6 Whart. 146. There
are statutes on this subject in many of the states. The party's own oath is usually
required to substantiate the charges. The books can only be made evidence of those things
which are properly the subject of book account; not of charges for money loaned, &c. See
Bradley v. Goodyear, 1 Day, 105. And upon the whole subject see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen,
Hill and Edwards, 370-386.
(20) [The entries in the book of a person deceased, not connected with the parties, are of
no more avail than hearsay. But the books of an incumbent, respecting the tithes of the
parish, are evidence for his successor. 5 T. R. 123; 2 Ves. 43.]
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thorough investigation of truth: and, upon the same principle, in the Athenian
courts, the witnesses who were summoned to attend the trial had the choice of
three things; either to swear to the truth of the fact in question, to deny or
abjure it, or else pay a fine of a thousand drachmas.(v)
All witnesses, of whatever religion or country, that have the use of their
reason, (21) are to be received and examined, except such as are infamous, or
such as are interested in the event of the cause. All others are competent wit-
nesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credi-
bility.(22) *Infamous persons are such as may be challenged as jurors, [*370]
propter delictum; and therefore never shall be admitted to give evidence E -
to inform that jury, with whom they were too scandalous to associate. Interested
witnesses may be examined upon a voir dire, if suspected of being secretly con-
cerned in the event; or their interest may be proved in court. Which last is
the only method of supporting an objection to the former class: for no man is
to be examined to prove his own infamy. (23) And no counsel, attorney, or
(v) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 21.
(21) [A Mahometan may be sworn upon the Alcoran, a Gentoo according to the custom of
India, and their evidence maybe received even in a criminal case. Leach's Cases, 52; 1 Atk.
21. But an atheist, or a person who has no belief or notion of a God, or a future state of
rewards and punishments, ought not in any instance to be admitted as a witness. 1 Atk. 45;
B. N. P. 202. See Peake Rep. 11, where Buller, J., held that the proper question to be asked
of a witness is, whether he believes in God, the obligation of an oath, and in a future state of
rewards and punishments.]
All persons may give evidence who believe in a supreme superintending Providence, who
rewards and punishes, and who declare that they consider an oath binding on their conscience.
See the leading case of Ormichund v. Barker, Wills, 538; and 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 535. See
also Cubbison v. McCreary, 7 W. and S. 262; Jones v. Harris, 1 Strob. 160; Brock v. Milligan,
10 Ohio, 121 ; Bennett v. State, 1 Swan, 411 ; Central R. R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541.
Some of the United States forbid witnesses being questioned concerning their religious belief.
See Cooley Const. Lim. 478, note.
Persons who cannot conscientiously take an oath are allowed to make affirmation, and are
under the like penalties with witnesses sworn, in case of false testimony.
(22) [" The old cases upon the competency of witnesses have gone upon very subtle grounds.
But of late years the courts have endeavored as far as possible, consistent with authorities
to let the objection go to the credit, rather than to the competency, of a witness." Lord Mans-
field, 1 T. R. 300.
It is now established that, if a witness does not immediately gain or lose by the event of the
cause, and if the verdict in the cause cannot be evidence either for or against him in any other
suit, he shall be admitted as a competent witness, though the circumstances of. the case may,
in some degree, lessen his credibility. 3 T. R. 27. The interest must be a present, certain, vested
interest, and not uncertain or contingent. Doug. 134; 1 T. R. 163; 1 P. Wins. 287; therefore
the heir apparent is competent in supporting the claim of the ancestor, though the remainder-
man, having a vested interest, is incompetent. Salk. 283; Ld. Raym. 724. A clerk of the com-
pany of wire-drawers is competent, in an action against a person for acting as an assistant,
although the verdict might cause the defendant to be sworn, u1pon which the clerk would
obtain a fee. See Stark. on Ev. pt. 4, 745.
A servant of a tradesman, from necessity, is permitted in an action by his master to prove
the delivery of goods, though he himself may have purloined them; but, in an action brought
against the master for the negligence of his servant, the servant cannot be a witness for his
master without a release; for the master may afterwards have his action against the servant,
and the verdict recovered against him may be given in evidence in that action to prove the
damage which the master has sustained. 4 T. R. 589.
By the 46 Geo. III, c. 37, it is enacted, that a witness cannot refuse to answer a question
relevant to the matter in issue, the answering of which has no tendency to accuse himself,
or to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture, by reason only that the answer to such question
may establish, or tend to establish, that he owes a debt or is subject to a civil suit.
This statute was passed because, upon a point which arose at Lord Melville's impeachment,
the high living authorities of the law were nearly divided, whether a witness was compellable to
answer such a question. But surely it was agreeable to the law'of England, that a man
should be compelled to be honest, and where, if he avoided the question, injustice would be
done both between the parties before the court, and afterwards between the witness and
some other party.]
(23) [A witness may be examined with regard to his own infamy, if the confession of it does
not subject him to any future punishment: as a witness he may be asked if he has not stood
in the pillory for perjury: 4 T. R. 440; but he cannot be entirely rejectcd as a witness with-
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other person, entrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party himself shall
be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or mat-
ters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confi-
dence: (w) (24) but he may be examined as to mere matters of fact, as the
execution of a deed or the like, which might have come to his knowledge with-
out being interested in the cause.
One witness (if credible) is sufficient evidence to a jury of any single fact,
though undoubtedly the concurrence of two or more corroborates the proof. Yet
our law considers that there are many transactions to which only one person is
privy; and therefore does not always demand the testimony of two, which the
civil law universally requires. "Unius responsio testis omnino non audiatur."(x)
(w) Law of Nisi Prius, 267. (x) Cod. 4, 20, 9.
out the production of the record of conviction, by which he is rendered incompetent. 8 East,
77. Though it has been held, in some other cases, that a witness is not bound to answer such
questions. 4 St. Tr. 748; 1 Salk. 153; 4 Esp. 225, 242. It is quite clear that a man is not
bound to answer any questions, either in a court of law or equity, which may tend to criminate
himself, or which may render him liable to a penalty. Stra. 444; 3 Taunt. 424; 4 St. Tr. 6;
6 id. 649; 16 Ves. 242; 2 Ld. Raym. 1088; Mitford's Ch. Pl. 157. As to questions which merely
disgrace the witness, there is some difficulty. See Stark. on Ev., pt. 2, 139. Still a witness is
in no case legally incompetent to allege his own turpitude, or to give evidence which involves his
own infamy: 2 Stark. Rep. 116; 8 East. 78; 11 id. 309; or impeaches his own solemn acts: 5 M.
and S. 244; 7 T. R. 604; unless he be rendered incompetent by a legal interest in the event of
the cause, or in the record. It seems to be an universal rule that a particeps criminis may be
examined as a witness in both civil and criminal cases, provided he has not been incapacitated
by a conviction of crime. As a clerk, who had laid out money which he had embezzled in
illegal insurances was held to be a competent witness for the master against the insurer.
Cowp. 197. So a man who has pretended to convey lands to another may prove that he had
no title. Ld. Raym. 1008. A co-assignee of a ship may prove that he had no interest in the
vessel. Cited in 1 T. R. 301. The parents may give evidence to bastardize their issue: 6 T. R.
230, 331; or to prove the legitimacy: id.; though it is said the sole evidence of the mother, a
married woman, shall not be sufficient to bastardize her child. 1 Wils. 340.]
[By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 99, all legal objection to the competency of witnesses on the
ground of interest is removed, and the parties to suits, and the persons in whose behalf they
are brought or defended, are made competent and compellable to give evidence, in behalf of
either party, except that a person charged with an offence cannot give evidence against him-
self, nor is any person compellable to answer a question tending to criminate himself, nor can
husband and wife give evidence for or against each other in criminal cases. The cases of actions
for breach of promise of marriage, and of proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery,
are excepted from the statute. The subsequent statute of 16 and 17 Vic. c. 83, makes the hus-
bands and wives of parties to suits, or of persons on whose behalf the suits are brought or de-
fended, competent and compellable to give evidence on behalf of either party. But they are not
to be made to disclose any communication made or received during marriage, and neither
party is a competent witness in a criminal proceeding, or in any proceeding instituted in con-
sequence of adultery. The previous statute of 6 and 7 Vic. c. 85, removed the incapacities of
witnesses on account of crime.]
In the United States the tendency of recent legislation is in the direction of the removal of
all the common law disabilities of witnesses, leaving the objections from infamy, interest, &c.,
to have such weight as the jury may see fit to give them as objections to the credibility of the
witnesses.
(24) LBut the principle and policy of this rule restrain it to that confidence, only, which is
placed in a counsel or solicitor, and which must necessarily be inviolable, where the use of
advocates and legal assistance is admitted. But the purposes of public justice supersede the
delicacy of every other species of confidential communication. In the trial of the duchess of
Kingston, it was determined that a friend might be bound to disclose, if necessary, in a court
of justice, secrets of the most sacred nature which one sex could repose in the other. And
that a surgeon was bound to communicate any information whatever, which he was possessed
of in consequence of his professional attendance. 11 St. Tr. 243, 246. And those secrets only,
communicated to a counsel or attorney, are inviolable in a court of justice, which have
been intrusted to them while acting in their respective characters to the party as their client.
4 T. R. 431, 753.]
For an excellent case on this subject, see Whiting v. Barnes, 30 N. Y. 330. See, also, People
v. Blakeley, 4 Park. Cr. R. 176; 1 Greeu. Ev. § 237 to 246; 1 Stark. Ev. 40; 1 Phil. Ev. by
Cowen, Hill and Edwards, 130, et seq. In several of the United States statutes have been passed
extending similar protection to the communications made to physicians and clergymen, with
a view to obtaining their professional advice or assistance.
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To extricate itself out of which absurdity, the modern practice of the civil law
courts has plunged itself into another. For, as they do not allow a less number
than two witnesses to the plenaprobatio, they call the testimony of one, though
never so clear and positive, semi-plena probatio only, on which no sentence can
be founded. To make up, therefore, the necessary complement of witnesses, when
they have one only to a single fact, they admit the party himself (plaintiff or
defendant) to be examined in his own behalf; and administer to him what is
called the suppletory oath; and if his evidence happens to be in his own favour,
this immediately converts the half proof into a whole one. By this ingenious
device, satisfying at once the forms of the Roman law, and acknowledging the
superior *reasonableness of the law of England: which permits one wit- ['371]
ness to be sufficient where no more are to be had: and, to avoid all tempta-
tions of perjury, lays it down as an invariable rule, that nemo testis esse debet in
propri causa. (25)
Positive proof is always required, where from the nature of the case it appears it
might possibly have been had. But next topositive proof, circumstantial evidence,
or the doctrine ofpresumptions, must take place; for when the fact itself cannot be
demonstratively evinced, that which comes nearest to the proof of the fact is the
proof of such circumstances as either necessarily, or usually, attend such
facts; and these are called presumptions, which are only to be relied upon till
the contrary be actually proved. Stabiturprmsumptiont donee probetur in con-
trarium. (y) Violent presumption is many times equal to full proof;(z) for
there those circumstances appear which necessarily attend the fact. As if a
landlord sues for rent due at michaelmas, 1754, and the tenant cannot prove the
payment, but produces an acquittance for rent due at a subequent time, in full
of all demands, this is a violent presumption of his having paid the former rent,
and is equivalent to full proof; for though the actual payment is not proved,
yet the acquittance in full of all demands is proved, which could not be without
such payment; and it therefore induces so forcible a presumption, that no
proof shall be admitted to the contrary. (a) (26) Probable presumption, arising
(y) Co. Lltt. 373. (z) Ibid. 6. (a) Glb. Evid. 161.
(25) In equity a rule apparently somewhat different prevails in a certain class of cases. If
the complainant calls for an answer from the defendant on oath, he thereby makes the answer
evidence in the cause; and as it is evidence called for by himself, it is allowed to have the
same weight in the case as the testimony of any other witness, and therefore the complainant,
who is bound to make out his case, cannot have a decree against an answer denying the equity
of the bill, unless he overcomes the answer with the testimony of two witnesses, or at least of
one witness and strong supporting circumstances. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 260. Where, however, by
statute, the parties in chancery are made competent witnesses generally, and may be orally ex-
amined, it would seem that this rule is substantially done away with. See Roberts v. Miles, 12
Mich. 297. In high treason two witnesses are essential in England, and in the United States
by the constitution. Art. 3, § 3. Two are also necessary in cases where perjury is charged.
But in other cases, if the evidence is competent, the jury must be the judges how much weight
it is entitled to. I Phil. Ev. 1, 2; 1 Stark Ev. 583.
(26) [Presumptions are or three kinds ; 1st. Legal presumptions, made by the law itself; 2dly.
Legal presumptions to be made by a jury, of law and fact; 3dly. Natural presumptions, or pre-
sumptions of mere fact.
1st. Legal presumptions are in some cases absolute, as that a bond or other specialty was ex-
ecuted upon a good consideration (4 Burr. 2225), so long as the deed or bond remains unim-
peached ; but it may be impeached on the ground of fraud, and then the consideration becomes
the subject of inquiry. But in the case of bills of exchange, the presumption that it was ac-
cepted for a good consideration may be rebutted by evidence. So where a fine has been levied,
it will be implied that it was levied with proclamations (3 Co. 86, b), unless rebutted (Bul. N. P.
229), and some other like instances; but the presumption in favor of innocence is, and has
been held, too strong to be overcome by any artificial intendment of law. 2 B. and A. 386. 2d.
Presumptions of law and fact, as that the adverse enjoyment unquestioned for twenty years, of
an incorporeal hereditament, presumes a grant; that a bond has been satisfied upon which no
interest has been paid, nor other acknowledgment made of its existence for a like period:
2 Stra. 826 ; 2 Ld. Rayn. 1370 ; that there has been a conversion of goods in the case of trover,
where the defendant refuses to deliver them up. 3d. Natural presumptions. It is the peculiar
province of the jury to deal with presumptions of this class; yet where the particular facts are
inseparably connected according to the usual course of nature, the courts themselves will
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from such circumstances as usually attend the fact, hath also its due weight:
as if, in a suit for rent due in 1754, the tenant proves the payment of the rent
due in 1755; this will prevail to exonerate the tenant, (b) unless it be clearly
shown that the rent of 1754 was retained for some special reason, or that there
was some fraud or mistake: for otherwise it will be presumed to have been paid
before that in 1755, as it is most usual to receive first the rents of longest stand-
ing. Light, or rash, presumptions have no weight or validity at all. (27)
[*372] *The oath administered to the witness is not only that what he deposes
shall be true, but that he shall also depose the whole truth: so that he is not
to conceal any part of what he knows, whether interrogated particularly to that
point or not. And all this evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence
of the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by-standers, and before the
judge and jury: each party having liberty to except to its competency, which ex-
ceptions are publicly stated and by the judge are openly and publicly allowed or
disallowed, in the face of the country: which must curb any secret bias or par-
tiality that might arise in his own breast. And if, either in his directions or de-
cisions, he misstates the law by ignorance, inadvertence, or design, the counsel
on either side may require him publicly to seal a bill of exceptions; stating the
point wherein he is supposed to err: and this he is obliged to seal by statute
Wesm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 31, or, if he refuses so to do, the party may have a com-
pulsory writ against him, (c) commanding him to seal it, if the fact alleged be
truly stated: and if he returns, that the fact is untruly stated when the case is
otherwise, an action will lie against him for making a false return. This bill of
exceptions is in the nature of an appeal; examinable, not in the court out of
which the record issues for the trial at nisiprius, but in the next immediate
superior court, upon a writ of error, after judgment given in the court below.
But a demurrer to evidence shall be determined by the court, out of which the
record is sent. This happens, where a record or other matter is produced in
evidence, concerning the legal consequences of which there arises a doubt in
law: in which case the adverse party may if he please demur to the whole evi-
dence; which admits the truth of every fact that has been alleged, but denies
the sufficiency of them all in point of law to maintain or overthrow the issue; (d)
which draws the question of law from the cognizance of the jury, to be decided
(as it ought) by the court. But neither these demurrers to evidence, nor the
[*373] bill of exceptions, are at present so much *in use as formerly; since the
more frequent extension of the discretionary powers of the court in
granting a new trial, which is now very commonly had for the misdirection of
the judge at nisi prius. (28)
(b) Co. Litt. 373. (c) Reg. Br. 182. 2 Inst. 427. (d) Co. Litt. 72. 5 Rep. 104.
draw the inference, as when a child has been born within a few weeks after access of the hus-
band, its bastardy will be inferred without the aid of a jury. 8 East, 198. All cases of circum-
stantial evidence may be more or less within this class. And it is obvious that the case put
in the text belongs to this division, upon which Mr. Christian has made the following remark:
"This can scarcely be correct: I should conceive that proof may be admitted to repel all
presumptions whatever; and even if a receipt should be produced expressly for the rent of
the year 1754, still the landlord might show that it had been obtained by mistake or fraud, and
that no rent had been received at the time."]
A receipt, so far as it is a mere acknowledgment of payment and delivery, is always open to
explanation or contradiction by parol evidence. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 305. And now by statute in
some of the United States, a seal to a bond or other obligation, is only prima facie evidence
of consideration, which may be rebutted.
(27) [It is difficult to say what is light and rash presumption, if it is any presumption at all.
Any circumstance may be proved from which a fair inference can be drawn, though alone it
would be too slight to support the verdict of the jury, yet it may corroborate other testimony,
and a number of such presumptions may become of importance.]
(28) To obviate the hardships which frequently occurred where parties were defeated on
trials at the circuit on account of defects in pleadings not material to the merits of the case,
enlarged powers to permit amendments at the trial have been granted by several recent Eng-
lish statutes, and especially by the common law procedure act, 1852, and almost any defect
may be amended by leave of the court, where the nature of the action or ground of defence is
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This open examination of witnesses, viva voce, in the presence of all mankind,
is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth(e) than the private and
secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the
ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from the
civil law; where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he will
be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or care-
less scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his
depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to correct
and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which he can never do after a writ-
ten deposition is once taken. Besides, the occasional questions of the judge,
the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out
the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned
and settled; and the confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportu-
nity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had upon any other
method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, during the examination, a
matter of small importance: for, besides the respect and awe with which his
presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able, by use and experience, to
keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue. In short, by this
method of examination, and this only, the persons who are to decide upon the
evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, under-
standing, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which points all persons
must appear alike, when their depositions are reduced to writing, and read to
the judge, in the absence of those who made them; and yet as much may be
frequently collected from the manner in which the evidence is delivered, as from
the matter of *it. These are a few of the advantages attending this, [*374]
the English, way of giving testimony, ore tenus. Which was also indeed
familiar among the ancient Romans, as may be collected from Quintilian ;(f)
who lays down very good instructions for examining and cross-examining wit-
nesses viva voce. And this, or somewhat like it, was continued as low as the
time of Hadrian: (g) but the civil law, as it is now modelled, rejects all public
examination of witnesses.
As to such evidence as the jury may have in their own consciences, by their
private knowledge of facts, it was an ancient doctrine, that this had as much
right to sway their judgment as the written or parol evidence which is delivered
in court. And therefore it hath been often held,(h) that though no proofs be
produced on either side, yet the jury might bring in a verdict. For the oath
of the jurors, to find according to their evidence, was construed(i) to be, to do
it according to the best of their own knowledge. This seems to have arisen
from the ancient practice in taking recognitions of assize, at the first introduc-
tion of that remedy; the sheriff being bound to return such recognitors as knew
the truth of the fact, and the recognitors, when sworn, being to retire immedi-
ately from the bar, and bring in their verdict according to their own personal
knowledge, without hearing extrinsic evidence or receiving any direction from
the judge.(j') And the same doctrine (when attaints came to be extended to
trials by jury,(29) as well as to recognitions of assize) was also applied to the
case of common jurors; that they might escape the heavy penalties of the
attaint, in case they could show, by any additional proof, that their verdict was
(e) Hale's Hist. C. L. 254, 255, 256. (f) Institut. Orat. 1. 5, c. 7.
(g) See his epistle to Varus, the legate or judge of Cilicia: "Ta magis scire potes, quanta fides sit haienda
testibus; qui, et cudus dignitats, et cujus cestimationis int; et, qui simpliciter vis sint dicere; utrum ununm
euniemque meditatum. sermoners attulerint, an ad eaqux interr ogaveras extempore verisimilia responderint"
FfJ. 22, 5. 3.
(h) Year-book, 14 Hen. VII, 29. Plowd. 12. Hob. 227. 1 Lev. 87. (i) Vaugh. 148, 149.
U)) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 19, § 3. Flet. 1. 4, c. 9, § 2.
not changed, and the opposite party not likely to be misled. Amendments are permitted on
such terms as the court thinks proper to impose. In the United States the statutes of amend-
ments are generally very broad and liberal, and permit amendments for the furtherance of
justice, in any state of the proceedings, and after judgment.
(29) Writs of attaint and assize are both abolished.
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agreeable to the truth, though not according to the evidence produced; with
which additional proof the law presumed they were privately acquainted, though
[*375] it did not appear in *court. But this doctrine was again gradually
exploded, when attaints began to be disused, and new trials introduced
in their stead. For it is quite incompatible with the grounds upon which such
new trials are every day awarded, viz., that the verdict was given without, or
contrary to, evidence. And, therefore, together with new trials, the practice
seems to have been first introduced (k) which now universally obtains, that if a
juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a witness,
and give his evidence publicly in court.
When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the judge, in the presence
of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up the whole to the jury; omit-
ting all superfluous, circumstances, observing wherein the main question and
principal issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support it, with such
remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving them his opinion
in matters of law arising upon that evidence.
The jury, after the proofs are summed up, unless the case be very clear, with-
draw from the bar to consider of their verdict: and, in order to avoid intem-
perance and causeless delay, are to be kept without meat, drink, fire, or candle,
unless by permission of the judge, till they are all unanimously agreed. A
method of accelerating unanimity not wholly unknown in other constitutions
of Europe, and in matters of greater concern. For, by the golden bull of the
empire,(1) if, after the congress is opened, the electors delay the election of a
king of the Romans for thirty days, they shall be fed only with bread and water
till the same is accomplished. But if our juries eat or drink at all, or have any
eatables about them, without consent of the court, and before verdict, it is fin-
able; and if they do so at his charge for whom they afterwards find, it will set
aside the verdict. Also, if they speak with either of the parties or their agents,
[*376] after they are gone *from the bar; or if they receive any fresh evidence
in private; or if to prevent disputes they cast lots for whom they shall
find; any of these circumstances will entirely vitiate the verdict.(30) And it
has been held, that if the jurors do not agree in their verdict before the judges
are about to leave the town, though they are not to be threatened or impris-
oned,(m) the judges are not bound to wait for them, but may carry them round
the circuit from town to town in a cart.(n) This necessity of a total unanimity
seems to be peculiar to our own constitution ;(o) or, at least in the nembda or
jury of the ancient Goths, there was required (even in criminal cases) only the
consent of the major part; and in case of an equality, the defendant was held
to be acquitted.(_p) (31)
(k) Styl. 233. 1 Sid. 133. (1) C. 2. (m) Mirr. c. 4, § 24. (n) Lib. Ass. fol. 40, pl. 11.
(o) See Barrington on the Statutes, 19, 20, 21. (p) Stiern. 1. 1, c. 4.
(30) That is, the court will set aside the verdict, on misconduct of this character being
proven. But the misconduct must be made out by other evidence than that of the jurors
themselves; for they will not be allowed to testify to it. Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487; Clum
v. Smith, 5 Hill, 560. See this principle limited in Wright v. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa, 195.
(31) [The learned judge has displayed much erudition in the beginning of this chapter, to
prove the antiquity of the trial by jury; but the trials referred to by the authors there cited,
and even the judikium parium, mentioned in the celebrated chapter of magna charta, are trials
which were something similar to that by a jury, rather than instances of a trial by jury
according to its present established form. The judicium pariura seems strictly the judgment
of a subject's equals in the feudal courts of the king and barons. And so little appears to be
ascertained by antiquarians respecting the introduction of the trial in criminal cases by two
juries, that, although it is one of the most important, it is certainly one of the most obscure
and inexplicable, parts of the law of England.
The unanimity of twelve men, so repugnant to all experience of human conduct, passions,
and understandings, could hardly in any age have been introduced into practice by a delib-
erate act of the legislature.
But that the life, and perhaps the liberty and property, of a subject, should not be affected
by the concurring judgment of a less number than twelve, where more were present, was a
law founded in reason and caution; and seems to be transmitted to us by the common law,
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When they are all unanimously agreed, the jury return back to the bar; and,
before they deliver their verdict, the plaintiff is bound to appear in court, by
himself, attorney, or counsel, in order to answer the amercement to which,
by the old law, he is liable, as has been formerly mentioned,(q) in case he fails
in his suit, as a punishment for his false claim. To be amerced, or a mercie, is
to be at the king's mercy with regard to the fine to be imposed; in misericordia
domini regis pro falso clamore suo. The amercement is disused, but the form
still continues; and if the plaintiff does not appear, no verdict can be given,
but the plaintiff is said to be nonsuit, non sequitur clamorem suumn. Therefore
it is usual for a plaintiff, when be or his counsel perceives that he has not given
evidence sufficient to maintain his issue, to be voluntarily nonsuited, or with-
draw himself: whereupon the crier is ordered to call the plaintiff: and if nei-
ther he, nor any body for him, appears, he is nonsuited, the jurors are discharged,
the action is at an end, and the defendant shall recover his costs. The reason
of this practice is, that a nonsuit is more eligible for the plaintiff than a verdict
against him: for, after a nonsuit, which is only a default, he may commence the
same suit *again for the same cause of action; but after a verdict had, [*377]
and judgment consequent thereupon, he is forever barred from attack-
ing the defendant upon the same ground of complaint. But, in case the plaintiff
appears, the jury by their foreman deliver in their verdict.(32)
A verdict, vere dictum, is either privy or public. A privy verdict is when
the judge hath left or adjourned the court: and the jury, being agreed, in
order to be delivered from their confinement, obtain leave to give their verdict
privily to the judge out of court :(r) which privy verdict is of no force, unless
afterwards affirmed by a public verdict given openly in court; wherein the jury
may, if they please, vary from the privy verdict. So that the privy verdict is
indeed a mere nullity; and yet it is a dangerous practice, allowing time for the
parties to tamper with the jury, and therefore very seldom indulged.(33) But
the only effectual and legal verdict is the public verdict: in which they openly
declare to have found the issue for the plaintiff, or for the defendant; and if for
the plaintiff, they assess the damages also sustained by the plaintiff, in conse-
quence of the injury upon which the action is brought.
Sometimes, if there arises in the case any difficult matter of law, the jury,
for the sake of better information, and to avoid the danger of having their
verdict attainted, will find a special verdict; which is grounded on the statute
of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, § 2. And herein they state the naked facts, as
they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon; con-
(q) Page 275. See also book IV, 379.
(r) If the judge hath adjourned the court to his own lodgings, and there receives the verdict, it is a public
and not a p svy verdict.
or from immemorial antiquity. The grand assize might have consisted of more than twelve,
yet the verdict must have been given by twelve or more; and if twelve did not agree, the
assize was afforced, that is; others were added till twelve did concur. See 1 Reeve's Hist. of
Eng. Law, 241,480. This was a majority, and not unanimity. A grand jury may consist
of any number from twelve to twenty-three inclusive, but a presentment ought not to be made
by less than twelve. 2 Hale P. C. 161. The same is true also of an inquisition before the
coroner. In the high court of parliament, and the court of the lord high steward, a peer may
be convicted by the greater number; yet there can be no conviction unless the greater number
consists at least of twelve. 3 Inst. 30; Kelyng, 56; Moore, 622. Under a commission of
lunacy the jury was seventetn, but twelve joined in the verdict. 7 Ves. Jun. 450. A jury
upon a writ of inquiry may be more than twelve. In all these cases, if twelve only appeared, it
followed, as a necessary consequence, that, to act with effect, they must have been unanimous.
Hence, this may be suggested as a conjecture respecting the origin of the unanimity of
juries, that, as less than twelve, if twelve or more were present, could pronounce no effective
verdict, when twelve only were sworn, their unanimity became indispensable.]
(32) [When a verdict will carry all the costs, and it is doubtful from the evidence for which
party it will be given, it is a common practice for the judge to recommend, and the parties to
consent, that a juror should be withdrawn; and thus no verdict is given, and each party pays
his own costs.]
(33) [A privy verdict cannot be given in treason and felony. 2 H. P. C. 300.]
Cbap. 23.]
cluding conditionally, that if upon the whole matter the court should be of
opinion that the plaintiff had cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff;
if otherwise, then for the defendant. This is entered at length on the record,
and afterwards argued and determined in the court at Westminster, from whence
the issue came to be tried.
[*37 . *Another method of finding a species of special verdict, is when the
8 jury find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but subject nevertheless to
the opinion of the judge of the court above, on a special case(34) stated by the
counsel on both sides with regard to a matter of law: which has this advan-
tage over a special verdict, that it is attended with much less expense, and
obtains a much speedier decision: the postea (of which in the next chapter)
being stayed in the hands of the officer of nisi prius, till the question is deter-
mined, and the verdict is then entered for the plaintiff or defendant, as the
case may happen. But, as nothing appears upon the record but the general
verdict, the parties are precluded hereby from the benefit of a writ of error, if
dissatisfied with the judgment of the court or judge upon the point of law.
Which makes it a thing to be wished, that a method could be devised of either
lessening the expense of special verdicts, or else of entering the cause at length
upon the postea. But in both these instances the jury may, if they think
proper, take upon themselves to determine, at their own hazard, the complicated
question of fact and law; and, without either special verdict or special case,
may find a verdict absolutely either for the plaintiff or defendant.(s)
When the jury have delivered in their verdict, and it is recorded in court,
they are then discharged. And so ends the trial by jury: a trial which, besides
the other vast advantages which we have occasionally observed in its progress,
is also as expeditious and cheap, as it is convenient, equitable, and certain; for
a commission out of chancery, or the civil law courts, for examining witnesses
in one cause will frequently last as long, and of course be full as expensive, as
the trial of a hundred issues at nisi prius: and yet the fact cannot be deter-
mined by such commissioners at all; no, not till the depositions are published,
and readat the hearing of the cause in court.
[,379] * Upon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever
* ] will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it has so great
an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that advan-
tage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases ! But this we must
refer to the ensuing book of these Commentaries: only observing for the present,
that it is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish
for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but
by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals. A constitution,
that I may venture to affirm has, under Providence, secured the just liberties of
this nation for a long succession of ages. And therefore a celebrated French
writer,(t) who concludes, that because Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have lost
their liberties, therefore those of England in time must perish, should have
recollected that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, at the time when their liberties
were lost, were strangers to the trial by jury.
Great as this eulogium may seem, it is no more than this admirable constitu-
tion, when traced to its principles, will be found in sober reason to deserve.
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted
to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the
prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite
of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards
those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be expected from human
(s) Litt. § 868. (t) Montesq. Sp. L. xi, 6.
(34) [And since the statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, the parties may state a special case for the
opinion of the court, without the intervention of a jury.]
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nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good of the
many. On the other hand, if the power of judicature were placed at random
in the hands of the multitude, their decisions would be wild and capricious, and
a new rule of action would be every day established in our courts. It is wisely
therefore ordered, that the principles and axioms of law, which are general
propositions, flowing from abstracted reason, and not *accommodated to [*380]
times or to men, should be deposited in the breasts of the judges, to be
occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained before them. For
here partiality can have little scope: the law is well known, and is the same for
all ranks and degrees; it follows as a regular conclusion from the premises of
fact pre-established. But in settling and adjusting a question of fact, when
intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample field
to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or by
more artfully suppressing some circumstances, stretching and warping others,
and distinguishing away the remainder. Here, therefore, a competent number
of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the middle
rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of
public justice. For the most powerful individual in the state will be cautious
of committing any flagrant invasion of another's right, when he knows that
the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent
men, not appointed till the hour of trial; and that, when once the fact is ascer-
tained, the law must of course redress it. This, therefore, preserves in the hands
of the people that share which they ought to have in the administration of
public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and
wealthy citizens. Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without
the intervention of a jury (whether composed of justices of the peace, com-
missioners of the revenue, judges of a court of conscience, or any other stand-
ing magistrates), is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive
of absolute governments. The feudal system, which, for the sake of military
subordination, pursued an aristocratical plan in all its arrangements of property,
had been intolerable in times of peace, had it not been wisely counterpoised by
that privilege so universally diffused through every part of it, the trial by the
feudal peers. And in every country on the continent, as the trial by the peers
has been gradually disused, so the nobles have increased in power, till the state
has been torn to pieces by rival factions, and oligarchy in effect has been estab-
lished, though under the shadow of regal government; *unless where [*31]
the miserable commons have taken shelter under absolute monarchy, as
the lighter evil of the two. And, particularly, it is a circumstance well worthy
an Englishman's observation, that in Sweden the trial by jury, that bulwark of
northern liberty, which continued in its full vigour so lately as the middle of
the last century,(u) is now fallen into disuse: (w) and that there, though the
regal power is in no country so closely limited, yet the liberties of the commons
are extinguished, and the government is degenerated into a mere aristocracy. (x)
It is, therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every man owes to his country,
his friends, his posterity and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power
this valuable constitution in all its rights; to restore it to its ancient dignity,
if at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated from
its first institution; to amend it, wherever it is defective; and, above all, to
guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new
and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretences,
ma in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.
Yet, after all, it must be owned, that the best and most effectual method to
preserve and extend the trial by jury in practice, would be by endeavouring to re-
move all the defects, as well as to improve the advantages, incident to this mode
of inquiry. If justice is not done to the entire satisfaction of the people, in this
method of deciding facts, in spite of all encomiums and panegyrics on trials at
the common law, they will resort in search of that justice to another tribunal;
(u) 2 Whitelock of Parl. 427. (w) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxiii, 22. (x) Ibid. 17.
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though more dilatory, though more expensive, though more arbitrary in its frame
and constitution. If justice is not done to the crown by the verdict of a jury
the necessities of the public revenue will call for the erection of summary tri-
bunals. The principal defects seem to be,
1. The want of a complete discovery by the oath of the parties. This each of
[*382] them is now entitled to have, by *going through the expense and circuity
of a court of equity, and therefore it is sometimes had by consent, even in
the courts of law. How far such a mode of compulsive examination is agreeable
to the rights of mankind, and ought to be introduced in any country, may be
matter of curious discussion, but is foreign to our present inquiries. It has long
been introduced and established in our courts of equity, not to mention the civil
law courts: and it seems the height of judicial absurdity, that in the same cause
between the same parties, in the examination of the same facts, a discovery by
the oath of the parties should be permitted on one side of Westminster-hall, and
denied on the other: or that the judges of one and the same court should be
bound by law to reject such a species of evidence, if attempted on a trial at bar,
but, when sitting the next day as a court of equity, should be obliged to hear
such examination read, and to found their decrees upon it. In short, within the
same country, governed by the same laws, such a mode of inquiry should be uni-
versally admitted, or else universally rejected. (35)
2. A second defect is of a nature somewhat similar to the first: the want of a
compulsive power for the production of books and papers belonging to the par-
ties. In the hands of third persons they can generally be obtained by rule of
court, or by adding a clause of requisition to the writ of subpcena, which is then
called a subpcena duces tecum. But, in mercantile transactions especially, the
sight of the party's own books is frequently decisive; as the day-book of a trader,
where the transaction was recently entered, as really understood at the time;
though subsequent events may tempt him to give it a different colour. And, as
this evidence may be finally obtained, and produced on a trial at law, by the cir-
cuitous course of filing a bill in equity, the want of an original power for the
same purposes in the courts of law is liable to the same observations as were
made on the preceding article. (36)
[*383] *3. Another want is that of power to examine witnesses abroad, and
to receive their depositions in writing, where the witnesses reside, and
especially when the cause of action arises, in a foreign country. To which may
be added the power of examining witnesses that are aged, or going abroad, upon
interrogatories de bene esse; to be read in evidence if the trial should be deferred
till after their death or departure, but otherwise to be totally suppressed. Both
these are now very frequently effected by mutual consent, if the parties are open
and candid; and they may also be done indirectly at any time, through the
channel of a court of equity; but such a practice has never yet been directly
(35) [The common law procedure act, 1854, now, however, enables either party, by leave of
the court or a judge, to interrogate his opponent upon any matter as to which discovery may
be sought, and to require such party to answer the questions within ten days, by affidavit
sworn and filed in court in the ordinary way. Any person omitting, without just cause, to
answer all questions as to which a discovery is sought, is guilty of a contempt, and liable to
be proceeded against accordingly.]
(36) [When one party is in possession of papers or any species of written evidence material
to the other, if notice is given him to produce them at the trial, upon his refusal copies of
them will be admitted; or if no copy has been made, parol evidence of their contents will be
received. The court and jury presume in favor of such evidence; because, if it were not
agreeable to the strict truth, it would be corrected by the production of the originals. There
is no difference with respect to this species of evidence between criminal and civil cases.
2 T. R. 201.]
[The statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 99, 6, enacts that on any action or other legal proceeding in
the superior courts of common law, the court or any judge thereof may, on application by
either of the litigants, compel the opposite party to allow the party applying to inspect all
documents in his custody or under his control relating to such action or other legal proceed-
ing, in all cases in which a discovery may be obtained by filing a bill or other proceeding in
a court of equity.]
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adopted (y) as the rule of a court of law. (37) Yet where the cause of action
arises in India, and a suit is brought thereupon in any of the king's courts at
Westminster, the court may issue a commission to examine witnesses upon the
spot, and transmit the depositions to England. (z)
4. The administration of justice should not only be chaste, but should not
even be suspected. A jury coming from the neighbourhood has in some respects
a great advantage; but is often liable to strong objections; especially in small
jurisdictions, as in cities which are counties of themselves, and such where assizes
are but seldom holden; or where the question in dispute has an extensive local
tendenc ; where a cry has been raised, and the passions of the multitude been
inflamed; or where one of the parties is popular, and the other a stranger or ob-
noxious. It is true that, if a whole county is interested in the question to be
tried, the trial by the rule of law (a) must be in some adjoining county; but, as
there may be a strict interest so minute as not to occasion any bias, so there may
be the strongest bias without any pecuniary interest. In all these cases, to sum-
mon a jury, laboring under local prejudices, is laying a snare for their consciences:
and, though *they should have virtue and vigour of mind sufficient to *.,4
keep them upright, the parties will grow suspicious, and resort under 8 
various pretences to another mode of trial. The courts of law will therefore in
transitory actions very often change the venue, or county wherein the cause is
to be tried: (b) but in local actions, though they sometimes do it indirectly and
by mutual consent, yet, to effect it directly and absolutely, the parties are driven
to a court of equity; where, upon making out a proper case, it is done upon the
ground of being necessary to a fair, impartial, and satisfactory trial. (c) (38)
The locality of trial required by the common law seems a consequence of the
ancient locality of jurisdiction. All over the world, actions transitory follow
the person of the defendant, territorial suits must be discussed in the territorial
tribunal. I may sue a Frenchman here for a debt contracted abroad; but lands
lying in France must be sued for there, and English lands must be sued for in
the kingdom of England. Formerly they were usually demanded only in the
court-baron of the manor, where the steward could summon no jurors but such
as were the tenants of the lord. When the cause was removed to the hundred-
court (as seems to have been the course in the Saxon times,) (d) the lord of the
hundred had a farther power, to convoke the inhabitants of different vills to
form a jury: observing probably always to intermix among them a stated num-
ber of tenants of that manor wherein the dispute arose. When afterwards it
came to the county court, the great tribunal of Saxon justice, the sheriff had
wider authority, and could empanel a jury from the men of his county at large:
but was obliged (as a mark of the original locality of the cause) to return a
competent number of hundredors; omitting the inferior distinction, if indeed it
ever existed. And when at length, after the conquest, the king's justiciars
drew the cognizance of the cause from the *county court, though they r.385]
could have summoned a jury from any part of the kingdom, yet they [L ]
chose to take the cause as they found it, with all its local appendages; triable by
a stated number of hundredors, mixed 'with other freeholders of the county.
The restriction as to hundredors hath gradually worn away, and at length
entirely vanished; (e) that of counties still remains, for many beneficial pur-
(y) See page 75. (z) Stat. 13 Geo. IIM, c. 63. (a) Stra. 177. (b) See page 294.(c) This, among a number of other instances, was the case of the issues directed by thehouse of lords in the
cause between the duke of Devonshire and the miners of the county of Derby, A. D. 1762.
(d) LL. Edw. Conf. c. 32. Wilk. 203. (e) See page 360.
(37) But now by statute 1 Win. IV, c. 22, the superior courts of law are empowered, upon
the application of any party to an action therein, to order the examination of any witnesses
upon interrogatories, and, if the witnesses are out of the jurisdiction of the court, a commission
may be issued for the purpose. But the examination is not to be read at the trial, without the
consent of the opposite party, unless it shall appear that the witness is then beyond the juris-
diction of the court, or dead, or unable from permanent sickness to attend the trial.
(38) [This may now be done in a court of law. Tidd, 8th ed. 655.]
385 JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS. [Book III.
poses: but, as the king's courts have a jurisdiction co-extensive with the king-
dom, there surely can be no impropriety in sometimes departing from the
general rule, when the great ends of justice warrant and require an exception.
I have ventured to mark these defects, that the just panegyric, which I have
given on the trial by jury, might appear to be the result of sober reflection, and
not of enthusiasm or prejudice. But should they, after all, continue unreme-
died and unsupplied, still (with all its imperfections) I trust that this mode of
decision will be found the best criterion, for investigating the truth of facts, that
was ever established in any country. (39)
CHAPTER XXIV.
OF JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.
IN the present chapter we are to consider the transactions in a cause next
immediately subsequent to arguing the demurrer, or trial of the issue.
If the issue be an issue of fact; and, upon trial by any of the methods men-
tioned in the two preceding chapters, it be found for either the plaintiff or
defendant, or specially; or if the plaintiff makes default, or is nonsutt; or what-
ever, in short, is done subsequent to the joining of issue and awarding the trial,
it is entered on record and is called apostea.(a) The substance of which is, that
postea, afterwards, the said plaintiff and defendant appeared by their attorneys
at the place of trial; and a jury, being sworn, found such a verdict; or, that the
plaintiff, after the jury sworn, made default, and did not prosecute his suit; or
as the case may happen. This is added to the roll, which is now returned to the
court from which it was sent; and the history of the cause, from the time it was
carried out, is thus continued by the postea.
Next follows, sixthly, the judgment of the court upon what has previously
passed; both the matter of law and matter of fact being now fully weighed and
[*387] adjusted. Judgment *may however for certain causes be suspended, or
finally arrested: for it cannot be entered till the next term after trial
had, and that upon notice to the other party. So that if any defect of justice
happened at the trial, by surprise, inadvertence, or misconduct, the party may
have relief in the court above, by obtaining a new trial; or if, notwithstanding
the issue of fact be regularly decided, it appears that the complaint was either
(a) Appendix, No. II, § 4.
(39) So important has the right of trial by jury been regarded in the United States, that not
only the national constitution, but the constitution of each of the states, contains limitations,
more or less broad, upon the power of the legislature to deprive parties of it. The national
constitution provides " that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed," and that" in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried byjury shall be other-
wise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common
law." Const. U. S. 6th and 7th amendments. The restrictions in the state constitutions vary
greatly, and they generally permit parties to waive the right. Some of them also allow a jury
of less number than twelve. It is well settled, however, that where the constitution preserves
the right of trial by jury in general terms, it preserves it for all those cases in which it was
demandable of right at the common law. Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 104; Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20
Wis. 210; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359; Byers v. Commonwealth,
42 Penn. St. 89; Raines v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412. And the right cannot be made to depend
upon any condition. Green v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311. And the number of the jury must
be twelve, and in criminal cases, at least, the party cannot waive the right, or bind himself by
consent to be tried by a less number. Work v. State, 2 Ohio, N. S. 296; Cancemi v. People,
18 N. Y. 128; Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351.
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not actionable in itself, or not made with sufficient precision and accuracy, the
party may supersede it by arresting or staying the judgment.
1. Causes of suspending the judgment, by granting a new trial,(1) are at pres-
ent wholly extrinsic, arising from matter foreign to, or dehors the record. Of
this sort are want of notice of trial; or any flagrant misbehaviour of the party
prevailing towards the jury, which may have influenced their verdict; or any
gross misbehaviour of the jury among themselves: also if it appears by the
judge's report, certified to the court, that the jury have brought in a verdict
without or contrary to evidence, so that he is reasonably dissatisfied there-
with; (b) or if they have given exorbitant damages; (c) or if the judge himself has
misdirected the jury, so that they found an unjustifiable verdict: for these, and
other reasons of the like kind, it is the practice of the court to award a new, or
second, trial. But if two juries agree in the same or a similar verdict, a third
trial is seldom awarded: (d) for the law will not readily suppose, that the verdict
of any one subsequent jury can countervail the oaths of the two preceding ones.
The exertion of these superintendent powers of the king's courts, in setting
aside the verdict of a jury and granting a new trial, on account of misbehaviour
in the jurors, is of a date extremely ancient. There are instances in the year-
(b) Law of Nisi Pries, 303, 304. (c) Comb. 357. (d) 6 Mod. 22. Salk. 649.
(1) [As to new trials in general, see Tidd, 8th ed. 934 to 949. When there are two contrary
verdicts, it is not of course, but in the discretion of the court, to grant a new trial. 2 Bla. R.
963. The principaflgrounds for setting aside a verdict or nonsuit, and granting a new trial,
besides those mentioned in the text, are-ist. The discovery of new and material evidence
since the trial. 2 Bla. Rep. 955. 2dly. If the witnesses on whose testimony the verdict was
obtained, have been since convicted of perjury in giving their evidence: M1. 22 Geo. III, K.
B; or if probable ground be laid to induce the court to believe that the witnesses are per-
jured, they will stay the proceedings on the finding of a bill of indictment against them for
perjury, till the indictment is tried: id. ; but the circumstance of an indictment for perjury
having been found against a witness, is no ground of motion for new trial. 4 M. and S. 140;
8 Taunt 182. 3dly. For excessive damages, indicating passion or partiality in the jury.
1 Stra. 692; 1 Burr. 609; 3 Wils. 18; 2 B). Rep. 929; Cowp. 230; 5 T. R. 257; 7 id. 529; 11
East, 23. It is not usual to grant a new trial for smallness of damages: 2 Salk. 647; 2 Stra.
940; Doug. 509; Barnes, 455, 456; in which latter case it is said, if the demand is certain, as
on a promissory note, the court will set aside a verdict for too small damages, but not where
the damages are uncertain. Lastly, it is a general rule not to grant a new trial except for the
misdirection of the judge: 4 T. R. 753; 5 id. 19; 6 East, 316 (b); 1 Marsh. 555; or where a
point has been saved at the trial: 1 B. and P. 338 ; in a penal (2 Stra. 899; 10 East, 268; 4
M. and S. 338; 2 Chitty R. 273), hard or trifling action: 2 Salk. 653; 3 Burr. 1306; and an
action is considered trifling in this respect, when the sum to be recovered is under 201.: 5 Taunt.
537; 1 Chitty R. 265 (a); unless the trial is to settle a right of a permanent nature. Id. In
all these cases, if the verdict be agreeable to equity and justice, the court will not grant a new
trial, though there may have been an error in the admission or rejection of evidence, or in the
direction of the judge, if it appear to the court on the whole matter disclosed by the report,
that the verdict ought to be confirmed. 4 T. R. 468.
A new trial cannot be granted in civil cases at the instance of one of several defendants:
12 M1od. 275; 2 Stra. 814; nor for a part only of the cause of action. 2 Burr. 1224; 3 Wils.
47. But there may be cases in which the new trial is restricted to a particular part of the
record, as if the judge give leave to move on one part or point only, on a stipulation that
counsel shall not move for any thing else; or if the court think injustice may be done by set-
ting the whole matter at large again, they may restrict the second trial to certain particular
points. 4 Taunt. 556.
In criminal cases no new trial can be granted where the defendant has been acquitted.
6 East, 315; 4 M. and S. 337; 1 B. and A. 64. Where several defendants are tried at the same
time for a misdemeanor, and some are acquitted, and others convicted, the court may grant a
new trial to those convicted, if they think the conviction improper. 6 East, 619. See flrther
on this subject, Tidd, 8th ed. 934. In civil cases a motion for a new trial cannot be made
after an unsuccessful motion in arrest of judgment. 4 Bar. and Cres. 160. The granting of
a new trial is either without or upon payment of the costs of the former trial; or such costs
are directed to abide the event of the suit. Thegeneral rule seems to be, that if the new trial
be granted for the misbehavior of the jury, or the misdirection of the judge, the costs are
not required to be paid by the party applying for a new trial; but where the mere error of the
jury, or the discovery of fresh evidence is the ground, the costs must be paid by the party
moving to set aside the former verdict. See Tidd, 8th ed. 945.1
As to new trials, see, in general, Graham and Waterman onNew Trials, passim.
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books of the reigns of Edward III,(e) Henry IV,(f) and Henry VII,(g) of j idg-
[*388] ments being stayed (even after a trial at bar) and *new venires awarded,
because the jury had eat and drank without consent of the judge, and
because the plaintiff had privately given a paper to a juryman before he was
sworn. And upon these the chief-justice Glynn in 1655, grounded the first
precedent that is reported in our books(h) for granting a new trial upon account
of excessive damages given by the jury: apprehending, with reason, that noto-
rious partiality in the jurors was a principal species of misbehaviour. A few
years before, a practice took rise in the common pleas,(i) of granting new trials
upon the mere certificate of the judge (unfortified by any report of the evi-
dence), that the verdict had passed against his opinion; though Chief-justice
Rolle (who allowed of new trials in case of misbehaviour, surprise, or fraud, or
if the verdict was notoriously contrary to evidence) (k) refused to adopt that
practice in the court of king's bench. And at that time it was clearly held for
law,(1) that whatever matter was of force to avoid a verdict, ought to be returned
upon the postea, and not merely surmised by the court; lest posterity should
wonder why a new venire was awarded, without any sufficient reason appearing
upon the record. But very early in the reign of Charles the Second new trials
were granted upon affidavits ; (m) and the former strictness of the courts of
law, in respect of new trials, having driven many parties into courts of equity
to be relieved from oppressive verdicts, they are now more liberal in granting
them: the maxim at present adopted being this, that (in all cases of moment)
where justice is not done upon one trial, the injured party is entitled to
another. (n)
Formerly the principal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was by
writ of attaint; of which we shall speak in the next chapter, and which is at
least as old as the institution of the grand assize by Henry II,(o) in lieu of the
[*389] Norman trial by battle. Such a sanction was probably thought *neces-
sary, when, instead of appealing to Providence for the decision of a
dubious right, it was referred to the oath of fallible or perhaps corrupted men.
Our ancestors saw that a jury might give an erroneous verdict; and if they did,
that it ought not finally to conclude the question in the first instance: but the
remedy, which they provided, shows the ignorance and ferocity of the times, and
the simplicity of the points then usually litigated in the courts of justice. They
supposed that the law being told to the jury by the judge, the proof of fact
must be always so clear, that, if they found a wrong verdict, they must be wil-
fully and* corruptly perjured. Whereas a juror may find a just verdict from
unrighteous motives, which can only be known to the great searcher of hearts:
and he may, on the contrary, find a verdict very manifestly wrong, without any
bad motive at all; from inexperience in business, incapacity, misapprehension,
inattention to circumstances, and a thousand other innocent causes. But such
a remedy as this laid the injured party under an insuperable hardship, by mak-"
inga conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his redress.
The judges saw this; and therefore very early, even upon writs of assize, they
devised a great variety of distinctions; by which an attaint might be avoided,
and the verdict set to rights in a more temperate and dispassionate method. (p)
Thus, if excessive damages were given, they were moderated by the discretion
of the justices. (q) And if, either in that, or in any other instance, justice was
not completely done, through the error of either the judge or the recognitors,
it was remedied by certificate of assize, which was neither more nor less than a
second trial of the same cause by the same jury. (r) And, in mixed or personal
actions, as trespass and the like (wherein no attaint originally lay), if the jury
gave a wrong verdict, the judges did not think themselves warranted thereby
to pronounce an iniquitous judgment; but amended it, if possible, by subse-
(e) 24 Edw. M, 24. Bro. Abr. tit. verdite, 17. (f) 11 Hen. IV, 18. Bro. Abr. tit. enquest, 75.
) 14 Hen. VII, 1. Bro. Abr. tit. verdit, 18. (h) Styl. 466. (i) Ibid. 238.
1 Sid. 235. Styl. Pract. Reg. 310, 311, edit. 1657. (1) Cro. Eliz. 616. Palm. 325. 1 Brown]. 207.
(i) 1 Sid. 235. 2 Lev. 140. (n) I Burr. 395. (o) Ipse regali instiltutioni eleganter inserta. Glanv. 1. 2, c. 19.
(p) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 5, c. 4. (q) Ibid. tr. 1, c. 19, J S. (r) Ibid. 1. 4, tr. 5, c. 6, § 2. F. N. B. 181. 2 Inst. 415.
242
JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.
quent inquiries of their own; and, if that *could not be, they referred *390]
it to another examination. (s) When afterwards attaints, by several [
statutes, were more universally extended, the judges frequently, even for the
misbehaviour of jurymen, instead of prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a
second trial: and subsequent resolutions, for more than a century past, have so
amplified the benefit of this remedy, that the attaint is now as obsolete as the
trial by battle which it succeeded; and we shall probably see the revival of the
one as soon as the revival of the other. And here I cannot but again admire (t)
the wisdom of suffering time to bring to perfection new remedies, more easy
and beneficial to the subject; which, by degrees, from the experience and appro-
bation of the people, supersede the necessity or desire of using or continuing
the old.
If every verdict was final in the first instance, it would tend to destroy this
valuable method of trial, and would drive away all causes of consequence to be
decided according to the forms of the imperial law, upon depositions in writing;
which might be reviewed in a course of appeal. Causes of great importance,
titles to land, and large questions of commercial property, come ofter to be tried
by a jury, merely upon the general issue: where the facts are complicated and
intricate, the evidence of great length and variety, and sometimes contradicting
each other; and where the nature of the dispute very frequently introduces nice
questions and subtilties of law. . Either party may be surprised by a piece of
evidence which (had he known of its production) he could have explained or
answered: or may be puzzled by a legal doubt, which a little recollection would
have solved. In the hurry of a trial the ablest judge may mistake the law, and
misdirect the jury: he may not be able so to state and range the evidence as to
lay it clearly before them, nor to take off the artful impressions which have been
made on their minds by learned and experienced advocates. The jury are to
give their *opinion instanter; that is, before they separate, eat, or drink.
And under these circumstances the most intelligent and best intentioned [*391]
men may bring in a verdict, which they themselves upon cool deliberation would
wish to reverse.
Next to doing right, the great object in the administration of public justice
should be to give public satisfaction If the verdict be liable to many objections
and doubts in the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of bystanders,
no party would go away satisfied unless he had a prospect of reviewing it. Such
doubts would with him be decisive: he would arraign the determination as
manifestly unjust; and abhor a tribunal which he imagined had done him an
injury without a possibility of redress.
Granting a new trial, under proper regulations; cures all these inconveniences,
and at the same time preserves entire and renders perfect that most excellent
method of decision, which is the glory of the English law. A new trial is a
rehearing of the cause before another jury; but with as little prejudice to either
party, as if it had never been heard before. No advantage is taken of the
former verdict on the one side, or the rule of court for awarding such second
trial on the other: and the subsequent verdict, though contrary to the first,
imports no tittle of blame upon the former jury; who, had they possessed the
same lights and advantages, would probably have altered their own opinion.
The parties come better informed, the counsel better prepared, the law is more
fully understood, the judge is more master of the subject; and nothing is now
tried but the real merits of the case.
A sufficient ground must however be laid before the court, to satisfy them that
it is necessary to justice that the cause should be farther considered. If the
matter be such, as did not or could not appear to the judge who presided at
'nisi prius, it is disclosed to the court by affidavit: if it arises from what passed
at the trial, it is taken from the judge's information; who usually makes a
(s) Si juratores erraverint, et justiciaril secundum eorum dictum judidum pronuntaverlnt, faksam facrunt
pronuntiationem; et ideo sequi non debent eorum dtetum, sed ilud emendare tenentur per diligentem examina-
tionem. Si autem dijudicare nesciant, recurrendum erit ad mouis judicium. Bract. l. 4, tr. 5, c. 4, § 2.
(t) Sce page 268.
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special and minute report of the evidence. Counsel are heard on both sides to,,39.] impeach *or establish the verdict, and the court give their reasons at[*392] large why a new examination ought or ought not to be allowed. The
true import of the evidence is duly weighed, false colours are taken off, and all
points of law which arose at the trial are upon full deliberation clearly explained
and settled.
Nor do the courts lend too easy an ear to every application for a review of the
former verdict. They must be satisfied that there are strong probable grounds
to suppose that the merits have not been fairly and fully discussed, and that the
decision is not agreeable to the justice and truth of the case. A new trial is
not granted, where the value is too inconsiderable to merit a second examina-
tion. It is not granted upon nice and formal objections, which do not go to -the
real merits. It is not granted in cases of strict right, or sumnum jus, where
the rigorous exaction of extreme legal justice is hardly reconcilable to con-
science. Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang nearly equal: that
which leans against the former verdict ought always very strongly to prepon-
derate.
In granting such farther trial (which is matter of sound discretion) the court
has also an opportunity, which it seldom fails to improve, of supplying those
defects in this mode of trial which are stated in the preceding chapter; by lay-
ing the party applying under all such equitable terms as his antagonist shall
desire and mutually offer to comply with: such as the discovery of some facts
upon oath; the admission of others, not intended to be litigated; the production
of deeds, books, and papers; the examination of witnesses, infirm, or going beyond
sea; and the like. And the delay and expense of this proceeding are so small
and trifling, that it seldom can be moved for to gain time or to gratify humour.
The motion must be made within the first four days of the next succeeding term,
within which term it is usually heard and decided. And it is worthy observa-
tion, how infinitely superior to all others the trial by jury approves itself, even
in the very mode of its revision. In every other country of Europe, and in those
[*393] of our own tribunals which conform themselves to the *process of the
civil law, the parties are at liberty, whenever they please, to appeal from
day to day and from court to court upon questions merely of fact; which is a
perpetual source of obstinate chicane, delay, and expensive litigation. (u) With
us no new trial is allowed, unless there be a manifest mistake, and the subject-
matter be worthy of interposition. The party who thinks himself aggrieved,
may still, if he pleases, have recourse to his writ of attaint (2) after judgment ;
in the course of the trial he may demur to the evidence, or tender a bill of excep-
tions. And, if the first is totally laid aside, and the other two very seldom put
in practice, it is because long experience has shown, that a motion for a second
trial is the shortest, cheapest, and most effectual cure for all imperfections in the
verdict; whether they arise from the mistakes of the parties themselves, of their
counsel or attorneys, or even of the judge or jury.
2. Arrests of judgment (3) arise from intrinsic causes, appearing upon the
face of the record. Of this kind are, first, where the declaration varies totally
(u) Not many years ago an appeal was brought to the house of lords from the court of session in Scotland, in
a cause between Napier and Macfarlane. It was instituted in March, 1745, and (after many interlocutory orders
and sentences below, appealed from and reheard as far as the course of proceedings would admit) was finally
determined in April, 1749,-the 9 uestion being only on the property in an ox, adjudged to be of the value of
three guineas. No pique or spirit could have made such a cause, in the court of king's bench or common pleas,
have lasted a tenth of that time, or have cost a twentieth part of the expense.
(2) Since abolished.
(3) [The parties cannot move in arrest of judgment for any thing that is aided after verdict
at common law, or by the statute of amendments, or cured, as matter of form, by the statute
of jeofails. See 1 Saund. 228, n. (1) It is a general rule that a verdict will aid a title imper-
fectly set out, but not an imperfect title. 2 BulT. 1159; 3 Wils. 275; 4 T. R. 472. The de-
fendant cannot move in arrest of judgment for any thing which he might have pleaded in
abatement. 2 Bla. R. 1120. Surplusage will not vitiate after verdict, as in trover stating the
possession of the goods in plaintiff on the 3d of March, and the conversion by defendant
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from the original writ; as where the writ is in debt or detinue, and the plaintiff
declares in an action on the case for an assumpsit: for the original writ out of
chancery being the foundation and warrant of the whole proceedings in the
common pleas, if the declaration does not pursue the nature of the writ, the
court's authority totally fails. (4) Also, secondly, where the verdict materially
differs from the pleadings and issue thereon; as if, in an action for words, it is
laid in the declaration that the defendant said, "the plaintiff is a bankrupt ;"
and the verdict find specially that he said, "the plaintiff will be a bankrupt."
Or, thirdly, if the case laid in the declaration is not sufficient in point of law to
found an action upon. And this is an invariable *rule with regard to *
arrests of judgment upon matters of law, "that whatever is alleged in [*394]
arrest of judgment must be such matter as would upon demurrer have been
sufficient to overturn the action or plea." As if, on an action for slander in
calling the plaintiff a Jew, the defendant denies the words, and issue is joined
thereon; now if a verdict be found for the plaintiff, that the words were actually
spoken, whereby the fact is established, still the defendant may move in arrest
of judgment, that to call a man a Jew is not actionable: and, if the court be of
that opinion, the judgment shall be arrested, and never entered for the plaintiff.
But the rule will not hold e converso, "that every thing that may be alleged as
cause of demurrer will be good in arrest of judgment ;" for if a declaration or
plea omits to state some particular circumstance, without proving of which, at
the trial, it is impossible to support the action or defence, this omission shall be
aided by a verdict. As if, in an action of trespass, the declaration doth not
allege that the trespass was committed on any certain day; (w) or if the defend-
ant justifies, by prescribing for a right of common for his cattle, and does not
plead that his cattle were levant and couchant on the land; (x) (5) though either
of these defects might be good cause to demur to the declaration or plea, yet
if the adverse party omit to take advantage of such omission in due time, but
takes issue, and has a verdict against him, these exceptions cannot, after verdict,
be moved in arrest of judgment. For the verdict ascertains those facts, which
before from the inaccuracy of the pleadings might be dubious; since the law will
not suppose that a jury, under the inspection of a judge, would find a verdict for
the plaintiff or defendant, unless he had proved those circumstances, without
which his general allegation is defective. (y) Exceptions, therefore, that are
moved in arrest of judgment, must be much more material and glaring than
such as will maintain a demurrer: or, in other words, many inaccuracies and
omissions, which would be fatal, if early observed, are cured by a subsequent
verdict; and not suffered, in the last stage of a cause, to unravel the whole pro-
ceedings. *But if the thing omitted be essential to the action or defence, *39,
as if the plaintiff does not merely state his title in a defective manner, [*395]
but sets forth a title that is totally defective in itself, (z) or if to an action of debt
the defendant pleads not guilty instead of nil debet,(a) these cannot be cured by
a verdict for the plaintiff in the first case, or for the defendant in the second.
(w) Carth. 389. (x) Cro. Jac. 44. (y) 1 Mod. 292. (z) Salk. 365. (a) Cro. Eliz. 778.
"afterwards, to wit, on the 1st of March," it was held that "afterwards" might stand, and the
other words be treated as surplusage. Cro. C. 428.
If the judgment be arrested in consequence of mistake in the form of action, or otherwise,
the plaintiff is at liberty to proceed de novo in a fresh action. 1 Mod. 207; Vin. Ab. tit. Judg-
ment, Q. 4; Bla. R. 831. Each party pays his own costs upon the judgment being arrested.
Cowp. 407.]
The rule as to the defects that shall be cured by verdict is thus stated in 2 Saund. Rep. 228, n. (1)
"When there is any defect, imperfection, or omission in any pleading, whether in substance
or form, which would have been a fatal objection on demurrer, yet if the issue joined be such
as necessarily required, on the trial, proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly stated
or omitted, and without which it is not to be presumed that either the judge would direct the
jury to give, or the jury would have given, the verdict, such defect, imperfection or omission,
is cured by the verdict at the common law." See, also, Gould P1. Ch. 10, § 13; 1 Chit. P1. 673.
(4) [Now no form of action is stated in the writ. Com. Law Prac. Act 1853, s. 3.]
(5) [See, however, 1 Saund. 228, note 1.]
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If, by the misconduct or inadvertence of the pleaders, the issue be joined on a
fact totally immaterial, or insufficient to determine the right, so that the court
upon the finding cannot know for whom judgment ought to be given; as if, in
an action on the case in assumpsit against an executor, he pleads that he him-
self (instead of the testator) made no such promise: (b) or if, in an action of debt
on bond conditioned to pay money on or before a certain day, the defendant
pleads payment on the day: (c) (which issue, if found for the plaintiff, would be
inconolusive, as the money might have been paid before;) in these cases the court
will after verdict award a repleader quod parties replacitent; unless it appears
from the whole record that nothing material can possibly be pleaded in any
shape whatsoever, and then a repleader would be fruitless. (d) And, whenever
a repleader is granted, the pleadings must begin de novo at that stage of them,
whether it be the plea, replication, or rejoinder, &c., wherein there appears to have
been the first defect, or deviation from the regular course. (e)
If judgment is not by some of these means arrested within the first four days
of the next term after the trial, it is then to be entered on the roll or record.
Judgments are the sentence of the law, pronounced by the court upon the mat-
ter contained in the record; and are of four sorts. First, where the facts are
confessed by the parties, and the law determined by the court; as in case of
judgment upon demurrer: secondly, where the law is admitted by the parties,
and the facts disputed; as in case of judgment on a verdict: tlbirdly, where
[*396] *both the fact and the law arising thereon are admitted by the defend-
ant; which is the case of judgments by confession or default: or, lastly,
where the plaintiff is convinced that either fact, or law, or both, are insufficient
to support his action, and therefore abandons or withdraws his prosecution:
which is the case in judgments upon a nonsuit or retraxit.
The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their de-
termination or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law. It is
the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law and
fact, which stand thus: against him who hath rode over my corn, I may recover
damages by law: but A hath rode over my corn; therefore I shall recover dama-
ges against A. If the major proposition be denied, this is a demurrer in law: if
the minor, it is then an issue of fact: but if both be confessed (or determined) to
be right, the conclusion or judgment of the court cannot but follow. Which
judgment or conclusion depends not, therefore, on the arbitrary caprice of the
judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of justice. The judgment, in
short, is the remedy prescribed by law for the redress of injuries; and the suit
or action is the vehicle of means or administering it. What that remedy may be,
is, indeed, the result of deliberation and study to point out, and therefore the style
of the judgment is, not that it is decreed or resolved by the court, for then the
judgment might appear to be their own; but "it is considered," consideratum
est per curiam, that the plaintiff do recover his damages, his debt, his possession,
and the like: which implies that the judgment is none of their own; but the act
of law, pronounced and declared by the court, after due deliberation and inquiry.
All these species of judgments are either interlocutory orfinal. Interlocu-
tory judgments are such as are given in the middle of a cause, upon some plea,
proceeding, or default, which is only intermediate, and does not finally determine
or complete the suit. Of this nature are all judgments for the plaintiff upon
[*397] pleas in abatement of the suit or action: in *which it is considered by
the court that the defendant do answer over, respondeat ouster; that is,
put in a more substantial plea. (f) It is easy to observe, that the judgment
here given is not final, but merely interlocutory; for there are afterwards farther
proceedings to be had, when the defendant hath put in a better answer.
But the interlocutory judgments most usually spoken of are those incomplete
judgments, whereby the right of the plaintiff is indeed established, but the quan-
tum of damages sustained by him is not ascertained: which is a matter that can-
(8) 2 Ventr. 190. (c) Stra. 994. (d) 1 Burr. 301, 302.
e) Raym. 458. Salk. 579. (f) 2 Saund. 30.
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not be done without the intervention of a jury. As by the old Gothic constitu-
tion the cause was not completely finished till the nembda or jurors were called
in "ad executionem decretorum judicii, ad tvstimationem pretii, damni, lucri,"
c. (g) This can only happen vhere the plaintiff recovers; for, when judgment is
given for the defendant, it is always complete as well as final. And this happens,
in the first place, where the defendant suffers judgment to go against him by
default, or nihil dicit; as if he puts in no plea at all to the plaintiff's declara-
tion: by confession or cognovit actionem, where he acknowledges the plaintiff's
demand to be just: or by non sum informatus, when the defendant's attorney
declares he has no instruction to say any thing in answer to the plaintiff, or in
defence of his client; which is a species of judgment by default. If these, or
any of them, happen in actions where the specific thing sued for is recovered, as
in actions of debt for a sum certain, the judgment is absolutely complete. And
therefore it is very usual, in order to strengthen a creditor's security, for the
debtor to execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by the creditor,
empowering him to confess a judgment by either of the ways just now mentioned
(by nihil dicit, cognovit actionem, or non sum informatus) in an action of debt
to be brought by the creditor against the debtor for the specific sum due: which
judgment, when confessed, is absolutely complete and binding; provided the
same (as is also required in all other judgments) be regularly doequetted, that is,
abstracted and entered in a book, *according to the directions of statute [,398]
4 and 5 W. and M. c. 20. But where damages are to be recovered, a jury [38
must be called in to assess them; unless the defendant, to save charges, will
confess the whole damages laid in the declaration: otherwise the entry of the
judgment is, "that the plaintiff ought to recover his damages (indefinitely), but
because the court know not what damages the said plaintiff hath sustained,
therefore the sheriff is commanded, that by the oaths of twelve honest and lawful
men he inquire into the said damages, and return such inquisition into court."
This process is called a writ of inquiry : in the execution of which the sheriff
sits as judge, and tries by a jury, subject to nearly the same laws and conditions
as the trial by jury at nisi prius, what damages the plaintiff hath really sus-
tained; and when their verdict is given, which must assess some damages, the sheriff
returns the inquisition, which is entered upon the roll in manner of a postea;
and thereupon it is considered that the plaintiff do recover the exact sum of the
damages so assessed. In like manner, when a demurrer is determined for the
plaintiff upon an action wherein damages are recovered, the judgment is also in-
complete, without the aid of a writ of inquiry. (6)
Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action, by declaring
that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy
he sues for. In which case, if the judgment be for the plaintiff, it is also con-
sidered that the defendant be either amerced, for his wilful delay of justice in
not immediately obeying the king's writ by rendering the plaintiff his due; (h)
or be taken up, capiatur, till he pays a fine to the king for the public mis-
demeanor which is coupled with the private injury, in all cases of force, (i) of
falsehood in denying his own deed, (k) or unjustly claiming property in replevin,
or of contempt by disobeying the command Of the king's writ or the express
(y) Stiernhook, de jure GotA. 1. 1, c. 4. (h) 8 Rep. 40, 61.
(i) 8 Rep. 59. 11 Rep. 43. 5 Mod. 285. See Append. No. II, § 4.
(k) F. N. B. 121. Co. Litt. 131. 8 Rep. 60. 1 Roll. Abr. 219. Lill. Entr. 379, C. B. Hil. 4 Ann. rot. 430.
(6) [It has been said, by C. J. Wilmot, that "this is an inquest of office to inform the con-
science of the court, who, if they please, may themselves assess the damages." 3 Wils. 62.
Hence a practice is now established in the courts of king's bench and common pleas, in actions
where judgment is recovered by default upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, to refer it
to the master or prothonotary to ascertain what is due for principal, interestand costs, whose
report supercedes the necessity of a writ of inquiry. 4 T. R. 275; 1 H. Bl. 541. And this
practice is now adopted by the court of exchequer. 4 Price, 134; see further, Tidd, 8th ed.
817, 819. In cases of difficulty and importance, the court will give leave to have the writ of
inquiry executed before a judge at sittings or nisi prius; and then the j adge acts only as an
assistant to the sheriff.]
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prohibition of any statute. (1) But now, in case of trespass, ejectment, assault,
and false imprisonment, it is provided by the statute 5 and 6 W. and M., c. 12,
that no writ of capias shall issue for this fine, nor any fine be paid; but the
plaintiff shall pay 6s. 8d. to the proper officer, and be allowed it against the
defendant among his other costs. And, therefore, upon such judgments in
the common pleas, they used to enter that the fine was remitted, and now in
[*399] both courts they take no notice of any fine or capias at all. (m) *But
9J if judgment be for the defendant, then, in case of fraud and deceit to
the court, or malicious or vexatious suits, the plaintiff may also be fined; (n)
but in most cases it is only considered that he and his pledges of prosecuting
be (nominally) amerced for his false claim, pro falso clamore suo, and that the
defendant may go thereof without a day, eat inde sine die, that is, without any
farther continuance or adjournment; the king's writ, commanding his attend-
ance, being now fully satisfied, and his innocence publicly cleared. (o)
Thus much for judgments; to which costs are a necessary appendage; it being
now as well the maxim of ours as of the civil law, that "victus victori in
expensis condemnandus est :" (p) though the common law did not professedly
allow any, the amercement of the vanquished party being his only punishment.
The first statute which gave costs, eo nomine, to the demandant in a real action
was the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1, as did the statute of Marlbridge,
52 Hen. III, c. 6, to the defendant in one particular case, relative to wardship in
chivalry: though in reality costs were always considered and included in the
quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given; and, even now,
costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of damages by
the court. (q) But, because those damages were frequently inadequate to the
plaintiff's expenses, the statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also added; and
farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases where the party
is to recover damages. And, therefore, in such actions where no damages were
then recoverable (as in quare impedit, in which damages were not given till the
statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I), no costs are now-allowed; (r) unless they have
been expressly given by some subsequent statute. The statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 10,
was the first which allowed any costs on a writ of error. But no costs were
allowed the defendant in any shape, till the statutes 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, 4 Jac. I,
c. 3, 8 and 9 Wm. III, c. 11, 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, which very equitably gave the
defendant, if he prevailed, the same costs as the plaintiff would have had, in
case he had recovered. These costs on both sides are taxed and moderated by
the prothonotary, or other proper officer of the court.
[*400] *The king (and any person suing to his use) (s) shall neither pay norreceive costs; for, besides that he is not included under the general words
of these statutes, as it is his prerogative not to pay them to a subject, so it is
beneath his dignity to receive them. (7) And it seems reasonable to suppose,
that the queen-consort participates of the same privilege; for in actions brought
by her, she was not at the common law obliged to find pledges of prosecution,
nor could be amerced in case there was judgment against her. (t) In two other
cases an exemption also lies from paying costs. Executors and administrators,
when suing in the right of the deceased, shall pay none; (u) for the statute
23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, doth not give costs to defendants, unless where the action
supposeth the contract to be made with, or the wrong to be done to, the plaintiff
himself. (8) And paupers, that is, such as will swear themselves not worth five
pounds, are, by statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 12, to have original writs and subpcenas
gratis, and counsel and attorney assigned them without fee; and are excused
(1) 8 Rep. 60. (m) Salk. 54. Carth. 390. (n) 8 Rep. 59, 60. (o) Appendix, No. -I, 6.
(p) Cod. 3, 1, 13. (q) Appendix, No. II, t4. (r) 10 Rep. 116. (s) Stat. 24 Hen. VIII, c. 8.
(t) F. N. B. 101. Co. Litt. 133. (u) Cro. Jac. 229. 1 Ventr. 92.
(7) In civil cases the rule is now otherwise.
(8) The statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, gives costs against executors suing in the right of
their testator, in all cases in which they would be liable to costs if suing in their own right,
unless the court or a judge otherwise orders.
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from paying costs, when plaintiffs, by the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, but shall
suffer other punishment at the discretion of the judges. And it was formerly
usual to give such paupers, if nonsuited, their election either to be whipped or
pay the costs: (w) though that practice is now disused. (x) (9) It seems, how-
ever, agreed that a pauper may recover costs, though he pays none; (10) for the
counsel and clerks are bound to give their labour to hign, but not to his antago-
nist. (y) To prevent also trifling and malicious actions, for words, for assault
and battery, and for trespass, it is enacted by statutes 43 Eliz. c. 6, 21 Jac. I,
c. 16, and 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 9, § 136, that, where the jury who try any of
these actions shall give less damages than 40s., the plaintiff shall be allowed no
more costs than damages, unless the judge before whom the cause is tried shall
certify under his hand, on the back of the record, that an actual battery (and not
an assault only) -was proved, or that in trespass the freehold or title of the land
came chiefly in question. Also, by statutes 4 and 5 W. and M. *c. 23, and r*401]
8 and 9 Win. III, c. 11, if the trespass were committed in hunting or [*401
sporting by an inferior tradesman, or if it appear to be wilfully and maliciously
committed, the plaintiff shall have full costs, (z) though his damages, as assessed
by the jury, amount to less than 40s.
After judgment is entered, execution will immediately follow, unless the party
condemned thinks himself unjustly aggrieved by any of these proceedings, and
then he has his remedy to reverse them by several writs in the nature of appeals,
which we shall consider in the succeeding chapter.
CHAPTER XXV.
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATURE OF APPEALS.
PROCEEDINGS in the nature of appeals from the proceedings of the king's
courts of law, are of various kinds: according to the subject-matter in which
they are concerned. They are principally four.
I. A writ of attaint : (1) which lieth to inquire whether a jury of twelve men
gave a false verdict; (a) that so the judgment following thereupon may be
reversed: and this must be brought in the lifetime of him for whom the verdict
was given; and of two at least of the jurors who gave it. This lay, at the com-
mon law, only upon writs of assize; and seems to have been coeval with that
institution by King Henry II, at the instance of his chief-justice, Glanvil: being
probably meant as a check upon the vast power then reposed in the recognitors
of assize, of finding a verdict according to their own personal knowledge, with-
out the examination of witnesses. And even here it extended no farther than
to such instances, where the issue was joined upon the very point of assize
(the heirship, disseisin, &c.), and not on any collateral matter; as villenage,
astardy, or any other disputed fact. In these cases the assize was said to be
turned into an inquest or jury (assisa vertitur in juratum), or that the assize
should be taken in modum juratce et non in modurm assiswe; that is, that the
issue should be tried by a common jury or inquest, and not by recognitors of
(w) 1 Sid. 261. 7 Mod. 114. (x) Salk. 506. (y) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 125.
(z) See pages 214, 215. (a) Finch, L. 484.
(9) [But, as observed in Tidd Prac. 8th ed. 94, it does not appear that so disgraceful a pro-
ceeding was ever adopted by inflicting the punishment.]
(10) [1 Bos. and P. 39. The pauper in such case can only recover as costs the sums he is
actually out of pocket; not such sums as would have been so paid in an ordinary suit by any
other plaintiff.]
(1) Abolished by statute 6 Geo. IV, c. 50.
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assize: (b) and then I apprehend that no attaint lay against the inquest or jury
-that determined such collateral issue.(c) Neither do I find any mention made
by our ancient writers, of such a process obtaining after the trial by inquest or
,*403] jury, in the old Norman or feudal actions *prosecuted by writ of entry.
[* 3 Nor did any attaint lie in trespass, debt, or other action personal, by the
old common law: because those were always determined by common inquests
or juries.(d) At length the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 38, allowed
an attaint to be sued upon inquests, as well as assizes, which were taken
upon any plea of land or of freehold. But this was at the king's discretion,
and is so understood by the author of Fleta, (e) a writer contemporary with
the statute; though Sir Edward Coke(f) seems to hold a different opinion.
Other subsequent statutes (g) introduced the same remedy in all pleas of tres-
pass, and the statute 34 Edw. III, c. 7, extended it to all pleas whatsoever, per-
sonal as well as real; except only the writ of right, in such cases where the
mise or issue is joined on the mere right, and not on any collateral question.
For though the attaint seems to have been generally allowed in the reign of
Henry the Second,(h) at the first introduction of the grand assize (which at
that time might consist of only twelve recognitors, in case they were all unani-
mous), yet subsequent authorities have holden, that no attaint lies on a false
verdict given upon the mere right, either at common law or by statute; because
that is determined by the grand assize, appealed to by the party himself, and
now consisting of sixteen jurors.(i)
The jury who are to try this false verdict must be twenty-four, and are called
the grand jury; for the law wills not that the oath of one jury of twelve men
should be attainted or set aside by an equal number, nor by less indeed than
double the former.(k) If the matter in dispute be of forty pounds value in
personals, or of forty shillings a year in lands and tenements, then, by statute
15 Hen. VI, c. 5, each grand juror must have freehold to the annual value of
twenty pounds. And he that brings the attaint can give no other evidence to
the grand jury than what was originally given to the petit. For, as their ver-
dict is now trying, and the question is, whether or no they did right upon the
evidence that appeared to them, the law adjudged it the highest absurdity to
[*404] produce any subsequent proof upon such trial, and to *condemn the prior
jurisdiction for not believing evidence which they never knew. But
those against whom it is brought are allowed, in affirmance of the first verdict,
to produce new matter; (1) because the petit jury may have formed their verdict
upon evidence of their own knowledge, which never appeared in court. If the
grand jury found the verdict a false one, the judgment by the common law was,
that the jurors should lose their liberam legem and become forever infamous;
should forfeit their goods and the profits of their lands; should themselves be
imprisoned, and their wives and children thrown out of doors; should have
their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their meadows ploughed; and
that the plaintiff should be restored to all that he lost by reason of the unjust
verdict. But as the severity of this punishment had its usual effect, in prevent-
ing the law from being executed, therefore by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 24,
revived by 23 Hen. VIII, c. 3, and made perpetual by 13 Eliz. c. 25, an attaint
is allowed to be brought after the death of the party, and a more moderate
punishment was inflicted upon attainted jurors; viz., perpetual infamy, and, if
the cause of action were above 401. value, a forfeiture of 201. apiece by the jurors,
or, if under 401., then 51. apiece: to be divided between the king and the party
injured. So that a man may now bring an attaint either upon the statute or at
common law, at his election; (m) and in both of them may reverse the former
judgment. But the practice of setting aside verdicts upon motion, and grant-
(b) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 34, % 2, 3, 4; tr. 3, c. 17; tr. 5, c. 4, §§ 1, 2. Flet. 1. 5, c. 22, § 8. Co. Entr. 61, b. Booth, 213.
(c) Bract. 4, 1, 34, 2. Flet. ibid. (d) Year-book, 28 Edw. III, 15, 17. Ass. pl. 15. Flet. 5, 22, 16.
(e) L. 5, C. 22, §§ 8, 16. (j) 2 Inst. 130, 237.
(q) Stat. 1 Edw. III, st. 1, c. 6. 5 Edw. InI, c. 7. 28 Edw. III, c. 8. (A) See page 389.
(i) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 5, c. 4, § 2. Flet. 5, 22, 7. Britt. 242, b. Year-book, 12 Hen. VI. 6 Bro. Abr. tit. attelrt, 42.
1 Roll. Abr. 289.
(k) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 5, c. 4, 2. Flet. 1. 5, c. 22, § 7. () Finch, L. 486. (i) 3 Inst. 164.
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ing new trials, has so superseded the use of both sorts of attaints, that I have
observed very few instances of an attaint in our books, later than the sixteenth
century. (n) By the old Gothic constitution, indeed, no certificate of a judge
was allowed, in matters of evidence, to countervail the oath of the jury; but
their verdict, however erroneous, was absolutely final and conclusive. Yet there
-was a proceeding from whence our attaint may be derived. If, upon a lawful
trial before a superior *tribunal, the jury were found to have given a false E*4051
verdict, they were fimied, and rendered infamous for the future.(o)
II. The writ of deceit, or action on the case in nature of it, may be brought in
the court of common pleas, to reverse a judgment there had by fraud or collu-
sion in a real action, whereby lands and tenements have been recovered to the
prejudice of him that hath right.(2) But of this enough hath been observed in
a former chapter. (p)
III. An audita querela is where a defendant, against whom judgment is recov-
ered, and who is therefore in danger of execution, or perhaps actually in execu-
tion, may be relieved upon good matter of discharge, which has happened since
the judgment: as if the plaintiff hath given him a general release; or if the
defendant hath paid the debt to the plaintiff, without procuring satisfaction to
be entered on the record. In these and the like cases, wherein the defendant
hath good matter to plead, but hath had no opportunity of pleading it (either
at the beginning of the suit, or puis darrein continuance, which, as was shown
in a former chapter,(q) must always be before judgment), an audita querela lies,
in the nature of a bill in equity, to be relieved against the oppression of the
plaintiff. It is a writ directed to the court, stating that the complaint of the
defendant hath been heard, audita querela defendentis, and then, setting out the
matter of the complaint, it at length enjoins the court to call the parties before
them, and, having heard their allegations and proofs, to cause justice to be done
between them. (r) It also lies for bail, when judgment is obtained against them
by scire facias to answer the debt of their principal, and it happens afterwards
that the original judgment against their principal is reversed: for here the bail,
after judgment had against them, have no opportunity to plead this special mat-
ter, and therefore they shall have redress by audita querela; (s) which is a writ
of a most remedial nature, and seems to have been invented, lest in any case
there should *be an oppressive defect of justice, where a party who hath [*406]
a good defence is too late to make it in the ordinary forms of law. But 06]
the indulgence now shown by the courts in granting a summary relief upon
motion, in cases of such evident oppression, (t) has almost rendered useless the
writ of audita querela, and driven it quite out of practice. (3)
IV. But, fourthly, the principal method of redress for erroneous judgments in
the king's court of record, is by writ of error to some superior court of appeal.
A writ of error(u) lies for some supposed mistake in the proceedings of a
court of record; for to amend errors in a base court, not of record, a writ
(n) Cro. Eliz. 309. Cro. Jac. 90.
(o) "81 tamen evidenti argumento falsum jura8se convinsantur (id quod superiu judicium cognosere debet)
muletantur in bonis, de ecetero perjuri ct inteetabilee." Stiernh. de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 4.
(p) See page 165. (q) See page 316. (r) Finch, L. 488. F. N. B. 102.
(i) 1 Roll. Abr. 308. (t) Lord Raym. 439. (u) Appendix, No. III, § 6.
(2) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.
(3) [Ch. J. Eyre says: "I take it to be the modern practice to interpose in a summary way,
in all cases where the party would be entitled to relief on an audita querela." 1 Bos. and Pul.
428. In general the courts will not put the defendant to the trouble and expense of an audita
querela, but will relieve him in a summary way on motion: 4 Burr. 2287; but where the
ground of his relief is a release, when there is some doubt about the execution, or some matter
of fact which cannot be clearly ascertained by affidavit, and therefore proper to be tried, the
court has driven the defendant to his audita querela. 1 Salk. 93, 264; 1 Ld. Raym. 439; 12
Mod. 240; 2 Ld. Raym. 1295; 2 Stra. 1198; see also, 5 Taunt. 561; 2 Marsh. 37. And indeed
the indulgence which of late has been shown by courts of law in granting summary relief
upon motion in most cases of evident oppression, for which the only remedy was formerly by
audita querela, has occasioned this remedy now to be very rarely resorted to.]
[Equitable defences arising after lapse of the period during which they could be pleaded
may be set up by way of audita querela. Com. Law Proc. Act, 1854, s. 84.]
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of false judgment lies. (v) The writ of error only lies upon matter of law aris-
ing upon the face of the proceedings; so that no evidence is required to sub-
stantiate or support it: there being no method of reversing an error in the
determination of facts, but by an attaint, or a new trial, to correct the mistakes
of the former verdict. (4)
Formerly, the suitors were much perplexed by writs of error brought upon
very slight and trivial grounds, as mis-spellings and other mistakes of the clerks,
all which might be amended at the common law, while all the proceedings were
in paper; (w) for they were then considered as only in fieri, and therefore sub-
ject to the control of the courts. But, when once the record was made up, it
was formerly held, that by the common law no amendment could be permitted,
unless within the very term in which the judicial act so recorded was done:
for during the term the record is in the breast of the court; but afterwards it
admitted of no alteration. (x) But now the courts are become more liberal;
and, where justice requires it, will allow of amendments at any time while the
suit is depending, notwithstanding the record be made up, and the term be past.
For they at present consider the proceedings as in fieri, till judgment is given;
[*407l and therefore that, till then, they have power to permit amendments *by
*407 the common law: but when judgment is once given and enrolled, no
amendment is permitted in any subsequent term. (y) Mistakes are also effectu-
ally helped by the statutes of amendment and jeofails: so called, because when
a pleader perceives any slip in the form of his proceedings, and acknowledges
such error (jeofaile), he is at liberty by those statutes to amend it; which
amendment is seldom actually made, but the benefit of the acts is attained by
the court's overlooking the exception. (z) These statutes are many in number,
and the provisions in them too minute to be here taken notice of, otherwise than
by referring to the statutes themselves; (a) by which all trifling exceptions are
-so thoroughly guarded against, that writs of error cannot now be maintained,
but for some material mistake assigned. (5)
This is at present the general doctrine of amendments; and its rise and history
are somewhat curious. In the early ages of our jurisprudence, when all plead-
ings were ore tenus, if a slip was perceived and objected to by the opposite party,
or the court, the pleader instantly acknowledged his error and rectified his plea;
which gave occasion to that length of dialogue reported in the ancient year-
books. So liberal were then the sentiments of the crown as well as the judges,
(v) Finch, L. 484. (w) Burr. 1099. (x) Co. Litt. 260. (y) Stat. 11 Hen. IV, c. 3.z) Stra. 1011.
(a) Stat. 14 Edw. III, c. 6. 9 Hen. V, c. 4. 4 Hen. VI, c. 3. 8 Hen. VI, c. 12 and 15. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 30.
18 Eliz. c. 14. 21 Jac. I, c. 13. 16 and 17 Car. II, c. 8 (styled, in 1 Ventr. 100, an omnipotent act). 4 and 5 Anne,
c. 16. 9 Anne, c. 20. 5 Geo. I, c. 13.
(4) [A writ of error lies for some error or defect in substance, that is not aided, amendable,
or cured at common law, or by some of the statutes of jeofails. And it lies to the same court
in which the judgment was given, if it be erroneous in matter of fact only; for error in fact
is not the error of the judges, and reversing it is not reversing their own judgment: as where
an infant appeared by attorney instead of guardian, or the plaintiff or defendant at the time
of commencing the suit was a married woman. If a judgment in the king's bench be errone-
ous in matter of fact only, and not in point of law, it may be reversed in the same court by
writ of error coram no6s, or qua coram nobds resident; so called from its being founded on the
record and process, which are stated in the writ to remain in the court of the lord the king,before the king himself. But if the error be in the judgent itself, and not in the process, awrit of error does not lie in the same court upon such judgment. 1 Roll. Ab. 746. In thecommon pleas, the record and process being stated to remain before the king's justices, thewrit is called a writ of error coram robis, or qua coram tobis resident. On a judgment againstseveral parties, the writ of error must be brought in all their namesb: 6 Co. 25; Mod. 184; 5id. 16; 1 Ld. Raym. 244; 2 id. 1582; Burr. 1792 ; 2 T. R. 77 ; but if one or more die, thesurvivors may bring the writ of error: Palm. 151; 1 Stra. 284; or if it be brought in the namesof several, and one or more refuse to appear and assign errors, they must be summoned, andsevered, and then the rest may proceed alone. Yelv. 4; Cro. Eliz. 892; 6 Mod. 40; 1 Stra.234; Cas. Temp. Iardw. 185, 186.](5) In addition to the statutes referred to by the author in the note, see 9 Geo . IV, c. 15; 3
and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, and the common law procedure act, 1852.
252
Chap. 25.] WRIT OF ERROR. 407
that in the statute of Wales, made at Rothelan, 12 Edw. I, the pleadings are
directed to be carried on in that principality, "sine calumpnia verborum, non
observata illa dura consuetudine, qui cadit a syllaba cadit a tota causa." The
judgments were entered up immediately by the clerks and officers of the court;
and if any misentry was made, it was rectified by the minutes, or by the remem-
brance of the court itself.
When the treatise by Britton was published, in the name and by authority of
the king (probably about the 13 Edw. I, because the last statutes therein re-
ferred to are those of Winchester and Westminster the second), a check seems
intended *to be given to the unwarrantable practices of some judges, [*408]
who had made false entries on the rolls to cover their own misbehaviour, 8
and had taken upon them by amendments and rasures to falsify their own
records. The king therefore declares, (b) that "although we have granted to
our justices to make record of pleas pleaded before them, yet we will not that
their own record shall be a warranty for their own wrong, nor that they may
rase their rolls, nor amend them, nor record them contrary to their original en-
rolment." The whole of which, taken together, amounts to this, that a record
surreptitiously or erroneously made up, to stifle or pervert the truth, should not
be a sanction for error; and that a record, originally made up according to the
truth of the case, should not afterwards by any private rasure or amendment be
altered to any sinister purpose.
But when afterwards King Edward, on his return from his French dominions
in the seventeenth year of his reign, after upwards of three years' absence, found
it necessary (or convenient, in order to replenish his exchequer) to prosecute his
judges for their corruption and other malpractices, the perversion ofjudgment and
other manifold errors, (c) occasioned by their erasing and altering records, were
among the causes assigned for the heavy punishments inflicted upon almost all
the king's justices, even the most able and upright. (d) The severity of which pro-
ceedings *seems so to have alarmed the succeeding judges, that through [*409]
a fear of being said to do wrong, they hesitated at doing what was right.
As it was so hazardous to alter a record duly made up, even from compassionate
motives (as happened in Heugham's case, which in strictness was certainly in-
defensible), they resolved not to touch a record any more; but held that even
palpable errors, when enrolled and the term at an end, were too sacred to be
rectified or called in question: and, because Britton had forbidden all criminal
and clandestine alterations, to make a record speak a falsity, they conceived that
they might not judicially and publicly amend it, to make it agreeable to truth.
In Edward the Third's time, indeed, they once ventured (upon the certificate of
the justice in eyre) to estreat a larger fine than had been recorded by the clerk
of the court below;, (e) blit instead of amending the clerk's erroneous record,
they made a second enrolment of what the justice had declared ore tenus; and
(b) Brit. proem 2 3 (c) Judicia pemverterunt, et in al is erravrunt. Matth. West. A. D. 1289.
(d) Among the other judges, Sir Ralph Uengham, chief justice of the king's bench is said to have been fined
7,000 marks; Sir Adam Stratton ehief baron of the exchequer, 34,000 marks; and Thomas Wayland, chief
justice of the common pleas, to have been attainted of felony, and to have abjured the realm, with a forfeiture
of all his estates: the whole amount of the forfeitures being upwards of 100,000 marks, or 70,000 pounds
(3 Pryn. Rec. 401, 402)-an incredible sum in those days, before paper credit was in use, and when the annual
salary of a chief justice was only sixty marks. Claus. 6 Edw. . m. 6. Dugd. Cron. Set. 26. The charge
against Sir Ralph Hengham (a very learned judge, to whom we are obliged for two excellent treatises of prac-
tice) was only, according to a tradition that was current in Richard the Third's time (Year-book, M. 2 Ric. III,
10), his altering, out of mere compassion, a fine, which was set upon a very poor man, from 13s. 4d. to 6s. 8d., for
which he was fined 800 marks-a more probable sum than 7,000. It is true, the book calls the judge so punished
agham, and not Heap/ham; but I find no judge of the name of Isp/hans in Dugdale's Series; and Sir Edward
Coke (4 Inst. 955) and Sir Matthew lsle (1 P. 0. 646) understand it to have been the chief justice. And certainly
is offence (whatever it was) was nothing very atrocious or disgraceful; for, though removed from the king's
bench at this time (together with the rest. of the judres) we flu him, about eleven years afterwards, one of the
justices in eyre for the general perambulation of the forest (Ret. pe'ainbuf, forest, in turri Land. 29 Edw. I,
iee. 5), and the next year made chief justice of the common pleas (Pat. 29 Rdw. I, n. 7; Dudg. Chron. Sea. 32), in
which office he continued till his death, in 2 Rdw. II. floss. 1 Rdw. II, no. 19. Pat. 2 Edw. II, p. 1, m. 9.
ludg. 34. Selden, pref. to Hengham. There is an appendix to this tradition, remembered by Justice South-
cute in the reign of Queen Elizabeth (3 Inst. 72; 4 Inst. 255), that with this fine of Chief Justice Hengham a
clock-house was built at Westminster, and furnished with a clock, to be heard into Westminster hall. Upon
which story I shall only remark that (whatever early instances may be found of the private exertion of
mechanical genius in constructing horological machines) clocks came not into common use till a hundred years
afterwards, about the end of the fourteenth century. Encycopedle, tit. ttorloge, 6 Pym. Ftd. 590. Derham's
Artif. Clockmaker, 91.
(e) I Hal P. C. 647.
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left it to be settled by posterity in which of the two rolls that absolute verity
resides, which every record is said to import in itself.(f) And, in the reign of
Richard the Second, there are instances (g) of their refusing to amend the most
palpable errors and mis-entries, unless by the authority of parliament.
To this real sullenness, but affected timidity, of the judges, such a narrowness
of thinking was added, that every slip (even of a syllable or letter) (h) was now
held to be fatal to the pleader, and overturned his client's cause.(i) If they durst
[*410] *not, or would not, set right mere formal mistakes at any time, upon
equitable terms and conditions, they at least should have held, that
trifling objections were at all times inadmissible; and that more solid exceptions
in point of form came too late when the merits had been tried. They might,
through a decent degree of tenderness, have excused themselves from amending
in criminal, and especially in capital, cases. They needed not have granted an
amendment, where it would work an injustice to either party; or where he
could not be put in as good a condition, as if his adversary had made no mis-
take. And, if it was feared that an amendment after trial might subject the
jury to an attaint, how easy was it to make waiving the attaint the condition of
allowing the amendment! And yet these were among the absurd reasons alleged
for never suffering amendments at all! (k)
The precedents then set were afterwards most religiously followed,(/) to the
great obstruction of justice, and ruin of the suitors: who have formerly suffered
as much by this scrupulous obstinacy and literal strictness of the courts, as they
could have done even by their iniquity. After verdicts and judgments upon the
merits, they were frequently reversed for slips of the pen or mis-spellings;
and justice was perpetually entangled in a net of mere technical jargon. The
legislature hath therefore been forced to interpose, by no less than twelve stat
utes, to remedy these opprobrious niceties: and its endeavours have been of late
so well seconded by judges of a more liberal cast, that this unseemly degree of
strictness is almost entirely eradicated: and will, probably in a few years, be no
more remembered than the learning of essoigns and defaults, or the counter-
pleas of voucher, are at present. But to return to our writs of error.
If a writ of error be brought to reverse any judgment of an inferior court of
record, where the damages are less than ten pounds; or if it is brought to reverse
the judgment of any superior court after verdict, he that brings the writ, or that
is plaintiff in error, must (except in some peculiar cases) find substantial pledges
[*411] of prosecution or bail: (m) to prevent *delays by frivolous pretences to
appeal; and for securing payment of costs and damages, which are now
payable by the vanquished party in all, except a few particular instances, by
virtue of the several statutes cited in the margin.(n)
A writ of error lies from the inferior courts of record in England into the
king's bench,(o) and not into the common pleas.(p), Also from the king's
bench in Ireland to the king's bench in England. It likewise may be brought
from the common pleas at Westminster to the king's bench; and then from the
king's bench the cause is removable to the house of lords. From proceedings
on the law side of the exchequer a writ of error lies into the court of exchequer
chamber before the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, and the judges of the court
of king's bench and common pleas; and from thence it lies to the house of
peers. From proceedings in the king's bench, in debt, detinue, covenant,
account, case, ejectment, or trespass, originally begun therein by bill (except
where the king is party), it lies to the exchequer chamber, before the justices of
the common pleas and barons of the exchequer; and from thence also to the
house of lords;(q) but where the proceedings in the king's bench do not first
commence therein by bill, but by original writ sued out of chancery,(r) this
(f) I Leon. 188. Co. Litt. 117. See page (1. (g) 1 Hal. P. C. 648. (h) Stat. 14 Edw. III, e. 6.
(s) In those days it was strictly true what Ruggle (in his Ignoramus) has humorously 
applied to more moder
pleadings in nostra loge unum comma evert.ttotum ilacitum."
(k) Styl. 207. (1) 8 Rep. 156, &e.
(n) Stat. 3 Ja . I, c. 8. 13 Car. II e. 2. 15 and 17 Car. II, . a. 19 eo. iln, .70.
(t) 3 Hen. VII, c. 10. 13 Car. II, c. 2. 8 and 9 Win. IIl c. 11. 4 and 
5 Anne, c. 15.
(o) See ch. 4. (p) Finch, L. 480. Dyer, 250. (q) Stat. 27 Eliz. C. 8. (r) See page 48.
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takes the case out of the general rule laid down by the statute; (s) so that the
writ of error then lies, without any intermediate state of appeal, directly to the
house of lords, the dernier resoi4 for the ultimate decision of every civil
action.(6) Each court of appeal, in their respective stages, may, upon hearing
the matter of law in which the error is assigned, reverse or affirm the judgment
of the inferior courts, but none of them are final, save only the house of peers,
to whose judicial decisions all other tribunals must therefore submit and con-
form their own. And thus much for the reversal or affirmance of judgments at
law, by writs in the nature of appeals.(7)
CHAPTER XXVI.
OF EXECUTION.
IF the regular judgment of the court, after the decision of the suit, be not
suspended, superseded, or reversed, by one or other of the methods mentioned in
the two preceding chapters, the next and last step is the execution of that judg-
ment; or putting the sentence of the law in force. This is performed in different
manners, according to the nature of the action upon which it is founded, and
of the judgment which is had or recovered.
If the plaintiff recovers in an action real or mixed, whereby the seisin or pos-
session of land is awarded to him, the writ of execution shall be an habere facias
seisinam, or writ of seisin, of a freehold; or an habere facias possessionem, or
writ of possession, (a) of a chattel interest. (b) These are writs directed to the
sheriff of the county, commanding him to give actual possession to the plaintiff
of the land so recovered: in the execution of which the sheriff may take with
him the posse comitatus, or power of the county; and may justify breaking open
doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered. But, if it be peaceably yielded
up, the delivery of a twig, a turf, or the ring of the door, in the name of seisin,
is sufficient execution of the writ. Upon a presentation to a benefice recovered
ts) 1 Roll. Rep. 264. 1 Sid. 424. 1 Saund. 340. Carth. 180. Comb. 295.
a) Appendix, No. II, § 4. (b) Finch, L. 470.
(6) But now, by statute 1 Win. IV, c. 70, and the common law procedure act, 1852, error
upon any judgment of the queen's bench, common pleas or exchequer, must be brought in the
exchequer chamber before the judges, or judges and barons as the case may be, of the other
two courts, whence it again lies to the house of lords.
(7) This appeal is taken away by 23 Geo. III, c. 21. See book 1, p. 104, n. 15. Since the
union, however, a writ of error lies from the superior courts in Ireland to the house of lords.
Before the union with Scotland, a writ of error lay not in this country upon any judgment'
in Scotland; but it is since given by statute 6 Ann. c. 26, s. 12; from the court of exchequer in
Scotland, returnable in parliament. And see the 48 Geo. III, c. 151, concerning appeals to
the house of lords from the court of session in Scotland.
[In this chapter Sir W. Blackstone has considered only the modes by which a judgment
may be reversed by writ of error brought in a court of appeal, and has stated that this can
only be done for error in law. There is, however, a proceeding to reverse a judgment by
writ of error in the same court, where the error complained of is in fact and not in law, and
where of course 'no fault is imputed to the court in pronouncing its judgment. This writ is
called the writ coram nobis, or coram vobis, according as the proceedings are in the king's
bench or common pleas, because the record is stated to remain before us (the king), if in the
former, and before you (the judges), if in the latter, and is not removed to another court. In
this proceeding it is of course necessary to suggest a new fact upon the record from which
the error in the first judgment will appear; thus, supposing the defendant, being an infant,
has appeared by attorney instead of guardian, it will be necessary to suggest the fact of his
infancy, of which the court was not before informed. There is, therefore, no inconsistency
in bringing this writ of error before the same judges who pronounced the judgment in the
first instance, because they are required to pronounce upon a new state of facts, without
impeachment of the former judgment on the facts as they then stood.]
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['413] in a quare impedit, or assize of darrein presentment, *the execution isby a writ de clerico admittendo; directed, not to the sheriff, but to the
bishop or archbishop, and requiring him to admit and institute the clerk of the
plaintiff.
In other actions, where the judgment is that something in special be done or
rendered by the defendant, then, in order to compel him so to do, and to see the
judgment executed, a special writ of execution issues to the sheriff, according
to the nature of the case. As, upon an assize of nuisance, or quod permittat
prosternere, where one part of the judgment is quod nocumentum amoveatur,
a writ goes to the sheriff to abate it at the charge of the party, which likewise
issues even in case of an indictment. (c) (1) Upon a replevin, the writ of exe-
cution is the writ de retorno habendo: (d) and, if the distress be eloigned, the
defendant shall have a cap ias in withernam ; (e) but on the plaintiff's tendering
the damages and submitting to a fine, the process in withernam shall be stayed.(f)
In detinue, after judgment, the plaintiff shall have a distringas, to compel the
defendant to deliver the goods, by repeated distresses of his chattels: (g) or else
a scire facias against any third person in whose hands they may happen to be,
to show cause why they should not be delivered: and if the defendant still
continues obstinate, then (if the judgment hath been by default or on demurrer)
the sheriff shall summon an inquet to ascertain the value of the goods, and the
plaintiff's damages: which (being either so assessed, or by the verdict in case
of an issue),(h) shall be levied on the person or goods of the defendant. So that,
after all, in replevin and detinue (the only actions for recovering the specific
possession of personal chattels), if the wrongdoer be very perverse, he cannot
be compelled to a restitution of the identical thing taken or detained; but he
still has his election to deliver the goods or their v alue: (i) an imperfection in
the law, that results from the nature of personal property, which is easily con-
cealed or conveyed out of the reach of justice, and not always amenable to the
magistrate.
[*44 *Executions in actions where money only is recovered, as a debt or
[*414] damages (and not any specific chattel), are of five sorts: either against
the body of the defendant; or against his goods and chattels; or against his
goods and the profits of his lands; or against his goods and the possession of
his lands; or against all three, his body, lands, and goods.
1. The first of these species of execution is by writ of capias ad satisfacien-
durn; (j) which addition distinguishes it from the former capias ad respond-
endure, which lies to compel an appearance at the beginning of a suit. And,
properly speaking, this cannot be sued out against any but such as were liable
to be taken upon the former capias. (k) The intent of it is, to imprison the
body of the debtor till satisfaction be made for the debt, costs, and damages;
it therefore doth not lie against any privileged persons, peers, or members of
parliament, nor against executors or administrators, nor against such other
persons as could not be originally held to bail. And Sir Edward Coke also gives
us a singular instance, (1) where a defendant in 14 Edw. III was discharged from
a capias, because he was of so advanced an age, quod pcenam imprisonamenti
subire non potest. If an action be brought against an husband and wife for the
debt of the wife when sole, and the plaintiff recovers judgment, the capias shall
issue to take both husband and wife in execution: (m) but, if the action was
originally brought against herself when sole, and pending the suit she marries,
the capias shall be awarded against her only, and not against her husband. (n)
Yet, if judgment be recovered against an husband and wife for the contract,
(c) Comb. 10. (d) See page 150. (e) See page 149. (f) 2 Leon. 174.
(g) I Roll. Abr. 737. Rast. Entr. 215. (h) Bro. Abr. tit. damages, 29. (i) Keliw. 64.
(j) Appendix, No. III§ 7. (k) 3 Rep. 12. Moor. 767. (1) 1 Inst. 289.
(in) Moor. 704. (n) Cro. Jac. 323.
(1) [That is, if it be stated in the indictment that the nuisance is still existing. If it does
not appear in the indictment that the nuisance was then in existence, it would be absurd to
give judgment to abate a nuisance which does not exist. 8 T. R. 144.]
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nay, even for the personal misbehaviour (o) of the wife during her coverture,
the capias shall issue against the husband only which is one of the many great
privileges of English wives. (2)
*The writ of capias ad satisfaciendum is an xecution of the highest [*415
nature, inasmuch as it deprives a man of his liberty, till he makes the
satisfaction awarded; and therefore, when a man is once taken in execution upon
this writ, no other process can be sued out against his lands or goods. Only
by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 24, if the defendant dies, while charged in execution upon
this writ, the plaintiff may, after his death, sue out a new execution against his
lands, goods, or chattels. The writ is directed to the sheriff, commanding him
to take the body of the defendant and have him at Westminster on a day therein
named, to make the plaintiff satisfaction for his demand. And, if he does not then
make satisfaction, he must remain in custody till he does. This writ may be sued
out, as may all other executory process, for costs, against a plaintiff as well as a
defendant, when judgment is bad against him. (3)
When a defendant is once in custody upon this process, he is to be kept in arct
et salva custodia: and if he be afterwards seen at large, it is an escape; and the
plaintiff may have an action thereupon against the sheriff for his whole debt. For
though, upon arrests, and what is called mnesne process, being such as intervenes
between the commencement and end of a suit,(p) the sheriff, till the statute 8 and
9 Win. III, c. 27, might have indulged the defendant as he pleased, so as he pro-
duced him in court to answer the plaintiff at the return of the writ: yet, upon
a taking in execution, he could never give any indulgence; for, in that case,
confinement is the whole of the debtor's punishment, and of the satisfaction made
to the creditor. Escapes are either voluntary, or negligent. Voluntary are such
as are by the express consent of the keeper; after which he never can retake his
prisoner again (q) (though the plaintiff may retake him at any time), (r) but
the sheriff must answer for the debt. Negligent escapes are where the prisoner
escapes without his keeper's knowledge or consent; and then upon fresh pursuit
the defendant may *be retaken, and the sheriff shall be excused, if he has
him again before any action brought against himself for the escape.(s) [*416
A rescue of a prisoner in execution, either going to gaol or in gaol, or a breach
of prison, will not excuse the sheriff from being guilty of and answering for the
escape; for he ought to have sufficient force to keep him, since he may command
the power of the county. (t) But by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28, if a defendant,
charged in execution for any debt not exceeding 1001. will surrender all his effects
to his creditors (except his apparel, bedding, and tools of his trade, not amount-
ing in the whole to the value of 101.), and will make oath of his punctual com-
pliance with the statute, the prisoner may be discharged, unless the creditor in-
sists on detaining him; in which case he shall allow him 2s. 4d. per week, to be
paid on the first day of every week, and on failure of regular payment the prisoner
(o) Cro. Car. 518. (p) See page 279. (q) 3 Rep. 52. 1 Sid. 330.
(r) Stat. 8 and 9 Win. III, c. 27. (s) F. N. B. 130. (t) Cro. Jac. 419.
(2) [There are many cases in which the defendant may be taken in execution after judgment,
though he could not be arrested at the commencement of the suit; but it is an universal rule
that, whenever a capias is allowed on mesne process before judgment, it may be had upon the
judgment itself. 3 Salk. 286; 3 Co. 12.]
A great change has been effected in the law of England regarding imprisonment for debt
since these Commentaries were written, and now it is not allowed in actions on contracts,
except in cases of fraud. See statutes 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110; 5 and 6 Vic. c. 116; 7 and 8 Vic.
c. 96; and 32 and 33 Vic. c. 62.
(3) Taking the body of the defendant in execution suspends the lien of the judgment. Jack-
son v. Benedict, 13 Johns. 533. If the plaintiff gives the defendant, when in execution, permis-
sion to go at large, the judgment is discharged, and he will have no remedy either against the
defendant or the sheriff. Blackburn v. Stupart, 2 East, 243; Yates v. Van Rensselaer, 5 Johns.
364; Poucher v Holley, 8 Wend. 184. And this irrespective of the intention of the plaintiff, or
of any violation by the defendant of any understanding on which he was discharged. Id. The
same principle is applicable if one of several defendants is discharged by the plaintiff. Ran-
som v. Keyes, 9 Cow. 128.
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shall be discharged. Yet the creditor may at any future time have execution
against the lands and goods of such defendant, though never more against his
person. And, on the other hand, the creditors may, as in case of bankruptcy,
compel (under pain of transportation for seven years) such debtor charged in
execution for any debt under 1001. to make a discovery and surrender of all
his effects for their benefit, whereupon he is also entitled to the like discharge of
his person.
If a capias ad satisfaciendum is sued out, and a non est inventus is returned
thereon, the plaintiff may sue out a process against the bail, if any were given:
who, we may remember, stipulated in this triple alternative, that the defendant
should, if condemned in the suit, satisfy the plaintiff his debt and costs; or that
he should surrender himself a prisoner; or, that they would pay it for him: as
therefore the two former branches of the alternative are neither of them complied
with, the latter must immediately take place.(u) In order to which a writ of scire
facias may be sued out against the bail, commanding them to show cause why
[,*417] the plaintiff should not have execution against them for his *debt and
damages: and on such writ, if they show no sufficient cause, or the de-
fendant does not surrender himself on the day of the return, or of showing cause
(for afterwards is not sufficient), the plaintiff may have judgment against the
bail, and take out a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, or other process of execu-
tion against them.
2. The next species of execution is against the goods and chattels of the de-
fendant; and is called a writ offieri facias, (w) from the words in it where the
sheriff is commanded, quodfierifaciat de bonis, that he cause to be made of the
goods and chattels of the defendant the sum or debt recovered. (4) This lies as
well against privileged persons, peers, &c., as other common persons; and against
executors or administrators, with regard to the goods of the deceased. The
sheriff may not break open any outer door, (x) to execute either this, or the
former writ: but must enter peaceably; and may then break open any inner
door, belonging to the defendant, in order to take the goods. (y) And he may
sell the goods and chattels (even an estate for years, which is a chattel real)(z)
of the defendant, till he has raised enough to satisfy the judgment and costs"
first paying the landlord of the premises, upon which the goods are found, the
arrears of rent then due, not exceeding one year's rent in the whole.(a) If part
only of the debt be levied on afieri facias, the plaintiff may have a capias ad
satisfaciendum for the residue. (b) (5)
3. A third species of execution is by writ of levari facias ; which affects a
man's goods and the profits of his lands, by commanding the sheriff to levy the
plaintiff's debt on the lands and goods of the defendant: whereby the sheriff
may seize all his goods, and receive the rents and profits of his lands, till satis-
[*418] faction be made to the plaintiff. (c) Little use *is now made of this
writ; the remedy by elegit, which takes possession of the lands them-
selves, being much more effectual. But of this species is a writ of execution proper
only to ecclesiastics; which is given when the sheriff, upon a common writ of
execution sued, returns that the defendant is a beneficed clerk, not having any
(u) Lutw. 1269-1273. (w) Appendix, No. m, § 7. (X) 5 Rep. 92. (y) Palm. 54. (z) 8 Rep. 171
(a) Stat. 8 Anne, c. 14. (b) 1 Roll. Abr. 904. Cro. Eliz. 844. (c) Finch, L. 471.
(4) [It, upon a judgment in tort, against two or more, execution be levied for the whole
damages upon one only (1 Camp. 343), that one cannot recover a moiety against the other for
his contribution; but he may maintain an action for the moiety, if the original action were
founded upon contract. 8 T. R. 186; see also 2 Camp. 452.]
(5) A levy upon sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment is a temporary bar to
further execution or suit, and will amount to satisfaction unless it fail, in whole or in part, with-
out the fault of the plaintiff. Green v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490. See Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 402;
Webb v. Bumpass, 9 Port. 201; F. and M. Bank v. Kingsley, 2 Doug. Mich. 379. If the de-
fendant is allowed to retain the property, it is no satisfaction. Peck v. Tiffany, 2 N. Y. 451.
Or if it is taken from the sheriff by due course of law. Alexander v. Polk, 39 Miss. 737. A
levy upon real property is not a satisfaction. Ladd v. Blunt, supra; Shepard v. Rowe, 14
Wend. 260. White v. Graves, 15 Texas, 183.
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lay fee. In this case a writ goes to the bishop of the diocese, in the nature of
a levari orfierifacias,(d) to levy the debt and damages de bonis ecclesiasticis,
which are not to be touched by lay hands: and thereupon the bishop sends out
a sequestration of the profits of the clerk's benefice, directed to the church-
wardens, to collect the same and pay them to the plaintiff, till the full sum be
raised.(e)
4. The fourth species of execution is by the writ of elegit; which is a judi-
cial writ given by the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 18, either upon a judg-
ment for a debt, or damages; or upon the forfeiture of a recognizance taken in
the king's court. By the common law a man could only have satisfaction of
goods, chattels, and the present profits of lands, by the two last-mentioned writs
of fieri facias, or levari facias; but not the possession of the lands themselves;
which was a natural consequence of the feudal principles, which prohibited the
alienation, and of course the incumbering of the fief with the debts of the
owner. And, when the restriction of alienation began to wear away, the conse-
quence still continued; and no creditor could take the possession of lands, but
only levy the growing profits: so'that, if the def6ndant aliened his lands, the
plaintiff was ousted of his remedy. The statute therefore granted this writ
(called an elegit, because it is in the choice or election of the plaintiff whether
he will sue out this writ or one of the former), by which the defendant's goods
and chattels are not sold, but only appraised; and all of them (except oxen and
beasts of the plough) are delivered to the plaintiff, at such reasonable appraise-
ment and price, in part of satisfaction of his debt. If the goods are not suffi-
cient, then the moiety or *one-half of his freehold lands, which he had [*419]
at the time of the judgment given,(f) whether held in his own name,
or by any other in trust for him(g) are also to be delivered to the plaintiff; to
hold, till out of the rents and profits thereof the debt be levied, or till the
defendant's interest be expired; as till the death of the defendant, if he be
tenant for life or in tail. During this period the plaintiff is called tenant by
elegit, of whom we spoke in a former part of these Commentaries.(h) We there
observed that till this statute, by the ancient common law, lands were not liable
to be charged with, or seized for, debts; because by these means the connexion
between lord and tenant might be destroyed, fraudulent alienations might be
made, and the services be transferred to be performed by a stranger; provided
the tenant incurred a large debt, sufficient to cover the land. And therefore,
even by this statute, only one-half was, and now is, subject to execution; that
out of the remainder sufficient might be left for the lord to distrain upon for his
services. And upon the same feudal principle, copyhold lands are at this day
not liable to be taken in execution upon a judgment.(i)(6) But, in case of a
debt to the king, it appears by magna carta, c. 8, that it was allowed by the
common law for him to take possession of the lands till the debt was paid.
For he, being the grand superior and ultimate proprietor of all landed estates,
might seize the lands into his own hands, if any thing was owing from the vassal ;
and could not be said to be defrauded of his services when the ouster of the
vassal proceeded from his own command. This execution, or seizing of lands
by elegit, is of so high a nature, that after it the body of the defendant cannot
be taken: but if execution can only be had of the goods, because there are no
lands, and such goods are not sufficient to pay the debt, a capias ad satisfacien-
dumn may then be had after the elegit; for such elegit is in this case no more in
(() Registr. Org. 300, judic. 22. 2 Inst. 4. (e) 2 Burn. Eccl. Law, 329. (f) 2 Inst. 895.
Stat. 29 Car. H, c. 3. (h) Book II, ch. 10. (i) 1 Roll. Abr. 88.
(6) [By statute 1 and 2 Vie., c. 110, a great alteration has been made in the law in this respect.
By section 11 the sheriff is empowered to deliver unto the judgment creditor all lands, tene-
ments and hereditaments, including those of copyhold or customary tenure, which the person
against whom execution is so sued out, or any person in trust for him, shall have been seized
or possessed of at the time of entering up the judgment, or over which the judgment debtor
at the time has, or at any time afterward shall have, a disposing power capable of being exer-
cised for his own benefit.]
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effect than a fteri facias.(j) So that body and goods may be taken in execu-
[,420] tion, or land and goods; but not body *and land too, upon any judg-
*420] ment between subject and subject in the course of the common law. But,
5. Upon some prosecutions given by statute; as in the case of recognizances or
debts acknowledged on statutes merchant, or statutes staple (pursuant to the
statutes 13 Edw. I, de mercatoribus, and 27 Edw. III, c. 9); upon forfeiture of
these, the body, lands and goods may all be taken at once in execution, to com-
pel the payment of the debt. The process hereon is usually called an extent, or
extendifacias, because the sheriff is to cause the lands, &c., to be appraised to
their full extended value, before he delivers them to the plaintiff, that it may be
certainly known how soon the debt will be satisfied.(k) And by statute 33
Hen. VIII, c. 39, all obligations made to the king shall have the same force, and
of consequence the same remedy to recover them, as a statute staple; though
indeed, before this statute, the king was entitled to sue out execution against
the body, lands and goods of his accountant or debtor.(l) And his debt shall,
in suing out execution, be preferred to that of any other creditor, who bath not
obtained judgment before the king commenced his suit.(m) The king's judg-
ment also affects all lands which the king's debtor hath at or after the time of
contracting his debt, or which any of his officers mentioned in the statute 13
Eliz. c. 4, bath at or after the time of his entering on the office: so that, if
such officer of the crown aliens for a valuable consideration, the land shall be
liable to the king's debt even in the hands of a bonafide purchaser; though the
debt due to the king was contracted by the vendor many years after the aliena-
tion.(n) Whereas judgments between subject and subject related, even at com-
mon law, no farther back than the first day of the term in which they were re-
covered, in respect of the lands of the debtor; and did not bind his goods and
chattels, but from the date of the writ of execution: and now, by the statute of
frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, the judgment shall not bind the land in the hands of a
[*421] bona *fide purchaser, but only from the day of actually signing the
same: which is directed by the statute to be punctually entered on 'the
record; nor shall the writ of execution bind the goods in the hands of a
stranger, or the purchaser,(o) but only from the actual delivery of the writ to
the sheriff or other officer, who is therefore ordered to endorse on the back of it
the day of his receiving the same.
These are the methods which the law of England has'pointed out for the ex-
ecution of judgments: and when the plaintiff's demand is satisfied, either by
the voluntary payment of the defendant, or by this compulsory process, or
otherwise, satisfaction ought to be entered on the record, that the defendant
may not be liable to be hereafter harassed a second time on the same account.
But all these writs of' execution must be sued out within a year and a day after
the judgment is entered; otherwise the court concludes prima facie that the
judgment is satisfied and extinct: yet, however, it will grant a writ of scire
facias in pursuance of statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 45, for the defendant to
show cause why the judgment should not be revived, and execution had against
him; to which the defendant may plead such matter as he has to allege, in
order to show why process of execution should not be issued: or the plaintiff
may still bring an action of debt, founded on this dormant judgment, which
was the only method of revival allowed by the common law.(p) (7)
In this manner are the several remedies given by the English law for all sorts
of injuries, either real or personal, administered by the several courts of justice,
(7) Hob. 58. (k) F. N. B. 131. (1) 3 Rep. 12. (m) Stat. 33 Hen. VIII, c. 39, § 74.
(n) 10 Rep. 55, 56. (o) Skin. 257. (p) Co. Litt. 290.
(7) [But the writ of scirefaeia8 for the ordinary purpose of reviving a judgment is retained.
During the lives of the parties to a judgment, or those of them during whose lives execution
may at present issue within a year and a day, without a scirefacias, and within six years from
the recovery of the judgment, execution may now, however, issue without revival of the
judgment. Com. Law Proc. 
Act, 1852, § 128.1
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and their respective officers. In the course, therefore, of the present book, we
have, first, seen and considered the nature of remedies, by the mere act of the
parties, or mere operation of law, without any suit in courts. We have next
taken a review of remedies by suit or action in courts: and therein have con-
templated, first, the nature and species of courts, instituted for the redress of
injuries in general; and then have shown in what particular courts application
ifiust be made for the redress of particular injuries, or the doctrine of jurisdic-
tions and *cognizance. We afterwards proceeded to consider the nature [*422]
and distribution of wrongs and injuries affecting every species of per-
sonal and real rights, with the respective remedies by suit, which the law of the
land has afforded for every possible injury. And, lastly, we have deduced and
pointed out the method and progress of obtaining such remedies in the courts
of justice: proceeding from the first general complaint or original writ, through
all the stages of process, to compel the defendant's appearance; and of pleading,
or formal allegation on the one side, and excuse or denial on the other; with
the examination of the validity of such complaint or excuse, upon demurrer;%,
or the truth of the facts alleged and denied, upon issue joined, and its several
trials; to the judgment or sentence of the law, with respect to the nature and
amount of the redress to be specifically given: till, after considering the suspen-
sion of that judgment by writs in the nature of appeals, we have arrived at its
final execution; which puts the party in specific possession of his right by the
intervention of ministerial officers, or else gives him an ample satisfaction,
either by equivalent damages, or by the confinement of his body who is guilty
of the injury complained of.
This care and circumspection in the law, -in providing that no man's right
shall be affected by any legal proceeding without giving him previous notice,
and yet that the debtor shall not by receiving such notice take occasion to escape
from justice; in requiring that every complaint be accurately and precisely
ascertained in writing, and be as pointedly and exactly answered; in clearly
stating the question either of law or of fact; in deliberately resolving the former
after full argumentative discussion, and indisputably fixing the latter by a dili-
gent and impartial trial; in correcting such errors as may have arisen in either
of those modes of decision, from accident, mistake, or surprise; and in finally
enforcing the judgment, when nothing can be alleged to impeach it; -this
anxiety to maintain and restore to every individual the enjoyment of his civil
rights, without intrenching upon those of any other individual in the nation,
this parental solicitude *which pervades our whole legal constitution, is [*423]
the genuine offspring of that spirit of equal liberty which is the singular [*423
felicity of Englishmen. At the same time it must be owned to have given a
handle, in some degree, to those complaints of delay in the practice of the law,
which are not wholly without foundation, but are greatly exaggerated beyond
the truth. There may be, it is true, in this, as in all other departments of
knowledge, a few unworthy professors: who study the science of chicane and
sophistry rather than of truth and justice; and who, to gratify the spleen, the
dishonesty, and wilfulness of their clients, may endeavor to screen the guilty,
by an unwarrantable use of those means which were intended to protect the in-
nocent. But the frequent disappointments and the constant discountenance,
that they meet with in the courts of justice, have confined these men (to the
honor of this age be it spoken) both in number and reputation to indeed a very
despicable compass.
Yet some delays there certainly are, and must unavoidably be, in the con-
duct of a suit, however desirous the parties and their agents may be to come to
a speedy determination. These arise from the same original causes as were
mentioned in examining a former complaint; (q) from liberty, property, civility,
commerce, and an extent of populous territory: which, whenever we are willing
to exchange for tyranny, poverty, barbarism, idleness, and a barren desert, we
may then enjoy the same dispatch of causes that is so highly extolled in some
(q) See page 327.
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foreign countries. But common sense and a little experience will convince us
that more time and circumspection are requisite in causes, where the suitors have
valuable and permanent rights to lose, than where their property is trivial and
precarious, and what the law gives them to-day, may be seized by their prince
to-morow. In Turkey, says Montesquieu, (r) where little regard is shown to
the lives or fortunes of the subject, all causes are quickly decided: the basha,
on a summary hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastinadoed, and
[*424] then sends them about their business. But in *free states, the trouble,
expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are the price that every sub-
ject pays for his liberty: and in all governments, he adds, the formalities of law
increase, in proportion to the value which is set on the honour, the fortune, the
liberty, and life of the subject.
From these principles it might reasonably follow, that the English courts
should be more subject to delays than those of other nations ; as they set a
greater value on life, on liberty, and on property. But it is our peculiar felicity
to enjoy the advantage, and yet to be exempted from a proportionable share of
the burthen. For the course of the civil law, to which most other nations conform
their practice, is much more tedious than ours; for proof of which I need only
appeal to the suitors of those courts in England where the practice of the
Roman law is allowed in its full extent. And particularly in France, not only
* our Fortescue (s) accuses (on his own knowledge) their courts of most unexam-
pled delays in administering justice; but even a writer of their own (t) has not
scrupled to testify that there were in his time more causes there depending
than in all Europe besides, and some of them a hundred years old. But (not to
enlarge on the prodigious improvements which have been made in the celerity
of justice by the disuse of real actions, by the statutes of amendment and jeo-
fails, (u) and by other more modern regulations, which it now might be indeli-
cate to remember, but which posterity will never forget) the time and attendance
afforded by the judges in our English courts are also greater than those of many
other countries. In the Roman calendar there were in the whole year but
twenty-eight judicial or triverbial (w) days allowed to the prator for deciding
causes: (x) whereas, with us, one-fourth of the year is term time in which three
courts constantly sit for the dispatch of matters of law; besides the very close
[*425 attendance of the court of chancery for determining *suits in equity,
and the numerous courts of assize and nisiprius that sit in vacation for
the trial of matters of fact. Indeed, there is no other country in the known
world, that hath an institution so commodious and so adapted to the dispatch
of causes, as our trial by jury in those courts for the decision of facts; in no
other nation under heaven does justice make her progress twice in each year
into almost every part of the kingdom, to decide upon the spot, by the voice of
the people themselves, the disputes of the remotest provinces.
And here this part of our Commentaries, which regularly treats only of re-
dress at the common law, would naturally draw to a conclusion. But, as the
proceedings in the courts of equity are very different from those at common law,
and as those courts are of a very general and extensive jurisdiction, it is in some
measure a branch of the task I have undertaken, to give the student some
general idea of the forms of practice adopted by these courts. These will, there-
fore, be the subject of the ensuing chapter.
(r) Sp. L. b. 6, c. 2. (s) De Laud. LL. c. 53. (t) Bodin. de republ. 1. 6, c. 6. (u) See page 407.
(w) Otherwise called dies fasti in quibus licebat preton .far tria verba, do, dico, addico. Calv. Lex. 285.
(x) Spelman of the Terms, § 4, c. 2.
Chap. 2 7.] PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY.
CHAPTER XXVII.
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY.
BEFORE we enter on the proposed subject of the ensuing chapter, viz., the na-
ture and method of proceedings in the courts of equity, (1) it will be proper to
recollect the observations which were made in the beginning of this book (a) on
the principal tribunals of that kind, acknowledged by the constitution of Eng-
(a) Pages 45, 50, 78.
(1) [That the courts of equity and courts of law are not opposed to each other, and often
concur in the exercise of their powers, to promote the ends of substantial justice, is not now
disputed. It is said that matters of fact should be left to courts of law for the decision of a
jury: 1 RidIway's Parl. Car. 9; and issues are oftentimes directed for that purpose; yet "there
is no doubt,' says Lord Eldon, "that according to the constitution of this court, it may take
upon itself the decision of every fact put in issue upon the record." And again, "This court
has a right (to be exercised very tenderly and sparingly) of deciding without issues." 9 Ves.
168. The general rule is, that a court of equity will never exercise jurisdiction over criminal
proceedings. Yet in a case where the plaintiffs indicted defendant's agent at the sessions,
where the plaintiffs themselves were judges, for a breach of the peace, Lord Hardwicke made
an order to restrain the prosecution till after hearing of the cause and further order; and
where a bill is brought to quiet possession, if the plaintiff afterwards prefer an indictment for
forcible entry, this court will stop the proceedings upon such indictment. 2 Atk. 302. The
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to prevent a crime, except in the protection of infants.
Therefore, it is said, that the publication of a libel cannot be restrained: 2 Swanst. 413.
Nor will the court compel a discovery in aid of criminal proceedings. 2 Ves. 398. The court
of chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty : Gilb. Eq. Rep. 228; and may
repeal letters of reprisal, after a peace, though there is a clause in the patent that no treaty
of peace shall prejudice it. 1 Vern. 54. So equity may relieve after verdict in K. B. or C. P.,
and even grant a perpetual injunction after five trials at law on the same point and verdicts
the same way: but equity is very tender in the exercise of this power. 2 P. Wms. 425; 10
Mod. 1. And a court of equity will not review the orders of the exchequer as a court of
revenue; nor interfere where that court, as a court of revenue, is competent to decide the sub-
ject matter. 3 Ridgw. P. C. 80.
Matters arising out of England. A question concerning the right and title to the Isle of
Man may be determined in a court of chancery. 1 Ves. 202. Where the defendant is in
England, though the cause of the suit arose in the plantations, if the bill be brought here, the
court agens in personam may, by compulsion of the person, force him to do justice, for the
jurisdiction of the chancellor is not ousted: 3 Atk. 589; see 1 Jac. and W. 27; and this
although in general all questions respecting real estates belong to the country where they are
situate. Elliott v. Lord Minto, 6 Mod. 16.
1. It is assistant to the common law, by removing legal impediments to a fair decision of a
question depending in those courts; as, preventing the setting up of outstanding terms, &c.
5 Mad. 428; 2 J. and W. 391.
2. It acts concur! ently with the common law, by compelling a discovery which may enable
those courts to decide according to the real facts and justice of the case; as, where the dis-
covery is to ascertain whether the defendant did not promise to marry: Forrest, Rep. 42; or
to disprove the defendant's plea, that he had made no promise within six years, and to com-
pel him to state whether he has not promised within that time: 5 Mad. 331; but he has a
right to protect himself in equity by the statute of limitations, from a discovery as to the
original constitution of the debt, or whether it has since been paid. 5 Mad. 331. So he may
be required to disclose whether he is an alien or not: 2 Ves. Sen. 287, 494; but where a dis.
covery would subject a party to penalty or forfeiture, it is not to be obtained: 1 Ves. 56 ;
2 Ch. Rep. 68; 2 Atk. 392; 2 Ves. 265; 1 Eq. Ab. 131, p. 10; except in cases under the stock-
jobbing act (7 Geo. II, c. 8, s. 1 ; 2 Marsh. Rep. 125), and some other particular provisions.
Nor will the court compel a discovery in aid of criminal proceedings. 2 Ves. 398; vide Mitf.
P1. 150. It exercises concurrent jurisdiction, in perpetuating testimony in danger of being
lost before it can be used; by preserving property during litigation; by counteracting fraudu-
lent judgments; by setting bounds to oppressive litigation; and in cases of fraud, accident,
mistake, account, partition and dower.
3. It claims exclusivejjurisdiction in matters of trust and confidence, and whenever, upon the
principles of universal justice, the interference of a court of judicature is necessary to prevent
a wrong, and the positive law is silent. 1 Fonb. Eq., p. 9, n. (f.)
The matters over which the court of chancery maintains an equitable jurisdiction have been
arranged in the following alphabetical order; and as this analysis has the recommendation of
practical utility, we shall proceed to embody the principal rules and decisions under each
head respectively.
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land; and to premise a few remarks upon those particular causes, wherein any
of them claims and exercises a sole jurisdiction, distinct from and exclusive of
the other.
I have already(b) attempted to trace (though very concisely) the history, rise,
and progress, of the extraordinary court, or court of equity, in chancery. The
(b) Page 50, &c.
I. ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE.
II. ACCOUNT.
III. FRAUD.
IV. INFANTS.
V. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENTS.
VI. TRUSTS.
I. ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE. By accident is meant, where a case is distinguished from
others of the like nature by unusual circumstances, for the court of chancery cannot control
the maxims of the common law, because of general inconvenience; but only where the
observation of a rule is attended with some unusual and particular inconvenience. 10 Mod. 1.
1. Bonds, &c. Equity will relieve against the loss of deeds (3 V. and B. 54), or bonds (5 Ves.
235; 6 id. 812), but not if the bond be voluntary. 1 Ch. Ca. 77. It will also set up a bond so
lost or destroyed, against sureties, though the principal be out of the jurisdiction. 3 Atk. 93 ;
1 Ch. Ca. 77; 9 Ves. 464. Bonds made joint, instead of several, may be modifid according to
intent in some cases. 2 Atk. 33; 9 Ves. 118; 17 id. 514; 1 Meriv. 564.
2. Boundaries, &c. Equity will ascertain the boundaries or fix the value, where lands have
been intermixed by unity of possession. 2 Meriv 507; 1 Swanst. 9. So to distinguish copy-
hold from freehold lands within the manor. 4 Ves. 180; Nels. 14.
3. Penalties, Forfeitures, &c., incurred by accident, are relieved against (2 Vern. 594; 1 Stra.
453; 1 Bro. C. C. 418; 2 Sch, and Lef. 685), where the thing may be done afterwards, or a com-
pensation made for it. 1 Ch. Ca. 24; 2 Ventr. 352; 9 Mod. 22; 18 Ves. 63. But no relief is
given in the case of a voluntary composition, payable at a fixed period. Amb. 332. See 1
Vern. 210; 2 Atk. 527; 3 id. 585; 16 Ves. 372. Equity will not relieve against the payment
of stipulated, or, as they are sometimes called, liquidated damages: 2 Atk. 194; Finch, 117;
2 Ch. Ca. 198; 6 Bro. P. C. 470; 1 Cox. 27; 2 Bos. and P. 346; 3 Atk. 395; and forfeitures
under acts of parliament, or conditions in law, which do not admit of compensation, or a
forfeiture which may be considered as a limitation of an estate, which determines it when
it happens, cannot be relieved against. 1 Ball and Batt. 373, 478; 1 Stra. 447, 452; Prec.
Ch. 574.
4. Mietake. A defective conveyance to charitable uses is always aided: 1 Eden, 14; 2 Vern.
755; Prec. Ch. 16; 2 Vern. 453; Hob. 136; but neither a mistake in a fine (if after death of
conusor), or in the names in a recovery, are supplied, especially against a purchaser: 2 Vern. 3;
Ambl. 102. Nor an erroneous recovery in the manorial court. 1 Vern. 367. Mistakes in a
deed or contract, founded on good consideration, may be rectified. 1 Ves. 317; 2 Atk. 203.
And if a bargain and sale be made and not enrolled within six months, equity will compel
the vendor to make a good title, by executing another bargain and sale which may be enrolled.
6 Ves. 745. A conveyance defective in form may be rectified (1 Eq. Ab. 320; 1 P. Wins. 279),
even against assignees (2 Vern. 564; 1 Atk. 162; 4 Bro. C. C. 472), or against representatives.
1 Anst. 14. So defects in surrenders of copyhold. 2 Vern. 564; Salk. 449; 2 Vern. 151. But
not the omission of formalities required by act of parliament in conveyances. 5 Ves. 240;
3 Bro. C. C. 571; 13 Ves. 588; 15 id. 60; 6 id. 745; 11 id. 626. Defects in the mode of con-
veyance may be remedied. 4 Bro. C. C. 382. So the execution of powers. 2 P. Wms. 623.
II. ACCOUNT. Mutual dealings and demands between parties, which are too complex to
be accurately taken by trial at law, may be adjusted in equity: 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 309; 13
Yes. 278, 279; 1 Mad. Ch. 86, and note (i); but if the subject be matter of set-off at law, and
capable of proof, a bill will not lie: 6 Ves. 136; and the difficulty in adjusting the account
constitutes no legal objection to an action. 5 Taunt. 481; 1 Marsh. 115; 2 Camp. 238.
III. FRAUD. Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud, that it will set aside its own
decrees if founded thereupon; and a bill lies to vacate letters patent obtained by fraud. 13
Yin. Ab. 543, pl. 9; 1 Vern. 277. All deceitful practices and artful devices, contrary to the
plain rules of common honesty, are frauds at common law, and punishable there; but for some
frauds or deceits there is no remedy at law, in which cases they are cognizable in equity, as
one of the chief branches of its original jurisdiction. 2 Ch. Ca. 103; Finch, 161; 2 P. Vvms.
270; 2 Vern. 189; 2 Atk. 324; 3 P. Wins. 130; Bridg. Ind. tit. Fraud. pl. 1. Where a person is
,prevented by fraud from executing a deed, equity will regard it as already done. 1 Jac. and
W. 99.
1. Trustees are in no case permitted to purchase from themselves the trust estate (1 Vern.
465), nor their solicitor. 3 Mer. 200. Nor in bankruptcy are the commissioners (6 Veg. 617),
or assignees (6 Ves. 627), nor their solicitors. 10 Yes. 381. Nor committee or keeper of a
lunatic (13 Ves. 156), nor an executor (1 Ves. and B. 170; 1 Cox. 134), nor governors of chari-
ties. 17 Ves. 500.
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same jurisdidtion is exercised, and the same system of redress pursued, in the
equity court of the exchequer; with a distinction, however, as to some few
matters, peculiar to each tribunal, and in which the other cannot interfere.
And, first, of those peculiar to the chancery.
2. Attorney and Client. Fraud in transactions between attorney and client is guarded against
most watchfully. 2 Ves. J. 201; 1 Mad. Ch. 114,115,116.
3. Heirs, Sailors, &c. Equity will protect improvident heirs against agreements binding on
their future expectancies, negotiated during some temporary embarrassment, provided such
agreement manifest great inadequacy of consideration. 1 Vern. 169; 2 id. 27; 1 P. W. 310;
1 Bro. C. C. .1; 2 Ves. 157. It will also set aside unequal contracts obtained from sailors
respecting their prize-money: Newl. Cont. 443; 1 Wils. 229; 2 Ves. 281, 516; and the fourth
section of 20 Geo. III, c. 24, declares all bargains, &c., concerning any share of a prize taken
from any of his majesty's enemies, &c., void. Vid. Newl. Cont. 444.
4. Guardian. Fraud between guardian and ward is also the subject of strict cognizance
in the court of chancery. For the details under this head, see book 1, ch. xvii, and notes.
5. Icaunetjions. In a modern work the subject of injunctions is considered under the head
of fraud: see 1 Mad. Ch. 125; but it seems to deserve a distinct consideration. An injunction
is a method by which the court of chancery interferes to prevent the commission of fraud and
mischief. The exercise of this authority may be obtained, 1st. To stay proceedings in other
courts. 2d. To restrain infringements of patent. 3d. To stay waste. 4th. To preserve copy-
right. 5th. To restrain negotiation of bills, &c., or the transfer of stock. 6th. To prevent
nuisances, and in most cases where the rights of others are invaded, and the remedy by action
at law is too remote to prevent increasing damage. See 1 Mad. Ch. 157 to 165. An injunc-
tion to stay proceedings at law does not extend to a distress for rent. 1 Jac. and W. 392.
Nor has equity any jurisdiction to stop goods in transitu in any case, nor will the court restrain
the sailing of a vessel for such purpose by injunction. 2 Jac. and W. 349.
6. Bills of Peace, which form an essential check on litigation. 1 Bro. P. C. 266; 2 id. 2107;
Bunb. 158; 1 P. W. 671; Prec. Ch. 262; 1 Stra. 404. For this purpose a perpetual injunction
will be granted. See 10 Mod. 1; 1 Bro. P. C. 268. This bill cannot hold in disputes between
two persons only. 2 Atk. 483, 391; 4 Bro. C. C. 157; Yin. tit. Ch. 425, pl. 35; 3 P. W. 156.
7. Bill of Interpleader will lie to prevent fraud or injustice, where two or more parties claim
adversely to each other, from him in possession; (otherwise it will not lie, 1 Mer. 405) for in
such case, it is necessary the two claimants should settle their rights before the person holding
possession be required to give up to either. 2 Ves. J. 310; Mitf. P1. 39; 1 Mad. Ch. 173; and,
on the same principle,
8. Bills or Writs of Certiorari, to remove a cause from an inferior, or incompetent, juris-
diction.
9. Bills to perpetuate testimony in danger of being lost before the right can be ascertained.
10. Bills to discover evidence in possession of defendant, whereof plaintiff would be otherwise
wholly deprived, or of deeds, &c., in defendant's custody.
11. Bills of Quia Timet for the purpose of preventing a possible future injury, and thereby
quieting men's minds and estates, &c. 1 Madd. Ch. 224; Newl. on Contr. 93, 493.
12. Bills for the delivering up of Deeds. As where an instrument is void at common law, as
being against the policy of the law, it belongs to the jurisdiction of equity to order it to be
delivered up. 11 Ves. 535. In Mayor, &c., of Colchester v. Lowton, Lord Eldon says: "My
opinion has always been (differing from others) that a court of equity has jurisdiction and
duty to order a void deed to be delivered up, and placed with those whose property may be
affected by it, if it remains in other hands." 1 Ves. and B. 244.
13. Bills for apportionment or contribution between persons standing in particular relations
one to another. 5 Ves. 792; 2 Freem. 97.
14. For dower and partition.
15. To establish moduses.
16. Bills to marshal securities.
17. Bills to secure property in litigation in other courts. And,
18, and lastly. Bills to compel lords of manors to hold courts, or to admit copyholders and
bills to reverse erroneous judgments in copyhold courts. Vi& 1 Madd. Ch. 242 to 253.
IV. INFANTs. The protection and care which the court of chancery exercises over infants
have already been incidentally noticed. Vide book 1, cc. xvi, xvii, and notes.
Wards of Court. To make a child a ward of court, it is sufficient to file a bill; and it is a
contempt to marry a ward of court, though the infant's father be living. Ambl. 301. The
court of chancery, representing the king as parens patrie, has jurisdiction to control 'the
right of the father to the possession of his infant; but the court of K. B. has not any portion
of that delegated authority. The court of chancery will restrain the father from removing
his child, or doing any act towards removing it out of the jurisdiction. So will the court
refuse the possession of the child to its mother, if she has withdrawn herself from her hus-
band. 10 Ves. 52; Co. Lit. 89,(a), n. 70; 2 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 224, n. (a); 2 Bro. C. C. 499;
1 P. W. 705; 4 Bro. C. C. 101 ; 2 P. W. 102. The court retains its jurisdiction over the prop-
erty of a ward of court after twenty-one, if it remains in court; and if the ward marries, will
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1. Upon the abolition of the court of wards, the care, which the crown was
bound to take as guardian of its infant tenants, was totally extinguished in
[*427] every feudal view; but *resulted to the king in his court of chancery,
together with the general protection (c) of all other infants in the king-
(c) F. N. B. 27.
order a proper settlement to be made, or reform an improper one, unless the ward consents to
the settlement either in court or under a commission. 2 Sim. and Stu. 123, n.(a). In case the
husband assign the property of the wife, who is a ward of court, it shall not prevail, but the
court will direct even the whole of the property in question to be settled on the wife and her
children, and the assignee will not be entitled even to the arrear of interest accrued since the
marriage. 3 Ves. 506.
V. SPECIFIC PERFORMVIANCE oF AGREEMENTS. The jurisdiction of the courts of equity, in
matters of this kind, though certainly as ancient as the reign of Edward IV, did not obtain
an unresisting and uniform acquiescence on the part of the public till many years afterwards.
See 1 Roll. Rep. 354; 2 id. 443; Latch. 172.
Realty. Thus equity enforces agreements for the purchase of lands, or things which relate
to realties, but not (generally) those which relate to personal chattels, as the sale of stock, corn,
hops, &c.; in such cases the remedy is at law. 3 Atk. 383; Newl. Cont. 87.
That which is agreed to be done is in equity considered as already done: 2 P. W. 222; and
therefore when a husband covenants on his markiage to make a settlement charged upon his
lands, which he is afterwards prevented from completing by sudden death, the heir shall make
satisfaction of the settlement out of the estate. Id. 233.
Personalty. In agreements, with penalties for the breach of them, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish the cases of a penalty intended as a security, for a collateral object, from those where
the contract itself has assessed the damages which the party is to pay, upon his doing or omit-
ting to do the particular act. In these latter cases, equity will not interfere either to prevent
or to enforce the act in question, or to restrain the recovery of damages after they have be-
come due. But in the former, where it plainly appears that the specific performance of that
act was the primary object of the agreement, and the penalty intended merely to operate as
a collateral security for its being done, though at law the party might make his election,
either to do the particular act or to pay the penalty, a court of equity will not permit him to ex-
ercise such right, but will compel him to perform the object of the agreement. Newl. Cont. c. 17.
Thus, as the principle whereon a specific performance of agreement relating to personals is
refused, is, that there is as complete a remedy to be obtained at law, therefore, where a party
sues merely on a memorandum of agreement (a mere memorandum not being regarded as
valid at law), a court of equity will give relief, for equity suffers not a right to be without a
remedy. 3 Atk. 382, 385. But it is only where the legal remedy is inadequate or defective,
that courts of equity interfere. 8 Ves. 163. Equity will not enforce an agreement for the
transfer of stock: 10 Ves. 161; but it has been held that a bill will lie for performance of
agreement for purchase of government stock, where it prays for the delivery of the certificates
which give the legal title to stock. 1 Sim. and Stu. 590. And it seems the court will entertain
a suit for the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a debt. 5 Price, 325. So
to sell the good will of a trade, and the exclusive use of a secret in dyeing (1 Sim. and Stu. 74),
but not without great caution. See 1 P. Wins. 181.
VI. TRUSTs. Trusts may be created of real or personal estate, and are either, 1st, Express;
or, 2d, Implied. Under the head of implied trusts may be included all resulting trusts, and
all such trusts as are not express. Express trusts are created by deed or will. Implied trusts
arise, in general, by construction of law, upon the acts or situation of parties. 1 Mad. Ch. 446.
1. Lunatics. The custody of the persons and estates of lunatics was a power not originally
in the crown, but was given to it by statute, for the benefit of the subject. 1 Ridgw. P. C. 224,
et rid. 2 Inst. 14.' And now, by the statute de prerogativa regis (17 Edw. II, c. 9 and 10), the
king shall have the real estates of idiots to his own use, and he shall provide for the safe keep-
ing of the real estates of lunatics, so that they shall have a competent maintenance, and the
residue is to be kept for their use. 1 Ridgw. P. C. 519, 535. A liberal application of the
property of a lunatic is made to secure every comfort his situation will admit (6 Ves. 8),
without regard to expectants on estate. 1 Ves. J. 297. The power of the chancellor extends
to making grants from time to time of the lunatic's estate, and as this power is derived under
the sign manual, in virtue of the prerogative of the crown, the chancellor, who is usually in-
vested with it, is responsible to the crown alone for the right exercise of it. Per Ld. Hardw.,
3 Atk. 635. It is said, that since the revolution the king has always granted the surplus profits
of the estate of an idiot to some of his family. Ridgw. P. C. 519, App. note 1.
2. Charities. The general controlling power of the court over charities does not extend to a
charity regulated by governors under a charter, unless they have also the management of the
revenues, and abuse their trust; which will not be presumed, but must be apparent, and made
out by evidence. 2 Ves. Jun. 42. The internal management of a charity is the exclusive
subject of visitorial jurisdiction: but, under a trust as to the revenue, abuse by misapplication
is controlled in chancery. 2 Ves. and B. 134.
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dom. When, therefore, a fatherless child has no other guardian, the court of
chancery has a right to appoint one: and from all proceedings relative thereto,
an appeal lies to the house of lords. The court of exchequer can only appoint
a guardiam ad litem, to manage the defence of the infant if a suit be commenced
against him; a power which is incident to the jurisdiction of every court of
justice: (d) but when the interest of a minor comes before the court judicially,
in the progress of a cause, or upon a bill for that purpose filed, either tribunal
indiscriminately will take care of the property of the infant.
2. As to idiots and lunatics: the king himself used formerly to commit the
custody of them to proper committees, in every particular case; but now, to
avoid solicitations and the very shadow of undue partiality, a warrant is issued
by the king, (e) under his royal sign manual, to the chancellor or keeper of his
seal, to perform this office for him: and, if he acts improperly in granting such
custodies, the complaint must be made to the king himself in council. (f) But
the previous proceedings on the commission, to inquire whether or no the party
be an idiot or a lunatic, are on the law side of the court of chancery, and can
only be redressed (if erroneous) by writ of error in the regular course of law.(2)
3. The king, as varens patritv, has the general superintendence of all chari-
ties; which he exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor. And,
therefore, whenever it is necessary, the attorney-general, at the relation of some
informant (who is usually called the relator), files ex officio an information in the
court of chancery to have the charity properly established. By statute also,
43 IEliz. c. 4, authority is given to the lord chancellor, or lord keeper, and to the
(d) Cro. Jac. 641. 2 Lev. 163. T. Jones, 90. (e) See book I, ch. 8. f) 3 P. Wins. 108. See Reg. Br. 267.
3. Executors. Where an executor has an express legacy, the court of chancery looks upon him
as a trustee with regard to the surplus, and will make him account, though the spiritual court
has no such power. 1 P. W. 7. And where an executor, who was directed to lay out the
testator's personalty in the funds, unnecessarily sold out stock, kept large balances in his hand,
and resisted payment of debts by false pretences of outstanding demands, he was charged
with five per cent interest and costs, but the court refused to make rests in the account. 1
Jac. and W. 586. And see, on this subject, ante, book 2, ch. 32.
4. Marshalling Assets. The testator's whole personal property, whether devised or not, is assets
both in law and equity, to which creditors by simple contract, or of any higher order, may
have recourse for the satisfaction of their demands. But the testator may, by clear and ex-
plicit words, exempt his personalty from payment of debts as against the dcvisee of his realty,
though not as against creditors. The rule in equity is, that, in case even of a specialty debt,
the personal assets shall be first applied, and if deficient, and there be no devise for payment
of debts, the heir shall then be charged for assets descended. 2 Atk. 426, 434. For lands are
in equity a favored fund, insomuch that the heir at law, or devisee, of a mortgagor may de-
mand to have the estate mortgaged by such devisor himself cleared out of the personalty.
Yin. Ab. tit. Heir, U. pl. 35; 1 Atk. 487. And a specific devisee of a mortgaged estate is enti-
tled to have it exonerated out of real assets descended. 3 Atk. 430, 439. But at law there is
no such distinction of favor shown to lands; a bond creditor may, if he please, proceed im-
mediately against the heir, without suing the personal representatives of his deceased debtor.
As to the order in which real assets shall be applied in equity for payment of debts (after
exhausting the personal effects, supposing them not exempted), the general rule is, first, to take
lands devised simply for that purpose, then lands descended, and, lastly, estates specifically
devised, even though they are generally charged with the payment of debts. 2 Bro. 263.
Equitable assets are such as at law cannot be reached by a creditor, as a devise in trust to
pay debts, of an equity of redemption subject to a mortgage in fee, or where the descent is
broken by a devise to sell for the payment of debts. 1 Vern. 411 ; 1 Ch. Ca. 128, n; 2 Atk. 290.
But lands so devised, subject to a mortgage for years, are legal assets.]
Upon the general subject of equity jurisdiction, a brief note like the foregoing can give but
very imperfect information. The treatises by Mr. Spence on the equitable jurisdiction, and by
Adams and Story on equity jurisprudence, are very full and satisfactory.
Some of the United States have no distinct equity system, and the relief formerly given in
equity in some cases cannot be had; in others, equity principles are administered, but under
the same forms and by the same courts as common-law principles are; and in others still, the
equity system is fully retained, but is administered under equitable forms by the same judges
who hold the courts of common law. This last is the case with the courts of the federal
government.
(2) This jurisdiction is now exercised under and regulated by statutes 16 and 17 Vic. c. 70,
and 30 and 31 Vic. c. 87, and the lords justices may exercise it.
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[*428] chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, respectively, to grant *commis-
sions under their several seals, to inquire into any abuses of charitable
donations, and rectify the same by decree; which may be reviewed in the
respective courts of the several chancellors, upon exceptions taken thereto. But,
though this is done in the petty bag office in the court of chancery, because the
commission is there returned, it is not a proceeding at common law, but treated
as an original cause in' the court of equity. The evidence below is not taken
down in writing, and the respondent, in his answer to the exceptions, may allege
what new matter he pleases; upon which they go to proof, and examine wit-
nesses in writing upon all the matters in issue: and the court may decree the
respondent to pay all the costs, though no such authority is given by the statute.
And as it is thus considered as an original cause throughout, an appeal lies of
course from the chancellor's decree to the house of peers, (g) notwithstanding
any loose opinions to the contrary. (h) (3)
4. By the several statutes relating to bankrupts, a summary jurisdiction is
given to the chancellor, in many matters consequential or previous to the commis-
sions thereby directed to be issued; from which the statutes give no appeal. (4)
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery doth not extend
to some causes, wherein relief may be had in the exchequer. No information
can be brought in chancery for such mistaken charities as are given to the
king by the statutes for suppressing superstitious uses. Nor can chancery give
any relief against the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make any
decree disposing of or affecting his property; not even in cases where he is a
royal trustee.(t) (5) Such causes must be determined in the court of exchequer,
[*429] as a court of revenue; which alone has power *over the king's treasury,
and the officers employed in its management: unless where it properly
belongs to the duchy court of Lancaster, which hath also a similar jurisdiction
as a court of revenue; and, like the other, consists of both a court of law and
a court of equity.
In all other matters, what is said of the court of equity in chancery will be
equally applicable to the other courts of equity. Whatever difference there may
be in the forms of practice, it arises from the different constitution of their offi-
cers: or, if they differ in any thing more essential, one of them must certainly
be wrong; for truth and justice are always uniform, and ought equally to be
adopted by them all.
Let us next take a brief, but comprehensive view of the general nature of
equity, as now understood and practiced in our several courts of judicature. I
have formerly touched upon it, (k) but imperfectly: it deserves a more complete
explication. Yet as nothing is hitherto extant that can give a stranger a
tolerable idea of the courts of equity subsisting in England, as distinguished
from the courts of law, the compiler of these observations cannot but attempt
it with diffidence: those who know them best are too much employed to find
time to write; and those who have attended but little in those courts must be
often at a loss for materials.
(q) Duke's Char. Uses, 62, 128. Corporation of Burford v. Lenthal, Cane. 9 May, 1743.
(h)* 2 Vern. 118.
(i) Huggins v. York Buildings' Company, Cane. 24 Oct. 1740. Reeve v. Attorney-General, Cane. 27 Nov. 1741.
Lightbourn v. Attorney-General, Cane. 2 May, 1743.
(k) Book I, introd. § 2, 3, ad cale.
(3) [The most important piece of legislation on this subject is the charitable trusts act, 1853,
of which the professed object is to secure the due administration of charitable trusts, and
in certain cases a more beneficial application of charitable funds than that previously in
operation.]
See, also, the charitable trusts acts, 1855 and 1860.
(4) This jurisdiction was transferred to the court of bankruptcy by statute 1 and 2 Win.
IV, c. 56.
(5) It has already been stated that a sovereignty is not suable in its own courts, except with
its own consent, and this consent is given either by general law, or specially for the particular
case. See note p. 257, supra.
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Equity, then, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all
law: positive law is construed, and rational law is made by it. In this, equity
is synonymous to justice; in that, to the true sense and sound interpretation
of the rule. But the very terms of a court of equity, and a court of law, as
contrasted to each other, are apt to confound and mislead us: as if the one
judged without equity, and the other was not bound by any law. Whereas
every definition or illustration to be met with, which now draws a line between
the two jurisdictions, by setting law and equity *in opposition to each [*430]
other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a certain
degree.
1. Thus in the first place it is said,(l) that it is the business of a court of
equity in England to abate the rigour of the common law. But no such power
is contended for. Hard was the case of bond-creditors whose debtor devised
away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule, which put the devisee in a
better condition than the heir; (m) yet a court of equity had no power to inter-
pose. Hard is the common law still subsisting, that land devised, or descending
to the heir, shall not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor or devi-
sor,(n) although the money was laid out in purchasing the very land,(6) and
that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the real estate of the
son: (o) but a court of equity can give no relief; though in both these instances
the artificial reason of the law, arising from feudal principles, has long ago
entirely ceased. The like may be observed of the descent of lands to a remote
relation of the whole blood, or even their escheat to the lord, in preference to
the owner's half brother; (p) and of the total stop to all justice, by causing the
parol to demur,(q) whenever an infant is sued as heir, or is party to a real
action.(7) In all such cases of positive law, the courts of equity, as well as the
courts of law, must say with Ulpian,(r) "hoc quidem perquain durumn est, sed
ita lex scripta est."
2. It is said,(s) that a court of equity determines according to the spirit of
the rule, and not according to the strictness of the letter. But so also does a
court of law. Both, for instance, are equally bound, and equally profess, to
interpret statutes according to the true intent of the legislature. In general
law all cases cannot be foreseen; or, if foreseen, cannot be expressed: some will
arise that will fall within the *meaning, though not within the words' of ['431]
the legislator; and others which may fall within the letter, may be contrary [ 1
to his meaning, though not expressly excepted. These cases, thus out of the letter,
are often said to be within the equity of an act of parliament; and so cases
within the letter are frequently out of the equity. Here by equity we mean
nothing but the sound interpretation of the law; though the words of the law
itself may be too general, too special, or otherwise inaccurate or defective.
These, then, are the cases which, as Grotlus (t) says, "lex non exacte definit, sed
arbitrio boni viri permittit;" in order to find out the true sense and meaning of
the lawgiver, from every other topic of construction. But there is not a single
rule of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strictly, that is not equally used
by the judges in the courts both of law and equity: the construction must in
both be the same: or, if they differ, it is only as one court of law may also hap-
pen to differ from another. Each endeavours to fix and adopt the true sense of
the law in question; neither can enlarge, diminish, or alter that sense in a
single tittle.
3. Again, it hath been said, (u) that fraud, accident, and trust, are the proper and
peculiar objects of a court of equity. But every kind offraud is equally cognizable,
(1) Lord Kaims, Prin. of Equity, 44. (m) See book II, ch. 23, p. 878.
(n) Ibid. ch. 15, pp. 243, 244 ;ch .23, p. 377. (o) Ibid. ch. 14, p. 208. (p) Ibid. p. 227.
(q) See page 300. (r) Vf. 40, 9, 12. (8) Lord Kaims, Princ. of Equity, 177.
(t) De cequitate, S 3. (u) 1 Roll. Abr. 374. 4 Inst. 84. 10 Mod. 1.
(6) This rule is since changed by statute.
(7) jThis delay of justice is remedied by the statute 11 Geo. IV and 1 Wm. IV, c. 47
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and equally adverted to, in a court of law: and some frauds are cognizable only
there: as fraud in obtaining a devise of lands, which is always sent out of the
equity courts, to be there determined. Many accidents are also supplied in a
court of law; as, loss of deeds, mistakes in receipts or accounts, wrong payments,
deaths which make it impossible to perform a condition literally, and a multi-
tude of other contingencies: and many cannot be relieved even in a court of
equity; as, if by accident a recovery is ill suffered, a devise ill executed, a contin-
gent remainder destroyed, or a power of leasing omitted in a family settlement.
A technical trust, indeed, created by the limitation of a second use, was forced
[*A 091into *the courts of equity in the manner formerly mentioned; (w) andthis species of trusts, extended by inference and construction, have ever
since remained as a kind of peculium in those courts. But there are other trusts,
which are cognizable. in a court of law: as deposits, and all manne of bailments;
and specially that implied contract, so highly beneficial and use;ul, of having
undertaken to account for money received to another's use, (x) which is the
ground of an action on thG case almost as universally remedial as a bill in equity.
4. Once more; it has been said that a court of equity is not bound by rules
or precedents, but acts from the opinion of the judg-,(y) rounded on the circum-
stances of every particular case. Whereas the system of our courts of equity is a
laboured, connected system, governed by established rules, and bound down by
precedents, from which they do not depart, although the reason of some of them
may perhaps be liable to objection. Thus the refusing of a wife her dower in a
trust-estate, (z) (8) yet allowing the husband his curtesy: the holding the pen-
alty of a bond to be merely a security for the debt and interest, yet considering
it sometimes as the debt itself, so that the interest shall not exceed that penalty,(a)
the distinguishing between a mortgage atfiveper cent. with a clause of a reduc-
tion to four, if the interest be regularly paid, and a mortgage at four per cent.
with a clause of enlargement to five, if the payment of the interest be deferred;
so that the former shall be deemed a conscientious, the latter an unrighteous bar-
gain :(b) all these, and other cases that might be instanced, are plainly rules of posi-
[*433] tive law; supported only by *the reverence that is shown, and generally
very properly shown, to a series of former determinations; that the rule
of property may be uniform and steady. Nay, sometimes a precedent is so strictly
followed, that a particular judgment, founded upon special circumstances, (c)
gives rise to a general rule.
In short, if a court of equity in England did really act as many ingenious
writers have supposed it (from theory) to do, it would rise above all law, either
common or statute, and be a most arbitrary legislator in every particular case.
No wonder they are so often mistaken. Grotius, or Puffendorf, or any other of
the great masters of jurisprudence, would have been as little able to discover, by
their own light, the system of a court of equity in England, as the system of a
court of law: especially, as the notions before mentioned of the character, power,
and practice of a court of equity were formerly adopted and propagated (though
not with approbation of the thing) by our principal antiquaries and lawyers;
Spelman,(d) Coke,(e) Lambard,(f) and Selden,(g) and even the great Bacon (h)
himself. But this was in the infancy of our courts of equity, before their juris-
(a) Book II, ch. 20. (x) See page 16.
(y) This is stated by Mr. Selden (Table-Talk, tit. Equity) with more pleasantry than truth. "For law we
have a measure, and know what to trust to: equity is according to the conscience of him that is chancellor; and
as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure a
chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be I One chancellor has a long foot, another a short
foot, a third an indifferent foot. It is the same thing with the chancellor's conscience."
(z) 2 P. Wms. 640. See book II, p. 337. (a) Salk. 154. (b) 2 Vern. 289, 316. 3 Atk. 520.
(c) See the case of Foster and Munt (1 Vein. 473) with regard to the undisposed residuum of personal estates.
(d) Qum in summis itaque tribunalibug multi e legum canone decernunt judice, solus (si re exierit) cohibeat
cancellarSus ex arbitrio; nec aliter decretis tenetur suce curie vel 1ui ipaius, quin, elucente nova ratione, recognoscat
que voluerit, mutet et deleat prout sum videbitur prudentm. Gloss. 108.
(e) See pages 54, 55. (f) Archeion. 71, 72, 73. (g) U1i supra.
(A) De Augm. Scient. 1. 8, c. 3.
(8) [This anomaly no longer exists. See statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 105.]
[Book III.
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diction was settled, and when the chancellors themselves, partly from their ig-
norance of law (being frequently bishops or statesmen), partly from ambition or
lust of power (encouraged by the arbitrary principles of the age they lived in),
but principally from the narrow and unjust decisions of the courts of law, had
arrogated to themselves such unlimited authority, as hath totally been disclaimed
by their successors for now about a century past. The decrees of a court of
equity were then rather in the nature of awards, formed on the sudden pro ne nata,
with more probity of intention than knowledge of the subject; *founded [*434]
on no settled principles, as being never designed, and therefore never
used for precedents. But the system of jurisprudence, in our courts both
of law and equity, are now equally artificial systems, founded on the same
principles of justice and positive law; but varied by different usages in the forms
and mode of their proceedings: the one being originally derived (though much
reformed and improved) from the feudal customs, as they prevailed in different
ages in the Saxon and Norman judicatures; the other (but with equal improve-
ments) from the imperial and pontifical formularies, introduced by their clerical
chancellors.
The suggestion indeed of every bill, to give jurisdiction to the courts of equity
(copied from those early times), is that the complainant hath no remedy at the
common law. But he who should from thence conclude, that no case is judged
of in equity where there might have been relief at law, and at the same time casts
his eye on the extent and variety of the cases in our equity reports, must think
the law a dead letter indeed. The rules of property, rules of evidence, and rules
of interpretation in both courts are, or should be, exactly the same: both ought
to adopt the best, or must cease to be courts of justice. Formerly some causes,
which now no longer exist, might occasion a different rule to be followed in one
court, from what was afterwards adopted in the other, as founded in the nature
and reason of the thing: but, the instant those causes ceased, the measure of sub-
stantial justice ought to have been the same in both. Thus the penalty of a
bond, originally contrived to evade the absurdity of those monkish constitutions
which prohibited taking interest for money, was therefore very pardonably con-
sidered as the real debt in the courts of law, when the debtor neglected to per-
form his agreement for the return of the loan with interest: for the judges could
not, as the law then stood, give judgment that the interest should be specifically
paid. But when afterwards the taking of interest became legal, as the necessary
companion of commerce, (i) nay after the statute of 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, had de-
clared the *debt or loan itself to be "the just and true intent" for which ,4 ]
the obligation was given, their narrow-minded successors still adhered [*43
wilfully and technically to the letter of the ancient precedents, and refused to
consider the payment of principal, interest, and costs, as a full satisfaction of the
bond. At the same time more liberal men, who sate in the courts of equity, con-
strued the instrument according to its "just and true intent," as merely a security
for the loan: in which light it was certainly understood by the parties, at least
after these determinations ; and therefore this construction should have been
universally received. So in mortgages, being only a landed as the other is a per-
sonal security for the money lent, the payment of principal, interest, and costs,
ought at any time, before judgment executed, to have saved the forfeiture in a
court of law, as well as in a court of equity. And the inconvenience, as well as
injustice, of putting different constructions in different courts upon one and
the same transaction, obliged the parliament at length to interfere, and to direct,
by the statutes 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, and 7 Geo. II, c. 20, that, in the cases of bonds
and mortgages, what had long been the practice of the courts of equity should
also for the future be universally followed in the courts of law; wherein it had
before these statutes in some degree obtained a footing. (J)
Again; neither a court of equity nor of law can vary men's wills or agree-
ments, or (in other words) make wills or agreements for them. Both are to under-
stand them truly, and therefore uniformly. One court ought not to extend, nor
the other abridge, a lawful provision deliberately settled by the parties, contrary
() See book IIH, p 456. (j) 2 Keb. 553, 555. Salk. 597. 6 Mod. 11, 60, 101. 271
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to its just intent. A court of equity, no more than a court of law, can relieve
against a penalty in the nature of stated damages; as a rent of 51. an acre for
ploughing up ancient meadow: (k) nor against a lapse of time, where the time
is material to the contract; as in covenants for the renewal of leases. Both
courts will equitably construe, but neither pretends to control or change, a law-
ful stipulation or engagement.
[*436] *The rules of decision are in both courts equally apposite to the sub-
jects of which they take cognizance. Where the subject-matter is such
as requires to be determined secundum cequum et bonum, as generally upon
actions on the case, the judgments of the courts of law are guided by the most
liberal equity. In matters of positive right, both courts must submit to and
follow those ancient and invariable maxims "quce relicta sunt et tradita."(1)
Both follow the law of nations, and collect it from history and the most approved
authors of all countries, where the question is the object of that law: as in the
case of the privileges of ambassadors,(m) hostages, or ransom-bills.(n) In mercan-
tile transactions they follow the marine law,(o) and argue from the usages and
authorities received in all maritime countries. Where they exercise a concurrent
jurisdiction, they both follow the law of the proper forum: (p) in matters ori-
ginally of ecclesiastical cognizance, they both equally adopt the canon or imperial
law, according to the nature of the subject; (q) and if a question came before
either, which was properly the object of a foreign municipal law, they would
both receive information what is the rule of the country,(r) and would both
decide accordingly.
Such then being the parity of law and reason which governs both species
of courts, wherein (it may be asked) does their essential difference consist? It
principally consists in the different modes of administering justice in each; in
the mode of proof, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief. Upon these, and
upon two other accidental grounds of jurisdiction, which were formerly driven
into those courts by narrow decisions of the courts of law, viz.: the true con-
[,*437] struction of securities for money lent, and the form and effect *of a trust
or second use; upon these main pillars hath been gradually erected that
structure of jurisprudence, which prevails in our courts of equity, and is inwardly
bottomed upon the same substantial foundations as the legal system which bath
hitherto been delineated in these Commentaries; however different they may
appear in their outward form, from the different taste of their architects.
1. And first, as to the mode of proof. When facts, or their leading circum-
stances, rest only in the knowledge of the party, a court of equity applies itself
to his conscience, and purges him upon oathwith regard to the truth of the
transaction; and, that being once discovered, the judgment is the same in equity
as it would have been at law. But for want of this discovery at law, the courts
of equity have acquired a concurrent jurisdiction with every other court in all
matters of account.(s) As incident to accounts, they take a concurrent cogni-
zance of the administration of personal assets,(t) consequently of debts, legacies,
the distribution of the residue, and the conduct of executors and adminis-
trators. (u) As incident to accounts, they also take the concurrent jurisdiction
of tithes, and all questions relating thereto; (w) of all dealings in partnership,(x)
and many other mercantile transactions; and so of bailiffs, receivers, factors,
and agents. (y) It would be endless to point out all the several avenues in
human affairs, and in this commercial age, which lead to or end in accounts.
From the same fruitful source, the compulsive discovery upon oath, the courts
of equity have acquired a jurisdiction over almost all matters of fraud; (z) all
matters in the private knowledge of the party, which, though concealed, are
binding in conscience; and all judgments at law, obtained through such fraud or
(k) 2 Atk. 239.
() De jure naturce cogitare per nos atque dicere debemus; de jure popul Romani, quce relieta sunt et tradita
Cic. de Leg. 1. 3, ad cale.
(m) See book I, p. 253. (n) Ricord v. Bettenham, Tr. 5 Geo. iH, B. R.
(o) See book I, p. 75. Book ii, pp. 459, 461, 467. (p) See book II, p. 513. (q) Ibid. 504.
i) Ibid. 463. (s) 1 Cha. Ca. 57. (t 2 P. Wms. 145. (u) 2 Cha. Ca. 152.
V) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 367. (x) 2 Vern. 277. (y) Ibid. 638. (z) 2 Cha. Ca. 46.
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concealment. And this, not by *impeaching or reversing the judgment [*438]
itself, but by prohibiting the plaintiff from taking any advantage of a
judgment, obtained by suppressing the truth; (a) and which, had the same
facts appeared on the trial as now are discovered, he would never have attained
at all.
2. As to the mode of trial. This is by interrogatories administered to the
witnesses, upon which their depositions are taken in writing, wherever they
happen to reside. If therefore the cause arises in a foreign country, and the
witnesses reside upon the spot; if, in causes arising in England, the witnesses
are abroad, or shortly to leave the kingdom; or if witnesses residing at home
are aged or infirm; any of these cases lays a ground for a court of equity to
grant a commission to examine them, and (in consequence) (9) to exercise the
same jurisdiction, which might have been exercised at law, if the witnesses could
probably attend.
3. With respect to the mode of relief. The want of a more specific remedy
than can be obtained in the courts of law gives a concurrent jurisdiction to a
court of equity in a great variety of cases. To instance in executory agreements.
A court of equity will compel them to be carried into strict execution, (b) unless
where it is improper or impossible: instead of giving damages for their non-
performance. And hence a fiction is established, that what ought to be done
shall be considered as being actually done, (c) and shall relate back to the time
when it ought to have been done originally: and this fiction is so closely pur-
sued through all its consequences, that it necessarily branches out into many rules
of jurisprudence, which form a certain regular system. So of waste, and other
similar injuries, a court of equity takes a concurrent cognizance, in order to
prevent them by injunction. (d) Over questions that may be tried at law, in a
great multiplicity of actions, a court of equity assumes a *jurisdiction
to prevent the expense and vexation of endless litigations and suits. (e) [*439]
In various kinds of frauds it assumes a concurrent (f) jurisdiction, not only
for the sake of a discovery, but of a more extensive and specific relief: as by
setting aside fraudulent deeds, (g) decreeing re-conveyances, (h) or directing an
absolute conveyance merely to stand as a security. (i) And thus, lastly, for the
sake of a more beneficial and complete relief by decreeing a sale of lands, (.1) a
court of equity holds plea of all debts, incumbrances, and charges, that may
affect it or issue thereout.
4. The true construction of securities for money lent is another fountain of
jurisdiction in courts of equity. When they held the penalty of a bond to be
the form, and that in substance it was only as a pledge to secure the repayment
of the sum bona fide advanced, with a proper compensation for the use, they
laid the foundation of a regular series of determinations, which have settled the
doctrine of personal pledges or securities, and are equally applicable to mort-
gages of real property. The mortgagor continues owner of the land, the mort-
gagee of the money lent upon it; but this ownership is mutually transferred,
and the mortgagor is barred from redemption, if, when called upon by the mort-
gagee, he does not redeem within a time limited by the court; or he may when
out of possession he barred by length of time, by analogy to the statute of limi-
tations. (10)
5. The form of a trust, or second use, gives the courts of equity an exclusive
jurisdiction as to the subject-matter of all settlements and devises in that form,
and of all the long terms created in the present complicated mode of convey-
ancing. This is a very ample source of jurisdiction: but the trust is governed by
a) 3 P. Wins. 148. Year-book, 22 Edw. IV, 37, pl. 21. (b) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 16.
C) 3 P. Wmns. 215. (d) I Cha. Rep. 14. 2 Cha. Ca. 32.
e) I Vern. 308. Prec. Cha. 261. 1 P. Wins. 672. Stra. 404. (f) 2 P. Wins. 156.
(q) 1 Vern. 32. 1 P. Wins. 239. (A) 1 Vern. 237. (i) 2 Vern. 84. (j) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 337.
(9) The courts of law now have this jurisdiction, under statutes heretofore referred to.
(10) Now the bar is by express statute. 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, § 28.
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very nearly the same rules, as would govern the estate in a court of law, (k) if
[*440] no trustee was interposed: and *by a regular positive system established
in the courts of equity, the doctrine of trusts is now reduced to as great
a certainty as that of legal estates in the courts of the common law.
These are the principal (for I omit the minuter) grounds of the jurisdiction
at present exercised in our courts of equity: which differ, we see, very consider-
ably from the notions entertained by strangers, and even by those courts them-
selves before they arrived to maturity; as appears from the principles laid down,
and the jealousies entertained of their abuse, by our early juridical writers cited
in a former page; (1) and which have been implicitly received and handed down
by subsequent compilers, without attending to those gradual accessions and
derelictions, by which in the course of a century this mighty river hath imper-
ceptibly shifted its channel. Lambard, in particular, in the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, lays it down, (v?) that "equity should not be appealed unto, but only
in rare and extraordinary matters: and that a good chancellor will not arrogate
authority in every complaint that shall be brought before him upon whatsoever
suggestion: and thereby both overthrow the authority of the courts of common
law, and also bring upon men such a confusion and uncertainty, as hardly any man
should know how or how long to hold his own assured to him." And certainly,
if a court of equity were still at sea, and floated upon the occasional opinion
which the judge who happened to preside might entertain of conscience in every
particular case, the inconvenience that would arise from this uncertainty would
be a worse evil than any hardship that could follow from rules too strict and
inflexible. Its powers would have become too arbitrary to have been endured
in a country like this, (n) which boasts of being governed in all respects by law
and not by will. But since the time when Lambard wrote, a set of great and
eminent lawyers. (o) who have successively held the great seal, have by degrees
erected the system of relief administered by a court of equity into a regular
[*441] *science, which cannot be attained without study and experience, any
more than the science of law: but from which, when understood, it may
be known what remedy a suitor is entitled to expect, and by what mode of suit,
as readily and with as much precision in a court of equity as in a court of law.
It were much to be wished, for the sake of certainty, peace, and justice, that
each court would as far as possible follow the other, in the best and most effect-
ual rules for attaining those desirable ends. It is a maxim that equity follows
the law; aiid in former days the law has not scrupled to follow even that equity
which was laid down by the clerical chancellors. Every one who is conversant
in our ancient books, knows that many valuable improvements in the state of
our tenures (especially in leaseholds (p) and copyholds) (q) and the forms of
administering justice, (r) have arisen from this single reason, that the same
thing was constantly effected by means of a subpcena in the chancery. And
sure there cannot be a greater solecism, than that in two sovereign independent
courts established in the same country, exercising concurrent jurisdiction, and
over the same subject-matter, there should exist in a single instance two differ-
ent rules of property, clashing with or contradicting each other.
It would carry me beyond the bounds of my present purpose to go further
into this matter. I have been tempted to go so far, because strangers are apt to
be confounded by nominal distinctions, and the loose, unguarded expressions to
be met with in the best of our writers; and thence to form erroneous ideas of
the separate jurisdictions now existing in England, but which never were sepa-
rated in any other country in the universe. It hath also afforded me an oppor-
[*4421 timity to vindicate, on the one hand, the justice of our *courts of law
J from being that harsh and illiberal rule, which many are too ready to
suppose it; and on the other, the justice of our courts of equity from being the
result of mere arbitrary opinion, or an exercise of dictatorial power, which rides
over the law of the land, and corrects, amends and controls it by the loose and
(k) 2 P. Wns. 645, 668, 669. (2) See page 433. (m) Archeion. 71, 78.
Il) 2 P. Wn1.. 695. 68. (0) Sece pges 54, 55, 56. (p) Gilb. of Ejectment, 2. 2 Bac. Abr. 160.
(q) Bro. Abr. Iit. )eu(an por cople, pl. 10. Litt. § i7. (r) See page 200.
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fluctuating dictates of the conscience of a single judge. It is now high time
to proceed to the practice of our courts of equity, thus explained, and thus
understood.(11)
The first commencement of a suit in chancery is by preferring a bill to the
lord chancellor, in the style of a petition; "humbly complaining, sheweth to
your lordship your orator A B that," &c. This is in the nature of a declaration
at common law, or a libel and allegation in the spiritual courts: setting forth
the circumstances of the case at length, as, some fraud, trust or hardship; "in
tender consideration whereof" (which is the usual language of the bill), "and
for that your orator is wholly without remedy at the common law," relief is
therefore prayed at the chancellor's hands, and also process of subpcena against
the defendant, to compel him to answer upon oath to all the matter charged in
the bill. And, if it be to quiet the possession of lands, to stay waste, or to stop
proceedings at law, an injunction is also prayed, in the nature of an interdictum
by the civil law, commanding the defendant to cease.
This bill must call all necessary parties, however remotely concerned in
interest, before the court, otherwise no decree can be made to bind them; and
must be signed by counsel, as a certificate of its decency and propriety. For it
must not contain matter either scandalous or impertinent: if it does, the de-
fendant may refuse to answer it, till such scandal or impertinence is expunged,
which is done upon an order to refer it to one of the officers of the court, called
a master in chancery; of whom there are in number twelve, including the
master of the rolls, all of whom, so late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, were
commonly doctors of the civil *law.(s) The master is to examine the *443]
propriety of the bill: and if he reports it scandalous or impertinent, such [
matter must be struck out, and the defendant shall have his costs; which ought
of right to be paid by the counsel who signed the bill.
When the bill is filed in the office of the six clerks (who originally were all
in orders; and therefore, when the constitution of the court begaii to alter, a
law(t) was made to permit them to marry), when, I say, the bill is thus filed, if
an injunction be prayed therein, it may be had at various stages of the cause,
according to the circumstances of the case. If the bill be to stay execution
upon an oppressive judgment, and the defendant does not put in his answer
within the stated time allowed by the rules of the court, an injunction will issue
of course: and, when the answer comes in, the injunction can only be con-
tinued upon a sufficient ground appearing from the answer itself. But if an
injunction be wanted to stay waste, or other injuries of an equally urgent na-
ture, then upon the filing of the bill, and a proper case supported by affidavits,
the court will grant an injunction, immediately, to continue till the defendant
has put in his answer, and till the court shall make some farther order concerning
it: and when the answer comes in, whether it shall then be dissolved or con-
tinued till the hearing of the cause, is determined by the court upon argument,
drawn from considering the answer and affidavit together.
But, upon common bills, as soon as they are filed, process of subpcena is taken
out: which is a writ commanding the defendant to appear and answer to the bill,
on pain of 1001. But this is not all; for if the defendant, on service of the sub-
epwna, does not appear within the time limited by the rules of the court, and
plead, demur or answer to the bill, he is then said to be in contempt; and the
(s) Smith's Commonw. b. ii, c. 12. (t) Stat. 14 and 15 Hen. VIlE, c. 8.
(11) In some particulars great changes were made in proceedings in chancery by the statute
15 and 16 Vic. c. 86, and the general orders of court since adopted. These changes will
appear by the recent editions of Daniell's Chancery Practice. Among the most important are
the light of the court, on the application of either party, to order the evidence as to any facts
or issues to be taken viva voce at the hearing, and the abl;6ition of the office of master, and the
putting of the business of that office under the immediate direction and control of the judges.
The court may now, in its discretion, summon a jury to try before itself any disputed ques-
tion of fact. See Fernie v. Young, L. R. 1 H. L. 63.
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respective processes of contempt are in successive order awarded against him.
[*444] The first of which is an attachment, which is a writ *in the nature of a
capias, directed to the sheriff, and commanding him to attach, or take
up, the defendant, and bring him into court. If the sheriff returns that the
defendant is non est inventus, then an attachment with proclamations issues;
which, besides the ordinary form of attachment, directs the sheriff that he
cause public proclamations to be made throughout the county, to summon the
defendant, upon his allegiance, personally to appear and answer. If this be also
returned with a non est inventus, and he still stands out in contempt, a commis-
sion of rebellion is awarded against him, for not obeying the king's proclama-
tions according to his allegiance; and four commissioners therein named, or
any of them, are ordered to attach him wheresoever he may be found in Great
Britain, as a rebel and con temner of the king's laws and government, by refus-
ing to attend his sovereign when thereunto required: since, as was before ob-
served,(u) matters of equity were originally determined by the king in person,
assisted by his council; though that business is now devolved upon his chan-
cellor. If upon this commission of rebellion a non est inventus is returned, the
court then sends a sergeant-at-arms in quest of him; and if he eludes the
search of the sergeant also, then a sequestration issues to seize all his personal
estate, and the profits of his real, and to detain them, subject to the order of the
court. Sequestrations were first introduced by Sir Nicholas Bacon, lord keeper
in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; before which the court found some difficulty
in enforcing its process and decrees.(v) After an order for a sequestration
issued, the plaintiff's bill is to be taken pro confesso, and a decree to be made
accordingly. So that the sequestration does not seem to be in the nature of
process to bring in the defendant, but only intended to enforce the performance
of the decree. Thus much if the defendant absconds.
If the defendant is taken upon any of this process, he is to be committed to
the Fleet, or other prison, till he puts in his appearance, or answer, or perform.;
[*445] whatever else this *process is issued to enforce, and also clears his con-
tempts by paying the costs which the plaintiff has incurred thereby
For the same kind of process (which was also the process of the court of star-
chamber till its dissolution)(w) is issued out in all sorts of contempt during
the progress of the cause, if the parties in any point refuse or neglect to obey
the order of the court.
The process against a body corporate is by distringas, to distrain them by,
their goods and chattels, rents and 'profits, till they shall obey the summons or
directions of the court. , And, if a peer is a defendant, the lord chancellor sends
a letter missive to him to request his appearance, together with a copy of the
bill; and, if he neglects to appear, then he may be served with a subpcana; and,
if he continues still in contempt, a sequestration issues out immediately agains'
his lands and goods, without any of the mesne process of attachments, &c.,
which are directed only against the person, and therefore cannot affect a lord
of parliament. The same process issues against a member of the house of com-
mons, except only that the lord chancellor sends him no letter missive.
The ordinary process before mentioned cannot be sued out till after service
of the subpwana, for then the contempt begins; otherwise he is not presumed to
have notice of the bill: and, therefore, by absconding to avoid the subpoena a
defendant might have eluded justice, till the statute 5 Geo. II, c. 25, which enacts
that, where the defendant cannot be found to be served with process of subpcena,
and absconds (as is believed) to avoid being served therewith, a day shall be ap-
pointed him to appear to the bill of the plaintiff; which is to be inserted in the
London gazette, read in the parish church where the defendant last lived, and
fixed up at the royal exchange; and, if the defendant doth not appear upon that
day, the bill shall be taken pro confesso.
But if the defendant appears regulirly, and takes a copy of the bill, he is
next to demur, plead, or answer.
(U) Page 50. (v) 1 Vern. 421. (w) 18 Rym. F d. 195.
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*A demurrer in equity is nearly of the same nature as a demurrer in [*446]
law; being an appeal to the judgment of the court, whether the defend-
ant shall be bound to answer the plaintiff's bill; as, for want of sufficient matter
of equity therein contained; or where the plaintiff, upon his own showing, ap-
pears to have no right; or where the bill seeks a discovery of a thing which may
cause a forfeiture of any kind, or may convict a man of any criminal misbe-
haviour. For any of these causes a defendant may demur to the bill. And if,
on demurrer, the defendant prevails, the plaintiff's bill shall be dismissed: if
the demurrer be over-ruled, the defendant is ordered to answer.
A plea may be either to the jurisdiction; showing that the court has no- cog-
nizance of the cause: or to the person; showing some disability in the plaintiff,
as by outlawry, excommunication, and the like: or it is in bar; showing some
matter wherefore the plaintiff can demand no relief, as an act of parliament, a
fine, a release, or a former decree. And the truth of this plea the defendant is
bound to prove, if put upon it by the plaintiff. But as bills are often of a com-
plicated nature, and contain various matter, a man may plead as to part, demur
as to part, and answer to the residue. But no exceptions to formal minutico in
the pleadings will be here allowed; for the parties are at liberty, on the discovery
of any errors in form, to amend them.(x)
An answer is the most usual defence that is made to a plaintiff's bill, It is
given in upon oath, or the honour of a peer or peeress: but where there are
amicable defendants, their answer is usually taken without oath by consent of
the plaintiff. This method of proceeding is taken from the ecclesiastical courts,
like the rest of the practice in chancery: for there, in almost every case, the
plaintiff may demand the *oath of his adversary in supply of proof. ['447i
Formerly this was done in those courts with compurgators, in the man-
ner of our waging of law; but this has been long disused; and instead of it
the present kind of purgation, by the single oath of the party himself, was
introduced. This oath was made use of in the spiritual courts, as well in
criminal cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, as in matters of civil right; and it
was then usually denominated the oath ex officio: whereof the high commission
court in particular made a most extravagant and illegal use; forming a court
of inquisition, in which all persons were obliged to answer in cases of bare
suspicion, if the commissioners thought proper to proceed against them ex officio
for any supposed ecclesiastical enormities. But when the high commission
court was abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 11, this oath ex officio was abolished
with it; and it is also enacted by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 12, "that it shall
not be lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical judge to tender to any person the
oath ex officio, or any other oath whereby the party may be charged or com-
pelled to confess, accuse, or purge himself, of any criminal matter." But this
does not extend to oaths in a civil suit, and therefore it is still the practice, both
in the spiritual courts and in equity, to demand the personal answer of the
party himself upon oath. Yet if in the bill any question be put, that tends to
the discovery of any crime, the defendant may thereupon demur, as was before
observed, and may refuse to answer.
If the defendant lives within twenty miles of London, he must be sworn before
one of the masters of the court: if farther off, there may be a dedimus potesta-
tern or commission to take his answer in the country, where the commissioners
administer him the usual oath; and then, the answer being sealed up, either
one of the commissioners carries it up to the court; or it is sent by a messenger,
who swears he received it from one of the commisioners, and that the same has
not been opened or altered since he received it. An answer must be signed by
counsel, and must either deny or confess all the *material parts of the [*448]
bill; or it may confess and avoid, that is, justify or palliate the facts. [
If one of these is not done, the answer may be excepted to for insufficiency,
and the defendant be compelled to put in a more sufficient answer. A defend-
(x) En eest court de ehaurwere, home ne serra prejudice par son mfspleding ou pur de aut de forme, res
so~onque le veryte del mater, ear it doit agarder 8olonque conedens, et nemi ex rigore jurT. DyversyMt Ses cour ee,
edit. 154, fol. 296, 297. Bro. Abr. tit. Jursdiction, 50.
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ant cannot pray any thing in this his answer, but to be dismissed the court; if
he has any relief to pray against the plaintiff, he must do it by an original bill
of his own, which is called a cross-bill.
After answer put in, the plaintiff, upon payment of costs, may amend his
bill, either by adding new parties or new matter, or both, upon the new lights
given him by the defendant; and the defendant is obliged to answer afresh to
such amended bill. But this must be before the plaintiff has replied to the
defendant's answer, whereby the cause is at issue; for afterwards, if new matter
arises, which did not exist before, he must set it forth by a supplemental-bill.
There may be also a bill of revivor when the suit is abated by the death of any
of the parties; in order to set the proceedings again in motion, without which
they remain at a stand. And there is likewise a bill of interyleader, (12) where
a person who owes a debt or rent to one of the parties in suit, but, till the deter-
mination of it, he knows not to which, desires that they may interplead, that he
may be safe in the payment. In this last case it is usual to order the money to
be paid into court for the benefit of such of the parties to whom, upon hearing,
the court shall decree it to be due. But this depends upon circumstances; and
the plaintiff must also annex an affidavit to his bill, swearing that he does not
collude with either of the parties. (13)
If the plaintiff finds sufficient matter confessed in the defendant's answer to
ground a decree upon, he may proceed to the hearing of the cause upon bill and
answer only. But in that case he must take the defendant's answer to be true
in every point. Otherwise the course is for the plaintiff to reply generally to
the answer, averring his bill to be true, certain and sufficient, and the defend-
[*449] ant's answer to be *directly the reverse; which he is ready to prove asthe court shall award; upon which the defendant rejoins, averring the
like on his side; which is joining issue upon the facts in dispute. To prove
which facts is the next concern.
This is done by examination of witnesses, and taking their depositions in
writing, according to the manner of the civil law. And for that purpose inter-
rogatories are framed, or questions in writing; which, and which only, are to be
proposed to, and asked of, the witnesses in the cause. These interrogatories
must be short and pertinent: not leading ones; (as, "did not you see this ?" or,
" did unot you hear that? ") for if they be such, the depositions taken thereon
will be suppressed and not suffered to be read. For the purpose of examining
witnesses in or near London, there is an examiner's office appointed; but for
such as live in the country, a commission to examine witnesses is usually
granted to four commissioners, two named of each side, or any three or two of
them, to take the depositions there. And if the witnesses reside beyond sea, a
commission may be had to examine them there upon their own oaths, and (if
foreigners) upon the oaths of skilful interpreters. And it bath been estab-
lished (y) that the deposition of an heathen who believes in the Supreme Being,
taken by commission in the most solemn manner according to the custom of
his own country, may be read in evidence.
The commissioners are sworn to take the examinations truly and without
partiality, and not to divulge them till published in the court of chancery; and
(y) Omichund v, Barker, 1 Atk. 21.
(12) [Without depriving courts of equity of their jurisdiction in these cases, the statute of
1 and 2 Win. IV, c. 58, gives, to a considerable extent, a concurrent jurisdiction to courts of
law. Upon tne application of a defendant sued in any action of asaumpsit, debt, detinue, or
trover, such application being made after declaration and before plea, showing that the
defendant does not claim any interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but that the right is
claimed by or supposed to belong to some third person; the court may order such third per-
son to appear and maintain, or relinquish, his claim; and in the meantime stay such action.
If such third party should not appear, the court may bar his claim against the original defend-
ant, his executors or administrators; and make such order between such defendant and the
plaintiff, as to costs and other matters, as may appear just.]
(13)lAnd must bring the money (if any is due) into court, or at least offer to do so by his
bill. Prac. Reg. 39; Bunb. 303; Bargard. Ch. 250; Mitf. P1. 40.]
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their clerks are also sworn to secrecy. The witnesses are compellable by pro-
cess of subtpna, as in the courts of common law, to appear and submit to
examination. And when their depositions are taken, they are transmitted
to the court with the same care that the answer of a defendant is sent.
*If witnesses to a disputable fact are old and infirm, it is very usual [*450]
to file a bill to perpetuate the testimony of those witnesses, although
no suit is depending; for, it may be, a man's antagonist only waits for the death
of some of them to begin his suit. This is most frequent when lands are
devised by will away from the heir at law; and the devisee, in order to per-
petuate the testimony of the witnesses to such will, exhibits a bill in chancery
against the heir, and sets forth the will verbatimn therein, suggesting that the
heir is inclined to dispute its validity: and then, the defendant having answered,
they proceed to issue as in other cases, and examine the witnesses to the will;
after which the cause is at an end, without proceeding to any decree, no relief
being prayed by the bill: but the heir is entitled to his costs, even though he
contests the will. This is what is usually meant by proving a will in chancery.
When all the witnesses are examined, then, and not before, the depositions
may be published, by a rule to pass publication; after which they are open for
the inspection of all the parties, and copies may be taken of them. The cause
is then ripe to be set down for hearing, which may be done at the procurement
of the plaintiff or defendant, before either the lord chancellor or the master .of
the rolls, according to the discretion of the clerk in court, regulated by the
nature and importance of the suit, and the arrear of causes depending before
each of them respectively. Concerning the authority of the master of the rolls,
to hear and determine causes, and his general power in the court of chancery,
there were (not many years since) divers questions and disputes very warmly
agitated; to quiet which it was declared by statute 3 Geo. 11, c. 30, that all
orders and decrees by him made, except such as by the course of the court were
appropriated to the great seal alone, should be deemed to be valid; subject
nevertheless to be discharged or altered by the lord chancellor, and so as they
shall not be enrolled, till the same are signed by his lordship. Either party
may be subpenaed to hear judgment *on the day so fixed for the hear- [*41]
ing: and then, if the plaintiff does not attend, his bill is dismissed with
costs; or, if the defendant makes default, a decree will be made against him,
which will be final, unless he pays the plaintiff's cost of attendance, and shows
good cause to the contrary on a day appointed by the court. A plaintiff's bill
may also at any time be dismissed for want of prosecution, which is in the
nature of a non-suit at law, if he suffers three terms to elapse without moving
forward in the cause.
When there are cross causes, on a cross bill filed by the defendant against the
plaintiff in the original cause, they are generally contrived to be brought on
together, that the same hearing and the same decree may serve for both of them.
The method of hearing causes in court is usually this. The parties on both sides
appearing by their counsel, the plaintiff's bill is first opened, or briefly abridged,
and the defendant's answer also, by the junior counsel on each side: after which the
plaintiff's leading counsel states the case and the matters in issue, and the points
of equity arising therefrom: and then such depositions as are called for by the
plaintiff are read by one of the six clerks, and the plaintiff may also read such
part of the defendant's answer as he thinks material or convenient :(z) and after
this, the rest of the counsel for the plaintiff make their observations and argu-
ments. Then the defendant's counsel go through the same process for him,
except that they may not read any part of his answer; and the counsel for the
plaintiff are heard in reply. When all are heard, the court pronounces the
decree, adjusting every point in debate according to equity and good conscience;
which decree being usually very long, the minutes of it are taken down and
(z) On a trial at law, if the plaintiff reads any part of the defendant's answer, he must read the whole of it;
for, by reading any of it, he shows a reliance on the truth of the defendant's testimony, and makes the whole
of his answer evidence.
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read openly in court by the registrar.(14) The matter of costs to be given to
either party, is not here held to be a point of right, but merely discretionary
(by the statute 17 Ric. II, c. 6), according to the circumstances of the case, as
[*452] they *appear more or less favourable to the party vanquished. And yet
the statute 15 Hen. VI, c. 4, seems expressly to direct, that as well
damages as costs shall be given to the defendant, if wrongfully vexed in this
court.
The chancellor's decree is either interlocutory or final. It very seldom happens
that the first decree can be final, or conclude the cause; for, if any matter of
fact is strongly controverted, this court is so sensible of the deficiency of trial
by written depositions that it will not bind the parties thereby, but usually directs
the matter to be tried by jury; especially such important facts as the validity
of a will, or whether A is the heir at law to B, or the existence of a modus deci-
mandi, or real and immemorial composition for tithes. But, as no jury can be
summoned to attend this court, the fact is usually directed to be tried at the bar
of the court of king's bench, or at the assizes, upon a feigned issue. For (in
order to bring it there, and have the point in dispute, and that only, put in
issue), an action is brought, wherein the plaintiff, by a fiction, declares that he
laid a wager of 51. with the defendant that A was heir at law to B; and then
avers that he is so; and therefore demands the 51. The defendant admits the
feipned wager, but avers that A is not the heir to B; and thereupon that issue
is joined, which is directed out of chancery to be tried; and thus the verdict of
the jurors at law determines the fact in the court of equity. These feigned
issues seem borrowed from the sponsio judicialis of the Romans: (a) and are
also frequently used in the courts of law, by consent of the parties, to determine
some disputed right without the formality of pleading, and thereby to save
much time and expense in the decision of a cause. (15)
So, likewise, if a question of mere law arises in the course of a cause, as
[*453] whether, by the words of a will, an estate for life or *in tail is created,
or whether a future interest devised by a testator shall operate as a re-
mainder or an executory devise, it is the practice of this court to refer it to the
opinion of the judges of the court of king's bench or common pleas, upon a
case stated for that purpose, wherein all the material facts are admitted, and the
point of law is submitted to their decision: who thereupon hear it solemnly
argued by counsel on both sides, and certify their opinion to the chancellor.
And upon such certificate the decree is usually founded. (16)
Another thing also retards the completion of decrees. Frequently long ac-
counts are to be settled, incumbrances and debts to be inquired into, and a
hundred little facts to be cleared up, before a decree can do full and sufficient
justice. These matters are always, by the decree on the first hearing, referred
to a master in chancery to examine; which examinations frequently last for
years: and then he is to report the fact, as it appears to him, to the court. This
report may be excepted to, disproved, and overruled; or, otherwise, is confirmed
and made absolute, by order of the court.
When all issues are tried and settled, and all references to the master ended,
the cause is again brought to hearing upon the matters of equity reserved; and
(a) Nota estsponsiojudicialis.: "spondesne quingentossi meus sit? spondeo, si tuns sit. Et tu 9luoque spondesne
qnqentos, ni tuus sit? spondeo, n! mes sit." Vide Heinec. Antiquitat. 1. 3, t. 16, § 3, and Sigon. de judiciis,
.21, p. 466, citat. ibid.
(14) [It is not now the practice for the registrar to read the minutes of the decree openly in
court; but any party to the suit may procure a copy of them, and if there is any mistake,
may move to have them amended.]
(15) [The consent of the court ought also to be previously obtained, for a trial of a feigned
issue without such consent is a contempt which will authorize the court to order the proceed-
ings to be stayed. 4 T. R. 402.]
(16) Under the chancery amendment acts, the court of chancery may itself determine, with
the aid of a jury, those issues which were formerly directed to be tried by a jury in a court
of common law.
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a final decree is made: the performance of which is enforced (if necessary) by
commitment of the person, or sequestration of the person's estate. And if,
by this decree, either party thinks himself aggrieved, he may petition the chan-
cellor for a rehearing; whether it was heard before his lordship, or any of the
judges, sitting for him, or before the master of the rolls. For whoever may
have heard the cause, it is the chancellor's decree, and must be signed by him
before it is enrolled; (b) which is done of course, unless a rehearing be desired.
Every petition for a rehearing must be signed by two counsel of character, usu-
ally such as have been concerned in the cause, certifying that they apprehend
the cause is proper to be reheard. And upon the *rehearing, all the evi-
dence taken in the cause, whether read before or not, is now admitted [*454]
to be read; because it is the decree of the chancellor himself, who only now sits
to hear reasons why it should not be enrolled and perfected; at which time all
omissions of either evidence or argument may be supplied. (c) But, after the
decree is once signed and enrolled, it cannot be reheard or rectified but by bill
of review, or by appeal to the house of lords.
A bill of review(17) may be had upon apparent error in judgment, appearing
on the face of the decree; or by special leave of the court upon oath made of
the discovery of new matter or evidence, which could not possibly be had or
used at the time when the decree passed. But no new evidence or matter then
in the knowledge of the parties, and which might have been used before, shall
be a sufficient ground for a bill of review.
An appeal to parliament, that is to the house of lords, is the dernier resort
of the subject who thinks himself aggrieved by an interlocutory order or
final determination in this court: and it is effected by petition to the
house of peers, and not by writ of error, as upon judgments at common law.
This jurisdiction is said(d) to have begun in 18 Jac. I, and it is certain, that the
first petition, which appears in the records of parliament, was preferred in that
year; (e) and that the first which was heard and determined (though the name
of appeal was then a novelty) was presented in a few months after; (f) both lev-
elled against the lord chancellor, Bacon, for corruption and other misbehaviour.
It was afterwards warmly controverted by the house of commons in the reign
of Charles the Second.(g) But this dispute is now at rest: (h) it being obvious
to the reason of all mankind, that, when the courts of equity became principal
tribunals for deciding causes of property, a revision of their *decrees [*45]
(by way of appeal) became equally necessary, as a writ of error from the [ 4 J
judgment of a court of law. And, upon the same principle, from decrees of
the chancellor relating to the commissioners for the dissolution of chauntries,
&c., under the statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 4, (as well as for charitable uses under
the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4), an appeal to the king in parliament was always unques-
tionably allowed.(i) But no new evidence is admitted in the house of lords
upon any account; this being a distinct jurisdiction : (k) which differs it very
considerably from those instances, wherein the same jurisdiction revises and
corrects its own acts, as in rehearings and bills of review. For it is a practice
unknown to our law (though constantly followed in the spiritual courts), when
a superior court is reviewing the sentence of an inferior, to examine the justice
of the former decree by evidence that was never produced below. And thus
much for the general method of proceeding in the courts of equity.
(b) Stat. 3 Geo. I, c. 39. See page 450. (c) Glib. Rep. 151, 152. (d) Com. Jour. 13 Mar. 1704.
(e) Lords' Jour. 23 Mar. 1620. (f) Ibid. 3, 11, 12 Dec. 1621. (g) Cor. Jour. 19 Nov. 1675, &c.
(h) Show. Parl. C. 81. (i) Duke s Charitable Uses, 62. (k) Gilb. Rep. 155, 156
(17) [A bill of review is only necessary where a decree is signed and enrolled. Mitf. P. 71.
It cannot be brought after twenty years. Id. 69; 1 Bro. P. 0. 95; 5 id. 460; 6 id. 895.]
THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.
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APPENDIX.
No. I.
PROCEEDINGS ON A WRIT OF RIGHT PATENT. No. 1.
SECT. 1. WRIT OF RIGHT PATENT IN THE COURT-BARON.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ire-
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to Willoughby, earl of Abingdon,
Sreeting. We command you that without delay you hold full right to William
ent, Esquire, of one messauge and twenty acres of land with the appurtenances,
in Dorchester, which he claims to hold of you by the free service of one penny
yearly in lieu of all services, of which Richard Allen deforces him. And unless
you do so, let the sheriff of Oxfordshire do it, that we no longer hear complaint
thereof for defect of right. Witness ourself at Westminster, the twentieth day
of August, in the thirtieth year of our reign. DOE.
Pledges of prosecution, RICHARD ROE.
SECT. 2. WRIT OF TOLT, TO REMOVE IT INTO THE COUNTY COURT.
CHARLES MORTON, Esquire, sheriff of Oxfordshire, to John Long, bailiff,
errant of our lord the king and of myself, greeting. Because by the com-
plaint of William Kent, Esquire, personally present at my county court, to
wit, on Monday, the sixth day of September, in the thirtieth year of the reign
of our lord George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France,
and Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth, at Oxford, in the shire-
house there holden, I am informed, that although he himself the writ of our
said lord the king of right patent directed to Willoughby, earl of Abingdon,
for this that *he should hold full right to the said William Kent, of one mes- [*ii]
suage and twenty acres of land, with the appurtenances, in Dorchester, within
my said county, of which Richard Allen deforces him, hath brought to the said
Willoughby, earl of Abingdon; yet for that the said Willoughby, earl of
Abingdon, favoureth the said Richard Allen in this part, and hath hitherto
delayed to do full right according to the exigence of the said writ, I command
you on the part of our said lord the king, firmly enjoining, that in your proper
person you go to the court-baron of the said Willoughby, eari of Abingdon, at
Dorchester aforesaid, and take away the plaint, which there is between the said
William Kent and Richard Allen by the said writ, into my county court to be
next holden; and summon by good summoners the said Richard Allen, that he
be at my county court, on Monday, the fourth day of October next coming, at
Oxford, in the shirehouse there to be holden, to answer to the said William
Kent thereof. And have you there then the said plaint, the summoners, and
this precept; Given in my county court, at Oxford, in the shirehouse, the
sixth day of September, in the year aforesaid.
SECT. 3. WRIT OF PONE, TO REMOVE IT INTO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire-
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
greeting. Put at the request of William Kent, before our justices at West-
minster, on the morrow of All Souls, the plaint which is in your county court
by our writ of right, between the said William Kent, demandant, and Richard
Allen, tenant, of one messuage and twenty acres of land, with the appurtenances,
in Dorchester; and summon by good smnmoners the said Richard Allen, that
he be then there, to answer to the said William Kent thereof. And have you
there the summoners and this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the tenth
day of September, in the thirtieth year of our reign.
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No. I. SECT. 4. WRIT OF RIGHT, QUIA DOmINUs REMIsrT CURIAX.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire-
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
greeting. Command Richard Allen, that he justly and without delay render
unto William Kent one messauge and twenty acres of land, with the appurten-
ances in Dorchester, which he claims to be his right and inheritance, and where-
upon he complains that the aforesaid Richard unjustly deforces him. And
[*iii] unless he shall so do, and *if the said William shall give you security of prose-
cuting his claim, then summon by good summoners the said Richard, that he
appear before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of All Souls, to show
wherefore he hath not done it. And have you there the summoners and this
writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the twentieth day of August, in the
thirtieth year of our reign. Because Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, the chief
lord of that fee, hath thereupon remised unto us his court.
Pledges of JOHN DOE. Summoners of the I JoHN DEN.
Sheriff's return, prosecution, RIcHARD ROE. within named Richard, £ RIcHARD FEN
SECT. 5. THE RECORD, WITH AWARD OF BATTEL.t
PLEAS at Westminster before Sir John Willes, knight, and his brethren,
justices of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of Saint
Michael, in the thirtieth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by
the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland king, defender of the
faith, &c.
Writ. Oxon, WILLIAM KENT, esquire, by James Parker, his attorney, demands against
to shit. Richard Allen, gentleman, one messauge and twenty acres of land, with
Dominus Reml- the appurtenances in Dorchester, as his right and inheritance, by writ of the
sit curiam. Lord the king of right, because Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, the chief lord
Court. of that fee, hath now thereupon remised to the lord the king his court. And
ivhereupon he saith that he himself was seized of the tenements aforesaid, with
the appurtenances, in his demesne as of fee and right, in the time of peace, in
the time of the lord George the First, late king of Great Britain, by taking the
Esplees. esplees thereof to the valuet [of ten shillings, and more, in rents, corn and grass].
And that such is his right he offers [suit and good proof]. And the said Richard
Defence. Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and defends the right of the said
William Kent, and his seisin, when [and where it shall behove him], and all [that
concerns it], and whatsoever [he ought to defend] and chiefly the tenements
aforesaid, with the appurtenances, as of fee and right [namely, one messuage
Wager of battel. and twenty acres of land, with appurtenances in Dorchester]. And this he is
ready to defend by the body of his freeman, George Rumbold by name, who is
present here in court, ready to defend the same by his body, or in what manner
soever the court of the lord the king shall consider that he ought to defend.
[*iv] ~And if any mischance should befall the said George (which God defend), he is
ready to defend the same by another man, who [is bounden and able to defend
it]. And the said William Kent saith, that the said Richard Allen unjustly
Replication. defends the right of him the said William, and his seisin, &c., and all, &c., and
whatsoever, &c., and chiefly of the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances,
as of fee and right, &c.; because he saith, that he himself was seised of the
tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, in his demesne as of fee and right,
in the time of peace, in the time of the said lord George the First, late
Joinder of king of Great Britain, by taking the esplees thereof to the value, &c. And
battel. that such is his right, he is prepared to prove by the body of his freeman,
Henry Broughton by name, who is present here in court ready to prove
the same by his body, or in what manner soever the court of the lord
the king shall consider that he ought to prove; and if any mischance
should befall the said Henry (which God defend), he is ready to prove the
same by another man, who, &c. And hereupon it is demanded of the
said George and Henry, whether they are ready to make battle as they
before have waged it; who say that they are. And the same George Rum-
Gages given, bold giveth gage of defending, and the said Henry Broughton giveth gage
of proving; and such engagement being given as the manner is, it is demanded
of the said William Kent and Richard Allen, if they can say any thing where-
fore battel ought not to be awarded in this case; who say that they cannot.
Award of Therefore it is considered, that battel be made thereon, &c. And the said
Battle. George Rumbold findeth pledges of battle, to wit, Paul Jenkins and Charles
Pledges. Carter; and the said Henry Broughton findeth also pledges of battel, to wit,
t As to battel, see page 337, n. 7.
: N.B. The clauses between hooks, in this and the subsequent numbers of the Appendix, are
usually no otherwise expressed in the Records than by an &c.
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Reginald Read and Simon Tayler. And thereupon day is here given as well No. I.
to the said William Kent as to the said Richard Allen, to wit, on the morrow
of Saint Martin next coming, by the assent as well of the said William Kent as
of the said Richard Allen. And it is commanded that each of them then have Continuance.
here his champion, sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes
him, and ready to make the battel aforesaid: and that the bodies of them in the
mean time be safely kept, on peril that shall fall thereon. At which day here Champions
come as well the said William Kent as the said Richard Allen by their attorneys appear.
aforesaid, and the said George Rumbold and Henry Broughton in their proper
persons likewise come, sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes
them, ready to make the battel aforesaid, as they had before waged it. And Adjournment
hereupon day is further given by the court here, as well to the said William to Tothill
Kent as to the said Richard Allen, at Tothill, near the city of Westminster, in Fields.
the county of Middlesex, to wit, on the morrow of the Purification of the Blessed
Virgin Mary next coming, by the assent as well of the said *William as of the [
aforesaid Richard. And it is commanded, that each of them have then there v]
his champion, armed in the form aforesaid, ready to make the battel aforesaid,
and that their bodies in the mean time, &c. At which day here, to wit, at Tot-
hill aforesaid, comes the said Richard Allen by his attorney aforesaid, and the said
George Rumbold and Henry Broughton in their proper persons likewise come,
sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes them, ready to make
the battel aforesaid, as they before had waged it. And the said William Kent
being solemnly called doth not come, nor bath prosecuted his writ aforesaid.
Therefore it is considered, that the same William and his pledges of prose- Demandant
cuting, to wit, John Doe and Richard Roe, be in mercy for his false complaint, nonsuit.
and that the same Richard go thereof without a day, &c., and also that the said
Richard do hold the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances, to him and his Final judgment
heirs, quit of the said William and his heirs, forever, &c. for the tenant.
SECT. 6. TRIAL BY THE GRAND AssIzE.
-And the said Richard Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and defends Defence.
the right of the said William Kent, and his seisin, when, &c., and all, &c., and
whatsoever, &c., and chiefly of the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances,
as of fee and right, &c., and puts himself upon the grand assize of the lord the Misc
king, and prays recognition to be made, whether he himself hath greater right
to hold the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances to him and his heirs as
tenants thereof as he now holdeth them, or the said William to have the said
tenements with the appurtenances, as he above demandeth them. And he Tender of de-
tenders here in court six shillings and eight-pence to the use of the lord the now mi-mark.
king, &c., for that, to wit, it may be inquired of the time [of the seisin alleged
by the said William]. And he therefore prays, that it may be inquired by the
assize, whether the said William Kent was seized of the tenements aforesaid
with the appurtenances in his demesne as of fee in the time of the said lord the
king George the First, as the said William in his demand before hath alleged.
Therefore it is commanded the sheriff, that he summon by good summoners Summons of
four lawful knights of his county, girt with swords, that they be here on the the knights.
octaves of Saint Hilary next coming, to make election of the assize aforesaid.
The same day is given as well to the said William Kent as to the said Richard
Allen here, &c. At which day here come as well the said William Kent, as the Return.
said Richard Allen; and the sheriff, to wit, Sir Adam Alstone, knight, now
returns, that he had caused to be summoned Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler,
Toby Cox, and Thomas Munday, four lawful knights of *his county, girt with
swords, by John Doe and Richard Roe his bailiffs, to be here at the said octaves [*vi]
of Saint Hilary, to do as the said writ thereof commands and requires; and that
the said summoners, and each of them, are mainprized by John Day and James
Fletcher. Whereupon the said Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, and
Thomas Munday, four lawful knights of the county aforesaid, girt with swords, Election of
being called, in their proper persons come, and being sworn upon their oath in the recognitors.
the presence of the parties aforesaid, chose of themselves and others twenty-four,
to wit, Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, Thomas M1unday, Oliver
Greenway, John Boys, Charles Price, knights; Daniel Prince, William Day,
Roger Lucas, Patrick Fleming, James Harris, John Richardson, Alexander
Moore, Peter Payne, Robert Quin, Archibald Stuart, Bartholomew Norton, and
Henry Davis, esquires; John Porter, Christopher Ball, Benjamin Robinson,
Lewis Long, William Kirby, gentlemen, good and lawful men of the county
aforesaid, who neither are of kin to the said William Kent nor to the said Rich-
ard Allen, to make recognition of the grand assize aforesaid. Therefore it is e ias.
commanded the sheriff, that he cause them to come here from the day of Easter fa
in fifteen days, to make the recognition aforesaid. The same day is there given
to the parties aforesaid. At which day here come as well the said William Kent
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No. I. as the said Richard Allen, by their attorneys aforesaid, and the recognitors of the
assize, whereof mention is made above, being called, come, and certain of them,
Recogaitors to wit, Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, Thomas Munday, Charles
sworn. Price, knights; Daniel Prince, Roger Lucas, William Day, James Harris, Peter
Payne, Robert Quin, Henry Davis, John Porter, Christopher Ball, Lewis Long,
Verdict for the and William Kirby, being elected, tried, and sworn upon their oath say, that the
demandant. said William Kent hath more right to have the tenements aforesaid with the
appurtenances to him and his heirs, as he demandeth the same, than the said
Richard Allen to hold the same as he now holdeth them, according as the said
Judgment. William Kent by his writ aforesaid hath supposed. Therefore it is considered,
that the said William Kent do recover his seisin against the said Richard Allen
of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to him and his heirs, quit
of the said Richard Allen and his heirs forever: and the said Richard Allen in
mercy, &c.
[*vii] *No. II.
PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION OF TRESPASS IN EJECTMENT, BY
ORIGINAL, IN THE KING'S BENCH.
SECT. 1. THE ORIGINAL WRIT.
Si fecerit te GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire-surem. land, king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Berkshire, greet
ing. If Richard Smith shall give you security of prosecuting his claim, then
put by gage and safe pledges William Stiles, late of Newbury, gentleman, so
that he be before us on the morrow of All-Souls, wheresoever we shall then be
in England, to show wherefore with force and arms he entered into one mes-
suage with the appurtenances, in Sutton, which John Rogers, Esquire, hath
demised to the aforesaid Richard, for a term which is not yet expired, and
ejected him from his said farm, and other enormities to him did, to the great
damage of the said Richard, and against our peace. And have you there the
names of the pledges and this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the twelfth
day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
Sherifs return. Pledges of JOHN DOE. The within named J DN
prosecution, RICHARD ROE. William Stiles is at- RJcHARN EN.
tached by pledges. RCHARD FEN.
SECT. 2. CoPY OF THE DECLARATION AGAINST THE CASUAL EJECTOR, WHO
GIVES NOTICE THEREUPON TO THE TENANT IN POSSESSION.
Michaelmas, the 29th of King George the Second.
Declaration. Berks WILLIAM STILES, late of Newbury in the said county, gentleman, was
to wit. attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefore with force and
arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances, in Sutton in the
county aforesaid, which John Rogers, Esquire, demised to the said Richard Smith
for a term which is not yet expired, and ejected him from his said farm and
other wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against
the peace of the lord the king, &c. And whereupon the said Richard by
[*viii] *Robert Martin his attorney complains, that whereas the said John Rogers, on
the first day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord the
king that now is, at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the same Richard the
tenement aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to have and to hold the said tene-
ment, with the appurtenances, to the said Richard and his assigns, from the
Feast of Saint Michael the Archangel then last past, to the end and term of five
years from thence next following and fully to be complete and ended, by virtue
of which demise the said Richard entered into the said tenement, with the
appurtenances, and was thereof possessed; and the said Richard being so pos-
sessed thereof, the said William afterwards, that is to say, on the said first day
of October in the said twenty-ninth year, with force and arms, that is to say,
with swords, staves, and knives, entered into the said tenement, with the appur-
tenances, which the said John Rogers demised to the said Richard in form afore-
said for the term aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected the said Richard
out of his said farm, and other wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the
said Richard, and against the peace of the said lord the king; whereby the
said Richard saith, that he is injured and damaged to the value of twenty pounds.
And thereupon he brings suit, &c.
MARTIN, for the plaintiff, Pledges of JOHN DOE,
PETERS, for the defendant. prosecution,5 RICHARD ROE.
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MR. GEORGE SAUNDERS: No. I•
I am informed that you are in possession of, or claim title to, the premises
mentioned in this declaration of ejectment, or to some part thereof ; and I, be- Notice.
ing sued in this action as a casual ejector, and having no claim or title to the
same, do advise you to appear next Hilary Term, in his majesty's court of
king's bench at Westminster, by some attorney of that court, and then and
there, by a rule to be made of the same court, to cause yourself to be made
defendant in my stead; otherwise I shall suffer judgment to be entered against
me, and you will be turned out of possession.
Your loving friend,
5th January, 1756. WILLIAM STILES.
'SEcT. 3. TEE RULE OF COURT. [*ix]
Ilitary Term, in the twenty-ninth Year of King George the Second.
Berh8, IT IS ORDERED by the court, by the assent of both parties, and their Smith against
to wit. C attorneys, that George Saunders, gentleman, may be made defendant Stiles, for one
I messuage with
in the place of the now defendant, William Stiles, and shall immediately appear the appurte-
to the plaintiff's action, and shall receive a declaration in a plea of trespass and nances in Sut-
ejectment of the tenements in question, and shall immediately plead thereto not tn, On the de.misc of Johnguilty: and, upon the trial of the issue, shall confess lease, entry, and ouster, Rogers.
and insist upon his title only. And if upon the trial of the issue, the said George
do not confess lease, entry, and ouster, and by reason thereof the plaintiff can-
not prosecute his writ, then the taxation of costs upon such non pros. shall cease,
and the said George shall pay such costs to the plaintiff, as by the court of our
lord the king here shall be taxed and adjudged, for such his default in non-
performance of this rule; and judgment shall be entered against the said William
Stiles, now the casual ejector, by default. And it is further ordered, that if, upon
the trial of the said issue, a verdict shall be given for the defendant, or if the
plaintiff shall not prosecute his writ upon any other cause than for the not con-
fessing lease, entry, and ouster, as aforesaid, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall
pay costs, if the plaintiff does not pay them. By the Court.
MARTIN, for the plaintiff.
NEWMAN, for the defendant.
SECT. 4. THE RECORD.
Pleas before the lord the king at Westminster, of the Term of Saint Hilary, in the
twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by the grace of
God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king, defender of the faith, &c.
Berks, GEORGE SAUNDERS, late of Sutton, in the county aforesaid, gentleman,
to wit. was attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefor with force and
arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances, in Sutton, which
John Rogers, Esq., hath demised to the said Richard, for a term which is not
yet expired, and ejected him from his said farm, and other wrongs to him
did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the peace of the [5 x]
lord the king that *now is. And whereupog the said Richard, by Robert Martin, Declaration, or
his attorney, complains, that whereas, the said John Rogers, on the first day of count.
October in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord the king that now is,
at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the said Richard the tenement aforesaid,
with the appurtenances, to have and to hold the said tenement, with the appur-
tenances, to the said Richard and his assigns, from the feast of Saint Michael
the Archangel then last past, to the end and term of five years from thence next
following, and fully to be complete and ended; by virtue of which demise the
said Richard entered into the said tenement, with the appurtenances, and was
thereof possessed: and the said Richard being so possessed thereof, the said
George afterwards, that is to say, on the first day of October in the said twenty-
ninth year, with force and arms, that is to say, with swords, staves, and knives,
entered into the said tenement, with the appurtenances,which the said John Rogers
demised to the said Richard, in form aforesaid, for the term aforesaid, which
is not yet expired, and ejected the said Richard out of his said farm, and other
wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the
peace of the said lord the king; whereby the said Richard saith that he is
injured and endamaged to the value of twenty pounds: and thereupon he brings
suit [and good proof]. And the aforesaid George Saunders, by Charles New- Defence.
man, his attorney, comes and defends the force and injury, when [and where it
shall behove him]; and saith that he is in no wise guilty of the trespass and Plea, not guilty.
ejectment aforesaid, as the Richard above complains against him; and thereof Issue.
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No. II. he puts himself upon the country; and the said Richard doth likewise the same;
Therefore let a jury come thereupon before the lord the king, on the octave of the
Venire awarded, purification of the blessed Virgin Mary, wheresoever he shall then be in England,
who neither [are of kin to the said Richard, nor to the said George], to recognize
[whether the said George, be guilty of the trespass and ejectment aforesaid];
because as well [the said George as the said Richard, between whom the differ-
ence is, have put themselves on the said jury]. The same day is there given to
Respite for de- the parties aforesaid. Afterwards the process therein, being continued be-
fault of jurors. tween the said parties of the plea aforesaid by the jury, is put between them in
2Vwisprius. respite, before the lord the king, until the day of Easter in fifteen days, where-
soever the said lord the king shall then be in England; unless the justices of
the lord the king, assigned to take assizes in the county aforesaid, shall have come
before that time, to wit, on Mondaythe eighth of March, at Reading, in the said
county, by the form of the statute [in that case provided], by reason of the default
of the jurors [summoned to appear as aforesaid]. At which day, before the lord
the king, at Westminster, come the parties aforesaid by their attorneys aforesaid;
[*xi and the aforesaid justices of *assize, before whom [the jury aforesaid came],
sent here their record before them, had in these words. to wit: Afterwards
t'osfea. at the day and place within contained, before Heneage Legger, Esquire, one of
the barons of the exchequer of the lord the king, and Sir John Eardly Wil-
mot, knight, one of the justices of the said lord the king, assigned to hold
pleas before the king himself, justices of the said lord the king, assigned to
take assizes at the county of Berks by the form of the statute [in that case pro-
vided], come as well the within-named Richard Smith, as the within-written
George Saunders, by their attorneys within contained; and the jurors of the
jury whereof mention is within made being called, certain of them, to wit,
Charles Holloway, John Hooke, Peter Graham, Henry Cox, William Brown,
and Francis Oakley, come, and are sworn upon the jury; and because the rest
of the jurors of the same jury did not appear, therefore others of the bystanders
being chosen by the sheriff, at the request of the said Richard Smith, and by the
Tales dectreum- command of the justices aforesaid, are appointed anew, whose names are affixedstant Tbus.
to the panel within written, according to the form of the statute in such case
made and provided; which said jurors so appointed anew, to wit, Roger Bacon.
Thomas Small, Charles Pye, Edward Hawkins, Samuel Roberts, and Daniel
Parker, being likewise called, come; and together with the other jurors aforesaid
before impanelled and sworn, being elected, tried, and sworn to speak the truth
of the matter within contained, upon their oath say, that the aforesaid George
Verdict for the Saunders is guilty of the trespass and ejectment within-written, in manner and
plaintiff. form as the aforesaid Richard Smith within complains against him; and asses
the damages of the said Richard Smith, on occasion of that trespass and eject-
ment, besides his costs and charges which he hath been put unto about his suit
in that behalf, to twelve-pence; and, for those costs and charges, to forty shil-
lings. Whereupon, the said Richard Smith, by his attorney aforesaid, prayeth
judgment against the said George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid,
by the jurors aforesaid given, in the form aforesaid; and the said George Saun-
ders, by his attorney aforesaid, saith that the court here ought not to proceed to
give judgment upon the said verdict, and prayeth that judgment against him,
Motion in ar the said George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid, by the jurors afore-
rest of judg- said, given in the form aforesaid, may be stayed, by reason that the said verdict
ment. is insufficient and erroneous, and that the same verdict may be quashed, and that
the issue aforesaid may be tried anew by other jurors, to be afresh impanelled.
And, because the court of the lord the king here is not yet advised of giving
Continuance. their judgment of and upon the premises, therefore day thereof is given as well
to the said Richard Smith as the said George Saunders, before the lord the
king, until the morrow of the ascension of our Lord, wheresoever the said
[*xii] lord *the king shall then be in England, to hear their judgment of and upon
the premises, for that the court of the lord the king is not yet advised thereof
At which day, before the lord the king, at Westminster, come the parties afore-
said, by their attorneys aforesaid; upon which, the record and matters aforesaid
having been seen, and by the court of the lord the king now here fully under-
stood, and all and singular the premises having been examined, and mature
Opinion of the deliberation being had thereupou, for that it seems to the court of the lord the
court, king now here that the verdict aforesaid is in no wise insufficient or erroneous,
and that the same ought not to be quashed, and that no new trial ought to be had
of the issue aforesaid,-Therefore it is considered, that the said Richard do re-
Judgment for cover against the said George his term jet to come, of and in the said tenements,
the plaintiff. with the appurtenances, and the said damages assessed by the said jury in form
Costs. aforesaid, and also twenty-seven pounds six shillings and eight-pence fcr his
costs and charges aforesaid, by the court of the lord the king here awarded to
Capiatur pro the said Richard, with his assent, by way of increase; which said damages in
fne. the whole amount to twenty-nine pounds, seven shillings and eight-pence.
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"'And let the said George be taken [until he maketh fine to the lord the king]."t No. III.
And hereupon the said Richard, by his attorney aforesaid, prayeth a writ of the
lord the king to be directed to the sheriff of the county aforesaid, to cause him Writ of pos-
to have possession of his term aforesaid yet to come, of and in the tenements session,
aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and it is granted unto him, returnable before
the lord the king on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, wheresoever he shall then
be in England. At which day, before the lord the king, at Westminster, corn- and return.
eth the said Richard, by his attorney aforesaid; and the sheriff, that is to say,
Sir Thomas Reeve, knight, now sendeth, that he, by virtue of the writ afore-
said, to him directed, on the ninth day of June last past, did cause the said
Richard to have his possession of his term aforesaid yet to come, of and in the
tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, as he was commanded.
*No. III. [*xliil
PROCEEDINGS ON AN ACTION OF DEBT IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS; REMOVED INTO THE KING'S BENCH BY
WRIT OF ERROR.
SECT. 1. ORIGINAL.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. Pdape.
Command Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, that justly and without
delay he render to William Burton two hundred pounds, which he owes him
and unjustly detains, as he saith. And unless he shall do so, and if the said
William shall make you secure of prosecuting his claim, then summon by good
sumponers the aforesaid Charles, that he be before our justices, at Westminster,
cn the octave of Saint Hilary, to show wherefore he hath not done it. And have
you there then the summoners and this writ. Witness ourself, at Westminster,
the twenty-fourth day of December, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
Pledges of JOiN DOE, Summoners of the ROGE R
prosecu- RICHARD ROE within-named R Sheriffs re-
ion, U " Charles Long, HNRY OHNSON . turn.
SECT. 2. PROCESS.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland Attachment.
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting.
Put by gage and safe pledges Charles Long, late. of Burford, gentleman, that he Pone.
be before our justices at Westminster, on the octave of the purification of the
blessed Mary, to answer to William Burton of a plea, that he render to him two
hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith; and to
show wherefore he was not before our justices at Westminster on the octave of
Saint Hilary, as he was summoned. And have there then the names of the
pledges and this writ. Witness Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the
twenty-third day of January, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
The within-named Charles Long EDWARD LEIGH, Sheriff's re-
is attached by pledges, f ROBERT TANNER. turn.
*GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. [*xiv]
We command you, that you distrein Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman,
by all his lands and chattels within your bailiwick, so that neither he nor any
one through him may lay hands on the same, until you shall receive from
us another command thereupon; and that you answer to us of the issue of
the same; and that you have his body before our justices, at Westminster, from
the day of Easter, in fifteen days, to answer to William Burton of a plea, that
he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains,
as he saith, and to hear his judgment of his many defaults. Witness Sir John
Willes, knight, at Westminster, the twelfth day of February, in the twenty-
eighth year of our reign.
The within named Charles Long hath nothing in my bailiwick, whereby he Sheriff's return.
may be distreined. Wtihil.
t Now omitted. See page 398.
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No. IM. GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxford-
Capias ad re- shire greeting. We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,
s"poadendurn. gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that
ou may have his body before our justices at Westminster from the day of
aster in five weeks, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that
he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains,
as he saith; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at Westminster,
that the said Charles hath nothing in your bailiwick, whereby he may be dis-
treined. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight,
at Westminster, the sixteenth day of April, in the twenty-eighth year of our
reign.
Sheriff 's return.Non est onven- The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.
tus.
Testatum ca- GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
pias. Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire,
greeting. We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,
gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that
you may have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of
the Holy Trinity, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he
render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains,
as he saith; and whereupon our sheriff of Oxfordshire hath made a return to
[*xv] our justices of Westminster, at a certain day now past, that the *aforesaid
Charles is not found in his bailiwick; and thereupon it is testified iii our said
court, that the aforesaid Charles lurks, wanders, and runs about in your county.
And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at
Westminster, the seventh day of May, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
Sheriff's re- By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within
turn. cepi cor- named Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within con-
PUS. tained, according as by this writ it is commanded me.
Or, upon the Return of non est inventus upon the first capias, the plaintiff may
sue out an alias and a pluries, and thence proceed to outlawry : thus :
Alias capia. GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxford-
shire greeting. We command you as formerly we commanded you, that you
take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may be found in your
bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before our jus-
tices at Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer to William
Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds, which
he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith. And have you then there this
writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the seventh day of May
in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
Sheriff's re-
turn. Non est The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.
inventus.
Pluries capias. GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire
greeting. We command you, as we have more than once commanded you, that
you take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may be found in your
bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before our jus-
tices at Westminster, from the day of the Holy Trinity in three weeks, to answer
to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred
pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith. And have you
there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the
thirtieth day of May, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
Sheriff's re-
turn. Non est The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.
inventus.
[*xvi] *GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Exigi facsa8. Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire
greeting. We command you, that you cause Charles Long, late of Burford,
gentleman, .to be required from county court to county court, until, according
to the law and custom of our realm of England, he be outlawed, if he doth not
appear: and if he doth appear, then take him and cause him to be safely kept,
so that you may have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the mor-
row of All Sodls, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he
render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as
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he saith; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at Westminster, No. m.
from the day of the Holy Trinity in three weeks, that he is not found in your
bailiwick. And have you then there this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight,
at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June, in the twenty-eighth year of our
reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in Sheriff's re-
the county of Oxford, on Thursday, the twenty-first day of June, in the twenty- turn.
ninth year of the r,,ign of the lord the king within written, the within named Primo exactus.
Charles Long was rquired the first time, and did not appear: and at my county Secundo eeac-
court held at Oxford aforesaid, on Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of June, tue.
in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required the second time, and
did not appear: and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, Tertio exactua.
the twenty-first day of August, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was
required the third time, and did not appear: and at my county court held at Quarto exactus.
Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the eighteenth day of September, in the year
aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required the fourth time, and did not ap-
pear: and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the six- Quinto exactus.'
teenth day of October, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required
the fifth time, and did not appear; therefore the said Charles Long, by the judg- Ideo utlagatus.
ment of the coroners of the said lord the king, of the county aforesaid, ac-
cording to the law and custom of the kingdom of England, is outlawed.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Writ of procla-
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire mation.
greeting. Whereas, by our writ we have lately commanded you that you should
cause Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, to be required from county
court to county court, until, according to *the law and custom of our realm of [*xvii]
England, he should be outlawed, if he did not appear: and if he did appear,
then that you should take him and cause him to be safely kept, so that you
might have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of All
Souls, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him
two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith:
Therefore we command you, by virtue of the statute in the thirty-first year of
the lady Elizabeth, late queen of England, made and provided, that you cause
the said Charles Long to be proclaimed upon three several days according to
the form of that statute; (whereof one proclamation shall be made at or near
the most usual door of the church of the parish wherein he inhabits) that he
render himself unto you; so that you may have his body before our justices at
Westminster at the day aforesaid, to answer the said William Burton of the
plea aforesaid. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes,
knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June, in the twenty-eighth year
of our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in the Sheriff's return.
county of Oxford, on Thursday the twenty-sixth day of June, in the twenty-ninth Protarnarifeci.
year of the reign of the lord and king within written, I caused to be proclaimed
the first time; and at the general quarter sessions of the peace, held at Oxford
aforesaid, on Tuesday, the fifteenth day of July, in the year aforesaid, I caused to
be proclaimed the second time; and at the most usual door of the church of Bur-
ford within written, on Sunday the third day of August in the year aforesaid, im-
mediately after divine service, one month at the least before the within named
Charles Long was required the fifth time, I caused to be proclaimed the third time,
that the said Charles Long should render himself unto me, as within it is com-
manded me.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland Capias utlaga
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire greeting. tun.
We command you, that you omit not by reason of any liberty of your county,
but that you take Charles Long, late of Burford in the county of Oxford, gentle-
man (being outlawed in the said county of Oxford, on Thursday the sixteenth
day of October last past, at the suit of William Burton, gentleman, of a plea of
debt, as the sheriff of Oxfordshire aforesaid returned to our justices at Westmin-
ster on the morrow of All Souls then next ensuing), if the said Charles Long
may be found in your bailiwick; and him safely keep, so that you may *have [*xvm]
his body before our justices at Westminster from the day of St. Martin in fifteen
days to do and receive what our court shall consider concerning him in this
behalf. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the sixth day of Nov-
ember, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within named Sheriff's return.
Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within contained, accord- Cep! corpus
ing as by this writ it is commanded me.
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No. MI. SECT. 3. tBILL OF MIDDLESEX, AND LATITAT THEREUPON IN THE COURT OF
KING'S BENCH.
Middlesex, THE SHERIFF is commanded that he take Charles Long, late ofBill at Middle- to wit. £ Burford, in the county of Oxford, if he may be found in his bailiwick,sex for tres-
pass. and him safely keep, so that he may have his body before the lord and king at
Westminster, on Wednesday next after fifteen days of Easter, to answer William
Burton, gentleman, of a plea of trespass [and also to a bill of the said William
Ac etiam against the aforesaid Charles, for two hundred pounds of debt, according to the
in debt. custom of the court of the said lord and king, before the king-himself to be ex-
hibited]; and that he have there then this precept.
Sheriff's re-
turn. Non est The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.
inventus.
Latitat. GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire, greeting.
Whereas we lately commanded our sheriff of Middlesex that he should take
Charles Long, late of Burford, in the county of Oxford, if he might be found in
his bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that he might be before us at Westminster,
at a certain day now past, to answer unto William Burton, gentleman, of a plea
Ac etiam. of trespass [and also to a bill of the said William against the aforesaid Charles,
for two hundred pounds of debt, according to the custom of our court, before
us to be exhibited]; and our said sheriff of Middlesex at that day returned to us
that the aforesaid Charles was not found in his bailiwick; whereupon on the
behalf of the aforesaid William in our court before us it is sufficiently attested
that the aforesaid Charles lurks and runs about in your county: Therefore we
[*Xix] command you, that you take him, if he may be found in *your bailiwick, and
him safely keep, so that you may have his body before us at Westminster, on
Tuesday next after five weeks of Easter, to answer the aforesaid William of the
plea [and bill] aforesaid; and have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir Dud-
ley Ryder, knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of April, in the twenty-
eighth year of our reign.
Sheriff's re- By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within
turn. named Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within contained,
Cepi corpus. according as by this writ it is commanded me.
SECT. 4. WRIT OF Quo MINus IN THE EXCHEQUER.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland
king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire, greeting.
We command you that you omit not by reason of any liberty of your county,
but that you enter the same, and take Charles Long, late of Burford, in the
county of Oxford, gentleman, wheresoever he shall be found in your bailiwick,
and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before the barons of our
exchequer at Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer William
Burton, our debtor of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds which
he owes him and unjustly detains, whereby he is the less able to satisfy us the
debts which he owes us at our said exchequer, as he said he can reasonably show
that the same he ought to render: and have you there this writ. Witness, Sir
Thomas Parker, knight, at Westminster, the sixth day of May, in the twenty-
eighth year of our reign.
Sheriff's re- By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within
turn. named Charles Long; which I have ready before the barons within written, ac-
Cepi corpus cording as within it is commanded me.
SECT. 5. SPECIAL BAIL, ON THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT, PURSUANT TO
THE TESTATUM CAPIAS.
Bail bond to the KNOW ALL MEN by these presents, that we Charles Long, of Burford, in the
sheriff, county of Oxford, gentleman, Peter Hamond of Bix, in the said county, yeoman,
and Edward Thomlinson, of Woodstock, in the said county, innholder, are held
and firmly bound to Christopher Jones, esquire, sheriff of the county of Berks,
in four hundred pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid to the said
sheriff, or his certain attorney, executors, administrators, or assigns; for which
t Note, that sections 3 and 4 are the usual method of process, to compel an appearance in the
courts of king's bench and exchequer; in which the practice of those courts does principally
differ from the court of common pleas ; the subsequent stages of proceeding being nearly alike
in them all.
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payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves and each of us by him- No. In.
self *for the whole and in gross, our and every of our heirs, executors, and ad-
ministrators, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals. Dated the fifteenth ]
day of May, in the twenty-eighth year of the reign of our sovereign lord George
the Second, by the grace of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland,
defender of the faith, and so forth, and in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and fifty-five.
The condition of this obligaton is such, that if the above bounden Charles Recognince
Long do appear before the justices of our sovereign lord the king, at Westmin-
ster, on the moriow of the Holy Trinity, to answer William Burton, gentleman,
of a plea of debt of two hundred pounds, then this obligation shall be void and
of none effect, or else shall be and remain in full force and virtue.
Sealed and delivered, being first CHARLES LONG. [L. S.]
duly stamped, in the presence PETER HAMOND. [L. S.]
of EDwARD THOMLINSON. [L. S.]
HENRY SHAW,
TIMOTHY GRIFFITH.
You Charles Long do acknowledge to owe unto the plaintiff four hundred
pounds, and you John Rose and Peter Hamond do severally acknowledge to owe
unto the same person the sum of two hundred pounds a piece, to be levied upon
your several goods and chattels, lands and tenements, upon condition that, if the of bail before
defendant be condemned in the action, he shall pay the condemnation, or render the commis-
himself a prisoner in the Fleet for the same; and, if he fail so to do, you John sioner.
Rose and Peter Hamond do undertake to do it for him.
Trinity Term, 28 Geo. IT
.erks, ON a Testatum Capias from Oxfoidshire against Charles Long, late of Bail piece.
to wit. j Burford, in the county of Oxford, gentleman, returnable on the morrow
of the Holy Trinity, at the suit of William Burton, of a plea of debt of two
hundred pounds:
The bail are John Rose, of Witney, in the county of Oxford, esquire,
Peter Hamond. of Bix, in the said county, yeoman.
RIctARD PRICE, attorney
for the defendant.
The party himself in 4001.
Each of the bail in 2001.
Taken and acknowledged the twenty-eighth
day of May, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, de
btne esse, before me,
ROBERT GROVE,
one of the Commissioners.
*SECT. 6. TnE RECORD, AS REMOVED BY WRIT OF ERROR. [*xxi]
THE lord the king hath given in charge to his trusty and beloved Sir John Writ of error.
Willes, knight, his writ closed in these words : - GEORGE the Second, by the
grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, king, defender of the
faith, and so forth; to our trusty and beloved Sir John Willes, knight, greet-
ing. Because in the record and process, and also in the giving of judgment
of the plaint, which was in our court before you and your fellows, our jus-
tices of the bench, by our writ, between William Burton, gentleman, and
Charles Long, late of Burford in the county of Oxford, gentleman, of a certain
debt of two hundred pounds, which the said William demands of the said
Charles, manifest error hath intervened, to the great damage of him the said
William, as we from his complaint are informed; we being willing that the
error, if any there be, should be corrected in due manner, and that full and
speedy justice should be done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do com-
mand you, that if judgment thereof be given, then under your seal you do dis-
tinctly and openly send the record and process of the plaint aforesaid, with all
things concerning them, and this writ; so that we may have them from the day
of Easter in fifteen days, wheresoever we shall then be in England; that the
record and process aforesaid being inspected, we may cause to be done there-
upon for correcting that error, what of right and according to the law and cus-
tom of our realm of England ought to be done. Witness ourself at West-
minster, the twelfth day, of February, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
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No. MT. TnE record and process whereof in the said writ mention above is made, fol-
Chief justice's low in these words, to wit:
return.
The Record. PLEAS at Westminster before Sir John Willes, knight, and his brethren, jus-
tices of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of the
Holy Trinity, in the twenty-eighth year of the reign of the lord GEORGE the
Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, king, de-
fender of the faith, &c.
Writ. Oxon, CHARLEs LoNG, late of Burford, in the county aforesaid, gentleman,
to wit. was summoned to answer William Burton, of Yarnton, in the said
county, gentleman, of a plea that he render unto him two hundred pounds,
Declaration, or which he owes him and unjustly detains [as he saith]. And whereupon the
count, on a said William, by Thomas Gough, his attorney, complains, that whereas, on the
bond.x.. first day of December, in the year of our Lord *one thousand seven hundred[ xxii] fifty-four, at Banbury, in this county, the said Charles by his writing obligatory
did acknowledge himself to be bound to the said William in the said sum of
two hundred pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid to the said
William, whenever after the said Charles should be thereto required; neverthe-
less the said Charles (although often required) hath not paid to the said William
the said sum of two hundred pounds, nor any part thereof, but hitherto alto-
gether hath refused, and doth still refuse, to render the same; wherefore he
Profert in curia. saith that he is injured, and hath damage to the value of ten pounds: and there-
upon he brings suit [and good proof]. And he brings here into court the writ-
ing obligatory aforesaid; which testifies the debt aforesaid in form aforesaid;
Defence. the date whereof is the day and year before mentioned. And the aforesaid
Charles, by Richard Price, his attorney, comes and defends the force and in-
jury when [and where it shall behoove him], and craves oyer of the said writing
obligatory, and it is read unto him [in the form aforesaid]: he likewise cravesOyer prayed of.. ...
On acndi- oyer of the condition of the said writing, and it is read unto him in thesebond~ "d condi- .. .
tion, viz.: to words: "The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden
perform an Charles Long, his heirs, executors and administrators, and every of them, shall
award. and do from time to time, and at all times hereafter, well and truly stand to,
obey, observe, fulfil and keep, the award, arbitrament, order, rule, judgment,
final end, and determination, of David Stiles, of Woodstock, in the said county,
clerk, and Henry Bacon, of Woodstock aforesaid, gentleman, (arbitrators in-
differently nominated and chosen by and between the said Charles Long and the
above-named William Burton, to arbitrate, award, order, rule, judge and deter-
mine, of all and all manner of actions, cause or causes of action, suits, plaints,
debts, duties, reckonings, accounts, controversies, trespasses and demands what-
soever had, moved, or depending, or which might have been had, moved or de-
pending, by and between the said parties, for any matter, cause or thing, from
the beginning of the world until the day of the date hereof), which the said
arbitrators shall make and publish, of or in the premises, in writing under their
hands and seals, or otherwise by word of mouth, in the presence of two credi-
ble witnesses, on or before the first day of, January next ensuing the date here-
of ; then this obligation to be void and of none effect, or else to be and remain
Imparlance. in full force and virtue." Thich being read and heard, the said Charles prays
leave to imparl therein here until the octave of the Holy Trinity; and it is
Continuance. granted unto him. The same day is given to the said William Burton, here, &c.
At which day, to wit, on the octave of the Holy Trinity, here come as well the
said William Burton as the said Charles Long, by their attorneys aforesaid:
[*xxiii] and hereupon the said William *prays that the said Charles may answer to his
Plea; no such writ and count aforesaid. And the said Charles defends the force and injury,
award, when, &c., and saith, that the said William ought not to have or maintain his
said action against him'; because he saith, that the said David Stiles and Henry
Bacon, the arbitrators before named in the said condition, did not make any such
award, arbitrament, order, rule, judgment, final end or determination, of or in
the premises above specified in the said condition, on or before the first day of
January, in the condition aforesaid above mentioned, according to the form and
effect of the said condition: and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays
judgment, whether the said William ought to have or maintain his said action
Replication set- thereof against him [and that he may go thereof without a day]. And the
ting forth an aforesaid William saith, that for any thing above alleged by the said Charles in
award. pleadings he ought not to be precluded from having his said action thereof
against him; because he saith, that after the making of the said writing obliga-
tory, and before the said first day of January, to wit, on the twenty-sixth day of
December, in the year aforesaid, at Banbury aforesaid, in the presence of two
credible witnesses, namely, John Dew of Chalbury, in the county aforesaid, and
Richard Morris, of Wyndham, in the county of Berks, the said arbitrators
undertook the charge of the award, arbitrament, order, rule, judgment, final
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end and determination aforesaid, of and in the premises specified in the No. Ill.
condition aforesaid; and then and there made and published their award by
word of mouth in manner and form following, that is to say, the said arbitrat-
ors did award, order and adjudge, that he the said Charles Long should forth-
with pay to the said William Burton the sum of seventy-five pounds, and that
thereupon all differences between them at the time of the making the said
writing obligatory should finally cease and determine. And the said William
further saith, that although he afterwards, to wit, on the sixth day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, at Banbury
aforesaid, requested him the said Charles to pay to him the said William the
said seventy-five pounds, yet (by protestation that the said Charles hath not Protestando.
stood to, obeyed, observed, fulfilled or kept any part of the said award,
which by him, the said Charles, ought to have been stood to, obeyed,
observed, fulfilled and kept) for further plea therein he saith, that the said
Charles the said seventy-five pounds to the said William hath not hitherto
paid; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment, and his
debt aforesaid, together with his damages occasioned by the detention of the said
debt, to be adjudged unto him, &c. And the aforesaid Charles saith, that the plea Demurrer.
aforesaid, by him the said William in manner and form aforesaid above in his
replication pleaded, and the matter in the same contained, are in no wise [axxiv]
sufficient in *law for the said William to have or maintain his action aforesaid [
thereupon against him the said Charles; to which the said Charles hath no
necessity, neither is he obliged by the law of the land, in any manner to
answer; and this be is ready to verify. Wherefore, for want of a sufficient
replication in this behalf, the said Charles, as aforesaid, prays judgment, and
that the said William may be precluded from having his action aforesaid there-
upon against him, &c. And the said Charles, according to the form of the Causes of
statute in that case made and provided, shows to the court here the causes of demurrer.
demurrer following: to wit, that it doth not appear, by the replication aforesaid,
that the said arbitrators made the same award in the presence of two credible
witnesses on or before the said first day of January, as they ought to have done,
according to the form and effect of the condition aforesaid; and that the
replication aforesaid is uncertain, insufficient and wants form. And the afore- Joinder in
said William saith, that the plea aforesaid by him the said William in manner
and form aforesaid above in his replication pleaded, and the matter in the
same contained, are good and sufficient in law for the said William to have and
maintain the said action of him the said William thereupon against the said
Charles; which said plea, and the matter therein contained, the said William
is ready to verify and prove as the court shall award; and because the afore-
said Charles hath not answered to that plea, nor hath he hitherto in any man-
ner denied the same, the said William as before prays judgment, and his debt
aforesaid, together with his damages occasioned by the detention of that debt,
to be adjudged unto him, &c. And because the justices here will advise thbm- Continuances.
selves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon, a day is
thereupon given to the parties aforesaid here, until the morrow of All Souls, to
hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said justices are not yet advised
thereof. At which day here come as well the said Charles as the said William,
by their said attorneys; and because the said justices here will farther advise
themselves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon, a
day is farther given to the parties aforesaid here until the octave of St. Hilary,
to hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said justices here are not yet
advised thereof. At which day here come as well the said William Burton as
the said Charles Long, by their said attorneys. Wherefore, the record and Opinion of
matters aforesaid having been seen, and by the justices here fully understood, the court.
and all and singular the premises being examined, and mature deliberation
being had thereupon; for that it seems to the said justices here, that the said Replication
plea of the said William Burton before in his replication pleaded, and the mat- insufficient.
ter therein contained, are not sufficient in law, to have and maintain the action
of the aforesaid William against the aforesaid Charles; therefore it is con-
sidered, that the aforesaid William *take nothing by his writ aforesaid, but [*xxv]
that he and his pledges of prosecuting, to wit, John Doe and Richard Roe, be Judgment
in mercy for his false complaint; and that the aforesaid Charles go thereof for the de-
without a day, &c. And it is farther considered, that the aforesaid Charles fendant.• . . uerens ni-
do recover against the aforesaid William eleven pounds and seven shillings, for hil capiat
his costs and charges by him about his defence in this behalf sustained, adjudged per breve.
by the court here to the said Charles with his consent, according to the form of gcement.
the statute in that case made and provided: and that the aforesaid Charles may Execution.
have execution thereof, &c.
Afterwards, to wit, on Wednesday next after fifteen days of Easter in this General er-
same term before the lord the king, at Westminster, comes the aforesaid ror assigned.
William Burton, by Peter Manwaring his attorney, and saith, that in the record
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No. M. and process aforesaid, and also in the giving of the judgment in the plaint
aforesaid, it is manifestly erred in this: to wit, that the judgment aforesaid was
given in form aforesaid for the said Charles Long against the aforesaid William
Burton, where by the law pf the land judgment should have been given for the
said William Burton against the said Charles Long; and this he is ready to
Writ of verify. And the said William prays the writ of the said lord the king, to warn
scire facas, the said Charles Long to be before the said lord the king, to hear the record
to hear
errors, and process aforesaid; and it is granted unto him; by which the sheriff afore-
said is commanded that by good [and lawful man of his bailiwick] he cause
the aforesaid Charles Long to know, that he be before the lord the king from
the day of Easter in five weeks, wheresoever [he shall then be in England] to
hear the record and process aforesaid, if [it shall have happened that in the
same any error shall have intervened]; and farther [to do and receive what the
Sheriff's re- court of the lord the king shall consider in his behalf]. The same day is given
turn; Soire to the aforesaid William Burton. At which day before the lord the king, at
A. Westminster, comes the aforesaid William Burton, by his attorney aforesaid;
and the sheriff returns, that by virtue of the writ aforesaid to him directed, he
had caused the said Charles Long to know, that he be before the lord the king
at the time aforesaid in the said writ contained, by John Den and Richard Fen,
good, &c., as by the same writ was commanded him; which said Charles Long
according to the warning given him in this behalf, here cometh by Thomas
Error as- Webb, his attorney. Whereupon the said William saith, that in the record and
signed
afresh, process aforesaid, and also in the giving of the judgment aforesaid, it is mani-
festly erred, alleging the error aforesaid by him in the form aforesaid alleged,
and prays, that the judgment aforesaid for the error aforesaid, and others, in
the record and process aforesaid being, may be reversed, annulled and entirely for
nothing esteemed, and that the said Charles *may rejoin to the errors aforesaid,
[*xxvi] and that the court of the said lord the king here may proceed to the examina-
tion as well of the record and process aforesaid, as of the matter aforesaid above
Rejoinder' for error assigned. And the said Charles saith, that neither in the record and
I nu.o es process aforesaid, nor in the giving of the judgment aforesaid, in any thing iserratum. there erred; and he prays in like manner that the court of the said lord the
king here may proceed to the examination as well of the record and process
Continuance. aforesaid, as of the matters aforesaid above for error assigned. And because
the court of the lord the king here is not yet advised what judgment to give of
and upon the premises, a day is therefore given to the parties aforesaid until
the morrow of the Holy Trinity, before the lord the king, wheresoever he shall
then be in England, to hear their judgment of and upon the premises, for that the
court of the lord the king here is not yet advised thereof. At which day before
the lord the king, at Westminster, come the parties aforesaid by the attorneys
Opinion of aforesaid: Whereupon, as well the record and process aforesaid, and the judg-
the court. ment thereupon given, as the mattters aforesaid by the said William above for
error assigned, being seen, and by the court of the lord the king here being
fully understood, and mature deliberation being thereupon had, for that it
appears to the court of the lord the king here, that in the record and process
aforesaid, and also in the giving of the judgment aforesaid, it is manifestly
Judgment of erred, therefore it is considered, that the judgment aforesaid for the error afore-
the common said, and others, in the record and process aforesaid, be reversed, annulled and
pleas re- entirely for nothing esteemed; and that the aforesaid William recover against
versed.
Judgnent the aforesaid Charles his debt aforesaid, and also fifty pounds for his damages
for th c which he hath sustained, as well on occasion of the detention of the said debt,
plaintiff. as for his costs and charges unto which he hath been put about this suit in this
Costs.
Defendant behalf, to the said William with his consent by the court of the lord the kijng
amerced. here adjudged. And the said Charlesin mercy.
SECT. 7. PROCESS OF EXECUTION.
Writ of capias GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland
ad ,atisfacien- king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting.
dum. We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if
he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have
his body before us in three weeks from the day of the Holy Trinity, whereso-
ever we shall then be in England, to satisfy William Burton, for two hundred
pounds debt, which the said William Burton hath lately recovered against him
[*xxvii] in our court before us, and also fifty pounds, which were *adjudged in our said
court before us, to the said William Burton, for his damages which he hath sus-
tained, as well by occasion of the detention of the said debt, as for his costs and
charges to which he hath been put about his suit in this behalf, whereof the
said Charles Long is convicted, as it appears to us of record; and have you there
then this writ. Witness, Sir Thomas Denison,t knight, at Westminster, the nine-
teenth day of June, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
t The senior puisn6 justice; there being no chief justice that term.
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By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within No. III.
named Charles Long; which I have ready before the lord the king at Westmin- -
ster, at the day within written, as within it is commanded me. Sheriff's re-
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Irelandturn; Cepi
king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. Writ of Ier
We command you that of the goods and chattels within your bailiwick of facias.
Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, you cause to be made two hundred
pounds debt, which William Burton lately in our court before us at Westmin-
ster hath recovered against him, and also fifty pounds, which were adjudged in
our court before us to the said William, for his damages which he hath sus-
tained, as well by occasion of the detention of his said debt, as for his costs and
charges to which he hath been put about his suit in this behalf, whereof the
said Charles Long is convicted, as it appears to us of record; and have that
money before us in three weeks from the day of the Holy Trinity, wheresoever
we shall then be in England, to render to the said William of his debt and
damages aforesaid; and have there then this writ. Witness, Sir Thomas Denison,
knight, at Westminster, the nineteenth day of June, in the twenty-ninth year of
our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have caused to be made of the goods Sheriff's re-
and chattels of the within written Charles Long, two hundred and fifty pounds ; turn; Fieri
which I have ready before the lord the king at Westminster, at the day within feet.
written, as it is within commanded me.
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OF PUBLIC WRONGS.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NATURE OF CRIMES, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT.
WE are now arrived at the fourth and last branch of these Commentaries,
which treats of public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors. For we may remem-
ber that, in the beginning of the preceding book, (a) wrongs were divided into two
species: the one private and the other public. Private wrongs, whiQh. are fre-
quently termed civil injuries, were the subject of that entire book: we are now
therefore, lastly, to proceed to the consideration of public wrongs, or crimes and
misdemeanors; with the means of their prevention and punishment. In the
pursuit of which subject I shall consider, in the first place, the general nature
of crimes and punishments; secondly, the persons capable of committing crimes;
thirdly, their several degrees of guilt, as principals, or accessories; *fourthly, r*2
the several species of crimes, with the punishment annexed to each by the I
laws of England; fifthly, the means of preventing their perpetration; and sixthly
the method of inflicting those punishments, which the law has annexed to each
several crime and misdemeanor.
First, as to the general nature of crimes and their punishment; the discussion
and admeasurement of which forms in every country the code of criminal law;
or, as it is more usually denominated with us in England, the doctrine of the
pleas of the crown; so called, because the king, in whom centers the majesty of
the whole community, is supposed by the law to be the person injured by every
infraction of the public rights, belonging to that community, and is therefore
in all cases the proper prosecutor for every public offence. (b)
The knowledge of this branch of jurisprudence, which teaches the nature,
extent, and degrees of every crime, and adjusts to it its adequate and necessary
penalty, is of the utmost importance to every individual in the state. For (as
a very great master of the crown law (c) has bserved upon a similar occasion)
no rank or elevation in life, no uprightness of heart, no prudence or circumspec-
tion of conduct, should tempt a man to conclude, that he may not at some time or
other be deeply interested in these researches. The infirmities of the best among
us, the vices, and ungovernable passions of others, the instability of all human
affairs, and the numberless unforeseen events, which the compass of a day may
(b) See book I, p.' 28. (c) Sir Michael Foster, pref. to rep.(a) Book III, ch. 1,
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bring forth, will teach us (upon a moment's reflection) that to know with pre-
cision what the laws of our country have forbidden, and the deplorable conse-
quences to which a wilful disobedience may expose us, is a matter of universal
concern.
In proportion to the importance of the criminal law ought also to be the care
and attention of the legislature in properly forming and enforcing it. It should
[,3] be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, *and universal;[*31 and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of
humanity, and the indellible rights of mankind: though it sometimes (provided
there be no transgression of these external boundaries) may be modified, nar-
rowed, or enlarged, according to the local or occasional necessities of the state
which it is meant to govern. And yet, either from a want of attention to these
principles in the first concoction of the laws, and adopting in their stead the
impetuous dictates of avarice, ambition, and revenge; from retaining the dis-
cordant political regulations, which successive conquerors or factions have estab-
lished, in the various revolutions of government; from giving a lasting efficacy
to sanctions that were intended to be temporary, and made (as Lord Bacon ex-
presses it) merely upon the spur of the occasion; or from, lastly, too hastily
employing such means as are greatly disproportionate to their end, in order to
check the progress of some very prevalent offence: from some, or from all, of
these causes, it hath happened, that the criminal law is in every country of Eu-
rope more rude and imperfect than the civil. I shall not here enter into any
minute inquiries concerning the local constitutions of other nations: the inhu-
manity and mistaken policy of which have been sufficiently pointed out by
ingenious writers of their own. (d) But even with us in England, where our
crown law is with justice supposed to be more nearly advanced to perfection;
where crimes are more accurately defined, and penalties less uncertain and arbi-
[*4] trary; where all our accusations are public, and our *trials in the face of
the world; where torture is unknown, and every delinquent is judged by
such of his equals, against whom he can form no exception nor even a personal
dislike ;-even here we shall occasionally find room to remark some particulars
that seem to want revision and amendment. These have chiefly arisen from
too scrupulous an adherence to some rules of the ancient common law, when
the reasons have ceased upon which those rules were founded; from not repealing
such of the old penal laws as are either obsolete or absurd; and from too little
care and attention in framing and passing new ones. The enacting of penalties,
to which a whole nation should be subject, ought not to be left as a matter of
indifference to the passions or interests of a few, who upon temporary motives
may prefer or support such a bill; but be calmly and maturely considered by
persons who know what provisions the laws have already made to remedy the
mischief complained of, who can from experience foresee the probable conse-
quences of those which are now proposed, and who will judge without passion or
prejudice how adequate they are to the evil. It is never usual in the house of
peers even to read a private bill, which may affect the property of an individual,
without first referring it to some of the learned judges, and hearing their report
thereon. (e) And surely equal precaution is necessary, when laws are to be
established, which may affect the property, the liberty, and perhaps even the
lives of thousands. Had such a reference taken place, it is impossible that in
the eighteenth century it could ever have been made a capital crime, to break
down (however maliciously) the mound of a flshpond, whereby any fish shall
escape; or to cut down a cherry tree in an orchard. (f) Were even a committee
appointed but once in a hundred years to revise the criminal law, it could not have
continued to this hour a felony, without benefit of clergy, to be seen for one month
in the company of persons who call themselves, or are called, Egyptians. (g)
It is true, that these outrageous penalties, being seldom or never inflicted, are
hardly known to be law by the public: *but that rather aggravates the mis-
* chief, by laying a snare for the unwary. Yet they cannot but occur to
(d) Baron Montesquieu, marquis Beccaria, &c. (e) See book IT, p. 345.
(f) Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 22. 31 Geo. II, c. 42. (g) Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 20.
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the observation of any one, who hath undertaken the task of examining the
great outlines of the English law, and tracing them up to their principles: and
it is the duty of such a one to hint them with decency to those, whose abilities
and stations enable them to apply the remedy.(1) Having therefore premised
this apology for some of the ensuing remarks, which might otherwise seem to
savour of arrogance, I proceed now to consider (in the first place) the general
nature of crimes.
I. A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of
a public law, either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition com-
prehends both crimes and misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are mere
synonymous terms; though, in common usage, the word "crimes " is made to
denote such offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller
faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name
of "misdemeanors" only.(2)
The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors
from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs or
civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong
to individuals, considered merely as individuals: public wrongs, or crimes and
misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due
to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity. As, if I detain a field from another man, to which the law has given
him a right, this is a civil injury, and not a crime: for here only the right of an
individual is concerned, and it is immaterial to the public, which of us is in
possession of the land; but treason, murder, and robbery are properly ranked
among crimes; since, besides the injury done to individuals, they strike at the
very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this sort
are suffered to escape with impunity.(3)
(1) This hint has been taken, at last, and a thorough revision has been made of the criminal
law of England, relieving it of its worst and most barbarous features.
(2) [In the English law, misdemeanor is generally used in contradistinction to felony, and
misdemeanors comprehend all indictable offences which do not amount to felony; as perjury,
battery, libels, conspiracies, attempts, and solicitations to commit felonies, &c.]
For the enlarged meaning of the word felony in American law, see Carpenter v. Nixon, 5
Hill, 260; post, p. 94, note.
(3) [The distinction between public crimes and private injuries seems entirely to be created
by positive laws, and is referable only to civil institutions. Every violation of a moral law,
or natural obligation, is an injury, for which the offender ought to make retribution to the
individuals who immediately suffer from it; and it is also a crime for which lie ought to be
punished to that extent, which would deter both him and others from a repetition of the
offence. In positive laws those acts are denominated injuries, for which the legislature has
provided only retribution, or a compensation in damages: but when, from experience, it is
discovered that this is not sufficient to restrain within moderate bounds certain classes of
injuries, it then becomes necessary for the legislative power to raise them into crimes, and to
endeavor to repress them by the terror of punishment, or the sword of the public magis-
trate. The word "crime " has no technical meaning in the law of England. It seems, when it
has a reference to positive law, to comprehend those acts which subject the offender to punish-
ment. When the words high crimes and misdemeanors are used in prosecutions by impeach-
ment, the words high crimes have no definite signification, but are used merely to give greater
solemnity to the charge. When the word crime is used with a reference to moral law, it
implies every deviation from moral rectitude. Hence we say, it is a crime to refuse the pay-
ment of a just debt; it is a crime wilfully to do an injury to another's person or property
without making him satisfaction. To destroy another's property wilfully, without making
the owner a compensation, is, in all cases, a worse crime in reason than theft; because the
individual deprived of his property suffers precisely the same injury, and the public loses the
benefit of that property, which contributes to the support of no one; and he who does
the injury has not the temptation of him who steals to supply his wants. In the case of
those actions which are only civil injuries, and to which no legal punishment is annexed, the
law has supposed that retribution will be sufficient to deter the commission of them.J
The meaning of the phrase " high crimes and misdemeanors" underwent much discussion
in the case of President Johnson, who was tried on articles of impeachment in 1868, but the
result of the case was not such that any authoritative rule can be derived from it. See, upon
the general subject, articles in the American Law Register, yol. vi, N. S. pp. 257 and 641.
Wrongs done to individuals for which they may have a remedy by private action, but
which involve no offence against the state, are usually spoken of as torts.
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In all cases the crime includes an injury; every public offence is also a private
wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the
*6] community. *Thus treason, in imagining the king's death, involves in it
" conspiracy against an individual, which is also a civil injury; but, as this
species of treason in its consequences principally tends to the dissolution of
government, and the destruction thereby of the order and peace of society, this
denominates it a crime of the highest magnitude. Murder is an injury to the
life of an individual ; but the law of society considers principally the loss which
the state sustains by being deprived of a member, and the pernicious example
thereby set for others to do the like. Robbery may be considered in the same
view: it is an injury to private property; but were that all, a civil satisfaction
in damages might atone for it: the public mischief is the thing, for the preven-
tion of which our laws have made it a capital offence. In these gross and
atrocious injuries the private wrong is swallowed up in the public: we seldom
hear any mention made of satisfaction to the individual ; the satisfaction to the
community being so very great. And, indeed, as the public crime is not other-
wise avenged than by forfeiture of life and property, it is impossible afterwards
to make any reparation for the private wrong: which can only be had from the
body or goods of the aggressor.(4) But there are crimes of an inferior nature,
in which the public punishment is not so severe, but it affords room for a private
compensation also; and herein the distinction of crimes from civil injuries is
very apparent. For instance: in the case of battery, or beating another, the
aggressor may be indicted for this at the suit of the king, for disturbing the pub-
lic peace, and be punished criminally by fine and imprisonment; and the party
beaten may also have his private remedy by action of trespass for the injury
which he in particular sustains, and recover a civil satisfaction in damages. So,
also, in case of a public nuisance, as digging a ditch across a highway, this is
punishable by indictment, as a common offence to the whole kingdom and all
[*7] his majesty's subjects ; but if any individual sustains any special *damage
thereby, as laming his horse, breaking his carriage, or the like, the offender
may be compelled to make ample satisfaction, as well for the private injury as
for the public wrong.
Upon the whole we may observe, that in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or
unlawful acts, the law has a double view: viz., not only to redress the party
injured, by either restoring to him his right, if possible; or by giving him an
equivalent; the manner of doing which was the object of our inquiries in the
preceding book of these Commentaries; but also to secure to the public the
benefit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of
those laws, which the sovereign power has thought proper to establish for the
government and tranquillity of the whole. What those breaches are, and how
prevented or punished, are to be considered in the present book.
II. The nature of crimes and misdemeanors in general being thus ascertained
and distinguished, I proceed, in the next place, to consider the general nature
of punishments: which are evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and
(4) [The civil right to sue for the injury the party has received for a case of felony is not
in general merged or destroyed, but only suspended until he has performed his duty to society,
by an endeavor to bring the offender to justice: and after the party on whom suspicion was
fixed has been convicted or acquitted, without collusion, the prosecutor may support an
action for the same cause as that on which the criminal prosecution was founded. Styles,
846; 12 East, 409; Rep. T. Hardw. 350; 17 Ves. 329. No action can be brought, or bill in
equity filed, in relation to a felony, until the offender has been duly tried for the offence (id.),
or that every exertion has been made to bring him to justice.]
This is believed not to be the law in the United States, where the management and control
of prosecutions for offences against the state are confined to officers chosen or appointed for
the purpose. Parties injured by a felony are not permitted to compound with the offender,
and to receive a compensation for suppressing a prosecution, or concealing the evidence of
the crime; but they may demand and recover compensation for the private injury the crime
has inflicted upon them, without awaiting the result of such action as the public prosecutor
may see fit to institute. See Plumer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 554; Boston, &c., R. R. Co. v. Dana,
1 Gray, 83, and cases cited.
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misdemeanors; being devised, denounced, and inflicted by human laws, in con-
sequence of disobedience or misbehaviour in those, to regulate whose conduct
such laws were respectively made. And herein we will briefly consider the
power, the end, and the measure of human punishment.1. As to the power of human punishment, or the right of the temporal legis-
lator to inflict discretionary penalties for crimes and misdemeanors. (h) It is
clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the laws of nature, as murder
and the like, is in a state of mere nature vested in every individual. For it
must be vested in somebody; otherwise the laws of nature would be vain and
fruitless, if none were empowered to put them in execution: and if that power
is vested in any one, it must also be vested in all mankind; *since all are [*8]
by nature equal. Whereof the first murderer Cain was so sensible, that we
find him (i) expressing his apprehensions, that whoever should find him would
slay him. In a state of society this right is transferred from individuals to the
sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their own
causes, which is one of the evils that civil government was intended to remedy.
Whatever power, therefore, individuals had of punishing offences against the
law of nature, that is now vested in the magistrate alone; who bears the sword
of justice by the consent of the whole community. And to this precedent nat-
ural power of individuals must be referred that right, which some have argued
to belong to every state (though, in fact, never exercised by any), of punishing
not only their own subjects, but also foreign ambassadors, even with death itself;
in case they have offended, not indeed against the municipal laws of the country,
but against the divine laws of nature, and become liable thereby to forfeit their
lives for their guilt. (k)
As to offences merely against the laws of society, which are only malaprohibita,
and not mala in se'- the temporal magistrate is also empowered to inflict coercive
penalties for such transgressions; and this by the consent of individuals; who,
in forming societies, did either tacitly or expressly invest the sovereign power
with the right of making laws, and of enforcing obedience to them when made,
by exercising, upon their non-observance, severities adequate to the evil. The
lawfulness, therefore, of punishing such criminals is founded upon this principle,
that the law by which they suffer was made by their own consent; it is a part
of the original contract into which they entered, when first they engaged in
society; it was calculated for, and has long contributed to, their own security.
This right, therefore, being thus conferred by universal consent, gives to the
state exactly the same power, and no more, over all its members, as each indi-
vidual member had naturally over himself or others. Which has *occa-
sioned some to doubt how far a human legislature ought to inflict capital [*9]
punishments for positive offences; offences against the municipal law only, and
not against the law of nature: since no individual has, naturally, a power of
inflicting death upon himself or others for actions in themselves indifferent.
With regard to offences mala in se, capital punishments are in some instances
inflicted by the immediate command of God himself to all mankind; as in the
case of murder, by the precept delivered to Noah, their common ancestor and
representative, "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." (1)
In other instances they are inflicted after the example of the Creator, in his posi-
tive code of laws for the regulation of the Jewish republic: as in the case of the
crime against nature. But they are sometimes inflicted without such express
warrant or example, at the will and discretion of the human legislature; as for
forgery, for theft, and sometimes for offences of a lighter kind. Of these we are
principally to speak; as these crimes are, none of them, offences against natural,
but only against social rights; not even theft itself, unless it be accompanied with
violence to one's house or person: all others being an infringement of that right
(h) See Grotius, dej. b. &p. 1. 2, c. 10. Puffendorf. L. of Nat. & N. 1. 8, e. 3. (i) Gen. lT, 14.
(k) See book I, p. 254. (1) Gen. ix, 6.
Chap. q.
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of property, which, as we have formerly seen, (m) owes its origin not to the law
of nature, but merely to civil society. (5)
The practice of inflicting capital punishments, for offences of human institu-
tion, is thus justified by that great and good man, Sir Matthew Hale :(n) "When
offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or state, destruc-
tive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great insecurity and danger
of the kingdom or its inhabitants, severe punishment, and even death itself, is
necessary to be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of lawgivers."
It is, therefore, the enormity, or dangerous tendency, of the crime that alone
can warrant any earthly legislature in putting him to death that commits it.
[,10] *It is not its frequency, only, or the difficulty of otherwise preventing it,
that will excuse our attempting to prevent it by a wanton effusion of
human blood. For, though the end of punishment is to deter men from offend-
ing, it can never follow from thence that it is lawful to deter them at any rate
and by any means; since there may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience
even to the justest laws. Every humane legislator will be therefore extremely
cautious of establishing laws that inflict the penalty of death, especially for
slight offences, or such as are merely positive. He will expect a better reason
for his so doing than that loose one which generally is given; that it is found
by former experience that no lighter penalty will be effectual. For is it found,
upon farther experience, that capital punishments are more effectual ? Was the
vast territory of all the Russias worse regulated under the late empress Eliza-
beth, than under her more sanguinary predecessors? Is it now, under Cath-
erine II, less civilized, less social, less secure? And yet we are assured that
neither of these illustrious princesses have, throughout their whole administra-
tion, inflicted the penalty of death: and the latter has, upon full persuasion of
its being useless, nay, even pernicious, given orders for abolishing it entirely
throughout her extensive dominions. (o) But, indeed, were capital punishments
proved by experience to be a sure and effectual remedy, that would not prove
the necessity (upon which the justice and propriety depend) of inflicting them
upon all occasions when other expedients fail. I fear this reasoning would
extend a great deal too far. For instance, the damage done to our public roads
by loaded wagons is universally allowed, and many laws have been made to
prevent it; none of which have hitherto proved effectual. But it does not there-
fore follow that it would be just for the legislature to inflict death upon every
obstinate carrier, who defeats or eludes the provision of former statutes. Where
the evil to be prevented is not adequate to the violence of the preventive, a sove-
reign that thinks seriously can never justify such a law to the dictates of
[*11] *conscience and humanity. To shed the blood of our fellow creature is
a matter that requires the greatest deliberation and the fullest conviction
of our own authority: for life is the immediate gift of God to man; which
neither he can resign, nor can it be taken from him, unless by the command or
permission of Him who gave it; either expressly revealed, or collected from the
laws of nature or society by clear and indisputable demonstration.
I would not be understood to deny the right of the legislature in any country
to enforce its own laws by the death of the transgressor, though persons of some
abilities have doubted it; but only to suggest a few hints for the consideration
of such as are, or may hereafter become, legislators. When a question arises,
(m) Book II, c. 1. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 13.
(o) Grand instructions for framing a new code of laws for the Russian empire, § 210.
(5) [It is strange that the learned judge's conclusion, viz., that theft itsef is not an offence
against natural rights, did not lead him to suspect the fallacy of the position, that the right of
roperty owes its origin not to the law of nature, but merely to civil society, which he has also
advanced in a former book (book 2, p. 11), and which I have there presumed to controvert.
If theft be not a violation of the law of nature and reason, it would follow that there is no
moral turpitude in dishonesty. "Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut
quid hujusmodi quam detractio aut appetitio alieni."-Cic. Thou shalt not steal, is certainly
one of the first precepts both of nature and religion. CHRIsTIAN.]
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whether death may be lawfully inflicted for this or that transgression, the wis-
dom of the laws must decide it; and to this public judgment or decision all
private judgments must submit; else there is an end of the first principle of all
society and government. The guilt of blood, if any, must lie at their doors,
who misinterpret the extent of their warrant; and not at the doors of the sub-
ject, who is bound to receive the interpretations that are given by the sovereign
power.
2. As to the end, or final cause, of human punishments. This is not by way
of atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for that must be left to the
just determination of the Supreme Being: but as a precaution against future
offences of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the amend-
ment of the offender himself; for which purpose all corporal punishments, fines,
and temporary exile or imprisonment, are inflicted: or, by deterring others by
the dread of his example from offending in the like way, " ut 1pena (as Tully(p)
expresses it) ad pauvos, metus ad omnes perveniat;".which gives rise to all
ignominious punishments, and to such executions of justice as are open and
public: *or, lastly, by depriving the party injuring of the power to do [*12]
future mischief; which is effected by either putting him to death, or con-
demning him to perpetual confinement, slavery, or exile. The same one end, of
preventing future crimes, is endeavoured to be answered by each of these three
species of punishment. The public gains equal security, whether the offender
himself be amended by wholesome correction, or whether he be disabled from
doing any further harm: and if the penalty fails of both these effects, as it may
do, still the terror of his example remains as a warning to other citizens. The
method, however, of inflicting punishment, ought always to be proportioned to
the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means to exceed it: there-
fore, the pains of death, and perpetual disability by exile, slavery, or imprison-
ment, ought never to be inflicted, but when the offender appears incorrigible:
which may be collected either from a repetition of minuter offences; or from
the perpetration of some one crime of deep malignity, which of itself demon-
strates a disposition without hope or probability of amendment: and in such
cases it would be cruelty to the public to defer the punishment of such a crim-
inal, till he had an opportunity of repeating perhaps the worst of villanies.
3. As to the measure of human punishments. From what has been observed
in the former articles, we may collect, that the quantity of punishment can
never be absolutely determined by any standing invariable rule; but it must be
left to the arbitration of the legislature to inflict such penalties as are warranted
by the laws of nature and society, and such as appear to be the best calculated
to answer the end of precaution against future offences.
Hence it will be evident, that what some have so highly extolled for its
equity, the lex talionis, or law of retaliation, can never be in all cases an ade-
quate or permanent rule of punishment. In some cases, indeed, it seems to be
dictated by natural reason; as in the case of conspiracies to do an injury, or
false accusations of the innocent: to which we may add that law of the Jews
and Egyptians, mentioned by *Josephus and Diodorus Siculus, that
whoever without sufficient cause was found with any mortal poison in his
custody, should himself be obliged to take it. But, in general, the difference
of persons, place, time, provocation, or other circumstances, may enhance or
mitigate the offence; and in such cases retaliation can never be a proper measure
of justice. If a nobleman strikes a peasant, all mankind will see, that if a court
of justice awards a return of the blow, it is more than a just compensation. On
the other hand, retaliation may, sometimes, be too easy a sentence; as, if a man
maliciously should put out the remaining eye of him who had lost one before,
it is too slight a punishment for the maimer to lose only one of his: and there-
fore the law of the Locrians, which demanded an eve for an eye, was in this in-
stance judiciously altered by decreeing, in imitation of Solon's laws,(q) that,
he who struck out the eye of a one-eyed man, should lose both his own in
(p) Pro Cluentio, 46. (q) Pott. Ant. b. 1, c. 26.
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return. Besides, there are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of these
penalties, without manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft cannot be pun-
ished with theft, defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by
adultery, and the like. And we may add, that those instances, wherein retalia-
tion appears to be used, even by the Divine authority, do not really proceed upon
the rule of exact retribution, by doing to the criminal the same hurt he has done
to his neighbour, and no more; but this correspondence between the crime and
punishment is barely a consequence from some other principle. Death is
ordered to be punished with death; not because one is equivalent to the other,
for that would be expiation, and not punishment. Nor is death always an
equivalent for death : the execution of a needy, decrepit assassin is a poor satis-
faction for the murder of a nobleman in the bloom of his youth, and full enjoy-
ment of his friends, his honours, and his fortune.(6) But the reason upon
which this sentence is grounded seems to be, that this is the highest penalty
[*14] that man can inflict, *and tends most to the security of mankind; by re-
moving one murderer from the earth, and setting a dreadful example to
deter others: so that even this grand instance proceeds upon other principles
than those of retaliation. And truly, if any measure of punishment is to be
taken from the damage sustained by the sufferer, the punishment ought rather
to exceed than equal the injury: since it seems contrary to reason and equity,
that the guilty (if convicted) should suffer no more than the innocent has done
before him; especially as the suffering of the innocent is past and irrevocable,
that of the guilty is future, contingent, and liable to be escaped or evaded.
With regard indeed to crimes that are incomplete, which consist merely in the
intention, and are not yet carried into act, as conspiracies and the like; the
innocent has a chance to frustrate or avoid the villainy, as the conspirator has
also a chance to escape his punishment: and this may be one reason why the
lex talionis is more proper to be inflicted, if at all, for crimes that consist in
intention, than for such as are carried into act. It seems indeed consonant to
natural reason, and has therefore been adopted as a maxim by several theoretical
writers, (r) that the punishment due to the crime of which one falsely accuses
another should be inflicted on the perjured informer. Accordingly, when it
was attempted to introduce into England the law of retaliation, it was intended
as a punishment for such only as preferred malicious accusations against others;
it being enacted by statute 37 Edw. III, c. 18, that such as preferred any sug-
gestions to the king's great council should put in sureties of taliation; that is,
to incur the same pain that the other should have had in case the suggestions
were found untrue. But, after one year's experience, this punishment of talia-
tion was rejected, and imprisonment adopted in its stead.(s)
But though from what has been said it appears that there cannot be any regu-
r*15 1 lar or determinate method of rating the *quantity of punishments forL 'J crimes, by any one uniform rule; but they must be referred to the will
and discretion of the legislative power: yet there are some general principles,
drawn from the nature and circumstances of the crime, that may be of some
assistance in alloting it an adequate punishment.
As, first, with regard to the object of it; for the greater and more exalted the
object of an injury is, the more care should be taken to prevent that injury,
and of course under this aggravation the punishment should be more severe.
Therefore treason in conspiring the king's death is, by the English law, punished
with greater rigour than even actualy killing any private subject. And vet,
generally, a design to transgress is not so flagrant an enormity as the actual
completion of that design. For evil, the nearer we approach it, is the more
disagreeable and shocking; so that it requires more obstinancy in wickedness to
(r) Beccar. c. 15. (s) Stat. 38 Edw. III, c. 9.
(6) [It is possible that the commentator meant to flatter an audience of the sons of noble-
men, by intimating that it was a less crime to kill a poor old man, than to kill a nobleman
even in the bloom of youth! In the eye of every sound moralist there can be no difference.]
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perpetrate an unlawful action, than barely to entertain the thought of it: and it
is an encouragement to repentance and remorse, even till the last stage of any
crime, that it never is too late to retract; and that if a man stops even here, it
is better for him than if he proceeds: for which reason an attempt to rob, to
ravish, or to kill, is far less penal than the actual robbery, rape or murder. But
in the case of a treasonable conspiracy, the object whereof is the king's majesty,
the bare intention will deserve the highest degree of severity; not because the
intention is equivalent to the act itself: but because the greatest rigour is no
more than adequate to a treasonable purpose of the heart, and there is no greater
left to inflict upon the actual execution itself.
Again: the violence of passion, or temptation, may sometimes alleviate a
crime; as theft, in case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion than when
committed through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses. To kill a
man upon sudden and violent resentment, is less penal than upon cool, deliber-
ate malice. The age, education, and character of the offender: the repetition
(or otherwise) *of the offence; the time, the place, the company wherein it [*16[
was committed; all these, and a thousand other incidents, may aggravate
or extenuate the crime.(t)
Further: as punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of future
crimes, it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should
be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety
and happiness; (u) and among crimes of an equal malignity, those which a man
has the most frequent and easy opportunities of committing, which cannot be
so easily guarded against as others, and which, therefore, the offender has the
strongest inducement to commit.; according to what Cicero observes,(v) "ea
sunt aninadvertendapeccata maxime, quw diffcillimeprcecaventur." Hence it
is, that for a servant to rob his master is in more cases capital, than for a
stranger: if a servant kills his master, it is a species of treason ; (7) in another
it is only murder: to steal a handkerchief or other trifle of above the value of
twelve pence, privately from one's person, is made capital; (8) but to carry off a
load of corn from an open field, though of fifty times greater value, is punished
with transportation only. And in the island of Man this rule was formerly
carried so far, that to take away a horse or ox was there no felony, but a tres-
pass, because of the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or carry
them off: but to steal a pig or a fowl, which is easily done, was a capital mis-
demeanor, and the offender was punished with death.(w)
Lastly: as a conclusion to the whole, we may observe that punishments of
unreasonable severity, especially when indiscriminately inflicted, have less effect
in preventing crimes, and amending the manners of a people, than such as are
more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with due *distinctions 1 7
of severity. It is the sentiment of an ingenious writer, who seems to [*1-1
have well studied the springs of human action,(x) that crimes are more
effectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of punishment. For
the excessive severity of laws (says Montesquieu) (y) hinders their execution:
when the punishment surpasses all measure, the public will frequently out of
humanity prefer impunity to it. Thus also the statute 1 Mar. st. 1, c. 1, recites in
its preamble, "that the state of every king consists more assuredly in the love of
the subject towards their prince, than in the dread of laws made with rigorous
pains; and that laws made for the preservation of the commonwealth without
(t) Thus Demosthenes (in his oration against Midias) finely works up the aggravations of the insults he had
received. "I was abused," says he, "by my enemy, in cold blood, out of malice, not by heat of wine, in the
morning, publicly, before strangers as well as citizens; and that in the temple, whither the duty of my office
called me."
(u) Beccar. c. 6. (v) Pro Sexto Roseio, 40. (w) 4 Inst. 285. (x) Beccar. c. 7.
(y) Sp. L. b. 6, c. 18.
(7) This is no longer the law. What was formerly petit treason is now murder. 9 Geo. IV,
c. 31, 2.
(8) the capital punishment for this offence was abolished by statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 29,
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great penalties are more often obeyed and kept, than laws made with extreme
punishments." Happy had it been for the nation, if the subsequent practice of
that deluded princess in matters of religion, had been correspondent to these
sentiments of herself and parliament, in matters of state and government! We
may further observe that sanguinary laws are a bad symptom of the distemper
of any state, or at least of its weak constitution. The laws of the Roman
kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri, were full of cruel punishments:
the Porcian law, which exempted all citizens from sentence of death, silently
abrogated them all. In this period the republic flourished: under the emperors
severe punishments were revived; and then the empire fell.(9)
It is moreover absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes
of different malignity. A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt that
may be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewise prove a
manifest defect either in the wisdom of the legislative or the strength of the
executive power. It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want
of solid skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the ultimum supplicium, to
every case of difficulty. It is, it must be owned, much easier to extirpate than to
r,18, amend mankind: yet *that magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and
*18]cruel surgeon, who cuts off every limb, which through ignorance or indo-
lence he will not attempt to cure. It has been therefore ingeniously proposed, (z)
that in every state a scale of crimes should be formed, with a corresponding scale
of punishments, descending from the greatest to the least: but, if that be too
romantic an idea yet at least a wise legislator will mark the principal divisions,
and not assign penalties of the first degree to offences of an inferior rank. Where
men see no distinction made in the nature and gradations of punishment, the
enerality will be led to conclude there is no distinction in the guilt. Thus in
rance the punishment of robbery, either with or without murder, is the
same: (a) hence it is, that though perhaps they are therefore subject to fewer
robberies, yet they never rob but they also murder. In China, murderers are
cut to pieces, and robbers not: hence in that country they never murder on the
highway, though they often rob. And in England, besides the additional ter-
rors of a speedy execution, and a subsequent exposure or dissection, robbers
have a hope of transportation which seldom is extended to murderers. This has
the same effect here as in China; in preventing frequent assassination and
slaughter.
Yet, though in this instance we may glory in the wisdom of the English law, we
shall find it more difficult to justify the frequency of capital punishment to be found
therein; inflicted (perhaps inattentively) by a multitude of successive independent
(z) Beccar. c. 6. (a) Sp. L. b. 6, c. 16.
(9) [The most admirable and excellent statute ever passed by the English legislature is the
1 Edw. VI, c. 12. In the preamble it states, in a beautiful and simple strain of eloquence, that
"Nothing is more godly, more sure, more to be wished and desired betwixt a prince, the
supreme head and ruler, and the subjects whose governor and head he is, than on the prince's
part great clemency and indulgency, and rather too much forgiveness and remission of his
royal power and just punishment, than exact severity and justice to be showed; and on the
subjects' behalf, that they should obey rather for love, and for the necessity and love of a
king and prince, than for fear of his strait and severe laws. But as in tempest or winter one
course and garment is convenient, in calm or warm weather a more liberal ease or lighter
garment both may and ought to be followed and used; so we have seen divers strait and
sore laws made in one parliament (the time so requiring), in a more calm and quiet reign of
another prince by the like authority and parliament taken away," &c. It therefore repeals
every statute which has created any treason since the 25 Edw. III, st. 5, c. 2. It repeals "all
and every act of parliament concerning doctrine or matters of religion." It repeals every
felony created by the legislature, during the preceding long and cruel reign of Henry VIII
It repeals the statute 31 Hen. VIII, "that proclamations made by the king's highness, by
the advice of his honorable counsel, should be made and kept as though they were made
by authority of parliament." It repeals also the extraordinary statute de bigamis, 4 Edw. I,
st. 3, c. 5, which enacted, that if any man married a widow, or married a second wife after
the death of the first, he should be deprived of the benefit of clergy, if he was convicted of
any clergyable felony whatever.]
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statutes, upon crimes very different in their natures. It is a melancholy truth,
that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less
than a hundred and sixty have been declared by act of parliament (b) to be
felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant
death. So dreadful a list, instead of diminishing, increases the number of
offenders.(10) *The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to [*19]
prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths,
and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence; and judges,
through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them
to the royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy and hard-
ened offender overlooks the multitude that suffer: he boldly engages in some
desperate attempt, to relieve his wants or supply his vices: and, if unexpectedly
the hand of justice overtakes him, he deems himself peculiarly unfortunate, in
falling at last a sacrifice to those laws, which long impunity has taught him
to contemn.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES.
HAVING, in the preceding chapter, considered in general the nature of crimes
and punishments, we are led next, in the order of our distribution, to inquire
what persons are, or are not, capable of committing crimes; or, which is all
one, who are exempted from the censures of the law upon the commis-
sion of those acts, which in other persons would be severely punished. In the
process of which inquiry, we must have recourse to particular and special excep-
tions: for the general rule is, that no person shall be excused from punishment
for disobedience to the laws of his country, excepting such as are expressly
defined and exempted by the laws themselves.
All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden
act from the punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced
to this single consideration, the want or defect of will. An involuntary act, as
it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of
the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, be-
ing the only thing *that renders human action either praiseworthy or [*21]
culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable by human laws,
there must be both a will and an act. For, though, in foro conscientice, a fixed
design or will to do an unlawful act, is almost as heinous as the commission of
it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intentions
of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it
therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know. For which reason, in all
temporal jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence of an intended crime,
is necessary in order to demonstrate the depravity of the will, before the man
is liable to punishment. And, as a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil
crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no
crime at all. So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be,
first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such
vicious will.
Now there are three cases, in which the will does not join with the act: 1. Where
there is a defect of understanding. For where there is no discernment, there is
(b) See Ruff head's index to the statutes, (tit. Felony), and the acts which have since been made.
(10) The legislature has at length been brought to see this truth, and has greatly dimin-
ished this fearful list.
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no choice; and where there is no, choice, there can be no act of the will, which
is nothing else but a determination of one's choice to do or to abstain from a
particular action: he, therefore, that has no understanding can have no will to
guide his conduct. 2. Where there is understanding and will sufficient, residing
in the party; but not called forth and exerted at the time of the action done;
which is the case of all offences committed by chance or ignorance. Here the
will sits neuter; and neither concurs with the act, nor disagrees to it. 3. Where
the action is constrained by some outward force and violence. Here the will
counteracts the deed; and is so far from concurring with, that it loaths and dis-
agrees to, what the man is obliged to perform. It will be the business of the
present chapter briefly to consider all the several species of defect in will, as they
fall under some one or other of these general heads: as infancy, idiocy, lunacy,
and intoxication, which fall under the first class; misfortune and ignorance,
which *may be referred to the second; and compulsion or necessity,
which may properly rank in the third.
I. First, we will consider the case of infancy or nonage; which is a defect
of the understanding. Infants, under the age of discretion, ought not to be
punished by any criminal prosecution whatever. (a) What the age of dis-
cretion is, in various nations, is matter of some variety. The civil law distin-
guished the age of minors, or those under twenty-five years old, into three stages:
infantia, from the birth till seven years of age; puerita, from seven to fourteen;
and pubertas, from fourteen upwards. The period of puerita, or childhood,
was again subdivided into two equal parts: from seven to ten and an half was
ceas infantice proxima; from ten and an half to fourteen, was ce/as pubertati
proxima. During the first stage of infancy, and the next half stage of childhood,
infantice proxima, they were not punishable for any crime.(b) During the other
half stage of childhood, approaching to puberty, from ten and an half to four-
teen, they were indeed punishable, if found to be doi capaces, or capable of
mischief: but with many mitigations, and not with the utmost rigour of the
law. (c) During the last stage (at the age of puberty, and afterwards), minors
were liable to be punished, as well capitally as otherwise.
The law of England does in some cases privilege an infant, under the age of
twenty-one, as to common misdemeanors, so as to escape fine, imprisonment, and
the like: and particularly in cases of omission, as not repairing a bridge, or a
highway, and other similar offences; (d) for, not having the command of his
fortune until twenty-one, he wants the capacity to do those things which the
law requires. But where there is any notorious breach of the peace, a riot, bat-
tery, or the like (which infants, when full grown, are at least as liable as others
[*231 to commit), for these an infant, above *the age of fourteen, is equally liable
to suffer, as a person of the full age of twenty-one.
With regard to capital crimes, the law is still more minute and circumspect;
distinguishing with greater nicety the several degrees of age and discretion. By
the ancient Saxon law, the age of twelve years was established for the age of
possible discretion, when first the understanding might open ;(e) and from thence
till the offender was fourteen, it was ce/as pubertatiproxima, in which he might
or might not be guilty of a crime, according to his natural capacity or incapacity.
This was the dubious stage of discretion: but, under twelve it was held that he
could not be guilty in will, neither after fourteen could he be supposed innocent,
of any capital crime which he in fact committed. But by the law, as it now
stands, and has stood at least ever since the time of Edward the Third, the
capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and
days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. For
one lad of eleven years old may have as much cunning as another of fourteen;
and in these cases our maxim is, that, "malitia supplet cetatem." Under seven
years of age indeed an infant cannot be guilty of felony; (f) for then a felonious
discretion is almost an impossibility in nature: but at eight years old he may be
(a) 1 Hawk. P. C. 2. (b) Inst. 8. 20. 10. (c) F4. 29. 5. 14. 50. 17. 111. 47. 2. 23. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 20, 21, 22.
(e) LL. Athestan. Wilk. 65. (f) Mir. c. 4, 16. 1 Hal. P. C. 27.
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guilty of felony. (g) Also, under fourteen, though an infant shall be prima facie
adjudged to be doli incapax; yet if it appear to the court and jury that he was doli
capax, and could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer
death. (1) Thus a girl of thirteen has been burnt for killing her mistress: and
one boy of ten, and another of nine years old, who had killed their companions,
have been sentenced to death, and he of ten years actually hanged; because it
appeared upon their trials, that the one hid himself, and the other hid the body
he had killed, which hiding manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a discretion
*to discern between good and evil. (h) And there was an instance in the last [*24]
century where a boy of eight years old was tried at Abingdon for firing two
barns; and it appearing that he had malice, revenge, and cunning, he was found
guilty, condemned, and hanged accordingly. (i) Thus also, in very modern
times, a boy of ten years old was convicted on is own confession of murdering
his bedfellow, there appearing in his whole behaviour plain tokens of a mis-
chievous discretion; and, as the sparing this boy merely on account of his tender
years might be of dangerous consequence to the public by propagating a notion
that children might commit such atrocious crimes with impunity, it was unani-
mously agreed by all the judges that he was a proper subject of capital punish-
ment. (j) But, in all such cases, the evidence of that malice which is to supply
age, ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction.
II. The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of
crimes, arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz, in an idiot or
a lunatic. For the rule of law as to the latter, which may easily be adapted also
to the former, is, that, "furiosus furore solum punitur." In criminal cases,
therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed
when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. (It) (2) Also, if a
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for
it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able
(g) Dalt. Just. c. 147. (h) 1 Hal. P. C. 26, 27. (i) Emlyn on 1 Hal. P. C. 25.
(j) Foster, 72. (k) 3 Inst. 6.
(1) See upon this subject, State v. Goin, 9 Humph. 175; People v. Randolph, 2 Park. C. R.
174; Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 380. A male child under the age of fourteen is sup-
posed incapable of committing a rape; but in Ohio it has been decided that this is but a pre-
sumption, which may be overcome by evidence of maturity. Williams V. State, 14 Ohio, 222.
So he may be convicted of an assault with intent to commit a rape. People v. Randolph, 2
Park. C. R. 174. An infant is liable civilly for his torts. Humphrey v. Douglass, 10 Vt. 71;
Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437. And this even though under
fourteen years of age. Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230.
(2) [It is not every frantic and idle humor of a man that will exempt him from justice, and
the punishment of the law. When a man is guilty of a great offence, it must be very plain
and clear before he is allowed such an exemption on the ground of lunacy; therefore, it is not
something unaccountable in a man's actions that points him out to be such a madman as is to
be exempted from punishment. It must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding
and memory; one who doth not know what he is doing any more than an infant, or a wild
beast; it is only such a one who is never the object of punishment. 16 How. St. Tr. 764. If
there be a total want of reason, it will acquit the prisoner; if there be an absolute temporary
want of it, when the offence was committed, it will acquit the prisoner; but if there be only a
partial degree of insanity, mixed with a partial degree of reason, not a full and complete use
of reason (as Lord Hale carefully and emphatically expresses himself), but a competent use of
it, sufficient to have restrained those passions which produce the crime; if there be thought
and design, a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, to discern the difference between
moral good and evil, then upon the fact of the offence proved, the judgment of the law must
take place. Per Yorke, solicitor-general, in Lord Ferrer's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 947, 948;
et per Lawrence, J., 3 Burn, J., 24th, ed. 312, 313.]
It has been sometimes supposed where insanity is set up as a defence in a criminal case, that
the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish the defence, and that he
must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt; but this idea is now exploded. The burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution throughout, and a presumption of innocence all the while
attends the prisoner, and entitles him to an acquittal if the jury are not reasonably satisfied of
his guilt. A reasonable doubt of the prisoner's capacity to commit the crime entitles him as
justly to an acquittal as a reasonable doubt upon any other branch of the case; and this fact
is fully recognized by the later authorities. People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Commonwealth
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to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has
pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make
his defence ? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before
judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he
becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed: for, peradventure, says
the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he
F,2 51 mioht have alleged *something in stay of judgment or execution.() In-
L J deed, in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, a statute was made,(m)
which enacted, that if a person, being compos mentis, should commit high treason,
and after fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and should suffer
death, as if he were of perfect memory. But this savage and inhuman law was
repealed by the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10. For, as is observed by Sir
Edward Coke,(n) "the execution of an offender is, for example, ut pmna ad
paucos, metus ad omnesperveniat: but so it is not when a madman is executed;
but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhuman-
ity and cruelty, and can be no example to others." But if there be any doubt,
whether the party be compos or not, this shall be tried by a jury. And if he be
so found, a total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of
course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such
deprivation of the senses: but, if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understand-
ing, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals as if he had no defi-
ciency.(o) Yet, in the case of absolute madmen, as they are not answerable for
their actions, they should not be permitted the liberty of acting unless under
proper control; and, in particular, they ought not to be suffered to go loose, to
the terror of the king's subjects. It was the doctrine of our ancient law, that
persons deprived of their reason might be confined till they recovered their
senses,(p) without waiting for the forms of a commission or other special
authority from the crown: and now, by the vagrant acts,(q) a method is chalked
out for imprisoning, chaining, and sending them to their proper homes.
III. Thirdly: as to artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, by drunkenness
or intoxication, which, depriving men of their reason, puts them in a tempo-
rary frenzy; our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offence, rather
[*26] *than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour. A drunkard, says
Sir Edward Coke,(r) who is voluntarius dwmon, hath no privilege there-
by; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it:
nam onine crimen ebrietas, et incendit et detegit. It hath been observed, that
the real use of strong liquors, and the abuse of them by drinking to excess, de-
pend much upon the temperature of the climate in which we live. The same
indulgence, which may be necessary to make the blood move in Norway, would
make an Italian mad. A German, therefore, says the president Montesquieu,(s)
drinks through custom, founded upon constitutional necessity; a Spaniard
drinks through choice, or out of the mere wantonness of luxury: and drunken-
ness, he adds, ought to be more severely punished, where it makes men mischiev-
(1) 1 Hal. P. C. 34. (i) 33 H. VIII, c. 20. (n) 3 Inst. 6. (o) 1 Hal. P. C. 31.
(p) Bro. Abr. t. Corone, 101. (q) 17 Gee. IL c. 5. (r) 1 Inst. 247. (s) Sp. L. b. 14, c. 10.
v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 340; State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43;
Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23. In the case last cited itis said that
the prosecution "are at liberty to rest upon the presumption of sanity until proof of the con-
trary condition is given by the defence. But when any evidence is given which tends to
overthrow that presumption, the jury are to examine, weigh and pass upon it with the under-
standing that, although the initiative in presenting the evidence is taken by the defence, the
burden of proof upon this part of the case, as well as upon the other, is upon the prosecution
to establish the conditions of guilt." And see per Rolfe, B., 3 C. and K. 188.
As to the degree of mental unsoundness which shall excuse a person from punishment for
his acts, the works on medical jurisprudence and insanity will need to be consulted, and the
case of Freeman v. People, 4 Denio, 9, and the Trial of Huntington, will be found instructive,
though they will probably leave upon the mind a painful sense of the difficulties surrounding
this whole subject, and the impossibility of laying down definitions and abstract rules which
can be easily and safely applied in practice. See also McNaughton's Case, 10 Cl. and Fin. 200.
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ous and mad, as in Spain and Italy, than where it only renders them stupid and
heavy, as in Germany and more northern countries. And accordingly, in the
warm climate of Greece, a law of Pittacus enacted, "that he who committed a
crime when drunk, should receive a double punishment;" one for the crime
itself, and the other for the ebriety which prompted him to commit it.(t) The
Roman law, indeed, made great allowances for this vice: "per vinum deipsis
capitalis pwana remittitur."(u) But the law of England, considering how easy
it is to counterfeit this excuse, and how weak an excuse it is (though real), will
not suffer any man thus to privilege one crime by another.(w)(3)
IV. A fourth deficiency of will is where a man commits an unlawful act by
misfortune or chance, and not by design. Here the will observes a total neu-
trality, and does not co-operate with the deed; which therefore wants one main
ingredient of a crime. Of this, when it affects the life of another, we shall
find more occasion to speak hereafter; at present only observing, that if any
accidental mischief *happens to follow from the performance of a lawful r.27]
act, the party stands excused from all guilt: but if a man be doing any [*-7
thing unlawful, and a consequence ensues which he did not foresee or intend,
as the death of a man or the like, his want of foresight shall be no excuse; for,
being guilty of one offence, in doing antecedently what is in itself unlawful,
he is criminally guilty-of whatever consequence may follow the first misbeha-
vio.x (4)V. ifthly: ignorance or mistake is another defect of will; when a man,
intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. For here, the deed and
the will acting separately, there is not that conjunction between them which is
necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or mistake of
fact, and not an error in point of law. As if a man, intending to kill a thief
or housebreaker in his own house, by mistake kills one of his own family, this
is no criminal action :(y) but if a man thinks he has a right to kill a person
excommunicated or outlawed, wherever he meets him, and does so; this is wil-
ful murder. For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion
not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort
of defence. Ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat, is
as well the maxim of our own law.(z) as it was of the Roman.(a)(5)
(t) Puff. L. of N., b. 8, e. 3. (u) Ff. 49. 16. 6. (w) Plowd. 19. (X) 1 Hal. P. C. 39.
(y) Cro. Car. 5. (z) Plowd. 343. (a) Ff. 22. 6. 9.
(3) A man who, by means of intoxication, voluntarily puts himself in condition to have
no control of his actions, must be held to intend the consequences. The safety of community
requires this rule. Intoxication is so easily counterfeited, and when real it is so often resorted
to as a means of nerving the person up to the commission of some desperate act, that the law
cannot recognize it as an excuse for the commission of crime. U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28;
Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph. 663; Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; People v. Garbutt,
17 Mich. 9. Nevertheless, the drunkenness of the party is often an important consideration
in criminal cases, where the guilty knowledge or intent constitute the principal ingredient of
the crime, so as to make the peculiar state and condition of the criminal's mind at the time,
with reference to the act done, the important subject of inquiry. See Swan v. State, 4 Humph.
141; U. S. v. Roudenbush, 1 Bald. 517; Kelley v. State, 3 S. and M. 518. As in the case of
passing counterteit money: Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555; or the appropriation of another's
property, which might be larceny or a trespass merely, according as the specific intent to steal
was present or absent. Rex v. Pitman, 2 C. and P. 423. See further, O'Herrin a. State,
14 Ind. 420; State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332; Golden v. State, 25 Geo. 527; Mooney v. State,
33 Ala. 419; Regina v. Cruse, 8 C. and P. 541. Where insanity results from long continued
intoxication, the insane person is no more to be punished for his acts than if the delirium had
proceeded from causes not under his control. U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28; State v. McCants,
1 Spears, 384.
(4) [By "unlawful" is intended here, any act morally wrong; that which is malum in se;
for if it was barely malum prohibitum, as shooting at game by a person not qualified by statute
law to use a gun for that purpose, the party will not be answerable for the unforeseen con-
sequence. Foster, 259.]
(5) Ignorance of the law, which every man is bound to know, excuses no man. See the
maxim and illustrations in Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 190.
And this maxim in criminal cases cannot often work a wrong, for there are few acts punish-
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VI. A sixth species of defect of will is that arising from compulsion and inev-
itable necessity. These are a constraint upon the will, whereby a man is urged
to do that which his judgment disapproves; and which, it is to be presumed,
his will (if left to itself) would reject. As punishments are therefore only
inflicted for the abuse of that free will which God has given to man, it is highly
just and equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which are done
through unavoidable force and compulsion.
[*28] t*1. Of this nature, in the first place, is the obligation of civil subjec-
tion, whereby the inferior is constrained by the superior to act contrary
to what his own reason and inclination would suggest: as when a legislator
establishes iniquity by a law, and commands the subject to do an act contrary to
religion or sound morality. How far this excuse will be admitted in foro con-
scientie, or whether the inferior in this case is not bound to obey the divine
rather than the human law, it is not my business to decide; though the ques-
tion, I believe, among the causists, will hardly bear a doubt. But, however that
may be, obedience to the laws in being is undoubtedly a sufficient extenuation
of civil guilt before the municipal tribunal. The sheriff who burnt Latimer
and Ridley, in the bigoted days of Queen Mary, was not liable to punishment
from Elizabeth, for executing so horrid an office; being justified by the com-
mands of that magistracy which endeavoured to restore superstition under the
holy auspices of its merciless sister, persecution.
As to persons in private relations; the principal case, where constraint of a
superior is allowed as an excuse for criminal misconduct, is with regard to the
matrimonial subjection of the wife to her husband; for neither a son nor a ser-
vant are excused for the commission of any crime, whether capital or otherwise,
by the command or coercion of the parent or master; (b) though in some cases the
command or authority of the husband, either expressed or implied, will privi-
lege the wife from punishment, even for capital offences. And therefore if a
woman commit theft, burglary or other civil offences against the laws of society,
by the coercion of her husband; or even in his company, which the law con-
strues a coercion; she is not guilty of any crime; being considered as acting
by compulsion and not of her own will. (c) (6) Which doctrine is at least a
(b) 1 Hawk. P. C. 3. (c) 1 Hal. P. C. 45.
able criminally which a party can be excusable for committing, whether he is aware of the
penalty or not. Nevertheless, the ignorance of the party may sometimes be ground for inflict-
ing a nominal punishment, or recommending him to pardon. Rex v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733; Rex a.
Bailey, R. and Ry. 1; Regina v. Esop, 7 C. and P. 456. And in some cases where the intent is
the essence of the crime, it may constitute a defence. As where a person is prosecuted for
larceny for the conversion to his own use of money which he had found, and which he erro-
neously believed became his own by the finding. The Queen v. Reed, Car. and M. 306. Or
where partieg riotously destroy a house, in the mistaken belief that in law it belongs to one of
them. The Queen a. Langford, Car. and M. 602. Or where a bankrupt, in honestly follow-
ing the advice of counsel, withholds property from his schedule which ought to be included,
and makes to the same an affidavit which in law is false. U. S. v. Conner, 3 McLean, 573.
(6) The husband must, however, be present when the offence is committed, or the presump-
tion of coercion by him does not arise. Rex v. Morris, Russ. and Ry. 270. As to what is suffi-
cient presence, see R. v. Connolly, 2 Lew. C. C. 229. And even then the presumption is not a
conclusive one, but only prima facie, and it may be shown by evidence that in fact the wife
was the real criminal. R. v. Hammond, 1 Leach, 347; 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 280; Whart. Cr. L. §
2475. The wife may therefore be indicted and tried jointly with the husband, and must rely
on the coercion for an acquittal when the proofs are adduced at the trial. State v. Parkerson,
1 Strob. 169; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 2 Gray, 510.
Coercion is not admitted as an excuse in the case of treason or murder. Reg. V. Manning,
2 C. and K. 903; and perhaps robbery should be added to this list. Arch. Cr. L. 6; 1 Bish.
Cr. L. § 270; Rex v. Cruse, 8 C. and P. 545. It is allowed in other felonies, and in misde-
meanors generally. R. v. Ingrain, 1 Salk. 384; Commonwealth v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152. But
the case of keeping a brothel and gaming-house are exceptions. R. v. Dixon, 10 Mod. 336;
State v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 27; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1 Met. 151. And husband and wife may
be jointly indicted and convicted of an assault: Regina v. Cruse, 8 C. and P. 541 ; or of keep-
ing a liquor nuisance. Commonwealth v. Tryon, 99 Mass. 442.
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thousand years old in this kingdom, being to be found among the laws of King
*Ina, the West Saxon. (d) And it appears that among the northern [*29]
nations on the continent, this privilege extended to any woman trans- [ q]
gressing in concert with a man, and to any servant that committed a joint
offence with a freeman; the male or freeman only was punished, the female or
slave dismissed: "procul dubio quod alterum libertas, alterum necessitas impel-
leret." (e) But (besides that in our law, which is a stranger to slavery, no
impunity is given to servants, who are as much free agents as their masters)
even with regard to wives this rule admits of an exception in crimes that are
mala in se, and prohibited by the law of nature, as murder and the like: not
only because these are of a deeper dye, but also, since in a state of nature no
one is in subjection to another, it would be unreasonable to screen an offender
from the punishment due to natural crimes, by the refinements and subordina-
tions of civil society. In treason, also (the highest crime which a member of
society can, as such, be guilty of), no plea of coverture shall excuse the wife;
no presumption of the husband's coercion shall extenuate her guilt :(f) as well
because of the odiousness and dangerous consequences of the crime itself, as
because the husband, having broken through the most sacred tie of social com-
munity by rebellion against the state, has no right to that obedience from a
wife which he himself as a subject has forgotten to pay. In inferior misde-
meanors, also, we may remark another exception ; that a wife may be indicted
and set in the pillory with her husband for keeping a brothel; for this is an
offence touching the domestic economy or government of the house, in which
the wife has a principal share; and is also such an offence as the law presumes
to be generally conducted by the intrigues of the female sex. (g) And in all
cases, where the wife offends alone, without the company or coercion of her
husband, she is responsible for her offence, as much as any feme-sole.
*2. Another species of compulsion or necessity is what our law calls [*3,
duress per minas; (h) or threats and menaces, which induce a fear of 0]
death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of
many crimes and misdemeanors; at least.before the human tribunal. But then
that fear which compels a man to do an unwarrantable action ought to be just
and well-grounded; such "qui cadere possit in virum constantem, non timidum
et meticulosum," as Bracton expresses it, (i) in the words of the civil law. (k)
Therefore, in time of war or rebellion, a man may be justified in doing many
treasonable acts by compulsion of the enemy or rebels, which would admit of
no excuse in the time of peace. (1) (7) This however seems only, or at least
principally, to hold as to positive crimes, so created by the laws of society; and
which therefore society may excuse; but not as to natural offences so declared
by the law of God, wherein human magistrates are only the executioners of
divine punishment. And therefore though a man be violently assaulted, and
(d) Cap. 57. (e) Stiernh. de jure Sueon. 1. 2, c. 4. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 47. (g) 1 Hawk. P. C. 2, 3.
(h) See book I, p. 31. (i) 1. 2,f. 16. (k) Ff. 4, 2, 5 and 6. (1) 1 Hal. P. C. 50.
The presumption of coercion will apply to admissions made by the wife in the husband's
presence, calculated to exonerate him and inculpate herself. Reg. V. Laugher, 2 C. and K. 225.
It is not necessary for the woman to prove an actual marriage in these cases; the jury may
presume it from evidence of cohabitation and reputation. Rex v. Woodward, 8 C. and P. 561;
Reg. v. Good, 1 C. and K. 185.
That an agent or other person acting under the authority of another is not excused from
criminal liability by the command of his superior, see Commonwealth v. Hadley, 11 Met. 66;
Kliffield v. State, 4 How. Miss. 304; Hays v. State, 13 Mo. 246; State V. Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32;
Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97. See, also, post, p. 37, n.
(7) [The fear of having houses burnt, or goods spoiled, is no excuse in the eye of the law,
for joining and marching with rebels. The only force that doth excuse, is a Force upon the
person, and present fear of death; and this force and fear must continue all the time the party
remains with the rebels. It is incumbent upon men, who make force their defence, to show
an actual force, and that they joined pro timore moris, et reces8erunt quam cito potuerunt.
Fost. 14, 216.]
See also Rex v. McGrowther, 1 East, P. C. 71; Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86.
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hath no other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent
person; this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather
to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent.(m) But in such a
case he is permitted to kill the assailant; for there the law of nature and self-
defence, its primary canon, have made him his own protector.
3. There is a third species of necessity, which may be distinguished from the
actual compulsion of external force or fear; beino, the result of reason and
reflection, which act upon and constrain a man's will, and oblige him to do an
action which, without such obligation, would be criminal. And that is, when
a man has his choice of two evils set before him, and, being under a necessity
[*31] of choosing one, he chooses the *least pernicious of the two. Here the
will cannot be said freely to exert itself, being rather passive than active
or, if active, it is rather in rejecting the greater evil than in choosing the less.
Of this sort is that necessity, where a man by the commandment of the law is
bound to arrest another for any capital offence, or to disperse a riot, and resist-
ance is made to his authority: it is here justifiable and even necessary to beat,
to wound or perhaps to kill the offenders, rather than permit the murderer
to escape, or the riot to continue. For the preservation of the peace of the
kingdom, and the apprehending of notorious malefactors, are of the utmost
consequence to the public; and therefore excuse the felony, which the killing
would otherwise amount to. (n) (8)
4. There is yet another case of necessity, which has occasioned great specula-
tion among the writers upon general law; viz. whether a man in extreme want of
food or clothing may justify stealing either to relieve his present necessities. And
this both Grotius (o) and Puffendorf, (p) together with many other of the foreign
jurists, hold in the affirmative; maintaining by many ingenious, humane, and
plausible reasons, that in such cases the community of goods, by a kind of tacit
confession of society, is revived. And some even of our own lawyers have held
the same, (q) though it seems to be an unwarranted doctrine, borrowed from the
notions of some civilians: at least it is now antiquated, the law of England ad-
mitting no such excuse at present. (r) And this its doctrine is agreeable not
only to the sentiments of many of the wisest ancients, particularly Cicero, (s) who
holds that "suum cuique incommnodum ferendum est, potius guam de alterius
commodis detraizendum;" but also to the Jewish law, as certified by King Solo-
mon himself: (t) "if a thief steals to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, he shall
[*3,] restore *seven-fold, he shall give all the substance of his house :" which
was the ordinary punishment for theft in that kingdom. And this is
founded upon the highest reason: for men's properties would be under a strange
insecurity, if liable to be invaded according to the wants of others, of which wants
no man can possibly lie an adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads
them. In this country, especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in ad-
mitting so dubious an excuse: for by our laws such sufficient provision is made
for the poor by the power of the civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the
most needy stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to sup-
port nature. The case of a stranger is, by the way, the strongest instance put
by Baron Puffendorf, and whereon he builds his principal arguments: which,
however they may hold upon the continent, where the parsimonious industry of
the natives orders every one to work or starve, yet must lose all their weight and
efficacy in England, where charity is reduced to a system, and interwoven in our
very constitution. Therefore, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being
unmerciful for denying this privilege to the necessitous; especially when we
consider, that the king, on the representation of his ministers of justice, hath a
power to soften the law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hardship. An
(m) I Hal. P. C. 51. (n) I Hal. P. C. 52. (o) De jure b. and p. 1. 2, c. 2.
(p) L. of Nat. and N. 1, 2, c. 6. (q) Britton, c. 10. Mirr. c. 4, § 16. (r) 1 Hal. P. C. 54.
(s) De off. 1. 3, c. 5. (t) Prov. vi. 30.
(8) See State v. Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Tate v. State, 5 Blackf. 73.
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advantage which is wanting in many states, particularly those which are demo-
cratical; and these have in its stead introduced and adopted, in the body of the
law itself, a multitude of circumstances tending to alleviate its rigour. But the
founders of our constitution thought it better to vest in the crown the power of
pardoning particular objects of compassion, than to countenance and establish
theft by one general undistinguishing law.
VII. To these several cases, in which the incapacity of committing crimes
arises from a deficiency of the will, we may add one more, in which the law sup-
poses an incapacity of doing wrong, from the excellence and perfection of the
*person ; which extend as well to the will as to the other qualities of his *33]
mind. I mean the case of the king; who, by virtue of his royal preroga- [*331
tive, is not under the coercive power of the law; (u) which will not suppose him
capable of committing a folly, much less a crime. We are therefore, out of rever-
ence and decency, to forbear any idle inquiries, of what would be the consequence
if the king was to act thus and thus: since the law deems so highly of his wis-
dom and virtue as not even to presume it possible for him to do any thing incon-
sistent with his station and dignity: and therefore has made no provision to
remedy such a grievance. But of this sufficient was said in a former volume,(v)
to which I must refer the reader.
CHAPTER III
OF PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES.
IT having been shown in the preceding chapter what persons are, or are not,
upon account of their situation and circumstances, capable of committing
crimes, we are next to make a few remarks on the different degrees of guilt
among persons that are capable of offending, viz.: as principal, and as accessory.
L. A man may be principal in an offence in two degrees. A principal, in the
first degree, is he that is the actor, or absolute perpetrator, of the crime; and,
in the second degree, he is who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to be
done.(a) Which presence need not always be an actual immediate standing by,
within sight or hearing of the fact; but there may be also a constructive pres-
ence, as when one commits a robbery or murder, and another keeps watch or
guard at some convenient distance.(b) (1) And this rule hath also other excep-
(u) I Hal. P. C. 44. (v) Book I, ch. 7, page 244. (a) 1 Hal. F. C. 615. (b) Foster, 850.
(1) [Where a person stood outside a house to receive goods which a confederate was steal-
ing within it, he was held a principal: 1 Ry. and M. C. C. 96; and in the case of privately
stealing in a shop, if several are acting together, some in the shop and some out of it, and the
property is stolen by the hands of one of those who are in the shop, those who are outside
are equally guilty as principals . Russ. and R. C. C. 348; and if several combine to forge an
instrument, and each executes by himself a distinct part of the forgery, and they are not to-
gether when the instrument is completed, they are nevertheless all guilty as principals. Russ.
and R. C. C. 446. But where a man incites a guilty agent to commit murder, and he is neither
actually nor constructively present, the perpetrator is the principal felon, and the former only
an accessory before the fact. 1 Hale, 435; 3 Inst. 49. Persons not present, nor sufficiently
near to give assistance, are not principals. Russ. and R. C. C. 363, 421.
Mere presence is not sufficient to constitute the party a principal, without he aids, assists, and
abets. Thus if two are fighting and a third comes by and looks on, but assists neither, he is
not guilty if homicide ensue: 1 Hale, 439; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 10; but if several come with
intent to do mischief, though only one does it, all the rest are principals in the second degree.
1 Hale, 440; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 8. So, if one present command another to kill a third, both the
agent and contriver are guilty. Id.; and see 1 Hale, 442, 444; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 8. In a late
singular case it was held, that if a man encourage a woman to murder herself, and is present
abetting her while she does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal; and that if two
encourage each other to murder themselves together, and one does so, but the other fails in
the attempt upon himself, he is a principal in the murder of the other; but if it be uncertain
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tions: for, in case of murder by poisoning, a man may be a principal felon by
preparing and laying the poison, or persuading another to drink it (c) who is
ignorant of its poisonous quality (d), or giving it to him for that purpose; and
yet not administer it himself, nor be present when the very deed of poisoning
is committed. (e) And the same reasoning will hold, with regard to other mur-
[*35] ders committed in the absence * of the murderer, by means which he had
prepared beforehand, and which probably could not fail of their mis-
chievous effect. As by laying a trap or pitfall for another, whereby he is killed:
letting out a wild beast, with an intent to do mischief, or inciting a madman to
commit murder, so that death thereupon ensues; in every of these cases the
party offending is guilty of murder as a principal in the first degree. For he
cannot be called an accessory, that necessarily pre-supposing a principal; and
the poison, the pitfall, the beast, or the madman, cannot be held principals, being
only the instruments of death. As therefore he must be certainly guilty either as
principal or accessory, and cannot be so as accessory, it follows that he must be
guilty as principal, and, if principal, then in the first degree; for there is no other
criminal, much less a superior in the guilt, whom he could aid, abet, or assist.(f)
IL. An accessory is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present
at its performance, but is some way concerned therein, either before or after the
fact committed. In considering the nature of which degree of guilt, we will,
first, examine what offences admit of accessories, and what not: secondly, who
may be an accessory before the fact: thirdly, who may be an accessory after it:
and, lastly, how accessories, considered merely as such, and distinct from princi-
pals, are to be treated.
1. And, first, as to what offences admit of accessories, and what not. In high
treason there are no accessories, but all are principals: the same acts, that make
a man accessory in felony, making him a principal in high treason, upon ac-
count of the heinousness of the crime.(g) Besides it is to be considered, that
the bare intent to commit treason is many times actual treason: as imagining
the death of the king, or conspiring to take away his crown. And, as no one
can advise and abet such a crime without an intention to have it done, there
[*36] can be no accessories before the fact; since the * very advice and abet-
ment amount to principal treason. But this will not hold in the inferior
species of high treason, which do not amount to the legal idea of compassing
the death of the king, queen, or prince. For in those no advice to commit
them, unless the thing be actually performed, will make a man a principal
traitor.(h) In petit treason, murder and felonies, with or without benefit of
clergy,(2) there may be accessories: except only in those offences which by
(C) Kel. 52. (d) Foster, 349. (e) 3 Inst. 138. (f) I Hal. P. C. 617. 2 Haw. P. C. 613.
(g) 3 Inst. 138. 1 Hal. P. C. 613. (h) Foster, 342.
whether the deceased really killed herself, or whether she came to her death by accident be-
fore the moment when she meant to destroy herself, it will not be murder in either. Russ.
and R. C. C. 523.
Besides presence and aiding and abetting the principal, there must be a partiipation in the
felonious design, or at least the offence must be within the compass of the original intention,
to constitute a principal in the second degree. Thus, if a master assaults another with malice
prepense, and the servant, being ignorant of his master's malignant design, takes part with
him, the servant is not an abettor of murder but manslaughter only. See 1 Hale, 446; Russ.
and R. C. C. 99. And in order to render persons liable as principals in the second degree, the
killing or other act must be in pursuance of some original unlawful purpose, and not col-
lateral to it. 1 East, P. C. 358.
The punishment of principals in the second degree is in general the same as principals in
the first degree. 1 Leach, 64; 4 Burr. 2076. But where the act is necessarily personal, as in
stealing privately from the person, he whose hand took the property can alone be guilty,
under the statute, and aiders and abetters are only principals in a simple larceny. 1 Hale,
529. So on an indictment on the statute against stabbing, only the party who actually stabs
is ousted of clergy. 1 Jac. I, c. 8; 1 East, P. C. 348, 350; 1 Hale, 468.]
(2) [This seems to apply merely to felonies where, by the law, judgment of death ought
regularly to ensue. 1 Hale, 618; 1 Burn, 5. The crime of petit treason is now abolished.]
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judgment of law are sudden and unpremeditated, as manslaughter and the
like; which therefore cannot have any accessories before the fact.(i) So, too, in
petit larceny, and in all crimes under the degree of felony, there are no acces-
sories either before or after the fact; but all persons concerned therein, if guilty
at all, are principals ;(lc) the same rule holding with regard to the highest and
lowest offences, though upon different reasons. In treason all are principals,
propter odium delicti; in trespass all are principals, because the law, quce de
minimis non curat, does not descend to distinguish the different shades of
guilt in petty misdemeanors. It is a maxim, that accessorius sequitur naturam
sui principalis; (1) and therefore an accessory cannot be guilty of a higher
crime than his principal; being only punished as a partaker of his guilt. So
that if a servant instigates a stranger to kill his master, this being murder in
the stranger as principal, of course the servant is accessory only to the crime
of murder; though, had he been present and assisting, he would have been
guilty as principal of petit treason, and the stranger of murder.(m)
2. As to the second point, who may be an accessory before the fact; Sir Mat-
thew Hale (n) defines him to be one who being absent at the time of the crime
committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime.
Herein absence is necessary to make him an accessory: for if such procurer, or
the like, be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. If A then advises B
to kill another, and *B does it in the absence of A, now B is principal [*37]
and A is accessory in the murder. And this holds, even though the
party killed be not in rerum natura at the time of the advice given. As if A,
the reputed father, advises B, the mother of a bastard child, unborn, to strangle
it when born, and she does so; A is accessory to this murder.(o) And it is also
settled,(p) that whoever procureth a felony to be committed, though it be by the
intervention of a third person, is an accessory before the fact. It is likewise a
rule, that he who in any wise commands or counsels another to commit an
unlawful act, is accessory to all that ensues upon that unlawful act; but is not
accessory to any act distinct from the other. As if A commands B to beat C,
and B beats him so that he dies: B is guilty of murder as principal, and A as
accessory.(3) But if A commands B to burn C's house; and he, in so doing,
commit a robbery; now A, though accessory to the burning, is not accessory to
the robbery, for that is a thing of a distinct and unconsequential nature.(q) (4)
But if the felony committed be the same in substance with that which is com-
manded, and on varying in some circumstantial matters; as if, upon a com-
mand to poison Titius, he is stabbed or shot, and dies: the commander is still
(i I Hal. P. C. 615. (k) [Id. 613. (1) 3 Inst. 139. (m) 2 Hawk. P. C. 315.
(n) 1 Hal. P. C. 616. (o) Dyer, 186. (p) Foster, 125. (q) 1 Hal. P. C. 617.
(3) [This must be understood to have reference to a case where the command is to beat
violently. 1 Hale, 442-444; 1 East, P. C. 257-259; Kel. 109, 117.]
It is no excuse for the party beating in such a case, that the command was by a master to his
servant, by a parent to his child, or by any other person occupying a position of authority; if
the beating was unwarranted by law both are criminally responsible. See Commonwealth v.
Drew, 3 Cush. 279; Hays v. State, 13 Mo. 246; State v. Bell, 5 Port. 365; Harmony v. Mitchell,
13 How. 115; State v. Bugbee, 22 Vt. 32; Curtis v. Knox, 2 Denio, 341.
(4) [The crime must be of the same complexion, and not on a different object than that to
which the agent was instigated. Thus, if A commands B to burn a certain house with which
he is well acquainted, and he burns another, or to steal a certain horse, and he steals a differ-
ent one, A will not be liable to be indicted as accessory to the crime committed, because B,
acting in contradiction to the commands of A, and that knowingly, it is on his part a mere
ineffectual temptation, and the specific crime he planned was never completed. Plowd. 475;
Hawk. b. 2, c. 29, § 18; 1 Hale, 617; 1 Fost. 360.]
See, also, Regina v. Taunton, 9 C. and P. 809. Where the offence committed is not the pre-
cise one planned and advised, Mr. Justice Foster says the proper criterion to determine
whether the adviser is involved in the legal guilt or not, is, "Did the principal commit the
offence he stands charged with under the influence of the flagitious advice; and was the event,
in the ordinary course of things, a probable consequence of that felony? or did he, following
the suggestions of his own wicked heart, wilfully and knowingly commit a felony of another
kind?" Fost. 372.
As to accessories in general, see 1 Bish. Cr. L. ch. 36; 1 Arch. Cr. L. ch. 1; 1 Russ on Cr. ch. 2.
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accessory to the murder; for the substance of the thing commanded was the
death of Titius, and the manner of its execution is a mere collateral circum-
stance.(r)
3. An accessory after the fact may be, where a person, knowing a felony to
have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon.(s) There-
fore, to make an accessory ex post facto, it is in the first place requisite that he
knows of the felony committed. (t) (5) In the next place he must receive,
relieve, comfort, or assist him. And generally, any assistance whatever, given
to a felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment,
makes the assistor an accessory. As furnishing him with a horse to escape his
[*38] *pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to
conceal him, or open force and violence to rescue or protect him.(u) So
likewise to convey instruments to a felon to enable him to break gaol, or to
bribe the gaoler to let him escape, makes a man an accessory to the felony.
But to relieve a felon in gaol with clothes or other necessaries, is no offence ;
for the crime imputable to this species of accessory is the hinderance of public
justice, by assisting the felon to escape the vengeance of the law.(v) To buy
or receive stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, falls under none of these
descriptions; it was therefore at common law a mere misdemeanor, and made
not the receiver accessory to the theft, because he received the goods only, and
not the felon: (w) but now by the statutes 5 Ann. c. 31, and 4 Geo. I, c. 11,
all such receivers are made accessories (where the principal felony admits of
accessories), (x) and may be transported for fourteen years; and, in the case of
receiving linen goods stolen fron the bleaching-grounds, are by statute 18 Geo.
II, c. 27, declared felons without benefit of clergy.(6) In France such receivers
are punished with death: and the Gothic constitutions distinguished also three
sorts of thieves, "unum qui consilium daret, alterum qui contractaret, tertium
qui receptaret et occuleret; paripenw singulos obnoxios."(y)
The felony must be complete at the. time of the assistance given; else it
makes not the assistant an accessory. As if one wounds another mortally, and
after the wound given, but before death ensues, a person assists or receives the
delinquent: this does not make him accessory to the homicide; for, till death
ensues, there is no felony committed.(z) But so strict is the law where a felony
is actually complete, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest relations
are not suffered to aid or receive one another.(7) If the parent assists his child,
or the child his parent, if the brother receives the brother, the master his
servant, or the servant his master, or even if the husband relieves his wife, who
[,*3 9 have any of them committed a *felony, the receivers become accessories
Jex post facto.(a) But a feme-covert cannot become an accessory by the
receipt and concealment of her husband; for she is presumed to act under his
coercion, and therefore she is -not bound, neither ought she, to discover her
lord.(b)
4. The last point of inquiry is, how accessories are to be treated, considered
distinct from principals. And the general rule of the ancient law (borrowed
from the Gothic constitutions), (c) is this, that accessories shall suffer the same
punishment as their principals: if one be liable to death, the other is also liable: (d)
as, by the laws of Athens, delinquents and their abettors were to receive the
same punishment. (e) Why, then, it may be asked, are such elaborate distinc-
tions made between accessories and principals, if both are to suffer the same
(r) 2 Hawk. P. C. 316. (s) 1 Hal. P. C. 618. (t) 2 Hawk. P. C. 319.
(u) Ibid. 317, 318. (v) 1 Hal. P. C. 620, 621. (w) Ibid. 620. (x) Foster, 73.
(y) Stiernhook, de jure. Goth. 1. 3, c. 5. (z) 2 Hawk. P. C. 320.
(a) 3 Inst. 108. 2 Hawk. P. C. 320. (b) 1 Hal. P. C. 621. (c) See Stiernhook, ibid.
d) 3 Inst. 188. (e) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.
(5) See 1 Hale, P. C. 323, 622; Whart. Cr. L. § 146; 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 488.
(6) These statutory provisions are repealed, and the death penalty abolished. The offence
is now punished under statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
(7) [That is (as stated in the last section), if done in order to prevent an arrest, &c.]
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punishment? For these reasons: 1. To distinguish the nature and denomina-
tion of crimes, that the accused may know how to defend himself, when indicted;
the commission of an actual robbery being quite a different accusation from that
of harboring the robber. 2. Because, though by the ancient common law the
rule is as before laid down, that both shall be punished alike, yet now by the
statutes relating to the benefit of clergy a distinction is made between them:
accessories after the fact being still allowed the benefit of clergy in all cases,
except horse-stealing (f) and stealing of linen from bleaching - grounds: (g)
which is denied to the principals and accessories before the fact, in many cases;
as, among others, in petit treason, murder, robbery, and wilful burning. (h) And
perhaps if a distinction were constantly to be made between the punishment of
principals and accessories, even before the fact, the latter to be treated with a
little less severity than the former, it might prevent the perpetration of many
crimes, by increasing the difficulty of finding a person to execute the deed itself;
as his danger would be greater *than that of his accomplices, by reason [*40]
of the difference of his punishment.(i) 3. Because formerly no man could
be tried as accessory till after the principal was convicted, or at least he must
have been tried at the same time with him: though that law is now much
altered, as will be shown more fully in its proper place. 4. Because, though a
man be indicted as accessory and acquitted, he may afterwards be indicted as
principal: for an acquittal of receiving or counselling a felon is no acquittal of the
felony itself: but it is matter of some doubt, whether, if a man be acquitted as
principal, he can be afterwards indicted as accessory before the fact; since those
offences are frequently very nearly allied, and therefore an acquittal of the guilt
of one may be an acquittal of the other also.(k) (8) But it is clearly held, that
one acquitted as a principal may be indicted as an accessory after the fact; since
that is always an offence of a different species of guilt, principally tending to
evade the public justice, and is subsequent in its commencement to the other.
Upon these reasons, the distinction of principal and accessory will appear to be
highly necessary; though the punishment is still much the same with regard
to principals, and such accessories as offend before the fact is committed.(9)
(f) Stat. 81 Eliz. c. 12. (q) Stat. 18 Geo. I1, a. 27. (A) 1 Hal. P. c0 615.
()Beccar. e. 37. (k) 1 Hal. P. C. 625, 626. 2 Hawk. P. C. 873. Foster, 861.
(8) [The authorities of Hawkins and Foster are both against this reasoning, and the princi-
ple of the law is certainly with them, because the offences are specifically different, and require
different evidence to prove them.]
(9) By statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, an accessory before the fact to a felony may be in-
dicted, tried and punished as if he were a principal felon; and, by sectioi 2, whoever shall
counsel, procure or command any other person to commit a felony, shall be guilty of felony,
and may be punished either as accessory before the fact, or for a substantive felony, and
whether the principal felon is previously convicted, or is amenable to justice, or not. And, by
section 8, accessories after the fact to a felony may be indicted and convicted of a substantive
felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not be previously convicted, or amenable to
justice, or not.
In a number of the United States there are similar modifications of the common law relat-
ing to this subject. For the rule, in the absence of such statutes, see Stoops v. Common-
wealth, 7 S. and R. 491; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477; State v. Duncan, 6 Ired. 98;
Holmes v. Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. 221.
As to charging accessories with a substantive felony, under statutes permitting that course,
see State v. Weston, 9 Conn. 527; Noland v. State, 17 Ohio, 131; Shannon V. People, 5
Mich. 71.
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CHAPTER IV.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST GOD AND RELIGION.
IN the present chapter we are to enter upon the detail of the several species
of crimes and misdemeanors, with the punishments annexed to each by the laws
of England. It was observed in the beginning of this book,(a) that crimes and
misdemeanors are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties owing
to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity. And in the very entrance of these Commentaries(b) it was shown that
human laws can have no concern with any but social and relative duties, being
intended only to regulate the conduct of man, considered under various rela-
tions, as a member of civil society. All crimes ought therefore to be estimated
merely according to the mischiefs which they produce in civil society ;(c) and
of consequence private vices or breach of mere absolute duties, which man is
bound to perform considered only as an individual, are not, cannot be, the ob-
ject of any municipal law, any farther than as by their evil example, or other
pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community, and thereby become a
species of public crimes. Thus the vice of drunkenness, if committed pri-
vately and alone, is beyond the knowledge, and of course beyond the reach of
human tribunals: but if committed publicly, in the face of the world, its evil
example makes it liable to temporal censures. The vice of lying, which con-
sists (abstractedly taken) in a criminal violation of truth, and therefore in any
[*42] *shape is derogatory from sound morality, is not however taken notice of
[*42] by our law, unless it carries with it some public inconvenience, as spread-
ing false news; or some social injury, as slander and malicious prosecution,
for which a private recompense is given. And yet drunkenness and malevolent
lying are, in foro conscientiw, as thoroughly criminal when they are not, as
when they are, attended with public inconvenience. The only difference is,
that both public and private vices are subject to the vengeance of eternal jus-
tice; and public vices are besides liable to the temporal punishments of human
tribunals.
On the other hand; there are some misdemeanors which are punished by the
municipal law, that have in themselves nothing criminal, but are made unlawful
by the positive constitutions of the state for public convenience; such as
poaching, exportation of wool, and the like. These are naturally no offences at
all; but their whole criminality consists in their disobedience to the supreme
power, which has an undoubted right, for the well-being and peace of the com-
munity, to make some things unlawful which were in themselves indifferent.
Upon the whole, therefore, though part of the offences to be enumerated in the
following sheets are offences against the revealed law of God, others against the
law of nature, and some are offences against neither; yet, in a treatise of muni-
cipal law, we must consider them all as deriving their particular guilt, here
punishable, from the law of man.
Having premised this caution, I shall next proceed to distribute the several
offences, which are either directly or by consequence injurious to civil society,
and therefore punishable by the laws of England under the following general
heads: first, those which are more immediately injurious to God and his holy
religion ; secondly, such as violate and transgress the law of nations; thirdly,
such as more especially affect the sovereign executive power of the state, or the
[*43] king and his government; fourthly, such as more directly *infringe the
rights of the public or commonwealth; and, lastly, such as derogate from
those rights and duties which are owing to particular individuals, and in the
preservation and vindication of which the community is deeply interested.
(a) See page 5. (&) See book I, pages 123, 124. (c) Beccar. c. 8.
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First, then, of such crimes and misdemeanors as more immediately offend
Almighty God, by openly transgressing the precepts of religion, either natural
or revealed; and mediately, by their bad example and consequence, the law of
society also: which constitutes that guilt in the action which human tribunals
are to censure.
I. Of this species the first is that of apostasy, or a total renunciation of
Christianity, by embracing either a false religion, or no religion at all. This
offence can only take place in such as have once professed the true religion.
The perversion of a Christian to Judaism, paganism, or other false religion, was
punished by the emperors Constantius and Julian with confiscation of goods ;(d)
to which the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian added capital punishment,
in case the apostate endeavoured to pervert others to the same iniquity :(e) a
punishment too severe for any temporal laws to inflict upon any spiritual
offence; and yet the zeal of our ancestors imported it into this country; for we
find by Bracton(f) that in his time apostates were to be burnt to death.
Doubtless the preservation of Christianity, as a national religion, is, abstracted
from its own intrinsic truth, of the utmost consequence to the civil state: which
a single instance will sufficiently demonstrate. The belief of a future state of
rewards and punishments, the entertaining just ideas of the moral attributes
of the Supreme Being, and a firm persuasion that he superintends and will
finally compensate every action in human life (all which are clearly revealed in
the doctrines, and forcibly inculcated by the precepts, of our Saviour Christ),
these are the grand foundation of all judicial oaths; which call God to witness
the truth of those facts, which perhaps may be only known to him and the
party attesting: all moral evidence, *therefore, all confidence in human [*441
veracity, must be weakened by apostasy, and overthrown by total
infidelity.(g) Wherefore all affronts to Christianity, or endeavours to depreciate
its efficacy, in those who have once professed it, are highly deserving of censure.
But yet the loss of life is a heavier penalty than the offence, taken in a civil
light, deserves: and, taken in a spiritual light, our laws have no jurisdiction
over it. This punishment therefore has long ago become obsolete; and th~e
offence of apostasy was for a long time the object only of the ecclesiastical
courts, which corrected the offender pro salute animwe. But about the close of
the last century, the civil liberties to which we were then restored being used
as a cloak of maliciousness, and the most horrid doctrines subversive of all
religion being publicly avowed both in discourse and writings, it was thought
necessary again for the civil power to interpose, by not admitting those mis-
creants (h) to the privileges of society, who maintained such principles as
destroyed all moral obligation. To this end it was enacted by statute 9 and 10
Win. III, c. 32, that if any person educated in, or having made profession of,
the Christian religion, shall, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking,
deny the Christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine
authority, he shall, upon the first offence, be rendered incapable to hold any
office or place of trust; and, for the second, be rendered incapable of bringing
any action, being guardian, executor, legatee, or purchaser of lands, and shall
suffer three years' imprisonment without bail. To give room, however, for
repentance, if, within four months after the first conviction, the delinquent will
in open court publicly renounce his error, he is discharged for that once from
all disabilities.
II. A second offence is that of heresy, which consists not in a total denial of
Christianity, but of some of its essential *doctrines, publicly and obstinately [*451
avowed; being defined by Sir Matthew Hale, "sententia rerum divinarum [*4,
humano sensu excogitata, palam doeta et pertinaciter defensa."(i) And here it
must also be acknowledged that particular modes of belief or unbelief, not tend-
(ai) Cod. 1, 7, 1. (e) Ibid. 6. (f) 1. 3, c. 9.
(g) Uties ease opinions8 has, qui8s negat, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur juredurando; quantce safais
sint foedesrum religlons; quam madtos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocavit; quamque sancta sit societas
civium inter ipsos, 1iii smmortalbs interpositis tum judcibus, turn testlbus? Ci. deLL. ii. 7.
(h) Meseroyantz in our ancient law books is the name of unbelievers. (i) I Hal. P. C. 384.
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ing to overturn Christianity itself, or to sap the foundations of morality, are by
no means the object of coercion by the civil magistrate. What doctrines shall
therefore be adjudged heresy was left by our old constitution to the determina-
tion of the ecclesiastical judge; who had herein a most arbitrary latitude allowed
him. For the general definition of an heretic given by Lyndewode,(k) extends
to the smallest deviation from the doctrines of holy church: "h'creticus est qui
dubitat defide catholica, et qui negligit servare ea, qutv Romana ecclesia statuit,
seu servare decreverat." Or, as the statute 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, expresses it in
English, "teachers of erroneous opinions, contrary to the faith and blessed
determinations of the holy church." Very contrary this to the usuage of the
first general councils, which defined all heretical doctrines with the utmost pre-
cision and exactness. And what ought to have alleviated the punishment, the
uncertainty of the crime, seems to have enhanced it in those days of blind zeal
and pious cruelty. It is true that the sanctimonious hypocrisy of the canonists
went at first no farther than enjoining penance, excommunication, and ecclesi-
astical deprivation for heresy; though afterwards they proceeded boldly to
imprisonment by the ordinary, and confiscation of goods in pios uses. But in
the mean time they had prevailed upon the weakness of bigoted princes to make
the civil power subservient to their purposes, by making heresy not only a tem-
poral, but even a capital offence: the Romish ecclesiastics determining, without
appeal, whatever they pleased to be heresy, and shifting off to the secular arm
the odium and drudgery of executions; with which they themselves were too
tender and delicate to intermeddle. Nay, they pretended to intercede and pray,
on behalf of the convicted heretic, ut citra mortis periculum sententia circa eum
[*461 moderatur :(1) well *knowing at the same time that they were delivering
the unhappy victim to certain death. Hence the capital punishments
inflicted on the ancient Donatists and Manichmans by the emperors Theodosius
and Justinian :(m) hence also the constitution of the emperor Frederic men-
tioned by Lyndewode,(n) adjudging all persons without distinction to be burnt
with fire, who were convicted of heresy by the ecclesiastioal judge. The same
emperor, in another constitution,(o) ordained that if any temporal lord, when
admonished by the church, should neglect to clear his territories of heretics
within a year, it should be lawful for good catholics to seize and occupy the
lands, and utterly to exterminate the heretical possessors. And upon this
foundation was built that arbitrary power, so long claimed and so fatally
exerted by the pope, of disposing even of the kingdoms of refractory princes to
more dutiful sons of the church. The immediate event of this constitution was
something singular, and may serve to illustrate at once the gratitude of the
holy see, and the just punishment of the royal bigot: for upon the authority of
this very constitution, the pope afterwards expelled this very emperor Frederic
from his kingdom of Sicily, and gave it to Charles of Anjou.(p)
Christianity being thus deformed by the damon of persecution upon the con-
tinent, we cannot expect that our own island should be entirely free from the
same scourge. And therefore we find among our ancient precedents (q) a writ
de hteretico comburendo, which is thought by some to be as ancient as the com-
mon law itself. However, it appears from thence, that the conviction of heresy
by the common law was not in any petty ecclesiastical court, but before the
archbishop himself, in a provincial synod; and that the delinquent was delivered
over to the king, to do as he should please with him: so that the crown had a
control over the spiritual power, and might pardon the convict by issuing
no process against him; the writ de hceretico comburendo being not a writ
r*A41 *of course, but issuing only by the special direction of the king in
council. (r) But in the reign of Henry the Fourth, when the eyes of the
Christian world began to open, and the seeds of the protestant religion (though
under the opprobrious name of lollardy) (s) took root in the kingdom; the clergy
(k) Cap. de hareticis. (1) Decretal. 1. 5, t. 40, c. 27. (m) Cod. 1. 1, tit. 5. (n) c. de heeretici&.
(o) Cod. 1, 5, 4. (p) Baldus in Cod. 1, 5, 4. (q) F. N. B. 269. (r) I Hal. P. C. 395.
(s) So called not from lolfum or tares, (an etymology which was afterwards devised in order to justify the
burning of them, Matth. xiii, 30) but from one Walter Lolhard, a German reformer, A. D. 1315. Mod. Un. Hist.
xxvi, 13. Spelm. Goss. 371.
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taking advantage from the king's dubious title to demand an increase of their
own power, obtained an act of parliament, (t) which sharpened the edge of
persecution to its utmost keenness. For, by that statute, the diocesan
alone, without the intervention of a synod, might convict of heretical tenets;
and unless the convict abjured his opinions, or if after abjuration he relapsed,
the sheriff was bound, ex officio, if required by the bishop, to commit the un-
happy victim to the flames, without waiting for the consent of the crown. By
the statute 2 Hen. V, c. 7, lollardy was also made a temporal offence, and indict-
able in the king's courts; which did not thereby gain an exclusive, but only a
concurrent, jurisdiction with the bishop's consistory.
Afterwards, when the final reformation of religion began to advance, the
power of the ecclesiastics was somewhat moderated: for though what heresy is,
was not then precisely defined, yet we were told in some points what it is not:
the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 14, declaring that offences against the see of Rome
are not heresy; and the ordinary being thereby restrained from proceeding in
any case upon mere suspicion; that is, unless the party be accused by two credi-
ble witnesses, or an indictment of heresy be first previously found in the king's
courts of common law. And yet the spirit of persecution was not then abated,
but only diverted into .a lay channel. For in six years afterwards, by statute 31
ien. VIII, c. 14, the bloody law of the six articles was made, which established
the six most contested points of *popery, transubstantiation, communion [*48]
in one kind, the celibacy of the clergy, monastic vows, the sacrifice of the
mass, and auricular confession; which points were "determined and resolved by
the most godly study, pain, and travail of his majesty: for which his most hum-
ble and obedient subjects, the lords spiritual and temporal. and the commons in
parliament assembled, did not only render and give unto his highness their
most high and hearty thanks," but did also enact and declare all oppugners of
the first to be heretics, and to be burnt with fire; and of the five last to be felons,
and to suffer death. The same statute established a new and mixed jurisdiction
of clergy and laity for the trial and conviction of heretics; the reigning prince
being then equally intent on destroying the supremacy of the bishops of Rome,
and establishing all other their corruptions of the Christian religion.
I shall not perplex this detail with the various repeals and revivals of these
sauguinary laws in the two succeeding reigns; but shall proceed directly to the
reign of Queen Elizabeth; when the reformation was finally established with
temper and decency, unsullied with party rancour, or personal caprice and
resentment. By statute 1 Eliz. c. 1, all former statutes relating to heresy are
repealed, which leaves the jurisdiction of heresy as it stood at common law;
viz., as to the infliction of common censures, in the ecclesiastical courts; and in
case of burning the heretic, in the provincial senate only.(u) Sir Matthew Hale
is indeed of a different opinion, and holds that such power resided in the diocesan
also, though he agrees that, in either case, the writ de hcretico comburendo was
not demandable of common right, but grantable or otherwise merely at the king's
(liscretion.(v) But the principal point now gained was, that by this statute a
boundary is for the first time set to what shall be accounted heresy; nothing
for the future being to be so determined, but only such tenets, which have been
heretofore so declared: 1. By the words of the canonical scriptures; 2. By the first
four general councils, or such *others as have only used the words of the [*49]
holy scriptures; or, 3. Which shall hereafter be so declared by the parlia-
ment, with the assent of the clergy in convocation. Thus was heresy reduced
to a greater certainty than before; though it might not have been the worst to
have defined it in terms still more precise and particular: as a man continued
still liable to be burnt for what perhaps he did not understand to be heresy
till the ecclesiastical judge so interpreted the words of the canonical scriptures.
For the writ de lceretico comburendo remained still in force; and we have in-
stances of its being put in execution upon two anabaptists in the seventeenth of
Elizabeth, and two arians in the ninth of James the First. But it was totally
() 2 Ien. IV, c. 15. (u) 5 Rep. 23. 12 Rep. 56, 92. (v) 1 Hal. P. (. 405.
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abolished, and heresy again subjected only to ecclesiastical correction, pro salute
anim, by virtue of the statute 29 Car. II, c. 9. For in one and the same reign,
our lands were delivered from the slavery of military tenures, our bodies from
arbitrary imprisonment by the habeas corpus act, and our minds from the
tyranny of superstitious bigotry, by demolishing this last badge of persecution
in the English law.
In what I have now said, I would not be understood to derogate from the just
rights of the national church, or to favor a loose latitude of propagating any crude,
undigested sentiments, in religious matters. Of propagating, I say; for the bare
entertaining them, without an endeavour to diffuse them, seems hardly cogniz-
able by any human authority. I only mean to illustrate the excellence of our
present establishment, by looking back to former times. Every thing is now as
it should be, with respect to the spiritual cognizance, and spiritual punishment,
of heresy: unless perhaps that the crime ought to be more strictly defined, and no
prosecution permitted, even in the ecclesiastical courts, till the tenets in question
are by proper authority previously declared to be heretical. Under these restric-
tions it seems necessary, for the support of the national religion, that the officers
of the church should have power to censure heretics; yet not to harass them
with temporal penalties, much less to exterminate or *destroy them. The
[0] legislature hath indeed thought it proper, that the civil magistrate should
again interpose, with regard to one species of heresy very prevalent in modern
times; for by statute 9 and 10 Win. III, c. 32, if any person educated in the
Christian religion, or professing the same, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or
advised speaking, deny any one of the persons in the holy trinity to be God, or
maintain that there are more gods than one, he shall undergo the same penalties
and incapacities, which were just now mentioned to be inflicted on apostacy by the
same statute.(1) And thus much for the crime of heresy.
III. Another species of offences against religion are those which affect the estab-
lished church. And these are either positive or negative: positive, by reviling its
ordinances; or negative, by non-conformity to its worship. Of both of these in
their order.
1. And, first, of the offence of reviling the ordinances of the church. (2) This
is a crime of a much grosser nature than the other of mere nonconformity: since
it carries with it the utmost indecency, arrogance, and ingratitude; indecency,
by setting up private judgment in virulent and factious opposition to public
authority: arrogance, by treating with contempt and rudeness what has at least
a better chance to be right than the singular notions of any particular man: and
ingratitude, by denying that indulgence and undisturbed liberty of conscience
to the members of the national church, which the retainers to every petty con-
venticle enjoy. However, it is provided by statutes 1 Edw. VI, c. 1, and 1 Eliz.
c. 1, that whoever reviles the sacrament of the Lord's supper shall be punished
by fine and imprisonment; and by the statute 1 Eliz. c. 2, if any minister shall
speak any thing in derogation of the book of common prayer, he shall, if not
beneficed, be imprisoned one year for the first offence, and for life for the second:
and if be be beneficed, he shall for the first offence be imprisoned six months,
and forfeit one year's value of his benefice: for the second offence he shall be
deprived, and suffer one year's imprisonment: and, for the third, shall in like
[*51] manner be deprived, and suffer imprisonment for life. *And if any person
whatsoever shall, in plays, songs, or other open words, speak any thing
in derogation, depraving, or despising of the said book, or shall forcibly prevent
the reading of it, or cause any other service to be used in its stead, he shall forfeit
for the first offence an hundred marks; for the second, four hundred; and for
the third, shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, and suffer imprisonment
(1) [This enactment, so far as it affected persons denying the holy trinity, was repealed by
the 53 Geo. III, c. 160, § 2. See R. v. Waddington, 1 B. and C. 26; R. v. Carlile, 3 B. and
Ald. 161.]
(2) See the cases cited in the previous note.
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for life. (3) These penalties were framed in the infancy of our present establish-
ment, when the disciples of Rome and Geneva united in inveighing with the ut-
most bitterness against the English liturgy; and the terror of these laws (for they
seldom, if ever, were fully executed) proved a principal means, under Providence,
of preserving the purity as well as decency of our national worship. Nor can
their continuance to this time (of the milder penalties at least) be thought too
severe and intolerant; so far as they are levelled at the offence, not of thinking
differently from the national church, but of railing at that church and obstructing
its ordinances, for not submitting its public judgment to the private opinion of
others. For, though it is clear that no restraint should be laid upon rational and
dispassionate discussions of the rectitude and propriety of the established mode
of worship; yet contumely and contempt are what no establishment can tole-
rate. (w) A rigid attachment to trifles, and an intemperate zeal for reforming
them, are equally ridiculous and absurd; but the latter is at present the less excus-
able, because from political reasons, sufficiently hinted at in a former volume,(x)
it would now be extremely unadvisable to make any alterations in the service of
the church; unless by its own consent, or unless it can be shown that some
manifest impiety or shocking absurdity will follow from continuing the present
forms.
2. Non-conformity to the worship of the church is the other, or negative
branch of this offence. And for this there is much more to be pleaded than for
the former; being a *matter of private conscience, to the scruples of [*52]
which our present laws have shown a very just and Christian indul-
gence. For undoubtedly all persecution and oppression of weak consciences,
on the score of religious persuasions, are highly unjustifiable upon every prin-
ciple of natural reason, civil liberty, or sound religion. But care must be taken
not to carry this indulgence into such extremes, as may endanger the national
church: there is always a difference to be made between toleration and estab-
lishment.
Non-conformists are of two sorts: first, such as absent themselves from divine
worship in the established church, through total irreligion, and attend the
service of no other persuasion. These, by the statutes of I Eliz. c. 2, 23 Eliz. c.
1, and 3 Jac. 1, c. 4, forfeit one shilling to the poor every Lord's day they so
absent themselves, and 201. to the king if they continue such default for a
month together. And if they keep any inmate, thus irreligiously disposed, in
their houses, they forfeit 101. per month.
The second species of non-conformists are those who offend through a mis-
taken or perverse zeal. Such were esteemed by our laws, enacted since the time
of the reformation, to be papists and protestant dissenters; both of which were
supposed to be equally schismatics in not communicating with the national
church; with this difference, that the papists divided from it upon material,
though erroneous reasons; but many of the dissenters upon matters of indiffer-
ence, or, in other words, upon no reason at all. Yet certainly our ancestors
were mistaken in their plans of compulsion and intolerance. The sin of schism,
as such, is by no means the object of temporal coercion and punishment. If
through weakness of intellect, through misdirected piety, through perverseness
and acerbity of temper, or (which is often the case), through a prospect of secular
advantage in herding with a party, men quarrel with the ecclesiastical establish-
ment, the civil magistrate has nothing to do with it, unless their tenets and
practice are such as to threaten ruin or disturbance to the state. He is bound,
indeed, to protect the established church; *and, if this can be better [*53]
effected, by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust
(w) By an ordinance 28 Aug. 1645, which continued till the restoration, to preach,write, or print any thing in
derogation or depraving of the directory, for the then established presbyterian worship, subjected the offender
upon indictment to a discretionary fine, not exceeding 501. (Scobell 96.)
(x) Book I. p. 98.
(3) [This statute of 1 Eliz. c. 2, was repealed, as far as relates to protestant dissenters, by the
31 Geo. III, c. 32, s. 3.]
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and emolument, he is certainly at liberty so to do : the disposal of offices being
matter of favour and discretion. But, this point being once secured, all perse-
cution for diversity of opinions, however ridiculous or absurd they may be, is
contrary to every principle of sound policy and civil freedom. The names and
subordination of the clergy, the posture of devotion, the materials and colour
of the minister's garment, the joining in a known or an unknown form of prayer,
and other matters of the same kind, must be left to the option of every man's
private judgment.
With regard, therefore, to protestant dissenters, although the experience of their
turbulent disposition in former times occasioned several disabilities and restric-
tions (which I shall not undertake to justify) to be laid upon them by abundance
of statutes, (y) yet at length the legislature, with a spirit of true magnanimity,
extended that indulgence to these sectaries, which they themselves, when in
power, had held to be countenancing schism, and denied to the church of
England.(z) The penalties are conditionally suspended by the statute 1 W. &
M. st. 1, c. 18, "for exempting their majesties' protestant subjects, dissenting
from the church of England, from the penalties of certain laws," commonly
called the toleration act; which is confirmed by the statute 10 Ann. c. 2, and
declares that neither the laws above mentioned, nor the statutes 1 Eliz. c. 2, § 14,
3 Jac. I, c. 4 and 5, nor any other penal laws made against popish recusants
(except the test acts), shall extend to any dissenters, other than papists and such
as deny the trinity: provided, first, that they take the oaths of allegiance and
supremacy (or make a similar affirmation, being quakers) (a) and subscribe the
declaration against popery; second, that they repair to some congregation certi-
fied to and registered in the court of the bishop or archdeacon, or at the county
sessions; third, that the doors of such meeting-house shall be unlocked, unbar-
[*54] red, and unbolted; in default of which *the persons meeting there are
still liable to all the penalties of the former acts. Dissenting teachers,
in order to be exempted from the penalties of the statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, c.
4, 15 Car. II, c. 6, 17 Car. II, c. 2, and 22 Car. II, c. 1, are also to subscribe the
articles of religion mentioned in the statute 13 Eliz. c. 12 (which only concern
the confession of the true Christian faith, and the doctrine of the sacraments),
with an express exception of those relating to the government and powers of
the church, and to infant baptism; or if they scruple subscribing the same,
shall make and subscribe the declaration prescribed by statute 19 Geo. III, c.
44, professing themselves to be Christians and protestants, and that they believe
the scriptures to contain the revealed will of God, and to be the rule of doctrine
and practice. Thus, though the crime of non-conformity is by no means uni-
versally abrogated, it is suspended and ceases to exist with regard to these
protestant dissenters, during their compliance with the conditions imposed by
these acts; and, under these conditions, all persons who will approve them-
selves no papists or oppugners of the trinity, are left at full liberty to act as
their consciences shall direct them, in the matter of religious worship. And
if any person shall wilfully, maliciously, or contemptuously disturb any con-
gregation, assembled in any church or permitted meeting-house, or shall misuse
any preacher or teacher there, he shall (by virtue of the same statute, 1 W. and
2N.) be bound over to the sessions of the peace, and forfeit twenty pounds. But
by statute 5 Geo. I, c. 4, no mayor or principal magistrate must appear at any
dissenting meeting with the ensigns of his office,(b) on pain of disability to hold
that or any other office: the legislature judging it a matter of propriety, that a
mode of worship, set up in opposition to the national, when allowed to be exercised
in peace, should be exercised also with decency, gratitude and humility. Dis-
senters, also, who subscribe the declaration of the act 19 Geo. III, are exempted
(y) 23 Eliz. c. 1. 29 Eliz. c. 6. 35 Eliz. c. 1. 22 Car. II. c. 1.
(z) The ordinance of 1645 (before cited) inflicted imprisonment for a year on the third offence, and pecuniary
penalties on the former two, in case of using the book of common prayer, not only in a place of public worship
ut also in any private family.
(a) See stat. 8 Geo. I, c. 6.
(b) Sir Humphrey Edwin, a lord mayor of London, had the imprudence goon after the toleration act to go to
a presbyterian meeting-house in his formalities; which is alluded to by Dean Swift, in his tale of a tub, under
the allegory of Jack getting on a great horse, and eating custard.
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(unless in the case of endowed schools, and colleges), from the penalties of the
statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 4, and 17 Car. II, c. 2, which prohibit (upon pain
of fine and imprisonment) all persons from teaching school, unless they be
licensed by the ordinary, and *subscribe a declaration of conformity to *
the liturgy of the church, and reverently frequent divine service, estab-
lished by the laws of this kingdom.(4)
As to papists, what has been said of the protestant dissenters would hold
equally strong for a general toleration of them; provided their separation was
founded only upon difference of opinion in religion, and their principles did
not also extend to a subversion of the civil government. If once they could be
brought to renounce the supremacy of the pope, they might quietly enjoy their
seven sacraments, their purgatory, and auricular confession; their worship of
reliques and images; nay, even their transubstantiation. But while they ac-
knowledge a foreign power, superior to the sovereignty of the kingdom, they
cannot complain if the laws of that kingdom will not treat them upon the foot-
ing of good subjects.
Let us therefore now take a view of the laws in force against the papists; who
may be divided into three classes, persons professing popery, popish recusants
convict, and popish priests. 1. Persons professing the popish religion, besides
the former penalties for not frequenting their parish church, are disabled from
taking their lands either by descent or purchase, after eighteen years of age, un-
til they renounce their errors; they must at the age of twenty-one register their
estates before acquired, and all future conveyances and wills relating to them;
they are incapable of presenting to any advowson, or granting to any other per-
son any avoidance of the same; they may not keep or teach any school under
pain of perpetual imprisonment; and if they willingly say or hear mass, they
forfeit, the one two hundred, the other one hundred marks, and each shall suffer
a year's imprisonment. Thus much for persons who, from the misfortune of
family prejudices or otherwise, have conceived an unhappy attachment to the
Romish church from their infancy, and publicly profess its errors. But if any
evil industry is used to rivet these errors upon them, if any person sends an-
other abroad to be educated in the popish religion, or to reside in any religious
house abroad for that purpose, or contributes to their maintenance when there;
*both the sender, the sent, and the contributor, are disabled to sue in 6
law or equity, to be executor or administrator to any person, to take any [
legacy or deed of gift, and to bear any office in the realm, and shall forfeit all
their goods and chattels, and likewise all their real estate for life. And where
these errors are also aggravated by apostasy, or perversion, where a person is rec-
onciled to the see of Rome, or procures others to be reconciled, the offence
amounts to high treason. 2. Popish recusants, convicted in a court of law of
not attending the service of the church of England, are subject to the follow-
ing disabilities, penalties and forfeitures, over and above those before mentioned.
They are considered as persons excommunicated; they can hold no office or
employment; they must not keep arms in their houses, but the same may be
seized by the justices of the peace; they may not come within ten miles of
London, on pain of 1001.; they can bring no action at law, or suit in equity;
they are not permitted to travel above five miles from home, unless by license,
upon pain of forfeiting all their goods; and they may not come to court under
pain of 1001. No marriage or burial of such recusant, or baptism of his child,
shall be had otherwise than by the ministers of the church of England, under
other severe penalties. A married woman, when recusant, shall forfeit two-
thirds of her dower or jointure, may not be executrix or administratrix to her
husband, nor have any part of his goods; and during the coverture may be kept
(4) The statutes here mentioned, and others operating as restraints and impediments to the
religious worship and education of persons not in communion with the established church,
are nearly all repealed. See statutes 9 Geo. IV, c. 17; 8 and 9 Vic. c. 102; 9 and 10 Vie. c.
59; 29 and 30 Vic. c. 52; 30 and 31 Vic. c. 62. For an account of the modern -advance
of religious liberty in England see May, Const. Hist. cc. 12-14.
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in prison, unless her husband redeems her at the rate of 101. a month, or the
third part of all his lands. And, lastly, as a feme-covert recusant may be im-
prisoned, so all others must, within three months after conviction, either submit
and renounce their errors, or, if required so to do by four justices, must abjure
and renounce the realm; and if they do not depart, or if they return without
the king's license, they shall be guilty of felony, and suffer death as felons with-
out the benefit of clergy. There is also an inferior species of recusancy
refusing to make the declaration against popery, enjoined by statute 30 Car.
I, st. 2, when tendered by the proper magistrate), which, if the party resides
within ten miles of London, makes him an absolute recusant convict; or if at
[*57] a greater distance, suspends him from having any seat in *parliament,
keeping arms in his house, or any horse above the value of five pounds.
This is the state, by the laws now in being,(c) of a lay papist. But, 3. The re-
maining species or degree, viz., popish priests, are in a still more dangerous
condition. For by statute 11 and 12 Win. III, c. 4, popish priests or bishops,
celebrating mass, or exercising any part of their functions in England, except in
the houses of ambassadors, are liable to perpetual imprisonment. And by the
statute 27 Eliz. c. 2, any popish priest, born in the dominions of the crown of
England, who shall come over hither from beyond sea (unless driven by stress
of weather, and tarrying only a reasonable time,(d) or shall be in England
three days without conforming and taking the oaths, is guilty of high treason:
and all persons harbouring him are guilty of felony without the benefit of
clergy.
This is a short summary of the laws against the papists, under their three
several classes, of persons professing the popish religion, popish recusants con-
vict, and popish priests. Of which the president Montesquieu observes,(e) that
they are so rigorous, though not professedly of the sanguinary kind, that they
do all the hurt that can possibly be done in cold blood. But, in answer to this,
it may be observed (what foreigners who only judge from our statute-book are
not fully apprized of), that these laws are seldom exerted to their utmost rigour:
and, indeed, if they were, it would be very difficult to excuse them. For they
are rather to be accounted for from their history, and the urgency of the times
which produced them, than to be approved (upon a cool review) as a standing
system of law. The restless machinations of the jesuits during the reign of
Elizabeth, the turbulence and uneasiness of the papists under the new religious
establishment, and the boldness of their hopes and wishes for the succession of
the queen of Scots, obliged the parliament to counteract so dangerous a spirit
by laws of a great, and then perhaps necessary, severity. The powder-treason,
in the succeeding reign, struck a panic into *James I, which operated
*58] in different ways: it occasioned the enacting of new laws against the
papists; but deterred him from putting them into execution. The intrigues
of Queen Henrietta in the reign of Charles I, the prospect of a popish successor
in that of Charles II, the assassination-plot in the reign of King William, and
the avowed claim of a popish pretender to the crown in that and subsequent
reigns, will account for the extension of these penalties at those several periods
of our history. But if a time should ever arrive, and perhaps it is not very
distant, when all fears of a pretender shall have vanished, and the power and
influence of the pope shall become feeble, ridiculous, and despicable, not only in
England, but in every kingdom of Europe; it probably would not then be
amiss to review and soften these rigorous edicts: at least till the civil principles
of the Roman catholics called again upon the legislature to renew them: for it
ought not to be left in the breast of every merciless bigot to drag down the
vengeance of these occasional laws upon inoffensive, though mistaken, subjects;
in opposition to the lenient inclinations of the civil magistrate, and to the
destruction of every principle of toleration and religious liberty.
(c) Stat. 23 Eliz. c. 1. 27 Eliz. c. 2. 29 Eliz, c. 6. 35 Eliz. c. 2. 1 Jac. I, c. 4. 3 Jac. 1, c. 4 and 5. 7 Jac. I, c. 6. 3
Car. I, c. 3. 25 Car. IT, c. 2. 30 Car. II, st. 2. 1 W. and M. c. 9, 15 and 26. 11 and 12 Wm. III, c. 4. 12 Ann. at. 2, c.
14. 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 55. 3 Geo. I, c. 18. 11 Geo. II, c. 17.
i) Raym. 377. Latch. 1. (e) Sp. L. b. 19, c. 27. k
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This hath partly been done by statute 18 Geo. III, c. 60, with regard to such
papists as duly take the oath therein prescribed, of allegiance to his majesty,
abjuration of the pretender, renunciation of the pope's civil power, and abhor-
rence of the doctrines of destroying and not keeping faith with heretics, and
deposing or murdering princes excommunicated by authority of the see of
Rome: in respect of whom only the statute of 11 and 12 Win. III is repealed,
so far as it disables them from purchasing or inheriting, or authorizes the
apprehending or prosecuting the popish clergy, or subjects to perpetual impris-
onment either them or any teachers of youth.(5)
In order the better to secure the established church against perils from non-
conformists of all denominations, infidels, Turks, Jews, heretics, papists, and
sectaries, there are however two bulwarks erected; called the corporation and
test acts: (6) by the former of which (f) no person can be legally elected to any
office relating to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within a
twelvemonth before he has received the sacrament of the Lord's supper,
according to the rites of the church of England; and he is also enjoined to
take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy at the *same time that he [*59]
takes the oath of office: or, in default of either of these requisites, such
election shall be void. The other, called the test act,(g) directs all officers,
civil and military, to take the oaths and make the declaration against transub-
stantiation, in any of the king's courts at Westminster, or at the quarter ses-
sions, within six calendar months after their admission; and also within the
same time to receive the sacrament of the Lord's supper, according to the usage
of the church of England, in some public church, immediately after divine
service and sermon, and to deliver into court a certificate thereof signed by the
minister and churchwarden, and also to prove the same by two credible wit-
nesses ; upon forfeiture of 5001. and disability to hold the said office. And of
much the same nature with these, is the statute 7 Jac. I, c. 2, which permits no
persons to be naturalized or restored in blood, but such as undergo a like test:
which test having been removed in 1753, in favor of the Jews, was the next
session of parliament restored again with some precipitation.
Thus much for offences, which strike at our national religion, or the doctrine
and discipline of the church of England in particular. I proceed now to con-
sider some gross impieties and general immoralities, which are taken notice of
and punished by our municipal law; frequently in concurrence with the ecclesi-
astical, to which the censure of many of them does also of right appertain;
though with a view somewhat different: the spiritual court punishing all sinful
enormities for the sake of reforming the private sinner, pro salute animt ;
while the temporal courts resent the public affront to religion and morality on
which all government must depend for support, and correct more for the sake
of example than private amendment.
IV. The fourth species of offences, therefore, more immediately against God
and religion, is that of blasphemy against the Almighty, by denying his being or
providence; or by contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ.(7) Whither
(V) Stat. 13 Car. II, st. 2, c. 1. (g) Stat. 25 Car. II, c. 2, explained by 9 Geo. II, c. 26.
(5) The restrictions, penalties and disabilities, imposed by statute upon persons professing
the Roman Catholic religion, are now nearly all removed. See statutes 10 Geo. IV, c. 7; 7 and
8 Vic. c. 102; 9 and 10 Vic. c. 59; 29 and 30 Vic. c. 22; 30 and 81 Vic. c. 62; May's Const.
Hist. c. 12-14.
(6) But these "bulwarks" of the church, having become generally odious, were in 1828
repealed, with the consent even of the prelates and to the general satisfaction of the nation.
(7) The law on the subject of blasphemy is so fully considered in the cases of People v.
Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S.
and R. 394; and Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 213, as to leave little to be added by
other authorities.
The doctrine of our commentator, that "Christianity is part of the law of England," is
true in the qualified sense that the law takes notice of the fact that Christianity is the prevail-
ing religion among the people, and that evil speech concerning the Being who is the object of
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also may be referred all profane scoffing at the holy scripture, or exposing it to
contempt and ridicule. These are offences punishable at common law by fine
and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment ;(h) for Christianity
is part of the laws of England.()
V. Somewhat allied to this, though in an inferior degree, is the offence of
[*60] profane and common swearing and *cursing. By the last statute against
which, 19 Geo. II, c. 21, which repeals all former ones, every labourer,
sailor, or soldier profanely cursing or swearing shall forfeit is.; every' other
person under the degree of a gentleman 2s.; and every gentleman or person of
superior rank 5s. to the poor of the parish; and, on the second conviction,
double; and, for every subsequent offence, treble the sum first forfeited; with
all charges of conviction: and in default of payment shall be sent to the house
of correction for ten days. Any justice of the peace may convict upon his own
hearing, or the testimony of one witness; and any constable or peace officer,
upon his own hearing, may secure any offender and carry him before a justice,
and there convict him. If the justice omits his duty, he forfeits 51. and the
constable 40s. And the act is to be read in all parish churches and public
chapels, the Sunday after every quarter-day, on pain of 51. to be levied by war-
rant from any justice.(8) Besides this punishment for taking God's name in
vain in common discourse, it is enacted by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 21, that if in any
stage-play, interlude, or show, the name of the holy trinity or any of the per-
sons therein, be jestingly or profanely used, the offender shall forfeit 101., one
moiety to the king, and the other to the informer.
VI. A sixth species of offence against God and religion, of which our ancient
books are full, is a crime of which one knows not well what account to give.
I mean the offence of witchcraft, conjuration, inchantment, or sorcery. To
deny the possibility, nay, actual existence, of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once
flatly to contradict the revealed word of God, in various passages both of the
Old and New Testament: and the thing itself is a truth to which every nation
in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly
well attested, or by prohibitory laws; which at least suppose the possibility of
commerce with evil spirits. The civil law punishes with death not only the
sorcerers themselves, but also those who consult them,(j) imitating in the for-
mer the express law of God,(k) "thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." And
[*61] our own laws, both before and since the conquest, have been * equally
penal; ranking this crime in the same class with heresy, and con-
demning both to the fiames.(l) The president Montesquieu (m) ranks them
also both together, but with a very different view; laying it down as an
important maxim, that we ought to be very circumspect in the prosecution
of magic and heresy; because the most unexceptionable conduct, the purest
morals, and the constant practice of every duty in life, are not a sufficient
security against the suspicion of crimes like these. And indeed the ridicu-
lous stories that are generally told, and the many impostures and delusions
that have been discovered in all ages, are enough to demolish all faith in
such a dubious crime; if the contrary evidence were not also extremely
strong. Wherefore it seems to be the most eligible way to conclude, with
an ingenious writer of our own, (n) that in general there has been such a
thing as witchcraft; though one cannot give credit to any particular modern
instance of it.
(I) I Hawk. P. C. 7. (i) I Ventr. 293. 2 Strange, 834. (j) Cod. 1. 9, c. 18.
(k) Exod. xxii, 18. (1) 3 Inst. 44. (m) Sp. L. b. 12, c. 5. (n) Mr. Addison, Spect. No. 117.
adoration by the Christian, and malicious reproach or profane ridicule of Christ or the books
of the Bible, have an evil effect in sapping the foundations of society and of public order,
and are therefore properly punished as crimes. And the punishment of the lower species of
profanity may be referred to the same principle. See upon this subject Cooley's Const. Lin.
472, et seq.
(8) [By the 4 Geo. IV, c. 31, this latter provision is repealed.]
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Our forefathers were stronger believers, when they enacted by statute 33 Hen.
VIII, c. 8, all witchcraft and sorcery to be felony without benefit of clergy; and
again by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 12, that all persons invoking any evil spirit, or consult-
ing, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or rewarding any evil
spirit; or taking up dead bodies from their graves to be used in any witchcraft,
sorcery, charm, or inchantment; or killing or otherwise hurting any person by
such infernal arts, should be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy, and suffer
death. And, if any person should attempt by sorcery to discover hidden treas-
ure, or to restore stolen goods, or to provoke unlawful love, or to hurt any man
or beast, though the same were not effected, he or she should suffer imprison-
ment and pillory for the first offence, and death for the second. These acts con-
tinued in force till lately, to the terror of all ancient females in the kingdom:
and many poor wretches were sacrificed thereby to the prejudice of their
neighbours, and their own illusions; not a few having, by some means or other,
confessed the fact at the gallows. But all executions for this dubious crime are
now at an end; our legislature having at length followed the wise example of
*Louis XIV, in France, who thought proper by an edict to restrain the [*62]
tribunals of justice from receiving informations of witchcraft.(o) And
accordingly it is with us enacted by statute 9 Geo. II, c. 5, that no prosecution
shall for the future be carried on against any persons for conjuration, witchcraft,
sorcery, or inchantment. But the misdemeanor of persons pretending to use
witchcraft, tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods by skill in the occult sciences,
is still deservedly punished with a year's imprisonment, and standing four times
in the pillory.(9)
VII. A seventh species of offenders in this class are all religious impostors:
such as falsely pretend an extraordinary commission from heaven; or terrify
and abuse the people with false denunciations of judgments. These, as tending
to subvert all religion, by bringing it into ridicule and contempt, are punishable
by the temporal courts with fine, imprisonment, and infamous corporal punish-
ment. ( p)
VIII. Simony, or the corrupt presentation of any one to an ecclesiastical
benefice for gift or reward, is also to be considered as an offence against religion;
as well by reason of the sacredness of the charge which is thus profanely bought
and sold, as because it is always attended with perjury in the person present-
ed. (q) (10) The statute 31 Eliz. c. 6 (which, so far as it relates to the forfeit-
ure of the right of presentation, was considered in a former book), (r) enacts,
that if any patron, for money or any other corrupt consideration or promise,
directly or indirectly given, shall present, admit, institute, induct, install, or
collate any person to an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity, both the giver and
taker shall forfeit two years' value of the benefice or dignity; one moiety to the
king, and the other to any one who will sue for the same. If persons also cor-
ruptly resign or exchange their benefices, both the giver and taker shall in like
manner forfeit double the value of the money or other corrupt consideration.
And persons who shall *corruptly ordain or license any minister, or pro- [*63]
cure him to be ordained or licensed (which is the true idea of simony), 1
shall incur a like forfeiture of forty pounds; and the minister himself of ten
pounds, besides an incapacity to hold any ecclesiastical preferment for seven
years afterwards. Corrupt elections and resignations in colleges, hospitals, and
other eleemosynary corporations, are also punished by the same statute with for-
feiture of the double value, vacating the place or office, and a devolution of the
right of election for that turn to the crown.
(o) Voltaire Sied. Louts XTE. ch. 29. Mod. Un. Fist. xxv, 215. Yet Voughlans (de droit riminel, 353, 459),
still reckons up sorcery and witchcraft among the crimes punishable in France.
(p) I Hawk. P. C. 7. (q) 3 Inst. 156. (r) See book II. p. 279.
(9) The vagrant act treats these persons as rogues and vagabonds, and restrains and pun-
ishes them accordingly.
(10) [But according to 2 Bla. Rep. 1052; 1 Ld. Raym. 449; Moore Rep. 564, simony is not
an offence criminally punishable at common law.]
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IX. Profanation of the Lord's day, vulgarly (but improperly) called Sabbath-
breaking, is a ninth offence against God and religion, punished by the munici-
pal law of England.( 1) For, besides the notorious indecency and scandal of
permitting any secular business to be publicly transacted on that day, in a
country professing Christianity, and the corruption of morals which usually fol-
lows its profanation, the keeping one day in the seventh holy, as a time of relax-
ation and refreshment as well as for public worship, is of admirable service to a
state, considered merely as a civil institution. It humanizes, by the help of
conversation and society, the manners of the lower classes; which would
otherwise degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness of spirit: it
enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in the ensuing week
with health and cheerfulness: it imprints on the minds of the people that sense
of their duty to God, so necessary to make them good citizens; but which yet
would be worn out and defaced by an unremitted continuance of labour, with-
out any stated times of recalling them to the worship of their Maker. And
therefore the laws of King Athelstan'(s) forbade all merchandizing on the Lord's
day, under very severe penalties. And by the statute 27 Hen. VI, c. 5, no fair
or market shall be held on the principal festivals, Good Friday, or any Sunday
(except the four Sundays in harvest), on pain of forfeiting the goods exposed
to sale. And since, by the statute 1 Car. I, c. 1, no person shall assemble out
of their own parishes, for any sport whatsoever upon this day; nor, in their
,*64] parishes, shall use any bull or *bear-baiting, interludes, plays, or other
u inlawful exercise, or pastimes; on pain that every offender shall pay
3s. 4d. to the poor. This statute does not prohibit, but rather impliedly
allows, any innocent recreation or amusement, within their respective parishes,
even on the Lord's day, after divine service is over. But by statute 29 Car. II,
c. 7, no person is allowed to work on the Lord's day or use any boat or barge,
or expose any goods to sale; except meat in public houses, milk at certain hours,
and works of necessity or charity, on forfeiture of 5s. Nor shall any drover,
carrier, or the like, travel upon that day, under pain of twenty shillings.
X. Drunkenness is also punished by statute 4 Jac. I, c. 5, with the forfeiture
of 5s.; or the sitting six hours in the stocks: by which time the statute pre-
sumes the offender will have regained his senses, and not be liable to do mischief
to his neighbours. And there are many wholesome statutes, by way of preven-
tion, chiefly passed in the same reign of King James I, which regulate the
licensing of alehouses, and punish persons found tippling therein; or the,
master of such houses permitting them.
XI. The last offence which I shall mention, more immediately against
religion and morality, and cognizable by the temporal courts, is that of open
and notorious lewdness; either by frequenting houses of ill-fame, which is an
indictable offence; (t)(12) or by some grossly scandalous and public indecency for
(s) C. 24. (t) Poph. 208.
(11) In the United States, generally by statute, persons are prohibited by law from follow-
ing their ordinary calling on Sunday, and contracts entered into on that day are made
void. These statutes have sometimes been assailed as unconstitutional, because encroaching
upon religious liberty; but the courts have sustained them. Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S.
and R. 50; Commonwealth v. Lisher, 17 S. and R. 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 529; Vogel-
song v. State, 9 Ind. 112; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225; Specht
v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312.
As to exceptions in such statutes of works of necessity or charity, see Commonwealth v.
Knox, 16 Mass. 76; Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502; Murray v. Commonwealth, 24 Penn. St. 270.
(12) The keeping of a bawdy-house is a nuisance at the common law, and indictable as
such. Smith v. State, 6 Gill, 425; Smith v. Commonwealth, 6. B. Mour. 21; State v. Evans, 5
Ired. 603; Commonwealth v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26; People v. Erwin, 4 Denio, 129. And any
form of open and notorious lewdness and indecency, as shown by Mr. Chitty in the following
note. And probably frequenting houses of ill-fame may be so open and scandalous as to con-
stitute a public offense, also, but single acts of private lewdness certainly are not such at the
common law.
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which the punishment is by fine and imprisonment. (u) (13) In the year 1650,
when the ruling power found it for their interest to put on the semblance of a
very extraordinary strictness and purity of morals, not only incest and wilful
adultery were made capital crimes; but also the repeated act of keeping a
brothel, or committing fornication, were (upon a second conviction) made
felony without benefit of clergy. (w) But at the restoration, when men, from
an abhorrence of the hypocrisy of the late times, fell into a contrary extreme of
licentiousness, it was not thought proper to renew a law of *such unfash- L*65
ionable rigour. And these offences have been ever since left to the feeble -'
coercion of the spiritual court, according to the rules of the canon law; a law
which has treated the offence of incontinence, nay, even adultery itself, with a
great degree of tenderness and lenity; owing perhaps to the constrained celibacy
of its first compilers. The temporal courts therefore take no cognizance of the
crime of adultery, otherwise than as a private injury.(x)(14)
But, before we quit this subject, we must take notice of the temporal punish-
ment for having bastard children, considered in a criminal light; for with
regard to the maintenance of such illegitimate offspring, which is a civil con-
cern, we have formerly spoken at large.(y) By the statute 18 Eliz. c. 3, two
justices may take order for the punishment of the mother and reputed father;
but what that punishment shall be is not therein ascertained; though the con-
temporary exposition was that a corporal punishment was intended.(z) By
statute 7 Jac. I, c. 4, a specific punishment (viz. commitment to the house of
correction) is inflicted on the woman only. But in both cases it seems that the
penalty can only be inflicted if the bastard becomes chargeable to the parish;
for otherwise the very maintenance of the child is considered as a degree of
punishment. By the last-mentioned statute the justices may commit the
mother to the house of correction, there to be punished and set on work for one
year; and, in case of a second offence, till she find sureties never to offend
again.(15)
(u) 1 Sid. 168. (w) Scobell, 121. (x) See book 111, p. 139. (y) See book I, p. 458. (z) Dalt. Just. ch. 11.
(13) [Exposing a party's person to the public view, is an offence contra bonos mores, and
indictable. See 1 Sid. 168; 2 Camp. 89; 1 Keb. 620. And by the vagrant act, 5 Geo. IV, c. 83,
§ 4, exposing a man's person with intent to insult a female, is an offence for which the
offender may be treated as a rogue and vagabond; and so is the wilfully exposing an
obscene print or indecent exhibition; indeed this would be an indictable offence at common
law. 2 Stra. 789; 1 Barn. Rep. 29; 4 Burr. 2527, 2574. And by the same act of 5 Geo. IV, c.
83, § 8, every common prostitute wandering in public and behaving in a riotous and indecent
manner, may be treated as an idle and disorderly person within the meaning of that act.
Publicly selling and buying a wife is clearly an indictable offence: 3 Burr. 1438; and many
prosecutions against husbands for selling, and others for buying, have been sustained, and
imprisonment for six months inflicted.
Procuring or endeavouring to procure the seduction of a girl seems indictable. 3 St. Tr.
519. So is endeavoring to lead a girl into prostitution. 3 Burr. 1438. And see post, 209,
212, as to the offence of seduction.
It is an indictable offence to dig up and carry away a dead body out of a church-yard. 2 T.
R. 733; Leach, C. L. 4th ed. 497, S. C.; 2 East, P. C. 652. And the mere disposing of a dead
body for gain and profit is an indictable offence. Russ. and R. C. C. 366, note; 1 Dowl. and
R. N. P. C. 13. And it is a misdemeanor to arrest a dead body, and thereby prevent a burial
in due time. 4 East, 465. The punishment for such an offence is fine and imprisonment.
2 T. R. 733.]
(14) Adultery and seduction are punished criminally in some of the United States. In
others the only redress is by civil action for the recovery of damages.
(15) The statute 7 James I, c. 4, was repealed by 50 Geo. III, c. 51, which made new pro-
visions for these cases.
In the United States the statutes upon the subject of bastard children do not usually go
much beyond the protection of the public against the bastard becoming a public charge.
With this object in view proceedings may be taken against the putative father, and he may
be compelled to support the child, either alone or with the assistance of the mother.
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CHAPTER V.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS.
AcCORDING to the method marked out in the preceding chapter, we are next
to consider the offences more immediately repugnant to that universal law of
society which regulates the mutual intercourse between one state and another;
those, I mean, which are particularly animadverted on, as such, by the English
law. (1)
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world; (a) in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and
civilities, and to insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that inter-
course which must frequently occur between two or more independent states,
and the individuals belonging to each.(b) This general law is founded upon
this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another
all the good they can; and in time of war as little harm as possible, without
prejudice to their own real interests.(c) And, as none of these states will allow
a superiority in the other, therefore neither can dictate or prescribe the rules
of this law to the rest; but such rules must necessarily result from those
[*67] *principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every nation
agree; or they depend upon mutual compacts or treaties between the
respective communities; in the construction of which there is also no judge to
resort to, but the law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all the
contracting parties are equally conversant, and to which they are equally
subject.
In arbitrary states, this law, wherever it contradicts, or is not provided for by,
the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power: but since in
England no royal power can introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of
the old, therefore the law of nations (wherever any question arises which is
properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. And those acts of
parliament which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal
law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as
introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental
constitutions of the kingdom: without which it must cease to be a part of the
civilized world. Thus, in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange, and
the like: in all marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances,
bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the law merchant, (d) which is a
branch of the law of nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to. So, too, in
all disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there
is no other rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from history
and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally approved
and allowed of. (2)
But though in civil transactions and questions of property between the
subjects of different states, the law of nations has much scope and extent, as
adopted by the law of England; yet the present branch of our inquiries will fall
[*68] *within a narrow compass, as offences against the law of nations can
rarely be the object of the criminal law of any particular state. For
(a) Ff'. 1, 1, 9. (b) See book 1, p. 43. (c) Sp. L. b. 1, c. 7. (d) See book I, p. 273.
(1) The offences enumerated in this chapter are in the United States cognizable by the
federal courts. They will be found treated of by Mr. Wheaton in his International Law, as
well as in other treatises on that subject, and those on criminal law.
(2) The ransom of ships is forbidden by statute 33 Geo. III, c. 66, and contracts and secureties
for that purpose are made void.
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offences against this law are principally incident to whole states or nations;
in which case recourse can only be had to war; which is an appeal to the God
of hosts, to punish such infractions of public faith as are committed by one
independent people against another: neither state having any superior jurisdic-
tion to resort to upon earth for justice. But where the individuals of any state
violate this general law, it is then the interest as well as duty of the govern-
ment, under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity,
that the peace of the world may be maintained. For in vain would nations in
their collective capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects were
at liberty to break them at their own discretion, and involve the two states in a
war. It is therefore incumbent upon the nation injured, first to demand satis-
faction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to which he belongs"
and, if that be refused or neglected, the sovereign then avows himself an acom-
plice or abettor of his subject's crime, and draws upon his community the
calamities of foreign war.
The principal offences against the law of nations, animadverted on as such
by the municipal laws of England, are of three kinds: 1. Violation of safe-con-
ducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and 3. Piracy.
I. As to the first, violation of safe-conducts or passports, expressly granted by
the king or his ambassadors (e) to the subjects of a foreign power in time of
mutual war; or committing acts of hostilities against such as are in amity,
league, or truce with us, who are here under a general implied safe-conduct:
these are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which there
can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and another: and such
offences may, according to the writers on the law of nations, be a just ground of
a national war; since it is not in the power of *the foreign prince [*691
to cause justice to be done to his subjects by the very individual delin-
quent, but he must require it of the whole community. And as during the
continuance of any safe-conduct, either express or implied, the foreigner is
under the protection of the king and the law: and, more especially, as'it is one
of the articles of magna carta, (f) that foreign merchants should be entitled to
safe-conduct and security throughout the kingdom: there is no question but
that any violation of either the person or property of such foreigner may be
punished by indictment in the name of the king, whose honour is more particu-
larly engaged in supporting his own safe-conduct. And, when this malicious
rapacity was not confined to private individuals, but broke out into general
hostilities, by the statute 2 Hen. V, st. 1, c. 6, breaking of truce and safe-con-
ducts, or abetting and receiving the truce-breakers, was (in affirmance and
support of the law of nations) declared to be high treason against the crown and
dignity of the king; and conservators of truce and safe-conducts were appointed
in every port, and empowered to hear and determine such treasons (when com-
mitted at sea) according to the ancient marine law then practised in the
admiral's court; and, together with two men learned in the law of the land, to
hear and determine according to that law the same treasons when committed
within the body of any county. Which statute, so far as it made these offences
amount to treason, was suspended by 14 Hen. VI, c. 8, and repealed by 20 Hen.
VI, c. 11, but revived by 29 Hen. VI, c. 2, which gave the same powers to the
lord chancellor, associated with either of the chief justices, as belonged to the
conservators of truce and their assessors; and enacted that, notwithstanding
the party be convicted of treason, the injured stranger should have restitution
out of his effects, prior to any claim of the crown. And it is farther enacted by
the statute 31 Hen. VI, c. 4, that if any of the king's subjects attempt or offend
upon the sea, or in any port within the king's obeysance, against any stranger in
amity, league, or truce, or under safe-conduct; and especially by attaching
*his person, or spoiling him or robbing him of his goods; the lord
chancellor, with any of the justices of either the king's bench or common [*70]
pleas, may cause full restitution and amends to be made to the party injured.
(e) See book I, page 260. (f) 9 Hen. II, c. 80. See book I, page 259, &c.
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It is to be observed, that the suspending and repealing acts of 14 and 20
Hen. VI, and also the reviving act of 29 Hen. VI, were only temporary, so that
it should seem that, after the expiration of them all, the statute 2 Hen. V con-
tinued in full force; but yet it is considered as extinct by the statute 14 Edw.
IV, c. 4, which revives and confirms all statutes and ordinances, made before
the accession of the house of York, against breakers of amities, truces, leagues,
and safe-conducts, with an express exception to the statute of 2 Hen. V. But
(however that may be) I apprehend it was finally repealed by the general stat-
utes of Edw. VI and Queen Mary, for abolishing new-created treasons; though
Sir Matthew Hale seems to question it as to treasons committed on the sea.(g)
But certainly the statute of 31 Hen. VI remains in full force to this day.
II. As to the rights of ambassadors, which are also established by the law of
nations, and are therefore matter of universal concern, they have formerly been
treated of at large.(h) It may here be sufficient to remark, that the common
law of England recognizes them in their full extent, by immediately stopping
all legal process sued out through the ignorance or rashness of individuals,
which may intrench upon the immunities of a foreign minister or any of his
train. And, the more effectually to enforce the law of nations in this respect,
when violated through wantonness or insolence, it is declared, by the statute
7 Ann. c. 12, that all process whereby the person of any ambassador, or of his
domestic or domestic servant, may be arrested, or his goods distrained or seized,
shall be utterly null and void; and that all persons prosecuting, soliciting, or
executing such process, being convicted by confession or the oath of one wit-
[*71] ness, before the *lord chancellor and the chief justices, or any two of
them, shall be deemed violators of the laws of nations, and disturbers
of the public repose; and shall suffer such penalties and corporal punishment
as the said judges, or any two of them, shall think fit.(i)(3) Thus, in cases of
extraordinary outrage, for which the law hath provided no special penalty, the
legislature hath intrusted to the three principal judges of the kingdom an un-
limited power of proportioning the punishment to the crime.
III. Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high
seas, is an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according
to Sir Edward Coke,(k) hostis humani generis. As, therefore, he has renounced
all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to
the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind
must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by the
rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him which every indi-
vidual would in a state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do, for any
invasion of his person or personal property.
By the ancient common law, piracy, if committed by a subject, was held to
be a species of treason, being contrary to his natural allegiance; and by an
alien, to be felony only: but now, since the statute of treason, 25 Edw. III, c. 2,
it is held to be only felony in a subject.(l) Formerly it was only cognizable by
(I 1 Hal. P. C. 267. (h) See book I, p. 253. (1) See the occasion of making this statute, book I, p. 255.
3 Inst. 113. (1) bthd.
(3) [A consul is not a public minister, within the act. The party, to entitle him to the
protection of the act, must be a servant, or employed in the ambassador's house: 3 D. and
R. 25; and a servant, within the meaning of the act, must be actually and bona fide such
servant. Tidd Prac. 8th ed. 193; 4 Burr. 2016, 2017. It does not matter whether the
servant is a native of the country where the ambassador resides, or a foreigner; and real
servants, though not residing with the ambassador, are within the act. 2 Stra. 797; 3 Wils.
35; 1 B. and C. 563; 2 D. and R. 840, S. C. But if the servant do not reside in the ambassa-
dor's house, and have goods in his own house, more than are necessary for his convenience as
such servant, they are not within the protection of the act. 1 B. and C. 554; 2 D. and R. 833,
S. C. The servant's name must be registered in the secretary of state's office, and transmitted
to the sheriff's office, to support a proceeding against the sheriff for such arrest. 1 Wils. 20;
Tidd Prac. 8th ed. 194.]
For similar statutory provisions in the United States, see act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at
Large. 117; Brightly's Dig. 40.
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the admiralty courts, which proceed by the rules of the civil law.(m) But it
being inconsistent with the liberties of the nation that any man's life should be
taken away unless by the judgment of his peers, or the common law of the
land, the statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, established a new jurisdiction for this
purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the common law, and of
which we shall say more hereafter.
*The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in committing those [*72]
acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed 1 -~
upon land, would have amounted to felony there. (n) But, by statute, some
other offences are made piracy also: as, by statute 11 and 12 Win. III, c. 7, if
any natural born subject commits any act of hostility upon the high seas against
others of his majesty's subjects, under colour of a commission from any foreign
power; this, though it would only be an act of war in an alien, shall be construed
piracy in a subject. And, farther, any commander, or other seafaring person,
betraying his trust, and running away with any ship, boat, ordnance, ammuni-
tion, or goods; or yielding them up voluntarily to a pirate; or conspiring to do
these acts; or any person assaulting the commander of a vessel to hinder him
from fighting in defence of his ship, or confining him, or making, or endeavor-
ing to make, a revolt on board; shall, for each of these offences, be adjudged a
pirate, felon, and robber, and shall suffer death, whether he be principal, or
merely accessory, by setting forth such pirates, or abetting them before the fact,
or receiving or concealing them or their goods after it. And the statute 4 Geo.
I, c. 11, expressly excludes the principals from the benefit of clergy. By the
statute 8 Geo. I, c. 24, the trading with known pirates, or furnishing them with
stores or ammunition, or fitting out any vessel for that purpose, or in any wise
consulting, combining, confederating, or corresponding with them: or the forci-
bly boarding any merchant vessel, though without seizing or carrying her off,
and destroying or throwing any of the goods overboard, shall be deemed piracy:
and such accessories to piracy as are described by the statute of King William
are declared to be principal pirates, and all parties convicted by virtue of this
act are made felons without benefit of clergy. (4) By the same statutes also
(to encourage the defence of merchant vessels against pirates), the commanders
or seamen wounded, and the widows of such seamen as are slain, in any pirat-
ical engagement, shall be entitled to a bounty, to *be divided among them, [*73]
not exceeding one-fiftieth part of the value of the cargo on board: and
such wounded seamen shall be entitled to the pension of Greenwich hospital:
which no other seamen are, except only such as have served in a ship of war.
And if the commander shall behave cowardly, by not defending the ship, if she
carries guns or arms, or shall discharge the mariners from fighting, so that the
ship falls into the hands of pirates, such commander shall forfeit all his wages,
and suffer six months' imprisonment. (5) Lastly, by statute 18 Geo. II, c. 30,
any natural born subject, or denizen, who in time of war shall commit hostili-
(n) 1 Hawk. P. C. 98. (n) 1 Hawk. P. C. 100.
(4) [The ordinary punishment of piracy, under the statute law, is now penal servitude for
life or any term not less than five years, or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not
more than two years.]
(5) [In the construction of the common law, as enlarged by the statutes mentioned in the
text, it appears that, for mariners to seize the captain, put him on shore against his will, and
afterwards employ the ship for their use, is piracy. 2 East, P. C. 796. And embezzling a ship's
anchor and cable is piracy, though the master of the vessel concur in it, and though the object
is to defraud the underwriters, not the insurers. Russ. and R. C. C. 123. Where the master
of a vessel insured the ship and cargo, landed the goods, and, on the destruction of the for-
mer, protested both as lost, with intent to defraud the owners and insurers, this was holden to
be a mere breach of trust and no felony, because there was no determination of the special
authority with which the defendant was intrusted. 2 East, P. C. 776. The rules as to larceny
will here apply.]
Cbap. 5.]
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ties at sea against any of his fellow-subjects, or shall assist an enemy on that
element, is liable to be tried and convicted as a pirate. (6)
These are the principal cases, in which the statute law of England interposes
to aid and enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common law: by inflict-
ing an adequate punishment upon offences against that universal law, commit-
ted by private persons. We shall proceed in the next chapter to consider
offences which more immediately affect the sovereign executive power of our
own particular state, or the king and government; which species of crime
branches itself into a much larger extent than either of those which we have
already treated.
CHAPTER VI.
OF HIGH TREASON.
THE third general division of crimes consists of such as more especially affect
the supreme executive power, or the king and his government; which amount
either to a total renunciation of that allegiance, or at least to a criminal neglect
of that duty, which is due from every subject to his sovereign. In a former part
of these Commentaries(a) we had occasion to mention the nature of allegiance,
as the tie or ligamen which binds every subject to be true and faithful to his
sovereign liege lord the king, in return for that protection which is afforded
him; and truth and faith to bear of life and limb, and earthly honour; and not
to know or hear of any ill intended him, without defending him therefrom.
And this allegiance, we may remember, was distinguished into two species: the
one natural and perpetual, which is inherent only in natives of the king's domin-
ions; the other local and temporary, which is incident to aliens also. Every
offence, therefore, more immediately affecting the royal person, his crown, or
dignity, is in some degree a breach of this duty of allegiance, whether natural
or innate, or local and acquired by residence: and these may be distinguished
into four kinds; 1. Treason. 2. Felonies injurious to the king's prerogative.
3. Premunire. 4. Other misprisions and contempts. Of which crimes, the
first and principal is that of treason.
*Treason, proditio, in its very name (which is borrowed from the
[*75] French) imports a betraying, treachery, or breach of faith. It therefore
happens only between allies, saith the Mirror: (b) for treason is indeed a general
appellation, made use of by the law, to denote not only offences against the
king and government, but also that accumulation of guilt which arises when-
ever a superior reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior, between whom and
himself there subsists a natural, a civil, or even a spiritual relation: and the
inferior so abuses that confidence, so forgets the obligations of duty, subjection
(a) Book I, eh. 10. (b) C. 1, J 7.
(6) [See 2 Haw. P. C. pp. 305, 461-465, 480, § 1. See also 5 Geo. IV, c. 113, b 9, and Forbes
v. Cochrane, 3 . and R. 679; 2 B. and C. 448.
The statute 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, repeals so much of the 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 11, "as relates to
any mariner laying violent hands on his commander, as therein mentioned." See also 9
Geo. IV, c. 84.]
Piracy is punished in the United States in the federal courts. The laws of congress prescribe
what acts shall be punishable as piracy; and the act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at Large, 113;
that of May 15, 1820, 3 id. 600; that of August 8, 1846, 9 id. 73; and that of March 3, 1847,
id. 175; are referred to for particulars. The act of 1820 makes the slave trade piracy. The
act of March 3, 1819, which was only temporary, provided for the punishment of offences
which were piracy by the law of nations; as to which, see U. S. v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; and
U. S. v. Furlong, id. 184; The Mariana Flora, 11 id. 1. And as to piracy under the act of
1790, see U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; U. S. V. Klintock, 5 id. 144; U. S. v, Furlong, id. 184.
The slave trade is made piracy by English statutes. See statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 98.
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and allegiance; as to destroy the life of uny such superior or lord.(c) This is
looked upon as proceeding from the same principle of treachery, in private life,
as would have urged him who harbours it to have conspired in public against
his liege lord and sovereign, and therefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband,
a servant his lord or master, and an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary: these being
breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, are denominated
petit treasons.(1) But when disloyalty so rears its crest as to attack even
majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high treason alta pro-
ditio; being equivalent to the crimen lwesw majestatis of the Romans, as
Glanvil(d) denominates it also in our English law.'
As this is the highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the com-
munity) any man can possibly commit, it ought therefore to be the more pre-
cisely ascertained. For if the crime of high treason be indeterminate, this
alone (says the president Montesquieu) is sufficient to make any government
degenerate into arbitrary power.(e) And yet, by the ancient common law, there
was a great latitude left in the breast of the judges to determine what was
treason or not so: whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity
to create abundance of constructive treasons; that is, to raise, by forced and
arbitrary constructions, offences into the *crime and punishment of
treason which never were suspected to be such. Thus the acroaching, [*76
or attempting to exercise, royal power (a very uncertain charge) was in the 21
Edw. III. held to be treason in a knight of Hertfordshire, who forcibly assaulted
and detained one of the king's subjects till he paid him 901.: (f) a crime, it
must be owned, well deserving of punishment; but which seems to be of a com-
plexion very different from that of treason. Killing the king's father, or
brother, or even his messenger, has also fallen under the same denomination.(g)
The latter of which is almost as tyrannical a doctrine as that of the imperial
constitutioa of Arcadius and Honorius, which determines that any attempts or
designs against the ministers of the prince shall be treason.(h) But, however,
to prevent the inconveniences which began to arise in England from this multi-
tude of constructive treasons, the statute 25 Edw. III, c. 2, was made; which
defines what offences only for the future should be held to be treason: in like
manner as the lex Julia majestatis among the Romans promulged by Augustus
C.Tsar, comprehended all tle ancient laws, that had before been enacted to punish
transgressors against the state(i) (2) This statute must therefore be our text
and guide, in order to examine into the several species of high treason. And we
shall find that it comprehends all kinds of high treason under seven distinct
branches.
1. "When a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the king, of
our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and heir." Under this description it is
(c) LL. Aelfredi. e.4. Aethest. c. 4. Canuti, e. 54, 61. (d) L. 1, c. 2. (e) Sp. L. b. 12, c. 7.
(f) I Hal. P. C. 80. (g) Britt. c. 22. 1 Hawk. P. C. 34.(h) Qu de nece virorum Mlustrium, qui consliH8 et consistorio nostro intersunt, senatorum etiam (nam et ipsipars corpos nostri gunt) vel oejus bet postremo, qui mititat nobscum, cogitaverit.: (eadem enim seve-tate volun-tatem seetrOs, qua effectum, puntri jura voluerint) ipse quidem, utpote ntsaestatis reus, gladioferiatur, bonis ejus
omnibus fsco nostro addictis. (Cod. 9, 8, 5.)
(i) Gravin. Orig. 1, J 34.
(1) This offence is not recognized in the United States, and is now abolished in England.
(2) [The provisions of this act are confirmed by the 36 Geo. III, c. 7, which is made perpet-
ual by the 57 Geo. III, c. 6. This latter statute renders the law of high treason more clear
and definite. It provides, that if any one within the realm, or without, shall compass or in-
tend death, destruction, or any bodily harm tending thereto, maiming, or wounding, imprison-
ment or restraint of his majesty, or to depose him from the style, honor, or kingly name of
the imperial crown of these realms, or to levy war against him within this realm, in order by
force or constraint to compel him to change his measures or counsels, or in order to put any
constraint upon, or intimidate both, or either house of parliament, or to move or stir any
foreigner with force to invade this realm, or any of his majesty's dominions; and such com-
passing or intentions shall express by publishing any printing or writing, or by any other
overt act, being convicted thereof on the oaths of two witnesses upon trial, or otherwise, bydue course of law, such person shall be adjudged a traitor, and suffer death as in cases of high
treason.]
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held that a queen regnant (such as Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne) is within
the words of the act, being invested with royal power, and entitled to the
allegiance of her subjects: ('j) but the husband of such a queen is not com-
[*77] prised within these words, *and therefore no treason can be committed
against him.(k) The king here intended is the king in possession, with-
out any respect to his title: for it is held, that a king de facto and not de jure,
or, in other words, an usurper that hath got possession of the throne, is a king
within the meaning of the statute: as there is a temporary allegiance due to
him, for his administration of the government and temporary protection of the
public: and, therefore, treasons committed against Henry VI were punished
under Edward IV, though all the line of Lancaster had been previously de-
clared usurpers by act of parliament. But the most rightful heir of the crown,
or king de jure and not defacto, who hath never had plenary possession of the
throne, as was the case of the house of York during the three reigns of the line
of Lancaster, is not a king within this statute against whom treasons may be
committed.(1) And a very sensible writer on the crown-law carries the point of
possession so far, that he holds,(m) that a king out of possession is so far from
having any right to our allegiance, by any other title which he may set up
against the king in being, that we are bound by the duty of our allegiance to
resist him. A doctrine which he grounds upon the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 1,
which is declaratory of the common law, and pronounces all subjects excused
from any penalty or forfeiture, which do assist and obey a king de facto. But,
in truth, this seems to be confounding all notions of right and wrong; and the
consequence would be, that when Cromwell had murdered the elder Charles,
and usurped the power (though not the name) of king, the people were bound
in duty to hilider the son's restoration: and were the king of Poland or Morocco
to invade this kingdom, and by any means to get possession of the crown (a
term, by the way, of very loose and indistinct signification), the subject would be
bound by his allegiance to fight for his natural prince to-day, and by the same
duty of allegiance to fight against him to-morrow. The true distinction seems
[*781 to be, that the statute of Henry *the Seventh does by no means com-
mand any opposition to a king de .jure; but excuses the obedience paid
to a king de facto. When, therefore, an usurper is in possession, the subject is
excused and iustified in obeying and giving him assistance: otherwise, under an
usurpation, no man could be safe: if the lawful prince had a right to hang him
for obedience to the powers in being, as the usurper would certainly do for dis-
obedience. Nay, farther, as the mass of people are imperfect judges of title, of
which in all cases possession is prima facie evidence, the law compels no man
to yield obedience to that prince, whose right is by want of possession rendered
uncertain and disputable, till Providence shall think fit to interpose in his
favour, and decide the ambiguous claim: and, therefore, till he is entitled to
such allegiance by possession, no treason can be committed against him. Lastly,
a king who has resigned his crown, such resignation being admitted and ratified
in parliament, is, according to Sir Matthew Hale, no longer the object of trea-
son.(n) And the same reason holds, in case a king abdicates the government;
or, by actions subversive of the constitution, virtually renounces the authority
which he claims by that very constitution: since, as was formerly observed,(o)
when the fact of abdication is once established, and determined by the proper
judges, the consequence necessarily follows, that the throne is thereby vacant,
and he is no longer king.
Let us next see, what is a compassing or imagining the death of the king, &c.
These are synonymous terms; the word compass signifying the purpose or
design of the mind or will,(p) and not, as in common speech, the carrying such
design to effect.(q) And therefore an accidental stroke, which may mortally
) 1 Hal. P. C. 101. (k) 3 Inst. 7. 1 Hal. P. C. 106. (1) 3 Inst. 7. 1 Hal. P. C. 104.
) I Hawk. P. C. 36. (n) 1 Hal. t'. C. 104 (o) Book I, page 212.
By the ancient law eompassing or intending the death of any man, demonstrated by some evident fact,
was equally penal as homicide itself. (3 Inst. 5.)
(q) 1 Hal. P. C. 107.
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wound the sovereign, per infortunium, without any traitorous intent, is no trea-
son: as was the case of Sir Walter Tyrrel, who, by the command of King Wil-
liam Rufus, *shooting at a hart, the arrow glanced against a tree, and killed [*79]
the king upon the spot.(r) But, as this compassing or imagining is an act
of the mind, it cannot possibly fall under any judicial cognizance, unless it be
demonstrated by some open, or overt act.(3) And yet the tyrant Dionysius is
recorded (s) to have executed a subject, barely for dreaming that he had killed
him; which was held of sufficient proof, that he bad thought thereof in his
waking hours. But such is not the temper of the English law; and, therefore,
in this, and the three next species of treason, it is necessary that there appear
an open or overt act of a more full and explicit nature, to convict the traitor
upon. The statute expressly requires that the accused "be thereof, upon suffi-
cient proof, attainted of some open act by men of his own condition." Thus,
to provide weapons or ammunition for the purpose of killing the king is held
to be a palpable overt act of treason in imagining his death.(t) To conspire to
imprison the king by force, and move towards it by assembling company, is an
overt act of compassing the king's death; (it) for all force, used to the person
of the king, in its consequence may tend to his death, and is a strong presump-
tion of something worse intended than the present force, by such as have so far
thrown off their bounden duty to their sovereign; it being an old observation,
that there is generally but a short interval between the prisons and the graves
of princes. There is no question, also, but that taking any measures to render
such treasonable purposes effectual, as assembling and consulting on the means
to kill the king, is a sufficient overt act of high treason.(w) (4)
How far mere words, spoken by an individual, and not relative to any treason-
(r) 3 Inst. 6. (s) Plutarch, in vit. (t) 3 Inst. 12. (u) 1 Hal. P. C. 109.
(w) 1 Hawk P. C. 38. 1 Hal. P. C. 119.
(3) [In the case of the regicides, the indictment charged is, that they did traitorously compass
and imagine the death of the king. And the taking off his head was laid, among others, as
an overt act of compassing. And the person who was supposed to have given the stroke was
convicted on the same indictment. For the compassing is considered as the treason, the overt
act as the means made use of to effectuate the intentions of the heart. And in every indict-
ment for this species of treason, and, indeed, for levying war, or adhering to the king's enemies,
an overt act must be alleged and proved. For the overt act is the charge to which the pris-
oner must apply his defence. But it is not necessary that the whole of the evidence intended
to be given should be seth forth; the common law never required this exactness, nor doth the
statute of King William require it. It is sufficient that the charge be reduced to a reasonable
certainty, so that the defendant may be apprized of the nature of it, and prepared to give an
answer to it. Fost. 194.]
(4) [This subject is so ably explained by Mr. Justice Foster in his first discourse on high
treason, that it may be useful to annex here two of his sections. "In the case of the king
the statute of treasons hath, with great propriety, retained the rule voluntas pro facto. The
principle upon which this is founded is too obvious to need much enlargement. The king is
considered as the head of the body-politic, and the members of that body are considered as
united and kept together by a political union with him and with each other. His life cannot,
in the ordinary course of things, be taken away by treasonable practices without involving a
whole nation in blood and confusion; consequently, every stroke levelled at his person is, in
the ordinary course of things, levelled at the public tranquillity. The law, therefore, tendereth
the safety of the king with an anxious concern; and, if I may use the expression, with a con-
cern bordering upon jealousy. It considereth the wicked imaginations of the heart, in the
same degree of guilt as if carried into actual execution, from the moment measures appear to
have been taken to render them effectual. And, therefore, if conspirators meet and consult
how to kill the king, though they do not then fall upon any scheme for that purpose, this is
an overt act of compassing his death; and so are all means made use of, be it advice, per-
suasion, or command, to incite or encourage others to commit the fact, or join in the attempt;
and every person who but assenteth to any overtures for that purpose will be involved in the
same guilt.
"The care the law hath taken for the personal safety of the king is not confined to actions
or attempts of the more flagitious kind,, to assassination or poison, or other attempts directly
and immediately aiming at his life. It is extended to every thing wilfully and deliberately
done or attempted, whereby his life may be endangered. And, therefore, the entering into
measures for deposing or imprisoning him, or to get his person into the power of the con-
spirators, these offences are overt acts of treason within this branch of the statute. For ex-
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able act or design then in agitation, shall amount to treason, has been formerly
matter of doubt. We have two instances in the reign of Edward the Fourth,
[,80] *of persons executed for treasonable words : the one a citizen of London,
[*80 who said he would make his son heir of the crown, being the sign of the
house in which he lived; the other a gentleman whose favourite buck the king kill-
ed in hunting, whereupon he wished it, horns and all, in the king's belly.(5) These
were esteemed hard cases: and the chief justice, Markham, rather chose to leave
his place than assent to the latter judgment.(x) But now it seems clearly to be
agreed, that by the common law and the statute of Edward III, words spoken
amount to only a high misdemeanor, and no treason. For they may be spoken
in heat, without any intention, or be mistaken, perverted, or mis-remembered by
the hearers; their meaning depends always on their connection with other words
and things; they may signify differently even according to the tone of voice with
which they are delivered; and sometimes silence itself is more expressive than
any discourse. As, therefore, there can be nothing more equivocal and ambiguous
than words, it would indeed be unreasonable to make them amount to high
treason. And accordingly in 4 Car. I, on a reference to all the judges, concern-
ing some very atrocious words spoken by one Pyne, they certified to the king,
"that though the words were as wicked as might be, yet they were no treason:
for unless it be by some particular statute, no words will be treason."(y) (6) If the
words be set down in writing, it argues more deliberate intention: and it has been
held that writing is an overt act of treason; for scribere est agere. But even in
this case the bare words are not the treason, but the deliberate act of writing
them. And such writing, though unpublished, has in some arbitrary reigns con-
victed its author of treason: particularly in the cases of one Peachum, a clergy-
man, for treasonable passages in a sermon never preached; (z) and of Algernon
Sydney, for some papers found in his closet; which, had they been plainly re-
lative to any previous formed design of dethroning or murdering the king, might
[*81] doubtless have been properly read in evidence as overt *acts of that treason,
which was specially laid in the indictment.(a) But being merely specu-
lative, without any intention (so far as appeared)of making any public use of them,
the convicting the authors of treason upon such an insufficient foundation has been
universally disapproved. Peachum was therefore pardoned: and though Sydney
indeed was executed, yet it was to the general discontent of the nation; and his
attainder was afterwards reversed by parliament. There was then no manner
of doubt, but that the publication of such a treasonable writing was a sufficient
overt act of treason at the common law; (b) though of late even that has been
questioned.
2. The second species of treason is, "if a man do violate the king's companion,
or the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the king's eldest son and
(x) I Hal. P. C. 115. (y) Cro. Car. 125. (z) Ibid. (a) Foster, 198. (b) 1 Hal. P. C. 118. 1 Hawk. P. C. 38.
perience has shown that between the prisons and the graves of princes the distance is very
small." Fost. 194.
. This was the species of treason with which the state prisoners were charged, who were
tried in 1794. And the question as stated by the court for the jury to try, was, Whether their
measures had been entered into with an intent to subvert the monarchy and to depose the
king? See Hardy's trial.]
And any one who would understand thoroughly the law of treason in England should not
fail to read this case, very fully reported in the State Trials, and in which was made one of
the finest displays of Mr. Erskine's matchless abilities as an advocate.
(5) [There was even. a refinement and degree of subtlety in the cruelty of that case, for he
wished it, horns and all, in the belly of him who counselled the king to kill it; and as the king
killed it of his own accord, or was his own counsellor, it was held to be a treasonable wish
against the king himself. 1 Hal. P. C. 115.]
(6) [This subject is fully and ably discussed by Mr. J. Foster, who maintains that words alone
cannot amount to an overt act of treason; but if they are attended or followed by a consulta-
tion, meeting, or any act, then they will be evidence, or a confession, t)f the intent of such con-
sultation, meeting, or act; and he concludes, that "loose words, not relative to facts, are at the
worst no more than bare indications of the malignity of the heart." Fost. 202, et seq.]
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heir." By the king's companion is meant his wife; and by violation is under-
stood carnal knowledge, as well without force, as with it: and this is high trea-
son in both parties, if both be consenting; as some of the wives of Henry the
Eighth by fatal experience evinced. The plain intention of this law is to guard
the blood royal from any suspicion of bastardy, whereby the succession to the
crown might be rendered dubious: and therefore, when this reason ceases, the law
ceases with it; for to violate a queen or princess-dowager is held to be no trea-
son : (c) (7) in like manner as, by the feudal law, it was a felony and attended with
a forfeiture of the fief, if the vassal vitiated the wife or daughter of his lord; (d)
but not so, if he only vitiated his widow. (e)
3. The third species of treason is, "if a man do levy war against our lord the
king in his realm." And this may be done by taking arms, not only to dethrone
the king, but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil
counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended. (f) (8) For the law
does not, neither can it, permit *any private man, or set of men, to inter- [*82]
fere forcibly in matters of such high importance; especially as it has es- 1*821
tablished a gufficient power, for these purposes, in the high court of parliament:
neither does the constitution justify any private or particular resistance for pri-
vate or particular grievances; though in cases of national oppression the nation
has very justifiably risen as one man, to vindicate the original contract subsisting
between the king and his people. To resist the king's forces by defending a
castle against them, is a levying of war: and so is an insurrection with an avowed
design to pull down all inclosures, all brothels, and the like; the universality
of the design making it a rebellion against the state, an usurpation of the powersgovernme t, and an insol nt invasion of the king's uthori y.i) But a tumult,
with a view to pull down a particular house, or lay open a particular inclosure,amounts at most to a riot ; this being no general defiance of public government.So, if two subjects quarrel and levy war against each other (in that spirit of pri-
vate war, which prevailed all over Europe (ih) in the early feudal times), it is only
a great riot and contempt, and no treason. Thus it happened between the earls
of Hereford and Gloucester, in 20 Edw. I, who raised each a little army, and com-mitted outrages on each others's lands, burning houses, attended with the loss
of many lives: yet this was held to be no high treason, but only a great misde-
meanor.(i) A bare conspiracy to levy war does not amount to this species of
treason ; but (if particularly pointed at the person of the king or his government)
it falls within the first, of compassing or imagining the king's death. (k)
4. "If a man be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm, giving to them
aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere," he is also declared guilty of high
treason. This must likewise be proved by some overt act, as by givng them
intelligence,(9) by sending them provisions, by selling them arms, by treacher-
ously surrendering a fortress, or the *like.(l) By enemies are here under- [*83]
stood the subjects of foreign powers w wo we ar amnt open war. As o
() 3Inst. 9. b (f p .rticu .rl e) itd. t. 21. (f) iHawk. P.oC. 37. (g) rHal. P.C. i2.
() Robertson Ch. V, i, 45, 28. (i) i Hal. P. C. 136. (k) 3 nst. 9. Foster,2i1, 213. () 5 Inst. iO.
(7) [But the instances specified in the statute do not prove much consistency in the applica-
tion of this reasou; for there is no protection giveu to the wives of the younger sons of the
king, though their issue must inherit the crown before the issue of the king's eldest daughter,
and her chastity is only inviolable before marriage, whilst her children would be clearly ille-
gitimate.Before the 25 Edw. III it was held to be high treason not only to violate the wife and daugh-
ters of the king, but also the nurses of his children, es notices e out enfantz. Britt. c. 8.]
(8) [Lord Mansfield declared, upon the trial of Lord George Gordon, that it was the unani-
mous opinion of the court, that an attempt, by intimidation and violence, to force the repeal
of a law, was a levyihg war agaiust the king, and high treason. Doug. 570.] See Regina r.
Frost, 9. C. and P. 129.(9) [Sending intelligence to the enemy of the destinations and designs of this kingdom, in
order to assist them in their operations against us, or in defence of themselves, is high treason,
although such correspondence should be intercepted. Dr. Hensey's Case, 1 Burr. 650. The
same doctrine was held by Lord Kenyon and the court in the case of William Stone, who
Vos t II.-44 345
Chap. 6.]
HIGH TREASON.
to foreign pirates or robbers, who may happen to invade our coasts, without any
open hostilities between their nation and our own, and without any commission
from any prince or state at emnity with the crown of Great Britain, the giving
them any assistance is also clearly treason; either in the light of adhering to
the public enemies of the king and kingdom,(m) or else in that of levying war
against his majesty. And, most indisputably, the same acts of adherence or aid,
which (when applied to foreign enemies) will constitute treason under this
branch of the statute, will (when afforded to our own fellow subjects in actual
rebellion at home) amount to high treason under the description of levying war
against the king.(n) But to relieve a rebel, fled out of the kingdom, is no
treason: for the statute is taken strictly, and a rebel is not an enemy: an enemy
being always the subject of some foreign prince, and one who owes no allegiance
to the crown of England.(o) And if a person be under circumstances of actual
force and constraint, through a well grounded apprehension of injury to his life
or person, this fear or compulsion will excuse his even joining with either rebels
or enemies in the kingdom, provided he leaves them whenever he hath a safe
opportunity. (p)
5. "If a man counterfeit the king's great or privy seal," this is also high
treason. But if a man takes wax bearing the impression of the great seal off
from one patent, and fixes it to another, this is held to be only an abuse of the
seal, and not a counterfeiting of it: as was the case of a certain chaplain, who
in such manner framed a dispensation for non-residence. But the knavish arti-
fice of a lawyer much exceeded this of the divine. One of the clerks in chan-
cery glued together two pieces of parchment, on the uppermost of which he
wrote a patent, to which he regularly obtained the great seal, the label going
[*84] through both the skins. He *then dissolved the cement; and taking off
the written patent, on the blank skin wrote a fresh patent, of a different
import from the former, and published it as true. This was held no counter-
feiting of the great seal, but only a great misprision ; and Sir Edward Coke(q)
mentions it with some indignation, that the party was living at that day.
(m) Foster, 219. (n) Ibid. 216. (o) 1 Hawk. P. C. 38. (p) Poster, 216. (q) 3 Inst. 16.
was tried at the bar of the court of king's bench, in Hilary term, 1796. In the same case it was
held, that sending a paper to the enemy, though it was afterwards intercepted, containing
advice not to invade this country, if sent with the intention of assisting their councils in
their conduct and in the prosecution of the war, was high treason. 6 T. R. 527.]
Treason against the United States is very carefully defined and limited by the constitution,
and it can consist " only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort." Const. of United States, art. 3, § 3. And by the same section, " No
person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court." See, also, act of April 30, 1790 ( 1 Stat. at Large
112), prescribing the penalty of death for this offence.
The question, what is treason under the constitution, was considered in Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch, 75, and it was there held that a conspiracy to subvert the government by force is
not treason, but that war must be actually levied. See also U. S. v. Hanway, 1 Wal. Jr. 139;
Respublica v. Carlisle, 1 Dall. 35. In Fries' Case (Whart. State Trials, 634), Judge Chase, of
the United States supreme court, charged the jury, among other things, as follows:
"It is the opinion of the court that any insurrection or rising of any body of people, within
the United States, to attain or effect by force or violence any object of a great public nature,
or of public and general (or national) concern, is a levying of war against the United States
within the contemplation and construction of the constitution.
"On this general position the court are of opinion that any such insurrection or rising to
resist, or to prevent by force or violence, the execution of any statute of the United States,
for levying or collecting taxes, duties, imposts or excises; or for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, or for any other object of a general nature or national
concern, under any pretence, as that the statute was unjust, burthensome, oppressive or
unconstitutional, is a levying war against the United States within the contemplation and
construction of the constitution. The reason for this opinion is, that an insurrection to
resist or prevent by force the execution of any statute of the United States has a direct tend-
ency to dissolve all the bands of society, to destroy all order and all laws, and also all security
for the lives, liberties and property of the citizens of the United States.
'The court are of opinion that military weapons (as guns and swords, mentioned in the
indictment) are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to a levying war,
346
[Book IV.
Chap. 6.] HIGhI TREASON.
6. The sixth species of treason under this statute, is "if a man counterfeit
the king's money: and if a man bring false money into the realm counterfeit to
the money of England, knoving the money to be false, to merchandise and
make payment withal." As to the first branch, counterfeiting the king's
money; this is treason, whether the false money be uttered in payment or not.
Also, if the king's own minters alter the standard or alloy established by law, it
is treason. But gold and silver money only are held to be within the stat-
ute.(r)(10) With regard likewise to the second branch, importing foreign
counterfeit money, in order to utter it here; it is held that uttering it, with-
out importing it, is not within the statute.(s) But of this we shall presently
say more.
7. The last species of treason ascertained by the statute, is, "if a man slay
the chancellor, treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other,
justices in eyre, or justices of assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and
determine, being in their places doing their offices." These high magistrates,
as they represent the king's majesty during the execution of their offices, are
therefore for the time equally regarded by the law. But this statute extends
only to the actual killing of them, and not wounding, or a bare attempt to kill
them. It extends also only to the officers therein specified; and therefore the
barons of exchequer, as such, are not within the protection of this act:(t) but
the lord keeper or commissioners of the great seal now seem to be within it, by
virtue of the statutes 5 Eliz. c. 18, and 1 W. and M. c. 21.
*Thus careful was the legislature, in the reign of Edward the Third [*85]
to specify and reduce to a certainty the vague notions of treason that
(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 42. (s) Ibid. 43, (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 231.
because numbers may supply the want of weapons, and other instruments may effect the in-
tended mischief. The legal guilt of levying war may be incurred without the use of military
weapons or military array.
" The court are of the opinion that the assembling of bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a
warlike manner, for purposes only of a private nature, is not treason, although the judges or
other peace officers should be insulted or resisted, or even great outrages committed to the
persons or property of our citizens.
"The true criterion whether acts committed are treason or a less offence (as a riot) is the
quo animo, or the intention, with which the people did assemble. When the intention is uni-
versal or general, as to effect some object of a general public nature, it will be treason, and
cannot be considered, construed, or reduced to a riot. The commission of any number of
felonies, riots, or other misdemeanors, cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount
to treason; and on the other hand, if the intention and acts combined amount to a treason,
they cannot be sunk down to a felony or riot. The intention with which any acts (as felonies,
the destruction of property or the like) are done, will show to what class of crimes the case
belongs." See also U. S. v. Hanway, 2 Wal. Jr. 144; U. S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall. 348; U. S. v.
Vigols, id. 246; U. S. v. Hoxie, 1 Paine, 265. And as to what is adhering to the enemies of
the United States, see U. S. v. Hodges, 2 Dall. 87 ; U. S. v. Pryor, 3 Wash. C. C. 234. And see 2
Bish. Cr. L., § 1032 to 1038 (where the doctrine of Judge Chase, above stated, is some-
what questioned), Whart. Cr. L. 2718, et seq.
Attainder of treason against the United States works corruption of blood, or forfeiture
only during the life of the person attainted. Const., art. 3, § 3.
Treason may also be committed against the several states. The crime is generally defined
and limited in the state constitutions in the same manner as in the constitution of the United
States, and the punishment prescribed is the same.
(10) [The moneys charged to be counterfeited must resemble the true and lawful coin, but
this resemblance is a mere matter of fact, of which the jury are to judge upon the evidence
before them; the rule being that the resemblance need not be perfect, but such as may in cir-
culation ordinarily impose upon the world. Thus a counterfeiting with some little variation
in the inscription, effigies, or arms, done probably with intent to evade the law, is yet within it ;
and so is the counterfeiting a different metal, if in appearance it be made to resemble the true
coin. Hawk. b. 1, c. 17, s. 81; 1 Russ. 80; 1 Hale, 178, 184, 211, 215; 1 East, P. C. 163.
Round blanks, without any impression, are sufficient if they resemble the coin in circulation.
1 Leach, 285; and see 1 East, P. C. 164. But where the impression of money was stamped on
an irregular piece of metal not rounded, without finishing it, so as not to be in a state to pass
current, the offence was holden to be incomplete, although the prisoner had actually attempted
to pass it in that condition. 2 Bla. Rep. 632; and see 1 Leach, 185.] This offence is now a
felony only. Statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99.
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had formerly prevailed in our courts. But the act does not stop here, but goes
on. "Because other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which
cannot be thought of nor declared at present, it is accorded, that if any other
case supposed to be treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before
any judge; the judge shall tarry without going to judgment of the treason,
till the cause be showed and declared before the king and his parliament,
whether it ought to be judged treason, or other felony." Sir Matthew Hale(u)
is very high in his encomiums on the great wisdom and care of the parliament,
in thus keeping judges within the proper bounds and limits of this act, by not
suffering them to run out (upon their own opinions) into constructive treasons,
though in cases that seem to them to have a like parity of reason, but reserving
them to the decision of parliament. This is a great security to the public, the
judges, and even this sacred act itself; and leaves a weighty memento to judges
to be careful and not over-hasty in letting in treasons by construction or inter-
pretation, especially in new cases that have not been resolved and settled. 2. He
observes, that as the authoritative decision of these casus omissi is reserved to
the king and parliament, the most regular way to do if is by a new declarative
act; and therefore the opinion of any one or of both houses, though of very
respectable weight, is not that solemn declaration referred to by this act, as
the only criterion for judging of future treasons.
In consequence of this power, not, indeed, originally granted by the statute
of Edward III, but constitutionally inherent in every subsequent parliament
(which cannot be abridged of any rights by the acts of a precedent one), the
legislature was extremely liberal in declaring new treasons in the unfortunate
reign of King Richard the Second; as, particularly, the killing of an ambassa-
[*86 ] dor was made so; *which seems to be founded upon better reason than
[*86]the multitude of other points, that were then strained up to this high
offence: the most arbitrary and absurd of all which was by the statute 21 Ric.
II, c. 3, which made the bare purpose and intent of killing or deposing the
king, without any overt act to demonstrate it, high treason. And yet so little
effect have over-violent laws to prevent any crime, that within two years after-
wards this very prince was both deposed and murdered. And in the first year
of his successor's reign, an act was passed,(v) reciting "that no man knew how
he ought to behave himself, to do, speak, or say, for doubt of such pains of
treason; and therefore it was accorded, that in no time to come any treason be
judged otherwise than was ordained by the statute of King Edward the Third."
This at once swept away the whole load of extravagant treasons introduced in
the time of Richard the Second.
But afterward, between the reign of Henry the Fourth and Queen Mary, and
particularly in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, the spirit of inventing
new and strange treasons was revived; among which we may reckon the offences
of clipping money; breaking prison or rescue, when the prisoner is committed
for treason; burning houses to extort money; stealing cattle by Welshmen;
counterfeiting foreign coin; wilful poisoning; execrations against the king,
calling him opprobrious names by public writing; counterfeiting the sign
manual or signet; refusing to abjure the pope; deflowering or marrying, with-
out the royal license, any of the king's children, sisters, aunts, nephews, or
nieces; bare solicitation of the chastity of the queen or princess, or advances
made by themselves; marrying with the king by a woman not a virgin, without
previously discovering to'him such her unchaste life; judging or believing
(manifested by any overt act) the king to have been lawfully married to Ann of
Cleves; derogating from the king's royal style and title; impugning his su-
[*871 premacy; and assembling riotously to the *number of twelve, and not
dispersing upon proclamation: all which new-fangled treasons were
totally abrogated by the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, which once more reduced all
treasons to the standard of the statute 25 Edw. III. Since which time, though
the legislature has been more cautious in creating new offences of this kind,
(u) 1 Hal. P. C. 259. (v) Stat. I Hen. IV, c. 10.
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yet the number is very considerably increased, as we shall find upon a short
review.(11)
These new treasons, created since the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, and not compre-
hended under the description of statute 25 Edw. III, I shall comprise under
three heads. 1. Such as relate to papists. 2. Such as relate to falsifying the
coin or other royal signatures. 3. Such as are created for the security of the
protestant succession in the house of Hanover.
1. The first species, relating to papists, was considered in a preceding chap-
ter, among the penalties incurred by that branch of non-conformists to the
national church; wherein we have only to remember, that by statute 5 Eliz. c. 1,
to defend the pope's jurisdiction in this realm, is, for the first time, a heavy
misdemeanor: and, if the offence be repeated, it is high treason. Also by statute
27 Eliz. c. 2, if any popish priest, born in the dominions of the crown of Eng-
land, shall come over hither from beyond the seas, unless driven by stress of
weather, (w) and departing in a reasonable time; (x) or shall tarry here three
days without conforming to the church, and taking the oaths; he is guilty of
high treason. And by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 4, if any natural-born subject be
withdrawn from his allegiance, and reconciled to the pope or see of Rome, or
any other prince or state, both he and all such as procure such reconciliation
shall incur the guilt of high treason. These were mentioned under the division
before referred to, as spiritual offences, and I now repeat them as temporal ones
also; the reason of distinguishing these overt acts of popery from all others, by
setting the mark of high treason on them, being certainly on a civil, and not on
a religious account. For every popish priest of course renounces his allegiance
to his *temporal sovereign upon taking orders; that being inconsistent [*88]
with his new engagements of canonical obedience to the pope; and the
same may be said of an obstinate defence of his authority here, or a formal
reconciliation to the see of Rome, which the statute construes to be a withdraw-
ing from one's natural allegiance; and therefore, besides being reconciled "to
the pope," it also adds. "or any other prince or state."
2. With regard to treasons relative to the coin or other royal signatures, we
may recollect that the only two offences respecting the coinage, which are made
treason by the statute 25 Edw. III, are the actual counterfeiting the gold and
silver coin of this kingdom; or the importing of such counterfeit money with
intent to utter it, knowing it to be false. But, these not being found sufficient to
restrain the evil practices of coiners and false moneyers, other statutes have
been since made for that purpose. The crime itself is made a species of high
treason; as being a breach of allegiance by infringing the king's prerogative,
and assuming one of the attributes of the sovereign, to whom alone it belongs,
to set the value and denomination of coin made at home, or to fix the currency
of foreign money: and besides, as all money which bears the stamp of the king-
dom is sent into the world upon the public faith, as containing metal of a partic-
ular weight and standard, whoever falsifies this is an offender against the state,
by contributing to render that public faith suspected. And upon the same
reasons, by a law of the emperor Constantine, (y) false coiners were declared
guilty of high treason, and were condemed to be burnt alive: as, by the laws of
Athens,_(z) all counterfeiters, debasers, and diminishers of the current coin were
subjected to capital punishment. However, it must be owned, that this methodof reasoning is a little overstrained : counterfeiting or debasing the coin being
usually practiced rather for the sake of private and unlawful lucre, than out of any
disaffection to the sovereign. And *therefore, both this and its kindred [*89]
species of treason, that of counterfeiting the seals of the crown or other
(i) Sir T. Raym. 37". (x) Latch. 1. - (y) C. 9, 24. 2 Cod. Theod. de falsa moneta, 1. 9.
(a) Pott. Ant. b. 1, c. 26.
(11) [The statute 1 Mar. c. 1, was only a confirmation, so far, of a much more important
statute, viz.: 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. See the statute 36 Geo. III, e. 7, rendered perpetual by 57 Geo.
III, c. 6, confirming the statute of 25 Edw. III.]
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royal signatures, seem better denominated by the later civilians a branch of the
crimenfalsi or forgery (in which they are followed by Glanvil, (a) Bracton, (b)
and Fleta), (c) than by Constantine and our Edward the Third, a species of the
crimen keswv majestatis or high treason. For this confounds the distinction and
proportion of offences; and, by affixing the same ideas of guilt upon the man
who coins a leaden groat and him who assassinates his sovereign, takes off from
that horror which ought to attend the very mention of the crime of high treason,
and makes it more familiar to the subject. Before the statute 25 Edw. III,
the offence of counterfeiting the coin was held to be only a species of petit
treason; (d) but subsequent acts in their new extensions of the offence have
followed the example of that statute, and have made it equally high treason
with an endeavour to subvert the government, though not quite equal in its
punishment.
In consequence of the principle thus adopted, the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, having
at one stroke (12) repealed all intermediate treasons created since the 25 Edw.
III, it was thought expedient by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 6, to revive two
species, viz.: 1. That if any person falsely forge or counterfeit any such kind
of coin of gold or silver, as is not the proper coin of this realm, but shall be
current within this realm by consent of the crown; or, 2, shall falsely forge or
counterfeit the sign manual, privy signet, or privy seal; such offences shall be
deemed high treason. And by statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 11, if any persons
do bring into this realm such false or counterfeit foreign money, being current
here, knowing the same to be false, with intent to utter the same in payment,
they shall be deemed offenders in high treason. The money referred to in these
statutes must be such as is absolutely current here, in all payments, by the
king's proclamation; of which there is none at present, Portugal money being
only taken by consent, as approaching the nearest to our standard: and falling
in well enough with our divisions of money into pounds and shillings: therefore
[*90] to counterfeit it is not high treason, but another inferior offence. *Clip-
ping or defacing the genuine coin was not hitherto included in these
statutes; though an offence equally pernicious to trade, and an equal insult
upon the prerogative, as well as personal affront to the sovereign; whose very
image ought to be had in reverence by all loyal subjects. And therefore among
the Romans, (e) defacing or even melting down the emperor's statues was made
treason by the Julian law; together with other offences of the like sort, accord-
ing to that vague conclusion, "aliudve quid simile si admiserint." And now,
in England, by statues 5 Eliz. c. 11, clipping, washing, rounding, or filing, for
wicked gain's sake, any of the money of this realm, or other money sunred to
be current here, shall be adjudged to be high treason; and by statute 18 Eliz. c. 1
(because "the same law, being penal, ought to be taken and expounded strictly
according to the words thereof, and the like offences, not by any equity to re-
ceive the like punishment or pains "), the same species of offences is therefore
described in other more general words, viz.: impairing, diminishing, falsifying,
scaling, and lightening; and made liable to the same penalties. By statute 8
and 9 Win. III, c. 26, made perpetual by 7 Ann. c. 25, whoever without proper
authority, shall knowingly make or mend, or assist in so doing, or shall buy,
sell, conceal, hide, or knowingly have in his possession, any implements of coin-
age specified in the act, or other tools or instruments proper only for the coin-
age of money; (13) or shall convey the same out of the king's mint; he, to-
gether with his counsellors, procurers, aiders, and abettors, shall be guilty of
(a) . 4. e. 7. (b) L. 3, c. 3, § I and 2. (c) L. i, c. 22.
(d) 1 Hal. P. C. 224. (e) l9. 45, 4, 6.
(12) [This was done far more effectually six years before by I Edw. VI, c. 12. The object of
the above statute, by this needless repetition, seems only an endeavor to continue to Mary the
popularity which had so justly been gained by her brother.]
(13) The law on this subject is now to be found in statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99, which makes
the offence felony only.
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high treason, which is by much the severest branch of the coinage law. The
statute goes on farther, and enacts that to mark any coin on the edges with
letters, or otherwise in imitation of those used in the mint; or to colour, gild,
or case over any coin resembling the current coin, or even round blanks of
base metal; shall be construed high treason. But all prosecutions on this act
are to be commenced within three * months after the commission of the [*91]
offence, except those for making or mending any coining tool or instru- [*1
ment, or for marking money round the edges; which are directed to be com-
menced within six months after the offence committed.(.f) (14) And, lastly, by
statute 15 and 16 Geo. II, c. 28, if any person colours or alters any shilling or
sixjpence, either lawful or counterfeit, to make them respectively resemble a
guinea or half guinea; or any halfpenny or farthing to make them respectively
resemble a shilling or sixpence; this is also high treason: but the offender shall
be pardoned, in case (being out of prison) he discovers and convicts two other
offenders of the same kind.(15)
3. The other new species of high treason is such as is created for the security
of the protestant succession over and above such treasons against the king and
government as were comprised under the statute 25 Edw. III. For this pur-
pose, after the act of settlement was made, for transferring the crown to the
illustrious house of Hanover, it was enacted by statute 13 and 14 Win. III, c. 3,
that the pretended Prince of Wales, who was then thirteen years of age, and
had assumed the title of King James III, should be attainted of high treason;
and it was made high treason for any of the king's subjects, by letters, messages, or
otherwise, to hold correspondence with him, or any person employed by him, or
to remit any money for his use, knowing the same .to be for his service. And
by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39, it is enacted, that if any of the sons of the pretender
shall land or attempt to land in this kingdom, or be found in Great Britain, or
Ireland, or any of the dominions belonging to the same, he shall be judged attainted
of high treason, and suffer the pains thereof. And to correspond with them, or to
remit money for their use, is made high treason in the same manner as it was
to correspond with the father. By the statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 17, if any person
shall endeavour to deprive or hinder any person, being the next in succession to
the crown according to the limitations of the act of settlement, from succeed-
ing to the crown, and shall maliciously and directly attempt the same by any
*overt act, such offence shall be high treason. And by statute 6 Ann. r'92]
c. 7, if any person shall maliciously, advisedly, and directly, by writing [*2
or printing, maintain and affirm, that any other person hath any right or title
to the crown of this realm, otherwise than according to the act of settlement;
or that the kings of this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to
(f) Stat. 7 Ann. c. 25.
(14) [If a person is apprehended in the act of coining, or is proved to have made consider-
able progress in making counterfeit pieces resembling the gold or silver coin of this realm,
yet if they are so imperfect as that no one would take them, he cannot be convicted upon
the charge of coining under this statute. Leach, 71, 126. But he may be convicted, if he
has made blank pieces without any impression to the similitude of silver coin worn smooth
by time. Welch's Case, ibid. 293. Or if any one shall put pieces of mixed metal into aqua
fortis, which attracts the baser metal and leaves the silver upon the surface, or, as the vulgar
say, draws out the silver, this is held to be coloring under this statute. Lavey's Case,
id. 140.]
(15) The counterfeiting, &c., of copper coin, the making, mending, &c., of tools or imple-
ments for the purpose, and having the same in custody without lawful excuse, &c., were made
punishable as felonies under statute 2 Wm. IV, c. 34. The uttering or putting in circula-
tion of counterfeit copper coin was not before indictable at all: Rex v. Curwan, 1 East, P. C.
182; and the making, &c., of tools, &c., for counterfeiting the copper coin was a common-law
misdemeanor only. The present statute on the subject is 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99. Offenses
against the currency are punishable in the federal courts of the United States, under various
acts of congress, as statutory offences. But they may also be punished by the states; the
same act constituting an offence against each sovereignty. Fox V. Ohio, 5 How. 410; U. S. v.
Marrigold, 9 How. 560; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13.
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make laws and statutes, to bind the crown and the descent thereof; such person
shall be guilty of high treason. This offence (or indeed maintaining this doctrine
in any wise, that the king and parliament cannot limit the crown) was once before
made high treason by statute 13 Eliz. c. 1, during the life of that princess. And
after her decease it continued a high misdemeanor, punishable with forfeiture
of goods and chattels, even in the most flourishing vera of indefeasible hereditary
right and jure divino succession. But it was again raised into high treason, by
the statute of Anne before mentioned, at the time of a projected invasion in
favour of the then pretender; and upon this statute one Matthews, a printer,
was convicted and executed in 1719, for printing a treasonable pamphlet, en-
titled "Voxpopuli vox Dei."(g)
Thus much for the crime of treason, or Icesw majestatis, in all its branches;
which consists, we may observe, originally, in grossly counteracting that allegi-
ance which is due from the subject by either birth or residence; though, in some
instances, the zeal of our legislators to stop the progress of some highly pernicious
practices has occasioned them a little to depart from this its primitive idea. But
of this enough has been hinted already: it is now time to pass on from defining
the crime to describing its punishment.
The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible. 1. That
the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk: though usually
(by connivance, (h) at length ripened by humanity into law) a sledge or hurdle
is allowed, to preserve the offender from the extreme torment of being dragged
[*93] on the ground or pavement.(i) 2. That he *be hanged by the neck, and
then cut down alive. 3. That his entrails be taken out and burned, while
he is yet alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into
four parts. 6. That his head and quarters be at the king's disposal.(k) (16)
The king may, and often doth, discharge all the punishment, except beheading,
especially where any of noble blood are attainted. For beheading, being part
of the judgment, that may be executed, though all the rest be omitted by the
king's command.(l) But where beheading is no part of the judgment, as in mur-
der or other felonies, it hath been said that the king cannot change the judgment,
although at the request of the party, from one species of death to another. (m)
But of this we shall say more hereafter. (n)
In the case of coining, which is a treason of a different complexion from the
rest, the punishment is milder for male offenders; being only to be drawn and
hanged by the neck till dead.(o) But in treasons of every kind the punishment
of women is the same, and different from that of men. For as the decency due
to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly mangling their bodies, their sentence
(which is to the full as terrible to sensation as the other) is to be drawn to the
gallows, and there to be burned alive. (,)
The consequence of this judgment (attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of
blood) must be referred to the latter end of this book, when we shall treat of them
all together, as well in treason as in other offences.
(q) State Tr. ix. 680. (h) 53 Ass. pl. 7. (i) 1 Hal. P. 0. 382.
(k) This punishment for treason, Sir Edward Coke tells us, is warranted by divers examples in Scripture;
for Joab was drawn, Bithan was hanged, Judas was embowelled, and so of the rest. (3 Inst. 211.)
() 1 Hal. P. C. 351. (m) 3 Inst. 52. (n) See ch. 32. (o) 1 Hal. P. C. 351.
(p) 2 Hal. P. C. 399.
(16) [But now by the statute 30 Geo. III, c. 48, women convicted, in all cases, of treason, shah
receive judgment to be drawn to the place of execution, and there to be hanged by the neck
till dead. Before this humane statute, women from the remotest times were sentenced to be
burned alive for every species of treason.
And now, by 54 Geo. III, c. 146, the judgment against a man for high treason is, in effect,
that he shall be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, and be there hanged by the neck
until he be dead, and that afterwards his head shall be severed from his body, and his body,
divided into four quarters, shall be disposed of as the king shall think fit; with power to the
king, by special warrant, in part to alter the punishment. A month's time has been allowed
between sentence and execution. 1 Burr. 650.]
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CHAPTER VIL
OF FELONIES INJURIOUS TO THE KING'S PREROGATIVE.
As, according to the method I have adopted, we are next to consider such
felonies as are more immediately injurious to the king's prerogrative, it will not
e amiss here, at our first entrance upon this crime, to inquire briefly into the
nature and meaning of felony: before we proceed upon any of the particular
branches into which it is divided.
Felony, in the general acceptation of our English law, comprises every species
of crime, which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or goods.(1)
This most frequently happens in those crimes, for which a capital punishment
either is or was liable to be inflicted: for those felonies which are called clergy-
able, or to which the benefit of clergy extends, were anciently punished with
death, in all lay, or unlearned offenders; though now by the statute-law that
punishment is for the first offence universally remitted. Treason itself, says Sir
Edward Coke,(a) was anciently comprised under the name felony: and in con-
firmation of this we may observe that the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. III, c. 2,
speaking of some dubious crimes, directs a reference to parliament; *that [*95]
it may there be adjudged, "whether they be treason, or other felony." All
treasons, therefore, strictly speaking, are felonies; though all felonies are not
treason. And to this also we may add, that not only all offences, now capital,
are in some degree or other felony; but that this is likewise the case with some
other offences, which are not punished with death; as suicide, where the party is
already dead; homicide by chance medley, or in self-defence; and petit larceny or
pilfering: all which are (strictly speaking) felonies, as they subject the committers
of them to forfeitures. So that upon the whole the only adequate definition of fel-
ony seems to be that which is before laid down; viz., an offence which occasions a
total forfeiture of either lands, or goods, or both, at the common law; and to which
capital or other punishment may be superadded, according to the degree of guilt.
To explain this matter a lfttle farther: the word felony or felonia, is of
undoubted feudal origin, being frequently to be met with in the books of feuds,
&c.; but the derivation of it has much puzzled the juridical lexicographers,
Prateus, Calvinus and the rest: some deriving it from the Greek Voq, an
impostor or deceiver; others from the Latin fallo, fefelli, to countenance which
they would have it called fallonia. Sir Edward Coke, as his manner is, has
given us a still stranger etymology;(b) that it is crimen animo felleo _erpe-
tratum, with a bitter or gallish inclination. But all of them agree in the
description, that it is such a crime as occasions a forfeiture of all the offender's
lands or goods. And this gives great probability to Sir Henry Spelman's
Teutonic or German derivation of it :(c) in which language indeed, as the word
is clearly of feudal original, we ought rather to look for its signification, than
among the Greeks and Romans. Fe-lon then, according to him, is derived from
two northern words: fee, which signifies (we well know) the fief, feud, or
beneficiary estate; and Ion, which signifies price or value. Felony is therefore
(a) 3 Inst. 15. (b) 1 Inst. 391. (6) Glossar. tit. Felon.
(1) In some of the United States by statute the term "felony" is made to embrace all offences
for which a specified punishment may be imposed; e.g., imprisonment in the state penitentiary.
People v. Van Steenburgh, 1 Park. C. R. 39. In the absence of such statutory definition, those
offences are felonies which were so at the common law: Ward v. People, 3 Hill, 395; Dren-
nan v. People, 10 Mich. 169; though in Ohio, where all offences are statutory, it has been said
that "the term felony has no distinct and well defined meaning applicable to our system of
criminal jurisprudence. In England it has a well-known and extensive signification, and com-
prises every species of crime which, at common law, worked a forfeiture of goods and lands.
But under our criminal code the word felonious, though occasionally used, expresses a signi-
fication no less vague and indefinite than the word criminal." Mathews v. State, 4 Ohio,
N. S. 542.
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[*96] the same as pretium feudi, the *consideration for which a man gives up
his fief; as we say in common speech, such an act is as much as your life
or estate is worth. In this sense it will clearly signify the feudal forfeiture, or
act by which an estate is forfeited, or escheats to the lord.(2)
To confirm this we may observe, that it is, in this sense, of forfeiture to the
lord, that the feudal writers constanItly use it. For all those acts, whether of a
criminal nature or not, which at this day are generally forfeitures of copyhold
estates,(d) are styled felonia in the feudal law: "scilicet per quas feudum
amittitur."(e) As "si domino deservire noluerit;(f) si per annum et diem ces-
saverit in patenda investitura;(g) si dominum ejuraverit, i. e., negaverit sea dom-
ino feudum habere;(h) si a domino, in jus eumi vocante, ter citatus non compa-
ruerit;"(i) all these, with many others, are still causes of forfeiture in our
copyhold estates, and were denominated felonies by the feudal constitutions.
So likewise injuries of a more substantial or criminal nature were denominated
felonies, that is, forfeitures: as assaulting or beating the lord ;(k) vitiating his
wife or daughter, "si dominum cucurbitaverit, i. e., cum uxore elus conculbue-
rit;"(l) all these are esteemed felonies, and the latter is expressly so denomi-
nated, "si fecerit felonium, dominum forte cucurbitando."(m) And as these
contempts, or smaller offences, were felonies or acts of forfeiture, of course
greater crimes, as murder and robbery, fell under the same denomination. On
the other hand, the lord might be guilty of felony, or forfeit his seignory to the
vassal, by the same acts as the vassal would have forfeited his feud to the lord.
"Si dominus commiserit feloniam, per quam vassallus amitteret feudum si eam
commiserit in dominum, feudi proprietatem etiam dominus perdere debet."(n)
One instance given of this sort of felony in the lord is beating the servant of
his vassal, so as that he loses his service; which seems merely in the nature of
a civil *injury, so far as it respects the vassal. And all these felonies
were to be determined "per laudamentum sive judicum parium suo-
rum" in the lord's court; as with us forfeiture of copyhold lands are presenta-
ble by the homage in the court-baron.
Felony and the act of forfeiture to the lord, being thus synonymous terms in
the feudal law, we may easily trace the reason why, upon the introduction of
that law into England, those crimes which induced such forfeiture or escheat
of lands (and, by small deflection from the original sense, such as induced the
forfeiture of goods also) were denominated felonies. Thus it was said, that
suicide, robbery and rape, were felonies; that is, the consequence of such crimes
was forfeiture; till by long use we began to signify by the term of felony the
actual crime committed, and not the penal consequence. And upon this system
only can we account for the cause, why treason in ancient times was held to be
a species of felony: viz. because it induced a forfeiture.
Hence it follows, that capital punishment does by no means enter into the true
idea and definition of felony. Felony may be without inflicting capital punish-
ment, as in the cases instanced of self-murder, excusable homicide and petit lar-
ceny: and it is possible that capital punishments may be inflicted, and yet the
offence be no felony; as in case of heresy by the common law, which, though capital,
never worked any forfeiture of lands or goods,(o) an inseparable incident to felony.
And of the same nature was the punishment of standing mute, without pleading to
an indictment, which at common law was capital, but without any forfeiture, and
therefore such standing mute was no felony. In short, the true criterion of felony
is forfeiture; for, as Sir Edward Coke justly observes(p) in all felonies which are
punishable with death, the offender loses all his lands in fee-simple, and also his
goods and chattels; in such as are not so punishable, his goods and chattels only.
(d) See book IT, page 284. (e) Feud. 1. 2, t. 16, in cale. (f ) Ibid. 1. 1, t. 21. (g) ibid. 1. 2, t. 24.
(A) Ibid. 1. 2, t. 34,. 2, t. 26, J 3. (i) Ibid. 1. 2, t. 22. (k) Ibid. 1. 2. t. 24, § 2. ( 1) ibid. 1. 1, t. 5.
(m) Ibid. 1. 2, t. 38. Britton, 1. 1, c. 22. (n) Ibid. 1. 2, t. 26 and 47. (o) 3 Inst. 43.
(p) I Inst. 391.
(2) [But a forfeiture of land is not a necessary consequence of felony; for petit larceny is
felony, which does not produce a forfeiture of lands; but every species of felony is followed
by forfeiture of goo-is and personal chattels.]
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*The idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with that of capi-
tal punishment, that we find it hard to separate them; and to this usage
the interpretations of the law do now conform. And, therefore, if a statute
makes any new offence felony, the law(q) implies that it shall be punished with
death, viz., by hanging as well as with forfeiture: unless the offender prays the
benefit of clergy(3) which all felons are entitled once to have, provided the
same is not expressly taken away by statute. And in compliance herewith, I
shall for the future consider it also in the same light, as a generical term, includ-
ing all capital crimes below treason; having premised thus much concerning
the true nature and original meaning of felony, in order to account for the
reason of those instances I have mentioned, of felonies that are not capital, and
capital offences that are not felonies: which seem at first view repugnant to the
general idea which we now entertain of felony, as a crime to be punished by
death: whereas properly it is a crime to be punished by forfeiture, and to which
death may, or may not be, though it generally is, superadded.
I proceed now to consider such felonies as are more immediately injurious to
the king's prerogative. These are, 1. Offences relating to the coin, not amount-
ing to treason. 2. Offences against the king's council. 3. The offence of serving
a foreign prince. 4. The offence of embezzling or destroying the king's armour
or stores of war. To which may be added a fifth, 5. Desertion from the king's
armies in time of war.
1. Offences relating to the coin, under which may be ranked some inferior mis-
demeanors not amounting to felony, are thus declared by a series of statutes which
I shall recite in the order of time. And first, by statute 27 Edw. I, c. 3, none
shall bring pollards and crockards, which were foreign coins of base metal, into
the realm on pain of forfeiture of life and goods. By statute 9 Edw. III, st. 2, no
sterling money shall be melted down, upon pain of forfeiture thereof. *By [*99]
statute 17 Edw. III, none shall be so hardy to bring false and ill money
into the realm, on pain of forfeiture of life and member by the persons import-
ing, and the searchers permitting such importation. By statute 3 Hen. V, st. 1,
to make, coin, buy, or bring into the realm any gaily-halfpence, suskins, or dot-
kins, in order to utter them, is felony; and knowingly to receive or pay either
them or blanks(r) is forfeiture of an hundred shillings. By statute 14 Eliz. c. 3,
such as forge any foreign coin, although it be not made current here by procla-
mation, shall (with their aiders and abettors) be guilty of misprision of treason:
a crime which we shall hereafter consider. By statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 31,
the offence of melting down any current silver money shall be punished with
forfeiture of the same, and also the double value: and the offender, if a freeman
of any town, shall be disfranchised; if not, shall suffer six months' imprison-
ment. By statute 6 and 7 Win. III, c. 17, if any person buys or sells, or know-
ingly has in his custody, any clippings, or filings, of the coin, he shall forfeit
the same and 5001.; one moiety to the king, and the other to the informer; and
be branded in the cheek with the letter R. By statute 8 and 9 Win. III, c. 26,
if any person shall blanch or whiten copper for sale (which makes it resemble
silver) ; or buy or sell, or offer to sell any malleable composition, which shall be
heavier than silver, and look, touch, and wear like gold, but be beneath the stand-
ard: or if any person shall receive or pay at a less rate than it imports to be of
(which demonstrates a consciousness of its baseness, and a fraudulent design,)
any counterfeit or diminished milled money of this kingdom, not being cut in
(q) I Hawk. P. C. 107. 2 Hawk. P. C. 444. (r) 2 Stat. Hen. VI. c. 9.
(3) [The criminal law was considerably ameliorated, however, in this respect by the statute
8 Geo. IV,, c. 28, § 8, which enacted that any person convicted of felony not punishable
with death should be punished in the same manner prescribed by the statute or statutes
especially relating to such felony; and that every person convicted of a felony for which no
punishment had been or might be specially provided, should be deemed to be punishable
under that statute, and be liable to transportation for seven years, or imprisonment (with
whipping if the court think fit) for any term not-exceeding two years.]
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pieces (an operation which is expressly directed to be performed when any such
money shall be produced in evidence, and which any person, to whom any gold
or silver money is tendered, is empowered by statutes 9 and 10 Win. III, c. 21,
13 Geo. III, c. 71, and 14 Geo. III, c. 70, to perform at his own hazard, and the
officers of the exchequer and receivers general of the taxes are particularly
required to perform): all such persons shall be guilty of felony; and may be
prosecuted for the same at any time within three months after the offence com-
[*100] mitted. *But these precautions not being found sufficient to prevent
the uttering of false or diminished money, which was only a misdemeanor
at common law, it is enacted by statute 15 and 16 Geo. II, c. 28, that if any
person shall utter or tender in payment any counterfeit coin, knowing it so to
be, he shall for the first offence be imprisoned six months, and find sureties for
his good behaviour for six months more; for the second offence, shall be im-
prisoned two years, and find sureties for two years longer; and for the third
offence, shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. Also, if a person
knowingly tenders in payment any counterfeit money, and at the same time has
more in his custody; or shall, within ten days after, knowingly tender other
false money; he shall be deemed a common utterer of counterfeit money, and
shall for the first offence be imprisoned one year, and find sureties for his good
behaviour for two years longer; and for the second, be guilty of felony without
benefit of clergy. By the same statute it is also enacted, that if any person
counterfeits the copper coin, he shall suffer two years' imprisonment, and find
sureties for two years more. By statute 11 Geo. III, c. 40, persons counterfeit-
ing copper half-pence or farthings, with their abettors; or buying, selling,
receiving, or putting off any counterfeit copper money (not being cut in pieces
or melted down) at a less value than it imports to be of; shall be guilty of single
felony. And by a temporary statute (14 Geo. III, c. 42), if any quantity of
money, exceeding the sum of five pounds, being or purporting to be the silver
coin of this realm, but below the standard of the mint in weight or fineness,
shall be imported into Great Britain or Ireland, the same shall be forfeited in
equal moieties to the crown and prosecutor. Thus much for offences relating to
the coin, as well misdemeanors as felonies, which I thought it most convenient
to consider in one and the same view.(4)
2. Felonies, against the king's council, (s) are these. First, by statute 3 Hen.
VII, c. 14, if any sworn servant of the king s household conspires or confederates
[*101] to kill any lord of this *realm, or other person sworn of the king's
council, he shall be guilty of felony. Secondly, by statute 9 Ann. c. 16,
to assault, strike, wound or attempt to kill, any privy councillor in the execution
of his office, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (5)
3. Felonies in serving foreign states, which service is generally inconsistent
with allegiance to one's natural prince, are restrained and punished by statute
3 Jac. I, c. 4, which makes it felony for any persons whatever to go out of the
realm, to serve any foreign prince, without having first taken the oath of alle-
giance before his departure. And it is felony also for any gentleman, or person
of higher degree, or who hath borne any office in the army, to go out of the
realm to serve such foreign prince or state, without previously entering into a
bond, with two sureties, not to be reconciled to the see of Rome, or enter into
any conspiracy against his natural sovereign. And further, by statute 9 Geo. II,
c. 30, enforced by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 17, if any subject of Great Britain shall
enlist himself, or if any person shall procure him to be enlisted, in any foreign
service, or detain or embark him for that purpose, without license under the
king's sign manual, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy; but
(s) See book I, page 334.
(4) This subject is now covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99, and the statutes mentioned
in the-text are repealed.
(5) All attempts to commit murder are now punishable without any distinction respecting
the rank of the party, except in the case of the king and the royal family. See statute 24 and
25 Vic. c. 100.
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if the person so enlisted or enticed shall discover his seducer within fifteen
days, so as he may be apprehended and convicted of the same, he shall be
indemnified. By the statute 29 Geo. II, c. 17, it is moreover enacted, that to
serve under the French king, as a military officer, shall be felony without bene-
fit of clergy; and to enter into the Scotch brigade in the Dutch service, without
previously taking the oaths of allegiance and abjuration, shall be a forfeiture
of 5001. (6)
4. Felony by embezzling or destroying the king's armour or warlike stores is,
in the first place, so declared to be by statute 31 Eliz. c. 4, which enacts, that if
any person having the charge or custody of the king's armour, ordnance, am-
munition, or habiliments of war, or of any victual provided for victualling the
king's soldiers or mariners, shall, either for gain, or to impede his majesty's
service, embezzle the same *to the value of twenty shillings, such offence [*102]
shall be felony. And the statute 22 Car. II, c. 5, takes away the benefit
of clergy for this offence, (7) and from stealing the king's naval stores to the
value of twenty shillings; with a power for the judge, after sentence, to trans-
port the offender for seven years. Other inferior embezzlements and misde-
meanors, that fall under this denomination, are punished by statutes 9 and 10
Win. III, c. 41, 1 Geo. I, c. 25, 9 Geo. I, c. 8, and 17 Geo. II, c. 40, with fine,
corporal punishment, and imprisonment. And by statute 12 Geo. III, c. 24,
to set on fire, burn, or destroy any of his majesty's ships of war, whether built,
building, or repairing; or any of the king's arsenals, magazines, dock-yards,
rope-yards, or victualling offices, or materials thereunto belonging; or military,
naval, or victualling stores, or ammunition; or causing, aiding, procuring,
abetting, or assisting in, such offence; shall be felony without benefit of clergy.
5. Desertion from the king's armies in time of war, whether by land or sea,
in England or in parts beyond the sea, is, by the standing laws of the land (exclu-
sive of the annual acts of parliament, to punish mutiny and desertion), and
particularly by statute 18 Hen. VI, c. 19, and 5 Eliz. c. 5, made felony, but not
without benefit of clergy. But by the statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 2, clergy is taken
away from such deserters, and the offence is made triable by the justices of every
shire. The same statutes punish other inferior military offences with fines,
imprisonment, and other penalties. (8)
(6) [These statutes of 9 Geo. II and 29 Geo. II are repealed by the 59 Geo. III, c. 69, which
re-enacts and adds to their provisions, and by it the entering into, or agreeing to enter into,
the aid of a foreign prince or people, &c., in any warlike capacity whatever, or going abroad
with that intent, or attempting to get others to do so, is a misdemeanor, and punishable by
fine or imprisonment, or both; and a penalty of 501. is imposed on masters of ships .and
owners for assisting in the offence: there are further provisions for preventing the offence.]
(7) This provision was repealed by statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 53.
(8) [To this class of felonies injunous to the king's prerogative, may be added two felonies
lately created by the legislature, who thought it expedient to repress the attempts of mis-
chievous and disaffected persons, by transportation or capital punishment. The 37 Geo. III,
c. 70 (revived and made perpetual by the 57 Geo. III, c. 7), enacts, that if any person shall
maliciously and advisedly endeavor to seduce any person serving in her majesty's service by
sea or land from his duty and allegiance, or to incite any person to commit any act of mutiny
or mutinous practice, he shall be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death without benefit of
clergy. The crime, wherever committed, may be tried in any county. A sailor in a sick
hospital, where he had been for thirty days, and therefore not entitled to pay, nor liable for
what he then does to a court-martial, is a person serving in the king's forces by sea, within
the 37 Geo. III, so as to make the seducing him an offence within that act. Russ. and R.
C. C. 76.]
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CHAPTER VIII.
OF PREMUNIRE.
A THIRD species of offence more immediately affecting the king ano his
government, though not subject to capital punishment, is that of prwmunire; so
called from the words of the writ preparatory to the prosecution thereof: "prw-
reunire (a) facias A B" cause A B to be forewarned that he appear before us
to answer the contempt wherewith he stands charged: which contempt is par-
ticularly recited in the preamble to the writ.(b) It took its original from the
exorbitant power claimed and exercised in England by the pope, which even
in the days of blind zeal was too heavy for our ancestors to bear.
It may justly be observed, that religious principles, which (when genuine and
pure) have an evident tendency to make their professors better citizens as well
as better men, have (when perverted and erroneous) been usually subversive of
civil government, and been made both the cloak and the instrument of every
pernicious design that can be harbored in the heart of man. The unbounded
authority that was exercised by the Druids in the west, under the influence of
pagan superstition, and the terrible ravages committed by the Saraeis in the
east, to propagate the religion of Mahomet, both witness to the truth of that
ancient universal observation, that in all ages and in all countries, civil and
ecclesiastical tyranny are mutually productive of each other. It is therefore
the glory of the church of England, that she inculcates due obedience to lawful
[*1041 authority, and hath been (as her prelates on *a trying occasion once
expressed it) (c) in her principles and practice ever most unquestionably
loyal. The clergy of her persuasion, holy in their doctrines and unblemished
in their lives and conversation, are also moderate in their ambition, and enter-
tain just notions of the ties of society and the rights of civil government. As
in matters of faith and morality they acknowledge no guide but the Scriptures,
so, in matters of external polity and of private right, they derive all their title
from the civil magistrate; they look up to the king as their head, to the parlia-
ment as their lawgiver, and pride themselves in nothing more justly, than in
being true members of the church, emphatically by law established. Whereas
the notions of ecclesiastical liberty, in those who differ from them, as well in
one extreme as the other (for I here only speak of extremes), are equally and
totally destructive of those ties and obligations by which all society is kept
together; equally encroaching on those rights which reason and the original
contract of every free state in the universe have vested in the sovereign power;
and equally aiming at a distinct independent supremacy of their own, where
spiritual men and spiritual causes are concerned. The dreadful effects of such
a religious bigotry, when actuated by erroneous principles, even of the protestant
kind, are sufficiently evident from the history of the anabaptists in Germany,
the covenanters in Scotland, and that deluge of sectaries in England, who
murdered their sovereign, overturned the church and monarchy, shook every
pillar of law, justice, and private property, and most devoutly established a
kingdom of the saints in their stead. But these horrid devastations, the effects
of mere madness, or of zeal that was nearly allied to it, though violent and
tumultuous, were but of a short duration. Whereas, the progress of the papal
policy, long actuated by the steady counsels of successive pontiffs, took deeper
root, and was at length in some places with difficulty, in others never yet,
extirpated. For this we might call to witness the black intrigues of the jesuits,
(a) A barbarous word for prwmonni.(1) (b) Old. Nat. Brw. 101, edit. 1534.
(p) Address to James H1, 1687.
(1) [Premunio, in law-latin, is used, in all its tenses and participles, for pramonio or cite.
Ducange Gloss.]
This chapter is wholly inapplicable in the United States.
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so lately triumphant over Christendom, but now universally abandoned by even
the Roman catholic powers: but the subject of our present *chapter [*105]
rather leads us to consider the vast strides which were formerly made
in this kingdom by the popish clergy; how nearly they arrived to effecting their
grand design; some few of the means they made use of for establishing their
plan; and how almost all of them have been defeated or converted to better
purposes, by the vigour of our free constitution, and the wisdom of successive
parliaments.
The ancient British church, by whomsoever planted, was a stranger to the
bishop of Rome, and all his pretended authority. But the pagan Saxon in-
vaders, having driven the professors of Christianity to the remotest corners of
our island, their own conversion was afterwards effected by Augustin the monk,
and other missionaries from the court of Rome. This naturally introduced
some few of the papal corruptions in point of faith and doctrine; but we read
of no civil authority claimed by the pope in these kingdoms, till the Vera of the
Norman conquest; when the then reigning pontiff, having fgvoured Duke Wil-
liam in his projected invasion, by blessing his host and consecrating his ban-
ners, took that opportunity also of establishing his spiritual encroachments :
and was even permitted so to do by the policy of the conqueror, in order more
effectually to humble the Saxon clergy and aggrandize his Norman prelates;
prelates, who, being bred abroad in the doctrine and practice of slavery, had
contracted a reverence and regard for it, and took a pleasure in riveting the
chains of a free-born people.
The most stable foundation of legal and rational government is a due sub-
ordination of rank, and a gradual scale of authority; and tyranny, also, itself
is most surely supported by a regular increase of despotism, rising from the
slave to the sultan: with this difference, however, that the measure of obedience
in the one is grounded on the principles of society, and is extended no farther
than reason and necessity will warrant: in the other it is limited only by abso-
lute will and pleasure, without permitting the inferior to examine the title upon
which it is founded. More effectually, therefore, to enslave the consciences and
minds of the people, the Romish *clergy themselves paid the most im- [*106]
plicit obedience to their own superiors or prelates; and they, in their
turn, were as blindly devoted to the will of the sovereign pontiff, whose decis-
ions they held to be infallible, and his authority co-extensive with the Christian
world. Hence his legates a latere were introduced into every kingdom of
Europe, his bulls and decretal epistles became the rule both of faith and dis-
cipline, his judgment was the final resort in all cases of doubt or difficulty, his
decrees were enforced by anathemas and spiritual censures, he dethroned even
kings that were refractory, and denied to whole kingdoms (when undutiful) the
exercise of Christian ordinances, and the benefits of the gospel of God.
But, though the being spiritual head of the church was a thing of great
sound, and of greater authority, among men of conscience and piety, yet the
court of Rome was fully apprised that (among the bulk of mankind) power
cannot be maintained without property; and therefore its attention began very
early to be riveted upon every method that promised pecuniary advantage. The
doctrine of purgatory was introduced, and with it the purchase of masses to re-
deem the souls of the deceased. New-fangled offences were created, and indul-
gences were sold to the wealthy, for liberty to sin without danger. The canon
law took cognizance of crimes, enjoined penance pro salute animte, and com-
muted that penance for money. Non-residence and pluralities among the
clergy, and marriages among the laity, related within the seventh degree, were
strictly prohibited by canon; but dispensations were seldom denied to those who
could afford to buy them. In short, all the wealth of Christendom was gradually
drained by a thousand channels into the coffers of the holy see.
The establishment also of the feudal system in most of the governments of
Europe, whereby the lands of all private proprietors were declared to be holden
of the prince, gave a hint to the court of Rome for usurping a similar an-
106 PREMNU RE. [Book IV.
thority over all the preferments of the church; which began first in Italy, and[,107] gradually spread itself to England. The pope became a *feudal lord;
and all ordinary patrons were to hold their right of patronage under
this universal superior. Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratu-
itous donations, were at that time denominated beneficia; their very name as
well as constitution was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence
came to be denominated a benefice. Lay fees were conferred by investiture or de-
livery of corporal possession; and spiritual benefices, which at first were uni-
versally donative, now received in like manner a spiritual investiture, by
institution from the bishop, and induction under his authority. As lands
escheated to the lord, in defect of a legal tenant, so benefices lapsed to the
bishop upon non-presentation by the patron, in the nature of a spiritual
escheat. The annual tenths collected from the clergy were equivalent to the
feudal render, or rent, reserved upon a grant; the oath of canonical obedience
was copied from the oath of fealty required from the vassal by his superior;
and the primer seisins of our military tenures, whereby the first profits of an
heir's estate were cruelly extorted by his lord, gave birth to as cruel an exaction
of first fruits from the beneficed clergy. And the occasional aids and talliages,
levied by the prince on his vassals, gave a handle to the pope to levy, by the
means of his legates a latere, peter-pence and other taxations.
At length the holy father went a step beyond any example of either emperor
or feudal lord. He reserved to himself, by his own apostolical authority, (d) the
presentation to all benefices which became vacant while the incumbent was at-
tending the court of Rome upon any occasion, or on his journey thither, or
back again; and moreover such also as became vacant by his promotion to a
bishopric or abbey: "etiamsi ad illa persone consueverint et de buerint per
electionem aut quemvis alium modum assumi." And this last, the canonists de-
clared, was no detriment at all to the patron, being only like the change of a
life in a feudal estate by the lord. Dispensations to avoid these vacancies begat
the doctrine of commenzdams: and papal provisions were the previous nominu-
['108] tion to such benefices, by a kind of anticipation, before they *became
actually void: though afterwards indiscriminately applied to any right of
patronage exerted or usurped by the pope. In consequence of which the best
livings were filled by Italian and other foreign clergy, equally unskilled in and
averse to the laws and constitution of England. The very nomination to
bishoprics, that ancient prerogative of the crown, was wrested from King
Henry the First, and afterwards from his successor King John; and seemingly,
indeed, conferred on the chapters belonging to each see; but by means of the
frequent appeals to Rome, through the intricacy of the laws which regulated
canonical elections, was eventually vested in the pope. And, to sum up this
head with a transaction most unparalleled and astonishing in its kind, Pope
Innocent III had at length the effrontery to demand, and King John had the
meanness to consent to, a resignation of his crown to the Pope, whereby England
was to become forever St. Peter's patrimony; and the dastardly monarch re-
accepted his sceptre from the hands of the papal legate, to hold as the vassal of
the holy see, at the annual rent of a thousand marks.
Another engine set on foot, or at least greatly improved, by the court of
Rome, was a master-piece of papal policy. Not content with the ample pro-
vision of tithes, which the law of the land had given to the parochial clergy,
they endeavoured to grasp at the lands and inheritances of the kingdom, and
(had not the legislature withstood them) would by this time have probably
been masters of every foot of ground in the kingdom. To this end they intro-
duced the monks of the Benedictine and other rules, men of sour and austere
religion, separated from the world and its concerns by a vow of perpetual
celibacy, vet fascinating the minds of the people by pretences to extraordinary
sanctity, vhile all their aim was to aggrandize the power and extend the influ-
ence of their grand superior, the pope. And as, in those times of civil tumult,
great rapines and violence were daily committed by overgrown lords and their
(d) Extrav. 1. 3, t, 2, e, 13.
adherents, they were taught to believe, that founding a monastery a little before
their death would atone for a life of incontinence, disorder and bloodshed.
Hence innumerable abbeys and religious houses were built within a *cen-[*1
tury after the conquest, and endowed, not only with the tithes of parishes 1*1091
which were ravished from the secular clergy, but also with lands, manors, lord-
ships, and extensive baronies. And the doctrine inculcated was, that whatever
was so given to, or purchased by, the monks and friars, was consecrated to God
himself; and that to alienate or take it away was no less than the sin of
sacrilege.
I might here have enlarged upon other contrivances, which will occur to the
recollection of the reader, set on foot by the court of Rome, for effecting an en-
tire exemption of its clergy from any intercourse with the civil magistrate:
such as the separation of the ecclesiastical court from the temporal; the ap-
pointment of its judges by merely spiritual authority without any interposition
from the crown; the exclusive jurisdiction it claimed over all ecclesiastical per-
sons and causes; and the privilegium clericale, or benefit of clergy, which de-
livered all clerks from any trial or punishment except before their own tribunal.
But the history and progress of ecclesiastical courts,(e) as well as of purchases
in mortmain,(f) have already been fully discussed in the preceding book: and we
shall have an opportunity of examining at large the nature of the privilegium
clericale in the progress of the present one. And therefore I shall only observe
at present, that notwithstanding this plan of pontifical power was so deeply laid,
and so indefatigably pursued by the unwearied politics of the court of Rome
through a long succession of ages; notwithstanding it was polished and im-
proved by the united endeavours of a body of men, who engrossed all the learn-
ing of Europe for centuries together; notwithstanding it was firmly and reso-
lutely executed by persons the best calculated for establishing tyranny and
despotism, being fired with a bigoted enthusiasm (which prevailed not only
among the weak and simple, but even among those of the best natural and
acquired endowments), unconnected with their fellow subjects, and totally in-
different what might befal that posterity to which they bore no endearing
relation: -yet it vanished into *nothing, when the eyes of the people
were a little enlightened, and they set themselves with vigour to oppose *10
it. So vain and ridiculous is the attempt to live in society, without acknowl-
edging the obligations which it lays us under; and to affect an entire inde-
pendence of that civil state which protects us in all our rights, and gives us
every other liberty, that only excepted of despising the laws of the community.
Having thus, in some degree, endeavoured to trace out the original and sub-
sequent progress of the papal usurpations in England, let us now return to the
statutes of premunire, which were framed to encounter this overgrown, yet
increasing evil. King Edward I, a wise and magnanimous prince, set himself
in earnest to shake off this servile yoke. (g) He would not suffer his bishops to
attend a general council, till they had sworn not to receive the papal benedic-
tion. He made light of all papal bulles and processes: attacking Scotland in
defiance of one: and seizing the temporalties of his clergy, who, under pretence
of another, refused to pay a tax imposed by parliament. He strengthened the
statutes of mortmain; thereby closing the great gulph in which all the lands
of the kingdom were in danger of being swallowed. And, one of his subjects
having obtained a bulle of excommunication against another, he ordered him
to be executed as a traitor, according to the ancient law. (h) And in the thirty-
fifth year of his reign was made the first statute against papal provisions, being,
according to Sir Edward Coke, (i) the foundation of all the subsequent statutes
of prwemunire, which we rank as an offence immediately against the king, be-
cause every encouragement of the papal power is a diminution of the authority
of the crown.
In the weak reign of Edward the Second the pope again endeavoured to
(e) See book III, p. 61. (f) See book II, p. 26. (g) Day. 8., &c.
(h) Bro. Abr. tit. (Cotore, 115. Treason, 14. 5 Rep. p. 1, fol. 12. 3 Ass. 19. (6) 2 Inst. 58.
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encroach, but the parliament manfully withstood him; and it was one of the
principal articles charged against that unhappy prince, that he had given allow-
ance to the bulles of the see of Rome. But Edward the Third was of a temper
extremely different: and to remedy these *inconveniences first by gentle
means, he and his nobility wrote an expostulation to the pope: but
receiving a menacing and contemptuous answer, withal acquainting him, that
the emperor (who a few years before, at the diet of Nuremberg, A. D. 1323, had
established a law against provisions), (k) and also the king of France, had lately
submitted to the holy see; the king replied, that if both the emperor and the
French king should take the pope's part, he was ready to give battle to them
both, in defence of the liberties of the crown. Hereupon more sharp and penal
laws were devised against provisors, (1) which enact severally, that the court of
Rome shall not present or collate to any bishopric or living in England; and
that whoever disturbs any patron in the presentation to a living by virtue of a
papal provision, such provisor shall pay fine and ransom to the king at his will,
and be imprisoned till he renounces such provision: and the same punishment
is inflicted on such as cite the king, or any of his subjects, to answer in the
court of Rome. And when the holy see resented these proceedings, and Pope
Urban V attempted to revive the vassalage and annual rent to which King John
had subjected his kingdom, it was unanimously agreed by all the estates of the
realm in parliament assembled (40 Edw. III), that King John's donation was
null and void, being without the concurrence of parliament, and contrary to his
coronation oath: and all the temporal nobility and commons engaged, that if
the pope should endeavour, by process or otherwise, to maintain these usurpa-
tions, they would resist and withstand him with all their power. (m)
In the reign of Richard the Second it was found necessary to Sharpen and
strengthen these laws, and therefore it was enacted by statutes 3 Ric. II, c. 3,
and 7 Ric. II, c. 12, first, that no alien should be capable of letting his benefice
to farm; in order to compel such as had crept in, at least to reside on their
[*112] preferments: and, afterwards, that no alien *should be capable to be
presented to any ecclesiastical preferment, under the penalty of the stat-
utes of provisors. By the statute 12 Ric. II, c. 15, all liegemen of the king,
accepting of a living by any foreign provision, are put out of the king's pro-
tection, and the benefices made void. To which the statute 13 Ric. II, st. 2, c. 2,
adds banishment and forfeiture of lands and goods: and, by chapter 3 of the
same statute, any person bringing over any citation or excommunication from
beyond sea, on account of the execution of the foregoing statutes of provisors,
shall be imprisoned, forfeit his goods and lands, and moreover suffer pain of
life and member.
In the writ for the execution of all these statutes, the words prwimunire
facias, being (as we said) used to command a citation of the party, have de-
nominated, in common speech, not only the writ, but the offence itself of main-
taining the papal power, by the name of prcemunire. And accordingly the
next statute I shall mention, which is generally referred to by all subsequent
statutes, is usually called the statute of prcrmunire. It is the statute 16 Ric. II,
c. 5, which enacts, that whoever procures at Rome, or elsewhere, any transla-
tions, processes, excommunications, bulles, instruments, or other things which
touch the king, against him, his crown, and realm, and all persons aiding and
assisting therein, shall be put out of the king's protection, their lands and goods
forfeited to'the kings use, and they shall be attached by their bodies to answer
to the king and his council: or process of prcemunire facias shall be made out
against them as in other cases of provisors.
By the statute 2 Hen. IV, c. 3, all persons who accept any provision from the
pope, to be exempt from canonical obedience to their proper ordinary, are also
subjected to the penalties of prcemunire. And this is the last of our ancient
statutes touching this offence; the usurped civil power of the bishop of Rome
(k) Mod. Un. Hist. xxix, 293. (1) Stat. 25 Edw. III, st. 6. 27 Edw. III, st. 1, c. 1. 88 Edw. III, st. 1, c. 4,
and st. 2, c. 1, 2, 3, 4. (m) Seld. in Flst. 10, 4.
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being pretty well broken down by these statutes, as his usurped religious power
was in about a century afterwards; the spirit of the nation being so much
raised * against foreigners, that about this time, in the reign of Henr [*113]
the Fifth, the alien priories, or abbeys for foreign monks, were suppressed,
and their lands given to the crown. And no farther attempts were afterwards
made in support of these foreign jurisdictions.
A learned writer, before referred to, is therefore greatly mistaken, when he
says,(n) that in Henry the Sixth's time the archbishop of Canterbury and other
bishops offered to the king a large supply, if he would consent that all laws
against provisors, and especially the statute 16 Ric. II, might be repealed; but
that this motion was rejected. This account is incorrect in all its branches.
For, first, the application, which he probably means, was made not by the bish-
ops only, but by the unanimous consent of a provincial synod, assembled in
1439 (18 Hen. VI), that very synod which at the same time refused to confirm
and allow a papal bulle, which then was laid before them. Next, the purport
of it was not to procure a repeal of the statutes against provisors, or that of
Richard II in particular; but to request that the penalties thereof, which by
forced construction were applied to all that sued in the spiritual, and even in
many temporal, courts of this realm, might be turned against the proper objects
only; those who appealed to Rome, or to any foreign jurisdiction; the tenor
of the petition being, "that those penalties should be taken to extend only to
those that commenced any suits or procured any writs or public instruments at
Rome or elsewhere out of England; and that no one should be prosecuted upon
that statute for any suit in the spiritual courts or lay jurisdictions of this
kingdom." Lastly, the motion was so far from being rejected, that the king
promised to recommend it to the next parliament, and in the meantime that no
one should be molested upon this account. And the clergy were so satisfied
with their success, that they granted to the king a whole tenth upon this
occasion.(o)
* And, indeed, so far was the archbishop, who presided in this synod, [*114]
from countenancing the usurped power of the pope in this realm,
that he was ever a firm opposer of it. And, particularly in the reign of Henry
the Fifth, he prevented the king's uncle from being then made a cardinal, and
legate a latere from the pope; upon the mere principle of its being within the
mischief of papal provisions, and derogatory from the liberties of the English
church and nation. For, as he expressed himself to the king in his letter upon
that subject, "he was bound to oppose it by his ligeance, and also to quit him-
self to God and the church of this land, of which God and the king had made
him governor." This was not the language of a prelate addicted to the slavery
of the see of Rome; but of one who was indeed of principles so very opposite
to the papal usurpations, that in the year preceding this synod (17 Hen. VI), he
refused to consecrate a bishop of Ely, that was nominated by Pope Eugenius
IV. A conduct quite consonant to his former behaviour, in 6 Hen. VI, when
he refused to obey the commands of Pope Martin V, who had required him to
exert his endeavours to repeal the statute of prcemunire (" execrabile illud statu-
turn," as the holy father phrases it); which refusal so far exasperated the court
of Rome against him, that at length the pope issued a bulle to suspend him
from his office and authority, which the archbishop disregarded, and appealed
to a general council. And so sensible were the nation of their primate's merits,
that the lords spiritual and temporal, and also the university of Oxford, wrote
letters to the pope in his defence; and the house of commons addressed the
king, to send an ambassador forthwith to his holiness, on behalf of the arch-
bishop, who bad incurred the displeasure of the pope for opposing the excessive
power of the court of Rome.(p)
() Day. 96. (o) Wilk. Concil. Mag. Brit. III, 533.
) See Wilk. Conc. Mag. Br. vol. iii, passim, and Dr. Duck's life of Archbishop Chichele, who was the pre-
late here spoken of and the munificent founder of All Souls college in Oxford; in vindication of whose
memory the author hopes to be excused this digression; if indeed it be a digression to show how contrary to
the sentiments of so learned and pious a prelate, even in the days of popery, those usurpations were, which
the statutes of prcemunire and provisors were made to restrain.
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[*115] * This then is the original meaning of the offence, which we call
premunire, viz.: introducing a foreign power into this land, and cre-
ating imperium in imperio, by paying that obedience to papal process, which
constitutionally belonged to the king alone, long before the reformation in the
reign of Henry the Eighth: at which time the penalties of prwemunire were
indeed extended to more papal abuses than before; as the kingdom then entirely
renounced the authority of the see of Rome, though not all the corrupted doc-
trines of the Roman church. And therefore by the several statutes of 24 Hen.
VIII, c. 12, and 25 Hen. VIII, cc. 19 and 21, to appeal to Rome from any of the
king's courts, which (though illegal before) had at times been connived at; to
sue to Rome for any license or dispensation; or to obey any process from thence;
are made liable to the pains of prmmunire. And, in order to restore to the
king in effect the nomination of vacant bishoprics, and yet keep up the estab-
lished forms, it is enacted by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 20, that if the dean and
chapter refuse to elect the person named by the king, or any archbishop or
bishop to confirm or consecrate him, they shall fall within the penalties of the
statutes of premunire. Also by statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, to refuse the oath of suprem-
acy will incur the pains of prmnunire; and to defend the pope's jurisdiction in
this realm, is a prcemunire for the first offence, and high treason for the second.
So, too, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, if any one import any agnus Dei, crosses, beads,
or other superstitious things pretended to be hallowed by the bishop of Rome,
and tender the same to be used; or receive the same with such intent, and
not discover the offender; or if a justice of the peace, knowing thereof, shall
not within fourteen days declare it to a privy counsellor; they all incurprwv-
munire.(2) But importing or selling mass-books, or other popish books, is by
statute 3 Jac. I, c. 5, § 25, only liable to a penalty of forty shillings. Lastly,
to contribute to the maintenanceof a jesuit's college, or any popish seminary
whatever, beyond sea; or any person in the same; or to contribute to the main-
tenance of any jesuit or popish priest in England, is, by statute 27 Eliz. c. 2,
made liable to the penalties of prcemunire.
[*116] Thus far the penalties of prcemunire seem to have kept within the
proper bounds of their original institution, the depressing the power of
the pope; but, they being pains of no inconsiderable consequence, it has been
thought fit to apply the same to other heinous offences; some of which bear
more, and some less, relation to this original offence, and some no relation
at all.
Thus, 1. By the statute 1 and 2 P. and Mf. c. 8, to molest the possessors of
abbey lands granted by parliament to Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth,
is a prcemunire. 2. So likewise is the offence of acting as a broker or agent in
any usurious contract, when above ten per cent. interest is taken, by statute 13
Eliz. c. 8. (3) 3. To obtain any stay of proceedings, other than by arrest of
judgment or writ of error, in any suit for a monopoly, is likewise a prcemunire,
by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 3. 4. To obtain an exclusive patent for the sole making
or importation of gunpowder or arms, or to hinder others from importing them,
is also a prcemunire by two statutes: the one 16 Car. I, c. 21, the other 1 Jac.
II, c. 8. (4) 5. On the abolition, by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, of purveyance, (q)
and the prerogative of pre-emption, or taking any victual, beasts, or goods for
the king's use, at a stated price, without consent of the proprietor, the exertion
of any such power for the future was declared to incur the penalties of premu-
fire. 6. To assert maliciously and advisedly, by speaking or writing, that both
or either house of parliament have a legislative authority without the king,
is declared a prwrnunire by statute 13 Car. II, c. 1. 7. By the habeas corpus
(q) See book I, page 287.
(2) [Repealed by statute 8 and 9 Vie. c. 59.]
(3) [This act was made perpetual by the 39Eliz. c. 18, ss. 30 and 32; but though not expressly
repealed, yet it seems to have virtually expired since the 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, s. 1.]
(4) [Repealed by 6 Geo. IV, c. 105.]
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act also, 31 Car. II, c. 2, it is a prwvmunire, and incapable of the king's pardon,
besides other heavy penalties, (r) to send any subject of this realm a prisoner
into parts beyond the seas. 8. By the statute 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 8, persons of
eighteen years of age, refusing to take the new oaths of allegiance, as well as
supremacy, upon tender by the proper magistrate, are subject to the penalties of
aprcemunire; (5) and by statute 7 and *8 Win. III, c. 24, serjeants, coun- [*117]
sellors, proctors, attorneys, and all officers of courts, practising without
having taken the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and subscribed the decla-
ration against popery, are guilty of aprcemunire, whether the oaths be tendered
or no. 9. By the statute 6 Ann. c. 7, to assert maliciously and directly, by
preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, that the then pretended prince of
Wales, or any person other than according to the acts of settlement and union,
hath any right to the throne of these kingdoms; or that the king and parlia-
ment cannot make laws to limit the descent of the crown; such preaching,
teaching, or advised speaking is a premunire; as writing, printing, or publish-
ing the same doctrines amounted, we may remember, to high treason. 10. By
statute 6 Ann. c. 23, if the assembly of peers in Scotland, convened to elect their
sixteen representatives in the British parliament, shall presume to treat of any
other matter save only the election, they incur the penalties of a PrCemunire.
11. The statute 6 Geo. I, c. 18 (enacted in the year after the infamous south-sea
project had beggared half the nation), makes all unwarrantable undertakings by
unlawful subscriptions, then commonly known by the names of bubbles, subject
to the penalties of aprwemunire. (6) 12. The statute 12 Geo. III, c. 11, subjects
to the penalties of the statute of preomunire all such as knowingly and wilfully
solemnize, assist, or are present at any forbidden marriage of such of the descend-
ants of the body of King George II, as are by that act prohibited to contract
matrimony without the consent of the crown. (s)
Having thus inquired into the nature and several species of preenunire; its
punishment may be gathered from the foregoing statutes, which are thus
shortly summed up by Sir Edward Coke: (t) "that from the conviction, the
defendant shall be out of the king's protection, and his lands and tenements,
goods and chattels, forfeited to the king: and that his body shall remain in
prison at the king's pleasure : *or (as other authorities have it) during
life :"(u) both which amount to the same thing; as the king, by his pre- [*118]
rogative, may any time remit the whole, or any part, of the punishment, except
in the case of transgressing the statute of habeas corpus. These forfeitures
here inflicted do not (by the way) bring this offence within our former defini-
tion of felony; being inflicted by particular statutes, and not by the common
law. But so odious, Sir Edward Coke adds, was this offence ofprcemunire, that
a man that was attainted of the same might have been slain by any other man
without danger of law; because it was provided by law,(w) that any man might
do to him as to the king's enemy; and any man may lawfully kill an enemy.
However, the position itself, that it is at any time lawful to kill an enemy, is by
no means tenable: it is only lawful, by the law of nature and nations, to kill
him in the heat of battle, or for necessary self-defence. And to obviate such
savage and mistaken notions, (x) the statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, provides, that it shall
not be lawful to kill any person attainted in aprcemunire, any law, statute, opinion,
or exposition of law to the contrary notwithstanding. (7) But still such delin-
quent, though protected as a part of the public from public wrongs, can bring
(r) See book I. page 138. Book HI, page 137. (s) See book I, ch. 4. (t) 1 Inst. 129. (u) 1 Bulst. 199.
(w) Stat. 25 Edw. IH, st. 5, c. 22. (x) Bro. Abr. t. Corone, 196.
(5) [By the 3 Geo. III, c. 32, § 18, it is enacted, that no person shall be summoned to take
the oath of supremacy, or make the declaration against transubstantiation, or be prosecuted
for not obeying the summons for that purpose.]
(6) [By the 6 Geo. IV the greater part of the provisions of this statute are repealed, and
illegal companies are left to be dealt with according to the common law.]
(7) [And although this statute has been repealed by the act 9 and 10 Vic. c. 59, it can scarcely
be suggested that a man convicted upon a prcemunire is wholly out of the pale of the law.]
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no action for any private injury, how atrocious soever, being so far out of the
protection of the law, that it will not guard his civil rights, nor remedy any
grievance which he as an individual may suffer. And no man, knowing him to
be guilty, can with safety give him comfort, aid, or relief. (y) (8)
CHAPTER IX.
OF MISPRISIONS AND CONTEMPTS AFFECTING THE
KING AND GOVERNMENT.
THE fourth species of offences more immediately against the king and govern-
ment are entitled misprisions and contempts.
Misprisions (a term derived from the old French, mespris, a neglect or con-
tempt) are, in the acceptation of our law, generally understood to be all such
high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon:
and it is said, that a misprision is contained in every treason and felony what-
soever: and that if the king so please, the offender may be proceeded against for
the misprision only.(a) And upon the same principle, while the jurisdiction of
the star-chamber subsisted, it was held that the king might remit a prosecution
for treason, and cause the delinquent to be censured in that court, merely for
a high misdemeanor: as happened in the case of Roger, earl of Rutland, in 43
Eliz., who was concerned in the earl of Essex's rebellion. (b) Misprisions are
generally divided into two sorts: negative, which consist in the concealment of
something which ought to be revealed; and positive, which consist in the com-
mission of something which ought not to be done.
[*120] *1. Of the first, or negative kind, is what is called misprision of
treason; (1) consisting in the bare knowledge and concealment of treason,
without any degree of assent thereto: for any assent makes the party a prin-
cipal traitor; as indeed the concealment, which was construed aiding and abet-
ting, did at the common law: in like manner as the knowledge of a plot against
the state, and not revealing it, was a capital crime at Florence and in other
states of Italy.(c) But it is now enacted by the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10,
that a bare concealment of treason shall be only held a misprision. This con-
cealment becomes criminal, if the party apprized of the treason does not, as
soon as conveniently may be, reveal it to some judge of assize or justice of the
peace.(d) But if there be any probable circumstances of assent, as if one goes
to a treasonable meeting, knowing before-hand that a conspiracy is intended
against the king; or, being in such company once by accident, and having heard
such treasonable conspiracy, meets the same company again, and hears more of
it, but conceals it; this is an implied assent in law, and makes the concealer
guilty of actual high treason.(e)
There is also one positive misprision of treason, created so by act of parlia-
ment. The statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, enacts, that those who forge foreign coin, not
current in this kingdom, their aiders, abettors, and procurers, shall all be guilty
(y) 1 Hawk. P. C. 55.
(a) Year-book, 2 Ric. IIt, 10. Staundf. P. C. 37. Kel. 71. 1 Hal. P. C. 374. 1 Hawk. P. C. 55, 56.
(b) Hudson of the court of star-chamber. MS. in Mus. Brt. (c) Guicciard. Hist., b. 3 and 13.
(d) 1 Hal. P. C. 372. (e) 1 Hawk. P. C. 56.
(8) [The terrible penalties of a prm~nunire are denounced by a great variety of statutes, yet
prosecutions upon a prcemunire are unheard of in our courts. There is only one instance of
such a prosecution in the State Trials, in which case the penalties of a pr(emunire were in-
flicted upon some persons for refusing to take the oath of allegiance in the reign of Charles the
Second. Harg. St. Tr. vol. 2, 463.]
(1) Misprision of treason against the United States is defined by the act of congress of April
30, 1790 (1 Stat. at Large, 112), and made punishable by imprisonment not exceeding seven
years, and by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
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of misprision of treason.(2) For, though the law would not put foreign coin
upon quite the same footing as our own; yet, if the circumstances of trade con-
cur, the falsifying it may be attended with consequences almost equally perni-
cious to the public; as the counterfeiting of Portugal money would be at present;
and therefore the law has made it an offence just below capital, and that is all.
For the punishment of misprision of treason is loss of the profits of land during
life, forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment during life.(f)(3) Which total for-
feiture of the goods was originally inflicted while *the offence amounted rl1
to principal treason, and of course included in it a felony, by the com-
mon law; and therefore is no exception to the' general rule laid down in a former
chapter,(g) that wherever an offence is punished by such total forfeiture, it is
felony at the common law.
Misprision of felony is also the concealment of a felony which a man knows,
but never assented to; for if he assented, this makes him either principal or
accessory. And the punishment of this, in a public officer, by the statute
Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 9, is imprisonment for a year and a day; in a common
person, imprisonment for a less discretionary time; and, in both, fine and ran-
som at the king's Pleasure: which pleasure of the king must be observed, once
for all, not to signify any extra-judicial will of the sovereign, but such as is
declared by his representatives, the judges in his courts of justice; "voluntas
regis in curia, non in camera."(h)
There is also another species of negative misprisions: namely, the concealing
of treasure-trove, which belongs to the king or his grantees by prerogative royal:
the concealment of which was formerly punishable by death ;(i) but now only
by fine and imprisonment.(J)
I. Misprisions, which are merely positive, are generally denominated con-
tempts or high misdemeanors; of which
1. The first and principal is the mal-administration of such high officers, as
are in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method
of parliamentary impeachment :(4) wherein such penalties, short of death, are
inflicted, as to the wisdom of the house of peers shall seem proper; consisting
usually of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability. Hitherto
also may be referred the *offence of embezzling the public money, called [*122]
among the Romans peculatus, which the Julian law punished with death
in a magistrate, and with deportation, or banishment, in a private person.(k)
With us it is not a capital crime, but subjects the committer of it to a discretion-
ary fine and imprisonment.(5) Other misprisions are, in general, such contempts
of the executive magistrate as demonstrate themselves by some arrogant and
undutiful behaviour, towards the king and government. These are,
2. Contempts against the king's prerogative. As, by refusing to assist him
for the good of the public; either in his councils, by advice, if called upon; or
in his wars by personal service for defence of the realm, against a rebellion or
I) 1 Hal. P. C. 374. (g) See page 94. (h) 1 Hal. P. C. 375. (i) Glan. 1. 1, c. 2. (C) 3 Inst. 133.
Inst. 4, 18, 9.
(2) By subsequent statutes the offence is made felony, or, in case of copper coin, misde-
meanor. See 37 Geo. III, c. 126; 43 Geo. III, c. 139, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99.
(3) [But this is only in case of high treason. Misprision of a lower degree is punishable only
by fine and imprisonment. 1 Hale, 375.]
(4) In the United States "The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Const. of U. S. art. 2, § 4. The senate is the tri-
bunal to try impeachments; the chief justice presiding when the president is on trial. Judg-
ment in case of conviction shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disquali-
fication to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment,
and punishment, according to law. Const. art 1, s. 3.
In the several states a similar tribunal is empowered to try state officers on impeachments.
For very full discussion of the law of impeachment, see The Trial of Andrew Johnson,
1868, 3 vols. Also, articles in 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 257 and 641.
(5) See statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 70.
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invasion.(1) Under which class may be ranked the neglecting to join the posse
comitatus, or power of the county, being thereunto required by the sheriff or
justices, according to the statute 2 Hen. V, c. 8, which is a duty incumbent
upon all that are fifteen years of age, under the degree of nobility, and able to
travel.(n) Contempts against the prerogative may also be, by preferring the
interests of a foreign potentate to those of our own, or doing or receiving any
thing that may create an undue influence in favour of such extrinsic power;
as, by taking a pension from any foreign prince without the consent of the
king.(n) Or, by disobeying the king's lawful commands; whether by writ,
issuing out of his courts of justice, or by a summons to attend his privy councils,
or by letters from the king to a subject commanding him to return from beyond
seas (for disobedience to which his lands shall be seized till he does return, and
himself afterwards punished), or by his writ of ne exeat regnum, or proclama-
tion, commanding the subject to stay at home.(o) Disobedience to any of these
commands is a high misprision and contempt; and so, lastly, is disobedience to
any act of parliament, where no particular penalty is assigned: for then it is
[*123] punishable, like the rest of *these contempts, by fine and imprisonment,
at the discretion of the king's courts of justice.(p)
3. Contempts and misprisions against the king's person and government may
be by speaking or writing against them, cursing or wishing him ill, giving out
scandalous stories concerning him, or doing any thing that may tend to lessen
him in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise
jealousies between him and his people. (6) It has been also held an offence of
this species to drink to the pious memory of a traitor; or for a clergyman to ab-
solve persons at the gallows, who there persist in the treasons for which they die:
these being acts which impliedly encourage rebellion. And for this species of
contempt a man may not only be fined and imprisoned, but suffer the pillory(7)
or other infamous corporal punishment: (q) in like manner, as in the ancient
German empire, such persons as endeavored to sow sedition, and disturb the pub-
lic tranquillity, were condemned to become the objects of public notoriety and
derision, by carrying a dog upon their shoulders from one great town to another.
The emperors Otho I and Frederic Barbarossa inflicted this punishment on
noblemen of the highest rank. (r)
4. Contempts against the king's title, not amounting to treason orprcemunire,
are the denial of his right to the crown in common and unadvised discourse; for,
if it be by advisedly speaking, we have seen (s) that it amounts to a prcomunire.
This heedless species of contempt is however punished by our law with fine and
imprisonment. Likewise if any person shall in any wise hold, affirm, or main-
tain, that the common law of this realm, not altered by parliament, ought not
to direct the right of the crown of England; this is a misdemeanor, by statute
13 Eliz. c. 1, and punishable with forfeiture of goods and chattels. A contempt
may also arise from refusing or neglecting to take the oaths, appointed by statute
[*124] for the better securing the government; and yet *acting in a public office,
place of trust, or other capacity, for which the said oaths are required to
be taken; viz. those of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration; which must be taken
within six calendar months after admission. The penalties for this contempt,
inflicted by statute 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 13, are very little, if any thing, short of
(1) 1 Hawk. P. C. 59. (m) Lamb. Eir. 315. (n) 3 Inst. 144. (o) See book I, page 266.
(p) 1 Hawk. P. C. 60. (q) Ibid. (r) Mod. Un. Hist. xxix, 28, 119. (s) See page 91.
(6) [To assert falsely that the king labors under the affliction of mental derangement is
criminal, and an indictable offence: 3 D. and R. 464; 3 B. and C. 257, S. C. In Rex v. Cobbett,
E. T. 1805; (Holt on Libel, 114, 115; 29 St. Tr. 1),where the defendant was convicted of pub-
lishing a libel upon the administration of the Irish government, and upon the public conduct
and character of the lord lieutenant and the lord chancellor of Ireland, Lord Ellenborough, C. J.,
observed, "It is no new doctrine, that if a publication be calculated to alienate the affections
of the people, by bringing the government into disesteem, whether the expedient be by ridicule
or obloquy, the person so conducting himself is exposed to the inflictions of the law." See also
Holt Rep. 424; 14 How. St. Tr. 1095, S. C.
(7) The punishment of the pillory was finally altogether abolished by statute 1 Vic. e. 23.
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those of prcenunire: being an incapacity to hold the said offices, or any other;
to prosecute any suit: to be guardian or executor: to take any legacy or deed of
gift; and to vote at any election for members of parliament: and after conviction
the offender shall also forfeit 5001. to him or them that will sue for the same.
Members on the foundation of any college in the two universities, who by this
statute are bound to take the oaths, must also register a certificate thereof in the
college-register, within one month after; otherwise, if the electors do not remove
him, and elect another within twelve months, or after, the king may nominate a
person to succeed him by his great seal or sign manual. Besides thus taking the
oaths for offices, any two justices of the peace may by the same statute summon,
and tender the oaths to, any person whom they shall suspect to be disaffected:
and every person refusing the same, who is properly called a non-juror, shall be
adjudged a popish recusant convict, and snbjected to the same penalties that were
mentioned in a former chapter; (t) which in the end may amount to the alter-
native of abjuring the realm, or suffering death as a felon.(8)
5. Contempts against the king's palaces or courts of justice, have been always
looked upon as high misprisions: and by the ancient law, before the conquest,
fighting in the king's palace, or before the king's judges, was punished with
death. (u) So, too, in the old Gothic constitutions, there were many places
privileged by law, quibus major reverentia et securitas debetur, ut tempia et
judicia, quce sancta habebantur,-arces et aula regis,-denique locus quilibet
prcesente aut adventante rege. (v) And at present, with us, by the statute
*33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, malicious striking in the king's palace, wherein his
royal person resides, whereby blood is drawn, is punishable by perpetual [*125]
imprisonment, and fine at the king's pleasure; and also with loss of the offender's
right hand, the solemn execution of which sentence is prescribed in the statute
at length. (9)
But striking in the king's superior courts of justice, in Westminster-hall, or
at the assizes, is made still more penal than even in the king's palace. The
reason seems to be, that those courts, being anciently held in the king's palace,
and before the king himself, striking there included the former contempt against
the king's palace, and something more; viz., the disturbance of public justice.
For this reason, by the ancient common law before the conquest,(w) striking in
the king's courts of justice, or drawing a sword therein, was a capital felony:
and our modern law retains so much of the ancient severity as only to exchange
the loss of life for the loss of the offending limb. Therefore a stroke or blow
in such a court of justice, whether blood be drawn or not, or even assaulting a
(t) See page 55. (u) 3 Inst. 140. LL. Alured. cap. 7 and 34. (v) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 3.
(w) LL. Ince. c. 6. LL. Canut. 56. LL. Alured. c. 7.
(8) By statute 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, assuming any ecclesiastical title established in England was
made punishable by a fine of 1001. In 1850 the pope issued a brief which, while evading this
statute, appointed catholic bishops with territorial designations different from those of the
established church, and they were enthroned with great pomp. This led to statute 14 and 15
Vic. c. 60, which forbade all such titles, and declared this and all similar briefs illegal and void.
The statute, however, has been substantially a dead letter, and is important only as a protest
of the English nation against any assumption of authority by the pope within the realm.
(9) [Mr. Hargrave has given, in the 11th volume of the State Trials, p. 16, an extract from
Stowe s Annals,containing a very curious account of the circumstances of the trial of Sir Edmund
Knevet, who was prosecuted upon this statute, soon after it was enacted: "for which offence
he was not only judged to lose his hand, but also his body to remain in prison, and his lands
and goods at the king's pleasure. Then the said Sir Edmund Knevet desired that the king, of
his benigne grace, would pardon him of his right hand, and take the left: for (quoth he) if my
right be spared, I may hereafter do such good service to his grace, as shall please him to ap-
point. Of this submission and request, the justices forthwith informed th.e king, who of his good-
ness, considering the gentle heart of the said Edmund, and the good report of lords and ladies,
granted him pardon, that he should lose neither hand, land nor goods, but should go free at
liberty.'
So much of the 83 Hen. VIII, c. 12 (part of§ 6 to . 18), as relates to the punishment of man-
slaughter, and malicious striking, by reason whereof blood shall be shed, is repealed by 9 Geo.
IV, c. 31. As to manslaughter generally, vide post, 191.]
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judge sitting in the court, by drawing a weapon, without any blow struck, is
punishable with the loss of the right hand, imprisonment for life, and forfeiture
of goods and chattels, and of the profits of his lands during life.(x) A rescue
also of a prisoner from any of the said courts, without striking a blow, is pun-
ished with perpetual imprisonment, and forfeiture of goods, and of the profits
of lands during life;(y) being looked upon as an offence of the same nature
with the last; but only, as no blow is actually given, the amputation of the
hand is excused. For the like reason, an affray, or riot, near the said courts,
but out of their actual view, is punished only with fine and imprisonment. (z) (10)
[*126] *Not only such as are guilty of an actual violence, but of threatening
or reproachful words to any judge sitting in the courts, are guilty of a
high misprision, and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and
corporal punishment.(a) And, even in the inferior courts of the king, an affray
or contemptuous behaviour is punishable with a fine by the judges there sitting;
as by the steward in a court-leet, or the like.(b)
Likewise all such as are guilty of any injurious treatment to those who are
immediately under the protection of a court of justice, are punishable by fine
and imprisonment: as if a man assaults or threatens his adversary for suing
him, a counsellor or attorney for being employed against him, a juror for his
verdict, or a gaoler or other ministerial officer for keeping him in custody, and
properly executing his duty :(c) which offences, when they proceeded farther than
bare threats, were punished in the Gothic constitutions with exile and forfeiture
of goods.(d)
Lastly, to endeavour to dissuade a witness from giving evidence; to disclose
an examination before the privy council; or, to advise a prisoner to stand mute
(all of which are impediments of justice); are high misprisions, and contempts
of the king's courts, and punishable by fine and imprisonment.(11) And an-
ciently it was held, that if one of the grand jury disclosed, to any person indicted,
the evidence that appeared against him, he was thereby made accessory to the
offence, if felony: and in treason a principal. And at this day it is agreed, that
he is guilty of a high misprision,(e) and liable to be fined and imprisoned.(f)(12)
(x) Staund. P. C. 38. 3 Inst. 140, 141. (y) I Hawk. P. C. 57. (z) Cro. Car. 373. (a) Ibid. 503.
(b) 1 Hawk. P. C. 58. (c) 3 Inst. 141, 142. (d) Stiernh. de jure Goth. 1. 3, c. 3.
(e) See Bar. 212. 27 Ass. pl. 44, § 4, fol. 138. (f) 1 Hawk. P. C. 59.
(10) [Lord Thanet and others were prosecuted by an information filed by the attorney-gen-
eral for a riot at the trial of Arthur O'Connor and others for high treason under a special
commission at Maidstone. Two of the defendants were found guilty generally. The first
three counts charged (inter alia) that the defendants did riotously make an assault on one
J. R., and did then and there beat, bruise, wound, and ill-treat the said J. R. in the presence of
the commissioners. When the defendants were brought up for judgment, Lord Kenyon
expressed doubts, whether upon this information the court was not bound to pronounce the
judgment of amputation of the right hand, &c., as required in a prosecution expressly for
striking in a court of justice. In consequence of these doubts the attorney-general entered a
nolle prosequi upon the first three counts, and the court pronounced judgment of fine and
imprisonment as for a common riot. 1 East, P. C. 488; 27 St. Tr. 821,.]
(11) [The mere attempt to stifle evidence is also criminal, though the persuasion should not
succeed, on the principle now fully established, that an incitement to commit any crime is
itself criminal. 6 East, 464; 2 id. 5, 21, 22; 2 Stra. 904; 2 Leach, 925. As to conspiring to
prevent a witness from giving evidence, see 2 East, 362. Knowingly making use of a false
affidavit is indictable. 8 East, 364; 2 Stra. 1144.]
(12) There is an exception to this rule in the case of a witness before the grand jury who is
indicted for perjury. The jurors in this case are not only competent but compellable to give
evidence of what was sworn to before them. State v. Offatt, 4 Blackf. 355; State v Fasset, 16
Conn. 457; State v. Broughton, 7 Ired. 96; Huidekoper v. Cotton, 8 Watts, 56.
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CHAPTER X.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.
THE order of our distribution will next lead us to take into consideration
such crimes and misdemeanors as more especially affect the commonwealth, or
public polity of the kingdom: which, however, as well as those which are pecul-
iarly pointed against the lives and security of private subjects, are also offences
against the king, as the pater-familias of the nation: to whom it appertains by
his regal office to protect the community, and each individual therein, from every
degree of injurious violence, by executing those laws which the people them-
selves in conjunction with him have enacted; or at least have consented to, by
an agreement either expressly made in the persons of their representatives, or
by a tacit and implied consent presumed from and proved by immemorial usage.
The species of crimes which we have now before us is subdivided into such a
number of inferior and subordinate classes, that it would much exceed the
bounds of an elementary treatise, and be insupportably tedious to the reader,
were I to examine them all minutely, or with any degree of critical accuracy.
I shall therefore confine myself principally to general definitions, or descriptions
of this great variety of offences, and to the punishments inflicted by law for
each particular offence; with now and then a few incidental observations:
referring the student for more particulars to other voluminous authors; who
have treated of these subjects with greater precision and more in detail than is
consistent with the plan of these Commentaries.
The crimes and misdemeanors that more especially affect the commonwealth,
may be divided into five species, .viz.: *offences against public justice, [*121
against the public peace, against public trade, against the public
health, and against the public police or economy: of each of which we will take
a cursory view in their order.
First, then, of offences against public justice: some of which are felonies,
whose punishment may extend to death; others only misdemeanors. I shall
begin with those that are most penal, and descend gradually to such as are of
less malignity.
1. Embezzling or vacating records, or falsifying certain other proceedings in a
court of judicature, is a felonious offence against public justice. It is enacted
by statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 12, that if any clerk, or other person, shall wilfully take
away, withdraw, or avoid any record or process in the superior courts of jistice
in Westminster-hall, by reason whereof the judgment shall be reversed or not
take effect; it shall be felony not only in the principal actors, but also in their
procurers and abettors. And this may be tried either in the king's bench or
common pleas, by a jury de medietate : half officers of any of the superior
courts, and the other half common jurors. (1) Likewise by statute 21 Jac. I,
c. 26, to acknowledge any fine, recovery, deed enrolled, statute, recognizance,
bail, or judgment, in the name of another person not privy to the same, is
felony without benefit of clergy. Which law extends only to proceedings in the
courts themselves: but by statute 4 W. and M. c. 4, to personate any other person
(as bail) before any judge of assize or other commissioner authorized to take
bail in the country, is also felony. (2) For no man's property would be safe, if
(1) This statute is now repealed. For statutes for the punishment of offences of the
character mentioned in the text, and others of a somewhat similar nature, see statutes 7 and 8
Geo. IV, c. 29; 1 Vic. c. 90; 1 and 2 Vic. c. 94; 7 and 8 Vic. c. 19; 14 and 15 Vic. c. 99 and
16 and 17 Vic. c. 99; 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 80; 24 and 25 Vic. c. 98.
(2) The statute now in force for the punishment of this offence, is 24 and 25 Vic. c. 98, s. 34.
For decisions under previous statutes, see 1 Stra. 304: 1 Vent. 501 ; 3 Keb. 694; 1 Ld. Raym.
445; 2 Sid. 90.
The false personation of voters at elections was made a misdemeanor by statute 6 and 7
Vic. c. 18, s. 33
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records might be suppressed or falsified, or persons' names be falsely usurped in
courts, or before their public officers.
2. To prevent abuses by the extensive power which the law is obliged to re-
pose in gaolers, it is enacted by statute 14 Edw. III, c. 10, that if any gaoler by
too great duress of imprisonment makes any prisoner, that he hath in ward,
*become an approver or an appellor against his will; that is, as we shall
see hereafter, to accuse and turn evidence against some other person; it is
felony in the gaoler. (3) For, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (a) it is not lawful
to induce or excite any man even to a just accusation of another; much less to
do it by duress of imprisonment; and least of all by a gaoler, to whom the
prisoner is committed for safe custody.
3. A third offence against public justice is obstructing the execution of lawful
process. This is at all times an offence of a very high and presumptuous na-
ture; but more particularly so, when it is an obstruction of an arrest upon
criminal process. And it hath been holden, that the party opposing such arrest
becomes thereby particeps criminis ; that is, an accessory in felony, and a prin-
cipal in high treason. (b) Formerly one of the greatest obstructions to pub
lie justice, both of the civil and criminal kind, was the multitude of pretended
privileged places, where indigent persons assembled together to shelter them-
selves from justice (especially in London and Southwark), under the pretext ot
their having been ancient palaces of the crown, or the like: (c) all of which
sanctuaries for iniquity are now demolished, and the opposing of any process
therein is made highly penal, by the statutes 8 and 9 Win. III, c. 27, 9 Geo. I,
c. 28, and 11 Geo. I, c. 22, which enact, that persons opposing the execution of
any process in such pretended privileged places within the bills of mortality,
or abusing any officer in his endeavours to execute his duty therein, so that
he receives bodily hurt, shall be guilty of felony, and transported for seven
years: and persons in disguise, joining in or abetting any riot or tumult on
such account, or opposing any process, or assaulting and abusing any officer
executing or for having executed the same, shall be felons without benefit of
clergy. (4)
4. An escape of a person arrested upon criminal process by eluding the vigilance
of his keepers before he is put in hold, is also an offence against public justice, and
[*130] the party himself *is punishable by fine or imprisonment.(d) (5) But the
officer permitting such escape, either by negligence or connivance, is
much more culpable than the prisoner; the natural desire of liberty pleading
strongly in his behalf, though he ought in strictness of law to submit himself
quietly to custody, till cleared by the due course of justice. Officers therefore
who, after arrest, negligently permit a felon to escape, are also punishable by
fine: (e) but voluntary escapes, by consent and connivance of the officer, are a
much more serious offence: for it is generally agreed that such escapes amount
-to the same kind of offence, and are punishable in the same degree, as the offence
of which the prisoner is guilty, and for which he is in custody, whether treason,
felony, or trespass. And this whether he were actually committed to gaol, or
only under a bare arrest. (f) But the officer cannot be thus punished, till
the original delinquent hath actually received judgment or been attainted
upon verdict, confession, or outlawry, of the crime for which he was so com-
mitted or arrested: otherwise it might happen, that the officer might be pun-
ished for treason or felony, and the person arrested and escaping might turn
out to be an innocent man. But, before the conviction of the principal party,
(a) 3 Inst. 91. (b) 2 Hawk. P. C. 121
(c) Stch as White-Friarsg, and its environs; the Savoy; and the Mint in Southwark
(d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 122. (e) 1 Hal. P. C 600. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 590. 2 Hawk, P. C. 134.
(3) This statute is now repealed.
(4) For provisions punishing similar offences, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. The wilful
refusal to aid a peace officer in the performance of his duty, when requested, is a misdemea-
nor at common law. Regina v. Brown, 1 C. & M. 314.
(5) See statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 29.
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the officer thus neglecting his duty may be fined and imprisoned for a mis-
demeanor. (g) (6)
5. Breach of prison by the offender himself, when committed for any cause,
was felony at the common law: (h) or even conspiring to break it.(i) But this
severity is mitigated by the statute defrangentibusprisonam, 1 Edw. II, st. 2,which
enacts that no person shall have judgment of life or member for breaking
prison, unless committed for some capital offence. So that to break prison and
escape, when lawfully committed for any treason or felony, remains still felony
as at the common law; and to break prison (whether it be the county-gaol, the
stocks, or other usual place of security), when lawfully confined upon any other
inferior charge, is still *punishable as a high misdemeanor by fine and [*131]
imprisonment. For the statute which ordains that such offence shall
be no longer capital, never meant to exempt it entirely from every degree of
punishment.(j) (7)
6. Rescue is the forcibly and knowingly freeing another from an arrest or
imprisonment; and it is generally the same offence in the stranger so rescuing,
as it would have been in a gaoler to have voluntarily permitted an escape. A
rescue, therefore, of one apprehended for felony, is felony; for treason, treason;
and for a misdemeanor, a misdemeanor also. But here, likewise, as upon volun-
tary escapes, the principal must first be attainted or receive judgment before
the rescuer can be punished: and for the same reason; because, perhaps, in fact
it may turn out there has been no offence committed.(k) By statutes 11 Geo.
I, c. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 40, if five or more persons assemble to rescue any
retailers of spirituous liquors, or to assault the informers against them, it is
felony, and subject to transportation for seven years. By the statute 16 Geo.
II, c. 31, to convey to any prisoner in custody for treason or felony any arms,
instruments of escape, or disguise, without the knowledge of the gaoler, though
no escape be attempted, or any way to assist such prisoner to attempt an escape,
though no escape be actually made, is felony, and subjects the offender to trans-
portation for seven years: or, if the prisoner be in custody for petit larceny or
(g), 1 Hal. P. C. 588, 589. 2 Hawk. P. C. 184, 185. (h) 1 Hal. P. C. 607. (i) Bract 1. 3, c. 9.
(J) 2 Hawk. P. C. 128. (k) 1 Hal. P. C. 607. Fost. 344.
(6) [There must be an actual arrest, as well as a lawful arrest, to make an escape criminal
in an officer. 2 Hawk. c. 19, ss. 1, 2. It must also be for a criminal matter. Id. s. 3. And
the imprisonment must be continuing at the time of the offence. Id. s. 4; 1 Russ. 531; 1 Hale,
594. In some cases it is an escape to suffer a prisoner to have greater liberty than can by law
be allowed him; as, to admit him to bail against law, or to suffer him to go beyond the limits
of the prison, though he return. 2 Hawk. c. 19, s. 5. A retaking will not excuse an escape.
Id. s. 13.
Private individuals, who have persons lawfully in their custody, are guilty of an escape if
they suffer them illegally to depart: 1 Hale, 595; but they may protect themselves from
liability by delivering over their prisoner to some legal and proper officer. 1 Hale, 594, 595.
A private person, thus guilty of an escape, the punishment is fine, or imprisonment, or both.
2 Hawk. c. 20, s. 6.]
(7) [An actual breaking is the gist of this offence, and must be stated in the indictment. It
must also appear that the party was lawfully in prison, and for a crime involving judgment
of life or member; it is not enough to allege that he " feloniously broke prison." 2 Inst. 591;
1 Russell, 381. If lawfully committed, a party breaking prison is within the statute, although
he may be innocent: as, if committed by a magistrate upon strong suspicion. 2 Inst. 590;
1 Hale, P. C. 610; 1 Russell, 378. To constitute a felonious prison breach, the party must be
committed for a crime which is capital at the time of the breaking. 1 Russell, 379; Cole's
Case, Plowd. Comm. 401. A constructive breaking is not sufficient; therefore, if a person
goes out of prison without obstruction, as by a door being left open, it is only a misdemeanor.
1 Hale P. C. 611. An actual intent to break is not necessary. The statute extends to a prison
in law, as well as to a prison in fact. 2 Inst. 589. " Prison breach or rescue is a common-
law felony, if the prisoner breaking prison, or rescued, is a convicted felon, and it is punish-
able at common law by imprisonment, and under 19 Geo. III, c. 74, s. 4, by three times whip-
ping. Throwing down loose bricks at the top of a prison wall, placed there to impede
escape and give alarm, is prison breach, though they were thrown down by accident." Rex v.
Haswell, R. and R. C. C. 458.]
See a very full discussion of this offence in 2 Bish. Cr. L. 893, et seq.
For recent acts to punish those aiding escapes, see 5 Geo. IV, c. 84, s. 22; 28 and 29 Vic. c.
126, s. 37.
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other inferior offence, or charged with a debt of 1001., it is then a misdemeanor)
punishable with fine and imprisonment.(8) And by several special statutes,(l)
to rescue, or attempt to rescue, any person corflmitted for the offences enumer-
ated in those acts, is felony without benefit of clergy; and to rescue, or attempt
to rescue, the body of a felon executed for murder, is single felony, and subject
to transportation for seven years. Nay, even if any person be charged with any
of the offences against the black-act, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, and being required by order
[*132 *of the privy council to surrender himself, neglects so to do for forty
I days, both he and all that knowingly conceal, aid, abet, or succour him,
are felons, without benefit of clergy.(9)
7. Another capital offence against public justice is the returning from trans-
portation, or being seen at large in Great Britain, before the expiration of the
term for which the offender was ordered to be transported, or had agreed to
transport himself. This is made felony without benefit of clergy in all cases,
by statutes 4 Geo. I, c. 11, 6 Geo. I, c. 23, 16 Geo. II, c. 15, and 8 Geo. III, c. 15,
as is also the assisting them to escape from such as are conveying them to the
port of transportation.(10)
8. An eighth is that of taking a reward, under pretence of helping the owner
to his stolen goods. This was a contrivance carried to a great length of villainy
in the beginning of the reign of George the First; the confederates of the
felons thus disposing of stolen goods, at a cheap rate, to the owners them-
selves, and thereby stifling all farther inquiry. The famous Jonathan Wild
had under him a well disciplined corps of thieves, who brought in all their
spoils to him; and he kept a sort of public office for restoring them to the
owners at half price. To prevent which audacious practice, to the ruin and in
defiance of public justice, it was enacted by statute 4 Geo. I, c. 11, that who-
ever shall take a reward under the pretence of helping any one to stolen goods,
shall suffer as the felon who stole them; unless he causes such principal felon
to be apprehended and brought to trial, and also gives evidence against them.
Wild, still continuing in his old practice, was upon this statute at last con-
victed and executed.(m) (11)
9. Receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, is also a high misde-
meanor and affront to public justice. We have seen in a former chapter,(n)
(1) 6 Geo. I, c. 23. (Transportation.) 9 Geo. I, c. 22. (Black-act.) 8 Geo. II, c. 20. (Destroying turnpikes,
&c.) 19 Geo. II, c. 34. (Smuggling. See the 52 Geo. III, c. 143, . 11.) 25 Geo. I, c. 87. (Murder.) 27 Geo.
II, c. 15 (Black-act.)
(m) See stat. 6 Geo. I, c. 23, S 9. (n) See page 38.
(8) [ On an indictment under this act, the offence of delivering instruments of escape to a
prisoner has been held to be complete, though the prisoner had been pardoned of the offence
of which he was convicted, on condition of transportation; and a party may be convicted
though there is no evidence that he knew of what offence the prisoner had been convicted.
Rex v. Shaw, R. and R. C. C. 526. This act applies only to cases of attempt (Tilley's Case, 2
Leach, 662), and a case where the commitment is on suspicion only, is not within it. Greenif's
Case, 1 Leach, 863. This act was virtually repealed by 4 Geo. IV, c. 64, s. 43.]
(9) [By statute 1 Vic. c. 91, ss. 1 and 2, any person rescuing or attempting to rescue any other
person who shall be committed or found guilty of murder, shall be liable to be transported
for life, or for any time not exceeding fifteen years, or to be imprisoned for three; and now
penal servitude may be substituted.]
See also statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 84, s. 22.
The statutes mentioned in the text are since repealed or essentially changed, so that the
punishments there mentioned are not now imposed.
(10) These offences are no longer capital. See statutes 5 Geo. IV, c. 84, s. 22; 20 and 21
Vic. c. 3, s. 2; 27 and 28 Vic. c. 47.
(11) By statutes 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 151, persons corruptly taking money or reward on
pretence of helping any person to property which has been stolen, embezzled, &c., unless
they shall use all due diligence to bring the offenders to trial, are made guilty of felony. See
Reg. v. King, 1 Cox, C. C. 36; Reg. v. Pascoe, 1 Den. C. C. 456. And by section 50, any per-
son advertising a reward for the return of property stolen or lost, and using words purport-
ing that no questions will be asked, or that a reward will be given for the property stolen or
lost, without seizing or making any inquiry after the person producing it, or promising to
return to any pawnbroker or other person money advanced or paid by him on such property,
or any other sum or reward for the return of such property, and any person publishing such
advertisement, is made subject to a fine of 501.
Chap. 10.] COMPOUNDING FELONY: BARRETRY.
that this offence, which is only a misdemeanor t common law, by the statute
3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, makes the offender accessory to the
theft and felony. But because the accessory cannot in * general be [*133]
tried, unless with the principal, or after the principal is convicted, the
receivers by that means frequently eluded justice. To remedy which, it is
enacted by statute 1 Ann. c. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, that such receivers may still
be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, and punished by fine and imprisonment,
though the principal felon be not before taken so as to be prosecuted and
convicted. And, in case of receiving stolen lead, iron, and certain other metals,
such offence is by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30, punishable by transportation for
fourteen years.(o) So that now the prosecutor has two methods in his choice:
either to punish the receivers for the misdemeanor immediately, before the
thief is taken ;(p) or to wait till the felon is convicted, and then punish them
as accessories to the felony. But it is provided by the same statutes, that he
shall only make use of one, and not both of these methods of punishment.
By the same statute, also, 29 Geo. II, c. 30, persons having lead, iron, and
other metals in their custody, and not giving a satisfactory account how
they came by the same, are guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable by fine
or imprisonment. And by statute 10 Geo. III, c. 48, all knowing receivers
of stolen plate or jewels, taken by robbery on the highway, or when a bur-
glary accompanies the stealing, may be tried as well before as after the con-
viction of the principal, and whether he be in or out of custody; and, if
convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and transported for fourteen
years.(12)
10. Of a nature somewhat similar to the two last is the offence of theft
bote, which is where the party robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes
his goods again, or other amends upon agreement not to prosecute. This is
frequently called compounding of felony; and formerly was held to make a
man an accessory; but it is now punished only with fine and imprisonment.(q)
This perversion of justice, in the old Gothic constitutions, was liable to the
most severe and infamous punishment. And the Salic law, "latroni eum
*sinmilem habuit, qui fertumn celare vellet, et occulte sine .judice coml)o- [*134
sitionem ejus admittere."(r) By statute 25 Geo. II, c. 36, even to adver-
tise a reward for the return of things stolen, with no questions asked, or words
to the same purport, subjects the advertiser and the printer to a forfeiture of
501. each.(13)
11. Common barretry is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up suits
and quarrels between his majesty's subjects, either at law or otherwise.(s) (14)
The punishment for this offence, in a common person, is by fine and imprison-
(o) See also statute 2 Geo. HI, c. 28, § 12, for the punishment of receivers of goods stolen by bumboats, &c.,
in the Thames.
(p) Foster, 873. (q) 1 Hawk. P. C. 125. (r) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 5.
(s) 1 Hawk. P. C. 243.
(12) These offences are covered by statutes 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96. The punishment is penal
servitude or imprisonment, and in case of males under sixteen years of age, with or without
whipping.
(13) See also statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 102.
(14) [Disturbing the peace, making false inventions, propagating evil reports and calumnies,
and spreading false and groundless rumors, whereby discord and disquiet may ensue amongst
neighbors, may properly be ranked under the head barretry. 1 Inst. 368; 1 Haw. P. C. 243.
See 1 Hale, P. C. c. 27; Bac. Abr. Barretry; 1 Russell, 185, on this subject. ' See also the Case
of Barretry, 8 Co. Rep. 36, b. No one can be convicted for a single act of barretry, for every
indictment for that offence must charge the defendant with being a common barretor. In a
case in the king's bench, where an attorney, without any corrupt or unworthy motives,
prepared a special case, in order to take the opinion of the court upon the will of a testator,
and suggested several facts which had no foundation, he was held to be guilty of a contempt,
and fined 301. In re Elsam, 5 D. and R. 389; 3 B. and C. 597.]
The statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, was made perpetual by 30 and 31 Vic. c. 59.
As to indictments for common barretry, see Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 15 Mass. 227;
State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey, 379; Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432.
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ment; but if the offender (as is too frequently the case) belongs to the profes-
sion of the law, a barretor, who is thus able as well as willing to do mischief,
ought also to be disabled from practising for the future.(t) And, indeed, it is
enacted by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, that if any one who hath been convicted of
forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, or common barretry, shall practise
as an attorney, solicitor, or agent, in any suit; the court, upon complaint, shall
examine it in a summary way; and, if proved, shall direct the offender to be
transported for seven years. Hereunto may also be referred another offence, of
equal malignity and audaciousness; that of suing another in the name of a
fictitious plaintiff; either one not in being at all, or one who is ignorant of the
suit. This offence, if committed in any of the king's superior courts, is left, as
a high contempt, to be punished at their discretion. But in courts of a lower
degree, where the crime is equally pernicious, but the authority of the judges
not equally extensive, it is directed by statute 8 Eliz. c. 2, to be punished by
six months' imprisonment, and treble damages to the party injured.
12. Maintenance is an offence that bears a near relation to the former; being
an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining
or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it : (u1)
a practice that was greatly encouraged by the first introduction of uses.(w)
[*1351 This is an offence against public justice, as it *keeps alive strife and
contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine
of oppression. And, therefore, by the Roman law, it was a species of the
crimen falsi to enter into any confederacy, or do any act to support another's
lawsuit, by money, witnesses, or patronage.(x) A man may, however, maintain
the suit of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbour, out of charity and
compassion, with impunity. Otherwise, the punishment by common law is fine
and imprisonment; (y) and by the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, a forfeiture of
ten pounds.
13. Champerty, campi-partitio, is a species of maintenance, and punished in
the same manner: (z) being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum
partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they pre-
vail at law; whereupon the champerter is to carry on the party's suit at his
own expense.(a) Thus, champart, in the French law, signifies a similar division
of profits, being a part of the crop annually due to the landlord by bargain or
custom. In our sense of the word it signifies the purchasing of a suit, or right
of suing: (15) a practice so much abhorred by our law, that it is one main reason
why a chose in action, or thing of which one hath the right but not the posses-
sion, is not assignable at common law; because no man shall purchase any pre-
tence to sue in another's right. These pests of civil society, that are perpetually
endeavoring to disturb the repose of their neighbours, and officiously interfering
in other men's quarrels, even at the hazard of their own fortunes, were severely
animadverted on by the Roman law, "qui improbe cceunt in alienam litem, ut
quicquid ex condemnatione in rem ipsius redactum fuerit inter eos communi-
caretur, lege Julia de vi privata tenentur; " (b) and they were punished by the
forfeiture of a third part of their goods, and perpetual infamy. Hitherto, also,
must be referred the provision of the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, that no one
shall sell or purchase any pretended right or title to land, unless the vendor
(t) Ibid. 244. (u) Ibid. 249. (w) Dr. and St. 203. (x) Ff. 48, 10, 20.
(y) 1 Hawk. P. C. 255. () Ibid. 257. (a) Stat. of conspirat. 33 Ed. I. (b) f. 48, 7, 6.
(15) [See 1 Haw. P. C. c. 3 ; Co. Litt. 368; 1 Russell, 176, on this subject. The distinction
between maintenance and champerty seems to be this : where there is no agreement to divide
the thing in suit, the party intermeddling is guilty of maintenance only; but, where he stipu-
lates to receive part of the thing in suit, he"is guilty of champerty. It seems that resorting
to machinery and contrivances in order to make a party interested in a suit a witness on the
trial, amounts to maintenance. Bell v. Smith, 7 D. and R. 846; 5 B. and C. 188.]
Upon the subject of champerty and maintenance, the reader is referred to 2 Bish. Cr. L.
§5 104-116. The tendency of late has been to confine these offences within bounds somewhat
narrower than those indicated by the older authorities.
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*hath received the profits thereof for one whole year before such grant, [*136,
or hath been in actual possession of the land, or of the reversion or
remainder; on pain that both purchaser and vendor shall each forfeit the value
of such land to the king and the prosecutor. These offences relate chiefly to
the commencement of civil suits: but,
14. The compounding of informations upon penal statutes is an offence of an
equivalent nature in criminal causes; and is, besides, an additional misdemeanor
against public justice, by contributing to make the laws odious to the people.
At once, therefore, to discourage malicious informers, and to provide that
offences, when once discovered, shall be duly prosecuted, it is enacted by statute
18 Eliz. c. 5, that if any person, informing under pretence of any penal law,
makes any composition without leave of the court, or takes any money or
promise from the defendant to excuse him (which demonstrates his intent in
commencing the prosecution to be merely to serve his own ends, and not for
the public good), he shall forfeit 101., shall stand two hours on the pillory, and
shall be forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute.(16)
15. A conspiracy, also, to indict an innocent man of felony falsely and mali-
ciously, who is accordingly indicted and acquitted, is a farther abuse and per-
version of public justice; (17) for which the party injured may either have a
civil action by writ of conspiracy (of which we spoke in the preceding book), (c)
or the conspirators, for there must be at least two to form a conspiracy, may be
indicted at the suit of the king, and were by the ancient common law (d) to
receive what is called the villenous judgment; viz., to lose their liberam legem,
whereby they are discredited and disabled as jurors or witnesses; to forfeit their
goods and chattels, and lands for life; to have those lands wasted, their houses
(c) See book III, page 126. (d) Bro. Abr. tit. Conspiracy, 28.
(16) [This statute does not apply to offences cognizable only before magistrates, 1 B. and A.
282; it applies only to common informers, and not to cases where the penalty is given to the
party grieved. 1 salk. 30 ; 2 Hawk. 279. The taking the penalty is an offence within the act,
though there is no action or proceeding for it. Russ. and R. C. C. 84; 3 Burn, J. 24th ed. 85.
A notice of action required by a penal statute is no commencement of the suit, so as to sub-
ject the plaintiff, or his agent, to an attachment for attempting to compound an offence pre-
vious to the suing out of the writ. 2 Bla. Rep. 781. As to the mode of obtaining leave to
compound, see Tidd's Prac. 8th ed. 604.]
This subject was considered and the previous cases examined by Ch. J. Tindal, in Keir v.
Leeman, 9 Q. B. 392, where the conclusion was that "in all offences which involve damages
to an injured party, for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwith-
standing they are also of a public nature, to compromise and settle his private damage in any
way he may think fit;" but that an agreement to pay money in consideration of a prosecution
for riot and assault being abandoned, was illegal and void. On the same subject, see Jones
v. Rice, 18 Pick. 440.
(17) [The instance pointed out by the learned commentator is not the only one in which
parties may be indicted for a conspiracy; and it may be stated, as a general rule, that all con-
federacies wrongfully to prejudice another, are misdemeanors at common law, and indictable
accordingly, whether the intention is to injure his property, his person or his character. See
1 Hawk. c. 72, s. 2. But no indictment lies for conspiring to commit a civil trespass on a pre-
serve to take game, though effected in the night, and with destructive weapons. 13 East, 228.
The offence of conspiracy is not confined to the prejudicing a particular individual; it may
be to injure public trade, to affect public health, to violate public policy, to insult public jus-
tice, or to do any act in itself illegal.
There are many cases in which the act itself would not be cognizable by law if done by a
single person, which become the subject of indictment when effected by several with a joint
design. 6 T. R. 636. Thus, each person attending a theater has a right to express his disap-
probation of the piece acted, or a performer on the stage; but if several previously agree to
condemn a play, or hiss an actor, they will be guilty of conspiring. 2 Camp. 358. In the
case of workmen refusing to proceed unless they receive an advance of wages, it is clear that
any one of them might singly act on this determination, but it is criminal when it follows
from a plan preconcerted by many. 6 T. R. 636. See the statute as to combinations among
workmen, infra. There are other cases in which, though the act may be morally criminal, it
is not illegal, except on the ground of conspiracy; thus the verbal slander of a private indi-
vidual is not indictable, but it is so where several unite in a scheme to blast his character.
1 Lev. 62 ; 1 Vent. 304. And in every case that can be adduced of conspiracy, the offence de-
Vol. JI.-48. 377
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razed, their trees rooted up, and their own bodies committed to prison. (e) But
F.137] it now is the better opinion, that the villenous judgment is by long *dis-*13"] use become obsolete; it not having been pronounced for some ages: but
instead thereof the delinquents are usually sentenced to imprisonment, fine, and
pillory. To this head may be referred the offence of sending letters, threatening
to accuse any person of a crime punishable with death, transportation, pillory,
or other infamous punishment, with a view to extort from him any money or
other valuable chattels. This is punishable by statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24, at the
discretion of the court, with fine, imprisonment, pillory, whipping, or transpor-
tation for seven years. (18)
16. The next offence against public justice is when the suit is past its com-
mencement, and come to trial. And that is, the crime of wilful and corrupt
perjury: which is defined by Sir Edward Coke, (f) to be a crime committed
when a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person
who swears wilfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or
point in question. The law takes no notice of any perjury but such as is com-
mitted in some court of justice, having power to administer an oath; or before
some magistrate or proper officer, invested with a similar authority, in some pro-
ceedings relative to a civil suit or a criminal prosecution: for it esteems all
other oaths unnecessary at least, and therefore will not punish the breach of
them. (19) For which reason it is much to be questioned, how far any magis-
trate is justifiable in taking a voluntary affidavit in any extra-judicial matter,
as is now too frequent upon every petty occasion: since it is more than possible,
that by such idle oaths a man may frequently in foro conscientice, incur the
guilt, and at the same time evade the temporal penalties, of perjury. The per-
(e) 1 Hawk. P. C. 193. (V) 3 Inst. 164.
pends on the unlawful agreement, and not on the act which follows it; the latter is but evi-
dence of the former. 2 Burr. 993; 3 id. 1321.
To constitute a conspiracy, as observed in the text, there must be at least two persons im-
plicated in it; and a husband and a wife cannot be guilty of it. 1 Hawk. c. 72, s. 8. If all
the persons in the indictment be acquitted except one, and the indictment do not lay the
offence as committed jointly with other persons unknown, no judgment can be passed on
such one. Poph. 202; 3 Burr. 1262; 12 Mod. 262. But one conspirator may be tried singly;
as, if the others had escaped, or died, before the trial, or the finding of the bill, he may be
convicted alone. 1 Stra. 193; 2 id. 1227. It is no offence to conspire to prosecute a guilty
person. 1 Salk. 174.
It is not necessary to constitute the offence, that any act should be done in pursuance of the
conspiracy: 2 Lord Raym. 1167; 8 Mod. 321; 1 Salk. 174; 1 Bla. Rep. 392; or that any party
was actually injured. 1 Leach, 39.]
As to what shall constitute conspiracy, see further O'Connell v. Queen, 11 Cl. and Fin. 155;
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Collins v. Commonwealth, 3 S. and R. 220; State v. Row-
ley, 12 Conn. 101 ; Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414; State v. Younger, 1 Dev. 357; State V.
urphy, 6 Ala. 765; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229; State v. Rickey, 4 Halst. 293; State v.
Straw, 42 N. H. 393 ; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17.
(18) This subject is covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.
(19) [And no breach of an oath made in a mere private concern, as in entering into a con-
tract, however malicious, is an indictable offence, but can only be redressed in an action for
the individual injury; nor can any criminal proceeding be maintained for the violation of an
oath, taken, however solemnly, to perform any duties in future, though the offence will be
highly aggravated by the breach of an obligation so sacred. 3 Inst 166; 11 Co. Rep. 98.
And even when an oath is required by an act of parliament in an extra-judicial proceeding,
the breach of that obligation does not seem to amount to perjury, unless the statute contain
an express provision to that effect. And it seems an indictment for perjury is not sustainable
on an oath taken before the house of commons, as they have not any power to administer an
oath, unless indeed in those particular cases in which an express power is granted to them by
statute. But it is indictable to swear falsely in any court of equity (1 Leach, 50; 1 Sid. 418);
any ecclesiastical court (Cro. Eliz. 609), and any other lawful court, whether it be of record
or otherwise. Hawk. b. 1, c. 69, s 3. So a false oath subjects the offender to all the penalties
of perjury, though it be taken in a stage of the proceedings when it does not influence the
final judgment, but only affects some intermediate step to be taken; thus, if a man offering
to bail another swears his property to be greater than it is, in order to be received as a surety:
Cro Car. 146; or if he swears falsely before a magistrate to induce him to compel another to
find sureties for the peace. Hawk. b. 1, c. 69, s. 3.
The party must be lawfully sworn, and, as above observed, the person by whom the oath is
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jury must also be corrupt (that is, committed malo anino), wilful, positive, and
absolute: (20) not upon surprise, or the like: it also must be in some point ma-
terial to the question in dispute; (21) for if it only be in some trifling collateral
circumstance, to which no regard is paid, it is no more penal than in the voluntary
extra-judicial oaths before mentioned. Subornation of perjury is the offence of
procuring another to *take such a false oath, as constitutes perjury in the [*138]
principal.(22) The punishment of perjury and subornation, at common
law, has been various. It was anciently death; afterwards banishment, or cutting
out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now it is fine and imprisonment, and
never more to be capable of bearing testimony.(g) But the statute of 5 Eliz.
c. 9 (if the offender be prosecuted thereon), inflicts the penalty of perpetual in-
famy, and a fine of 401. on the suborner: and, in default of payment, imprison-
(a) 3 Inst. 163.
administered must have competent authority to receive it. And, therefore, no false swearing
before individuals acting merely in a private capacity, or before officers who have no legal
jurisdiction to administer the particular oath in question, will amount to the offence of per-
jury. 3 Inst. 166. And though the officer stands colorably in the situation which confers
a power of receiving an oath on such an occasion, if in fact he is not duly appointed, the
proceedings will be of no avail: id.; 3 Campb. 432; Wood's Inst. 435; for though it is sufficient
prima facie to show the ostensible capacity in which lie acted when the oath was taken, the
presumption may be rebutted by other evidence, and the defendant, if he succeed, will be
entitled to an acquittal. 3 Campb. 432; see id. 96.]
And mere negligence or carelessness in swearing to the witness's belief, when proper pains
would have enabled him to ascertain the truth to be otherwise, seems not to be perjury, inas-
much as the specific wilful intent is wanting. U. S. v. Shellnire, 1 Bald. 378; U. S. v. Bab-
cock, 4 McLean, 113; State v. Cockran, 1 Bailey, 50. See State v. Lea, 3 Ala. 602; Common-
wealth v. Brady, 5 Gray, 78.
(20) [If a man swears that he believes that to be true which he knows to be false, he swears as
absolutely, and is as criminal, in point of law, as if he had made a positive assertion that the
fact was as he swore he believed it to be. 3 Wils. 427; 2 Bla. Rep. 881; 1 Leach, 242; Hawk.
b. 1, c. 69, s. 7, n. a. The false swearing, however, as to the legal operation of a deed is not
indictable. I Esp. Rep. 280.]
(21) [If the subject-matter is entirely foreign to the purpose, not tending either to extenuate
or increase the damages or the guilt, nor likely to induce the jury to give a more easy credit
to the substantial part of the evidence, the party will not be liable to an indictment. Hawk.
b. 1, c. 69, s. 8. To swear falsely as to the character of a witness is sufficiently material. Com.
Rep. 43; 1 Ld. Raym. 258. And in general it is sufficient if the matter be circumstantially
material to the issue, or affect the ultimate decision. 1 Ld. Raym. 258; 2 id. 889; 2 Roll R.
369. Thus perjury may be committed by falsely swearing that another witness is entitled to
credit, if such assertion conduce to the proof of the point in issue. 1 Ld. Raym. 258. And it
is certain, that there is no necessity that the false evidence should be sufficient to render the
party on whose behalf it is given successful, but it will suffice if that is its evident tendency:
2 Ld. Raym. 889; or if in a civil action it has the effect of increasing or extenuating the
damages, comnme semble. Wood's Inst. 435. In a late case, in an indictment for perjury, in an
answer in chancery to a bill filed against the defendant for the specific performance of an
agreement relating to the purchase of land, the defendant had relied on the statute of frauds
(the agreement not being in writing), and had also denied having ever entered into such an
agreement, and upon this denial he was indicted; but it was held that the denial of an agree-
ment, which by the statute of frauds was not binding on the parties, was immaterial and irrel-
evant, and not indictable. 1 Ry. and M. 109
To constitute perjury at common law, it is not necessary that the false oath should obtain
any credit, or occasion any actual injury to the party against whom the evidence is given;
for the prosecution is not grounded on the inconvenience which an individual may sustain,
but on the abuse and insult to public justice. 2 Leon. 211 ; 3 id. 230; 7 T. R. 315.
In some cases, where a false oath has been taken, the party may be prosecuted by indict-
ment at common law, though the offence may not amount to perjury. Thus, it appears to
have been holden, that any person making, or knowingly using, any false affidavit taken abroad
(though a perjury could not be assigned on it here), in order to mislead our courts of justice, is
punishable as a misdemeanor; and Lord Ellenborough, 0. J., said "that he had not the least
doubt that any person making use of a false instrument, in order to prevent the due course of
justice, was guilty of an offence punishable by indictment." 8 East, 364; 2 Russ. 1759.]
(22) [To render the offence of subornation of perjury complete, either at common law or
on the statute, the false oath must be actually taken, and no abortive attempt to solicit will
bring the offender within its penalties. 3 Mod. 122; 1 Leach. 455, notes. But the criminal
solicitation to commit perjury, though unsuccessful, is a misdemeanor at common law, punish-
able not only by fine and imprisonment, but by corporal and infamous punishment. 2 East
Rep. 17; 1 Hawk. c. 19, s. 10; 6 East, 464.]
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ment for six months, and to stand with both ears nailed to the pillory. Perjury
itself is thereby punished with six months' imprisonment, perpetual infamy, and
a fine of 201., or to have both ears nailed to the pillory. But the prosecution is
usually carried on for the offence at common law; especially as to the penalties
before inflicted, the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, superadds a power for the court to
order the offender to be sent to the house of correction for a term not exceeding
seven years, or to be transported for the same period; and makes it felony with-
out benefit of clergy to return or escape within the time.(23) It has sometimes
been wished, that perjury, at least upon capital accusations, whereby another's
life has been or might have been destroyed, was also rendered capital, upon aprinciple of retaliation: as it is in all cases by the laws of France.(h) And cer-
tainly the odiousness of the crime pleads strongly in behalf of the French law.
But it is to be considered, that there they admit witnesses to be heard only on the
side of the prosecution, and use the rack to extort a confession from the accused.
In such a constitution, therefore, it is necessary to throw the dread of capital
punishment into the other scale, in order to keep in awe the witnesses for the
crown, on whom alone the prisoner's fate depends; so naturally does one cruel
law beget another. But corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile and per-
petual infamy, are more suited to the genius of the English law: where the fact
is openly discussed between witnesses on both sides, and the evidence for the
crown may be contradicted and disproved by those of the prisoner. Where,
[*139] *indeed, the death of an innocent person has actually been the conse-
quence of such wilful perjury, it falls within the guilt of deliberate
murder, and deserves an equal punishment: which our ancient law in fact
inflicted.(i) But the mere attempt to destroy life by other means not being
capital, there is no reason that an attempt by perjury should; much less that
this crime should in all judicial cases be punished with death. For to multiply
capital punishments lessens their effect, when applied to crimes of the deepest
dye; and, detestable as perjury is, it is not by any means to be compared with
some other offences, for which only death can be inflicted; and therefore it
seems already (except perhaps in the instance of deliberate murder by perjury) very
properly punished by our present law, which has adopted the opinion of Cicero, (k)
derived from the law of the twelve tables, "periurii pcena divina, exitium; hu-
mana, dedecus."
17. Bribery is the next species of offence against public justice; which is
when a judge, or other person concerned in the administration of justice, takes
any undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office.(l)(24) In the east it
is the custom never to petition any superior for justice, not excepting their
kings, without a present. This is calculated for the genius of despotic coun-
tries; where the true principles of government are never understood, and it is
imagined that there is no obligation from the superior to the inferior, no rela-
tive duty owing from the governor to the governed. The Roman law, though
(A) Montesq. Sp. L. b. 29 c. 11. (1) Britton, c. 5. (k) De Leg. 2, 9. (1) 1 Haw. P. C., 168.
(23) [There is another circumstance which attends all convictions for perjury, though it
forms no part of the judgment at common law, the incapacity of the offender to bear testi-
mony as a witness. But when the indictment is framed at common law, a pardon under the
great seal restores the competency, which the conviction destroyed: 1 Vent. 349; 4 Harg. St.
r. 682; 1 Esp. Rep. 94; but where the proceedings are grounded on the 5 Eliz. c. 9, this can-
not be done without a reversal of the judgment, because it is here made a part of the punish-
ment prescribed. 1 Salk. 289; 5 Esp. Rep. 94.] For the punishment of the offences here men-
tioned, see also statutes 20 and 21 Vic. c. 3; 27 and 28 Vic. c. 47.
(24) [It is equally a crime to give as to receive, and in many cases the attempt itself is an
offence complete on the side of him who offers it. 4 Burr. 2500; 2 East, 5; Russ. and R. C. C. 107.
Thus an attempt to bribe a privy counsellor to procure a reversionary patent of an office,
grantable by the king under the great seal, is indictable, though it did not succeed. 4 Burr.
2495; 2 Camp. 231. An attempt to bribe at elections to parliament is criminal for the same
reason. 4 Burr. 2500; and see ante, book 1, 179. So a promise of money to a corporator to
vote for a member of a corporation is criminal: 2 Lord Raym. 1377; 4 Burr. 2501; and the
offence is not, as the learned commentator supposes, confined to bribing judicial officers. See
1 East, 183; 4 Burr. 2494.] See also Whart. Cr. L. § 2815.
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it contained many severe injunctions against bribery, as well for selling a
man's vote in the senate or other public assembly, as for the bartering of com-
mon justice, yet, by a strange indulgence in one instance, it tacitly encouraged
this practice: allowing the magistrate to receive small presents, provided they
did not in the whole exceed a hundred crowns in the year :(m) not considering
the insinuating nature and gigantic progress of this vice, when once admitted.
Plato therefore more wisely, in his ideal republic,(n) *orders those who [*140]
take presents for doing their duty to be punished in the severest man- [*140]
ner: and by the laws of Athens he that offered was also prosecuted, as well as
be that received a bribe.(o) In England this offence of taking bribes is pun-
ished, in inferior officers, with fine and imprisonment; and in those who offer a
bribe, though not taken, the same.(p) But in judges, especially the superior
ones, it hath been always looked upon as so heinous an offence, that the chief jus-
tice Thorpe was hanged for it in the reign of Edward III. By a statute(q) 11
Hen. IV, all judges and officers of the king, convicted of bribery, shall forfeit
treble the bribe, be punished at the king' s will, and be discharged from the
king's service forever.(25) And some notable examples have been made in par-
liament, of persons in the highest stations, and otherwise very eminent and
able, comtaminated with this sordid vice.(26)
18. Embracery is an attempt to influence a jury corruptly to one side by
promises, persuasions, entreaties, money, entertainments, and the like.(r) The
punishment for the person embracing is by fine and imprisonment; and for the
juror so embraced, if it be by taking money, the punishment is (by divers stat-
utes of the reign of Edward III) perpetual infamy, imprisoimnent for a year,
and forfeiture of the tenfold value.(27)
19. The false verdict of jurors, whether occasioned by embracery or not, was
anciently considered as criminal, and therefore exemplarily punished by attaint
in the manner formerly mentioned.(s)
20. Another offence of the same species is the negligence of public officers, in-
trusted with the administration of justice, as sheriffs, coroners, constables and
the like, which makes the offender liable to be fined; and in very notorious
cases will amount to a forfeiture of his office, if it be a beneficial one.(t) Also
the omitting to apprehend persons offering stolen *iron, lead and other ['141]
metals to sale, is a misdemeanor, and punishable by a stated fine, or im-
prisonment, in pursuance of the statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30.
21. There is yet another offence against public justice, which is a crime of
deep malignity; and so much the deeper, as there are many opportunities of
putting it in practice, and the power and wealth of the offenders may often deter
the injured from a legal prosecution. This is the oppression and tyrannical
partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the administration and
under the colour of their office. However, when prosecuted, either by impeach-
ment in parliament, or by information in the court of king's bench (according
to the rank of the offenders), it is sure to be severely punished with forfeiture
of their offices (either consequential or immediate), fines, imprisonment, or other
discretionary censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations of the offence
committed.(28)
(.) )$ 48, 11, 6. (n) De Leg. 1. 12. (o) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 23. (p) 3 Inst. 147.
(q) lM 146. (r) I Haw. P. C. 259. (s) See book 1II, pp. 402, 403. (t) 1 Haw. P. 0. 168.
(25) This statute is repealed by 26 and 27 Vic. c. 125.
(26) [See the proceedings against Lord Bacon, 2 St. Tr. 1087, and against Lord Macclesfield,
16 id. 767.]
(27) [Bythe 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, s. 61, the offence of embracery of jurors, and jurors wilfully
and corruptly consenting thereto, is punishable by fine and imprisonment.]
(28) [On motions for informations against magistrates, the question is, not whether the act
done might on full investigation be found to be strictly right, but whether it proceeded from
oppressive, dishonest, or corrupt motives (under which fear and favor may generally be in-
cluded), or from mistake or error; in either of the latter cases, the court will not grant a rule.
Rex v. Barron, 3 B. and A. 432. That case seems to lay down the general rule upon this sub-
ject clearly and definitively.]
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22. Lastly, extortion is an abuse of public justice, which consists in any
officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money
or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is
due.(u) The punishment is fine and imprisonment, and sometime a forfeiture
of the office.(29)
CHAPTER XI.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.
WE are next to consider offences against the public peace; the conservation
of which is intrusted to the king and his officers, in the manner and for the
reasons which were formerly mentioned at large.(a) These offences are either
such as are an actual breach of the peace: or constructively so, by tending to
make others break it. Both of these species are also either felonious, or not
felonious. The felonious breaches of the peace are strained up to that degree of
malignity by virtue of several modern statutes: and, particularly,
1. The riotous assembling of twelve (1) persons, or more, and not dispersing
upon proclamation. This was first made high treason by statute 3 and 4 Edw.
VI, c. 5, when the king was a minor, and a change in religion to be effected;
but that statute was repealed by the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, among the other treasons
created since the 25 Edw. III: though the prohibition was in substance re-
enacted, with an inferior degree of punishment, by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 12,
which made the same offence a single felony. These statutes specified and par-
ticularized the nature of the riots they were meant to suppress; as, for example,
such as were set on foot with intention to offer violence to the privy council, or
to change the laws of the kingdom, or for certain other specific purposes: in
which cases, if the persons were commanded, by proclamation, to disperse, and
they did not, it was, by the statute of Mary, made felony, but within the benefit
[*143] of clergy; and *also the act indemnified the peace officers and their
assistants, if they killed any of the mob in endeavoring to suppress such
riot. This was thought a necessary security in that sanguinary reign, when
popery was intended to be re-established, which was likely to produce great
discontents: but at first it was made only for a year, and was afterwards con-
tinued for that queen's life. And, by statute 1 Eliz. c. 16, when a reformation
in religion was to be once more attempted, it was revived and continued during
her life also; and then expired. From the accession of James the First to the
death of Queen Anne, it was never once thought expedient to revive it: but, in
the first year of George the First, it was judged necessary, in order to support
the execution of the act of settlement, to renew it, and at one stroke to make it
perpetual. with large additions. For, whereas, the former acts expressly defined
and specified what should be accounted a riot, the statute 1 Geo. I, c. 5, enacts,
generally, that if any twelve persons are unlawfully assembled to the disturbance
of the peace, and any one justice of the peace, sheriff, under-sheriff, or mayor
of a town. shall think proper to command them, by proclamation, to disperse,
(u) I Hawk. P. C. 170. (a) Book I, pp. 118, 268, 350.
(29) Extorting an agreement to pay money or deliver something of value seems not suffi-
cient to make out the offence. Commonwealth v. Cony, 2 Mass. 523; Commonwealth v.
Pease. 16 Mass. 91. Nor does the receiving of a reward voluntarily given. State v. Stotts, 5
Blackf. 460; Evans v. Trenton, 4 Zab. 764. A custom to take larger fees than the law per-
mits is no defence to the officer who has demanded and received them. Lincoln v. Shaw, 17
Mass. 410; Commonwealth v. Bagley, 7 Pick. 279. The taking must be wilful and corrupt.
State v. Gardner, 2 Mo. 22; People v. Coon, 15 Wend. 277.
(1) [It does not seem necessary that twelve persons should have been guilty, to constitute a
riotous assembly within the acts. See Doug. 1st ed. 673; id. 2d ed. 699; 5 T. R. 14; 2 Saund.
377, b. n. 12.]
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if they contemn his orders and continue together for one hour afterwards, such
contempt shall be felony, without benefit of clergy.(2) And, farther, if the
reading of the proclamation be by force opposed, or the reader be in any man-
ner wilfully hindered from the reading of it, such opposers and hinderers are
felons, without benefit of clergy: and all persons to whom such proclamation
ought to have been made, and knowing of such hinderance, and not dispersing,
are felons, without benefit of clergy. There is the like indemnifying clause, in
case any of the mob be unfortunately killed in the endeavour to disperse them:
being copied from the act of Queen Mary. And, by a subsequent clause of the
new act, if any person, so riotously assembled, begin, even before proclamation,
to pull down any church, chapel, meeting-house, dwelling-house, or out-houses,
they shall be felons, without benefit of clergy.(3)
2. By statute 1 Hen. VII, c. 7, unlawful hunting in any legal forest, park, or
warren, not being the king's property, *by night, or with painted faces, r*144
was declared to be single felony. But now, by the statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, L 
to appear armed in any inclosed forest or place, where deer are usually kept, or
in any warren for hares or conies, or in any high road, open heath, common, or
down, by day or night, with faces blacked, or otherwise disguised, or (being so
disguised) to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, to rob a warren, or to steal
fish, or to procure, by gift or promise of reward, any person to join them in
such unlawful act, is felony, without benefit of clergy.(4) I mention these
offences in this place, not on account of the damage thereby done to private
property, but of the manner in which that damage is committed: namely, with
the face blacked or with other disguise, and being armed with offensive weapons,
to the breach of the public peace and the terror of his majesty's subjects.
3. Also by the same statute, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, amended by statute 27 Geo. II, c.
15, knowingly to send any letter without a name, or with a fictitious name,
demanding money, venison, or any other valuable thing, or threatening (without
any demand) to kill any of the king's subjects, or to fire their houses, out-houses,
barns, or ricks, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (5) This offence was
formerly high treason by the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6.
4. To pull down or destroy any lock, sluice, or floodgate, erected by authority of
parliament on a navigable river, is, by statute 1 Geo. II, st. 2, c. 19, made
felony, punishable with transportation for seven years. By the statute 8 Geo.
II, c. 20, the offence of destroying such works, or rescuing any person in
custody for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and it may be
inquired of and tried in any adjacent county, as if the fact had been therein
committed. By the statute 4 Geo. III, c. 12, maliciously to damage or destroy
any banks, sluices, or other works on such navigable river, to open the flood-
gates or otherwise obstruct the navigation, is again made felony, punishable with
transportation for seven years. And by statute 7 Geo. III, c. 40 *(which [*145]
repeals all former acts relating to turnpikes), maliciously to pull down
or otherwise destroy any turnpike-gate or fence, toll-house or weighing engine
thereunto belonging, erected by authority of parliament, or to rescue any person
in custody for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and the
indictment may be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. (6) The
remaining offences against the public peace are merely misdemeanors and no
felonies; as,
5. Affrays (from affraier, to terrify) are the fighting of two or more persons
in some public place, to the terror of his majesty's subjects: for, if the fighting
(2) The punishment is now reduced to transportation or imprisonment (statute 1 Vic. c. 91),
or penal servitude may be substituted. Statute 16 and 17 Vic. c. 99.
(3) Subsequent statutes embrace other cases than these here mentioned, and the punish-
ment is now reduced to penal servitude.
(4) The statutes relating to these offences were repealed and consolidated by 7 and 8 Geo.
IV, cc. 27 and 29, and the punishment greatly mitigated.
(5) This subject is covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. cc. 96, 97, 100.
(6) Upon the subject of this paragraph, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 97.
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be in private, it is no affray, but an assault.(b) Affrays may be suppressed by
any private person present, who is justifiable in endeavouring to part the com-
batants, whatever consequence may ensue.(c) But more especially the constable,
or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to keep the peace; and
to that purpose may break open doors to suppress an affray, or apprehend the
affrayers; and may either carry them before ajustice, or imprison them by his own
authority for a convenient space till the heat is over; and may then perhaps
also make them find sureties for the peace. (d) The punishment of common
affrays is by fine and imprisonment; the measure of which must be regulated
by the circumstances of the case; for, where there is any material aggravation,
the punishment proportionately increases. As where two persons coolly
and deliberately engage in a duel ; this being attended with an apparent inten-
tion and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of the justice of the
nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually
ensued.(e) Another aggravation is, when thereby the officers of justice are
disturbed in the due execution of their office: or where a respect to the partic-
ular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in com-
mon ones; as in the king's court and the like. And upon the same account
[*146] also all affrays in a church or church-yard are esteemed very *heinous
offences, as being indignities to him to whose service those places are
consecrated. Therefore mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray
nor an offence in any other place, are penal here. For it is enacted by statute
5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 4, that if any person shall, by words only, quarrel, chide, or
brawl, in a church or church-yard, the ordinary shall suspend him, if a layman,
ab ingressu ecclesice; and, if a clerk in orders, from the ministration of his
office during pleasure. And if any person in such church or church-yard pro-
ceeds to smite or lay violent hands upon another, he shall be excommunicated
ipso facto; or if he strikes him with a weapon, or draws any weapon, with
intent to strike, he shall, besides excommunication (being convicted by a jury),
have one of his ears cut off: or, having no ears, be branded with the letter F in
his cheek.(7) Two persons may be guilty of an affray: but,
6. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, must have three persons at least to
constitute them. An unlawful assembly is when three or more do assemble
themselves together to do an unlawful act, as to pull down enclosures, to destroy
a warren or the game therein; and part without doing it, or making any motion
towards it.(f)(8) A rout is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act upon
a common quarrel, as forcibly breaking down fences upon a right claimed of com-
mon or of way; and make some advances towards it.(g) A riot is where three or
more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or without a common
b) I Hawk. P. C. 134. (c) Ibid. 136. (d) Ibid. 137. (e) Ibid. 138. (f) 3 Inst. 176.
) Bro. Abr. t. Riot, 4, 5.
(7) A clergyman may be guilty of brawling who addresses a public reproof to a parisher
during his sermon, without any just cause or provocation, and with great warmth of passion,
and a loud voice. Cox v. Goodday, 2 Hagg. Cons. 138. On this subject, see statute 23 and
24 Vic. c. 32.
The statute 5 Edw. VI, c. 4, so far as relates to the punishment of persons convicted of striking
with any weapon, or drawing any weapon with intent to strike, as therein mentioned, was
repealed by 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 1. And so far as relates to persons not in holy orders, it was
repealed by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32, s. 5.
(8) [An assembly of a man's friends for the defence of his person against those who threaten
to beat him if he go to such a market, &c., is unlawful, for he who is in fear of such insults
must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the persons by
whom he is threatened, and not make use of such violent methods which cannot but be
attended with the danger of raising tumults and disorders, to the disturbance of the public
peace. But an assembly of a man's friends at his own house for the defence of the possession
of it against such as threaten to make an unlawful entry, or for the defence of his person
against such as threaten to beat him in his house, is permitted by law, for a man's house is
looked upon as his castle. He is not, however, to arm himself and assemlile his friends in
defence of his close. 1 Russ. 362.]
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cause or quarrel :(h) as if they beat a man; or hunt and kill game in another's
park, chase, warren, or liberty; or do any other unlawful act with force and
violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and
tumultuous manner.(9) The punishment of unlawful assemblies, if to the
number of twelve, we have just now seen, may be capital, according to the cir-
cumstances that attend it; but, from the number of three to eleven, is by fine
and imprisonment only. The same is the case in riots and routs by the com-
mon law; to *which the pillory (10) in very enormous cases has been [*147
sometimes superadded.(i) And by the statute 13 Hen. IV, c. 7, any two [ ]-7
justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, may come
with the posse comitatus, if need be, and suppress any such riot, assembly, or
rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature and circumstances
of the whole transaction; which record alone shall be a sufficient conviction of
the offenders. In the interpretation of which statute it hath been holden, that
all persons, noblemen and others, except women, clergymen, persons decrepit,
and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the justices in suppressing a riot,
upon pain of fine and imprisonment; and that any battery, wounding, or kill-
ing the rioters, that may-happen in suppressing the riot, is justifiable.(j) So
that our ancient law, previous to the modern riot act, seems pretty well to have
guarded against any violent breach of the public peace; especially as any riotous
assembly on a public or general account, as to redress grievances or pull down
all enclosures, and also resisting the king's forces if sent to keep the peace, may
amount to overt acts of high treason, by levying war against the king.
7. Nearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petition-
ing; which was carried to an enormous height in the times preceding the grand
rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 5, it is enacted, that not
more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the king or either
house of parliament, for any alteration of matters established by law in church
or state: unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the country, by
three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or quarter
sessions; and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council,(k)
and that no petition shall be delivered by a company of more than ten persons;
on pain *in either case of incurring a penalty not exceeding 1007. and [*148]
three months' imprisonment.(11)
(A) ,3 Inst. 176. (1) 1 Hawk. P. C. 159. () 1Hal. P. C. 495. 1Hawk. P. C. 161.
(k) This may be one reason (among others) why the corporation of London has, since the Restoration, usually
taken the lead in petitions to parliament for the alteration of any established law.
(9) [To constitute a riot, the parties must act without any authority to give color to their
proceedings, for a sheriff, constable, or even a private individual, are not only permitted, but
enjoined, to raise a number of people to suppress riots, &c. 2 Hawk. c. 65, s. 2. The inten-
tion also with which the parties assemble, or at least act, must be unlawful, for if a sudden
disturbance arise among persons met together for an innocent purpose, they will be guilty of
a mere affray, though if they form parties, and engage in any violent proceedings, with promises
of mutual assistance; or if they are impelled with a sudden disposition to demolish a house or
other building, there can be no doubt they are rioters, and will not be excused by the propriety
of their original design. 2 Hawk. c. 65, s. 3. But though there must be an evil intention,
whether premeditated or otherwise, the object of the riot itself may be perfectly lawful; as to
obtain entry into lands to which one of the parties has a rightful claim, for the law will not,
as we have before seen, (ante, book 3, 5 n. 4), suffer private individuals to disturb the peace,
by obtaining that redress by force which the law would regularly award them. 2 Hawk. c. 65,
s. 7; 8 T. R. 357, 364.
Women are punishable as rioters, but infants under the age of discretion are not. 1 Hawk.
c. 65, s. 44. In a riot all are principals, and therefore if any person encourages or promotes,
or takes part in a riot, whether by words, signs, or gestures, or by wearing the badge or ensign
of the rioters, he is himself to be considered a rioter. 2 Camp. 370.]
For a discussion of the general nature of this offence, see 2 Bish. Cr. L. § 954, et seq.; 1 Russ.
on Crimes, 266.
(10) Since abolished. And for the statutes for the punishment of riots, routs, &c., see
24 and 25 Vic. cc. 96,97 and 100.
(11) See Rex v. Lord George Gordon, Doug. 592.
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8. An eighth offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or
detainer; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands
and tenements, with menaces, force, and arms, and without the authority of law.
This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out of possession,
unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect, or other circum-
stances; which were explained more at large in a former book.(l) But this being
found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary by several
statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods, even of
doing themselves justice; and much more if they have no justice in their
olaim.(m) So that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that for-
bidden is such as is carried on and maintained with force, with violence, and
unusual weapons. By the statute 5 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 8, all forcible entries are
punished with imprisonment and ransom at the king's will. And by the several
statutes of 15 Ric. II, c. 2, 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, 31 Eliz. c. 11, and 21 Jac. I, c. 15,
upon any forcible entry, or forcible detainer after peaceable entry, into any lands,
or benefices of the church, one or more justices of the peace, taking sufficient
power of the county, may go to the place, and there record the force upon his
own view, as in case of riots; and upon such conviction may commit the offender
to gaol, till he makes fine and ransom to the king. And moreover the justice
or justices have power to summon a jury to try the forcible entry or detainer
complained of: and, if the same be found by that jury, then, besides the fine on
the offender, the justices shall make restitution by the sheriff of the possession,
without inquiring into the merits of the title: for the force is the only thing to
be tried, punished, and remedied by them: and the same may be done by in-
dictment at the general sessions. But this provision does not extend to such as
[*149] endeavour to maintain possession by force, where they *themselves, or[* ] their ancestors, have been in the peaceable enjoyment of the lands and
tenements for three years immediately preceding.(n) (12)
9. The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons,
is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land;
and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III, c. 3,
upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the king's pleasure:
in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked
about the city in armour. (o)
10. Spreading false news, to make discord between the king and nobility, or
concerning any great man of the realm, is punishable by common law (p) with
fine and imprisonment; which is confirmed by statutes Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 34,
2 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Ric. II, c. 11.
11. False and Jretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally
unlawful, and more penal; as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people, and
terrify them with imaginary fears. They are therefore punished by our law,
upon the same principle that spreading of public news of any kind, without com-
municating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the ancient Gauls. (q)
Such false and pretended prophecies were punished capitally by statute 1 Edw.
IV, c. 12, which was repealed in the reign of Queen Mary. And now by the
statute 5 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence is a fine of ten pounds and
one year's imprisonment; for the second, forfeiture of all goods and chattels, and
imprisonment during life.
[*150] *12. Besides actual breaches of the peace, any thing that tends to
provoke or excite others to break it, is an offence of the same denomina-
(0 See book Il, page 174, &c. (m) I Hawk. P. C. 141.
(n) Holding over by force, where the tenant's title was under a lease, now expired, is said to be a forcible de
tainer. (Cro. Jac. 199.)
(o) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26. (p) 2 Inst. 226. 3 Inst. 198.
(q) "iHabent legibus sanctum,, si quss quid de republica afinitimis rumore aut fama acceperit, ut ad magistra-
turn deferat, neve cue alo ceommunwet: quod seepe homines temsrarios atque imperitosfalsi8 rumoribus terrer, et
adfacinus impelli. et de summis rebus conilium capere cognitum est." Ces. de bell Gall. lib. 6, cap. 19.
(12) [A forcible entry and detainer is indictable at common law. R. v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 357.
per Parke, B.; Harvey v. Brydges, 14 M. and W. 442; R. v. Smyth, 5 C. and P. 201.] See,
also, State v. Wilson, 3 Mo. 125; Com. v. Shattuck, 4 Cush. 141 ; Henderson's Case, 8 Grat. 789.
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tion. Therefore, challenges tofigk, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer
of such a challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the
circumstances of the offence. (r)(13) If this challenge arises on account of any
money won at gaining, or if any assault or affray happens upon such account,
the offender, by statute 9 Ann. c. 14, shall forfeit all his goods to the crown, and
suffer two years' imprisonment.
13. Oa nature very similar to challenges are libels, libelli famosi, which, taken
in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the
like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which we are
now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially
a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order
to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridi-
cule. (s) (14) The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of the public
peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed.
The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the
law :(t) and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a
libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to a breach of the peace. (u)
For the same reason it is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether
the matter of it be true or false; (v) since the provocation, and not the falsity, is
the thing to be punished criminally: though doubtless, the falsehood of it may
aggravate its guilt and enhance its punishment. In a civil action, we may re-
member, a libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; (w) for, if the
charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to
demand a compensation for himself, whatever *offence it may be against
the public peace; and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the ac- [*151]
cusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution, the
tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public
peace, is the whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such prosecutions,
the only points to be inquired into are, first, the making or publishing of the
book or writing: and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal: and, if both
these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete.
The punishment of such libellers, for either making, repeating, printing, or pub-
lishing the libel, is fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in its discre-
tion shall inflict: regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the
offender.(x) By the law of the twelve tables at Rome, libels, which affected the
reputation of another, were made a capital offence: but, before the reign of
Augustus, the punishment became corporal only.(y) Under the emperor Valen-
tinian (z) it was again made capital, not only to write, but to publish, or even to
omit destroying them. Our law, in this and many other respects, corresponds
rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence, when liberty, learning and
humanity were in their full vigour, than with the cruel edicts that were estab-
lished in the dark and tyrannical ages of the ancient decemviri, or the later
emperors.
(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 135, 188. (8) 1 Hawk. P. C. 193. (t Moor, 513.
(u)2Brownl. 115. 12lRep. 85. Hob. 251. Poph. 139. 1Hawk.P. C. 195. (v)Moor, 627. 5 Rep.125. liMod. 99.
(w) See book III, page 125. (x) 1 Hawk. P. C. 196.
(y) - Quinetiam lex
Poenaque lata, Mato quo' niet carmine quenquam
Describ: --- vertere modum formidine fustis.-Hor. ad Auq. 152.
(z) Cod. 9, 6.
(13) [The offences of fighting duels,and sending or provoking challenges,were fully considered
by Mr. J. Grose, in passing sentence on Rice, convicted on a criminal information for a misde-
meanor of the latter kind (3 East, 581), where the opinions of the earlier writers are collected.
It is an offence, though the provocation to fight do not succed: 6 East, 464; 2 Smith, 550 ; and
it is a misdemeanor merely to endeavor to provoke another to send a challenge. 6 East, 464.
But mere words which, though they may produce a challenge, do not directly tend to that
issue, as calling a man a liar, or knave, are not necessarily criminal: 2 Lord Raym. 1081; 6 East,
471 ; though it is probable they would be so if it could be shown that they were meant to pro-
voke a challenge.]
(14) [Though it has been held, at least for these two centuries, that the truth of a libel is no
justification in a criminal prosecution, yet in many instances it is consid zred an extenuation of.
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In this and the other instances which we have lately considered, where blas-
phemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are
punished by the English law, some with a greater, others with a less, degree of
severity; the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed
or violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
[*152] *not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Ev-
ery freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if
he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the conse-
the offence; and the court of king's bench has laid down this general rule, viz. that it will not
grant an information for a libel, unless the prosecutor, who applies for it, makes an affidavit,
asserting directly and pointedly that he is innocent of the charge imputed to him. But this
rule may be dispensed with, if the person libelled resides abroad, or if the imputations of the
libel are general and indefinite, or if it is a charge against the prosecutor for language which
he has held in parliament. Doug. 271, 372.
It had frequently been determined by the court of king's bench, that the only questions for
the consideration of the jury, in criminal prosecutions for libels, were the fact of publication
and the truth of the innuendos, that is, the truth of the meaning and sense of the passages of
the libel, as stated and averred in the record, and that the judge or court alone were competent
to determine whether the subject of the publication was or was not a libel. See the case of
the dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 428. But the legality of this doctrine having been much con-
troverted, the 32 Geo. III, c. 60, was passed, entitled, "An act to remove doubts respecting the
functions of juries in cases of libels." And it declares and enacts that, on every trial of an in-
dictment or information for a libel, the jury may give a general verdict of guilty, or not guilty,
upon the whole matter in issue, and shall not be required or directed by the judge to find the
defendant guilty, merely on the proof of the publication of the paper charged to be a libel,
and of the sense ascribed to it in the record. But the statute provides, that the judge may give
his opinion to the jury respecting the matter in issue, and the jury may at their discretion, as
in other cases, find a special verdict, and the defendant, if convicted, may move the court, as
before the statute, in arrest of judgment.
A person may be punished for a libel reflecting on the memory and character of the dead,
but it must be alleged, and proved to the satisfaction of the jury, that the author intended by
the publication to bring dishonor and contempt on the relations and descendants of the de-
ceased. 4 T. R. 126.
It is not a libel to publish a correct copy of the reports or resolutions of the two houses of
parliament, or a true account of the proceedings of a court of justice. " For though," as Mr.
Justice Lawrence has well observed, "the publication of such proceedings may be to the disad-
vantage of the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that
the proceedings of courts of justice should be universally known. The general advantage to
the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the incon-
venience to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings." Rex V.
Wright, 8 T. R. 293.
But this will not apply to the publication of part of a trial, before it is finally concluded;
for that might enable the friends of the parties to pervert the justice of the court by the fabri-
cation of evidence, and other impure practices.
Nor ought it to extend to the publication of trials, where indecent evidence must from ne-
cessity be introduced; for it would be in vain to turn women and children out of court, if they
are afterwards permitted to read what has passed in their absence.]
The act above mentioned in this note is what is known as Mr. Fox's Libel Act, and was passed
to put an end to a violent controversy in which the judges were charged with perverting the
common law. A still more recent statute (6 and 7 Vic. c. 96, s. 6) provides that on the trial
of any indictment or information for libel, the defendant having properly pleaded, the truth
of the matter charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence unless it was
for the public benefit that the matter charged should be published; and to enable the defendant
to give the truth in evidence as a defence, he must in pleading allege the truth of such matters,
and that it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published; and if
after such plea the defendant is convicted, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider
whether the guilt of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the plea. The defendant in
addition may plead not guilty.
In the United States generally the truth of the alleged libellous matter is made a defenco
where the publication is made with good motives and for justifiable ends. See Townsend on
Slander and Libel; 2 Bish. Cr. L. §b 783, 815; Whart. Cr. L. § 2525, et seq.; Cooley Const. Lim.
424, 438,464. And as to what shall establish good motives and justifiable ends, see King V.
Root, 4 Wend. 121 ; Commonwealth v. Bonner, 9 Met. 410; Regina v. Newman, 1 El. and B1.
268 and 558; Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; Commonwealth V.
Snelling, 15 Pick. 337.
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uence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a
licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revolution,(a) is to sub-
ject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion,
and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be
adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace
and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil
liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that
free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid
upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left;
the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends
of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a *fine r*153]
writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but L -
not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only
plausible argument heretofore used for the restraining the just freedom of the
press, "that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose
its force, when it is shown (by a seasonable exertion of the laws) that the press
cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment:
whereas it never can be used to any good one, when under the control of an
inspector. So true it will be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to
maintain the liberty, of the press.(15)
CHAPTER XII.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRADE.
OFFENCES against public trade, like those of the preceding classes, are either
felonious, or not felonious. Of the first sort are,
1. Owling, so called from its being carried on in the night, which is the offence
of transporting wool or sheep out of this kingdom, to the detriment of its staple
manufacture. This was forbidden at common law,(a) and more particularly by
statute 11 Edw. III, c. 1, when the importance of our woollen manufacture was
first attended to; and there are now many later statutes relating to this offence,
the most useful and principal of which are those enacted in the reign of Queen
Elizabeth and since. The statute 8 Eliz. c. 3, makes the transportation of live
sheep, or embarking them on board any ship, for the first offence forfeiture of
(a) The art of printing, soon after its introduction, was looked upon (as well in England as in other coun
tries) as merely a matter of state, and subject to the coercion of the crown. It was therefore regulated with
us by the king's proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privileges and of licence, and, finally, by the
decrees of the court of star-chamber; which limited the number of printers, and of presses which each should
employ, and prohibited new publications, unless previously approved by proper licensers. On the demolition
of this odious jurisdiction in 1641, the long parliament of Charles I, after their rupture with that prince,
assumed the same powers as the star-chamber exercised with respect to the licensing of books; and in 1648,
1647, 1649, and 1652 (Scobell, i, 44, 134; ii, %8, 230), issued their ordinances for that purpose, founded principally
on the star-chamber decree of 1687. In 1662 was passed the statute 18 and 14 Car. II, c. 83, which (with some
few alterations) was copied from the parliamentary ordinances. This act expired in 1679, but was revived by
statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, and continued till 1692. It was then continued for two years longer by statute 4 W. and
M. c. 24; but, though frequent attempts were made by the government to revive it, in the subsequent part of
the reign: Com. Journ. 11 Feb. 1694; 26 Nov. 1695; 22 Oct. 1696; 9 Feb. 1697; 81 Jan. 1698; yet the parliament
resisted it so strongly that it finally expired, and the press became properly free, in 1694; and has ever since so
continued.
(a) Mir. c. 1, S 8.
(15) It may well be doubted, however, if attempts to restrain the licentiousness of the press
through criminal prosecutions ever served a beneficial purpose. The attempt by the govern-
ment of the United States, by means of the " Sedition Act," during the administration of
President Ad-ims, was so conspicuous and mortifying a failure, that it is not likely to be soon
repeated. The excesses of the press seem to be best restrained by public sentiment, and by the
infliction of damages at the hands of a jury where private character is unjustly assailed.
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goods, and imprisonment for a year, and that at the end of the year the left hand
shall be cut off in some public market, and shall be there nailed up in the openest
place; and the second offence is felony. The statutes 12 Car. II, c. 32, and 7 and
8 Win. III, c. 28, make the exportation of wool, sheep, or fuller's earth, liable to
pecuniary penalties, and the forfeiture of the interest of the ship and cargo by
the owners, if privy, and confiscation of goods, and three years' imprisonment
to the master and all the mariners. And the statute 4 Geo. I, c. 11 (amended
[*155] and farther enforced by 12 Geo. *Il, c. 21, and 19 Geo. III, c. 34), makes
* it transportation for seven years if the penalties be not paid.(1)
2. Smuggling, or the offence of importing goods without paying the duties
imposed thereon by the laws of the customs and excise, is an offence generally
connected and carried on hand in hand with the former. This is restrained by
a great variety of statutes, which inflict pecuniary penalties and seizure of the
goods for clandestine smuggling; and affix the guilt of felony, with transport-
ation for seven years, upon more open, daring, and avowed practices: but the
last of them, 19 Geo. II, c. 34, is for this purpose instar omnium; for it makes
all forcible acts of smuggling, carried on in defiance of the laws, or even in
disguise to evade them, felony without benefit of clergy: enacting, that if three
or more persons shall assemble, with fire-arms or other offensive weapons, to
assist in the illegal exportation or importation of goods, or in rescuing the same
after seizure, or in rescuing offenders in custody for such offences; or shall pass
with such goods in disguise; or shall wound, shoot at, or assault any officers of
the revenue when in the execution of their duty; such persons shall be felons
without the benefit of clergy. As to that branch of the statute which required
any person, charged upon oath as a smuggler, under pain of death to surrender
himself upon proclamation, it seems to be expired; as the subsequent statutes, (b)
which continue the original act to the present time, do in terms continue only
so much of the said act as relates to the punishment of the offenders, and not to
the extraordinary method of apprehending or causing them to surrender: and
for offences of this positive species, where punishment (though necessary) is
rendered so by the laws themselves, which by imposing high duties on commodi-
ties increase the temptation to evade them, we cannot surely be too cautious in
inflicting the penalty of death.(c)(2)
*3. Another offence against public trade is fraudulent bankruptcy,
which was sufficiently spoken of in a former volume; (d) I shall there-
fore now barely mention the several species of fraud taken notice of by the
statute law, viz.: the bankrupt's neglect of surrendering himself to hi8 credit-
ors; his non-conformity to the directions of the several statutes; his concealing
or embezzling his effects to the value of 201.; and his withholding any books or
writings with intent to defraud his creditors: all which the policy of our com-
mercial country has made felony without benefit of clergy.(e) (3) And indeed
it is allowed by such as are the most averse to the infliction of capital punish-
ment, that the offence of fraudulent bankruptcy, being an atrocious species of
the crimen falsi, ought to be put upon a level with those of forgery and falsify-
ing the coin. (f) And, even without actual fraud, if the bankrupt cannot make
it appear that he is disabled from paying his debts by some casual loss, he shall
by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 19, be set on the pillory for two hours, with one of
his ears nailed to the same, and cut off. To this head we may also subjoin,
that by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28, it is felony, punishable by transportation for
seven years, if a prisoner, charged in execution for any debt under 1001., neg-
(b) Stat. 26 Geo. I, c. 32. 82 Geo. II, c. 18. 4 Geo. III, e. 12. (c) See book I, p. 317. Beccar. c. M8.
(d) See book H, page 481, 482. (e) Stat. 5 Geo. II, c. 30. (f) Beecar. c. 34.
(1) These statutes are since repealed.
(2) The present law on this subject is in 16 and 17 Vic. c. 107. The punishments are greatly
mitigated.
(3) The previous statutes on the subject of bankruptcy were superseded by the new bank-
rupt law which took effect Jan. 1, 1870. The penalties are now much less severe than those
specified in the text.
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lects or refuses on demand to discover and deliver up his effects for the benefit
of his creditors. And these are the only felonious offences against public trade;
the residue being mere misdemeanors: as,
4. Usury, which is an unlawful contract upon the loan of money, to receive
the same again with exorbitant increase. Of this also we had occasion to dis-
course at large in a former volume.(g) We there observed that by statute 37
Hen. VIII, c. 9, the rate of interest was fixed at 101. per cent. per anuum, which
the statute 13 Eliz. c. 8, confirms: and ordains that all brokers shall be guilty
of a prwvmunire that transact any contracts for more, and the securities them-
selves shall be void. The statute 21 Jac. I, c. 17, reduced interest to eight per
cent.; and, it having been lowered in 1650, during the usurpation, to six er
cent., the same reduction was re-enacted after the restoration by statute 12 Car.
II, c. 13 ; and, lastly, the statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, has reduced it to five per cent.
Wherefore, not only all contracts for taking more are in themselves totally void,
but also the lender shall forfeit treble the * money borrowed.(4) Also, E,15]
if any scrivener or broker takes more than five shillings per cent. pro- [*15j
curation money, or more than twelvepence for making a bond, he shall forfeit
207., with costs, and shall suffer imprisonment for half a year. And by statute
17 Geo. III, c. 26, to take more than ten shillings per cent. for procuring any
money to be advanced on any life-annuity, is made an indictable misdemeanor,
and punishable with fine and imprisonment: as is also the offence of procuring
or soliciting any infant to grant any life-annuity; or to promise, or otherwise
engage, to ratify it when he comes of age.
5. Cheating is another offence, more immediately against public trade; as
that cannot be carried on without a punctilious regard to common honesty,
and faith between man and man. Hither, therefore, may be referred that pro-
digious multitude of statutes, which are made to restrain and punish deceits in
particular trades, and which are enumerated by Hawkins and Burn, but are
chiefly of use among the traders themselves. The offence also of breaking the
assize of bread, or the rules laid down by the law, and particularly by the stat-
utes 31 Geo. II, c. 29, 3 Geo. III, c. 11, and 13 Geo. III, c. 62, for ascertaing its
price in every given quantity, is reducible to this head of cheating; as is like-
wise in a peculiar manner the offence of selling by false weights and measures;
the standard of which fell under our consideration in a former volume.(h) The
punishment of bakers breaking the assize was anciently to stand in the pillory,
by statute 51 Hen. III, st. 6, and for brewers (by the same act) to stand in the
tumbrel or dungcart :(i) which, as we learn from domesday book, was the pun-
ishment for knavish brewers in the city of Chester so early as the reign of
Edward the Confessor. "IMalam cerevisiam faciens, in cathedra ponebatur
stercoris."(j ) But now the general punishment for all frauds *of this [*158]
kind, if indicted (as they may be) at common law, is by fine and im-
prisonment: though the easier and more usual way is by levying on a sum-
mary conviction, by distress and sale, the forfeitures imposed by the several acts
of parliament. Lastly, any deceitful practice, in cozening another by artful
means, whether in matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice,
or the like, is punishable with fine, imprisonment, and pillory.(h) (5) And by
the statutes 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 30 Geo. II, c. 24, if any man defrauds
(g) See book II, page 455, &c. (h) See book I, page 274. (i) a Inst. 219.
U) Seld. tit. of Hon. b. 2, c. 5, J 2. (k) 1 Hawk. P. C. 188.
(4) Negotiable securities in the hands of an innocent indorsee for value are not now void
for usury. Statute 58 Geo. III, c. 93.
As to usury in general, see book 2, 455, et seq.
(5) [Pillory is now abolished by the 56 Geo. III, c. 138. See in general, 3 Chit. Crim. Law,
994, 995. The cases in which fraud is indictable at common law seem confined to the use of
false weights and measures, the selling of goods with counterfeit marks, playing with false
dice, and frauds affecting the course of justice, and immediately injuring the interests of the
public or crown : and it is settled that no mere fraud, not amounting to felony, is an indict-
able offence at comDmon law, unless it affects the public. 2 Burn. 1125; 1 Bla. Rep. 273, S. C.]
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another of any valuable chattels by colour of any false token, counterfeit letter,
or false pretence, or pawns or disposes of another's goods without the consent
of the owner, he shall suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory,
transportation, whipping, or other corporal pain, as the court shall direct.(6)
6. The offence of forestalling the market is also an offence against public trade.
This, which (as well as the two following) is also an offence at common law,(l)
was described by statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, to be the buying or contract-
ing for any merchandise or victual coming in the way to market; or dissuading
persons from bringing their goods or provisions there; or persuading them to
enhance the price, when there: any of whi6h practices make the market dearer
to the fair trader.(7)
7. Regrating was described by the same statute to be the buying of corn, or
other dead victual, in any market, and selling it again in the same market, or
within four miles of the place. For this also enhances the price of the pro-
visions, as every successive seller must have a successive profit.
8. Engrossing was also described to be the getting into one's possession, or
buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead 'victual, with intent to sell
them again. This must of course be injurious to the public, by putting it in the
power of one or two rich men to raise the price of provisions at their own dis-
cretion. And so the total engrossing. of any other commodity, with intent
1 to sell it at an unreasonable *price, is an offence indictable and finable
at the common law.(m) And the general penalty for these three offences
by the common law (for all the statutes concerning them were repealed by 12
Geo. III, c. 71, is, as in other minute misdemeanors, discretionary fine and
imprisonment.(n) Among the Romans these offences, and other mal-practices
to raise the price of provisions, were punished by a pecuniary mulct. "Pmna
viginti aureorum statuitur adversus eurn, qui contra annonam fecerit, societa-
temve coierit quo annona carior fiat."(o)
9. Monopolies are much the same offence in other branches of trade, that
engrossing is in provisions: being a license or privilege allowed by the king for
the sole buying and selling, making, working or using of any thing whatsoever;
whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing
or trading which he had before.(p) These had been carried to an enormous
height during the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and were heavily complained of by
Sir Edward Coke,(q) in the beginning of the reign of King James the First:
but were in great measure remedied by statute 21 Jac. I; c. 3,(8) which declares
such monopolies to be contrary to law and void (except as to patents, not
exceeding the grant of fourteen years, to the authors of new inventions; and
except also patents concerning printing, saltpetre, gunpowder, great ordnance
and shot); and monopolists are punished with the forfeiture of treble damages
and double costs, to those whom they attempt to disturb; and if they procure
any action, brought against them for these damages, to be stayed by any extra-
judicial order, other than of the court wherein it is brought, they incur the
penalties of prcemunire. Combinations, also, among victuallers or artificers, to
raise the price of provisions, or any commodities, or the rate of labour,(9) are
(1) 1 Hawk. P. C. 234. (m) Cro. Car. 232. (n) I Hawk. P. c. 235. (o) Ay. 48, 12, 2.
(p) 1 Hawk. P. C. 321. (q) 3 Inst. 181.
(6) By statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 88, "Whosoever shall, by any false pretence, obtain
from any other person any chattel, money or valuable security with intent to defraud, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of
the court, to be kept in penal servitude for the term of three years, or be imprisoned for any
term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary con-
finement."
See, as to this offence, 2 Bish. Cr. L. ch. 32; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 286, et seq.
(7) This and the two following offences are now done away with by statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.
(8) Amended by statute 5 and 6 Win. IV, e. 83. See also statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.
(9) [By the 6 Geo. IV, c. 129, § 1, all acts relative to combinations of workmen, or masters,
as to wages, time of working, quantity of work, &c., are repealed. By section 2 persons com-
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in many cases severely punished by particular statutes; and in general by
statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 15, with the forfeiture of 101. or twenty-one days'
imprisonment, with an allowance of only bread and water, for the first offence;
201. or the pillory, for the second; and *401. for the third, or else the E.160]
pillory, loss of one ear and perpetual infamy. In the same manner by a
constitution of the Emperor Zeno,(r) all monopolies and combinations to
keep up the price of merchandise, provisions or workmanship, were prohibited
upon pain of forfeiture of goods and perpetual banishment.
10. To exercise a trade in any town, without having previously served as an
apprentice for seven years, (s) is looked upon to be detrimental to public trade,
upon the supposed want of sufficient skill in the trader: and therefore is
punished by statute 5 Eliz. c. 4, with the forfeiture of forty shillings by the
month.(10)
11. Lastly, to prevent the destruction of our home manufactures by transport-
ing and seducing our artists to settle abroad, it is provided by statute 5 Geo. I,
c. 27, that such as so entice or seduce them shall be fined 1001. and be imprisoned
three months: and for the second offence shall be fined at discretion, and be
imprisoned a year: and the artificers, so going into foreign countries, and not
returning within six months after warning given them by the British ambassa-
dor where they reside, shall be deemed aliens, and fbrfeit all their land and goods,
and shall be incapable of any legacy or gift. By statute 23 Geo. II, c. 13, the
seducers incur, for the first offence, a forfeiture of 5001. for each artificer con-
tracted with to be sent abroad, and imprisonment for twelve months; and for
the second 1,0001. and are liable to two years' imprisonment: and by the same
statute, connected with 14 Geo. III, c. 71, if any person exports any tools or
utensils used in the silk, linen, cotton, or woollen manufactures (excepting wool-
cards to North America), (t) he forfeits the same and 2001., and the captain of
the ship (having knowledge thereof) 1001.; and if any captain of a king's ship,
or officer of the customs, knowingly suffers such exportation, he forfeits 1001.
and his employment; and is for ever made incapable of bearing any public office:
and every person collecting such tools or utensils, in order to export the same,
shall, on conviction at the assizes, forfeit such tools and also 2001.(11)
(r) Cod. 4, 59, 1. (s) See book I, page 427. (t) Stat. 15 Geo. III, c. 5.
pelling journeymen to leave their employment, or to return work unfinished, preventing them
from hiring themselves, compelling them to belong to clubs, &c., or to pay fines, or forcing
manufacturers to alter their mode of carrying on their business, are punishable with imprison-
ment, with or without hard labor, for three months. The remaining clauses provide for the
mode of conviction of offenders before justices of the peace. For the form and requisites of
convictions for these offences under former acts of parliament, see Rex v. Nield, 6 East, 417;
Rex v. Ridgway, 1 D. and R. 123; 5 B. and A. 527; Paley on Convictions, 2d ed. by Dowling,
99, et seq. By 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 25, assaults in pursuance of any conspiracy to raise the rate
of wages, and section 26, assaults upon certain workmen to prevent them from working at
their trades, are punishable with imprisonment and hard labor.]
See amendatory statutes, 22 Vic. c. 34, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.
(10) The part of this statute here referred to was repealed by statute 54 Geo. III, c. 96, s. 1.
(11) All statutes prohibiting artificers from going abroad are repealed by statute 5 Geo. IV
c. 97, and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 84.
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CHAPTER XIII.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE
PUBLIC POLICE OR ECONOMY.
THE fourth species of offences, more especially affecting the commonwealth,
are such as are against the public health of the nation; a concern of the highest
importance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries
special magistrates or curators appointed.
1. The first of these offences is a felony; but, by the blessing of Providence
for more than a century past, incapable of being committed in this nation. For
by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 31, it is enacted, that if any person infected with the plague,
or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor or constable, or
other head officer of his town or vill, to keep his house, and shall venture to
disobey it, he may be enforced, by the watchman appointed on such melancholy
occasions, to obey such necessary command: and, if any hurt ensue by such
enforcement, the watchmen are thereby indemnified. And farther, if such per-
son so commanded to confine himself goes abroad, and converses in company,
if he has no plague sore upon him, he shall be punished as a vagabond by whip-
ping, and be bound to his good behaviour; but, if he has any infectious sore
upon him, uncured, he then shall be guilty of felony. By the statute 26 Geo.
r* 1 6 2] II, c. 6 (explained and amended by 29 Geo. II, c. 8), the *method of
L J performing quarantine, or forty days' probation, by ships coming from
infected countries, is put in a much more regular and effectual order than
formerly, and masters of ships coming from infected places and disobeying the
directions there given, or having the plague on board and concealing it, are
guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. The same penalty also attends per-
sons escaping from the lazarets, or places wherein quarantine is to be performed;
and officers and watchmen neglecting their duty; and persons conveying goods
or letters from ships performing quarantine.(1)
2. A second, but much inferior species of offence against public health is the
selling of unwholesome provisions.(2) To prevent which the statute 51 Hen.
III, st. 6, and the ordinance for bakers, c. 7, prohibit the sale of corrupted wine,
contagious or unwholesome flesh, or flesh that is bought of a Jew; under pain
of amercement for the first offence, pillory for the second, fine and imprisonment
for the third, and abjuration of the town for the fourth. And by the statute 12
Car. II, c. 25, s. 11, any brewing or adulteration of wine is punished with the
forfeiture of 1001. if done by the wholesale merchant; and 401. if done by the
vintner or retail trader. These are all the offences which may properly be said
to respect the public health.(3)
V. The last species of offences which especially affect the commonwealth, are
those against the public police or economy. By the public police and economy
(1) Other statutes imposing lighter punishments now take the place of those mentioned in
the text.
Vaccination of children is made compulsory by statute 16 and 17 Vic. c. 100, § 9, under a
penalty of 20s.
(2) [It is a misdemeanor at common law to give any person injurious food to eat, whether
the offender be excited by malice, or a desire of gain ; nor is it necessary he should be a public
contractor, or the injury done to the public service, to render him criminally liable. 2 East,
P. C. 822 ; 6 East, 133 to 141. If a baker direct his servant to make bread containing a specific
quantity of alum, which, when mixed with the other ingredients is innoxious, but in the
execution of these orders, the agent mixes up the drug in so unskilful a way that the bread
becomes unwholesome, the master will be liable to be indicted. 3 M. and S. 10; 4 Camp. 10.
But an indictment will not lie against a miller for receiving good barley to grind at his mill,
and delivering a mixture of oat and barley which is musty and unwholesome. 4 M. and S. 214.]
(3) See also the statutes 1 W. and X., st. 1, c. 34, s. 20; 3 Geo. IV, c. 106; 6 and 7 Win. IV,
c. 37; and 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.
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I mean the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom; whereby the
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to
conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood,
and good marmers; and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their
respective stations. This head of offences must therefore be very miscellaneous,
as it comprises all such crimes as especially affect public society, and are not
comprehended under any of the four preceding species. These amount, some
of them to felony, and others to misdemeanors only. Among the former are,
*1. The offence of clandestine marriages : for by the statute 26 Geo. [*163]
II, c. 33, 1. To solemnize marriage in any other place besides a church, [*163
or public chapel wherein banns have been usually published, except by license
from the archbishop of Canterbury; and, 2. To solemnize marriage in such
church or chapel without due publication of banns, or license obtained from a
proper authority; do both of them not only render the marriage void, but sub-
ject the person solemnizing it to felony, punished by transportation for four-
teen years: as, by three former statutes,(a) he and his assistants were subject to
a pecuniary forfeiture of 1001. 3. To make a false entry in a marriage register;
to alter it when made; to forge, or counterfeit such entry, or a marriage license;
to cause or procure, or act or assist in such forgery; to utter the same as true,
knowing it to be counterfeit; or to destroy or procure the destruction of any
register, in order to vacate any marriage, or subject any person to the penalties
of this act; all these offences, knowingly and wilfully committed, subject the
party to the guilt of felony without benefit of clergy.(4)
2. Another felonious offence, with regard to this holy estate of matrimony, is
what some have corruptly called bigamy, which properly signifies being twice
married; but is more justly denominated polygamy, or having a plurality of
wives at once.(b) Such second marriage, living the former husband or wife, is
simply void, and a mere nullity, by the *ecclesiastical law of England: [*164]
and yet the legislature has thought it just to make it felony, by reason
of its being so great a violation of the public economy and decency of a well-
ordered state. For polygamy can never be endured under any rational civil
establishment, whatever specious reasons may be urged for it by the eastern
nations, the fallaciousness of which has been fully proved by many sensible
writers; but in northern countries the very nature of the climate seems to
reclaim against it; it never having obtained in this part of the world, even from
the time of our German ancestors, who, as Tacitus informs us,(c) "prope soli
barbarorurn singulis uxoribus contenti sunt." It is therefore punished by the
laws both of ancient and modern Sweden with death.(d) And with us in
England it is enacted by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 11, that if any person, being married,
do afterwards marry again, the former husband or wife being alive, it is felony;
but within the benefit of clergy. The first wife in this case shall not be
admitted as a witness against her husband, because she is the true wife, but the
second may, for she is indeed no wife at all; (e) and so vice versa, of a second
husband. This act makes an exception to five cases, in which such second mar-
(a) 6 and 7 Win. M, c. 6. 7 and 8Wm. M, c. 35. 10 Ann, c. 19, § 176.
(b) 3 Inst. 88. Bigamy, according to the canonists, consisted in marrying two virgins successively, one after
the death of the other, or once marrying a widow. Such were esteeme incapable of orders &c and by a
canon of the council of Lyons, A D 1274 held under Pope Gregory X, were omni privilegio clercali nudati,
et coercioni fo-i seilaris addicti (6 Decretal, 1, 12). This canon was adopted and explained in England, by stat-
ute 4 Edw. I, st. 3, c. 5, and bigamy thereupon became no uncommon counter-plea to the claim of the benefit
of clergy. ff. 40 Edw. 111, 42; M, 11 Hen. IV, 11, 48. M. 13 Hen. 1Y, 6; Staundf. P. C. 134. The cognizance of
the plea of bigamy was declared by statute 18 Edw. III, st. 3, c. 2, to belong to the court christian, like that
of bastardy. 'But by statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, § 16, bigamy was declared to be no longer an impediment to the
claim of clergy. See Dal. 21; Dyer, 201.
(c) Du mot. Germ. 18. (d) Stiernh. de jure Seoan. 1. 3, c. 2. (e) 1 Hal. P. C. 693.
(4) The law on this subject is much modified by subsequent statutes. See statutes 4 Geo. IV,
c. 76; 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 85; 7 Wm. IV and 1 Vic. c. 22; 3 and4Vic. c. 72; and 24 and 25 Vic.
c. 98. Marriages solemnized knowingly except in the manner provided are void, and the per-
sons officiating are guilty of felony.
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riage, though in the three first it is void, is yet no felony.(f) 1. Where either
party hath been continually abroad for seven years, whether the party in England
hath notice of the other's being living or no. 2. Where either of the parties
hath been absent from the other seven years within this kingdom, and the
remaining party hath had no knowledge of the other's being alive within that
time. 3. Where there is a divorce (or separation a mensa et thoro) by sentence in
the ecclesiastical court. 4. Where the first marriage is declared absolutely void
by any such sentence, and the parties loosed a vinculo. Or, 5. Where either of
the parties was under the age of consent at the time of the first marriage, for in
such case the first marriage was voidable by the disagreement of either party,
[*165] which the second marriage very clearly amounts to. But *if at the age
of consent the parties had agreed to the marriage, which completes the
contract, and is indeed the real marriage; and afterwards one of them should
marry again; I should apprehend that such second marriage would be within
the reason and penalties of the act.(5)
3. A third species of felony against the good order and economy of the king-
dom, is by idle soldiers and mariners wandering about the realm, or persons
pretending so to be, and abusing the name of that honourable profession.(g)
Such a one not having a testimonial or pass from a justice of the peace, limit-
ing the time of his passage; or exceeding the time limited for fourteen days,
unless be falls sick; or forging such testimonial; is by statute 39 Eliz. c. 17,
made guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. This sanguinary law, though
in practice deservedly antiquated, still remains a disgrace to our statute-book:
yet attended with this mitigation, that the offender may be delivered, if any
honest freeholder or other person of substance will take him into his service,
(f) 3 Inst. 89. Kel. 27. 1 Hal. P. 1. 694. (g) 3 Inst. 85.
(5) [The statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100, s. 57, enacts that whosoever, being married, shall
marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second
marriage shall have taken place in England or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony; and any
such offender may be tried in any place' in England where he shall be apprehended or be in
custody, in the same manner in all respects as if the offence had been actually committed
there, and may be punished by penal servitude for not more than seven years, nor less than
five years, or by imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard
labor. But this enactment does not extend (1) to any second marriage contracted elsewhere
than in England or Ireland by any other than a subject of her majesty; or (2) to any person
marrying a second time whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such
person for the space of seven years then last past, and shall not have been known by such
person to be living within that time: see Reg. v. Cullen, 9 P. and C. 681; Reg. v. Curgerwen,
1 L. R. C. C. 1; or (3) to any person who, at the time of such second marriage, shall have
been divorced from the bond of such first marriage; or (4) to any person whose former mar-
riage shall have been declared void by the sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction.]
Of the previous statute, 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, which was superseded by this, Mr. Chitty says
that three important improvements were introduced by it. "First, the offence is now punish-
able wherever committed; formerly it was not punishable at all, if committed out of the
jurisdiction of England. Secondly, the absence of one party for seven years abroad will not
now excuse the second marriage, if such party be known by the other party to have been
alive within that period; formerly the mere absence was a protection, though the absent
party was well known by the other to be living. Thirdly, a divorce a vinculo alone will now
justify the second marriage; formerly a divorce a mensa et thoro was held sufficient. 1 East,
P. C. 466. In a prosecution for bigamy it has been said, that a marriage in fact must be
proved: Morris v. Miller, 4 Burr. 2059; but see Truman's Case, 1 East, P. C. 470; but if proved
by a person who was present, it does not seem necessary to prove the registry or license: Rex
v. Allison, R. and R. C. C. 109; and it matters not that the first marriage is voidable, by
reason of affinity, &c. 3 Inst. 88. Parties who are within age at the time of the first mar,
riage (subsequently affirming the union by their consent) will be liable to be punished for
bigamy if they break that contract and marry again. 1 East, P. C. 468. On an indictment
for bigamy, where the first marriage is in England, it is not a valid defence to prove a divorce a
vinculo out of England before the second marriage, founded on grounds on which a divorce
a vineuto could not be obtained in England. Rex v. Lolley, R. and R. C. C. 237, cited in
Tovey v. Lindsay, 1 Dow, 117. The burthen of proving the first marriage to have been legal
lies upon the prosecutor. Rex v. James, R. and R. C. C. 17; Rex v. Morton, id. 19; Rex V.
Butler, id. 61."
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and he abides in the same for one year; unless licensed to depart by his em-
ployer, who in such case shall forfeit ten pounds.(6)
4. Outlandish persons calling themselves Eqyptians, or gypsies, are another
object of the severity of some of our unrepealed statutes. These are a strange
kind of commonwealth among themselves of wandering impostors and jugglers,
who were first taken notice of in Germany about the beginning of the fifteenth
century, and have since spread themselves all over Europe. Munster, (7h) who
is followed and relied upon by Spelman(i) and other writers, fixes the time of
their first appearance to the year 1417; under passports, real or pretended, from
the emperor Sigismund, king of Hungary. And Pope Pius II (who died A. D.
1464) mentions them in his history as thieves and vagabonds, then wandering
with their families over Europe under the name of Zigari; and whom he sup-
poses to have migrated from the country of *Zigi, which nearly answers [*166]
to the modern Circassia. In the compass of a few years they gained
such a number of idle proselytes (who imitated their language and complexion,
and betook themselves to the same arts of chiromancy, begging, and pilfering),
that they became troublesome, and even formidable to most of the states of
Europe. Hence they were expelled from France in the year 1560, and from
Spain in 1591.(k) And the government in England took the alarm much
earlier: for in 1530 they are described by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10, as "out-
landish people, calling themselves Egyptians, using no craft nor feat of mer-
chandise, who have come into this realm and gone from shire to shire and
place to place in great company, and used great, subtil, and crafty means to
deceive the people; bearing them in hand, that they by palmestry could tell
men's and women's fortunes; and so many times by craft and subtility have
deceived the people of their money, and also have committed many heinous
felonies and robberies." Wherefore they are directed to avoid the realm, and
not to return under pain of imprisonment, and forfeiture of their goods and
chattels: and upon their trials for any felony which they may have committed,
they shall not be entitled to a jury de medietate lingum. And afterwards it is
enacted by statutes 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 4, and 5 Eliz. c. 20, that if any such
persons shall be imported into this kingdom, the importer shall forfeit 401.
And if the Egyptians themselves remain one month in this kingdom, or if any
person, being fourteen years old (whether natural-born, subject or stranger),
which hath been seen or found in the fellowship of such Egyptians, or which
hath disguised him or herself like them, shall remain in the same one month,
at one or several times, it is felony without benefit of clergy: and Sir Matthew
Hale informs us, (1) that at one Suffolk assizes no less than thirteen gypsies
were executed upon these statutes a few years before the restoration. But, to
the honour of our *national humanity, there are no instances more [*167]
modern than this, of carrying these laws into practice.(7)
5. To descend next to offences whose punishment is short of death. Common
nuisances are a species of offences against the public order and economical
regimen of the state; being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all
the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good
requires. (m) The nature of common nuisances, and their distinction from
private nuisances, were explained in the preceding book:(n) when we con-
sidered more particularly the nature of the private sort, as a civil injury to
individuals. I shall here only remind the student, that common nuisances are
such inconvenient and troublesome offences, as annoy the whole community in
general, and not merely some particular person; and therefore are indictable
only, and not actionable; as it would be unreasonable to multiply suits, by
(A) (osmoqr. 1. 3. (0 Gloss. 193. (k) Dufresne, Gloss. 1, 200.
(1) 1 Hal. P. C. 671. (m) 1 Hawk. P. C. 197. (n) Book III, page 216.
(6) This act is repealed.
(7) Statute 5 Eliz. c. 20, is repealed, and gypsies are now only punishable under the vagrant
acts.
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giving every man a separate right of action, for what damnifies him in common
only with the rest of his fellow-subjects. Of this nature are, 1. Annoyances in
highways, bridges, and public rivers,(8) by rendering the same inconvenient or
dangerous to pass, either positively, by actual obstructions; or negatively, by
want of reparations. For both of these, the person so obstructing, or such
individuals as are bound to repair and cleanse them, or (in default of these last)
the parish at large, may be indicted, distrained to repair and amend them, and
in some cases fined. And a presentment thereof by a judge of assize, &c., or a
justice of the peace, shall be in all respects equivalent to an indictment.(o) (9)
Where there is a house erected, or an enclosure made, upon any part of the
king's demesnes, or of an highway, or common street, or public water, or such
like public things, it is properly called a purpresture.(p) (10) 2. All those
kinds of nuisances (such as offensive trades and manufactures), which when
injurious to a private man are actionable, are, when detrimental to the public,
[*168] * punishable by public prosecution, and subject to fine according to the
quantity of the misdemeanor: and particularly the keeping of hogs in
(o) Stat. 7 Geo. IL, c. 42. (p) Co. Litt. 277, from the French pourpris, an enclosure.
(8) [See Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 377; Reg. v. Betts, 16 Q. B. 102: Reg. V.
Charlesworth, id. 1012.]
(9) By the highway act, 5 and 6 Win. IV, c. 50, the proceeding by presentment for the non-
repair of highways is abolished, and a summary mode of proceeding before magistrates sub-
stituted. See also statutes 25 and 26 Vic. c. 61.
(10) [With respect to nuisances in general to highways, &c., by actual obstruction, it is to be
observed, that every unauthorized obstruction of the highway, to the annoyance of the king's
subjects, is an indictable offence. 3 Camp. 227. Thus if a wagoner, carrying on a very ex-
tensive concern, constantly suffers wagons to remain on the side of the highway on which his
premises are situate, an unreasonable time, he is guilty of a nuisance. 6 East, 427; 2 Smith,
424. And if stage coaches regularly stand in a public street in London, though for the pur-
pose of accommodating passengers, so as to obstruct the regular track of carriages, the pro-
prietor may be indicted. 3 Camp. 224. So a timber merchant occasionally cutting logs of
wood in the street, which he could not otherwise convey into his premises, will not be excused
by the necessity which, in choosing the situation, he himself created. 3 Camp. 230. It is
even said that "if coaches on the occasion of a rout wait an unreasonable length of time in a
public street, and obstruct the transit of his majesty's subjects who wish to pass through it in
carriages or on foot, the persons who cause and permit such coaches so to wait are guilty of
a nuisance." 3 Camp. 226; and see 1 Russel, 463. Nor is it necessary, in order to fix the re-
sponsibility on the defendant, to show that he immediately obstructed the public way, or even
intended to do so; it seems to be sufficient if the inconvenience result, as immediate con-
sequence of any public exhibition or act; for the erection of a booth to display rope-dancing,
and other attractive spectacles, near a public street in London, which draws together a con-
course of people, is a nuisance liable to be punished and abated. 1 Ventr. 169; 1 Mod. 76;
2 Keb. 846; Bac. Abr. t. Nuisance. And it may be collected that a mere transitory obstruction,
which must necessarily occur, is excusable, if all reasonable promptness be exerted. So that
the erection of a scaffolding to repair a house, the unloading a cart or wagon, and the delivery
of any large articles, as casks of liquor, if done with as little delay as possible, are lawful,
though, if an unreasonable time were employed in the operation, they would become nui-
sances. 3 Camp. 231. No length of time will legalize the nuisance. 7 East, 199; 3 Camp.
227; 6 East, 195. If the party who has been indicted for a nuisance continue the same, he is
again indictable for such continuance. 8 T. R. 142. Independently of any legal proceedings,
it appears that any person may lawfully abate a public nuisance, at least if it be placed in the
middle of a highway, and obstruct the passage of his majesty's subjects: Hawk. b. 1, c. 75, s.
12; but though a party may remove the nuisance, yet he cannot remove the materials or con-
vert them to his own use: Dalt. c. 50; and so much of the thing only as causes the nuisance
ought to be removed, as if a house be built too high, only so much of it as is too high should
be pulled down. 9 Rep. 53; God. 221 ; 2 Stra. 686.
With respect to nuisances to water courses by actual obstruction, any diversion of a public
river, whereby the current is weakened and rendered incapable of carrying vessels of the
same burthen as it could before, is a common nuisance. Hawk. b. 1. c. 75, s. 11. But if a
ship or other vessel sink by accident in a river, although it obstruct the navigation, if the
owner removes it in a reasonable time, it is not indictable as a nuisance. 2 Esp. 675. No
length of time will legalize the nuisance.: 6 East, 195, supra; and even the rightful existence
of a weir of brushwood will not authorize the building one of stone in its room. 7 East, 199.]
That a nuisance is not legalized by length of time, see Mills v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Com-
monwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray, 476; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Douglass v. State, 4
Wis. 392.
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any city or market town is indictable as a public nuisance.(q) (11) All disorderly
inns or ale-houses, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses, stage-plays, unlicensed booths
and stages for rope-dancers, mountebanks, and the like, are public nuisances, and
may upon indictment be suppressed and fined.(r) Inns, in particular, being
intended for the lodging and receipt of travellers, may be indicted, suppressed,
and the inn-keepers fined, if they refuse to entertain a traveller without a very
sufficient cause: for thus to frustrate the end of their institution is held to be
disorderly behaviour.(s) Thus, too, the hospitable laws of Norway punish in
the severest degree such inn-keepers as refuse to furnish accommodations at a
just and reasonable price.(t) 4. By statute 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 17, all lot-
teries are declared to be public nuisances, and all grants, patents, or licenses
for the same to be contrary to law. But, as state-lotteries have, for many years
past, been found a ready mode for raising the supply, an act was made, 19 Geo.
III, c. 21, to license and regulate the keepers of such lottery-offices.(12) 5. The
making and selling of fire-works, and squibs, or throwing them about in any
street, is, on account of the danger that may ensue to any thatched or timber
buildings, declared to be a common nuisance, by statute 9 and 10 Win. III, c. 7,
and therefore is punishable by fine.(13) And to this head we may refer (though
not declared a common nuisance) the making, keeping, or carriage, of too large
a quantity of gunpowder at one time, or in one place or vehicle; which is pro-
hibited by statute 12 Geo. III, c. 61, under heavy penalties and forfeiture.(14)
6. Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a
house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mis-
chievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the court-leet: (u) or
are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by fine and finding sureties for
their good behaviour.(v) 7. Lastly, a common scold, communis rixatrix (for
our law-latin confines it to the feminine gender), is a public nuisance to her
neighbourhood. For which offence she may be indicted :(w) (15) *and if *169]
convicted, shall (x) be sentenced to be placed in a certain engine of cor- [19
rection called the trebucket, castigatory, or cucking stool, which in the Saxon
language is said to signify the scolding stool; though now it is frequently
corrupted into ducking stool, because the residue of the judgment is, that,
when she is so placed therein, she shall be plunged in the water for her
punishment.(y)
6. Idleness in any person whatsoever is also a high offence against the public
economy. In China it is a maxim, that if there be a man who does not work, or
a woman that is idle, in the empire, somebody must suffer cold or hunger: the
produce of the lands not being more than sufficient, with culture, to maintain
(q) Salk. 460. (r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 198, 225. (s) Ibid. 225.
(t) Stiernh. dejure 8.1eon. 1. 2, c. 9. (u) Kitch. of courts, 20. (v) Ibid. 1 Hawk. P. C. 132.
(w) 6 Mod. 21. (x) 1 Hawk. P. C. 198, 200. (y) 3 Inst. 219.
(11) [It is not essential, in order to constitute this a nuisance, that the smell or other incon-
venience complained of, should be unwholesome; it is sufficient if it impairs the enjoyment of
life or property. 1 Burr 333. The material increase in a neighborhood of noisome smells
is indictable. Peake Rep. 91.
To this class of public nuisances may be added that of making great noises in the streets
in the night, by trumpets or otherwise (2 Stra. 704), exhibiting monsters (2 Ch. Ca. 110),
suffering mischievous animals, having notice of their propensity, to go loose, &c.: Dyer, 25;
2 Salk. 662; 1 Vent. 295; carrying about persons infected with contagious diseases. 4 M. and
S. 73, 272, ante, 162. But neither an old nor a new dovecote is a common nuisance. Hawk.
b. 1, c. 7, s. 8.]
Nuisances by offensive trades and manufactures are now punished under "The Sanitary
Act, 1856," 29 and 30 Vic. c. 90; St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642.
And on the same subject reference may also be had to Commonwealth v. Brown, 13 Met. 365;
Smith v. Commonwealth, 6 B. Monr. 22; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524.
(12) Since repealed. And statute 6 Geo. IV, c. 60, entirely abolishes state lotteries.
(13) [The offender may be indicted on the statute or at common law. 4 T. R. 202; 1 Saund.
136, n. 4; Cowp. 650; 2 Burr. 863.]
(14) See statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 139, and the acts amendatory thereof. See also Williams
v. East India Co., 3 East, 192, 201.
(15) James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. and R. 220; U. S. v. Royall, 3 Cranch C. C. 620.
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the inhabitants: and therefore, though the idle person may shift off the want
from himself, yet it must in the end fall somewhere. The court also of Areopa-
gus at Athens punished idleness, and exerted a right of examining every citizen
in what manner he spent his time; the intention of which was, (z) that the
Athenians, knowing that they were to give an account of their occupations,
should follow only such as were laudable, and that there might be no room left
for such as lived- by unlawful arts. The civil law expelled all sturdy vagrants
from the city:(a) and, in our own law, all idle persons or vagabonds, whom our
ancient statutes describe to be "such as wake on the night and sleep on the day,
and haunt customable taverns, and ale-houses, and routs about; and no man
wot from whence they come ne whither they go," or such as are more particu-
luarly described by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 5, and divided into three classes, idle
and disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds and incorrigible rogues;-all these
are offenders against the good order, and blemishes in the government, of any
kingdom. They are therefore all punished by the statute last mentioned; that
is to say, idle and disorderly persons with one month's imprisonment in the
house of correction; rogues and vagabonds with whipping and imprisonment
,j not exceeding six *months; and incorrigible rogues with the like disci-L *°-j pline and confinement, not exceeding two years; the breach and escape
from which confinement in one of an inferior class, ranks him among incorri-
gible rogues; and in a rogue (before incorrigible) makes him a felon and liable
to be transported for seven years. Persons harbouring vagrants are liable to
a fine of forty shillings, and to pay all expenses brought upon the parish
thereby: in the same manner as, by our ancient laws, whoever harboured any
stranger for more than two nights, was answerable to the public for any offence
that such his inmate might commit.(b) (16)
7. Under the head of public economy may also be properly ranked all sump-
tuary laws against luxury, and extravagant expense in dress, diet and the like;
concerning the general utility of which to a state, there is much controversy
among the political writers. Baron Montesquien lays it down, (c) that. luxury
is necessary in monarchies, as in France; but ruinous to democracies, as in
Holland. With regard therefore to England, whose government is compounded
of both species, it may still be a dubious question how far private luxury is a
public evil; and as such cognizable by public laws. And indeed our legislators
have several times changed their sentiments as to this point; for formerly there
were a multitude of penal laws existing, to restrain excess in apparel ;(d) chiefly
made in the reigns of Edward the Third, Edward the Fourth and Henry the
Eighth, against piked shoes, short doublets and long coats; all of which were
repealed by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 25. But, as to excess in diet there still remains
one ancient statute unrepealed, 10 Edward III, st. 3, which ordains, that no
man shall be served, at dinner or supper, with more than two courses; except
upon some great holidays there specified, in which he may be served with three.
8. Next to that of luxury naturally follows the offence of gaming, which is
[*171] generally introduced to supply or retrieve *the expenses occasioned by the
former: it being a kind of tacit confession, that the company engaged
therein do, in general, exceed the bounds of their respective fortunes; and there-
fore they cast lots to determine upon whom the ruin shall at present fall, that the
rest may be saved a little longer. But, taken in any light, it is an offence of
the most alarming nature; tending by necessary consequence to promote public
idleness, theft and debauchery among those of a lower class; and, among per-
sons of a superior rank, it hath frequently been attended with the sudden ruin
and desolation of ancient and opulent families, an abandoned prostitution of
() Valer. Maxim. 1. 2. c, 6. (a) Nov. 80, c. 5. (b) LL. Edw. c. 27. Bracton, 1. 3, tr. 2, c. 10, § 2.
c) Sp. L. b. 7, cc. 2 and 4. (d) 3 Inst. 199.
(16) These offences are now punishable under statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 83, amended by 1 and 2
Vic. c. 38.
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every principle of honour and virtue, and too often bath ended in self-mur-
der.(17) To restrain this pernicious vice among the inferior sort of people, the
statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 9, was made; which prohibits to all but gentlemen.
the games of tennis, tables, cards, dice, bowls and other unlawful diversions there
specified,(e) unless in the time of Christmas, under pecuniary pains and impris-
onment. And the same law, and also the statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24, inflict pecu-
niary penalties, as well upon the master of any public house wherein servants
are permitted to game, as upon the servants themselves, who are found to be
gaming there. But this is not the principal ground of modern complaint: it is
the gaming in high life that demands the attention of the magistrate; a passion
to which every valuable consideration is made a sacrifice, and which we seem to
have inherited from our ancestors the ancient Germans; whom Tacitus (f)
describes to have been bewitched with a spirit of play to a most exorbitant
degree. "They addict themselves," says he, "to dice (which is wonderful) when
sober, and as a serious employment: with such a mad desire of winning or los-
ing, that when stript of every thing else, they will stake at last their liberty and
their very selves. The loser goes into a voluntary slavery, and though younger
and stronger than his antagonist, suffers himself to be bound and sold. And
this perseverance in so bad a cause they call the point of honour : *ea
est in re parva pervicacia, il)si fidem vocant." One would almost be
tempted to think Tacitus was describing a modern Englishman. When men
are thus intoxicated with so frantic a spirit, laws will be of little avail; because
the same false sense of honour that prompts a man to sacrifice himself, will
deter him from appealing to the magistrate. Yet it is proper that laws should
be, and be known publicly, that gentlemen may consider what penalties they
wilfully incur, and what a confidence they repose in sharpers; who, if successful
in play, are certain to be paid with honour, or, if unsuccessful, have it in their
power to be still greater gainers by informing. For by statute 16 Car. II, c. 7,
if any person by playing or betting shall lose more than 1001. at one time, he
shall not be compellable to pay the same; and the winner shall forfeit treble
the value, one moiety to the king, the other to the informer. The statute 9
Ann. c. 14, enacts, that all bonds and other securities, given for money won at
play, or money lent at the time to play withal, shall be utterly void; that all
mortgages and incumbrances of lands, made upon the saute consideration, shall be
and enure to the use of the heir of the mortgagor; that, if any person at any time or
sitting lose 101. at play, he must sue the winner, and recover it back by action
of debt at law; and in case the loser does not, any other person may sue the
winner for treble the sum so lost ;(18) and the plaintiff may by bill in equity
examine the defendant himself upon oath ; and that in any of these suits no
privilege of parliament shall be allowed. The statute further enacts, that, if any
person by cheating at play shall win any money or valuable thing, or shall at
any one time or sitting win more than 10l., he may be indicted thereupon, and
shall forfeit five times the value to any person who will sue for it; and (in case
of cheating) shall be deemed infamous, and suffer such corporal punishment
as in case of wilful perjury. By several statutes of the reign of King George
(e) Logetting in the fields, slide thrift or shove groat, cloyish cayles, half-bowl and coyting.
f) De Mor. Gem. c. 24.
(17) [At common law, the playing at cards, dice and other games of chance, merely for the
purposes of recreation, and without any view to inordinate gain, is regarded as innocent.
Bac. Ab. Gaming, A.; Com. Dig. Justices of the peace, B. 42; and see the preamble to 16 Car.
II, c. 7. But a common player at hazard, using false dice, is liable to be indicted at common
law: 2 Rol. Ab. 78; Bac. Ab. Gaming, A.; and any person cheating by means of cards or
dice might be fined or imprisoned in proportion to the nature of the offence. Bac. Ab. Gam-
ing, A.; and see the 9 Ann. c. 15, s. 6.]
(18) The penalties for winning or losing to a certain ampunt are repealed by 8 and 9 Vic. c.
109, which makes new provisions. See also 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100; 16 and 17 Vic. c. 119; 17
and 18 Vic. c. 38; and 22 and 23 Vic. c. 17.
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II,(g) all private lotteries by tickets, cards or dice (and particularly the gaines
of faro, basset, ace of hearts, hazard, passage, rolly polly, and all other, games
with dice except backgammon) are prohibited under a penalty of 2001. for him
[*173] that shall erect such lotteries, and 501. a time for the players. Public *lot-
teries, unless by authority of parliament, and all manner of ingenious
devices, under the denomination of sales or otherwise, which in the end are
equivalent to lotteries, were before prohibited by a great variety of statutes(h)
under heavy pecuniary penalties. But particular descriptions will ever be lame
and deficient, unless all games of mere chance are at once prohibited: the
inventions of sharpers being swifter than the punishment of the law, which
only hunts them from one device to another. The statute 13 Geo. II, c. 19, to
prevent the multiplicity of horse races, another fund of gaming, directs that no
plates or matches under 501. value shall be run, upon penalty of 2001. to be paid
by the owner of each horse running, and 1001. by such as advertise the plate.
By statute 18 Geo. II, c. 34, the statute 9 Ann. is farther enforced, and some
deficiencies supplied; the forfeitures of that act may now be recovered in a court
of equity; and, moreover, if any man be convicted upon information or indict-
ment of winning or losing at play, or by betting at one time 101. or 201. within
twenty-four hours, he shall be fined five times the sum for the benefit of the
poor of the parish. Thus careful has the legislature been to prevent this
destructive vice; which may show that our laws against gaming are not so
deficient, as ourselves and our magistrates in putting those laws in
execution.(19)
9. Lastly, there is another offence, constituted by a variety of acts of parlia-
ment; which are so numerous and so confused, and the crime itself of so ques-
tionable nature, that I shall not detain the reader with many observations there-
upon. And yet it is an offence which the sportsmen of England seem t) think
of the highest importance; and a matter, perhaps the only one, of general and
national concern: associations having been formed all over the kingdom to Pre-
vent its destructive progress. I mean the offence of destroying such beasts and
fowls as are ranked under the denomination of game; which, we may remem-
ber, was formerly observed(i) (upon the old principles of the forest law),
[*174] *to be a trespass and offence in all persons alike, who have not author-
ity from the crown to kill game (which is royal property), by the grant
either of a free warren, or at least a manor of their own. But the laws, called
the game laws, have also inflicted additional punishments (chiefly pecuniary) on
persons guilty of this general offence, unless they be people of such rank or
fortune as is therein particularly specified. All persons, therefore, of what
property or distinction soever, that kill game out of their own territories, or
even upon their own estates, without the king's license, expressed by the grant of
a franchise, are guilty of the first original offence, of encroaching on the royal
prerogative. And those indigent persons who do so, without having such rank
or fortune as is generally called a qualification, are guilty not only of the
(g) 12 Geo I, c. 28. 13 Geo. I, c. 19. 18 Geo. II, c. 34.
(h) 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 17. 9 Ann. c. 6, § 56. 10 Ann. c. 26, § 109. 8 Geo. I, e. 2, §§ 36, 37. 9 Geo. I, c. 19,
§§ 4, 5. 6 Geo. II, c. 35, §§ 29, 30.
(1) See book II, page 417, &e.
(19) The enactment of 13 Geo. II, c. 19, referred to in the text, was repealed by 3 and 4 Vic.
c. 5, and the penalties under statute 9 Ann. were repealed by 8 and 9 Vic. c. 109, s. 15. Sec-
tion 18 of the same statute made all wagers and wagering contracts null and void, and pro-
hibited suit to recover the stakes. That wagers in general were legal at the common law, see
Good v. Elliot, 3 T. R. 693; Bland v. Collett, 4 Campb. 37; Marryat v. Broderick, 2 M. and W.
369. But if the subject-matter of the wager is such as to make it inconsistent with public
policy, either party may demand his stakes and recover from the stakeholder if he refuse to
pay back, even though the wager is determined (Cotton v. Thurland, 5 T. R. 405; Lacaussade
v. White, 7 T. R. 535), unless the stakeholder has actually paid it over to the winner before
notice not to do so. Howson v. Hancock, 8 T. R. 575; Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N. H. 152; Liv-
ingston v. Wootan, 1 N. and. McC. 178. In the United States wagers are generally made
illegal by statute.
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original offence, but of the aggravations also, created by the statutes for preserv-
ing the game: which aggravations are so severely punished, and those punish-
ments so implacably inflicted, that the offence against the king is seldom
thought of, provided the miserable delinquent can make his peace with the lord
of the manor. The offence, thus aggravated, I have ranked under the present
head, because the only rational footing upon which we can consider it as a
crime, is that in low and indigent persons it promotes idleness, and takes them
away from their proper employments and callings; which is an offence against
the public police and economy of the commonwealth.
The statutes for preserving the game are many and various, and not a little
obscure and intricate; it being remarked,(j) that in one statute only, 5 Ann.
c. 14, there is false grammar in no fewer than six places, besides other mistakes;
the occasion of which, or what denomination of persons were probably the pen-
ners of these statutes, I shall not at present inquire. It is in general sufficient
to observe, that the qualifications for killing game, as they are usually called,
or more properly the exemptions from the penalties inflicted by the statute law,
are, 1. The having a freehold estate of 1001. *per annum : there being [*175]
fifty times the property required to enable a man to kill a partridge, as
to vote for a knight of the shire: 2. A leasehold for ninety-nine years of 1501.
per annum: 3. Being the son and heir apparent of an esquire (a very loose
and vague description), or person of superior degree: 4. Being the owner or
keeper of a forest, park, chase, or warren. For unqualified persons transgress-
ing these laws, by killing game, keeping engines for that purpose, or even hav-
ing game in their custody, or for persons (however qualified) that kill game or
have it in possession, at unseasonable times of the year, or unseasonable hours
of the day or night, on Sundays or on Christmas day, there are various penalties
assigned, corporal and pecuniary, by different statutes ;(k) on any of which,
but only on one at a time, the justices may convict in a summary way, or (in
most of them) prosecutions may be carried on at the assizes. And, lastly, by
statute 28 Geo. II, c. 12, no person, however qualified to kill, may make mer-
chandise of this valuable privilege, by sellinq or exposing to sale any game, on
pain of like forfeiture as if he had no qualification.(20)
CHAPTER XIV.
OF HOMICIDE.
IN the ten preceding chapters we have considered, first, such crimes and mis-
demeanors as are more immediately injurious to God, and his holy religion;
secondly, such as violate or transgress the law of nations; thirdly, such as more
especially affect the king, the father and representative of his people; fourthly,
such as more directly infringe the rights of the public or commonwealth, taken
in its collective capacity; and are now, lastly, to take into consideration those
which in a more peculiar manner affect and injure individuals or private
subjects.
Were these injuries indeed confined to individuals only, and did they affect
none but their immediate objects, they would fall absolutely under the notion
(j) Bum's Justice, Game, 5 3. (k) Burn's Justice, tit. Game.
(20) The changes made in the game laws by which the property qualifications are dispensed
with, and the buying and selling of game are legalized under certain restrictions, are else-
where referred to. See statute 1 and 2 Win. IV, c. 32, and 2 and 3 Vic. c. 35. And as to
taking game by night, statute 9 Geo. IV, c. 69; 7 and 8 Vic. c. 29, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96,
s. 17. In this connection, the offence of buying and selling offices may properly be mentioned.
The statutes concerning it are 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 16, and 49 Geo. III, c. 106, which make it
a misdemeanor.
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of private wrongs; for which a satisfaction would be due only to the party in-
jured; the manner of obtaining which was the subject of our inquiries in the
preceding book. But the wrongs, which we are now to treat of, are of a much
more extensive consequence: 1. Because it is impossible they can be committed
without a violation of the laws of nature; of the moral as well as political rules
of right: 2. Because they in-clude in them almost always a breach of the pub-
lie peace: 3. Because by their example and evil tendency they threaten and
endanger the subversion of all civil society. Upon these accounts it is,
[*1*7] that, besides the private satisfaction due and given in many cases to the
individual, by action for the private wrong, the government also calls
upon the offender to submit to public punishment for the public crime. And
the prosecution of these offences is always at the suit and in the name of the
king, in whom, by the texture of our constitution, the jus gladii, or executory
power of the law, entirely resides. Thus, too, in the old Gothic constitution,
there was a threefold punishment inflicted on all delinquents; first, for the
private wrong to the party injured; secondly, for the offence against the king
by disobedience to the laws; and, thirdly, for the crime against the public by
their evil example.(a) Of which we may trace the groundwork, in what
Tacitus tells us of his Germans; (b) that, whenever offenders were fined, "pars
mulcte reyi, vel civitati, pars ipsi, qui vindicatur vel propinquis e/us, ex-
solvitur."
These crimes and misdemeanors against private subjects are principally of
three kinds; against their persons, their habitations, and their property.
Of crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects, the most principal and
important is the offence of taking away that life which is the immediate gift of
the great Creator; and of which therefore no man can be entitled to deprive
himself or another, but in some manner either expressly commanded in, or
evidently deducible from, those laws which the Creator has given us; the
divine laws, I mean, of either nature or revelation. The subject, therefore, of the
present chapter, will be the offence of homicide, or destroying the life of man,
in its several stages of guilt, arising from the particular circumstances of mitiga-
tion or aggravation which attend it.
Now homicide, or the killing of any human creature, is of three kinds; Justi-
fiable, excusable, and felonious. The first has no share of guilt at all ; the second
[*178]. very little; but the *third is the highest crime against the law of natureL-1781 that man is capable of committing.
I. Justifiable homicide is of divers kinds.
1. Such as is owing to some unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention,
or desire, and without any inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and
therefore without any shadow of blame. As, for instance, by virtue of such an
office as obliges one, in the execution of public justice, to put a malefactor to
death, who hath forfeited his life by the laws and verdict of his country. This
is an act of necessity, and even of civil duty; and therefore not only justifiable,
but commendable, where the law requires it. But the law must require it,
otherwise it is not justifiable: therefore, wantonly to kill the greatest of male-
factors, a felon or a traitor, attainted or outlawed, deliberately, uncompelled,
and extra-judicially, is murder. (c) For, as Bracton (d) very justly observes,
"istud homicidium, si fit ex livore, vel delectatione e/fundendi humanum san-
guinem, licet just occidatur iste, tamen occisor peccat mortaliter, propter intea-
tionem corruptam." And farther, if judgment of death be given by a judge not
authorized by lawful commission, and execution is done accordingly, the judge
is guilty of murder. (e) And upon this account, Sir Matthew Hale himself,
though he accepted the place of a judge of the common pleas under Cromwell's
government (since it is necessary to decide the disputes of civil property in the
worst of times), yet declined to sit on the crown side at the assizes, and try
prisoners; having very strong objections to the legality of the usurper's com-
(a) Stiernhook, 1. 1, c. 5. (b) dr mo. Germ. c. 12. (a) 1 Hal. P. C. 497. (d) fol. 120.
(e) 1 Hawk. P. C. 70. 1 Hal. P. C. 497.
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mission; (f) a distinction perhaps rather too refined; since the punishment of
crimes is at least as necessary to society, as maintaining the boundaries of prop-
erty. Also, such judgment, when legal, must be executed by the proper officer,
or his appointed deputy; for no one else is required by law to do it, which
requisition it is that justifies the homicide. If another *person doth *19]
it of his own head, it is held to be murder: (y) even though it be the L
judge himself. (h) It must farther be executed servato juris ordine; it must
pursue the sentence of the court. If an officer beheads one who is adjudged to
be hanged, or vice versa, it is murder: (i) for he is merely ministerial, and
therefore only justified when he acts under the authority and compulsion of the
law: but if a sheriff changes one kind of death for another, he then acts by his
own authority, which extends not to the commission of homicide, and besides,
this license might occasion a very gross abuse of his power. The king, indeed,
may remit part of a sentence; as in the case of treason, all but the beheading:
but this is no change, no introduction of a new punishment; and in the case of
felony, where the judgment is to be hanged, the king (it hath been said) cannot
legally order even a peer to be beheaded. (k) But this doctrine will be more
fully considered in a subsequent chapter.
Again, in some cases homicide is justifiable, rather by the permission, than
by the absolute command, of the law, either for the advancement of public justice,
which without such indemnification would never be carried on with proper
vigour; or, in such instances where it is committed for the prevention of some
atrocious crime, which cannot otherwise be avoided.
2. Homicides committed for the advancement of public justice, are; 1. Where
an officer, in the execution of his office, either in a civil or criminal case, kills
a person that assaults and resists him.(1) 2. If an officer, or any private person,
attempts to take a man charged with felony, and is resisted; and, in the endeav-
our to take him, kills him.(m) This is similar to the old Gothic constitutions,
which (Stiernhook informs us) (n) "furem, si aliter capi non posset, occidere
*permittud." 3. In case of a riot, or rebellious assembly, the officers [*180]
endeavouring to disperse the mob are justifiable in killing them, both at
common law,(o) and by the riot act, 1 Geo. I, c. 5. 4. Where the prisoners in a
gaol, or going to a gaol, assault the gaoler or officer, and he in his defence kills
any of them, it is justifiable for the sake of preventing an escape.(p) 5. If tres-
passers in forests, parks, chases, or warrens, will not surrender themselves to the
keepers, they may be slain; by virtue of the statute 21 Edw. I, st. 2, de malefac-
toribus in parcis, and 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 10. (1) But in all these cases, there
must be an apparent necessity on the officer's side, viz.: that the party could not
be arrested or apprehended, the riot could not be suppressed, the prisoners could
not be kept in hold, the deer-stealers could not but escape, unless such homicide
were committed: otherwise, without such absolute necessity, it is not justifi-
able. (2) 6. If the champions in a trial by battle killed either of them the other,
(f) Burnet in his life. (g) 1 Hal. P. C. 501. 1 Hawk. P. C. 70. (h) Dalt. Just. e. 150.
(i) Finch. L. 31. 3 Inst. 52. 1 Hal. P. C. 501. (k) 3 Inst. 52, 212.
(1) 1 Hal. P. C. 491. 1 Hawk. P. C. 71. (m) 1 Hal. P. C. 494. (n) dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 5.
(o) 1 Hal. P. C. 495. 1 Hawk. P. C. 161. (p) 1 Hal. P. C. 496.
(1) These statutes are since repealed.
k2) [If a person commits felony, and flies, or resists those who attempt to apprehend him,
or is indicted of felony, and flies, or is arrested by warrant or process of law, and escapes, or
is being conveyed to prison, and escapes; in any of these cases, if he Cannot be taken alive,
and is killed in the act of resistance, the homicide is justifiable. 1 Hale, P. C. 489; 1 East,
P. C. 298. So, if an officer has a warrant against A, by name, for felony, or if A is indicted of
felony, or if the hue and cry is levied against him, by name; in any of these cases, if A, though
innocent, flies or resists, and is killed by the officer or any other person aiding him, during
flight or resistance, the person so killing him is ideninifled. Fost. 318 ; 1 East, P. C. 303.
And tile officer, it seems, would be equally indemnified, though lie had no warrant, if lie acted
on a charge of felony, and on reasonable suspicion, even though it should appear in the result
that no felony had been committed. Samuel v. Payne, Doug. 359; Guppy v. Brittlebank,
5 Price, 525.]
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such homicide was justifiable, and was imputed to the just judgment of God,
who was thereby presumed to have decided in favour of the truth.(q) (3)
In the next place, such homicide as is committed for the prevention of any
forcible and atrocious crime, is justifiable by the law of nature; (r) and also by
the law of England, as it stood so early as the time of Bracton, (s) and as it is
since declared irn statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 5.(4) If any person attempts a rob-
bery or murder of another, or attempts to break open a house in the night-time
(which extends also to an attempt to burn it), (t) and shall be killed in such
attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged. This reaches not to any
crime unaccompanied with force, as picking of pockets; or to the breaking
open of any house in the day-time, unless it carries with it an attempt of robbery
also. So the Jewish law, which punished no theft with death, makes homicide
only justifiable in case of nocturnal house-breaking; if a thief be found
['181] breaking up, and he be "smitten that *be die, there shall no blood be shed
for him: but if the sun be risen upon him, there shall blood be shed for
him; for he should make full restitution." (u) At Athens, if any theft
was committed by night, it was lawful to kill the criminal, if taken in the
fact: (w) and by the Roman law of the twelve tables, a thief might be slain by
night with impunity: or even by day, if he armed himself with any dangerous
weapon: (x) which amounts very nearly to the same as is permitted by our own
constitutions.
The Roman law also justifies homicide, when committed in defence of the
chastity either of one's self or relations :(y) and so also, according to Selden,(z)
stood the law in the Jewish republic. The English law likewise justifies a
woman killing one who attempts to ravish her:(a) and so, too, the husband or
father may justify killing a man who attempts a rape upon his wife or daugh-
ter: but not if he takes them in adultery by consent, for the one is forcible and
felonious, but not the other.(b) And I make no doubt but the forcibly attempt-
ing a crime of a still more detestable nature may be equally resisted by the death
of the unnatural aggressor. For the one uniform principle that runs through
our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: that where a crime, in itself capi-
tal, is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by
the death of the party attempting. But we must not carry this doctrine to the
same visionary length that Mr. Locke does: who holds,(c) "that all manner of
force without right upon a man's person, puts him in a state of war with the
aggressor; and, of consequence, that being in such a state of war, he may law-
fully kill him that puts him under this unnatural restraint." However just this
conclusion may be in a state of uncivilized nature, yet the law of England, like
[*182] that of every other *well-regulated community, is too tender of the public
peace, too careful of the lives of the subjects, to adopt so contentious a
system; nor will suffer with impunity any crime to be prevented by death,
unless the same, if committed, would also be punished by death.
In these instances of justifiable homicide, it may be observed, that the slayer
is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is there-
fore to be totally acquitted and discharged, with commendation rather than
blame. But that is not quite the case in excusable homicide, the very name
whereof imports some fault, some error, or omission: so trivial, however, that
the law excuses it from the guilt of felony, though, in strictness, it judges it
deserving of some little degree of punishment.
(q) 1 Hawk. P. C. 'l. (r) Puff. L. of N. 1. 2, c. 5. (s) fol. 155. (t) I Hal. P. C. 488.
(a) Exod. xxii, 2. (w) Potter, Antiq. b. 1, c. 25. (x) Cic. proMW/one, 3. ii. 9,2.4.
(y) "Divas Hadrianus rescripsit eum qui stuprum sibi vel sus inferentem occidit dimittendurn." (Ff. 48. 8. 1.)
(z) De legib. Hebrmor, 1. 4, c. 3. (a) Bac. Elem. 34. 1 Hawk. P. C. 71. (b) 1 Hal. P. C. 485, 486.
(C) Ess. on Gov. p. 2, c. 5.
(3) [The trial by battle is abolished by 59 Geo. III, c. 46; see further upon that subject,
post, 346.]
(4) [Repealed by 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, section 10 of which enacts, that no punishment or for-
feiture shall be incurred by any person who shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own
defence, or in any other manner without felony.]
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II. Excusable homicide is of two sorts; either per infortuuium, by mis-
adventure; or se defendendo, upon a principle of self-preservation. We will first
see wherein these two species of homicide are distinct, and then wherein they
agree.
1. Homicide per infortunium or misadventure is where a man, doing a law-
ful act, without any intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another: as where a
man is at work with a hatchet, and the head thereof flies off, and kills a stander-
by; or where a person, qualified to keep a gun, is shooting at a mark, and unde-
signedly kills a man :(d) for the act is lawful, and the effect is merely accidental.(5)
So where a parent is moderately correcting his child, a master his apprentice or
scholar, or an officer punishing a criminal, and happens to occasion his death,
it is only misadventure; for the act of correction is lawful: but if he exceeds
the bounds of moderation, either in the manner, the instrument, or the quan-
tity of punishment, and death ensues, it is manslaughter at least, and in some
cases (according to the circumstances) murder;(e) for the act of immoderate
correction is unlawful. *Thus, by an edict of the emperor Constan- [*183]
tine,(f) when the rigour of the Roman law with regard to slaves began
to relax and soften, a master was allowed to chastise his slave with rods and
imprisonment, and, if death accidentally ensued, he was guilty of no crime:
but if he struck him with a club or a stone, and thereby occasioned his death;
or if, in any other, yet grosser manner, "immoderatN suo Jure utatur, tune reus
homicidii sit."
But to proceed. A tilt or tournament, the martial diversion of our ancestors,
was, however, an unlawful act: and so are boxing and sword-playing, the suc-
ceeding amusement of their posterity: and, therefore, if a knight in the former
case, or a gladiator in the latter, be killed, such killing is felony or manslaugh-
ter. But if the king command or permit such diversion, it is said to be only
misadventure; for then the act is lawful.(g) In the like manner, as by the laws
bo ' of Athens and Rome, he who killed another in the pancratium, or public
games authorized or permitted by the state, was not held to be guilty of homi-
cide.(h) Likewise, to whip another's horse, whereby he runs over a child and
kills him, is held to be accidental in the rider, for he had done nothing unlaw-
ful: but manslaughter in the person who whipped him, for the act was a tres-
pass, and at best a piece of idleness, of inevitably dangerous consequences.(i) (6)
(d) I Hawk. P. C. 73, 74. (e) 1 Hal. P. C. 473, 474. (f) Cod. 1. 9, t. 14.
(g) 1 Hal. P. C. 473. 1 Hawk. P. C. 74. (A) Plato, de LL. ll0. 7. Ff. 9. 2. 7. (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 73.
(5) [If a person driving a carriage happen to kill another, if he saw or had timely notice of
the mischief likely to ensue, and yet wilfully drove on, it will be murder: if lie might have
seen the danger, but did not look "before him, it will be manslaughter; but if the accident
happened in such a manner that no want of due care could be imputed to the driver, it will
be accidental death, and excusable homicide. 1 East, P. C. 263. Where, on a false alarm of
thieves, the master of the house killed one of the family by mistake, who had concealed him-
self in a closet, this was holden homicide by misfortune. Cro. Car. 538. Where an unquali-
fied person by accident shoots another in sporting, it is no greater offence than in a qualified
person. 1 East, P. C. 2601
Homicide by practical joke is manslaughter. As, where a fire was kindled around a drunken
man only to frighten him, but into which he rolled and was killed. Errington's Case, 2 Lewin
C. C. 217. And see Fenton's Case, 1 id. 179; Martin's Case, 3 C. and P. 211.
(6) [Whenever death is the consequence of idle, dangerous and unlawful sports, or of heed-
less, wanton and indiscreet acts, without a felonious intent, the party causing the death is
guilty of manslaughter. As, if a man rides an unruly horse amongst a crowd of people: 1
East, P. C. 231 ; or throws a stone, or shoots an arrow, over a wall, into a frequented pub-
lie street: I Hale, P. C. 475; or discharges his pistols in a public street upon alighting from
his carriage: 1 Stra. 481; or throws a stone at a horse, which strikes a man: 1 Hale, P. C. 39;
in any of these cases, though the party may be perfectly innocent of any mischievous intent,
still, if death ensues, he is guilty of manslaughter. So, if the owner suffers to be at large any
animal which he knows to be vicious and mischievous, and it kills a man, it has been thought
by some that he may be indicted for manslaughter: but it is well agreed that he is guilty of a
high misdemeanor: 2 Haw. P. C. c. 13, 8; and, in a very recent case of that kind, Best, C. J.,
laid it down as law, "that, if a person thinks proper to keep an animal of this description (a
bull), knowing its vicious nature, and another person is killed by it, it will be manslaughter in
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And in general, if death ensues in consequence of an idle, dangerous, and un-
lawful sport, as shooting or casting stones in a town, or the barbarous diversion
of cock-throwing, in these and similar cases the slayer is guilty of manslaughter,
and not misadventure only, for these are unlawful acts.(k)
2. Homicide in self-defence, or se defendendo, upon a sudden affray, is also
excusable, rather than justifiable, by the English law. This species of self-
defence must be distinguished from that just now mentioned, as calculated to
L*184] *hinder the perpetration of a capital crime; which is not only a matter
of excuse, but of justification. But the self-defence which we are now
speaking of is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the
like, in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults
him. And this is what the law expresses by the word chance-medley, or (as
some rather choose to write it) clhaud-medley, the former of which in its
etymology signifies a casual affray, the latter an affray in the teat of blood or
passion; both of them of pretty much the same import: but the former
is in common speech too often erroneously applied to any manner of homicide
or misadventure; whereas it appears by the statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 5, and our
ancient books,(/) that it is properly applied to such killing as happens in self-
defence upon a sudden rencounter.(m) This right of natural defence does not
imply a right of attacking: for, instead of attacking one another for injuries
past or impending, men need only have recourse to the proper tribunals of
justice. They cannot, therefore, legally exercise this right of preventive defence,
but in sudden and violent cases when certain and immediate suffering would be
the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. Wherefore, to excuse
homicide by the plea of self defence, it must appear that the slayer had no
other possible (or, at least, probable) means of escaping from his assailant(7)
It is frequently difficult to distinguish this species of homicide (upon chance-
medley in self-defence) from that of manslaughter, in the proper legal sense of
the word.(n) But the true criterion between them seems to be this: when both
parties are actually combating at the time when the mortal stroke is given, the
slayer is then guilty of manslaughter: but if the slayer has not begun the fight,
or (having begun) endeavours to decline any farther struggle, and afterwards,
being closely pressed by his antagonist, kills him to avoid his own destruction,
this is homicide excusable by self-defence.(o) For which reason the law requires
[*185] that the person, who kills another, in his own defence, *should have
retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of
the assault, before he turns upon his assailant; and that not factitiously, or
in order to watch his opportunity, but from a real tenderness of shedding his
brother's blood. And though it may be cowardice, in time of war between two
independent nations, to flee from an enemy; yet between two fellow-sub-
jects the law countenances no such point of honour: because the king and his
courts are the vindices injuriarum, and will give to the party wronged all the
(k) Ibid. 74. 1 Hal. P. C. 472. Fost. 261. (1) Staundf. P. C. 16. (m) 3 Inst. 55, 57. Fost. 275, 276.
(n) 3 Inst. 55. (o) Fost. 277.
the owner, if nothing more; at all events, it will be an aggravated species of manslaughter.
Blackman v Simmons, 3 C. and P. 140. If workmen, in the ordinary course of their busi-
ness, throw rubbish from a house in a direction in which persons are likely to pass, and any
one passing is killed, this is manslaughter. 1 East, P. C. 262. Killing a person in a prize-fight
is manslaughter. Ward's Case, 1 East, P. C. 270.]
(7) [The general principle seems to be this. If a man is attacked in such a manner that
there is no possibility of his escaping without killing his assailant, he is justified in doing so,
after having done his utmost to retreat. Fost. 278; Kel. 128. But no assault, however
violent, will justify killing the assailant, under the plea of necessity, unless there is a clear
manifestation of a felonious intent. 1 East, P. C. 277; 1 Russell, 551. And an officer who
kills one who resists him in the execution of his office, and even a private person that kills
one who feloniously assaults him in the highway, may justify the fact without retreating at
all. 1 Haw. P. C. c. 29, 16; 1 Hale P. C. 41; 3 Inst. 56.]
On this subject of homicide in self-defence and of the necessity of endeavor to avoid so
serious a consequence, see note 1, book 3, page 3.
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satisfaction he deserves.(p) In this the civil law also agrees with ours, or per-
haps goes rather farther: "qui cum alier tueri se non possunt, damni culpam
dederint, innoxii sunt." (q) The party assaulted must therefore flee as far as he
conveniently can, either by reason of some wall, ditch, or other impediment; or
as far as the fierceness of the assault will permit him: (r) for it may be so fierce
as not to allow him to yield a step, without manifest danger of his life, oi
enormous bodily harm: and then in his defence he may kill his assailant
instantly. And this is the doctrine of universal justice,(s) as well as of the
municipal law.
And as the manner of the defence, so is also the time to be considered: for
if the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray is over, or
when he is running away, this is revenge, and not defence. Neither, under the
colour of self-defence, will the law permit a man to screen himself from the
guilt of deliberate murder: for if two persons, A and B, agree to fight a duel,
and A gives the first onset, and B retreats as far as he safely can, and then kills
A, this is murder; because of the previous malice and concerted design.(t) But
if A upon a sudden quarrel assaults B first, and upon B's returning the assault
A really and bona fide flees; and, being driven to the wall, turns again upon B
and kills him: this may be se defendendo according to some of our writers; (u)
*though others (w) have thought this opinion too favourable: inasmuch [*18
as the necessity, to which he is at last reduced, originally arose from his 6]
own fault. Under this excuse of self-defence, the principal civil and natural
relations are comprehended; therefore master and servant, parent and child,
husband and wife, killing an assailant in the necessary defence of each other
respectively, are excused ; the act of the relation assisting being construed the
same as the act of the party himself.(x)
There is one species of homicide se defendendo, where the party slain is equally
innocent as he who occasions his death: and yet this homicide is also excusable
from the great universal principle of self-preservation, which prompts every man
to save his own life preferably to that of another, where one of them must
inevitably perish. As, among others, in that case mentioned by Lord Bacon,(y)
where two persons, being shipwrecked, and getting on the same plank, but find-
ing it not able to save them both, one of them thrusts the other from it, whereby
he is drowned. le who thus preserves his own life at the expense of another
man's is excusable through unavoidable necessity, and the principle of self-de-
fence: since their both remaining on the same weak plank is a mutual, though
innocent, attempt upon, and an endangering of, each other's life.
Let us next take a view of those circumstances wherein these two species of
homicide, by misadventure and self-defence, agree ; and those are in their blame
and punishment. For the law sets so high a value upon the life of a man, that
it always intends some misbehaviour in the person who takes it away, unless by
the command or express permission of the law. In the case of misadventure,
it presumes negligence, or at least a want of sufficient caution in him who was
so unfortunate as to commit it; who therefore is not altogether faultless. (z)
And as to the necessity which excuses a man who *kills another se defen- *187]
dendo, Lord Bacon(a) entitles it necessitas culpabilis, and thereby dis- 18
tinguishes it from the former necessity of killing a thief or a malefactor. For
the law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some unknown wrong, or
some provocation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both parties may
be, and usually are, in some fault; and it scarce can be tried who was originally
in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor entirely guiltless. But it is
clear, in the other case, that where I kill a thief that breaks into my house, the
original default can never be upon my side. The law besides may have a farther
view, to make the crime of homicide more odious, and to caution men how they
venture to kill another upon their own private judgment; by ordaining, that
(p) 1 Hal. P. C. 481, 483. (q) Ff. 9, 2, 45. (r) 1 iHal. P. C. 483. (s) Puff. 1. 2, c 5, § 13.
(t) 1 Hal. P. C. 479, (u) Aid. 482. (w) I Hawk. P. C. 75. (x) 1 Hal. P. C. 84.
(y) Elem. c. 5. See also 1 Hawk. P. C. 73. (z) 1 Hawk. P. C. 72. (a) Elem. c. 5.
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he who slays his neighbour, without an express warrant from the law so to do,
shall in no case be absolutely free from guilt.
Nor is the law of England singular in this respect. Even the slaughter of
enemies required a solemn purgation among the Jews; which implies that the
death of a mal, however it happens, will leave some stain behind it. And the
Mosaical law(b) appointed certain cities of refuge for him "who killed his
neighbour unawares: as when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to
hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and
the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die,
he shall flee unto one of those cities and live." But it seems he was not held
wholly blameless, any more than in the English law; since the avenger of blood
might slay him before he reached his asylum, or if he afterwards stirred out of
it till the death of the high priest. In the imperial law likewise(c) casual
homicide was excused, by the indulgence of the emperor signed with his own sign-
manual, " annotatione principis :" otherwise the death of a man, however com-
mitted, was in some degree punishable. Among the Greeks(d) homicide by
[*188] misfortune was expiated by voluntary *banishment for a year.(e) In
Saxony a fine is paid to the kindred of the slain ; which also, among the
Western Goths, was little inferior to that of voluntary homicide :(f) and in
France(g) no person is ever absolved in cases of this nature, without a largess to
the poor, and the charge of certain masses for the soul of the party killed.
The penalty inflicted by our laws is said by Sir Edward Coke to have been
anciently no less than death ;(h) which, however, is with reason denied by later
and more accurate writers. (i) It seems rather to have consisted in a forfeiture,
some say of all the goods and chattels, others of only part of them, by way of
fine or weregild :(k) which was probably disposed of, as in France, inpios usus,
according to the humane superstition of the times, for the benefit of his soul
who was thus suddenly sent to his account, with all his imperfections on his
head. But that reason having long ceased, and the penalty (especially if a total
forfeiture) growing more severe than was intended, in proportion as personal
property has become more considerable, the delinquent has now, and has had as
early as our records will reach,(Q) a pardon and writ of restitution of his goods as
a matter of course and right, only paying for suing out the came.(mt)(8) And,
indeed, to prevent this expense, in cases where the death has notoriously hap-
pened by misadventure or in self-defence, the judges will usually permit (if not
direct) a general verdict of acquittal.(n)
III. Felonious homicide is an act of very different nature from the former,
being the killing of a human creature, of any age or sex, without justification
or excuse. This may be done either by killing one's self, or another man.
[*189] *Self-murder, the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic
philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they
had not the fortitude to endure, though the attempting it seems to be counte-
nanced by the civil law,(o) yet was punished by the Athenian law with cutting
off the hand, which committed the desperate deed.(p) And also the law of
England wisely and religiously considers, that no man hath a power to destroy
life, but by commission from God, the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty
of a double offence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty,
and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal,
(b) Numb. c. %5, and Dent. c. 19. (c) Cod. 9 16, 5. (d) Plato de Leg. lib. 9.
(e) To this expiation by banishment the spirit of Patroclus in Homer may be thought to allude, when he
reminds Achilles, in the twenty-third Iliad, that when a child he was obliged to flee his country for casually
killing his playfellow; " vn o a?0 0 .
(f) Stiernh. dejure Goth 1. 3, c. 4. (g) De Morney, on the digest. (A) 2 Inst. 148, 315.
(t) 1 Hal. P. C. 425. 1 Hawk. P. C. 75. Fost. 282, &c. (k) Fost. 287. (1) Ibid. 283.
(m) 2 Hawk. P. C, 381. (n) Fost. 288.
(o) "Si quis impatientia doloris, aut t6edio vita, aut morbo, aut furore, aut pudore, more maluit, non animad.
vertatur n eum." P'f. 49, 16, 6.
(p) Pot. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.
(8) [But now all forfeiture and punishment is removed in such cases. See 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 10.]
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against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects; the
law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar
species of felony, a felony committed on one's self. And this admits of acces-
sories before the fact, as well as other felonies; for if one persuades another to
kill himself, and he does so, the adviser is guilty of murder.(q) Afelo de se
therefore is he that deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits
any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death: as if
attempting to kill another, he runs upon his antagonist's sword: or, shooting
at another, the gun bursts and kills himself.(r)(9) The party must be of years
of discretion, and in his senses, else it is no crime. But this excuse ought not
to be strained to that length to which our coroner's juries are apt to carry it,
viz.: that the very act of suicide is an evidence of insanity; as if every man,
who acts contrary to reason had no reason at all: for t he same argument would
prove every other criminal non compos, as well as the self-murderer. The law
very rationally judges that every melancholy or hypochondriac fit does not de-
prive a man of the capacity of discerning right from wrong; which is neces-
sary, as was observed in a former chapter;(s) to *form a legal excuse. [*190]
And therefore if a real lunatic kills himself in a lucid interval, he is a
felo de se as much as another man.(t)
But now the question follows, what punishment can human laws inflict on
one who has withdrawn himself from their reach? They can only act upon
what he has left behind him, his reputation and fortune: on the former, by an
ignominious burial in the highway, with a stake driven through his body ;(10)
on the latter, by a forfeiture of all his goods and chattels to the king: hoping
that his care for either his own reputation, or the welfare of his family, would
be some motive to restrain him from so desperate and wicked an act. And it is
observable, that this forfeiture has relation to the time of the act done in the
felon's lifetime, which was the cause of his death. As if husband and wife
be possessed jointly of a term of years in land, and the husband drowns him-
self; the land shall be forfeited to the king, and the wife shall not have it by
survivorship. For by the act of casting himself into the water he forfeits the
term; which gives a title to the king, prior to the wife's title by survivorship,
which could not accrue till the instant of her husband's death.(u) And though it
must be owned that the letter of the law herein borders a little upon severity, yet
it is some alleviation that the power of mitigation is' left in the breast of the
sovereign, who upon this, as on all other occasions, is reminded by the oath
of his office to execute judgment in mercy.(11)
(q) Keilw. 136. (r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 68. 1 Hal. P. C. 413. (s) See page 24. (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 412.
(u) Finch, L. 216.
(9) [He who kills another upon his desire or command, is in the judgment of the law as
much a murderer, as if lie had done it merely of his own head; aud the person killed is not
looked upon as a fetlo de se, inasmuch as his assent was merely void, being against the law of
God and man. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, s. 6; Keilw. 136; Moor. 754. And see Rex v. Sawyer,
1 Russell, 424; Rex v. Evans, id. 426.]
(10) Interment in the highway, with a stake driven through the body, is done away with by
statute 4 Geo. IV, c. 52, but it must be private, and without the rites of Christian burial.
(11) [As to what a felo de se shall forfeit, it seems clear that he shall forfeit all chattels real
or personal which he has in his own right; and also all chattels real whereof he is possessed,
either jointly with his wife, or in her right; and also all bonds and other personal things in
action, belonging solely to himself; and also all personal things in action, and, as some say,
entire chattels in possession to which he was entitled jointly with another, or any account,
except that of merchandise. But it is said that he shall forfeit a moiety only of such joint
chattels as may be severed, and nothing at all of what he was possessed of as executor or
administrator. 1 Haw. P. C., c. 27, , 7. The blood of a feto de se is not corrupted, nor his
lands of inheritance forfeited, nor 'his wife barred of her dower. 1 Haw. P. C., c. 27, , 8;
Plowd. 261, b., 262, a.; 1 Hale, P. C. 413. The will of afelo de se, therefore, becomes void as
to his personal property, but not as to his real estate. Plowd. 261. No part of the personal
estate of a felo de se vests in the king, before the self-murder is found by some inquisition;
and, consequently, the forfeiture thereof is saved by a pardon of the offence before such find-
ing. 5 Co. Rep. 110, b.; 3 Inst. 54. 1 Saund. 362; 1 Sid. 150, 162. But if there be no such
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The other species of criminal homicide is that of killing another man. But
in this there are also degrees of guilt, which divide the offence into manslaughter
and murder. The difference between which may be partly collected from what
has been incidentally mentioned in the preceding articles, and principally con-
sists in this, that manslaughter, when voluntary, arises from the sudden heat of
the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart.
[191] *1. Manslaughter is therefore thus deflned,(v) the unlawful killing of
another without malice either express or implied; which may be either
voluntarily, upon a sudden heat; or involuntarily, but in the commission of
some unlawful act. These were called in the Gothic constitutions "homicidia
vulgaria; quce aut casu, aut etiam sponte committuntur, sed in subitaneo quo-
dam iracundice calore et impetu." (w) And hence it follows, that in man-
slaughter there can be no accessories before the fact; because it must be done
without premeditation.
As to ihe first, or voluntary branch: if upon a sudden quarrel two persons
fight, and one of them kills the other, this is manslaughter: and so it is, if they
upon such an occasion go out and fight in a field; for this is one continued act
of passion: (x) and the law pays that regard to human frailty, as not to put a
hasty and a deliberate act upon the same footing with regard to guilt. So also
if a man be greatly provoked, as by pulling his nose, or other great indignity,
and immediately kills the aggressor, though this is not excusable se defendendo,
since there is no absolute necessity for doing it to preserve himself; yet neither
is it murder, for there is no previous malice; but it is manslaughter. (y) But
in this and in every other case of homicide upon provocation, if there be a suffi-
cient cooling-time for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the person
so provoked afterwards kills the other, this is deliberate revenge and not heat of
blood, and accordingly amounts to murder.(z) (12) So if a man takes another in
the act of adultery with his wife, and kills him directly upon the spot: though
this was allowed by the laws of Solon,(a) as likewise by the Roman civil law (if
the adulterer was found in the husband's own house),(b) and also among the
ancient Goths;(c) yet in England it is not absolutely ranked in the class of
[*192] justifiable homicide, as in case of a forcible rape, *but it is man-
[ slaughter.(d) (13) It is however the lowest degree of it; and therefore
in such a case the court directed the burning in the hand to be gently inflicted,
because there could not bo a greater provocation.(e) Manslaughter, therefore, on
a sudden provocation differs from excusable homicide se defendendo in this:
that in one case there is an apparent necessity, for self-preservation, to kill the
aggressor; in the other, no necessity at all, being only a sudden act of revenge.
The second branch, or involuntary manslaughter, differs also from homicide
excusable by misadventure in this; that misadventure always happens in conse-
quence of a lawful act, but this species of manslaughter in consequence of an
unlawful one. As, if two persons play at sword and buckler, unless by the king's
command, and one of them kills the other: this is manslaughter, because the
original act was unlawful; but it is not murder, for the one had no intent to do
(v) I Hal. P. C. 466. (w) Stiernh. de jure GotA. 1. 3, c. 4. (x) 1 Hawk. P. C. 82. (y) Kelyng. 135.
(z) Fost. 296. (a) Plutarch, in vita Solon. (b) Ff. 48, 5, 24. (c) Sticrnh. de jure GotA. 1. 3, c. 2.
(d) 1 Hal. P C. 486. (e) Sir T. Raym. 212.
pardon, the whole is forfeited immediately after such inquisition, from the time of the act
done by which the death was caused, and all intermediate alienations and titles are avoided.
Plowd. 260; 1 Hale, P. C. 29; 5 Co. Rep. 110; Finch, L. 216. See, also upon this subject,
Lambert v. Taylor, 6 D. and R. 188; 4 B. and C. 138.]
The offence of self-murder is not punishable in the United States.
(12) The question what is sufficient cooling time under all the circumstances of the case is
one of fact for the jury, in which the nature of the aggravation is an important consideration.
See Rex v. Lynch, 5 C. and P. 324; Rex v. Howard, 6 C. and P. 157; Maher v. People, 10
lMich. 212. This doctrine though disputed (2 Bish. Cr. L. f 642; Whart. Cr. L. 984), is nev-
ertheless practically acted upon, and is believed to be sound.
(13) See State v. Samuel, 3 Jones, N. C. 74; State v. John, 8 Ired. 330; Whart. Cr. L. § 983.
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the other any personal mischief.(f) So where a person does an act, lawful in it-
self, but in an unlawful manner, and without due caution and circumspection : as
when a workman flings down a stone or piece of timber into the street, and kills
a man; this may be either misadventure, manslaughter, or murder, according
to the circumstances under which the original act was done: if it were in a
country village, where few passengers are, and he calls out to all people to have
a care, it is misadventure only; but if it were in London, or other populous town,
where people are continually passing, it is manslaughter, though he gives loud
warning; (g) and murder, if he knows of their passing, and gives no warning at
all, for then it is malice against all mankind.(/i) And, in general, when an in-
voluntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be either
murder or manslaughter,(i) according to the nature of the act which occasioned
it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious *intent, or in its consequences
naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but, if no more was
intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter.(j)
Next, as to the punishment of this degree of homicide: the crime of man-
slaughter amounts to felony, but within the benefit of clergy; and the offender
shall be burnt in the hand, and forfeit all his goods and chattels.
But there is one species of manslaughter which is punished as murder, the
benefit of clergy being taken away from it by statute; namely, the offence of
mortally slabbing another, though done upon sudden provocation. For by
statute 1 Jac. I, c. 8, when one thrusts or stabs another, not then having a weapon
drawn, or who hath not then first stricken the party stabbing, so that he dies
thereof within six months after, the offender shall not have the benefit of clergy,
though he did it not of malice aforethought. This statute was made on account
of the frequent quarrels and stabbings with short daggers, between the Scotch
and the English at the accession of James the First,(k) and being therefore of a
temporary nature, ought to have expired with the mischief which it meant to
remedy. For in point of solid and substantial justice, it cannot be said that the
mode of killing, whether by stabbing, strangling, or shooting, can either extenu-
ate or enhance the guilt : unless where, as in the case of poisoning, it carries
with it an internal evidence of cool and deliberate malice. But the benignity
of the law hath construed the statute so favourably in behalf of the subject, and
so strictly when against him, that the offence of stabbing now stands almost
upon the same footing as it did at the common law.(l) Thus (not to repeat the
cases before mentioned, of stabbing an adulteress, &c. which are barely man-
slaughter, as at common law), in the construction of this statute it bath been
doubted whether, if the deceased had struck at all before the mortal blow given,
this does not take it out of the statute, though in the preceding quarrel the
stabber had given the first blow; and *it seems to be the better opinion *
that this is not within the statute.(m) Also it hath been resolved, that
the killing a man by throwing a hammer or other blunt weapon is not within
the statute; and whether a shot with a pistol be so or not, is doubted. (a) But
if the party slain had a cudgel in his hand, or had thrown a pot or bottle, or dis-
charged a pistol at the party stabbing, this is a sufficient having a weapon drawn
on his side within the words of the statute. (o)(14)
2. We are next to consider the crime of deliberate and wilful murder; a
crime at which human nature starts, and which is, I believe, punished almost
universally throughout the world with death. The words of the Mosaical law
(over and above the general precept to Noah,(p) that "whoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed'), are very emphatical in prohibiting the
(f) 3 Inst. 56. (g) Kel. 40. (t) 3 Inst. 57.
(1) Our statute law has severely animadverted on one species of criminal negligence, whereby the death of a
man is occasioned. For by statute 10 Geo. II, c. 31, if any wsaterman between Gravesend and Windsor receives
into his boat or barge a greater number of persons than the act allows, and any passenger shall then be drowned,
snch waterman is guilty (not of manslaughter, but) of felony, and shall be transported as a felon.
(j) Fost. 258. 1 Hawk. P. C. 84. ) Lord Raym. 140. (1) Fost. 299, 300.
(m) Fost. 301. 1 Hawk. P. C. 77. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 470. (o) I Hawk. P. C. 77. (p) Gen. ix. 6.
(14) The statute 1 James I, c. 8, is repealed. The crime of attempt to murder is punishable
under 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. Murder and manslaughter are punishable under the sue statute.
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pardon of murderers.(q) "Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for the life
of a murderer, who is guilty of death, but he shall surely be put to death; for
the land cannot be cleansedof the blood that is shed therein but by the blood
of him that shed it." And therefore our law has provided one course of prose-
cution (that by appeal, of which hereafter), wherein the king himself is excluded
the power of pardoning murder; so that, were the king of England so inclined,
he could not imitate the Polish monarch mentioned by Puffendorf:(r) who
thought proper to remit the penalties of murder to all the nobility, in an edict,
with this arrogant preamble, "nos, divini juris rigorem moderantes," &c. But
let us now consider the definition of this great offence.
The name of murder (as a crime) was anciently applied only to the secret
killing of another ;(s) (which the word moerda signifies in the Teutonic lan-
guage);(t) and it was defined, "homicidium quod nullo vidente, nullo sciente,
clam perpetratur :"(u) for which the vill wherein it was committed, or (if that
[*195] were too poor) the whole hundred was liable to a heavy *amercement;
which amercement itself was also denominated murdrum.(w) This was
an ancient usage among the Goths in Sweden and Denmark; who supposed the
neighbourhood, unless they produced the murderer, to have perpetrated, or at
least connived at the murder:(x) and, according to Bracton,(y) was introduced
into this kingdom by King Canute, to prevent his countrymen the Danes from
being privily murdered by the English; and was afterwards continued by Wil-
liam the Conqueror, for the like security to his own Normans.(z) And there-
fore if, upon inquisition had, it appeared that the person found slain was an
Englishman (the presentment whereof was denominated englescherie),(a) the
country seems to have been excused from this burthen. But, this difference
being totally abolished by statute 14 Edw. III, c. 4, we must now (as is ob-
served by Staundforde)(b) defihe murder in quite another manner, without
regarding whether the party slain was killed openly or secretly, or whether he
was of English or foreign extraction.
Murder is therefore now thus defined, or rather described, by Sir Edward
Coke :(c) "when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth
any reasonable creature in being, and under the kings peace, with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied." The best way of examining the nature of
this crime will be by considering the several branches of this definition.
First, it must be committed by a person of sound memory and discretion;
for lunatics or infants, as was formerly observed, are incapable of committing
any crime: unless in such cases where they show a consciousness of doing
wrong, and of course a discretion, or discernment, between good and evil.
Next, it happens when a person of such sound discretion unlawfully killeth.
The unlawfulness arises from the killing without *warrant or excuse:
and there must also be an actual killing to constitute murder; for a
bare assault, with intent to kill, is only a great misdemeanor, though formerly
it was held to be murder.(d) The killing may be by poisoning, striking, starv-
ing, drowning, and a thousand other forms of death, by which human nature may
be overcome. And if a person be indicted for one species of killing, as byoisoning, he cannot be convicted by evidence of a totally different species of
death, as by shooting with a pistol, or starving. But where they only differ in
circumstances, as if a wound be alleged to be given with a sword, and it proves
to have arisen from a staff, an ax, or a hatchet, this difference is immaterial. (e) (15)
(q) Numb. xxxv, 31. (r) L. of N. 1. 8, c. 3. (s) Dial. deScoach. 1. 1, e. 10.
(t) Stiernh. de jure Sueon. 1. 3, c. 3. The word murdre in our old statutes also signified any kind of conceal-
ment or stifling So in the statute of Exeter, 14 Edw. I, "je riens ne celerai, ne s(erai estre cele ne murdre '
which is thus translated in Fleta, 1. 1, c. 18, § 4. "Nulam vertatem cdeabo, nec ceari permittam nec murdrari."
And the words "par murdre le droit," in the articles of that statute, are rendered in Fleta, ibid. § 8, "pro jur
alicjs murdrando. "
(u) Glanv. 1. 14, c. 3. (w) Bract. 1. 3, tr. 2, c. 15, § 7. Stat. Marl. e. 26. Fost. 281.
(x) Stiernh. 1. 3, c. 4. (y) 1. 3, tr. 2, c. 15. (z) I Hal. P. C. 447. (a) Bract. ubi supr.
(b) P. C. 1. 1, c. 10. (c) 3 lnst. 47. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 425. (e) 3 Inst. 319. 2.Hal. P. C. 185.
(15) [See 1 East, P. C. 341, and Sharwin's Case, there cited, in which it was held that an
averment of an assault with a wooden staff, was satisfied by proof of an assault with a stone;
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Of all species of deaths, the most detestable is that of poison; because it can
of all others be the least prevented either by manhood or forethought.(f) And
therefore by the statute 22 H. VIII, c. 2, it was made treason, and a more griev-
ous and lingering kind of death was inflicted on it than the common law
allowed; namely, boiling to death: (16) but this act did not live long, being
repealed by 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. There was also, by the ancient common law,
one species of killing held to be murder, which may be dubious at this day; as
there hath not been an instance wherein it has been held to be murder for many
ages past: (g) I mean by bearing false witness against another, with an express
premeditated design to take away his life, so as the innocent person be con-
demned and executed. (h) The Gothic laws punished, in this case, both the
judge, the witnesses, and the prosecutor: "peculiari pena judicen puniunt;
peculiari testes, quorum fides Judicem seduxit; peculiari denique et maxima
auctorem, ut homicidum." (i) And, among the Romans, the lex Cornelia,
de sicariis, punished the false witness with death, as being guilty of a
species of assassination.(k) And there is no doubt but this is equally murder
in foro conscientice as killing with a *sword; though the modern law *197
(to avoid the danger of deterring witnesses from giving evidence upon [ I']
capital prosecutions, if it must be at the peril of their own lives) has not yet
punished it as such. If a man however does such an act of which the probable con-
sequence may be, and eventually is, death; such killing may be murder, although
no stroke be struck by himself, and no killing be primarily intended: as was
the case of the unnatural son who exposed his sick father to the air, against
(f) 3 Inst. 48.
(g) Fost. 132. In the case of Macdaniel and Berry, reported by Sir Michael Foster, though the then attorney.
g enral declined to argue this point of law, I have good grounds to believe it was not from any apprehension of
his that the point was not maintainable, but from other prudential reasons. Nothing therefore should be con-
cluded from the waiving of that prosecution.
(h) Mirror, c. 1, § 9. Britt. c. 52. Bract. 1. 3, c. 4.
(a) Stiernh. de jure Goth. . 3, c. 3. (k) Ff. 48. 8. 1.
the effect being the same. See Rex v. Dale, 13 Price, 172; 9 J. B. Moore, 19. A stroke must
be expressly averred, and an indictment stating that the prisoner murdered, or gave a mortal
wound, without saying that he struck, is bad. Rex v. Long, 5 Co. Rep. 122, a; 1 East, P. C.
342. It must also be stated upon what part of the body the deceased was struck: 2 Hale,
P. C. 185; and the length and depth of the wound must be shown. Id. 186; Haydon's Case, 4
Co. Rep. 42, a. Where there are several wounds, the length and breadth of each need not be
stated. Rex v. Mosley, R. and M. C. C. 97. And see Young's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 40; Walker's
Case, id. 41; Rex v. Lorkin, 1 Bulstr. 124; 2 Hale, P. C., 184; Rex v. Dale, R. and M. C. C. 5,
as to the wound, cause of death, &c. Where the death proceeded from suffocation from the
swelling up of the passage of the throat, and such swellings proceeded from wounds occa-
sioned by forcing something into the throat, it was held sufficient to state in the indictment,
that the things were forced into the throat, and the person thereby suffocated; and that the
process immediately causing the suffocation, namely, the swelling, need not be stated. Rex
v. Tye, R. and R. C. C. 345. The death, by the means stated, must be positively averred, and
cannot be inferred: 1 East, P. C. 343; and where the death is occasioned by a stroke, it must
be further alleged that the prisoner gave the deceased a mortal wound, &c., whereof he died.
2 Hale, P. C. 186; Kel. 125; Lad's Case, Leach, 96. The time and place both of the wound
and of the death must be stated, in order to show that the deceased died within a year
and a day from the cause of the death; in computing which the day of the act done is
reckoned the first; though a precise statement of the day is immaterial, if the party is proved
to have died within the limited period. 2 Inst. 318; 2 East, P. C. 344. The word murdered
is absolutely necessary in the indictment. 2 Hale, P. C. 187.]
The common-law rule in setting forth the instrument of death is, that where the instrument
laid and that proved are of the same nature and character, there is no variance, but where
they are of an opposite nature and character, the contrary. Whart. Cr. L. § 1059. Thus, evi-
dence of a dagger will support the averment of a knife, but evidence of a knife will not sup-
port the averment of a pistol. If the indictment allege a death by one kind of poison, proof
of a death by another kind of poison will support the indictment. Id.
(16) [This extraordinary punishment seems to have been adopted by the legislature, from
the peculiar circumstances of the crime which gave rise to it; for the preamble of the statute
informs us, that John Roose, a cook, had been lately convicted of throwing poison into a
large pot of broth, prepared for the bishop of Rochester's family, and for the poor of the
parish; and the said John Roose was, by a retrospective clause of the same statute, ordered
to be boiled to death. Lord Coke mentions several instances of persons suffering this horrid
punishment. 3 Inst. 48.]
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his will, by reason whereof lie died; (1) of the harlot, who laid her child un-
der leaves in an orchard, where a kite struck it and killed it; (m) and of the
parish officers, who shifted a child from parish to parish, till it died for want
of care and sustenance. (n) (17) So, too, if a man hath a beast that is used to do
mischief; and he knowing it, suffers it to go abroad, and it kills a man
even this is manslaughter in the owner: but if he had purposely turned it
loose, though barely to frighten people, and make what is called sport, it is with us
(as in the Jewish law) as much murder as if he had incited a bear or dog to
worry them.(o) If a physician or surgeon gives his patient a potion or plaster
to cure him, which, contrary to expectation, kills him, this is neither murder
nor manslaughter, but misadventure; and he shall not be punished crimin-
ally, however liable he might formerly have been to a civil action for neglect
or ignorance: (1))(18) but it hath been holden, that if it be not a regular physi-
cian or surgeon, who administers the medicine or performs the operation, it
is manslaughter at the least.(q) Yet Sir Matthew Hale very justly questions
the law of this determination.(r) (19) In order also to make the killing mur-
der, it is requisite that the party die within a year and a day after the
stroke received, or cause of death administered; in the computation of
which, the whole day upon which the hurt was done shall be reckoned the
first. (s)
Farther; the person killed must be "a reasonable creature in being, and
[*198] under the king's peace," at the time of the *killing. Therefore to kill
an alien, a Jew, or an outlaw, who are all under the king's peace and
protection, is as much murder as to kill the most regular-born Englishman ;
except he be an alien enemy in time of war.(t) To kill a child in its mother's
womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child be born alive,
and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems,
by the better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or gave them.(u)
But, as there is one case where it is difficult to prove the child's being born
alive, namely, in the case of the murder of bastard children by the unnatural
mother, it is enacted by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 27, that if any woman be delivered
of a child which if born alive should by law be a bastard; and endeavours pri-
vately to conceal its death, by burying the child or the like; the mother so
offending shall suffer death as in the case of murder, unless she (%in prove, by
one witness at least, that the child was actually born dead. This law, which
savours pretty strongly of severity, in making the concealment of the death
almost conclusive evidence of thle child's being murdered by the mother, is
nevertheless to be also met with in the criminal codes of many other nations of
Europe; as the Danes, the Swedes, and the French. (v) But I apprehend it has
(/) 1 Hawk. P. C. 78. (i) 1 Hal. P. C. 432. (n) Palm. 545. (o) ibid. 431.
(p) Mirr. e. 4. § 16. See book III, page 122. (q) Britt. c. 5. 4 Inst. 251. (r) 1 Hal. P. C. 430.
(s) 1 Hawk. P. C. 79. (t) 3 Inst. 50. 1 Hal. P. C. 433.
(t) 3 Inst. 50. 1 Hawk. P. C. 80, but see I Hal. P. C. 433. (v) See Barrington on the statutes, 425.
(17) [Or if a master refuse his apprentice necessary food or sustenance, or treat hin with
such continued harshness and severity as his death is occasioned thereby, the law will imply
malice, and the offence will be murder. Leach, 127; 2 Camp. 650; and see 1 Russ. 621. If
a prisoner die by the cruelty or neglect of the gaoler, or, in legal language, by duress of im-
prisonment, the party actually offending is criminal in this degree. Fost. 321; and see 2 Stra.
856; 2 Lord Raym. 1578; Fost. 322. Laying noisome and poisonous filth at a man's door,
which kills him by corrupting the air which he breathes, will be murder. 1 Hale, 432.]
On this subject see 2 Bish. Cr. L. §§ 599-610; Roscoe Cr. Ev. §§ 665-670; Ann v. State, 11
Humph. 159.
(18) [Such persons are clearly still liable to a civil action, where gross negligence or igno-
rance can be proved: Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359; Seare v. Prentice, 8 East, 348; and it would
also be a good defence to an action by an apothecary on his bill, that he had treated his patient
ignorantly or improperly. Kannea v. M'Mullen, Peake, 59.]
To the same effect, see Piper v. Menifee, 12 B. Monr. 465; Leighton a. Sargeant, 11 Fost.
119; Simonds v. Henry, 39 Me. 155 (case of a dentist).
(19) See also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134; Rice v. State, 8 M1o. 561; Rex V. Wil-
liamson, 3 C. and P. 635; Rex v. Long, 4 id. 398; Rex v. Spiller, 5 id. 333.
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of late years been usual with us in England, upon trials for this offence, to
require some sort of presumptive evidence that the child was born alive, before
the other constrained presumption (that the child whose death is concealed
was therefore killed by its parent) is admitted to convict the prisoner.(20)
Lastly, the killing must be committed with malice aforethought, to make it the
crime of murder. This is the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder
from other killing: and this malice prepense, malitia prcecogitata, is not so
properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design
in general: the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; (w) un dis-
position d faire un male chose; (x) and it may be either express or implied in
law. Express *malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and [*1991
formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is evidenced by
external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as lying in wait,
antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some
bodily harm.(y) This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties
meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their duty as gentlemen
and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their
fellow creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power either
divine or human, but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man ;
and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder on
them, and on their seconds also.(z) (21) Yet it requires such a degree of passive
valour to combat the dread of even undeserved contempt, arising from the false
notions of honour too generaly received in Europe, that the strongest prohibi-
tions and penalties of the law will never be entirely effectual to eradicate this
unhappy custom; till a method be found out of compelling the original aggres-
sor to make some other satisfaction to the affronted party, which the world
shall esteem equally reputable, as that which is now given at the hazard of the
life and fortune, as well of the person insulted, as of him who hath given the
insult.(22) Also, if even upon a sudden provocation one beats another in a
cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did not intend his death,
yet he is guilty of murder by express malice; that is, by an express evil design,
the genuine sense of malitia. As, when a park-keeper tied a boy that was steal-
ing wood, to a horse's tail, and dragged him along the park; when a master
(w) Foster, 256. (x) 2 Roll. Rep. 461. (y) I Hal. P. C. 451. (z) 1 Hawk. P. C. 82.
(20) Statute 21 James I, c. 27, is repealed. The present law on the subject of this para-
graph is 24 and 25 Vie. c. 100.
(21) [Wherever two persons in cold blood meet and fight on a precedent quarrel, and one
of them is killed, the other is guilty of murder, and cannot excuse himself by alleging that
he was first struck by the deceased; or that he had often declined to meet him, and was pre-
vailed upon to do it by his importunity; or that his only intent was to vindicate his reputa-
tion; or that he meant not to kill, but only to disarm his adversary: for as he deliberately
engaged in an act in defiance of the law, he must at his peril abide the consequences. 1 Raw.
P. C. c. 31, § 21; 1 Bulstr. 86, 87; 2 id. 147; Crom. 22, 26; 1 Rol. Rep. 360; 3 Bulstr. 171;
1 Hale, P. C. 48. Therefore, if two persons quarrel over night, and appoint to fight the next
day, or quarrel in the morning, and agree to fight in the afternoon, or such a considerable
time after, by which, in common intendment, it must be presumed that the blood was cooled,
and then they meet and fight, and one kill the other, he is guilty of murder. 1 Haw. P. C. c.
31, § 22; 3 Inst. 51; 1 Hale, P. C. 48; Kel. 56; 1 Lev. 180.]
(22) [See the law of duelling fully stated 3 East Rep. 581 ; 6 East, 464; 2 Bar. and Ald.
462; Reg. v. Young, 8 C. and P. 644; Reg. v. Cuddy, 1 C. and K. 210.]
See the case of Commonwealth v. Webster 5 Cush. 295, for the meaning of "malice afore-
thought." Also State v. Martin, 2 Ired. 101; Whiteford v. Commonwealth, 6 Rand. 721; Dale
v. State, 10 Yerg. 551; Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43; U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gratt. 624. The
words "premeditated design," it has been held, mean in legal effect the same as "malice
aforethought." McDaniel v. State, 8 S. and M. 401. Whether it is legally with malice afore-
thought when one is killed upon the sudden impulse of passion without previous design, com-
pare Commonwealth a. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, and People v. Austin, 1 Park. C. R. 154, with
Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671, and Bevins v. State, 6 Eng. 455, and the cases referred to
in each.
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corrected his servant with an iron bar; and a schoolmaster stamped on his
scholar's belly; so that each of the sufferers died: these were justly held to be
murders, because the correction being excessive, and such as could not proceed
but from a bad heart, it was equivalent to a deliberate act of slaughter.(a) (23)
[*200] Neither shall he be guilty of a less crime, who kills another *in conse-
quence of such a wilful act as shows him to be an enemy to all man-
kind in general; as going deliberately, and with intent to do mischief,(b) upon
a horse used to strike, or coolly discharging a gun among a multitude of
eople.(c) So, if a man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and does kill
im, it is murder, although he knew him not; for this is universal malice. And,
if two or more come together to do an unlawful act against the king's peace, of
which the probable consequence might be bloodshed, as to beat a man, to com-
mit a riot, or to rob a park: and one of them kills a man; it is murder in them
all, because of the unlawful act, the nalitiaprcocogitata, or evil intended before-
hand.(d) (24.)
Also, in many cases where no malice is expressed, the law will imply it, as,
where a man wilfully poisons another: in such a deliberate act the law presumes
(a) 1 Hal. P. C. 454, 473, 474. (b) Lord Raym. 143. (c) 1 Hawk. P. C. 7.4. (d) Rbid. 84.
(23) [Homicide may be and is often extenuated by the circumstances of a mutual contest
arising from the spur of the occasion, where no undue advantage is either sought or taken
by either of the parties. See 5 Burr. 2793, and cases cited; 1 East, P. C. 241 to 246. And in
this case, it is of no consequence from whom the first provocation arises. 1 Hale, 456. But
if one with his sword drawn makes a pass at another whose sword is undrawn, and a combat
ensues, if the former be killed, it will only be manslaughter in the latter; but if the latter
fall, it will be murder in the former, for by making the pass before his adversary's sword was
drawn, he evinced an intention not to fight with but to destroy him. Kel. 61; Hawk. c. 31, s.
33, 34 (a). And where a man upon occasion of some angry words, threw a bottle at the head
of his opponent and immediately drew, and when his adversary returned the bottle, stabbed
him; this was holden to be murder in him, because he drew previous to the first aggression.
Kel. 119; 2 Ld. Raym. 1489. So if two bailiffs arrest a man, and he abuse and threaten and
strike them, and bring pistols, declaring that he will not be forced from his house, and on
high words arising between them, and on the bailiff's being struck and provoked, they fall on
him and kill him, they will be guilty of manslaughter only. 6 Hargr. St. Tr. 195; Fost. 292,
294. And where, on an affray in a street, a soldier ran to the combatants, and in his way a
woman struck him in the face with an iron patten and drew a great deal of blood, on which
he struck her on the breast with the pommel of his sword; and on her running away, imme-
diately followed and stabbed her in the back; he was holden to be guilty simply of felonious
homicide : Fost. 292 ; see 5 Burr. 2794 ; and where after mutual blows between the prisoner
and the deceased, the prisoner knocked down the deceased, and after he was upon the ground
stamped upon his stomach and belly with great force, it was held manslaughter only. Russ.
and Ry. C. C. 166. On a quarrel between a party of keel-men and soldiers, one of the latter
drew his sword to protect himself and his comrades from the assaults of the mob, and killed
a person dressed like one of the former, whom he mistook for one of the keel-men, and this
was held to be no more than manslaughter. Brown's Case, 1 Leach, 148. If A stands with
an offensive weapon in the door-way of a room, wrongfully to prevent T. S. from leaving
it, and others from entering, and C, who has a right to the room, struggles with him to get
his weapon from him, upon which D, a comrade of A, stabs C, it will be murder in D if C
dies. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 228. See a late case, where the judges, entertaining doubts as to
whether the prisoner who killed another in an affray was guilty of murder, recommended
him to a pardon. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 43. Where, after mutual provocation, the deceased
and his opponent struggled, and in the course of the contest the former received his mortal
wounds from a knife which the latter had previously in his hand in use, though the jury
found the prisoner guilty of murder, the judges held the conviction wrong, and recommended
him for a pardon. 1 Leach, 151. But in no case will previous provocation avail, if it was
sought for by the act of the slayer, to afford him a pretence for gratifying his own malice.
Nor will it alter the case, that blows had previously been given, if they evidently left traces
of a deadly revenge, which seeks an opportunity of indulging itself by provoking a second
contest to cover and excuse a deliberate attempt on the life of its object. 1 East, P. C.
239,240.]
(24) [Where in an act which is not malum in se, but malum prohibitum (it being prohibited,
except to persons of a certain description), as shooting at game, an unqualified person will
not be more guilty, if in sbooting he accidently kills a human being, than one who is
qualified. 1 Hale, 475; Fost. 259.]
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malice, though no particular enmity can be proved.(e) And if a man kills
another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable, provocation, the law
implies malice; for no person, unless of an abandoned heart, would be guilty
of such an act, upon a slight or no apparent cause. No affront, by words o-r
gestures only, is a sufficient provocation, so as to excuse or extenuate such acts
of violence as manifestly endanger the life of another.(f) But if the person so
provoked had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him in such a manner
as showed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him, the law so far considers
the provocation of contumelious behaviour as to adjudge it only manslaughter,
and not murder. (g) In like manner, if one kills an officer of justice, either civil
or criminal, in the execution of his duty, or any of his assistants, endeavouring
to conserve the peace, or any private person, endeavouring to suppress an affray
or apprehend a felon, knowing his authority or the intention with which he
interposes, the law will imply malice, and the killer shall be guilty of murder.(h)
And if one intends to do another felony, *and undesignedly kills a man, [*201]
this is also murder.(i) Thus, if one shoots at A and misses him, but
kills B, this is murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which the law
transfers from one to the other. The same is the case where one lays poison for
A; and B, against whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it, and it
kills him; this is likewise murder.(') So also if one gives a woman with child
a medicine to procure abortion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman,
this is murder in the person who gave it.(k) It were endless to go through all
the cases of homicide which have been adjudged, either expressly or impliedly,
malicious: these, therefore, may suffice as a specimen; and We may take it for
a general rule, that all homicide is malicious, and, of course, amounts to murder,
unless where j fustified by the command or permission of the law; excused on
the account of accident or self-preservation; or alleviated into manslaughter,
by being either the involuntary consequence of some act, not strictly lawful, or
(if voluntary) occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation.
And all these circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation, it is incum-
bent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction- of the court and jury:
the latter of whom are to decide whether the circumstances alleged are proved
to have actually existed; the former, how far they extend to take away or miti-
gate guilt. For all homicide is presumed to be malicious, until the contrary
appeareth upon evidence.(l) (25)
The punishment of murder, and that of manslaughter, was formerly one and
the same; both having the benefit of clergy; so that none but unlearned per-
sons, who least knew the guilt of it, were put to death for this enormous
crime. (m) But now by several statutes, (n) the benefit of clergy is taken
away from murderers through malice prepense, their abettors, procurers, and
counsellors. In. atrocious cases it was frequently usual for the court to direct
the murderer, after execution, to be hung upon a gibbet in chains near the
place *where the fact was committed: but this was no part of the legal [*202]
judgment; and the like is still sometimes practised in the case of I
notorious thieves. This, being quite contrary to the express command of the
Mosaical law, (o) seems to have been borrowed from the civil law: which, be-
sides the terror of the example, gives also another reason for this practice, viz.:
that it is a comfortable sight to the relations and friends of the deceased.(pl
(e) I Hal. P. C. 455. () 1 Hawk. P. C. 82. 1 Hal. P. C. 455, 456. (q) Fost. 291.
(A) 1 Hal. P. C. 457. Fost. 808, &c. (i) 1 Hal. P. C. 465. (j) Ibid. 466. (k) Ibid. 429. (1) Fost. 2 .
(m) 1 Hal. P. C. 450. (n) 23 Hen. ViII, c. 1. 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 4.
(o) "The body of a malefactor shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him
that day that the land be not defiled." Dent. xxi, 23.
(p) "Kamosos latrones, in his lo es, ub grassati sunt,furcafigendos placuit: vt, et consectu deterreantur alit,et sotatio sit cognatis interemptorum eodem loco poena reddita, in quo latrones homicidiafecissent." lf. 48, 19,
2s,5S15.
(25) As the majority of homicides are not, in fact, -malicious, but occur through mis-
adventure, or under circumstances which would reduce the offence to manslaughter, a legal
presumption of malice seems inconsistent with the general doctrines of the criminal law, as
well as with humanity. On this subject, the reader is referred to the Review of the Trial of
Prof. Webster, by Hon. Joel Parker, North American Review, No. 72, p. 178.
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But now in England, it is enacted by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, that the judge,
before whom any person is found guilty of wilful murder, shall pronounce sen-
tence immediately after conviction, unless he sees cause to postpone it; and
shall, in passing sentence, direct him to be executed on the next day but one
(unless the same shall be Sunday and then on the Monday following), and that
his body be delivered to the surgeons to be dissected and anatomized: (q) and
that the judge may direct his body to be afterwards hung in chains, but in no-
wise to be buried without dissection. And, during the short but awful interval
between sentence and execution, the prisoner shall be kept alone, and sustained
with only bread and water. But a power is allowed to the judge, upon good
and sufficient cause, to respite the execution, and relax the other restraints of
this act.(26)
By the Roman law, parricide, or the murder of one's parents or children,
was punished in a much severer manner than any other kind of homicide.
After being scourged, the delinquents were sewed up in a leathern sack, with a
live dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and so cast into the sea.(r) Solon, it is
true, in his laws, made none against parricide; apprehending it impossible that
any one should be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity.(s) And the Persians,
according to Herodotus, entertained the same notion, when they adjudged all
persons who killed their reputed parents to be bastards. And, upon some such
[*203] reason as this, we must account for *the omission of an exemplary pun-
ishment for this crime in our English laws; which treat it no otherwise
than as simple murder, unless the child was also the servant of his parent.(t)
For, though the breach of natural relation is unobserved, yet the breach of
civil or ecclesiastical connexions, when coupled with murder, denominates it a
new offence, no less than a species of treason, called parvaproditio, or petit
treason: which however is nothing else but an aggravated degree of murder ;(u)
although, on account of the violation of private allegiance, it is stigmatized as
an inferior species of treason.(v) And thus, in the ancient Gothic constitution,
we find the breach both of natural and civil relations ranked in the same class
with crimes against the state and the sovereign.(w)
Petit treason, (27) according to the statute 25 Edw. III, c. 2, may happen
three ways: by a servant killing his master, a wife her husband, or an ecclesi-
astical person (either secular or regular) his superior, to whom he owes faith
and obedience. A servant who kills his master, whom he has left, upon a
grudge conceived against him during his service, is guilty of petit treason: for
the traitorous intention was hatched while the relation subsisted between them;
and this is only an execution of that intention.(x) So, if a wife be divorced
a mensa et thoro, still the vinculum matrimonii subsists; and if she kills such
divorced husband, she is a traitress.(y) And a clergyman is understood to owe
canonical obedience to the bishop who ordained him, to him in whose diocese
he is beneficed, and also to the metropolitan of such suffragan or diocesan
bishop: and therefore to kill any of these is petit treason.(z) As to the rest,
whatever has been said, or remains to be observed hereafter, with respect to wil-
ful murder, is also applicable to the crime of petit treason, which is no other
[*204] than murder in * its most odious degree: except that the trial shall be
24 as in cases of high treason, before the improvements therein made by
the statutes of William III.(a) But a person indicted of petit treason may be
acquitted thereof, and found guilty of manslaughter or murder :(b) and in such
(q) Fost. 107. (r) Ff. 41, 9. 9. (s) Cic. pro S. Rosejo, J 25. (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 380.
(u) Foster, 107, 324, 336. (v) See page 75.
(w) " Onnium gravissima censetur visfacta ab incolis in patriam, subditis in rem, liberis in parentes, mariNt8
in uxores (et vice versa), servis in dominos, aut etiam ab homine in semet ipsam. Stiern. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 3.
(x) I Hawk. P. C. 89. 1 Hal. P. C. 380. (y) 1 Hal. P. C. 381. (z) l Ud. (a) Fost. 337.
(b) Foster, 106. 1 Hal. P. C. 378. 2 Hal. P. C. 184.
(26) The act 25 Geo. II, c. 87, is repealed, and by 6 and 7 Win. IV, c. 30, sentence of death
in cases of murder was made the same as in other capital cases.
(27) Petit treason is unknown to the law of the United States, and was abolished in Eng.
land by statute 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 2.
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case it should seem that two witnesses are not necessary, as in case of petit
treason they are. Which crime is also distinguished from murder in its pun-
ishment.
The punishment of petit treason, in a man, is to be drawn and hanged, and
in a woman to be drawn and burnt: (c) the idea of which latter punishment
seems to have been handed down to us by the laws of the ancient Druids, which
condemned a woman to be burnt for murdering her husband ; (d ) and it is now the
usual punishment for all sorts of treason committed by those of the female
sex.(e)(28) Persons guilty of petit treason were first debarred the benefit of clergy,
by statute 12 Hen. VII, c. 7, which has been since extended to their aiders, abet-
tors and counsellors, by statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 4.
CHAPTER XV.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS.
HAVING in the preceding chapter considered the principal crime, or public
wrong, that can be committed against a private subject, namely, by destroying
his life; I proceed now to inquire into such other crimes and misdemeanors,
as more peculiarly affect the security of his person, while living.
Of these some are felonies, and in their nature capital; others are simple
misdemeanors, and punishable with a lighter animadversion. Of the felonies,
the first is that of mayhem.
1. Mayhem, mayhemium, was in part considered in the preceding book, (a) as
a civil injury: but it is also looked upon in a criminal light by the law, being all
atrocious breach of the king's peace, and an offence tending to deprive him of
the aid and assistance of his subjects. For mayhem is properly defined to be,
as we may remember, the violently depriving another of the use of such of his
members as may render him the less able in fighting, either to defend himself, or to
annoy his adversary. (b) And therefore the cutting off, or disabling, or weakening
a man's hand or finger, or striking out his eye or foretooth, or depriving him o?
those parts the loss of which in all animals abates their courage, are held to
*be mayhems. But the cutting off his ear, or nose, or the like, are not [*206]
held to be mayhems at common law; because they do not weaken but
only disfigure him.
By the ancient law of England he that maimed any man, whereby he lost
any part of his body, was sentenced to lose the like part; membrum pro mem-
bro; (c) which is still the law in Sweden. (d) But this went afterwards out of
use: partly because the law of retaliation, as was formerly shown, (e) is at best
an inadequate rule of punishment; and partly because upon a repetition of the
offence the punishment could not be repeated. So that, by the common law, as
it for a long time stood, mayhem was only punishable with fine and imprison-
ment; (f) unless perhaps the offence of mayhem by castration, which all our
old writers held to be felony: "et sequitur aliquando pcena capitalis, aliquando
perpetuum exilium, cum omnium bonorum ademptione." (g) And this, although
the mayhem was committed upon the highest provocation. (h)
(e) I Hal. P. C. 382. 3 Inst. 811. (d) Cesar de bel. Gall. 1. 6, e. 18. (e) See page 93.
(a) See book 1I, page 121. (b) Britt. 1. 1, e. 25. 1 Hawk. P. C. 111.
(c) 3 Inst. 118.-Mes, si la pleynte soit faite de femme qu'avera tolls a home ses membres, en tiel ease perdra ks
fenm Ia une meynparjugement, corm lernembre dount te avera trespasse. (Brit. c. 25.)
(d) Stiernhook de jure Sueon. 1. 3, t. 3. (e) See page 12.
(f) 1 Hawk. P. C. 112. (g) Brac.fol. 144.
(h) Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst. 62) has transcribed a record of Henry the Third's time (Claus. 13 Hen. r11 m. 9),
by which a gentleman of Somersetshire and his wife appear to have been apprehended and committed to prison,
being indicted for dealing thus with John, the monk, who was caught in adultery with the wife.
(28) It was abolished by 30 Geo. III, c. 48. The punishment is now death by hanging.
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But subsequent statutes have put the crime and punishment of mayhem
more out of doubt. For first, by statute 5 Henry IV, c. 5, to remedy a mis-
chief that then prevailed of beating, wounding, or robbing a man, and then
cutting out his tongue, or putting out his eyes, to prevent him from being an
evidence against them, this offence is declared to be felony, if done of malice
prepense; that is, as Sir Edward Coke (i) explains it, voluntarily, and of set
purpose, though done upon a sudden occasion. Next, in order of time, is the
statute of 37 Hen. VIII, c. 6, which directs, that if a man shall maliciously and
[*207] unlawfully cut off the ear of any of the *king's subjects, he shall not
only forfeit treble damages to the party grieved, to be recovered by action
of trespass at common law, as a civil satisfaction; but also 101. by way of fine
to the king, which was his criminal amercement. The last statute, but by far
the most severe and effectual of all, is that of 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 1, called the
Coventry Act; being occasioned by an assault on Sir John Coventry in the
street, and slitting his nose, in revenge (as was supposed) for some obnoxious
words uttered by him in parliament. By this statute it is enacted, that if any
person shall, of malice aforethought and by lying in wait, unlawfully cut out or
disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off a nose or lip, or cut off
or disable any limb or member of any other person, with intent to maim or dis-
figure him; such person, his counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall be guilty
of felony without benefit of clergy. (k)
Thus much for the felony of mayhem: to which may be added the offence of
wilfully and maliciously shooting at any person in any dwelling-house or other
place; an offence, of which the probable consequence may be either killing or
*208] maiming him. This, though no such evil consequence *ensues, is made
[ 8 felony without benefit of clergy by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, and thereupon
one Arnold was convicted in 1723 for shooting at Lord Onslow; but, being half
a madman, was never executed, but confined in prison, where he died about
thirty years after.(1)
II. The second offence, more immediately affecting the personal security of
individuals, relates to the female part of his majesty's subjects; being that of
their forcible abduction and marriage; which is vulgarly called stealing an heiress.
For by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 2, it is enacted, that if any person shall for lucre
take any woman, being maid, widow or wife, and having substance either in
goods or lands, or being heir apparent to her ancestors, contrary to her will; and
afterwards she be married to such misdoer, or by his consent to another, or
defiled; such person, his procurers and abettors, and such as knowingly receive
such woman, shall be deemed principal felons; and by statute 39 Eliz. e. 9, the
benefit of clergy is taken away from all such felons, who shall be principals,
procurers, or accessories before the fact.(2)
(i) 3 Inst. 62.
(R) On this statute Mr. Coke, a gentleman of Suffolk. and one Woodburn, a laborer, were indicted in 1722;
Coke for hiring and abetting Woodburn, and Woodburn for the actual fact of slitting the nose of Mr. Crispe,
Coke's brother-in-law. The case was somewhat singular. The murder of Crispe was intended, and he was left
for dead, being terribly hacked and disfigured with a hedge-bill; but he recovered. Now the bare intent to
murder is no felony; but to disfigure with an intent to disfigure, is made so by this statute; on which they were
therefore indicted. And Coke, who was a disgrace to the profession of the law, had the effrontery to rest his
defence upon this point, that the assault was not committed with an intent to disfigure, but with an intent to
murder; and therefore not within the statute. But the court held, that if a man attacks another to murder
him with such an instrument as a hedge-bill,which cannot but endanger the disfiguringhim; and in such attack
happens not to kill, but only to disfigure him; he may be indicted on this statute; and it shall be left to the
jury to determine whether it were not a design to murder by disfiguring, and consequently a malicious intent
to disfigure as well as to murder. Accordingly the jury found them guilty of such previous intent to disfigure,
in order to effect the principal intent to murder, and they were both condemned and executed. (State Trials,
VI, 212.)
(1) All the previous statutes, so far as they relate to offences against the person, were
repealed by 7 Win. IV, and 1 Vic. c. 85. For the most recent revision of the law on this
subject, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. Penal servitude for life is now the extreme penalty.
As to the proper mode of charging mayhem, see Chick v. State, 7 Humph. 161 ; State v. Briley,
8 Port. Ala. 472.
(2) This offence is now punishable under statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. The extreme penalty
is fourteen years' penal servitude. The guilty party is made incapable, by the statute, of taking
any estate or interest in the property of the woman married, but the property, on his convic-
tion, is to be settled as the court of chancery may appoint.
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In the construction of this statute it hath been determined: 1. That the indict-
ment must allege that the taking was for lucre, for such are the words of the
itatute.(l) 2. In order to show this, it must appear that the woman has substance,
either real or personal, or is an heir apparent.(m) 3. It must appear that she
was taken away against her will. 4. It must also appear that she was afterwards
married or defiled. And though possibly the marriage or defilement might be
by her subsequent consent, being won thereunto by flatteries after the taking,
yet this is felony, if the first taking were against her will: (n) and so vica versa,
if the woman be originally taken away with her own consent, yet if she afterwards
refuse to continue with the offender, and be forced against her will, she may
from that time as properly *be said to be taken against her will, as if she [*209]
never had given any consent at all; for till the force was put upon her,
she was in her own power.(o) It is held that a woman thus taken away and
married may be sworn and give evidence against the offender, though he is her
husband de facto; contrary to the general rule of law; because he is no husband
de jure, in case the actual marriage was also against her will.(p) In cases,
indeed, where the actual marriage is good, by the consent of the inveigled wo-
man obtained after her forcible abduction, Sir Matthew Hale seems to question
how far her evidence should be allowed: but other authorities (q) seem to agree,
that it should even then be admitted; esteeming it absurd, that the offender
should thus take advantage of his own wrong, and that the very act of marriage,
which is a principal ingredient of his crime, should (by a forced construction
of law) be made use of to stop the mouth of the most material witness against
him.
An inferior degree of the same kind of offence, but not attended with force, is
punished by the statutes 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 8, which enacts, that if any person,
above the age of fourteen, unlawfully shall convey or take away any, woman
child unmarried (which is held (r) to extend to bastards as well as to legitimate
children), within the age of sixteen years, from the possession and against the
will of the father, mother, guardians, or governors, he shall be imprisoned for
two years, or fined at the discretion of the justices; and if he deflowers such
maid or woman child, or without the consent of parents contracts matrimony
with her, he shall be imprisoned five years, or fined at the discretion of the
justices, and she shall forfeit all her lands to her next of kin, during the life of
her said husband. So that as these stolen marriages, under the age of sixteen,
were usually upon mercenary views, this act, besides punishing the seducer,
wisely remov'ed the temptation. But this latter part of the act is now rendered
*almost useless, by provisions of a very different kind, which make the r*A1
marriage totally void, (s) in the statute 26 Geo. II, c. 33. (3) t
III. A third offence, against the female part also of his majesty's subjects, but
attended with greater aggravation than that of forcible marriage, is the crime of
rape, raptus mulierum, or the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against
her will. This, by the Jewish law, (t) was punished with death, in case the
damsel was betrothed to another man; and in case she was not betrothed, then
a heavy fine of fifty shekels was to be paid to the damsel's father, and she was to
be the wife of the ravisher all the days of his life; without that power of divorce,
which was in general permitted by the Mosaic law.
The civil law (u) punishes the crime of ravishment with death and confisca-
tion of goods: under which it includes both the offence of forcible abduction, or
taking away a woman from her friends, of which we last spoke: and also the
present offence of forcibly dishonouring them; either of which, w*ithout the other,
is in that law sufficient to constitute a capital crime. Also, the stealing away a
() 1 Hawk. P. C. 110. (m) I Hal. P. C. 660. 1 Hawk. P. C. 109. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 660.
(o) 1 Hawk. P. C. 110. (p) 1 Hal. P. C. 661. (q) Cro. Car. 488. 3 Keb. 193. State Trials, V, 455.
(r) Stra. 1162. (8) See book I, page 437, &c. (t) Deut. xxii, 25. (u) Cod. 9, tit. 13.
(3) The act 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 8, is repealed, and the subject of this paragraph is covered
by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. See Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 6th ed. 244.
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woman from her parents or guardians, and debauching her, is equally penal by
the emperor's edict, whether she consent or is forced: "sive volentibus, sive
nolentibus mulieribus, tale facinus fuerit perpetratum." And this, in order to
take away from women every opportunity of offending in this way: whom the
Roman law supposes never to go astray, without the seduction and arts of the
other sex: and therefore, by. restraining and making so highly penal the solicita-
tions of the men, they meant to secure effectually the honour of the women.
" Si enim ipsi raptores metu, vel atrocitate penwv, ab hujusmodi facinore se
temperaverint, nulli mulieri, sive volenti, sive nolenti, peccandi locus relinquetur;
quia hoc ipsum velle mulierum, ab insidiis nequissimi hominis, qui meditatur
rapinam, inducitur. *Nisi etenim earn solicitaverit, nisi odiosis arti-
bus circurnvenerit, non faciet earn velle in tantum dedecus sese prodere."
But our English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas of the honour
of either sex, as to lay the blame of a mutual fault upon one of the transgressors
only: and therefore makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime of rape, that it
must be against the woman's will.
Rape was punished by the Saxon laws, particularly those of King Athelstan, (w)
with death: which was also agreeable to the old Gothic or Scandinavian consti-
tution. (x) But this was afterwards thought too hard: and in its stead another
severe but not capital punishment was inflicted by William the Conqueror;
viz., castration and loss of eyes; (y) which was continued till after Bracton
wrote, in the reign of Henry the Third. But, in order to prevent malicious
acctsations, it was then the law (and, it seems, still continues to be so in appeals
of rape),(z) that the woman should immediately after, "dum recensfuerit male-
ficium, go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons
of the injury she has suffered: and afterwards should acquaint the high constable
of the hundred, the coroners, and the sheriff with the outrage.(a) This seems to
correspond in some degree with the laws of Scotland and Arragon,(b) which re-
quire that complaint must be made within twenty-four hours: though afterwards,
by statute Westm. 1, c. 13, the time of limitation in England was extended to forty
days. At present there is no time of limitation fixed: for as it is usually now pun-
ished by indictment at the suit of the king, the maxim of law takes place, that nul-
lum tempus occurrit regi; but the jury will rarely give credit to a stale complaint.
During the former period also it was held for law, (c) that the woman (by con-
sent of the judge and her parents) might redeem the offender from the execution
of his sentence, by accepting him for her husband; if he also was willing to
agree to the exchange, but not otherwise.
[*212] *In the 3 Edw. I, by the statute Westm. 1, c. 13, the punishment of rape
was much mitigated; the offence itself of ravishing a damsel within age
(that is, twelve years old), either with her consent or without, or of any other
woman against her will, being reduced to a trespass, if not prosecuted by appeal
within forty days, and subjecting the offender only to two years' imprisonment,
and a fine at the king's will. But this lenity being productive of the most terri-
ble consequences, it was in ten years afterwards, 13 Edw. I, found necessary to
make the offence of forcible rape felony by statute Westm. 2, c. 34. And by
statute 18 Eliz. c. 7, it is made felony without benefit of clergy; as is also the
abominable wickedness of carnally knowing and abusing any woman child under
the age of ten years; in which case the consent or non-consent is immaterial, as
by reason of her tender years she is incapable of judgment and discretion. Sir
Matthew Hale is indeed of opinion that such profligate actions committed on
an infant under the age of twelve years, the age of female discretion by the com-
mon law, either with or without consent, amount to rape and felony: as well
since as before the statute'of Queen Elizabeth; (d) but that law has in general
been held only to extend to infants under ten: though it should seem that
(w) Bracton, 1. 3, C. 28. (x) Stiernh. dejure Sueon. 1. 3, c. 2, (y) LL. ull. Coq. c. 19.
(z) 1 Hal. P. C. 631. (a) Glan. 1. 14, c. 6. Bract. 1. 3, c. 28. (b) Barrington, 142.
(c) Glanv. 1. 14, c. 6. Bract. 1. 3, c. 28. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 631.
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damsels between ten and twelve are still under the protection of the statute
Westm. 1, the law with respect to their seduction not having been altered by
either of the subsequent statutes.(4)
A male infant, under the age of fourteen years, is presumed by law incapa-
ble to commit a rape, and therefore it seems cannot be found guilty of it. For
though in other felonies malitia supplet Wtatem, as has in some cases been shown;
yet, as to this particular species of felony, the law supposes an imbecility of body
as well as mind.(e) (5)
The civil law seems to suppose a prostitute or common harlot incapable of any
injuries of this kind: (f) not allowing *any punishment for violating [*213]
the chastity of her who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least hath
no regard to it. But the law of England does not judge so hardly of offenders,
as to cut off all opportunity of retreat even from common strumpets, and to
treat them as never capable of amendment. It therefore holds it to be felony
to force even a concubine or harlot; because the woman may have forsaken that
unlawful course of life: (g) for, as Bracton well observes, (h) "licet meretrix
fuerit antea, certe tune temporis non fuit, cum reclamando nequitice e'.us con-
sentire noluit.(6)
As to the material facts requisite to be given in evidence and proved upon
an indictment of rape, they are of such a nature, that though necessary to be
known and settled, for the conviction of the guilty and preservation of the
innocent, and therefore to be found in such criminal treatises as discourse
of these matters in detail, yet they are highly improper to be publicly discussed,
except only in a court of justice. I shall, therefore, merely add upon this head
a few remarks from Sir Matthew Hale: with regard to the competency and
credibility of witnesses; which may, salvo pudore, be considered.
And, first, the party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a
competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she
is to be believed, must be left to the jury upon the circumstances of fact that
concur in that testimony. For instance: if the witness be of good fame; if she
presently discovered the offence, and made search for the offender; if the party
accused fled for it; these and the like are concurring circumstances which give
greater probability to her evidence. But, on the other side, if she be of evil
fame, and stand unsupported by others; if she concealed the injury for any
considerable time after she had opportunity to complain; if the place where the
fact was alleged to be committed was where it was possible she might have been
heard, and she made no outcry; these and the *like circumstances carry [*214
a strong but not conclusive presumption that her testimony is false or
feigned.(7)
(e) Ibid. (f) Cod. 9, 9, 22. Ff. 47, 2, 89. (g) I Hal. P. C. 629. 1 Hawk. P. C. 106. (A) fol. 147.
(4) The punishment for rape, and also for carnal knowledge of a female child under ten
years of age, was reduced to transportation for life, by statute 4 and 5 Vic. c. 56, and now to
penal servitude or imprisonment. Statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.
(5) But a boy under the age of puberty, or a woman, or a husband in respect to his own
wife, may become guilty as principal in the second degree of this offence of rape. 2 Bish.
Cr. Law, § 948. In Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 880, it was held that a boy under fourteen
might be guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape. And see Williams v. State, 14
Ohio, 222.
(6) And whether she has forsaken it or not, she is entitled to the protection of the law.
See Wright v. State, 4 Humph. 194; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624. But her character may
have an important bearing on the credibility of her accusation.
(7) [But the rule respecting the time that elapses before the prosecutrix complains will not
apply where there is a good reason for the delay, as that she was under the control, or influ-
enced by fear, of her ravisher. 1 East, P. C. 445. And so all other general rules, as they are
deduced from circumstances, must yield, when they appear to be unsafe guides to the dis-
covery of truth. The state and appearance of the prosecutrix, marks of violence upon her
person, and the torn and disordered state of her dress, recently after the transaction, at the
time of complaint, are material circumstances, which are always admissible in evidence. See
2 Stark. 241. If the prosecutrix be an infant of tender years, the whole of her account recently
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Moreover, if the rape be charged to be committed on an infant under twelve
years of age, she may still be a competent witness, if she hath sense and under-
standing to know the nature and obligations of an oath; or even to be sensible
of the wickedness of telling a deliberate lie. Nay, though she hath not, it is
thought by Sir Matthew Hale(i) that she ought to be heard without oath, to
give the court information; and others have held, that what the child told her
mother, or other relations, may be given in evidence, since the nature of the case
admits frequently of no better proof. But it is now settled [Brazier's case,
before the twelve judges, P. 19 Geo. III], that no hearsay evidence can be given
of the declaration of a child who hath not capacity to be sworn, nor can such
child be examined in court without oath: and that there is no determinate age
at which the oath of a child ought either to be admitted or rejected. Yet, where
the evidence of children is admitted, it is much to be wished, in order to render
their evidence credible, that there should be some concurrent testimony of time,
place, and circumstances, in order to make out the fact; and that the convic-
tion should not be grounded singly on the unsupported accusation of an infant
under years of discretion. There may be, therefore, in many cases of this nature,
witnesses who are competent, that is, who may be admitted to be heard; and
yet, after being heard, may prove not to be credible, or such as the jury is bound
to believe. For one excellence of the trial by jury is, that the jury are triers
of the credit of the witnesses, as well as of the truth of the fact.
[*215] '* "It is true," says this learned judge, (j) "that rape is a most detest-
able crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished
with death; but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easy to be made,
hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though inno-
cent." He then relhtes two very extraordinary cases of malicious prosecution
for this crime, that bad happened within his own observation; and concludes
thus: "I mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials
of offences of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease
be imposed upon, without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the
offence many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation
that they are overhastily carried to the conviction of the person accused thereof,
by the confident testimony sometimes of false and malicious witnesses."
IV. What has been here observed, especially with regard to the manner of
proof, which ought to be more clear in proportion as the crime is the more
detestable, may be applied to another offence, of a still deeper malignity; the
infamous crime against nature, committed either with man or beast. A crime
which ought to be strictly and impartially proved, and then as strictly and
impartially punished. But it is an offence of so dark a nature, so easily charged,
and the negative so difficult to be proved, that the accusation should be clearly
made out: for, if false, it deserves a punishment inferior only to that of the
crime itself.
I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to
() 1 Hal. P. C. 634. U) 1 Hal. P. C. 635.
given seems to be admissible, for it is of the highest importance to ascertain the accuracy of
her recollection. 1 East, P. C. 443; Stark. on Evidence, part iv, 1268.]
The complaint made by the person alleged to have been ravished, immediately after the
occurrence, cannot be put in as independent evidence, to show who were the persons who
committed the offence, even though she be since deceased. Rex v. Megson, 9 C. and P. 420;
and see People v. McGee, 1 Denio, 19.
It has been held that rape is not committed where the woman's consent is obtained by fraud.
she at the time supposing the man to be her husband. Rex v. Jackson, Russ. and Ry. 487;
Reg. v. Saunders, 8 C. and P. 265; Reg. v. Williams, id. 286; State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765;
Wyatt v. State, 2 Swan, 394. But this has been doubted. People V. Metcalf, 1 Wheel. C. C.
378 and note, 381; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54. Carnal knowledge of the person of a
woman, unaccompanied with any circumstance of force or fraud, is not rape, though the
woman may have been at the time mentally incompetent to give consent. Croswell v. People
13 Mich. 427.
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dwell any longer upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature. It will be more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy
of our English law, which treats it, in its very indictments, as a crime not fit to
be named: "peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non nominandum."(k)
A taciturnity observed *likewise by the edict of Constantius and Con- *[216]
stans:(l) "ubi scelus est id, quod non proficit scire, jubemus insurgere k[2 6
leges, armari jura gladio ultore, ut exquisitis ptvnis subdantur infames, qui sunt,
vel qui futuri sunt rei." Which leads me to add a word concerning its punish-
ment.
This the voice of nature and of reason, and the express law of God,(m) deter-
mined to be capital. Of which we have a signal instance, long before the Jew-
ish dispensation, by the destruction of two cities by fire from heaven; so that
this is an universal, not merely a provincial precept. And our ancient law in
some degree imitated this punishment, by commanding such miscreants to be
burnt to death; (n) though Fleta (o) says they should be buried alive; either
of which punishments was indifferently used for this crime among the ancient
Goths.(p) But now the general punishment of all felonies is the same, namely,
by hanging; and this offence (being in the times of popery only subject to ec-
clesiastical censures) was made felony without benefit of clergy by statute 25
Hen. VIII, c. 6, revived and confirmed by 5 Eliz. c. 17. And the rule of law
herein is that if both are arrived at years of discretion, agentes et consentientes
pari pcena plectantur. (q) (8)
These are all the felonious offences more immediately against the personal
security of the subject. The inferior offences or misdemeanors, that fall
under this head, are assaults, batteries, wounding, false imprisonment, and kid-
napping. (9)
V. VI. VII. With regard to the nature of the three first of these offences in
general, I have nothing further to add to what has already been observed in the
preceding book of these Commentaries; (r) when we considered them as private
wrongs, or civil injuries, for which a satisfaction or remedy is given to the party
aggrieved. But, taken in a public light as a *breach of the king's [*217l
peace, an affront to his government, and a damage done to his subjects, k ]
they are also indictable and punishable with fines and imprisonment; or with
other ignominious corporal penalties, where they are committed with any very
atrocious design.(s) As in case of an assault with an intent to murder, or with an
intent to commit either of the crimes last spoken of; for which intentional as-
saults, in the two last cases, indictments are much more usual than for the abso-
lute perpetration of the facts themselves, on account of the difficulty of proof;
or, when both parties are consenting to an unnatural attempt, it is usual not to
charge any assault ; but that one of them laid hands on the other with intent to
commit, and that the other permitted the same with intent to suffer the com-
mission of, the abominable crime before mentioned. And, in all these cases,
besides heavy fine and imprisonment, it is usual to award judgment of the
pillory.(10)
There is also one species of battery, more atrocious and penal than the rest,
which is the beating of a clerk in orders, or clergyman; on account of the
respect and reverence due to his sacred character, as the minister and ambassa-
dor of peace. Accordingly it is enacted by the statute called articuli cleri, 9
Edw. II, c. 3, that if any person lay violent hands upon a clerk, the amends for
(k) See In Rot. Part. 50 Edw. IM, n. 58, a complaint, that a Lombard did commit the sin, "that was not to be
named." 12 Rep. 37.
(1) Cod. 9. 9. 31 (m) Levit. xx, 13, 15. (n) Britt. c. 9. (o) 1. 1, c. 37.
(p) Stiernh. de jure Goth. 1. 3, c. 2, (q) 3 Inst. 59. (r) See book HI, page 120.
(s) 1 Hawk. P. C. M5.
(8) As to this offence see statute 24 and 25 Vie. c. 100, s. 61, which makes it punishable by
penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than ten years. And see 2 Bish. Cr. L. §
1027; Ros. Cr. Ev. 871; 1 Russ. on Cr. 698.
(9) See, as to these offences, statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.
(10) This punishment is abolished.
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the peace broken shall be before the king; that is, by indictment in the king's
courts; and the assailant may also be sued before the bishop, that excommuni-
cation or bodily penance may be imposed: which if the offender will redeem by
money, to be given to the bishop, or the party aggrieved, it may be sued for be-
fore the bishop; whereas otherwise to sue in any spiritual court for civil dam-
ages for the battery, falls within the danger of prcemunire.(t) But suits are,
and always were, allowable in the spiritual court, for money agreed to be given
as a commutation for penanee.(u) So that upon the whole it appears, that a
person guilty of such brutal behaviour to a clergyman is subject to three kinds
of prosecution, all of which may be pursued for one and the same offence: an
indictment, for the breach of the king's peace by such assault and battery; a
civil action, for the special damage sustained by the party injured; and a suit
in the ecclesiastical court, first, pro correctione et salute animw, by enjoining
penance, and then again for such sum of money as shall be agreed on for taking
[*218] off the penance enjoined; *it being usual in those courts to exchange
their spiritual censures for a round compensation in money; (v) per-
haps because poverty is generally esteemed by the moralists the best medicine
pro salute animw.(11)
VIII. The two remaining crimes and offences, against the persons of his
majesty's subjects, are infringements of their natural liberty: concerning the
first of which, false imprisonment, its nature and incidents, I must content my-
self with referring the student to what was observed in the preceding book, (w)
when we considered it as a mere civil injury. But besides the private satisfac-
tion given to the individual by action, the law also demands public vengeance
for the breach of the king's peace, for the loss which the state sustains by the
confinement of one of its members, and for the infringement of the good order
of society. We have seen before,(z) that the most atrocious degree of this of-
fence, that of sending any subject of this realm a prisoner into parts beyond
the seas, whereby he is deprived of the friendly assistance of the laws to redeem
him from such his captivity, is punished with the pains of prcsmunire, and in-
capacity to hold any office, without any possibility of pardon.(y) And we may
also add, that by statute 43 Eliz. c. 13, to carry any one by force out of the four
northern counties, or imprison him within the same, in order to ransom him or
make spoil of his person or goods, is felony without benefit of clergy, in the
principals and all accessories before the fact. Inferior degrees of the same of-
fence, of false imprisonment, are also punishable by indictment, (like assaults
and batteries) and the delinquent may be fined and imprisoned.(z) And, in-
deed, (a) there can be no doubt but that all kinds of crimes of a public nature,
all disturbances of the peace, all oppressions, and other misdemeanors whatso-
ever of a notoriously evil example, may be indicted at the suit of the king.
[*2191 *IX. The other remaining offence, that of kidnapping, being the
forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child, from
their own country, and sending them into another, was capital by the Jewish
law. "He that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand,
he shall surely be put to death." (b) So likewise in the civil law, the offence of
spiriting away and stealing men and children; which was called plagium, and
the offenders plagiarii, was punished with death.(c) This is unquestionably a
very heinous crime, as it robs the king of his subjects, banishes a man from his
country, and may in its consequences be productive of the most cruel and dis-
agreeable hardships; and therefore the common law of England has punished
it with fine, imprisonment, and pillory.(d) And also the statute 11 and 12 Win.
III, c. 7, though principally intended against pirates, has a clause that extends
(t) 2 Inst. 492, 620. (u) Artic. Cler. Edw. II, c. 4. F. N. B, 53. (v) 2 Roll. Rep. 384.
(w) See book Iii page 127. (x) See page 116. (y) Stat. 31 Car. II, c. 2.
(z) West. Symbol, part 2, page 92. (a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 210. (b) Exod. xxi, 16.
(e) Ff. 48. 15. 1. (d) Raym. 474. 2 Show. 221. Skin. 47. Comb. 10.
(11) The punishment is now imprisonment not exceeding two years. Statute 24 and 25
Vic. c. 100, § 36.
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to prevent the leaving of such persons abroad, as are thus kidnapped or spirited
away; by enacting, that if any captain of a merchant vessel shall (during his
being abroad) force any person on shore, or wilfully leave him behind, or refuse
to bring home all such men as he carried out, if able and desirous to return, be
shall suffer three months' imprisonment.(12) And thus much for offences that
more immediately affect the persons of individuals.
CHAPTER XVI.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE HABITATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS.
THE only two offences that more immediately affect the habitations of indi-
viduals or private subjects, are those of arson and burglary.
1. Arson, ab ardendo, is the malicious and wilful burning the house or out-
house of another man. This is an offence of very great malignity, and much
more pernicious to the public than simple theft: because first, it is an offence
against the right of habitation, which is acquired by the law of nature as well
as by the laws of society; next, because of the terror and confusion that neces-
sarily attend it; and, lastly, because in simple theft the thing stolen only
changes its master but still remains in esse for the benefit of the public, whereas
by burning the very substance is absolutely destroyed. It is also frequently
more destructive than murder itself, of which, too, it is often the cause: since
murder, atrocious as it is, seldom extends beyond the felonious act designed;
whereas fire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons unknown
to the incendiary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends as well as
enemies. For which reason the civil law (a) punishes with death such as
maliciously set fire to houses in towns, and contiguous to others; but is more
merciful to such as only fire a cottage, or house, standing by itself.(1)
(a) -Ff. 4s, 19, m8 § 1[2.
(12) See statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100, for the punishment of abduction and kidnapping.
Also, statute 17 and 18 Vic. c. 104, for the punishment of wilfully and wrongfully leaving
persons abroad.
(1) The English statutes on this subject were revised and consolidated in 24 and 25 Vic.
c. 97.
Section 1 makes it felony, punishable with penal servitude for life, or for any term not less
than three years, or with imprisonment not more than two years, with or without whipping,
if the offender be a male over sixteen years of age, to set fire, unlawfully and maliciously, to
any church, chapel, meeting-house or other place of divine worship.
Section 2 imposes the like punishment for setting fire to a dwelling-house, any person being
therein.
Section 3 imposes the like punishment for setting fire to any house, stable, coach-house,
outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malt-house, hop-oant, barn, storehouse, granary, hovel,
shed or fold, or to any farm building, or to any building or erection used in farming land, or
in carrying on any trade or manufacture, whether in possession of the offender or not, with
intent to injure or defraud any person.
And by subsequent sections the unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to buildings belong-
ing or appertaining to railways, ports, docks, harbors or canals, or to public buildings, or "to
any buildings other than such as are in this act before mentioned," or to any thing in, against
or under a building, under such circumstances that, if the building were thereby set fire to,
the offence would be felony, or to crops of hay, grass, corn, grain or pulse, or of any cultivated
vegetable produce, standing or cut, or to any wood, coppice or plantation of trees, or to any
heath, gorse, furze or fern, or to stacks of hay, grain, straw, coal, peat, wood, &c., or to coal
mines, or to ships or vessels, is also made felony. Attempts to burn the like buildings or
property are also provided for by the same act; and, by section 58, it is not essential to any
of these offences that they should be committed from malice conceived against the owner of
the property.
[Book IV.
[*221] * Our English law also distinguishes with much accuracy upon this
crime. And therefore we will inquire, first, what is such a house as
may be the subject of this offence; next, wherein the offence itself consists, or
what amounts to a burning of such house; and, lastly, how the offence is
punished.
1. Not only the bare dwelling-house, but all outhouses that are parcel thereof,
though not contiguous thereto, nor under the same roof, as barns and stables,
may be the subject of arson.(b) And this by the common law: which also
accounted it felony to burn a single barn in the field, if filled with hay or corn,
though not parcel of the dwelling-house.(c) The burning of a stack of corn
was anciently likewise accounted arson.(d) And indeed all the niceties and
distinctions which we meet with in our books, concerning what shall, or shall
not, amount to arson, seem now to be taken away by a variety of statutes;
which will be mentioned in the next chapter, and have made the punishment
of wilful burning equally extensive as the mischief. The offence of arson
(strictly so called) may be committed by wilfully setting fire to one's own house,
provided one's neighbour's house is thereby also burnt; but if no mischief is
done but to one's own, it does not amount to felony, though the fire was kindled
with intent to burn another's.(e) For by the common law no intention to com-
mit a felony amounts to the same crime; though it does, in some cases, by par-
ticular statutes. However, such wilful firing one's own house, in a town, is a
high misdemeanor, and punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and perpetual
sureties for the good behaviour.(f) (2) And if a landlord or reversioner sets
fire to his own house, of which another is in possession under a lease from him-
self, or from those whose estate he hath, it shall be accounted arson; for during
the lease the house is the property of the tenant.(g) (3)
S*2. As to what shall be said to be a burning, so as to amount to arson,
[*2221 a bare intent, or attempt to do it, by actually setting fire to a house,
unless it absolutely burns, does not fall within the description of incendit et
combussit; which were words necessary, in the days of law-latin, to all indict-
ments of this sort. But the burning and consuming of any part is sufficient;
though the fire be afterwards extinguished.(h) Also, it must be a malicious
burning: otherwise it is only a trespass: and, therefore, no negligence or mis-
chance amounts to it.(4) For which reason, though an unqualified person, by
(b) 1 Hal. P. C. 567. (c) 3 Inst. 69. (d) 1 Hawk. P. C. 105.
Cro. Car. 377. 1 Jon. 351. (f) I Hal. P. C. 568. 1 Hawk. P. C. 106.
Fost. 15. (A) 1 Hawk. P. C. 106.
(2) [It has been decided that an attempt, or preparation, by a man to set fire to his own
house in a town, though the fire be never kindled, is a misdemeanor. And that every attempt
to commit a felony is a misdemeanor; and, in eneral, an attempt to commit a misdemeanor
is an offence of the same nature. Cald. 397; 6 East, 464; 1 Wils. 139. So also an incitement
or solicitation to commit a crime is a misdemeanor. R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5.
Voluntas reputatur pro facto is still true, both in treason and misdemeanor; but the inten-
tion in both must be manifested by an open act. Men cannot be punished by the law for the
thoughts of the mind, however wicked they may be: even a resolution to commit high treason,
evidenced only by a confession, without any attempt to carry it into effect, is not punishable
by the law of England. The principle of these cases is well illustrated by Lord Coke, who,
after treating of single combats and affrays, says, "if any subject challenge another to fight,
this is also an offence, before any combat be performed, and punishable by law, for quando
aliquid prolibetur, prohibetur et omne, per quod devenitur ad illud." 3 Inst. 158. And, there-
fore, he who carries the challenge, knowing that it is a challenge, is also guilty of a misde-
meanor: and he who designedly attempts to provoke another to fight or to send a challenge, is
guilty of the same offence.]
(3) See 2 Bish. Cr. L. 24. It is usual to provide by statute that the burning one's own
house, with intent to defraud, shall be felony.
(4) [The term malice, in this case as in many others, does not merely imply a design to
injure the party who is eventually the sufferer, but an evil and mischievous intention, however
general, producing damage to individuals. For if a man has a design to burn one house, and
by accident the flames destroy another, instead of that against which his contrivance was
directed, he will be guilty of maliciously burning the latter. 1 Hale, 569; Hawk. b. 1, c. 39
s. 5. The maxim malitia supplet eatem applies to this as well as to other cases; for Lord
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shooting with a gun, happens to set fire to the thatch of a house, this Sir Mat-
thew H ale determines not to be felony, contrary to the opinion of former
writers.(i) But by statute 6 Ann. c. 31, any servant negligently setting fire to
a house or outhouses shall forfeit 1001. or be sent to the house of correction
for eighteen months; in the same manner as the Roman law directed, "eos, qui
negligenter ignes apud se habuerint, fustibus vel flagellis codi."(k)
3. The punishment of arson was death by our ancient Saxon laws.(1) And
in the reign of Edward the First this sentence was executed by a kind of lex
talionis; for the incendiaries were burnt to death :(m) as they were also by the
Gothic constitutions. (n) The statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6, made the wilful burning
of houses, under some special circumstances therein mentioned, amount to the
crime of high treason. But it was again reduced to felony by the general acts
of Edward VI, and Queen Mary; and now the punishment of all capital felo-
nies is uniform, namely, by hanging. The offence of arson was denied the ben-
efit of clergy by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 1, but that statute was repealed by 1
Edward VI, c. 12, and arson was afterwards held to be ousted of clergy, with
respect to the principal offender, only by inference and deduction from the
statute 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 4, *which expressly denied it to the acces- [*22
sories before the fact; (o) though now it is expressly denied to the prin- *23]
cipal in all cases within the statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22.(5)
II. Burglary, or nocturnal housebreaking, burgi latrocinium, which by our
ancient law was called hamesecken, as it is in Scotland to this day, has always
been looked upon as a very heinous offence: not only because of the abundant
terror that it naturally carries with it, but also as it is a forcible invasion and
disturbance of that right of habitation which every individual might acquire
even in a state of nature; an invasion, which in such a state would be sure to
be punished with death, unless the assailant were the stronger. But in civil
society the laws also come in to the assistance of the weaker party; and, besides
that they leave him this natural right of killing the aggressor, if he can (as was
shown in a former chapter),(p) they also protect and avenge him, in case the
might of the assailant is too powerful. And the law of England has so par-
ticular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it
his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity; agreeing herein
with the sentiments of ancient Rome, as expressed in the words of Tully ;(q)
"quid enim sanctius, quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscujusque
civium ?" For this reason no outward doors can in general be broken open to
execute any civil process; though, in criminal cases, the public safety super-
sedes the private. Hence also, in part, arises the animadversion of the law upon
eaves-droppers, nuisancers and incendiaries: and to this principle it must be
assigned, that a man may assemble people together lawfully (at least if they do
not exceed eleven) without danger of raising a riot, rout or unlawful assembly,
in order to protect and defend his house; which he is not permitted to do in
in any other case.(r)(6)
*The definition of a burglar, as given us by Sir Edward Coke,(s) is "he [*224]
that by night breaketh and entereth into a mansion-house, with intent to
(6) 1 Hal. P. C. 569. (k) ly. 1, 15, 4. (1) LL. Inae, c. 7. (in) Britt. c. 9.
(,) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 6. (o) 11 Rep. 35. 2 Hal. P. C. 346, 347. Fost. 336.
p) See page 180. (q) 1'v domo, 41. (r) I Hal P. C. 547. (s) 3 Inst. 63.
Hale gives an instance of a youth of tender age being convicted before himself, and executed
for this offence, on circumstances affording strong evidence of a mischievous discretion.
1 Hale, 569, 570. And the intent to injure may be always inferred from the wrongful act of
setting fire, for a man must be supposed to intend the necessary consequence of his own act.
Russ. and Ry. C. C. 207.] As to intent, see further, Reg. v. Paice, 1 C. and K. 73; Reg. v.
Wallace, Car. and M. 200; Jesse v. State, 28 Miss. 100; State v. O'Connell, 26 Ind. 266.
(5) The punishment of arson is no longer capital in England.
(6) The English statute for the punishment of this offense is 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96. The
penalty in the discretion of the court is penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than
three years, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard
labor, and with or without solitary confinement.
Chap. 16.]
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commit a felony." In this definition there are four things to be considered; the
time, the place, the manner, and the intent.
1. The time must be by night, and not by day: for in the day time there is
no burglary. We have seen,(t) in the case of justifiable homicide, how much
more heinous all laws made an attack by night, rather than by day; allowing
the party attacked by night to kill the assailant with impunity. As to what is
reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose: anciently the day was accounted
to begin only at sun-rising, and to end immediately upon sun-set; but the bet-
ter opinion seems to be, that if there be daylight or crepusculum enough, begun
or left to discern a man's face withal, it is no burglary. (u) But this does not
extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglars would go unpunished:
and besides, the malignity of the offence does not so properly arise from its
being done in the dark, as at the dead of night; when all the creation, except
beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has disarmed the owner, and rendered his
castle defenceless.
2. As to the place. It must be, according to Sir Edward Coke's definition, in a
mansion-house: and, therefore, to account for the reason why breaking open a
church is burglary, as it undoubtedly is, he quaintly observes that it is domus
mansionalis Dei.(v) But it does not seem absolutely necessary that it should
in all cases be a mansion-house;(7) for it may be also committed by breaking
(t) See pages 180, 181. (u) 3 Inst. 63. 1 Hal. P. C. 350. 1 Hawk. P. C. 101. (v) 3 Inst. 64.
(7) [Where the owner has never by himself, or by any of his family, slept in the house, it is
not his dwelling-house, so as to be the subject of burglary. Rex v. Martin, R. and R. C. C. 108.
And see Lyon's Case, Leach, 169; Thompson's Case, id. 893. Where a servant has part of a
house for his occupation, and the rest is reserved by the proprietor for other purposes, the
part reserved cannot be deemed part of the servant's dwelling-house; and it will be the same
if any other person has part of the house, and the rest is reserved. Rex v. Wilson, R. and R.
C. C. 115. Where a servant stipulates upon hire for the use of certain rooms in his master's
premises for himself and family, the premises may be described as the master's dwelling-
house, although the servant is the only person who inhabits them; for he shall be considered
as living there as servant, not as holding as tenant. Rex v. Stock, id. 185. Where a shop
was rented with some of the apartments of a house, it was held that the shop was still part
of the dwelling-house, and that burglary might be committed in it, as the house of the land-
lord. Gibson's Case, Leach, 887. Where it must be laid in the indictment to be the dwelling-
house of the landlord, if he break open the apartments of his lodgers, and steal their goods,
it is not burglary, for a man cannot be guilty of burglary in his own house. Kel. 84.
As to the residence, from all the cases, it appears that it must be a place of actual residence.
Thus, a house under repair, in which no one lives, though the owner's property is deposited
there, is not a place in which burglary can be committed ; for it cannot be deemed his dwell-
jug-house until he has taken possession and begun to inhabit it. 1 Leach, 185. Nor will it
make any difference, if one of the workmen engaged in the repairs sleep there, in order to
protect it. 1 Leach, 186, in notis. Nor, though the house is ready for the reception of the
owner, and he has sent his property into it preparatory to his own removal, will it become for
this purpose his mansion. 2 Leach, 771. And where the owner has never, by himself or by
any of his family, slept in the house, it is not his dwelling-house, so as to make the breaking
thereof burglary, though he has used it for his meals, and all the purposes of his business.
Russ. and Ry. C. C. 138. So, if the landlord of a house purchases the furniture of his out-
going tenant, and procure a servant to sleep there, in order to guard it, but without any inten-
tion of making it his own residence, a breaking into the house will not amount to burglary.
2 Leach, 876. But, if the agent of a public company reside at a warehouse belonging to his
employers, this crime may be committed by breaking it, and he may be considered as the
owner. 2 Leach, 931. And it seems, that if a man die in his house, and his executors put
servants in it, and keep them there at board wages, burglary may be committed in breaking
it, and it may be laid to be the executors' property. 2 East, P. C. 499.
It seems quite settled, as above observed, that the proprietor of the house need not be actu-
ally within it at the time the offence is committed, provided it is one of his regular places of
abode. For if he leaves it animo revertendi, though no person reside there in his absence, it
will still be his mansion. As, if a man has a house in town, and another in the country, and
goes to the latter in the summer, the nocturnal breaking into either, with a felonious design,
will be burglarious. Fost. 77. And, though a man leaves his house, and never means to live
in it again, yet if he uses part of it as a shop, and lets a servant and his family live and sleep
in another part of it, for fear the place should be robbed, and lets the rest to lodgers, the
habitation by his servant and family will be a habitation by him, and the shop may still be
considered as part of his dwelling-house. 1 Burn, J., 24th ed. 503; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 442,
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the gates or walls of a town in the night ;(w) though that perhaps Sir Edward
Coke would have called the mansion-house of the garrison or corporation.
Spelman defines burglary to be, "noclurna diruptio alicujus *habitaculi,
vel ecclesim, etiam murorum portarumve burgi, ad feloniam perpetran- [*225]
dam." And therefore we may safely conclude, that the requisite of its being
domus mansionalis is only in the burglary of a private house: which is the most
frequent, and in which it is indispensably necessary to form its guilt, that it
must be in a mansion or dwelling-house. For no distant barn, warehouse, or
the like, are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man's castle of
defence: nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no man resides, and which,
therefore, for the time being, are not mansion-houses, attended with the same
circumstances of midnight terror. A house, however, wherein a man some-
times resides, and which the owner hath only left for a short season, animo rever-
tendi, is the object of burglary, though no one be in it at the time of the fact
committed.(x) And if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-
house, and within the same common fence,(y) though not under the same roof
or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house pro-
tects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage
or homestall.(z) A chamber in a college or an inn of court, where each inhab-
itant hath a distinct property, is, to all other purposes as well as this, the man-
sion-house of the owner.(a) So also is a room or lodging, in any private house,
the mansion for the time being of the lodger; if the owner doth not himself
dwell in the house, or if he and the lodger enter by different outward doors.
But if the owner himself lies in the house, and hath but one outward door at
which he and his lodgers enter, such lodgers seem only to be inmates, and all
their apartments to be parcel of the one dwelling-house of the owner.(b) Thus,
too, the house of a corporation, inhabited in separate apartments by the officers
of the body corporate, is the mansion-house of the corporation, and not of the
respective officers.(c), But if I hire a shop, parcel of another man's house, and
work or trade in it, but never lie there; it is no dwelling-house, nor can bur-
glary be committed therein; for by the lease *it is severed from the rest
of the house, and therefore is not the dwelling-house of him who occu- [26
pies the other part: neither can I be said to dwell therein, when I never lie
there.(d) Neither can burglary be committed in a tent or booth erected in a
market or fair; though the owner may lodge therein ;(e) for the law regards
thus highly nothing but permanent edifices; a house or church, the-wall or
gate of a town; and though it may be the choice of the owner to lodge in so
fragile a tenement, yet his lodging there no more makes it burglary to break it
open, than it would be to uncover a tilted wagon in the same circumstances.
3. As to the manner of committing burglary: there must be both a breaking
and an entry to complete it. But they need not be both done at once: for if a
hole be broken one night, and the same breakers enter the next night through
the same, they are burglars.(f) There must in general be an actual breaking:
M elm. Gloss. t. Burglary. 1 Hawk, P.c.i03. () 1 Hal. P. c. 566. Fost. 77.
. v. Garland, P. 16 Geo. III, by all the judges. (z) 1 Hal. P. c. 558. 1 Hawk. P. C. 104.
(a) 1 Hal. P. C. 556. (b) Kel. 84. 1 Hal. P. C. 556. (c) Foster, 38, 39. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 558.
(e) 1 Hawk. P. C. 104. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 553.
S. C. But in an indictment for larceny from a dwelling-house, where the prosecutor left his
house without any intention of living in it again, and intending to use it as a warehouse only,
though he had persons (not of his own family) to sleep in it to guard the property, it was
held, it could not be considereu the prosecutor's dwelling-house, to support the charge. Russ.
and Ry. C. C. 187. And if the occupier of a house iemoves from it with his whole family,
and takes away so much of his goods as to leave nothing fit for the accommodation of inmates,
and has no settled idea of returning to it, but rather intends to let it, the offence will be merely
larceny. Fost. 76. And the mere casual use of a tenement will not suffice; and, therefore,
the circumstance of a servant sleeping in a barn, or porter in a warehouse, for particular and
temporary purposes, will not so operate as to make a violent entry in the night, in order to
steal, a burglary. 1 Hale, 557, 558.]
The cases regarding a dwelling-house, and what shall be considered as within the curtilage,
are numerous, and are collected and classified in the works on criminal law.
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not a mere legal clausum .fregit (by leaping over invisible ideal boundaries,
which may constitute a civil trespass), but a substantial and forcible irruption.
As at least by breaking, or taking out the glass of, or otherwise opening, a win-
dow; picking a lock, or opening it with a key; nay, by lifting up the latch of a
door, or unloosing any other fastening which the owner has provided. (8) But
if a person leaves his doors or windows open, it is his own folly and negligence,
and if a man enters therein, it is no burglary: yet, if he afterwards unlocks an
inner or chamber door, it is so. (g) (9) But to come down a chimney is held a
burglarious entry; for that is as much closed as the nature of things will per-
mit. (h) So also to knock at the door, and upon opening it to rush in, with a
felonious intent: or under pretence of taking lodgings, to fall upon the land-
lord and rob him; or to procure a constable to gain admittance, in order to
search for traitors, and then to bind the constable and rob the house; all these
[*227] entries have been adjudged burglarious, though there was *no actual
breaking; for the law will not suffer itself to be trifled with by such
evasions, especially under the cloak of legal process. (i) And so, if a servant
opens and enters his master's chamber-door with a felonious design; or if any
other person lodging in the same house, or in a public inn, opens and enters
another's door, with such evil intent, it is burglary. Nay, if the servant con-
spires with a robber and lets him into the house by night, this is burglary in
both ; (k) for the servant is doing an unlawful act, and the opportunity afforded
him of doing it with greater ease rather aggravates than extenuates the guilt.
As for the entry, any the least degree of it, with any part of the body, or with
an instrument held in the hand, is sufficient; as to step over the threshold, to
put a hand or a hook in at a window to draw out goods, or a pistol to demand
one's money, are all of them burglarious entries. (1) (10) The entry may be be-
I Ibid. (h) 1 Hawk. P. C. 102. 1 Hal. P. c. 552. (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 102.
Stra. 881. 1 Hal. P. C. 53. 1 Hawk. P. C. 103. (1) 1 Hal. P. C. 555. 1 Hawk. P. C. 103. Fost. 108.
(8) [So, to push open massive doors which shut by their own weight, is burglarious, though
there is no actual fastening. 2 East, P. C. 487. Pulling down the sash of a window is a break-
ing, though it has no fastening, and is only kept in its place by the pulley weight; it is equally
a breaking, although there is an outer shutter which is not put to. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 451.
And where a window opens upon hinges, and is fastened by a wedge, so that pushing against
it will open it, forcing it open by pushing against it is sufficient to constitute a breaking.
Russ. anf Ry. C. C. 355. But where the prisoner broke out of a cellar by lifting up a heavy
flap, by which the cellar was closed on the outside next the street (the flap was not bolted,
but it had bolts), six of the learned judges were of opinion that there was a sufficient break-
ing to constitute burglary; the remaining six were of a contrary opinion. Russ. and Ry. C.
C. 157. And it is to be observed, that even when the first entry is a mere trespass, being as
per janua aperta, if the thief afterwards breaks open any inner room, he will be guilty of bur-
glary: 1 Hale, 553 ; and this may be done by a servant who sleeps in an adjacent room, un-
latching his master's door, and entering his apartment, with intent to kill him. 1 Hale, 544.
But Lord Hale doubts whether a guest at an inn is guilty of burglary by rising in the night,
opening his own door, and stealing goods from other rooms. 1 Hale, 554. And it seems cer-
tain that breaking open a chest or trunk is not in itself burglarious: Fost. 108, 109; and accord-
ing to the better opinion, the same principle applies to cupboards, presses, and other fixtures,
which, though attached to the freehold, are intended only the better to supply the place of
movable depositories. Fost. 109.]
(9) [It will be burglary to unlatch an inner door with a felonious intent, and whatever
would be a breaking of an outer door will also be a breaking of an inner door to constitute
burglary. See 2 East, P. C. 488.
But it does not seem to be a burglary to break the doors of cupboards, presses and closets.
Ibid.]
Erskine, J., in one case said that if a thief who is lawfully within even lifts the latch to get
out of the house with the stolen property, that is a burglarious breaking out of the house.
Reg. v. Wheeldon, 8 C. and P. 747. See Rex v. Lawrence, 4 id. 231; Curtiss v. Hubbard, 1
Hill, 336; 4 id. 437; Commonwealth v. Stephenson, 8 Pick. 354; Ducher v. State, 18 Ohiu,
308.
(10) [So if the prisoner breaks open a shop window, and with his hand takes out goods, the
offence is complete. Fost. 107; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 499, S. P. Introducing the hand between
the glass of an outer window and an inner shutter is sufficient entry to constitute burglary.
Russ. and Ry. C. C. 341. And where several having broken open a house, and attempting to
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fore the breaking, as well as after: for by statute 12 Ann. c. 7, if a person enters
into the dwelling-house of another, without breaking in, either by day or by
night, with intent to commit felony, or being in such a house, shall commit any
felony; and shall in the night break out of the same, this is declared to be burg-
lary ; there having before been different opinions concerning it: Lord Bacon (,m)
holding the affirmative, and Sir Mathew Hale (n) the negative. But it is
universally agreed, that there must be both a breaking, either in fact or by im-
plication, and also an entry, in order to complete the burglary.
4. As to the intent; it is clear, that such breaking and entry must be with a
felonious intent, otherwise it is only a trespass. And it is the same, whether
such intention be actually carried into execution, or only demonstrated by some
attempt or overt act, of which the jury is to judge. And therefore such a breach
or entry of a house as has been before described, by night, with intent to commit
a robbery, *a murder, a rape, or any other felony, is burglary; whether
the thing be actually perpetrated or not. Nor does it make any differ- L*228]
ence, whether the offence were felony at common law, or only created so by
statute; since that statute which makes an offence felony, gives it incidentally
all the properties of a felony at common law..(o) (11)
Thus much for the nature of burglary; which is a felony at common law, but
within the benefit of clergy. The statute, however, of I Edw. VI, c. 12, and 18
Eliz. c. 7, take away clergy from the principals, and that of 3 and 4 W. and N.
c. 9, from all abettors and accessories before the fact.(p) And in like manner,
the laws of Athens, which punished no simple theft with death, made burglary
a capital crime.(q)
(m) Elm. 65. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 554. (o) 1 Hawk. P. C. 105.
(p) Burglary in any house belonging to the plate glass company, with intent to steal the stock or utensils, is
by statute 18 Geo. III, c. 38, declared to be single felony, and punished with transportation for seven years.
(q) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.
enter, are opposed by the owner, and in making a pass at him the hand of one of the party is
within the threshhold, he will be guilty of burglary. 1 Hale, 553. If, however, an instrument
has been thrust into the window, not for the purpose of taking out property, but only calcu-
lated to form the aperture, this will not be regarded as an entry: 1 Leach, 406; or if a house
be broken open, and the owner, through the fear occasioned by the circumstance, throw out
his money, the burglary will not be completed. 1 Hale, 555. It seems doubtful whether
shooting through a window is sufficient, by the entry of the shot discharged; but it seems the
better opinion that it is; as in this case, a felony by killing is as much attempted, as, in the in-
troduction of an instrument, a felony by stealing is attempted. 1 Hale, 555 ; Hawk, b. 1, c. 38,
s. '7. See 4 Camp. 220 ; 1 Stark. 58.]
As to what is a sufficient entry, see State a. McCall, 4 Ala. 643; State v. Reid, 20 Iowa, 413;
Frank a. State, 39 Miss. 705. Where a building is leased to different persons in distinct apart-
ments, each apartment is the dwelling-house of the lessee : Mason a. People, 26 N. Y. 200; Sted-
man V. Crane, 11 Met. 295; and see Dale V. State, 27 Ala. 31. As to what is within the term
"dwelling-house," see State v. Ginns, 1 N. and McC. 583; State v. Langford, 1 Dev. 253;
Armour v. State, 3 Humph. 379; People v. Parker, 4 Johns. 424; People v. Snyder, 2 Parker, 23;
People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 10 Pik. 293; State v. Shaw, 31
Me. 523.
(11) [But if a servant, intrusted by his master to sell goods, receives money to his use, con-
ceals it in the house instead of paying it over, and after his dismissal, breaks the house and
steals it, the entry is not burglarious, because there was no felony in the original taking.
1 Show. 53. And even where prisoners were proved to have broken open a house in the night
time, to recover teas seized for want of a legal permit, for the use of the person from whom
they were taken, an indictment for burglary with intent to steal was holden not to be sup-
ported. 2 East, P. C. 510.]
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CHAPTER XVII.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY.
THE next and last species of offences against private subjects, are such as more
immediately affect their property. Of which there are two, which are attended
with a breach of the peace; larceny and malicious mischief: and one, that is
equally injurious to the rights of property, but attended with no act of violence;
which is the crime of forgery. Of these three in their order.
I. Larceny, or theft, by contraction for latrociny, latrocinium, is distinguished
by the law into two sorts: the one called simple larceny, or plain theft unaccom-
panied with any other atrocious circumstances; and mixed or compound larceny,
which also includes in it the aggravation of a taking from one's house or person.(]-)
And, first, of simple larceny; which, when it is the stealing of goods above the
value of twelve-pence, is called grand larceny ; when of goods to that value, or
under, is petit larceny; offences which are considerably distinguished in their
punishment, but not otherwise. I. shall, therefore, first consider the nature of
simple larceny in general; and then shall observe the different degrees of punish-
ment inflicted on its two several branches.
Simple larceny, then, is "the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal
[*230] goods of another." This *offence certainly commenced then, whenever
*230] it was, that the bounds of property, or laws of meum and tuum, were es-
tablished. How far such an offence can exist in a state of nature, where all things
are held to be common, is a question that may be solved with very little difficulty.
The disturbance of any individual, in the occupation of what he has seized to
his present use seems to be the only offence of this kind incident to such a state.
But unquestionably, in social communities, when property is established, the
necessity whereof we have formerly seen, (a) any violation of that property is
subject to be punished by the laws of society: though how far that punishment
should extend, is matter of considerable doubt. At present we will examine the
nature of theft, or larceny, as laid down in the foregoing definition.
1. It must be a taking.(2) This implies the consent of the owner to be wanting.
Therefore no delivery of the goods from the owner to the offender, upon trust,
(a) See book II, p. 8, &c.
(1) The punishment for this offence is now provided for by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
That statute abolishes the distinction between grand and petit larceny, and limits the punish-
ment for the first offence of simple larceny to three years' penal servitude, or two years' im-
prisonment, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement.
(2) [The cases upon this important requisite of the offence of larceny are so numerous, and
the distinctions so subtle, that it will be necessary to go into considerable detail to give a
complete view of the law upon the subject. See in general, 3 Chit. Crim. L., 2d. ed. 917 to 924.
1. When offender lawfully acquired the possession of goods, but under a bare charge, the owner
still retaining his property in them, the offender will be guilty of larceny in common law in
embezzling them. Thus, in addition to the instances put by the learnedauthor, of the butler,
the shepherd, and guest at an inn, if a master deliver property into the hands of a servant for
a special purpose, as to leave it at the house of a friend, or to get change, or deposit with a
banker, the servant will be guilty of felony in applying it to his own use, for it still remains
in the constructive possession of its owner. 2 Leach, 870, 942; and see 2 East, P. C. 563, sed
vide 2 East, P. C. 562; R. and R. C. C. 215 ; 4 Taunt. 258, S. C. Ifa banker's clerk is sent to the
money-room to bring cash for a particular purpose, and he takes the opportunity of secreting
some for his own use, (1 Leach, 344) he is guilty of larceny; and see 1 Leach, 251 ; Kel. 33 ;
Cowp. 294. And if several persons play together at cards, and deposit money for that pur-
pose, not parting with their property therein, and one sweep it all away, and take it to himself,
he will be guilty of theft, if the jury find that he acted with a felonious design. 1 Leach, 270;
Cal. 395. So if there be a plan to cheat a man of his property, under color of a bet, and he
parts with the possession only, to deposit as a stake with one of the confederates; the taking
by such confederate is felonious. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 413. And if a bag of wheat be delivered
to a warehouseman for safe custody, and he take the wheat out of the bag, and dispose of it, it
is larceny. Ross. and Ry. C. C. 337. And where a banker's clerk took notes from the till,
under color of a check from a third person, which check he obtained by having entered a
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can ground a larceny. As if A lends B a horse, and he rides away with him:
or, if I send goods by a carrier, and he carries them away; these are no larcenies.(b)
But if the carrier opens a bale or pack of goods, or pierces a vessel of wine, and
takes away part thereof, or if he carries it to the place appointed, and afterwards
takes away the whole, these are larcenies ; (c) for here the animusfurandi is mani-
fest; since in the first case he had otherwise no inducement to open the goods,
and in the second the trust was determined, the delivery having taken its effect.
But bare non-delivery shall not of course be intended to arise from a felonious
(b) 1 Hal. P. C. 504. (c) 3 Inst. 107.
fictitious balance in the books in favor of that person, it was held he was guilty of felony; the
fraudulent obtaining the check being nothing more than mere machinery to effect his purpose.
4 Taunt. 304: R. and R. C. C. 221, S. C.; 2 Leach, C. C. 1083. And where one employed as a
clerk, in the day-time, but not residing in the house, embezzles a bill of exchange, which he
received from his master in the usual course of business, with directions to transmit it by the
post to a correspondent, it was held to be larceny. 2 East P. C. 565; and see 2 Chit. C. L. 2d.
ed. 917, b. And where goods have not been actually reduced into the owner's possession, yet
if he has entrusted another to deliver them to his servant, and they are delivered accordingly,
and the servant embezzles them, he will be guilty of larceny; as where a corn factor having
purchased a cargo of oats on board a ship, sent his servant with his barge to receive part of
the oats in loose bulk, and the servant ordered some of them to be put into sacks, which he
afterwards embezzled, this was holden larceny. 2 East P. C. 1798; 2 Leach, 825.
2. Where the offender unlawfully acquired the posses.sion of goods, as by fraud or fore, &c., with
intent to steal them, the owner still retaining his property in them, such an offender will be guilty
of larceny in embezzling them. Therefore, in addition to the instances mentioned in the text,
hiring a horse on pretence of taking a journey, and immediately selling it, is larceny, because
the jury found the defendant acted animo furandi, in making the contract, and the parting
with the possession had not changed the nature of the property. 2 East, P. C. 685; 1 Leach,
212 ; and see 2 Leach, 420; 2 East, P. C. 691. So obtaining a horse by pretending another per-
son wanted to hire it to go to B, but in truth with intent to steal it, and not going to B, but
taking the horse elsewhere and selling it, is larceny. 1 Leach, 409; 2 East, P. C. 689. So where
the prisoner, intending to steal the mail bags from a post-office, procured them to be let down
to him by a string from the window of the post-office, under pretence that he was the mail
guard, he was held guilty of larceny. 2 East, P. C. 603. It is larceny for a person hired for the
special purpose of driving sheep to a fair to convert them to his own use, he having the in-
tention so to do at the time of receiving them from the owner. 1 Ry. and M. C. C. 87. And
where a man ordered a pair of candlesticks from a silversmith, to be paid for on delivery, to
be sent to his lodgings, whither they were sent accordingly, with a bill of parcels, by a ser-
vant, and the prisoner contriving to send the servant back under some pretence, kept the
goods, it was holden larceny. Cited in 2 Leach, 420. And if a sale of goods is not completed,
and the pretended purchaser absconds with them, and from the first his intention was to de-
fraud, he is guilty of stealing: 1 Leach, 92; and to obtain money from another by ring-
dropping, is a similar offence, if there was an original design to steal: 1 Leach, 238; 2 id.
572: and where the owner of goods sends them by a servant, to be delivered to A, and B, pre-
tending to be A, obtains them from him, B is guilty of larceny. 2 East, P. C. 673. So where
the prisoner pretending to be the servant of a person who had bought a chest of tea, deposited
at the E. I. company's warehouse, got a request paper and permit for the chest, and took it
away with the assent of a person in the company's service who had the charge of it; this
was held felony. R. and Ry. C. C. 163. So, to obtain a bill of exchange from an endorsee,
under a pretence of getting it discounted, is felony, if the jury find that the party did not in-
tend to leave the bill in the possession of the defendant, previous to receiving the money to be
obtained on his credit, and that he undertook to discount with the intent to convert it to his
own use: I Leach, 294; and it seems that if a person procure possession of a house with an
intent to steal the lead affixed to it, he may be indicted on the 4 Geo. II, c. 32, for the statuta-
ble larceny. 2 Leach, 850.
In all these cases the defendant's original design in obtaining the goods was felonious, and
the owner never parted with his property therein, for where either is not the case there can be
no larceny, as will appear from the following instances: Thus, where a house was burning,
and a neighbor took some of the goods, apparently to save them from the flames, and after-
wards corverted them to his own use, it was holden no felony, because the jury thought the
original design honest. 1 Leach, 411, notes. And it is certain, that if the property in effects
be given voluntarily, whatever false pretence has been used to obtain it, no felony can be com-
mitted. 1 Hale, P. C. 506; R. and R. C. C. 225, S. P. Thus, obtaining silver on pretence of
sending a half guinea presently in exchange, is no felony. 2 East, P. C. 672. So, writing a
letter in the name of a third person to borrow money, which he obtains by that fraud, is only
a misdemeanor: 2 East, P. C. 673; and it makes no difference in these cases that the credit
was obtained by fraudulently using the name of another, to whom it was intended to be given:
1 Leach, 303, notes; 2 East, P. C. 673; R. and R. C. C. 225; and if a horse dealer delivers a
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design; since that may happen from a variety of other accidents. Neither
by the common law was it larceny in any servant to run away with the goods com-
mitted to him to keep, but only a breach of civil trust. But by statute 33 Hen.
VI, c. 1, the servants of a person deceased, accused of embezzling their masters'
[*231] goods, may by writ out of chancery (issued by *the advice of the chief jus-
tices and chief baron, or any two of them), and proclamation made there-
upon, be summoned to appear personally in the court of king's bench, to answer
horse to another on his promise to return immediately and pay for it, the party's riding off and
not returning is no felony. 1 Leach, 467; 2 East, P. C. 669. So, if a tradesman sells goods to
a stranger as for ready money, and sends them to him by a servant, who delivers them, and
takes in payment for them bills which prove to be mere fabrications, this will be no larceny,
though the party took his lodgings for the express purpose of obtaining the goods by fraud,
because the owner parted with his property. 2 Leach, 614. So, fraudulently winning money
at gaining, where the injured party really intended to play, is no larceny, though a conspiracy
to defraud appear in evidence. 2 Leach, 610. So, brokers, bankers, or agents, embezzling se-
curities deposited with them for security or any special purpose, are not guilty of larceny: 4
Taunt. 258; 2 Leach, 1054; R. and R. C. C. 215, S. C.; but this decision occasioned the 52 Geo.
III, c. 63, tW be passed, making it a misdemeanor in brokers, bankers and others, to embezzle
securities deposited with them for safe custody or for any special purpose, in violation of good
faith, and contrary to the special purpose for which they were deposited. Thus, in all cases
where a voluntary delivering by the prosecutor is the defence to be relied on, two questions
arise: first, whether the property was parted with by the owner; secondly, whether, supposing
it was not, the prisoner at the time he obtained it conceived a felonious design. In the
first case, no fraud or breach of trust can make a conversion larceny; in the second, the com-
plexion of the offence must depend on the felonious design.
3. Where offender lawfully acquired possession and qualied property in goods, under color of
bailment, but with intention of stealing them, and privity of the bailment has been determined either
by wrongful act of offender or by intention of parties, if he afterwards embezzle such goods,
he will be guilty of larceny. For, in the first case, after the determination of the special con-
tract by any plain and unequivocal wrongful act of the bailee, inconsistent with that con-
tract, the property, as against the bailee, reverts to the owner, although the actual possession
remain in the bailee. 2 East, P. C. 691, 627. The most remarkable case of this description is
that of a carrier pointed out by the learned commentator. So, the conversion of money with
a felonious intent, which was found in a bureau delivered to a carpenter to be repaired, by
breaking it open, when there was no necessity for so doing for the purpose of repairs, will
amount to a larceny: 8 Ves. 405; 2 Leach, 952; 2 Russ. 1045; and in the same case it was
said, that if a pocket-book containing bank notes were left in the pocket of a coat sent to be
mended, and the tailor took the pocket-book out of the pocket, and the notes out of the
pocket-book with a felonious intent, it would amount to a felony. If the master and owner
of a ship steal some of the goods delivered to him to carry, it is not larceny in him, unless he
took the goods out of their package: nor if larceny, would it be an offence within 24 Geo. II,
c. 45. R. and R. C. C. 92. And if corn be sent to a miller to grind, and he take part of it, he
will be guilty of felony: 1 Roll. Abr. 73; but where forty bags of wheat were sent to prisoner,
a warehouseman, for safe custody, until sold by prosecutor, and prisoner's servant, by direc-
tion of prisoner, emptied four of the bags and mixed their contents with other inferior wheat,
and part of mixture was disposed of by prisoner, and remainder was placed in prosecutor's
bags, which had thus been emptied, and there was no severing of any part of wheat in any
one bag with intent to embezzle that part only which was so severed, the prisoner was held
guilty of larceny in taking the wheat out of the bag. R. and R. C. C. 337. And where prop-
erty which prosecutors had bought was weighed out in the presence of their clerk, and de-
livered to their carter's servant to cart, who let other persons take away the cart and dispose
of the property for his benefit, jointly with that of the other persons, it was held that the
carter's servant was not guilty of a mere breach of trust, but that he as well as the other per-
sons were guilty of larceny at common-law. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 125; and see 2 East, P. C.
568 to 574, 695 to 698. But in all these cases the defendant must have had an intention of
stealing the property at the time it was delivered to him. R. and R. C. C. 441, overruling 2
East, P. C. 690, 694; 2 Russ. 1089, 1090; 1 R. and M. C. C. 87.
4. Where the offender has the qualified property and actual possession of the goods at the time of
the embezzlement, he will not be guilty of larceny at common-law. Thus, where a servant or
clerk had received property for the use of his master, and the master never had any other
possession than such possession by his servant or clerk, it was doubted whether the latter was
guilty of felony in stealing such property, or was guilty merely of a breach of trust. 2 Leach,
835; Hale, 668; 2 East, P. C. 570, 571; and see 4 Taunt. 258; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 215, S. C. ; 2
Leach, C. C. 1054. So, a cashier of the bank could not be guilty of a felony in embezzling an India
bond which he had received from the court of chancery, and which was in his actual as well as
constructive possession. 1 Leach, 28. So, if a clerk received money of a customer, and, without
at all putting it in the till, converted it to his own use, he was guilty only of a breach of trust,
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their masters' executors in any civil suit for such goods; and shall, on default of ap-
pearance, be attainted of felony. And by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 7, if any servant
embezzles his masters' goods to the value of forty shillings, it is made felony;
except in apprentices, and servants under eighteen years old.(3) But if he had
not the possession, but only the care and oversight of the goods, as the butler
of the plate, the shepherd of the sheep, and the like, the embezzling of them is
felony at common law.(d) So, if aguest robs his inn or tavern of a piece of plate, it
is larceny: for he hath not the possession delivered to him, but merely the use,(e)
and so it is declared to be by statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, if a lodger runs away
with the goods from his ready furnished lodgings. Under some circumstances,
also, a man may be guilty of felony in taking his own goods: as if he steals them
from a pawnbroker, or any one to whom he hath delivered and entrusted them,
with intent to charge such bailee with the value; or if he robs his own messen-
ger on the road, with an intent to charge the hundred with the loss according
to the statute of Winchester.(f)
2. There must not only be a taking, but a carrying away; (4) cepit et asportavit
(d) 1 Hal. P. C. 506. (e) I Hawk. P. C. 90. (f) Fost. 123, 124.
though, had he once deposited it, and then taken it again, he would have been guilty of
felony. 2 Leach, 835. The dangers resulting from this doctrine occasioned the enactment of
39 Geo. III, c. 85, against such embezzlements by servants, or clerks, rendering the offence
punishable with transportation for fourteen years.
5. Party stealing his own goods, &e. Besides the cases already mentioned in the text, if a man
steals his own goods from his own bailee, though he has no intent to charge the bailee, but
his intent is to defraud the king, yet, if the bailee had an interest in the possession, and could
have withheld it from the owner, the taking is a larceny. R. and R. C. C. 470: 3 Burn, J., 24th
ed. 240, S. C. And a man may be accessory after the fact to a larceny committed on himself,
by receiving and harboring the thief, instead of bringing him to justice: Fost. 123; but a
joint tenant or tenant in common of effects cannot be guilty of larceny in appropriating the
whole to his own purpose: 1 Hale, 513; but if a part owner of property steal it from the
person in whose custody it is, and who is responsible for its safety, he is guilty of larceny.
R. and R. C. C. 478. Nor can a wife commit larceny of her husband's goods, because his
custody is, in law, her's, and they are considered as one person. 1 Hale, 514. On the same
ground no third person can be guilty of larceny by receiving the husband's goods from the
wife, and if she keep the key of the place where the property is kept, her privity will be pre-
sumed, and the defendant must be acquitted. 1 Leach, 47. See 1 Hale, 45, 516;. Kel. 37.
6. The taking must always be against the will of the owner: 1 Leach, 47; but if the owner, in
order to detect a number of men in the act of stealing, directs a servant to appear to encour-
age the design, and lead them on till the offence is complete, so long as he did not induce the
original intent, but only provided for its discovery afer it was formed, the criminality of the
thieves will not be destroyed. 2 Leach, 913. So, if a man be suspected of an intent to steal,
and another, to try him, leaves property in his way, which he takes, he is guilty of larceny.
2 Leach, 921. And if, on thieves breaking in to plunder a house, a servant, by desire of his
master, show them where the plate is kept, which they remove, this circumstance will
not affect the crime. 2 Leach, 922.]
(3) This subject is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, which imposes the punish-
ment of penal servitude for not more than fourteen and not less than three years, or impris-
onment not more than two years.
(4) [If a thief cut a belt on which a purse is hung, and it drops to the ground where he
leaves it, or if he compel a man to lay down goods, which he is carrying, and is apprehended
before he raises them from the ground, the crime is incomplete. 1 Leach, 322, n. b. ; 1 Hale,
533. And if goods are tied to a string, which is fastened at one end to a counter, and a per-
son, intending to steal them, takes hold of the other, and removes them towards the door, as
far as the string will permit him, this will be no felony. So, where the prosecutor had his
keys tied to the strings of his purse in his pocket, which the prisoner endeavored to take from
him, and was detected with the purse in his hand, but the strings still hung to the pocket by
the keys, this was holden to be no asportation, and therefore no larceny was committed.
I Leach, 321, n. a.; 1 Hale, 508. But a very slight asporation will suffice. Thus, to snatch a
diamond from a lady's ear, which is instantly dropped among the curls of her hair: 1 Leach,
320; 2 East, P. C. 557; to remove sheets from a bed, and carry them into an adjoining room
(1 Leach, 222, in notes), to take plate from a trunk, and lay it on the floor, with intent to carry
it away (id.), and to remove a package from one part of a wagon to another, with a view to
steal it (1 Leach, 236), have respectively been holden to be felonies; and where a prisoner had
lifted up a bag from the bottom of a boot of a coach, but was detected before lie had got it
out, and it did not appear that it was entirely removed from the space it at first occupied in the
boot, but the raising it from the bottom had completely removed each part of it from the space
that specific part occupied, this was held a complete asportation. 1 Ry. and Moody, C. C. 14.
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was the old law-latin. A bare removal from the place in which he found the
goods, though the thief does not quite make off with them, is a sufficient asporta-
tion, or carrying away. As, if a man be leading another's horse out of a close, and
be apprehended in the fact; or if a guest, stealing goods out of an inn, has
removed them from his chamber down stairs: these have been adjudged suffi-
cient carryings away to constitute a larceny.(g) Or, if a thief, intending to
steal plate, takes it out of a chest in which it was, and lays it down upon the
floor, but is surprised before he can make his escape with it; this is larceny.(k)
[.232 *3. This taking, and carrying away, must also be felonious; that is,
' done animofurandi: or, as the civil law expresses it, lucri causa.(i) (5)
(q) 3 Inst. 108, 109. (A) I Hawk. P. C. 93. (f) 1 Inst. 4, 1, 1.
But if the defendant merely change the position of a package from lying endways to length-
ways, for the greater convenience of taking out its contents, and cuts the outside of it for that
purpose, but is detected before he has taken any thing, there will be no larceny committed.
Id. in notes. Where it is one continuing transaction, though there be several distinct asporta-
tions in law by several persons, yet all may be indicted as principals who concur in the felony
before the final carrying away of the goods from the virtual custody of the owner: 2 East, P. 0.
557; but two cannot be convicted upon an indictment charging a joint larcency, unless there
be evidence to satisfy a jury that they were concerned in a joint taking. 2 Stark. on Evi-
dence, 840. If one steal another man's goods, and afterwards another stealeth from him, the
owner may prosecute the first or the second felon at his choice. Dalt. c. 162. There is no
occasion that the carrying away be by the hand of the party accused; for, if he procured an
innocent agent, as a child or a lunatic, to take the property, or if he obtained it from the sheriff
by a replevin, without the slightest color of title, and with a felonious design, he will himself
be a principal offender. Hawk. b. 1, c. 33, s. 12.]
(5) [The felonious quality consists in the intention of the prisoner to defraud the owner, and
to apply the thing stolen to his own use; and it is not necessary that the taking should be
done lucri causa; taking with an intent to destroy will be sufficient to constitute the offence,
if done to serve the prisoner or another person, though not in a pecuniary way. R. and R.
C. C. 292. In a late singular case it was determined that, where a servant clandestinely took
his master's corn, though to give it to his master's horses, he was guilty of larceny-the
servant in some degree being likely to diminish his labor thereby. V and R. C. C. 807; 3
Burn, J., 24th ed. 209. (See a late case, Rus. and Ry. C. C. 118, under very particular circum-
stances.) It is sufficient if the prisoner intend to appropriate the value of the chattel, and
not the chattel itself, to his own use, as where the owner of goods steals them from his own
servant or bailee, in order to charge him with the amount. 7 Hen. VI, f. 43. The intention
must exist at the time of the taking, and no subsequent felonious intention will render the
previous taking felonious.
We have seen that a taking by finding, and a subsequent conversion, will not amount to a
felony. 3 Inst. 108; 1 Hawk. c. 33, s. 2; 2 Russ. 1041. But if the goods are found in the
place where they are usually suffered to lie, as a horse on a common, cattle in the owner's
fields, or money in a place where it clearly appears the thief knew the owner to have con-
cealed it : 1 Hale, 507, 508 ; 2 East, P C. 664 ; or if the finder in any way know the owner, or
if there be any mark on the goods by which the owner can be ascertained, the taking will be
felonious. So, if a parcel be left in a hackney coach, and the driver open it, not merely from
curiosity, but with a view to appropriate part of its contents to his own use, or if the prose-
cutor order him to deliver the package to the servant, and he omits so to do, he will be guilty
of felony. 2 East, P. C. 664; 1 Leach, 413-415, and in notes.
Where the taking exists, but without fraud, it may amount only to a trespass. This is also
a point frequently depending on circumstantial evidence, and to be left for the jury's decision.
Thus, where the prisoners entered another's stable at night, and took out his horses, and rode
them thirty-two miles, and left them at an inn, and were afterwards found pursuing their
ourney on foot, they were held to have committed only a trespass, and not a felony. 2 East,
P. C. 662. It depends also on circumstances what offence it is to force a man, in the posses-
sion of goods, to sell them; if the defendant takes them, and throws down more than their
value, it will be evidence that it was only trespass; if less were offered, it would probably be
regarded as felony. 1 East Rep. 615, 636. And it seems that the taking may be only a tres-
pass, where the original assault was felonious. Thus, if a man searches the pockets of another
for money, and finds none, and afterwards throws the saddle from his horse on the ground,
and scatters bread from his packages, he will not be guilty of robbery (2 East, P. C. 662),
though he might certainly have been indicted for feloniously assaulting with intent to steal,
for that offence was complete.
The openness and notoriety of the taking, where possession has not been obtained by force
or stratagem, is a strong circumstance to rebut the inference of a felonious intention: 1 Hale,
507; 2 East, P. C. 661, 662; but this alone will not make it the less a felony. Kel. 82; 2 Raym.
276: 2 Vent. 94. A taking by mere accident, or in joke, or mistaking another's property for
one's own, is neither legally nor morally a crime. 2 Hale, 507, 509.]
440
This requisite, besides excusing those who labor under incapacities of mind or
will (of whom we spoke sufficiently at the entrance of this book),(k) indemnifies
also mere trespassers, and other petty offenders. As, if a servant takes his master's
horse without his knowledge, and brings him home again; if a neighbour takes
another's plough that is left in the field, and uses it upon his own land, and then
returns it: if under colour of arrear of rent, where none is due, I distrain
another's cattle, or seize them: all these are misdemeanors and trespasses, but
no felonies.(l) The ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is where the party
doth it clandestinely; or, being charged with the fact, denies it. But this is by
no means the only criterion of criminality: for, in cases that may amount to
larceny the variety of circumstances is so great, and the complications thereof
so mingled, that it is impossible to recount all those which may evidence a
felonious intent, or animum furandi: wherefore they must be left to the due
and attentive consideration of the court and jury.
4. This felonious taking and carrying away must be of the personal goods of
another: for, if they are things real, or savour of the realty, larceny at the
common law cannot be committed of them. Lands, tenements, and heredita-
ments (either corporeal or incorporeal) cannot in their nature be taken and
carried away. And of things, likewise, that adhere to the freehold, as corn,
grass, trees, and the like, or lead upon a house, no larceny could be committed
by the rules of the common law: but the severance of them was, and in many
things is still, merely a trespass which depended on a subtility in the legal
notions of our ancestors. These things were parcel of the real estate; and,
therefore, while they continued so, could not, by any possibility, be the sub-
ject of theft, being absolutely fixed and immovable. (m) And if they were
*severed by violence, so as to be changed into movables; and, at the ,233
same time, by one and the same continued act, carried off by the person [* ]
who severed them; they could never be said to be taken from the proprietor,
in this their newly acquired state of mobility (which is essential to the nature
of larceny), being never, as such, in the actual or constructive possession of
any one, but of him who committed the trespass. He could not, in strictness,
be said to have taken what at that time were the personal goods of another,
since the very act of taking was what turned them into personal goods. But
if the thief severs them at one time, whereby the trespass is completed, and
they are converted into personal chattels, in the constructive possession of him
on whose soil they are left or laid; and come again at another time, when they
are so turned into personalty, and take them away; it is larceny: and so it is,
if the owner, or any one else, has severed them.(n) And, now, by the statute
4 Geo. II, c. 32, to steal, or rip, cut, or break, with intent to steal, any lead, or
iron bar, rail, gate, or palisado, fixed to a dwelling-house or outhouse, or in any
court or garden thereunto belonging, or to any other building, is made felony,
liable to transportation for seven years; and to steal, damage, or destroy under-
wood or hedges, and the like, to rob orchards or gardens of fruit, growing
therein, to steal or otherwise destroy any turnips, potatoes, cabbages, parsnips,
peas, or carrots, or the roots of madder when growing, are (o) punishable, crimi-
nally, by whipping, small fines, imprisonment, and satisfaction to the party
wronged, according to the nature of the offence. Moreover, the stealing by
night of any trees, or of any roots, shrubs, or plants, of the value of 5s., is, by
statute 6 Geo. III, c. 36, made felony in the principals, aiders and abettors, and
in the purchasers thereof, knowing the same to be stolen: and by statutes 6 Geo.
III, c. 48, and 13 Geo. III, c. 33, the stealing of any timber trees therein speci-
fied,(p) and of any root, *shrub or plant, by day or night, is liable to [*234]
pecuniary penalties for the two first offences, and for the third is con- [*234
stituted a felony, liable to transportation for seven years. Stealing ore out of
(k) See page 20. (2) 1 Hal. P. C. 509. (in) See book H, p. 16. (n) 3 Inst. 109. 1 Hal. P. C. 510.
(o) Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 7. 15 Car. II, c. 2. 31 Geo. II, c. 35. 6 Geo. III, c. 4S. 9 Geo. In, c. 41. 13 Geo. III, c. 82.
(p) Oak, beech, chestnut, walnut, ash, elm, cedar, fir, asp, lime, sycamore, birch, poplar, alder, larch, maple,
and hornbeam.
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mines is also no larceny, upon the same principle of adherence to the freehold;
with an exception only to mines of black lead, the stealing of ore out of which,
or entering the same with intent to steal, is felony, punishable with imprison-
ment and whipping, or transportation not exceeding seven years; and to escape
from such imprisonment, or return from such transportation, is felony, without
benefit of clergy, by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 10. Upon nearly the same principle
the stealing of writings relating to a real estate is no felony; but a trespass: (q)
because they concern the land, or (according to our technical language) savour
of the realty, and are considered as part of it by the law: so that they descend
to the heir, together with the land which they concern.(r) (6)
Bonds, bills, and notes, which concern mere choses in action, were also, at the
common law, held not to be such goods whereof larceny might be committed;
being of no intrinsic value ;(s) and not importing any property in possession of
the person from whom they are taken. But by the statute 2 Geo. II, c. 25, they
are now put upon the same footing, with respect to larcenies, as the money they
were meant to secure. By statute 15 Geo. II, e. 13, officers or servants of the
bank of England, secreting or embezzling any note, bill, warrant, bond, deed,
security, money, or effects intrusted with them or with the company, are guilty
of felony without benefit of clergy. The same is enacted by statute 24 Geo. II,
c. 11, with respect to officers and servants of the south-sea company. And by
statute 7 Geo. III, c. 50, if any officer or servant of the post-office shall secrete,
embezzle, or destroy any letter or pacquet, containing any bank note or other
valuable paper particularly specified in the act, or shall steal the same out of
[*235] any letter or *pacquet, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of
5 clergy. Or, if he shall destroy any letter or pacquet with which he has
received money for the postage, or shall advance the rate of postage on any let-
ter or pacquet sent by the post, and shall secrete the money received by such
advancement, he shall be guilty of single felony. Larceny also could not, at
common law, be committed of treasure-trove or wreck, till seized by the king or
him who hath the franchise, for till such seizure no one hath a determinate
property therein. But by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from
any ship in distress (whether wreck or no wreck) is felony without benefit of
clergy: in like manner as, by the civil law,(t) this inhumanity is punished in
the same degree as the most atrocious theft.(7)
Larceny also cannot be committed of such animals in which there is no prop-
erty either absolute or qualified; as of beasts that are ferw naturce and unre-
claimed, such as deer, hares, and conies, in a forest, chase, or warren; fish, in an
open river or pond: or wild fowls at their natural liberty.(u) But if they are
reclaimed or confined, and may serve for food, it is otherwise, even at common
law: for of deer so inclosed in a park that they may be taken at pleasure, fish in
a trunk, and pheasants or partridges in a mew, larceny may be committed. (v) (8)
And now, by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer; to
rob a warren; or to steal fish from a river or pond (being in these cases armed
and disguised) ; also to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, in the king's forests
or chases inclosed, or in any other inclosed place where deer have been usually
kept; or by gift or promise of reward to procure any person to join them in
such unlawful act; all these are felonies without benefit of clergy. And the
statute 16 Geo. III, c. 30, enacts that every unauthorized person, his aiders and
abettors, who shall course, hunt, shoot at, or otherwise attempt to kill, wound,
or destroy any red or fallow deer in any forest, chase, purlieu, or ancient walk,
(q) 1 Hal. P. C. 510. Stra. 1137. (r) See book HT, p. 428. (s) 8 Rep. 33. (t) Cod. 6. 2. 18.
(a) I Hal. P. C. 511. Fost. 366. (v) I Hawk. P. C. 94. 1 Hal. P. C. 511.
(6) The subject of this paragraph is now covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, which
provides for the criminal punishment of the various wrongs here enumerated.
(7) The subject of this paragraph is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
(8) See Reg. v. Cheafor, 2 Den. C. C. 361. The statutes mentioned in this paragraph are now
repealed.
or in any inclosed park, paddock, wood, or other ground, *where deer r*236]
are usually kept, shall forfeit the sum of 201., or for every deer actually [236"
killed, wounded, destroyed, taken in any toil or snare, or carried away, the sum
of 301., or double those sums in case the offender be a keeper: and upon a sec-
ond offence (whether of the same or a different species), shall be guilty of felony,
and transportable for seven years. Which latter punishment is likewise inflicted
on all persons armed with offensive weapons, who shall come into such places
with an intent to commit any of the said offences, and shall there unlawfully
beat or wound any of the keepers in the execution of their offices, or Shall
attempt to rescue any person from their custody. Also, by statute 5 Geo. III,
c. 14, the penalty of transportation for seven years is inflicted on persons steal-
ing or taking fish in any water within a park, paddock, garden, orchard, or
yard: and on the receivers, aiders, and abettors: and the like punishment,
or whipping, fine, or imprisonment, is provided for the taking or killing of
conies(w) by night in open warrens: and a forfeiture of five pounds to the owner
of the fishery, is made payable by persons taking or destroying (or attempting
so to do) any fish in any river or other water within any inclosed ground, being
private property. Stealing hawks, in disobedience to the rules prescribed by the
statute 37 Edw. III, c. 19, is also felony.(x) It is also said,(y) that, if swans be
lawfully marked, it is felony to steal them, though at large in a public river;
and that it is likewise felony to steal them, though unmarked, if in any private
river or pond; otherwise it is only a trespass. But of all valuable domestic
animals, as horses and other beasts of draught, and of all animals domitc9
nature, which serve for food, as neat or other cattle, swine, poultry, and the
like, and of their fruit or produce, taken from them while living, as milk or
wool,(z) larceny may be committed; and also of the flesh of such as are either
domitce or ferm naturce, when killed. (a) As to those animals which do not serve
for food, and which, therefore, the law holds to have no intrinsic value, as dogs
of all sorts, and other creatures kept for whim and pleasure, though a man may
have a base property therein, and maintain a civil action for the loss of them,(b)
yet they are not of such estimation as that the crime of stealing them amounts
to larceny.(c) But by statute 10 Geo. III, c. 18, very high pecuniary penalties,
or a long imprisonment, and whipping in their stead, may be inflicted by two
justices of the peace (with a very extraordinary mode of appeal to the quarter
sessions), on such as steal, or knowingly harbour, a stolen dog, or have in their
custody the skin of a dog that has been stolen.(d)(9)
Notwithstanding however that no larceny can be committed, unless there be
some property in the thing taken, and an owner; yet, if the owner be unknown,
provided there be a property, it is larceny to steal it; and an indictment will
lie, for the goods of a person unknown.(e) In like manner as among the Ro-
mans, the lex Hostilia defurtis provided that a prosecution for theft might be
carried on without the intervention of the owner.(f) This is the case of steal-
ing a shroud out of a grave; which is the property of those, whoever they
were, that buried the deceased: but stealing the corpse itself, which has no
owner, (though a matter of great indecency) is no felony, unless some of the
grave-clothes be stolen with it.(g) (10) Very different from the law of the
ranks, which seems to have respected both as equal offences : when it directed
(w) See stat. 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 25. (X) a Inst. 98. (y) Dalt. Just. c. 156.
(z) Dal. 21. Crompt. 86. 1 Hawk. P. C. 93. 1 Hal. P. C. 507. The King v. Martin, by all the judges. P. 17
Geo. III.
(a) 1 Hal. P. C. 511. (b) See book Ir, p. 393. (c) 1 Hal. P. (. 512.
(d) See the remarks in page 4. The statute hath now continued eighteen sessions of parliament unrepealed.
(e) 1 Hal. P. C. 512. (.f) Gravin. 1. 3, § 106. (g) See book II, page 429.
(9) Dog stealing, under statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, may be visited with the maximum pun-
ishment of six months' imprisonment, or a forfeiture of twenty pounds over and above the
value of the dog.
(10) Violation of the sepulture is made highly penal by statutes in the United States.
It was an indictable offence at the common law, even where the body was taken up for the
purpose of dissection. See 2 East, P. C. 652; 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 382; Roscoe Cr. Ev. 392.
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that a person who had dug a corpse out of the ground in order to strip it,
should be banished from society, and no one suffered to relieve his wants, till
the relations of the deceased consented to his re-admission.(h)
Having thus considered the general nature of simple larceny, I come next to
treat of its punishment. Theft, by the Jewish law, was only punished with a pe-
cuniary fine, and satisfaction to the party injured.(i) Andin the civil law, till
some very late constitutions, we never find the punishment capital. The laws
of Draco at Athens punished it with death: but his laws were said to be writ-
ten in blood; and Solon afterwards changed the penalty to a pecuniary mulct.
And so the Attic laws in general continued; (j) except that once, in a time of
dearth, it was made capital to break into a garden and steal figs: but this law,
and the informers against the offence, grew so odious, that from them all mali-
cious informers were styled sycophants; a name which we have much perverted
from its original meaning. From these examples, as well as the reason of the
thing, many learned and scrupulous men have questioned the propriety, if not
lawfulness of inflicting capital punishment for simple theft.(k) And certainly
the natural punishment for injuries to property seems to be the loss of the of-
fender's own property; which ought to be universally the case, were all men's
fortunes equal. But as those who have no property themselves are generally
the most ready to attack the property of others, it has been found necessary in-
stead of a pecuniary to substitute a corporal punishment; yet how far this cor-
poral punishment ought to extend, is what has occasioned the doubt. Sir
Thomas More,(l) and the Marquis Beccaria,(m) at the distance of more than
two centuries from each other, have very sensibly proposed that kind of corpo-
ral punishment which approaches the nearest to a pecuniary satisfaction; viz., a
temporary imprisonment, with an obligation to labour, first for the party
robbed, and afterwards for the public, in works of the most slavish kind: in
[*237] *order to oblige the offender to repair, by his industry and diligence,
the depredations he has committed upon private property and public
order. But notwithstanding all the remonstrances of speculative politicians
and moralists, the punishment of theft still continues, throughout the greatest
part of Europe, to be capital; and Puffendorff,(n) together with Sir Matthew
Hale,(o) are of opinion that this must always be referred to the prudence of
the legislature; who are to judge, say they, when crimes are become so enor-
mous as to require such sanguinary restrictions.( p) Yet both these writers
agree, that such punishment should be cautiously inflicted, and never without
the utmost necessity.
Our ancient Saxon laws nominally punished theft with death, if above the
value of twelvepence; but the criminal was permitted to redeem his life by a
pecuniary ransom; as, among their ancestors the Germans, by a stated number
of cattle. (q) But in the ninth year of Henry the First, this power of redemption
was taken away, and all persons guilty of larceny above the value of twelve-
pence were directed to be hanged; which law continues in force to this day.(r)
For though the inferior species of theft or larceny is only punished by impris-
onment or whipping at common law,(s) or by statute 4 Geo. I, c. 11, may be
extended to transportation for seven years, as is also expressly directed in the
case of the plate-glass company, (t) yet the punishment of grand larceny, or the
stealing above the value of twelvepence, (which sum was the standard in the
(h) Montesq. Sp. L. b. 30, ch. 19. (1) Exod. c. xxii.
(j) Petit. LL. Attic. 1. 7, tit. 5.
(k) Est enim ad vindicanda furta nim8l atrox, nee tamen ad refrcsnanda suffideng; quippe neque furtum sim-
plex tam ingens factnus est, ut eapite debeat pleeti , neque ula pmna est tanta, ut ab latrocinis eohieat eo8, quI
nullam aliam artem qucerendi rictus habent. (ifori Utopia, edit. Glasg. 1750, pag. 21.)--Denique, cum lee o-
waica. quanuam incdemens et espera, tam n petunia furtum, haud morte, mulctavit ne putemus Deum, in nova
lege dementu qua paler imperat lltie majorem indulsisse noble invleem nsviendi licentiam. Hcee aunt cur nonl&ere pulem; guama nero sit absurdum, atque etiam per-niciosum relpubicce, furem atque koanicidam ez cequo
uaniri, nerno eat (opinor) ge need at. (Ibid. 39.)() lUtp. page42. () h. 22. (n) L. of N. b. 8, c. 3. (o) 1 Hal. P. . 13.
(p) See page . (g Tac. de nar. Germ. c. 12. (r) 1 Hal. P. c. 12. 3 Inst. 53.( y) 3 Inst. 218. (t) Stat. 13 Geo. fI, c. 38.
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time of King Athelstan, eight hundred years ago,) is at common law regularly
death. Which, considering the great intermediate alteration (u) in the price or
denomination of *money, is undoubtedly a very rigorous constitution .
and made Sir Henry Spelman (above a century since, when money was [*238]
at twice its present rate), complain, that while every thing else was risen in its
nominal value, and become dearer, the life of man had continually grown
cheaper.(v) It is true, that the mercy of juries will often make them strain a
point, and bring in larceny to be under the value of twelvepence, when it is
really of much greater value: but this, though evidently justifiable and proper,
when it only reduces the present nominal value of money to the ancient stand-
ard,(w) is otherwise a kind of pious perjury, and does not at all excuse our
common law in this respect froa the imputation of severity, but rather strongly
confesses the charge. It is likewise true, that by the merciful extensions of
the benefit of clergy by our modern statute law, a person who commits a simple
larceny to the value of thirteen pence or thirteen hundred pounds, though
guilty of a capital offence, shall be excused the pains of death: but this is only
for the first offence. And in many cases of simple larceny the benefit of clergy
is taken away by statute; as for horse-stealing in the principals, and accesso-
ries both before and after the fact; (x) theft by great and notorious thieves in
Northumberland and Cumberland; (y) taking woollen cloth from off the tent-
ers,(z) or linens, fustians, calicoes, or cotton goods from the place of manufac-
ture (a) (which extends, in the last case, to aiders, assisters, procurers, buyers,
and receivers); feloniously driving away, or otherwise stealing one or more
sheep or other cattle specified in the *acts, or killing them with intent *391
to steal the whole or any part of the carcase,(b) or aiding or assisting *2 ]
therein; thefts on navigable rivers above the value of forty shillings, (c) or
being present, aiding and assisting thereat: plundering vessels in distress, or that
have suffered shipwreck ;(d ) stealing letters sent by the post,(e) (11) alnd also steal-
ing deer, fish, hares, and conies under the peculiar circumstances mentioned in
the Waltham black act.(f) Which additional severity is owing to the great
malice and mischief of the theft in some of these instances; and, in others,
to the difficulties men would otherwise lie under to preserve these goods, which
are so easily carried off. Upon which last principle the Roman law punished
more severely than other thieves the abiegi, or stealers of cattle; (g) and the
balnearii, or such as stole the clothes of persons who were washing in the public
baths;(h) both which constitutions seem to be borrowed from the laws of
Athens.(i) And so, too, the ancient Goths punished with unrelenting severity
thefts of cattle or corn that was reaped and left in the field: such kind of
property (which no human industry can sufficiently guard) being esteemed
under the peculiar custody of heaven.(j) And thus much for the offence of
simple larceny.
Mixed or compound larceny is such as has all the properties of the former,
(u) In the reign of King Henry I, the stated value, at the exchequer, of a pasture-fed ox, was one shilling
(Dial. de Scacc. 1. 1, § 7), which, if we should even suppose to mean the solidus legalis mentioned by Lyndewode
(Prov. 1. 3, c. 13. See book II, page 509), or the 72d part of a pound of gold, is only equal to 138. 4d. of the
present standard.
v) Gloss. 350. (w) 2 Inst. 189.
x) Stat. 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 33. 31 Eliz. c. 12. (y) Stat. 18 Car. I, c. 3.
(z) Stat. 22 Car. ii, c. 5. But, as it sometimes is difficult to prove the identity of the goods so stolen,
the onus probandi with respect to innocence is now by statute 15 Geo. II, C. 27, thrown on the persons in whose
custody such goods are found; the failure whereof is, for the first time, a misdemeanor punishable by the for-
feiture of the treble value; for the second, by imprisonment, also; and the third time it becomes a felony, pun-
ished with transportation for seven years.
(a) Stat. 18 Geo. II, c. 27. Note, in the three last cases an option is given to the judge to transport the offen-
der: for life in the first case, for seven years in the second, and forfourteen years in the third; in the first and
third cases instead of sentence of death, in the second after sentence is given.
(b) Stat. 14 Oeo. Ii, c. 6. 15 Geo. II, c. 34. See book 1, page 88. (c) Stat. 24 Geo. II, c. 45.
(d) St. 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18. 26 Geo. II, c. 19. (e) Stat. 7 Geo. I, c. 50. f) Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 22.
(7) Ff. 47, t. 14. (h) Ibid. t. 17. (i) Pott. Antiq, b. 1, c. 26.
(j) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 5.
(11) Offences relating to the post-office were provided for by statute 7 Win. IV, and 1 Vic.
c. 36. As to the other offences nientioned in this paragraph, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. e. 96.
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but is accompanied with either one or both of the aggravations of a taking from
one's house or person. First, therefore, of larceny from the house, and then of
larceny from the person.
1. Larceny from the house, though it seems (from the considerations men-
tioned in the preceding chapter) (c) to have a higher degree of guilt than simple
[*240] larceny, yet it is not at all *distinguished from the other at common
law; (1) unless where it is accompanied with the circumstance of break-
ing the house by night; and then we have seen that it falls under another
description, viz., that of burglary. But now by several acts of parliament (the
history of which is very ingeniously deduced by a learned modern writer,(rn)
who bath shown them to have gradually arisen from our improvements in trade
and opulence), the benefit of clergy is taken from larcenies committed in a house
in almost every instance; except that larceny of the stock or utensils of the
plate-glass company from any of their houses, &c., is made only a single felony,
and liable to transportation for seven years.(n) The multiplicity of the general
acts is apt to create some confusion; but upon comparing them diligently we
may collect, that the benefit of clergy is denied upon the following domestic
aggravations of larceny; viz.: First, in larcenies above the value of twelvepence,
committed, 1. In a church or chapel, with or without violence, or breaking the
same; (o) 2. In a booth or tent, in a market or fair, in the day-time or in the
night, by violence or breaking the same; the owner or some of his family being
therein: (p) 3. By robbing a dwelling-house in the day-time (which robbing
implies a breaking), any person being therein: (q) 4. In a dwelling-house by
day or by night, without breaking the same, any person being therein put in
fear; (r) which amounts in law to a robbery; and in both these last cases the
accessory before the fact is also excluded from his clergy. Secondly, in larcenies
to the value of five shillings, committed, 1. By breaking any dwelling-house or
any outhouse, shop, or warehouse thereunto belonging in the day-time, although
no person be therein; (s) which also now extends to aiders, abettors, and acces-
[,OA11 sories before the fact: (t) 2. By privately stealing goods, *wares, or mer-
L chandise in any shop, ware-house,(u) coachhouse, or stable, by day or
by night; though the same be not broken open, and though no person be there-
in: (v) which likewise extends to such as assist, hire, or command the offence
to be committed. Lastly, in larcenies to the value of forty shillings in a dwelling-
house, or its outhouses, although the same be not broken, and whether any per-
son be therein or no; unless committed against their masters by apprentices
under the age of fifteen.(w) This also extends to those who aid or assist in the
commission of any such offence.(12)
2. Larceny from the person is either by privately stealing; or by open and
violent assault, which is usually called robbery.
The offence of privately stealing from a man's person, as by picking his
pocket or the like, privily without his knowledge, was debarred of the benefit
of clergy, so early as by the statute 8 Eliz. c. 4. But then it must be such
a larceny as stands in need of the benefit of clergy, viz., of above, the value of
twelvepence; else the offender shall not have judgment of death. For the
statute creates no new offence; but only prevents the prisoner from praying the
benefit of clergy, and leaves him to the regular judgment of the ancient law.(x)
This severity (for a most severe law it certainly is) seems to be owing to the
(k) See page 223. (1) 1 Hawk. P. C. 98. (in) Barr. 375, &c. (n) Stat. 13 Geo. III, c. 38.
(0) Stat. 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1. 1 Edw. VI c 12 1 Hal. P. C. 518.
(p) Stat. 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 9. 1 Hal. P.C. 522. (q) Stat. 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9. (r) ibid.
(s) Stat. 89 Eliz. c. 15. (t) Stat. 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9. (u) See Foster, 78. Barr. 379.
(v) Stat. 10 and 11 Win. M, c. 23. (w) Stat. 12 Ann. at. 1, c. 7.
() 1 Hawk. P. C. 98. The like observation will certainly hold in the cases of horse-stealing (1 Hal. P. C.
5. ), thefts in Northumberland and Cumberland, and stealing woollen cloths from the tenters; and possibly
in such other cases where it is provided by any statute that simple larceny under certain circumstances shall
be felony without benefit of clergy.
(12) See, as to this offence, statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
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ease with which such offences are committed, the difficulty of guarding against
them, and the boldness with which they were practiced (even in the queen's
court and presence) at the time when this statute was made: besides that this
is an infringement of property, in the manual occupation or corporal possession
of the *owner, which was an offence even in a state of nature. And [*242]
therefore the saccularii, or cut-purses, were more severely punished than
common thieves by the Roman and Athenian laws.(y)(13)
Open and violent larceny from the person, or robbery, the rapina of the
civilians, is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of
goods or money to any value, by violence or putting him in fear.(z)
1. There must be a taking, otherwise it is no robbery. A mere attempt to rob
was indeed held to be felony, so late as Henry the Fourth's time: (a) but after
wards it was taken to be only a misdemeanor, and punishable with fine and
imprisonment; till the statute 7 Geo. II, c. 21, which makes it a felony (trans-
portable for seven years) unlawfully and maliciously to assault another with any
offensive weapon or instrument; or by menaces, or by other forcible or violent
manner, to demand any money or goods; with a felonious intent to rob. If
the thief, having once taken a purse, returns it, still it is a robbery; and so it is
whether the taking be strictly from the person of another, or in his presence
only ; as, where a robber by menaces and violence puts a man in fear, and drives
away his sheep or his cattle before his face.(b) But if the taking be not either
directly from his person, or in his presence, it is no robbery.(c) 2. It is imma-
terial of what value the thing taken is: a penny as well as a pound, thus forci-
bly extorted, makes a robbery. (d) 3. Lastly, the taking must be by force, or a pre-
vious putting in fear; which makes the violation of the person more atrocious than
privately stealing. For, according to the maxim of the civil law (e) "qui vi
rapuit, fur inprobior esse videtur." This previous violence, or putting in
fear, is the criterion that distinguishes robbery from other larcenies. For if one
*privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards *,43,
keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is sub- L ]
sequent: (f) neither is it capital, as privately stealing, being under the value of
twelvepence. Not that it is indeed necessary, though usual, to lay in the indict-
ment that the robbery was committed by putting in fear; it is sufficient, if
laid to be done by violence.(g) And when it is laid to be done by putting in
fear, this does not imply any great degree of terror or affright in the party rob-
bed: it is enough that so much force, or threatening by word or gesture, be
used, as might create an apprehension of danger, or induce a man to part with
his property without or against his consent.(h) Thus, if a man be knocked
down without previous warning, and stripped of his property while senseless,
though strictly he cannot be said to be put in fear, yet this is undoubtedly a
robbery. Or, if a person with a sword drawn begs an alms, and I give it him
through mistrust and apprehension of violence, this is a felonious robbery.(i) So
if, under a pretence of sale, a man forcibly extorts money from another, neither
shall this subterfuge avail him. But it is doubted,(j) whether the forcing a
higler, or other chapman, to sell his wares, and giving him the full value of
them, amounts to so heinous a crime as robbery.(14)
y) F47,11,7. Pott.Anti. 1. 1 c. 26. (z) I Hawk. P. C. 95. (a) i Hal. F. C. 532.
(b) i1al
. 
P. C 5,. () 1 Comeyns 478. Stra. 1015. (d) 1 Hawk. P. 
C. 97.
(e) .zY. 4, 2, 14, §12. (f) I Hal P. C. 534. (g) Trin. 3 Ann. by all the judges.
(h) Fost. 128. (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 96. (3) Ibid. 97.
(13) This subject is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96. If a robbery is com-
mitted, being armed, or by more than one person, and with personal violence, the punishment
may be penal servitude for life; in other cases it is limited to penal servitude for not more
than fourteen nor less than three years, or to imprisonment not more than two years.
(14) [And see R. and R. C. C. 146; 1 Leach, 139, 193, 278; 3 Chit. Cr. L. 803. Mr. Justice
Ashurst says: " The true definition of robbery is the stealing or taking from the person of
another, or in the presence of another, property of any amount with such a degree of force
or terror, as to induce the party unwillingly to part with his property; and whether terror
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This species of larceny is debarred of the benefit of clergy by statute 23 Hen.
VIII, c. 1, and other subsequent statutes, not indeed in general, but only when
committed in a dwelling-house, or in or near the king's highway. A robbery,
therefore, in a distant field or footpath, was not punished with death; (k) but
was open to the benefit of clergy, till the statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, which
takes away clergy from both principals and accessories before the fact, in rob-
bery, wheresoever committed.
11. Malicious mischief, or damage, is the next species of injury to private
property, which the law considers as a public crime. This is such as is done,
not animo furandi, or with an intent of gaining by another's loss; which is
some though a weak excuse: but either out of a spirit of wanton cruelty, or
black and diabolical revenge. In which it bears a near relation to the crime of
arson ; for as that affects the habitation, so this does the other property of indi-
viduals. And therefore any damage arising from this mischievous disposition,
though only a trespass at common law, is now by a multitude of statutes made
penal in the highest degree. Of these I shall extract the contents in order of
time.
(k) I HaI P. C. 535.
arises from real or expected violence to the person, or from a sense of injury to the character,
makes no kind of difference; for to most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation
is equally, if not more terrific, than the dread of personal injury. The principal ingredient
in robbery is a man's being forced to part with his property; and the judges are unanimously
of opinion, that, upon the principles of law, as well as the authority of former decisions, a
threat to accuse a man of the greatest of all crimes, is a sufficient force to constitute the crime
of robbery by putting in fear." 1 Leach, 280. And fear of loss of character and service upon
a charge of sodomitical practices, is sufficient to constitute robbery, though the party has no
fear of being taken into custody or of punishment. R. and R. C. C. 375. But if no actual
force was used, and, at the time of parting with the money, the party were under no appre-
hension, but gave it merely for the purpose of bringing the offenders to justice, they cannot
be capitally convicted, though we have seen it is otherwise where personal violence is
employed. 1 East, P. C. 734; R. and R. C. C. 408. And the influence exercised over the
mind, where the force is merely constructive, must be of such kind as to disenable the prose-
cutor to make resistance. 2 Leach, 721; 6 East, 126. So that a threat to take an innocent
person before a magistrate, and thence to prison, without charging him with any specific
crime, is not sufficient to make the party a robber, if he obtain money to induce him to for-
bear. 2 Leach, 721. Indeed it has been said that the only instance in which a threat will
supply the place of force is an accusation of unnatural practices. 2 Leach, 730, 731 ; id. 139 ;
2 Russ. 1009. And it has recently been held, contrary, it seems, to the principle of some
former decisions, that, even in this case, the money must be taken immediately on the threat,
and not after time has been allowed to the prosecutor to deliberate and advise with friends as
to the best course to be pursued: 1 East, P. C. Append. xxi; though as some of the judges
dissented, it does not seem to be decisive. Where, on the other hand, there is an immediate
threat of injury to the property, as by pulling down a house with a mob in time of riots, which
produces great alarm, and induces a man to part with his money, this has been holden to be
a sufficient putting in fear to constitute a robbery. 2 East, P. C. 729, 731. And if a man
assaults a woman with intent to commit a rape, and she, in order to prevail on him to desist,
offers him money, which he takes, but continues his endeavors till prevented bythe approach
of a third person, he will be guilty of robbery, though his original intent was to ravish.
1 East, P. C. 711. If thieves meet a person and, by menaces of death, make him swear to
bring them money, and he, under the continuing influence of fear for his life, complies, this
is robbery in them, though it would not be so if he had no personal fear, and acted merely
from a superstitious regard to an oath so extorted. 1 East, P. C. 714. In the absence of force,
to constitute robbery the fear must arise before and at the time of the property being taken;
it is not enough that it arise afterwards; and where the prisoner by stealth took some money
out of the prosecutor's pocket, who turned round, saw the prisoner, and demanded the money,
but the prisoner threatening him, he desisted through fear from making any farther demand,
it was held no robbery. Roll. Rep. 154; 1 Hale, 534.
To constitute a robbery, where an actual violence is relied on, and no putting in fear can
be expressly shown, there must be a struggle, or at least a personal outrage. So that to snatch
property suddenly from the hand, to seize a parcel carried on the head, to carry away a hat
and wig without force, and to take an umbrella of a sudden, have been respectively holden
to be mere larcenies. 1 Leach, 290, 291, and in notes. But where a man snatched at the
sword of a gentleman hanging at his side, and the latter, perceiving the design, laid hold on
the scabbard, on which a contest ensued, and the thief succeeded in wresting the weapon from
the owner, his offence was holden to be robbery. Id. Snatching an article from a man will
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*And, first, by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 11, perversely and maliciously E.244]
to cut down or destroy the powdike, in the fens of Norfolk and Ely, is [*4
felony. And in like manner it is, by many special statutes enacted upon the
occasions, made felony to destroy the several sea-banks, river-banks, public
navigations, and bridges, erected by virtue of those acts of parliament.(15) By
statute 43 Eliz. c. 13 (for preventing rapine on the northern borders), to burn;
any barn or stack of corn or grain; or to imprison or carry away any subject,
in order to ransom him, or to make prey or spoil of his person or goods upon
deadly feud or otherwise, in the four northern counties of Northumberland,
Westmoreland, Cumberland, and Durham, or being accessory before the fact to
such carrying away or imprisonment; or to give or take any money or contri-
bution, there called blackmail, to secure such goods from rapine; is felony with-
out benefit of clergy. By statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 7, maliciously, unlawfully,
and willingly, in the night time, to burn, or cause to be burnt or destroyed, any
ricks or stacks of corn, hay, or grain, barns, houses, buildings, or kilns; or to
kill any horses, sheep, or other cattle, is felony; but the offender may make
his election to be transported for seven years; and to maim or hurt such,
*horses, sheep, or other cattle, is a trespass for which treble damages [*245]
shall be recovered. By statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 23, to burn on any
waste, between Candlemas and Midsummer, any grig, ling, heath, furze, goss, or
fern, is punishable with whipping and confinement in the house of correction.
By statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, captains and mariners belonging to ships, and des-
troying the same, to the prejudice of the owners (and by 4 Geo. I, c. 12, to the
prejudice of insurers also), are guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. And
by statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, making any hole in a ship, in distress, or stealing
her pumps, or aiding or abetting such offences, or wilfully doing any thing tend-
ing to the immediate loss of such ship, is felony without benefit of clergy. By,
statute 1 Geo. I, c. 48, maliciously to set on fire any underwood, wood, or coppice,
is made single felony. By statute 6 Geo. I, c. 23, the wilful and malicious tear-
ing, cutting, spoiling, burning, or defacing of the garments or clothes of any
person passing in the streets or highways, with intent so to do, is felony. This
was occasioned by the insolence of certain weavers and others; who, upon the
introduction of some Indian fashions prejudical to their own manufactures,
made it their practice to deface them; either by open outrage, or by privily
cutting, or casting aqua fortis in the streets upon such as wore them. By
statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, commonly called the Waltham black act, occasioned by
the devastations committed near Waltham in Hampshire, by persons in disguise
constitute robbery if it is attached to his person or clothes so as to afford resistance; and.
therefore, where the prosecutor's watch was fastened to a steel chain which went round his
neck, and the seal and chain hung from his fob, and the prisoner laid hold of the seal and
chain and pulled the watch from the fob, but the steel chain still secured it, and by two jerks'
the prisoner broke the steel chain, and made off with the watch, it was held a robbery, for
the prisoner did not get the watch at once, but had to overcome the resistance the steel chain
made, and actual force was used for that purpose. R. and R. C. C. 419. And where a heavy
diamond pin, with a corkscrew stalk, which was twisted and strongly fastened in a lady's
hair, was snatched out, and part of the hair torn away, the judges came to a similar decision.
1 Leach, 335. The case of the man who tore an ear-ring from the ear, and in so doing lace-
rated the flesh, serves also to confirm this position. 1 Leach, 320. Nor will it excuse the
violence that it was done under pretence of law; for where a bailiff handcuffed a prisoner
and used her with great cruelty, for the purpose of extorting money from her, he was holden
to be guilty; as were also a number of men for seizing a wagon under pretence that there
was no permit, when none was in reality necessary. 1 Leach, 280; 1 East, P. C. 709.]
That extorting money or other thingof value by means of a charge of sodomy may be robbery,
see People v. McDaniels, I Parker, 198. But this is an exceptional case, and it is held not rob-
bery to extort money by means of the charge of any other offence, as, for instance, forgery.
Long v. State, 12 Geo. 293; Britt v. State, 7 Humph. 45. Obtaining money from a woman
under a threat to accuse her husband of an indecent assault, was held not to be robbery in Rex
v. Edwards, 5 C. and P. 518; 1 Moo. and R. 257.
(15) See as to this offence statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 97. The same statute provides generally
for the other offences mentioned in this paragraph.
VOL. II.-57 449
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF.
or with their faces blacked (who seem to have resembled the Roberdsmen, or
followers of Robert Hood, that in the reign of Richard the First committed
great outrages on the borders of England and Scotland) ;(l) by this black act, I
say, which has in part been mentioned under the several heads of riots, menaces,
mayhem, and larceny,(m) it is farther enacted, that to set fire to any house,
barn, or outhouse (which is extended by statute 9 Geo. III, c. 29, to the
*malicious and wilful burning or setting fire to all kinds of mills), or
[*241] to any hovel, cock, mow, or stack of corn, straw, hay, or wood; or un-
lawfully and naliciously to break down the head of any fish pond, whereby the
fish shall be lost or destroyed; or in like manner to kill, maim, or wound any
cattle: or cut down or destroy any trees planted in an avenue, or growing in a
garden, orchard, or plantation, for ornament, shelter, or profit; all these mali-
cious acts, or procuring by gift or promise of reward any person to join them
therein, are felonies without benefit of clergy; and the hundred shall be charge-
able for the damages, unless the offender be convicted. In like manner by the
Roman law to cut down trees, and especially vines, was punished in the same
degree as robbery.(n) By statutes 6 Geo. II, c. 37, and 10 Geo. II, c. 32, it is
also made felony, without the benefit of clergy, maliciously to cut down any
river or sea-baik, whereby lands may be overflowed or damaged; or to cut any
hop-binds growing in a plantation of hops, or wilfully and maliciously to set on
fire, or cause to be set on fire, any mine, pit, or depth of coal. By statute 11
Geo. II, c. 22, to use any violence in order to deter any person from buying corn
or grain; to seize any carriage or horse carrying grain or meal to or from any
market or sea port; or to use any outrage with such intent; or to scatter, take
away, spoil, or damage such grain or meal; is punished for the first offence with
imprisonment and public whipping: and the second offence, or destroying any
granary where corn is kept for exportation, or taking away or spoiling any grain
or meal in such granary, or in any ship, boat, or vessel intended for exporta-
tion, is felony, subject to transportation for seven years. By statute 28 Geo. II,
c. 19, to set fire to any goss, furze, or fern, growing in any forest or chase, is
subject to a fine of five pounds. By statutes 6 Geo. III, cc. 36 and 48, and
13 Geo. III, c. 33, wilfully to spoil or destroy any timber or other trees, roots
*,47, *shrubs, or plants, is for the two first offences liable to pecuniary penal-
ties; and for the third, if in the day time, and even for the first, if at
night, the offender shall be guilty of felony, and liable to transportation for
seven years. By statute 9 Geo. III, c. 29, wilfully and maliciously to burn or
destroy any engine or other machines, therein specified, belonging to any mine;
or any fences for inclosures pursuant to any act of parliament, is made single
felony, and punishable with transportation for seven years, in the offender, his
advisers, and procurers. And by statute 13 Geo. III, c. 38, the like punishment
is inflicted on such as break into any house, &c., belonging to the plate-glass
company, with intent to steal, cut, or destroy, any of their stock or utensils, or
wilfully and maliciously cut or destroy the same. And these are the principal
punishments of malicious mischief.
III. Forgery, (16) or the crimenfalsi, is an offence, which was punished by
the civil law with deportation or banishment, and sometimes with death. (o) It
(1) 3 Inst. 197. (m) See pages 144, 208, 235, 240. (n) ly. 47, 7, 2. (o) Inst. 4, 18, 7.
(16) [FORGERY. We will endeavor to elucidate the nature of, and what constitutes, this
offence, by considering, 1. What false making is sufficient; 2. With what intent the forgery
must be committed; and, 3. How far the instrument forged must appear to be genuine. The
consideration of what instruments may be the subjects of forgery will follow.
I. WHAT FALSE MAKING IS SUFFICIENT. It is not necessary that the whole instrument
should be fictitious. Making a fraudulent insertion, alteration, or erasure, in any material
part of a true document, by which another may be defrauded; the fraudulent application of
a false signature to a true instrument, or a real signature to a false one; and the alteration of
a date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, by which its payment may be accelerated, are
forgeries. 1 Hale, 683-685; 4 .T. R. 320. Altering a bill from a lower to a higher sum is
forging it; and a person may be indicted on the 7 Geo. II, c. 22, for forging such an instru-
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may with us be defined, at common law, to be, "the fraudulent making or alter-
ation of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right ;" for which the of-
fender may suffrr fine, imprisonment, and pillory. And also by a variety ot
statutes, a more severe punishment is inflicted on the offender in many particu-
went, though the statute has the word alter as well as forge; and in the same case it was held
no ground of defence, that before the alteration it had been paid by the drawer and re-issued.
R. and R. C. C. 88; 2 East, P. C. 979, S. C. So altering a banker's one pound note, by substi-
tuting the word ten for the word one, is a forgery. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 101 ; 2 Burn, J., 24th ed.,
491 ; 2 East P. C. 986. If a note be made payable at a country banker's, or at their banker's in
London, who fails, it is forgery to introduce a piece of paper over the names of the London
bankers, who have so failed, containing the names of another banking-house in London.
Russ. and By. C. C. 164; 2 Taunt. 828; 2 Leach, 1040, S. C.; and see 2 East, P. C. 856;
2 Burn, J. 24th ed. 492, S.C. Expunging an indorsment on a bank note with a liquor unknown,
has been bolden to be an erasure within 8 and 9 Win. III, c. 20, and 3 P. Wms. 419. The
instrument must, in itself, be false; for if a man merely pass for another, who is the maker or
indorser of a true instrument, it is no forgery, though it may be within the statute of false
pretences. 1 Leach, 229. The instrument counterfeited must also bear a resemblance to that
for which it is put forth, but need not be perfect or complete: it is sufficient if it is calculated
to impose on mankind in general, though an individual skilled in that kind of writings would
detect its fallacy. Thus, if it appears that several persons have taken forged bank notes as good
ones, the offender will be deemed guilty of counterfeiting them, though a person from the bank
should swear that they would never impose on him, being, in several respects, defective.
2 East, P. C. 950. And it has been holden that a bank note may be counterfeited, though the
paper contains no water mark, and though the word pounds is omitted, that word being sup-
plied by the figures in the margin. 1 Leach, 174. For it was said that in forgery there need
not be an exact resemblance, but it is sufficient if the instrument counterfeited be prima face
fitted to pass for the writing which it represents. 1 Leach, 179. As to how far the instrument
should appear genuine, and the forging of fictitious names, see infra, div. III.
II. WITH WHAT INTENT THE FORGERY MUST BE COMMITTED. The very essence of for-
gery is an intent to defraud; and, therefore, the mere imitation of another's writing, the as-
sumption of a name, or the alteration of a written instrument, where no person can be injured,
does not come within the definition of the offence. Most of the statutes expressly make an
intent to defraud a necessary ingredient in the crime; whether it existed or not is a question
for the jury to determine. But it is in no case necessary that any actual injury should result
from the offence. 2 Stra. 747; 2 Lord Raym. 1461. The question as to the party's intent, is
for a jury, and such jury ought to infer an intent to defraud the person who would have to
pay the instrument, if it were genuine, although, from the manner of executing the forgery,
or from that person's ordinary caution, it would not be likely to impose on him, and although
the object was general, to defraud whoever might take the instrument, and the intention of
defrauding, in particular, the person who would have to pay the instrument, if genuine, did
not enter into the prisoner's contemplation. R. and Ry. C. C. 291; and see id. 769.
III. How FAR THE INSTRUMENT FORGED MUST APPEAR GENUINE. It is of no conse-
quence whether the counterfeited instrument be such as if real would be effectual to the pur-
pose it intends, so long as there is a sufficient resemblance to impose on those to whom it is
uttered. Whether the fraud be effected on the party to whom an instrument is addressed, or
whose writing is counterfeited, or on a third person who takes it upon the credit it assumes,
is immaterial. Thus, to counterfeit a conveyance with a wrong name, has been deemed
within 5 Eliz. c. 14, though it would have been ineffectual if genuine. 1 Keb. 803; 3 id. 51.
The fabrication of an order for payment of a sailor's prize-money is forgery, as we have
already seen, though it be invalid as wanting the requisites required by statute. 2 Leach, 883.
The offence of uttering a forged stamp will be complete, though, at the time of uttering, that
part which in a genuine stamp would in terms specify the amount of duty is concealed, and
in fact cut out, and though that part where the papers were entire did not contain any thing
specifying the amount of duty, provided the parts left visible are like a genuine stamp. Russ.
and Ry. C. C. 229, 212. We have also seen that the forgery of an instrument, as a last will,
comes within the statutes, although the supposed testator is living. 1 Leach, 449. And it
may be collected from a number of cases, that forgery in the name of a person who has no
real existence is as much criminal as if there was an intent to defraud an individual whose
writing is counterfeited. 1 Leach, 83. Thus, the making of a bill of exchange is within the
acts, though all the names to it are fictitious. 2 East, P. C. 957. To counterfeit a power of
attorney, as by the administratrix and daughter of a seaman who died childless, is capital.
Fost. 116. Nor is it necessary that any additional credit should be obtained by using the fic-
titious name. 1 Leach, 172, and see R. and Ry. C. C. 75, 90, 209, 278. So, to put a fictitious
name on a bill indorsed in blank, in order to circulate it with secrecy, is a similar offence. 1
Leach, 215. And indeed it seems that it is not necessary, to constitute forgery, that there
should be an intent to defraud any particular person, and a general intent to defraud will suf-
fice. 3 T. R. 176; 1 Leach, 216, 217, in notes. But to support a charge of forgery, by sub-
scribing a fictitious name, there must be satisfactory evidence on the part of the prosecutor
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lar cases, which are so multiplied of late as almost to become general. I shall
mention the principal instances. (17)
By statute 5 Eliz. c. 14, to forge or make, or knowingly to publish or give in
evidence, any forged deed, court-roll or will, with intent to affect the right of
real property, either freehold or copyhold, is punished by a forfeiture to the
party grieved of double costs and damages by standing in the pillory, and
having both his ears cut off, and his nostrils slit and seared; by forfeiture to
the crown of the profits of his lands, and by perpetual imprisonment. For any
[*24,] forgery *relating to a term of years, or annuity, bond, obligation,
acquittance, release or discharge of any debt or demand of any personal
chattels, the same forfeiture is given to the party grieved; and on the offender
is inflicted the pillory, loss of one of his ears, and a year's imprisonment: the
second offence in both cases being felony without benefit of clergy.
Besides this general act, a multitude of others, since the revolution (when
paper credit was first established), have inflicted capital punishment on the
forging, altering or uttering as true, when forged, of any bank bills or notes, or
other securities;(p) (18) of bills of credit issued from the exchequer;(q) of South-
(p) Stat 8. 9 Win. III, c. 20, J 36. 11 Geo. I, c. 9. 12 Geo. I, c. 32. 15 Geo. II, c. 13. 13 Geo. I, c. 79.
(q) See the several acts for issuing them.
that it is not the party's real name, and that it was assumed for the purpose of fraud in that
instance. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 260. Assuming and using a fictitious name, though for pur-
poses of concealment and fraud, will not amount to forgery, if it were not for that very fraud
or system of fraud, of which the forgery forms a part. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 260. If there is
proof of what is the prisoner's real name, it is for him to prove that he used the assumed
name before the time he had the fraud in view, even in the absence of all proof as to what
name he had used for several years, before the fraud in question. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 278;
id. 405; 3 Brod. and Bing. 228, S. C.; 2 Burn, J., 24th ed. 510; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 463,
S.C.
A defect in the stamp will not avail the prisoner: 1 Leach, 257, 258, in notes; 2 East, P. C.
955 ; and it has even been decided that, if there be no stamp at all on a counterfeit promissory
note, it may still be forgery: 2 Leach, 703 ; though this case seems to go too far; for how can
a promissory note, without the appearance of a stamp, have such a similitude to a genuine in-
strument as is requisite to constitute forgery? But though the validity of the instrument if
real is thus immaterial, it must not appear on its face, so that no one of common understand-
ing would give it credit. Thus, it will not be forgery to fabricate a will for land, as attested
by only two witnesses. 2 East, P. C. 953. Nor is it felony to counterfeit a bill of exchange
for a sum more than twenty shillings and less than five pounds, without mentioning the abode
of the payee and being attested by a subscribing witness; as such an instrument is, by 17 Geo.
III, c. 30, absolutely void. 1 Leach, 431. These cases will sufficiently explain the law on this
subject.]
(17) The 24 and 25 Vic. c. 98, consolidates the various statutes on this subject, and goes with
great particularity into an enumeration of the cases which shall be punishable under it. The
punishment in some cases may be penal servitude for life.
Besides the punishment to which the forger is subject, he becomes, at common-law, infamous,
and incapable of giving evidence. Co. Litt. 6, b. ; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 373. But to have this effect,
there must be both a conviction and a judgment. Rex v. Castell, 8 East, 77; Rex v. Teal, 11
id. 309; People v. Whiffie, 9 Cow. 707. The disability will be removed by a reversal of
judgment, or by pardon: People v. Pease, 3 Johns. Cas. 333; and it is not competent to attach
to the pardon a condition that the disability shall still remain. Id.
Statutes, in some cases, have changed this common law rule, either bymaking the convicted
party a competent witness after he has endured the punishment, or by making the infamy of
a person an objection to his credibility only.
(18) [What circumstances are sufficient to constitute the offence of uttering, which must be
attended with a guilty knowledge, and what proofs required to substantiate it, may be
deduced from the following abstract of decided cases, which have been selected from among
many others. Where a prisoner, charged with uttering a forged note to A B, knowing it to
be forged, gave forged notes to a boy, who was not aware of their being forgeries, and
directed the boy to pay away the note described in the indictment at A B's for the purchase of
goods, and the boy did so, and brought back the goods and the change to the prisoner; it was
held by the twelve judges an uttering by the prisoner to A B. Rex v. Giles, Car. C. L. 191. So
the delivering a box containing, among other things, forged stamps, to the party's own ser-
vant, that he might carry them to an inn to be forwarded by a carrier to a customer in the
country, is an uttering. And if the delivery be in one county, and the inn to Which they are
carried by the servant in another, the prisoner may be indicted in the former. The offence
of uttering a forged stamp will be complete, although at the time of uttering, certain parts f
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sea bonds, &c. ;(r) of lottery tickets or orders; (s) of army or navy debentures; (t)
of East India bonds;(u) of writings under the seal of the London, or royal
exchange assurance ;(w) of the hand of the receiver of the pre-fines ;(x) or of
the accountant-general and certain other officers of the court of chancery ;(y)
of a letter of attorney or other power to receive or transfer stock or annuities;
and on the personating a proprietor thereof, to receive or transfer such annui
ties, stock or dividends ;(z) also on the personating, or procuring to be person-
ated, any seaman or other person, entitled to wages or other naval emoluments,
or any of his personal representatives; and the taking, or procuring to be
taken, any false oath in order to obtain a probate, or letters of administration
in order to receive such payments; and the forging or procuring to be forged
and likewise the uttering, or publishing, as true, of any counterfeited seaman's
*will or power: (a) to which may be added, though not strictly reducible 01
to this head, the counterfeiting of Mediterranean passes, under the [*24J
hands of the lords of the admiralty, to protect one from the piratical states of
Barbary ;(b) the forging or imitating of any stamps to defraud the public revenue (c)
and the forging of any marriage-register or license ;(d) all which are by distinct
acts of parliament made felonies without benefit of clergy. By statute 13 Geo.
III, cc. 52 and 59, forging or counterfeiting any stamp or mark to denote the
standard of gold and silver plate, and certain other offences of the like tendency,
are punished with transportation for fourteen years. By statute 12 Geo. III, c. 48
certain frauds on the stamp-duties, therein described, principally by using the sam-
stamps more than once, are made single felony, and liable to transportation for
seven years. And the same punishment is inflicted by statute 13 Geo. III, c. 38, on
such as counterfeit the common seal of the corporation for manufacturing plate-
glass (thereby erected) or knowingly demand money of the company by virtue
of any writing under such counterfeit seal.
There are also certain other general laws, with regard to forgery; of which the
first is 2 Geo. II, c. 25, whereby the first offence in forging or procuring to be
forged, acting or assisting therein, or uttering or publishing as true any forged
(r) Stat. 9 Ann. c. 21. 6 Geo. I cc 4 and 11. 12 Geo. I, c. 32.
(s) See the several acts for the lotteries. (t) Stat. 5 Geo. I c 14 9 Geo. I c 5
(u) Stat. 12 Geo. I. c. 32. (w) Stat. 6 Geo. I, c. 18. () Stat. 32 Geo. lI, c.'14.(y) Stat. i2 Geo. I, c. 32. (a) Stat. 8 Geo. I, c. 22. 9 Geo. I, c. 12. 31 Geo. II. c. 22, § '77.(a) Stat. 31 Geo. II, c. 10. 9 Geo. III, c. 30. (b) Stat. 4 Geo. II, c. 18. (c) Se the several stamp acts.
(cd) Stat. 26. Geo. II, c. 33.
the stamp are concealed; all the parts that are visible being like those of a genuine stamp
Rex v. Callicott, R. and R. C. C. 212. An indictment on 45 Geo. III, c. 89, for uttering forged
notes, need not state to whom they were disposed, it is sufficient to state that the prisoner dis-
posed of the notes with intent to defraud the bank, he knowing them at the time to be forged;
and although the person to whom they were disposed purchased them as and for forged notes,
and purchased them on his own solicitation, and as agent for the bank, for the purpose of
bringing the prisoner to punishment. Rex v. Holden, id. 154. Uttering a forged order fol
the payment of money under a false representation, is evidence of knowing it to be forged.
Id. 169. To prove the guilty knowledge of an utterer of a forged bank note, evidence may
be given of the prisoner s having previously uttered other forged notes, knowing them to be
forged. Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, C. C. 983. So, upon an indictment for uttering a forged note,
evidence is admissible of the prisoner's having, at a former period, uttered others of a similar
manufacture; and that others of similar fabrication had been discovered on the files of the
bank with the prisoner's handwriting on the back of them, in order to show the prisoner's
knowledge of the note mentioned in the indictment being a forgery. Rex V. Ball, R. and R.
C. C. 132. But in order to show a guilty knowledge on an indictment for uttering forged
bank notes, evidence of another uttering, subsequent to the one charged, is inadmissible,
except the latter uttering was in some way connected with the principal case, or it can be
shown that the notes were of the same manufacture; for only previous or contemporaneous
acts, can show, quo animo, a thing is done. Rex v. Taverner, Car. C. L. 195.
So, if a second uttering be made the subject of a distinct indictment, it cannot be given in
evidence to show a guilty knowledge in a former uttering. Rex v. Smith, 2 C. and P. 633.
The person whose name is forged was formerly held to be not a competent witness to prove
the forgery. Rex v. Russell, 1 Leach, C. C. 8. But he has recently been made competent by
the 9 Geo. IV, c. 32, s. 2.]
See further as to uttering, Rex v. Anscott, 6 C. and P. 408; R. v. Harris, 7 id. 428; R. V.
Page, 8 id. 122; R. v. Cook, 8 id. 582; R. v. Callicotl, 4 Taunt. 300; R. V. Radford, 1 C. and K.
707; R. v. Heywood, 2 id. 352; Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. .136.
GChap. 1 T.]
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deed, will, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note, indorse-
ment, or assignment thereof, or any acquittance or receipt for money or goods,
with intention to defraud any person (or corporation),(e) is made felony without
benefit of clergy. And by statute 7 Geo. II, c. 22, and 18 Geo. III, c. 18, it is
equally penal to forge or cause + be forged, or utter as true, a counterfeit ac-
ceptance of a bill of exchange, the number or principal sum of any account-
[*2501 able receipt for any note, bill, or any *other security for money; or any
warrant or order for the payment of money, or delivery of goods. So
that, I believe, through the number of these general and special provisions, there
is now hardly a case possible to be conceived wherein forgery, that tends to
defraud, whether in the name of a real or fictitious person, (f) is not made a
capital crime. (19)
These are the principal infringements of the rights of property: which were
the last species of offences against individuals or private subjects which the
method of distribution has led us to consider. We have before examined the
nature of all offences against the public, or commonwealth; against the king
or supreme magistrate, the father and protector of that community; against the
universal law of all civilized nations, together with some of the more atrocious
offences, of publicly pernicious consequence, against God and his holy religion.
And these several heads comprehend the whole circle of crimes and misde-
meanors, with the punishment annexed to each, that are cognizable by the laws
of England.
CHAPTER XVIIL
OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES.
WE are now arrived at the fifth general branch, or head, under which I pro-
posed to consider the subject of this book of our Commentaries; viz., the means
of preventing the commission of crimes and misdemeanors. And really it is an
honour, and almost a singular one, to our English laws, that they furnish a title
of this sort; since preventive justice is, upon every principle of reason, of human-
ity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice; (a) the
execution of which, though necessary, and in its consequences a species of
mercy to the commonwealth, is always attended with many harsh and disagree-
able circumstances.
This preventive justice consists in obi~ging those persons, whom there is a
probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to give
full assurance to fhe public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not
(e) Stat. 51 Geo. lI, c. 22, 1 78. (f) Fost. 116, &c. (a) Beccar. ch. 41.
(19) [It has frequently been determined, that drawing, indorsing, or accepting a bill of ex-
change in a fictitious name is a forgery. Bolland's Case, &c., Leach, 78, 159, 192; 1 Hen.
Black. 588; Fost. 116. It is also forgery to fabricate a will, by counterfeitirig the name of a
pretended testator, who is'still living. Cogan's Case, id. 355.
If a person puts his own name to an instrument, representing himself to be a different per-
son of that name with an intent to defraud, he is guilty of forgery. 4 T. R. 28.
But where a bill of exchange is indorsed by a person in his own name, and another repre-
sents himself to be that person, he is not guilty of forgery, but it is a misdemeanor. Hevey's
Case, Leach, 268.
A bill or note may be produced in evidence against a prisoner prosecuted for the forgery of
it; and he may be convicted upon the usual evidence of the forgery, though it has never been
stamped pursuant to the stamp acts. Hawkeswood's and Reculist's Cases, Leach, 292 and
811. For the forgery in such a case is committed with an intent to defraud; and the legisla-
ture meant only to prevent their being given in evidence, when they were proceeded upon to
recover the value of the money thereby secured.]
That a party may be convicted of forging an instrument not stamped, see further, Rex v.
Teague, Russ. and Ry. 33, Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moody, 70; People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507.
454
PREVENTION OF CRIMES.
happen ; by finding pledges or securities for keeping the peace, or for their good
behaviour. This requisition of sureties has been several times mentioned before,
as part of the penalty inflicted upon such as have been guilty of certain gross
misdemeanors: but there, also, it must be understood rather as a caution against
the repetition of the offence, than any immediate pain or punishment. And
indeed, if we consider all human *punishments in a large and extended [*25
view, we shall find them all rather calculated to prevent future crimes, 1*2]21
than to expiate the past: since, as was observed in a former chapter,(b) all pun-
ishments inflicted by temporal laws may be classed under three heads; such as
tend to the amendment of the offender himself, or to deprive him of any power
to do future mischief, or to deter others by his example; all of which conduce
to one and the same end, of preventing future crimes, whether that can be
effected by amendment, disability or example. But the caution which we speak
of at present is such as is intended merely for prevention, without any crime
actually committed by the party, but arising only from a probable suspicion
that some crime is intended or likely to happen; and consequently it is not
meant as any degree of punishment, unless perhaps for a man's imprudence in
giving just ground of apprehension.
By the Saxon constitution these sureties were always at hand, by means of
King Alfred's wise institution of decennaries or frankpledges; wherein, as has
more than once been observed,(c) the whole neighbourhood or tithing of free-
men were mutually pledges for each other's good behaviour. But this great
and general security being now fallen into disuse and neglected, there hath
succeeded to it the method of making suspected persons find particular and
special securities for their future conduct: of which we find mention in the
laws of King Edward the Confessor ;(d) "tradatfidejussores de pace et legalitate
tuenda." Let us, therefore, consider, first, what this security is; next, who may
take or demand it; and, lastly, how it may be discharged.I. This security consists in being bound, with one or more securities, in a
recognizance or obligation to the king, entered on record, and taken in some
court or by some judicial officer; whereby the parties acknowledge themselves
to be indebted to the crown in the sum required (for instance 1001.), with con-
dition to be void and of none effect if the *party shall appear in court [*253]
on such a day, and in the mean time shall keep the peace;(1) either
generally towards the king and all his liege people; or particularly, also, with
regard to the person who craves the security. Or, if it be for the good behaviour,
then on condition that he shall demean and behave himself well (or be of good
behaviour), either generally or specially, for the time therein limited, as for one
or more years, or for life. This recognizance, if taken by a justice of the peace,
must be certified to the next sessions, in pursuance of the statute 3 Hen. VII,
c. 1, and if the condition of such recognizance be broken, by any breach of the
peace in the one case, or any misbehaviour in the other, the recognizance be-
comes forfeited or absolute; and being estreated or extracted (taken out from
among the other records) and sent up to the exchequer, the party and his
sureties, having now become the king's absolute debtors, are sued for the several
sums in which they are respectively bound.
2. Any justices of the peace, by virtue of their commission, or those who are
ex officio conservators of the peace, as was mentioned in a former volume,(e) (2)
(b) See page 11. (c) See book I, page 114. (d) Cap. 18. (e) See book I, page 850.
(1) [It is now settled that a justice of the peace is authorized to require surety to keep the
peace for a limited time, as two years, according to his discretion, and that he need not bind
the party over to the next sessions only: 2 B. and A. 278; but if a recognizance to appear at
the sessions be taken, and an order of court for finding sureties applied for, articles of the
peace must be exhibited. 5 Burn, J., 24th ed. 304; 1 T. R. 696.]
See also Prichett v. Greatrex, 8 Q. B. 1020.
(2) [A secretary of state or privy counsellor cannot bind to keep the peace or good be-
haviour: 11 St. Tr. 317.]
Chap. 18.]
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may demand such security according to their own discretion; or it may be
granted at the request of any subject, upon due cause shown, provided such
demandant be under the king's protection; for which reason it has been for-
merly doubted, whether Jews, pagans, or persons convicted of a prnemunire were
entitled thereto.(f) Or, if the justice is averse to act, it may be granted by a
mandatory writ, called a supplicavit, issuing out of the court of king's bench or
chancery; which will compel the justice to act, as a ministerial and not as a
judicial officer: and he must make a return to such writ, specifying his com-
pliance, under his hand and seal.(g) But this writ is seldom used: for, when
application is made to the superior courts, they usually take the recognizances
there, under the directions of the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 8. And, indeed, a peer
or peeress cannot be bound over in any other place than the courts of
[*254] *king's bench or chancery:(3) though a justice of the peace has a!
power to require sureties of any other person, being compos mentis and
under the degree of nobility, whether he be a fellow-justice or other magistrate,
or whether he be merely a private man.(h) Wives may demand it against their
husbands; or husbands, if necessary, against their wives.(i) But feme coverts,
and infants under age, ought to find security by their friends only, and not to
be bound themselves: for they are incapable of engaging themselves to answer
any debt; which, as we observed, is the nature of these recognizances or ac-
knowledgments.(4)
3. A recognizance may be discharged, either by the demise of the king, to
whom, the recognizance is made; or by the death of the principal party bound
thereby, if not before forfeited; or by order of the court to which such recog-
nizance is certified by the justices (as the quarter sessions, assizes, or king's
bench), if they see sufficient cause; or in case he at whose request it was
granted, if granted upon a private account, will release it, or does not make his
appearance to pray that it may be continued.(k)
Thus far what has been said is applicable to both species of recognizances, for
the peace, and for the good behaviour : de pace, et legalitate, tuenda, as expressed
in the laws of King Edward. But as these two species of securities are in some
respects different, especially as to the cause of granting, or the means of forfeit-
ing them, I shall now consider them separately: and, first, shall show for what
cause such a recognizance, with sureties for the peace, is grantable; and then,
how it may be forfeited.
-1. Any justice of the peace may, ex officio, bind all those to keep the peace,
who in his presence make any affray: or threaten to kill or beat another; or
contend together with hot and angry words; or go about with unusual weapons
*255]* or attendance, to the terror of the people; and all such as he knows
to be common barretors; and such as are brought before him by the
constable for a breach of peace in his presence; and all such persons, as, having
been before bound to the peace, have broken it and forfeited their recogniz-
ances.(1) Also, wherever any private man hath just cause to fear that another
will burn his house, or do him a corporal injury, by killing, imprisoning, or
beating him; or that he will procure others so to do; he may demand surety
of the peace against such person: and every justice of the peace is bound to
grant it, if he who demands it will make oath that he is actually under fear of
death or bodily harm; and will show that he has just cause to be so, by reason
of the other's menaces, attempts, or having lain in wait for him; and will also
further swear, that he does not require such surety out of malice, or for mere
() 1 Hawk. P. C. 126. (q) F. N. B. 80. 2 P. Wins. 202. (h) 1 Hawk. P. C. 127.
(i) 2 Stra. 1207. (k) 1 Hawk. P. C. 129. (1) Ibid. 126.
(3) [A peeress may demand surety of the peace against her husband. Fost. 359; 2 Stra.
1202; 13 East, 171, N. Cas. ; T. Hard. 74; 1 Burr. 631, 703; 1 T. R. 696.]
(4) In default of giving security the party is committed to prison, but is not to be detained
on the warrant of a single magistrate for more than twelve calendar months. Statute 16 and
17 Vic. c. 30, s. 3.
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vexation.(m) (5) This is called swearing the peace against another: and, if the
party does not find such sureties, as the justice in his discretion shall require,
he may immediately be committed till he does.(n)
2. Such recognizance for keeping the peace, when given, may be forfeited by
any actual violence, or even an assault, or menace, to the person of him who
demanded it, if it be a special recognizance; or if the recognizance be general,
by any unlawful action whatsoever, that either is or tends to a breach of the
peace; or more particularly, by any one of the many species of offences which
were mentioned as crimes against the public peace in the eleventh chapter of
this book; or, by any private violence committed against any of his majesty's
subjects. But a bare trespass upon the lands or goods of another, which is a
ground for a civil action, unless accompanied with a wilful breach of the peace,
is no forfeiture of the recognizance.(o) Neither are mere reproachful words, as
calling a man a knave or liar, any breach of the peace, so as to forfeit one's
recognizance (being * looked upon to be merely the effect of unmean- [*256J
ing heat and passion), unless they amount to a challenge to fight.(p) [*256]
The other species of recognizance, with sureties, is for the good abearance or
good behaviour. This includes security for the peace, and somewhat more; we
will therefore examine it in the same manner as the other.
1. First, then, the justices are empowered by the statute 34 Edw. III, c. 1, to
bind over to the good behaviour towards the king and his people, all them that
be not of good fame, wherever they be found;(6) to the intent that the people
be not troubled nor endamaged, nor the peace diminished, nor merchants and
others, passing by the highways of the realm, be disturbed nor put in the peril
which may happen by such offenders. Under the general words of this expres-
sion, that be not of good fame, it is holden that a man may be bound to his
good behaviour for causes of scandal, contra bonos mores, as well as contra
pacem: as, for haunting bawdy-houses with women of bad fame; or for keep-
ing such women in his own house; or for words tending to scandalize the gov-
ernment, or in abuse of the officers of justice, especially in the execution of
their office. Thus, also, a justice may bind over all night-walkers; eaves-drop-
pers; such as keep suspicious company, or are reported to be pilferers or robbers;
such as sleep in the day, and wake in the night; common drunkards; whore-
masters; the putative fathers of bastards; cheats; idle vagabonds; and other
persons whose misbehaviour may reasonably bring them within the general
words of the statutes, as persons not of good fame: an expression, it must be
owned, of so great a latitude, as leaves much to be determined by the discretion
of the magistrate himself. But if he commits a man for want of sureties, he
must express the cause thereof with convenient certainty; and take care that
such cause be a good one.(q) (7)
(m) 1 Hawk. P. C. 127. (n) Ibid. 128. (o) Ibid. 181. (p) I bid. 180. (q) rbid. 132.
(5) [The surety of the peace will not be granted but where there is a fear of some present
or future danger, and not merely for a battery or trespass, or for any breach of the peace that
is past. Dalt. c. 11.
The articles to entitle a party to have sureties of the peace must be verified by the oath of
the exhibitant. 1 Stra. 527; 12 Mod. 243. The truth of the allegations therein cannot be
controverted by the defendant, and if no objections arise to the articles exhibited, the court or
justice will order securities to be taken immediately. 2 Stra. 1202 ; 13 East, 171, n. If the
articles manifestly appear to contain peijury, the court will refuse the application, and even
commit the exhibitant. 2 Burr. 806; 3 id. 1922. The articles will not generally be received
if the parties live at a distance in the county, unless they have previously made application toa justice in the neighbourhood. 2 Burr. 780.]
(6) See Haylock v. Sparke, 1 E. and B. 471, in which this subject was examined by Lord
Campbell, and it was decided that a magistrate might require sureties for good behavior of a
person charged with having published a libel calculated to cause a breach of the peace. See
also Butt v. Conant, 1 B. and B. 548.
(7) The subject of this chapter will be found covered by statutes in the several states of the
American Union, and treated of in the treatises published for the guide of magistrates in
criminal cases, and also in some of the works on criminal law.
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[*257] *2. A recognizance for the good behaviour may be forfeited by all the
same means as one for the security of the peace may be: and also by
some others. As, by going armed, with unusual attendance, to the terror of the
people; by speaking words tending to sedition; or by committing any of those
acts of misbehaviour which the recognizance was intended to prevent. But not
by barely giving fresh cause of suspicion of that which perhaps may never
actually happen :(r) for, though it is just to compel suspected persons to give
security to the public against misbehaviour that is apprehended ; yet it would
be hard, upon such suspicion, without the proof of any actual crime, to punish
them by a forfeiture of their recognizance.
CHAPTER XIX.
OF COURTS OF A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.
TniE sixth, and last, object of our inquiries will be the method of inflicting
those punishments which the law has annexed to particular offences; and which
I have constantly subjoined to the description of the crime itself. In the
discussion of which, I shall pursue much the same general method that I fol-
lowed in the preceding book, with regard to the redress of civil injuries: by,
first, pointing out the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, wherein offenders
may be prosecuted to punishment; and by, secondly, deducing down, in their
natural order, and explaining, the several proceedings therein.
First, then, in reckoning up the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, I
shall, as in the former case, begin with an account of such as are of a public
and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm; and, afterwards, proceed
to such as are only of a private and special jurisdiction, and confined to some
particular parts of the kingdom.
I. In our inquiries into the criminal courts of public and general jurisdiction,
I must, in one respect, pursue a different order from that in which I considered
the civil tribunals. For there, as the several courts had a gradual subordination
to each other, the superior correcting and reforming the errors of the inferior,
I thought it best to begin with the lowest, and so ascend gradually to the courts
*1259] of appeal, or those of *the most extensive powers. But, as it is contrary
to the genius and spirit of the law of England to suffer any man to be
tried twice for the same offence in a criminal way, especially if acquitted upon
the first trial; therefore, these criminal courts may be said to be all independent
of each other; at least, so far as that the sentence of the lowest of them can
never be controlled or reversed by the highest jurisdiction in the kingdom,
unless for error in matter of law, apparent upon the face of the record; though
sometimes causes may be removed from one to the other before trial. And
therefore as, in these courts of criminal cognizance, there is not the same chain
and dependence as in the others, I shall rank them according to their dignity,
and begin with the highest of all, viz.:
1. The high court of parliament; which is the supreme court in the king-
dom, not only for the making, but also for the execution, of laws; by the trial
of great and enormous offenders, whether lords or commoners, in the method of
parliamentary impeachment. (1) As for acts of parliament to attaint particular
(r) I Hawk. P. C. 133.
(1) In the United States, as well as in the several states of the Union, the senate tries im-
peachments, while the lower house prefers the charges. The whole law of impeachment was
very fully considered on the trial of President Johnson, to the report of which the reader is
referred. See also 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 257 and 641.
Special acts, imposing punishments on particular persons, cannot be passed in the United
States. Const. of U. 9. art. 1, §§ 9 and 10; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Ex parte
Garland, id. 333.
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persons of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or con-
trary to the common law, to serve a special purpose, I speak not of them; being
to all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by no means an
execution of such as are already in being. But an impeachment before the
lords by the commons of Great Britain, in parliament, is a prosecution of the
already known and established law, and has been frequently put in practice;
being a presentment to the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdic-
tion by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom.(a) A commoner
cannot, however, be impeached before the lords for any capital offence, but only
for high misdemeanors :(b) a peer may be impeached for any *crime.(2) [*260]
And they usually (in case of an impeachment of a peer for treason)
address the crown to appoint a lord high steward for the greater dignity and
regularity of their proceedings; which high steward was formerly elected by
the peers themselves, though he was generally commissioned by the king;(c)
but it bath of late years bQen strenuously maintained(d) that the appointment
of an high steward in such cases is not indispensably necessary, but that the
house may proceed without one. The articles of impeachment are a kind of
bills of indictment, found by the house of commons, and afterwards tried by
the lords; who are, in cases of misdemeanors, considered not only as their own
peers, but as the peers of the whole nation. This is a custom derived to us from
the constitution of the ancient Germans; who, in their great councils, some-
times tried capital accusations relating to the public: "licet apud consilium
accusare quoque, et discrimen capitis intendere." (e) And it has a peculiar
propriety in the English constitution; which has much improved upon the
ancient model imported hither from the continent. For, though in general the
union of the legislative and judicial powers ought to be more carefully avoid-
ed,(f) yet it may happen that a subject, intrusted with the administration of
public affairs, may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such crimes
as the ordinary magistrate either *dares not or cannot punish. Of these [*261
the representatives of the people, or house of commons, cannot prop- -
erly judge; because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore
only impeach. But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not
before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority
of so powerful an accuser. Reason, therefore, will suggest that this branch of
the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge before the
other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same inter-
ests nor the same passions as popular assemblies.(g) This is a vast superiority,
which the constitution of this island enjoys, over those of the Grecian or Ro-
man republics; where the people were, at the same time, both judges and
accusers. It is proper that the nobility- should judge, to insure justice to the
(a) I Hal. P. C. 150.
(b) When, In 4 Edw. HI, the king demanded the earls, barons, and peers to give judgment against Simon de
Bereford, who had been a notorious accomplice in the treasons of Roger, Earl of Mortifher, they came before
the king in parliament, and said all with one voice that the said Simon was not their par; and, therefore, they
were not bound to judge him as a peer of the land. And when afterwards, in the same parliament, they were
prevailed upon, in respect of the notoriety and heinousness of his crimes, to receive the charge, and to give
judgment against him, the following protest and proviso was entered in the parliament-roll: "And itis assented
and accorded by our lord the king, and all the great men, in full parliament, that albeit the peers, as judges of
the parliament, have taken upon them, in the presence of our lord the king, to make and render the said judg-
ment, yet the peers who now are, or shall be in time to come, be not bound or charged to render judgment upon
others than peers ; nor that the peers of the land have power to do this, but thereof onght ever to be discharged
and acquitted; and that the aforesaid judgment now rendered be not drawn to example or consequence in lime
to come, whereby the said peers may be charged hereafter to judge others than their peers, contrary to the laws
of the land, if the like case happen, which God forbid." (Rot. P.ar. 4 Ed. IlI, _. 2 and 6. 2 Brad. Hist. 190.
Selden, Judic. in Pan. c. 1.)
(c) 1 Hal. F. c. 550. (d) Lords' Journ. 12 May, 1679. Com. Journ. 15 May, 1679. Fost. 142, &c.
(e) Tacit. de mar. Germ. 12. (f) See book I, page 269. (g) Montesq. Sp. L. xi, 6.
(2) [For misdemeanors, as libels, riots, &c., peers are to be tried, like commoners, by a jury,
for, at the common law, in these four cases only, a peer shall be tried by his peers, viz., in
treason, felony, misprision of treason, and misprision of felony: and the statute law which
gives such trial hath reference unto these, or to other offences made treason or felony; his
trial by his peers shall be as before; and to this effect are all these statutes. Per Fleming,
C. J., assented to by the whole court, in Rex v. Lord Vaux, 1 Bulstr. 197.]
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accused; as it is proper that the people should accuse, to insure justice to
the commonwealth. And, therefore, among other extraordinary circumstances
attending the authority of this court, there is one of a very singular nature,
which was insisted on by the house of commons in the case of the earl of
Danby, in the reign of Charles II;(h) and it is now enacted by statute 12 and
13 Win. III, c. 2, that no pardon under the great seal shall be pleadable to an
impeachment by the commons of Great Britain in parliament.(i)
2. The court of the lord high steward of Great Britain(k) is a court insti-
tuted for the trial of peers, indicted for treason or felony, or for misprision of
either.(l) The office of this great magistrate is very ancient; and was formerly
hereditary, or at least held for life, or dum bene se gesserit: but now it is usually
and hath been for many centuries past, (m) granted pro hac vice only; and it
bath been the constant practice (and therefore seems now to have become nec-
[*262] essary) to grant *it to a lord of parliament, else he is incapable to try
such delinquent peer.(n) When such an indictment is therefore found
by a grand jury of freeholders in the king's bench, or at the assizes before the
justices of oyer and terminer, it is to be removed by a writ of certiorari into
the court of the lord high steward, which only has power to determine it. A
peer may plead a pardon before the court of king's bench, and the judges have
power to allow it; in order to prevent the trouble of appointing an high stew-
ard, merely for the purpose of receiving such plea. But he may not plead, in
that inferior court, any other plea; as guilty, or not guilty, of the indictment;
but only in this court: because, in consequence of such plea, it is possible that
judgment of death might be awarded against him. The king, therefore, in
case a peer be indicted for treason, felony or misprision, creates a lord high stew-
ard pro hac vice by commission under the great seal; which recites the indict-
ment so found, and gives his grace power to receive and try it, secundum legem
et consuetudinem Angliw. Then, when the indictment is regularly removed by
writ of certiorari, commanding the inferior court to certify it up to him, the
lord high steward directs a precept to the serjeant at arms, to summon the lords
to attend and try the indicted peer. This precept was formerly issued to sum-
mon only eighteen or twenty, selected from the body of peers: then the num-
ber came to be indefinite; and the custom was for the lord high steward to
summon as many as he thought proper (but of late years not less than twenty-
three),(o) and that those lords only should sit upon the trial :(3) which threw a
monstrous weight of power into the hands of the crown, and this its great officer,
of selecting only such peers as the then predominate party should most approve
of. And accordingly, when the earl of Clarendon fell in disgrace with Charles
[*263] II, *there was a design formed to prorogue the parliament, in order to try
him by a select number of peers; it being doubted whether the whole
house could be induced to fall in with the views of the court.(p) But now by
statute 7 Win. III, c. 3, upon all trials of peers for treason or misprision, all the
peers who have a right to sit and vote in parliament shall be summoned, at least
twenty days before such trial, to appear and vote therein; and every lord
appearing shall vote in the trial of such peer, first taking the oaths of allegiance
and supremacy, and subscribing the declaration against popery.
(h) Com. Journ. 5 May, 1679. (1) See c. 31. (k) 4 Inst. 58. 2 Hawk. P. C. 5, 421. 2 Jon. 54.
(1) 1 Bulstr. 19. (m) Pryn. on 4 Inst. 46.
(n) Qand un seigneur de parlement serra arrein de treason o felony, le roypar se lettres patents fera un grand
et aate seigneur d'estre legrand senesehal d'Angeterre: qui-dot f aire un precept-pur faire venir x seigneurs,
on reii. &e. (Yearb. 13 Hen. VILE, 11.) See Standf. P. c. 152. 3. Inst. 28. 4 Inst. 59. 2 Hawk. P. C. 5.
Barr. 234.
(o) Kelynge, 56. (p) Carte's Life of Ormonde, Vol. II.
(3) [The decision is by a majority, but a majority cannot convict, unless it consists of twelve
or more.
A peer cannot have the benefit of a challenge like a commoner. 1 Harg. St. Tr. 198, 388.]
The right of challenge was somewhat discussed in the case of the impeachment of Presi-
dent Johnson.
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During the session of parliament the trial of an indicted peer is not properly
in the court of the lord high steward, but before the court last mentioned, of
our lord the king in parliament.(q) It is true, a lord high steward is always
appointed in that case, to regulate and add weight to the proceedings: but he
is rather in the nature of a speaker pro tempore, or chairman of the court, than
the judge of it; for the collective body of the peers are therein the judges both
of law and fact, and the high steward has a vote with the rest, in right of
his peerage. But in the court of the lord high steward, which is held in the
recess of parliament, he is the sole judge of matters of law, as the lords triors
are in the matters of fact; and as they may not interfere with him in regulating
the proceedings of the court, so he has no right to intermix with them in giv-
ing any vote upon the trial.(r) Therefore, upon the conviction and attainder
of a peer for murder in full parliament, it hath been holden by the
judges,(s) that in case the day appointed in the judgment for execution should
lapse before execution done, a new time of execution may be appointed by
either the high court of parliament during its sitting, though no high steward
be existing; or, in the recess of parliament, by the court of king's bench, the
record being removed into that court.*It has been a point of some controversy, whether the bishops have [*2641
now a right to sit in the court of the lord high steward, to try indict-
ments of treason and misprision. Some incline to imagine them included
under the general words of the statute of King William, "all peers who have a
right to sit and vote in parliament ;" but the expression had been much clearer
if it had been, "all lords," and not "all peers;" for though bishops, on account
of the baronies annexed to their bishopricks, ate clearly lords of parliament, yet,
their blood not being ennobled, they are not universally allowed to be peers
with the temporal nobility: and perhaps this word might be inserted purposely
with a view to exclude them. However, there is no instance of their sitting on
trials for capital offences, even upon impeachments and indictments in full
parliament, much less in the court we are now treating of; for indeed they
usually withdraw voluntarily, but enter a protest declaring their right to stay.
It is observable that, in the eleventh chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon,
made in parliament 11 Hen. II, they are expressly excused, rather than
excluded, from sitting and voting in trials, when they come to concern life or
limb: "episcopi, sicut ccteri barones, debent interesse Judiciis cur baronibus,
quosqueperveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum, vel ad mortem;" and Becket's
quarrel with the king hereupon was not on account of the exception (which
was agreeable to the canon law), but of the general rule that compelled the
bishops to attend at all. And the determination of the house of lords in the earl
of Danby's case,(t) which hath ever since been adhered to, is consonant to these
constitutions; "that the lords spiritual have a right to stay and sit in court incapital cases, till the court proceeds to the vote of guilty, or not guilty." It
must be noted that this resolution extends only to trials infullparliament: for
to the court of the lord high steward (in which no vote can be given, but merely
that of guilty, or not guilty), no bishop, as such, ever was or could be sum-
moned; and though the statute of King William *regulates the pro- [*265]
ceedings in that court, as well as in the court of parliament, yet it never
intended to new-model or alter its constitution: and consequently does not
give the lords spiritual any right in cases of blood which they had not before. (u)
And what makes their exclusion more reasonable is, that they have no right to
be tried themselves in the court of the lord high steward, (w) and therefore
surely ought not to be judges there. For the privilege of being thus tried
depends upon nobility of blood, rather than a seat in the house: as appears
from the trials of popish lords, of lords under age, and (since the union) of the
Scots' nobility, though not in the number of the sixteen; and from the trials
of females, such as the queen consort or dowager, and of all peeresses by birth;
(q) Fost. 141. (r) State Trials, vol. iv, 214, 232, 283. (8) Fost. 139.
(t) Lords' Journ. 15 May, 1679. (u) Fost. 248. (w) Bro. Abr. t. Trial, 142.
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and peeresses by marriage, also, unless they have, when dowagers, disparaged
themselves by taking a commoner to their second husband.(4)
3. The court of king's bench,(x) concerning the nature of which we partly
inquired in the preceding book,(y) was (we may remember) divided into a crown
side and a plea side. And on the crown side, or crown office, it takes cogni-
zance of all criminal causes, from high treason down to the most trivial misde-
meanor or breach of the peace. Into this court also indictments from all
inferior courts may be removed by writ of certiorari, and tried either at bar, or
at nisi prius, by a jury of the county out of which the indictment is brought.
The judges of this court are the supreme coroners of the kingdom. And the
court itself is the principal court of criminal jurisdiction (though the two
former are of greater dignity) known to the laws of England. For which reason
by the coming of the court of king's bench into any county (as it was removed
to Oxford on account of the sickness in 1665), all former commissioners of oyer
and terminer, and general gaol delivery, are at once absorbed and determined
[*266] ipso facto(5) *in the same manner as by the old Gothic and Saxon consti-
tutions, jure vetusto obtinuit, quievisse omnia inferiora judicia, dicente
jus re qe."(z)
Into this court of king's bench hath reverted all that was good and salutary
of the jurisdiction of the court of star-chamber, camera stellata; (a) which was
a court of very ancient original, (b) but new-modeled by statutes 3 Hen. VII,
c. 1, and 21 Hen. VIII, c. 20, consisting of divers lords, spiritual and temporal,
being privy counsellors, together with two judges of the courts of common law,
without the intervention of any jury. Their jurisdiction extended legally
[*2671 over riots, perjury, misbehaviour of sheriffs, and other notorious *misde-
meanors, contrary to the laws of the land. Yet, this was afterwards (as
Lord Clarendon informs us) (c) stretched "to the asserting of all proclamations
and orders of state: to the vindicating of illegal commissions, and grants of
monopolies; holding for honorable that which pleased, and for just that which
profited, and becoming both a court of law to determine civil rights, and a court
of revenue to enrich the treasury; the council table by proclamations enjoining
to the people that which was not enjoined by the laws, and prohibiting that
which was not prohibited; and the star-chamber, which consisted of the same
persons in different rooms, censuring the breach and disobedience to those proc-
lamations by very great fines, imprisonments, and corporal severities: so that
any disrespect to any acts of state, or to the persons of statesmen, was in no time
(x) 4 Inst. 70. 2 Hal. P. 0. 2. 2 Hawk. P. C. 6. (y) See book 3, page 41. (z) Stiernhook, 1. 1, c. 2.
(a) This is said (Lamb. Arch. 154) to have been so called, either from the Saxon word to steer or
govern ;-or from its punishing the erinen 8tellionatus, or cosenage i-or because the room wherein it sat, the old
council-chamber of the palace of Westminster (Lamb. 148), which is now converted into the lottery office, and
forms the eastern side of New Palace-yard, was full of windows; or (to which Sir Edward Coke, 4 Inst. 66, ac-
cedes) because haply the roof thereof was at the first garnished with gilded stars. As all these are merely con-
Sectures (for no stars are now in the roof, nor are any said to have remained there so late as the reign of Queen
Elizabeth), it may be allowable to propose another conjectural etymology, as plausible perhaps as any of them.
It is well known that before the banishment of the Jews under Edward I, their contracts and obligations were
denominated in our ancient records starra or starrs, from a corruption of the Hebrew word shetar, a covenant.
Tovey's Angl. judaic. 32. Selden, tit. of hon. i, 34. Uxor. ebraic i 14. These starrs, by an ordinance of
Richard the First, preserved by Hoveden, were commanded to be enrolled and deposited in chests under three
keys in certain places; one, and the most considerable, of which was in the king s exchequer at Westminster;
and no starr was allowed to be valid unless It were found in some of the said repositories. (Memorana in
&Scacc. P. 6 Edw. , prefixed to Maynard's year-book of Edw. II, fol. 8. Madox, hist. exch. c. vii, i 4, 5,6.) The
room at the exchequer, where the chests containing these starrs were kept, was probably called the starr-cham-
ber" and when the Jews were expelled the kingdom, was applied to the use of the king's council, sitting in
theirjudicial capacity. To confirm this, the first time the starr-chamber is mentioned in any record, it is said
to have been situated near the receipt of the exchequer at Westminster; the king's council, his chancellor,
treasurer, justices, and other sages, were assembled en la chaumbre des esteilles pres la receipt la Westminster.-
Claus. 41. Edw. 111, m. 13. For in process of time when the meaning of the Jewish starrs was forgotten, the
word starr-chamber was naturally rendered in law-French, la chaumbre des esteilfes, and in law-latin camera stel-
lata; which continued to be the style in latin till the dissolution of that court.
(b) Lamb. Arch. 156. (c) Hist. of Reb., books 1 and 3.
(4) [See, for instance, the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 St. Tr. 355.
Upon conviction for felony a peer is now liable to the same punishment as any other sub-
ject of the crown (statute 4 and 5 Vic. c. 22), and for a misdemeanor, as libel, he is liable in
like manner as a commoner. Case of Lord Vaux, 1 Bulstr. 197.]'
(5) This is now otherwise by statute.
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more penal, and the foundations of right never more in danger to be destroyed."
For which reasons it was finally abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, to the gen-
eral joy of the whole nation. (d) (6)
4. The court of chivalry, (e) of which we also formerly spoke (f) as a mili-
tary court, or court of honour, when held before the earl marshal only, is also a
criminal court when held before the lord high constable of England jointly
with the earl marshal. And then it has jurisdiction over pleas of life and mem-
ber, arising in matters of arms and deeds of war, as well out of the realm
as within it. But the criminal, as *well as civil part of its authority, r,268]
is fallen into entire disuse: there having been no permanent high con- [ J
,stable of England (but only pro hac vice at coronations and the like) since the
attainder and execution of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, in the thirteenth
year of Henry VIII ; the authority and charge, both in war and peace, being
deemed too ample for a subject: so ample, that when the chief justice Fineux
was asked by King Henry the Eighth, how far they extended, he declined
answering; and said, the decision of that question belonged to the law of arms,
and not to the law of England. (g)
5. The high court of admiralty, (h) held before the lord high admiral of
England, or his deputy, styled the judge of the admiralty, is not only a court
of civil but also of criminal jurisdiction. This court hath cognizance of all
crimes and offences committed either upon the sea, or on the coasts, out of the
body or extent of any English county; and by statute 15 Ric. II, c. 3, of death
and mayhem happening in great ships being and hovering in the main stream
of great rivers, below the bridges of the same rivers, which are then a sort of
ports or havens; such as are the ports of London and Gloucester, though they
lie at a great distance from the sea. But, as this court proceeded without jury,
in a method much conformed to the civil law, the exercise of a criminal juris-
diction there was contrary to the genius of the law of England: inasmuch as a
man might be there deprived of his life by the opinion of a single judge, with-
out the judgment of his peers. And besides, as innocent persons might thus
fall a sacrifice to the caprice of a single man, so very gross offenders might, and
did frequently, escape punishment: for the rule of the civil law is, how reason-
ably I shall not at present inquire, that no judgment of death can be given
against offenders, without proof by two witnesses, or a confession of the fact by
themselves. This was always a great offence to the English nation: and there-
fore in the eighth year of Henry VI it was endeavoured to apply *a [*2691
remedy in parliament: which then miscarried for want of the royal assent.
However, by the statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, it was enacted, that these offences
should be tried by commissioners of oyer and terminer, under the king's great
seal; namely, the admiral orhis deputy, and three or four more (among whom
two common law judges are usually appointed); the indictment being first found
by a grand jury of twelve men, and afterwards tried by a petty jury: and that
the course of proceedings should be according to the law of the land. This is
(d) The just odium into which this tribunal had fallen before its dissolution, has been the occasion that few
memorials have reached us of its nature, jurisdiction and practice except such as, on account of their enormous
oppression, are recorded in the histories of the times. There are, however, to be met with some reports of its
proceedings in Dyer, Lroke, Coke, and other reporters of that age, and some in manuscript, of whicl the
author hat two; one from 40 Elz. to 13 Jac. I, the other for the first three years of King Charles; and there isin the British Museum (Harl. NiSS. vol. I. No. 1226) a very full, methodical, and accurate account of the con-
stitution and course of this court, compiled by William Hudson of Grays Inn, an eminent practitioner therein;and a short account of the same, with copies of all its process, may also be found in 1S Ryni. Foed. 192, &c.
(e) 4 Inst. 123. 2 Hawk. r. C. 9. (f) See book III page 6. (g) Duck. de auflkrit. jur. dv.S4 I t. 1 4, 147.
(6) In this place should be mentioned the court of criminal appeal, established by 11 and
12 Vic. c. 78.It consists of the judges of the superior courts of common law, any five of whom, including
one of the chief justices, or the chief baron, shall constitute a quorum. On a conviction
before a court of oyer and terminer, gaol delivery or quarter sessions, the judges before whom
the cause was tried, may reserve the questions of law for the consideration of this court. The
court, after argument, may make such order in the premises as justice may require, and may
either pronounce the proper judgment themselves, or remit the record for that purpose.
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now the only method of trying marine felonies in the court of admiralty; the
judge of the admiralty still presiding therein, as the lord mayor is the president
of the session of oyer and lerminer in London. (7)
These five courts may be held in any part of the kingdom, and their juris-
diction extends over crimes that arise throughout the whole of it, from one end
to the other. What follow are also of a general nature, and universally diffused
over the nation, but yet are of a local jurisdiction, and confined to particular
districts. Of which species are,
6, 7. The courts of oyer and terminer, and the general gaol delivery, (i) which are
held before the king's commissioners, among whom are usually two judges of the
courts at Westminster, twice in every year in every county of the kingdom; except
the four northern ones, where they are held only once, and London and Middle-
sex, wherein they are held eight times. These were slightly mentioned in the
preceding book.(k) We then observed that, at what is usually called the assizes,
the judges sit by virtue of five several authorities: two of which, the commis-
sion of assize and its attendant jurisdiction of nisi prius, being principally of.
a civil nature, were then explained at large; to which I shall only add, that
these justices have, by virtue of several statutes, a criminal jurisdiction, also, in
r*2 7 01 certain special cases.(l) The third, which is the *commission of theU " peace, was also treated of in a former volume, (m) when we inquired into!
the nature and office of a justice of the peace. I shall only add, that all the
justices of the peace of any county, wherein the assizes are held, are bound by
law to attend them, or else are liable to a fine; in order to return recognizances,
&c., and to assist the judges in such matters as lie within their knowledge and
jurisdiction, and in which some of them have probably been concerned, by way
of previous examination. But the fourth authority is the commission of oyer
and term iner (n) to hear and determine all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors.
(i) 4 Inst. 162, 168. 2 Hal. P. C. 22, 32. 2 Hawk. P. C. 14, 2.1. (k) See book III, p. 60.
(1) 2 Hal. P. C. 39. 2 Hawk. P. C. 28. (m) See book I, p. 351. (n) See Appendix, 1.
(7) [If a pistol be fired on shore, which kills a man at sea, the offence is properly triable at
the admiralty sessions, because the murder is, in law, committed where the death occurs: 1.
East, P. C. 367; 1 Leach, 388; 12 East, 246; 2 Hale, 17, 20; but if, on the other hand, a man
be stricken upon the high sea, and died upon shore after the reflux of the water, the admiral,
by virtue of this commission, has no cognizance of that felony. 2 Hale, 17, 20; 1 East, P. C.
365, 366. And, it being doubtful whether it could be tried at common law, the statute 2 Geo.
II, c. 21, provides that the offender may be indicted in the county where the party died. So
the courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty, in murders com-
mitted in Milford Haven, and all other havens, creeks, and rivers in this realm. 2 Leach,
1093; 1 East, P. C. 368; R. and R. C. C. 243, S. C.]
By 4 and 5 Win. IV, c. 36, and 7 Win. IV and 1 Vic. c. 77, the central criminal court was
created, with a district composed of London, and Middlesex, and parts of Kent and Surrey.
It is composed of the lord mayor of London, the lord chancellor, the common law judges, the
judges of the courts of bankruptcy and admiralty, the dean of the arches, the aldermen of
London, the recorder and common sergeant of London, the judge of the sheriff's court of
London, and the ex-chancellors and ex-judges of the superior courts. Any two or more may
hold the court, and, in practice, it is generally presided over by two judges of the superior
courts and the law officers of the city of London. It has jurisdiction of offences committed
within the district, and also of all offences committed on the high seas and other places within
the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
By 7 and 8 Vic. c. 2, after reciting that the issuing of a special commission in the manner
prescribed by 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, was found inconvenient, it is enacted that her majesty's
justices of assize, or others, her majesty's commissioners, by whom any court shall be holden
under any of her majesty's commissions of oyer and terminer, or general gaol delivery, shall
have the powers which by any act are given to any commissioners named in any commission
of oyer and terminer, for the trying of offences committed within the jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty, and to deliver the gaol, &c., of any person therein for any offence alleged to have been
committed on the high seas and other places within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. See,
also, 18 and 19 Vic. c. 91, s. 21. And several subsequent statutes declare that offences com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of the admiralty shall be deemed offences of the same nature,
and liable to the same punishments, as if committed upon land within England or Ireland,
and may be tried in any county or place in which the offender may be apprehended or m
custody.
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This is directed to the judges and several others, or any two of them; but the
judges or serjeants at law only are of the quorum, so that the rest cannot act
without the presence of one of them. The words of the commission are, "to,
inquire, hear and determine ;" so that, by virtue of this commission, they can
only proceed upon an indictment found at the same assizes; for they must first
inquire by means of the grand jury or inquest, before they are empowered to
hear and determine by the help of the petit jury. Therefore, they have, besides,
fifthly, a commission of general gaol delivery; (o) which empowers them to try
and deliver every prisoner, who shall be in the gaol when the judges arrive at
the circuit town, whenever or before whomsoever indicted, or for whatever crime
committed. It was anciently the course to issue special writs of gaol delivery
for each particular prisoner, which were called the writs de bono et malo: (p)
but these being found inconvenient and oppressive, a general commission for all
the prisoners has long been established in their stead. So that, one way or
other, the gaols are in general cleared, and all offenders tried, punished, or
delivered, twice in every year: a constitution of singular use and excellence.(8)
Sometimes, also, upon urgent occasions, the king issues a special or extraordi-
nary commission of oyer and terminer, and gaol delivery confined to those
offences which stand in need of immediate inquiry and punishment: upon
which the course of proceeding is much the same, as upon general and ordinary
commissions. Formerly it was held, in *pursuance of the statutes E.27l]
8 Ric. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 4, that no judge or other lawyer
could act in the commission of oyer and terminer, or in that of gaol delivery,
within his own county where he was born or inhabited; in like manner as
they are prohibited from being judges of assize and determining civil causes.
But that local partiality, which the jealousy of our ancestors was careful to
prevent, being judged less likely to operate in the trial of crimes and misde-
meanors, than in matters of property and disputes between party and party, it
was thought proper by the statute 12 Geo. II, c. 27, to allow any man to be a justice
of oyer and terminer, and general gaol delivery, within any county of England.
8. The court of general quarter sessions of the peace (q) is a court that must
be held in every county once in every quarter of a year; which, by statute
2 Hen. V, c. 4, is appointed to be in the first week after Michaelmas-day; the first
week after the epiphany; the first week after the close of easter; and in the
(e) See Appendix, § 1. (p) 2 Inst. 43. (q) 4 Inst. 170. 2 Hal. P. C. 42. 2 Hawk. P. C. 32.
(8) [Every description of offence, even high treason, is cognizable under this commission;
and the justices may proceed upon any indictment of felony or trespass found before other
justices: 2 Hale, 32; Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, s. 2; or may take an indictment originally before them-
selves: Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, s. 3; 2 Hale, 34; and they have power to discharge, not only prisoners
acquitted, but also such against whom, upon proclamation made, no parties shall appear to
indict them, which cannot be done either by justice of oyer and terminer, or of the peace.
Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, s. 6; 2 Hale, 34. It is not imperative on a commissioner of gaol delivery to
discharge all the prisoners in the gaol who are not indicted; but it is discretionary in him to
continue on their commitments such prisoners as appear to him committed for trial, but the
witnesses against whom did not appear, having been bound over to the sessions. Russ. and
R. C. C. 173. But it seems clear, from the words of the commission, that these justices can-
not try any persons, except in some special cases, who are not in actual or constructive cus-
tody of the prison specifically named in the commission. Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, s. 5; Bac. Ab.
Court of Justices of Oyer, &c. B. But it is not necessary that the party should be always in
actual custody, for if a person be admitted to bail, yet he is, in law, in prison, and his bail are
his keepers, and justices of gaol delivery may take an indictment against him, as well as if
he were actually in prison. 2 Hale, 34, 35. The commissions of gaol delivery are the same
on all the circuits. Unlike the commission of oyer and terminer, in which the same authority
suffices for every county, there is a distinct commission to deliver each particular gaol of the
prisoners under the care of its keeper.
The court of general gaol delivery has jurisdiction to order, that the proceedings on a trial,
from day to day, shall not be published till all the trials against different prisoners shall be
concluded, and the violation of such orders is a contempt of court, punishable by fine or
imprisonment, and if the party refuse to attend, he may be fined in his absence. 4 B. and A.
218; 11 Price, 68.]
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week after the translation of St. Thomas the Martyr, or the seventh of July.
It is held before two or more justices of the peace, one of whom must be of
the quorum.(9) The jurisdiction of this court, by statute 34 Edw. III, c. 1,
extends to the trying and determining all felonies and trespasses whatsoever:
though they seldom, if ever, try any greater offence than small felonies, within
the benefit of clergy; their commission providing, that if any case of difficulty
arises, they shall not proceed to judgment, but in the presence of one of the
justices of the court of king's bench or common pleas, or one of the judges of
assize. And, therefore, murders, and other capital felonies, are usually remitted
for a more solemn trial to the assizes.(10) They cannot also try any new
created offence, without express power given them by the statute which creates
it.(r) But there are many offences and particular matters, which by partibular
statutes belong properly to this jurisdiction, and ought to be prosecuted in this
r.272] court: as, the *smaller misdemeanors against the public or common-
272] wealth, not amounting to felony; and, especially, offences relating to
the game, highways, ale-houses, bastard children, the settlement and provision
for the poor, vagrants, servants' wages, apprentices, and popish recusants.(s)
Some of these are proceeded upon by indictment; and others in a summary
way by motion and order thereupon; which order may, for the most part,
unless guarded against by particular statutes, be removed into the court of
king's bench, by a writ of certiorari facias, and be there either quashed or con-
firmed. The records or rolls of the sessions are committed to the custody of a
special officer, denominated the custos rotulorum, who is always a justice of
the quorum; and among them of the quorum (saith Lambard) (t) a man for
the most part especially picked out, either for wisdom, countenance, or credit.
The nomination of the custos rotulorum (who is the principal civil officer in
the county, as the lord lieutenant is the chief in military command) is by the
king's sign manual: and to him the nomination of the clerk of the peace
belongs; which office he is expressly forbidden to sell for money.(u)
In most corporation towns there are quarter sessions kept before justices of
their own, within their respective limits: which have exactly the same authority
as the general quarter sessions of the county, except in a very few instances:
one of the most considerable of which is the matter of appeals from orders of
removal of the poor, which, though they be from the orders of corporation
justices, must be to the sessions of the county, by statutes 8 and 9 Win. III,
c. 30. In both corporations and counties at large, there is sometimes kept a
special or petty session, by a few justices, for dispatching smaller business in
the neighbourhood, between the times of the general sessions; as, for licensing
ale-houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and the like.
*273] *9. The sheriff's tourn,(v) or rotation, is a court of record, held twice
271 every year, withiin a month after easter and michaelmas, before the
sheriff, in different parts of the county; being, indeed, only the turn of the
sheriff to keep a court-leet in each respective hundred: (w) this, therefore, is
the great court-leet of the county, as the county court is the court-baron: for
out of this, for the ease of the sheriff, was it taken.
10. The court-leer, or view offrankpledqe,(x) which is a court of record, held
once in the year, and not oftener,(y) within a particular hundred, lordship, or
manor, before the steward of the leet: being the king's court, granted by charter
(r) 4 Mod. 379. Salk. 406. Lord Raym. 1144. (s) See Lambard drenarcha and Burn's Justice.
(t) B. 4, c. 3. (u) Stat. 37 Hen. ViII, c. 1. 1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 21.
(v) 4 Inst. 259. 2 Hal. P. c. 69. 2 Hawk. P. C. 55. (w) Mirr. c. 1, § 13, 16.
(x) 4 Inst. 261. 2 Hawk. P. C. 72. (y) Mirror, c. 1, § 10.
(9) The commission so runs, but it is made immaterial by statute. The terms of the court
are also now altered by statute.
(10) Since the statute 5 and 6 Vic. c. 38, this court cannot try any person for treason or
murder, or for any felony which, when committed by a person not previously convicted of
felony, is punishable by transportation for life; and its jurisdiction is still further restricted
by subsequent statutes.
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to the lords of those hundreds or manors. Its original intent was to view the
frankpledges, that is, the freeman within the liberty; who (we may remember),(z)
according to the institution of the great Alfred, were all mutually pledges for
the good behaviour of each other. Besides this, the preservation of the peace,
and the chastisement of divers minute offences against the public good, are the
objects both of the court-leet and the sheriff's tourn; which have exactly the
same jurisdiction, one being only a larger species of the other; extending over
more territory, but not over more causes. All freeholders within the precinct
are obliged to attend them, and all persons commorant therein; which com-
morancy consists in usually lying there: a regulation, which owes its origin to
the laws of King Canute.(a) But persons under twelve and above sixty years
old, peers, clergymen, women, and the king's tenants in ancient demesne, are
excused from attendance there: all others being bound to appear upon the
jury, if required, and make their due presentments. It was also, anciently, the
custom to summon all the king's subjects, as they respectively grew to years of
discretion and strength, to *come to the court-leet, and there take the [.274]
oath of allegiance to the king. The other general business of the leet L
and tourn, was to present by jury all crimes whatsoever that happened within
their jurisdiction; and not only to present, but also to punish, all trivial mis-
demeanors, as all trivial debts were recoverable in the court-baron, and county
court: justice, in these minuter matters of both kinds, being brought home to
the doors of every man by our ancient constitution. Thus, in the Gothic con-
stitution, the hcereda, which answered to our court-leet, "de omnibus quidem
coqnoscit, non tamen de omnibus judicat."(b) The objects of their jurisdiction
are therefore unavoidably very numerous: being such as, in some degree, either
less or more, affect the public weal, or good governance of the district in which
they arise; from common nuisances and other material offences against the
king's peace and public trade, down to eaves-dropping, waifs, and irregularities
in public commons. But both the tourn and the leet have been for a long time
in a declining way; a circumstance, owing in part to the discharge granted by
the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, c. 10, to all prelates, peers, and clergy-
men, from their attendance upon these courts; which occasioned them to grow
into disrepute. And, hence, it is that their business hath, for the most part,
gradually devolved upon the quarter sessions; which it is particularly directed
to do in some cases by 1 Edw. IV, c. 2.
11. The court of the coroners (c) is also a court of record, to inquire when
any one dies in prison, or comes to a violent or sudden death, by what manner
he came to his end. And this he is only entitled to do super visum corporis.
Of the coroner and his office we treated at large in a former volume, (d) among
the public officers and ministers of the kingdom; and, therefore, shall not here
repeat our inquiries; only mentioning his court by way of regularity, among the
criminal courts of the nation.
*12. The court of the clerk of the market(e) is incident to every fair [*275]
and market in the kingdom, to punish misdemeanors therein; as a court [*27J
pie poudre is, to determine all disputes relating to private or civil property. The
object of this jurisdiction (f) is principally the cognizance of weights and
measures, to try whether they be according to the true standard thereof, or no:
which standard was anciently committed to the custody of the bishop, who
appointed some clerk under him to inspect the abuse of them more narrowly;
and hence this officer, though now usually a layman, is called the clerk of the
market.(g) If they be not according to the standard, then, besides the punish-
ment of the party by fine, the weights and measures themselves ought to be burnt.
This is the most inferior court of criminal jurisdiction in the kingdom: though
the objects of its coercion were esteemed among the Romans of such importance
to the public that they were committed to the care of some of their most digni-
fied magistrates, the curule Tdiles.
(z) See book III, p. 113. (a) Part 2, c. 19. (b) Stiernhook, de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 2.
(c) 4 Inst. 271. 2 Hal. P. C. 53. 2 Hawk. P. C. 42. (d) See book I, page 349. (e) 4 Inst. 273.
(f) See st. 17 Car. H, c. 19. 22 Car. II, c. 8, 23 Car. II, c. 12. (g) Bacon of English Gov. b. x, c. 8.
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II. There are a few other criminal courts of greater dignity than many of these,
but of a more confined and partial jurisdiction; extending only to some particu-
lar places, which the royal favour, confirmed by act of parliament, has distill-
guished by the privilege of having peculiar courts of their own for the punish-
ment of crimes and misdemeanors arising within the bounds of their cognizance.
These, not being universally dispersed, or of general use, as the former, but con-
fined to one spot, as well as to a determinate species of causes, may be denomi-
nated private or special courts of criminal jurisdiction.
I speak not here of ecclesiastical courts; which punish spiritual sins, rather
than temporal crimes, by penance, contrition and excommunication, pro salute
animce; or, which is looked upon as equivalent to all the rest, by a sum of
*money to the officers of the court by way of commutation of penance.
Of these we discoursed sufficiently in the preceding book.(h) Iam now
speaking of such courts as proceed according to the course of the common law;
which is a stranger to such unaccountable barterings of public justice.
1. And, first, the court of the lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the
king's household, (i) was instituted by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 14, to inquire of
felony by any of the king's sworn servants, in the cheque roll of the household,
under the degree of a lord, in confederating, compassing, conspiring, and imagin-
ing the death or destruction of the king, or any lord or other of his majesty's
privy council, or the lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the king's house.
The inquiry, and trial thereupon, must be by a jury according to the course of
the common law, consisting of twelve sad men (that is, sober and discreet per-
sons) of the king's household. (11)
2. The court of the lord steward of the king's household, or (in his absence)
of the treasurer, comptroller, and steward of the marshalsea, (k) was erected by
statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, with jurisdiction to inquire of, hear, and determine,
all treasons, misprisions of treason, murders, manslaughters, bloodshed, and other
malicious strikings; whereby blood shall be shed in, or within the limits (that
is, within two hundred feet from the gate) of, any of the palaces and houses of
the king, or any other house where the royal person shall abid6. The proceed-
ings are also by jury, both a grand and a petit one, as at common law, taken out
of the officers and sworn servants of the king's household. The form and solem-
nity of the process, particularly with regard to the execution of the sentence for
cutting off the hand, which is part of the punishment for shedding blood in
the king's court, are very minutely set forth in the said statute 33 Hen. VIII,
and the several officers of the servants of the household in and about such execu-
[*277] tion are *described; from the sergeant of the wood-yard, who furnishes
the chopping-block, to the sergeant-farrier, who brings hot irons to sear
the stump.(12)
3. As in the preceding book (1) we mentioned the courts of the two universities,
or their chancellors' courts, for the redress of civil injuries; it will not be im-
proper now to add a short word concerning the jurisdiction of their criminal
courts, which is equally large and extensive. The chancellor's court of Oxford
(with which university the author hath been chiefly conversant, though probably
that of Cambridge hath also a similar jurisdiction) hath authority to determine
all causes of property, wherein a privileged person is one of the parties, except
only causes of freehold; and also all criminal offences or misdemeanors under
the degree of treason, felony, or mayhem. The prohibition of meddling with
freehold still continues: but the trial of treason, felony, and mayhem, by a par-
ticular charter, is committed to the university-jurisdiction in another court,
namely, the court of the lord high steward of the university.
(A) See book M, p. 61. (1) 4 Inst. 133. (k) 4 Inst. 133. 2 Hal. P. C. 7. (1) See book I, page 83.
(11) [The statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 14, was repealed by the 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, and the jurisdiction
of this court has accordingly become obsolete.]
(12) That part of statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, relating to this subject, was repealed by 9 Geo.
IV, c. 31, and this court is therefore become obsolete.
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For by the charter of 7th June, 2 Hen. IV, (confirmed, among the rest, by the
statute 13 Eliz. c. 29), cognizance is granted to the university of Oxford of all
indictments of treasons, insurrections, felony and mayhem, which shall be found
in any of the king's courts against a scholar or privileged person; and they are
to be tried before the high steward of the university, or his deputy, who is to be
nominated by the chancellor of the university for the time being. But when his
office is called forth into action, such high steward must be approved by the lord
high chancellor of England; and a special commission under the great seal is
given to him, and others, to try the indictment then depending, according to
the law of the land and the privileges of the said university. When, therefore,.
an indictment is found *at the assizes, or elsewhere, against any scholar E,28]
of the university, or other privileged person, the vice-chancellor may [*278
claim the cognizance of it; and (when claimed in due time and manner) it
ought to be allowed him by the judges of assize: and then it comes to be tried
in the high steward's court. But the indictment must first be found by a grand
jury, and then the cognizance claimed: for I take it that the high steward can-
not proceed originally ad inquirendum; but only, after inquest in the common-law
courts ad audiendum et determinandum. Much in the same manner, as when
a peer is to be tried in the court of the lord high steward of Great Britain, the
indictment must first be found at the assizes, or in the court of king's bench, and
then (in consequence of a writ of certiorari) transmitted to be finally heard and
determined before his grace the lord high steward and the peers.
When the cognizance is so allowed, if the offence be inter minora crimina, or
a misdemeanor only, it is tried in the chancellor's court by the ordinary judge.
But if it be for treason, felony, or mayhem, it is then, and then only, to be deter-
mined before the high steward, under the king's special commission to try the
same. The process of the trial is this. The high steward issues one precept to
the sheriff of the county, who thereupon returns a panel of eighteen freeholders;
and another precept to the bedels of the university, who thereupon return a panel
of eighteen matriculated laymen, "laicosprivilegio universitatis yaudentes:" and
by a jury formed de medietate, half of freeholders and half of matriculated per-
sons, is the indictment to be tried; and that in the guildhall of the city of Ox-
ford. And if execution be necessary to be awarded, in consequence of finding
the party guilty, the sheriff of the county must execute the university-process;
to which he is annually bound by an oath.
*I have been the more minute in describing these proceedings, as there
has happily been no occasion to reduce them into practice for more [*279]
than a century past; nor will it perhaps be thought advisable to revive them:
though it is not a right that merely rests in scriptis or theory, but has formerly
often been carried into execution. There are many instances, one in the reign
of Queen Elizabeth, two in that of James the First, and two in that of Charles
the First, where indictments for murder have been challenged by the vice-
chancellor at the assizes, and afterwards tried before the high steward by jury.
The commissions under the great seal, the sheriff's and bedel's panels, and all
the other proceedings on the trial of the several indictments, are still extant in
the archives of that university.
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CHAPTER XX.
OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.
WE, are next, according to the plan I have laid down, to take into considera-
tion the proceedings in the courts of criminal jurisdiction, in order to the
punishment of offences. These are plain, easy, and regular; the law not admit-
ting any fictions, as in civil causes, to take place where the life, the liberty, and
the safety of the subject are more immediately brought into jeopardy. And
these proceedings are divisible into two kinds; summary and regular: of the
former of which I shall briefly speak, before we enter upon the latter, which will
require a more thorough and particular examination.
By a summary proceeding(l) I mean principally such as is directed by several
acts of parliament (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless in the case of
contempts) for the conviction of offenders, and the inflicting of certain penal-
ties created by those acts of parliament. In these there is no intervention of a
jury, but the party accused is acquitted or condemned by the suffrage of such
person, only, as the statute has appointed for his judge. An institution designed
professedly for the greater ease of the subject, by doing him speedy justice, and
by not harassing the freeholders with frequent and troublesome attendances to
*2811 try every minute *offence. But it has of late been so far extended, as,if a check be not timely given, to threaten the disuse of our admirable
and truly English trial by jury, unless only in capital cases.(2) For,
I. Of this summary nature are all trials of offences and frauds contrary to
the laws of the excise, and other branches of the revenue: which are to be
inquired into and determined by the commissioners of the respective depart-
ments, or by justices of the peace in the country; officers, who are all of them
appointed and removable at the discretion of the crown. And though such
convictions are absolutely necessary for the due collection of the public money,
and are a species of mercy to the delinquents, who would be ruined by the
expense and delay of frequent prosecutions by action or indictment; and though
such has usually been the conduct of the commissioners, as seldom (if ever) to
afford just grounds to complain of oppression; yet when we again(a) consider
the various and almost innumerable branches of this revenue; which may be
in their turns the subjects of fraud, or, at least, complaints of fraud, and, of
course, the objects of this summary and arbitrary jurisdiction; we shall find
that the power of these officers of the crown over the property of the people is
increased to a very formidable height.
II. Another branch of summary proceedings is that before justices of the
peace, in order to inflict divers petty pecuniary mulcts, and corporal penalties
denounced by act of parliament for many disorderly offences; such as common
swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a vast variety of others, for
which I must refer the student to the justice-books formerly cited,(b) and which
used to be formerly punished by the verdict of a jury in the court-leet. This
(a) See book I, page 319, &c. (b) Lambard and Burn.
(1) [As to summary proceedings in general, and the dispositions of the courts, especially
where no appeal is given, to require a stricter accuracy than is essential in other cases where
there is a trial by jury, see 1 Stra. 67; Burn, J., tit. Convictions; 1 East, 649, 655; 5 M. and
S. 206; 1 Chitty on game laws, 189 to 223; Bracy's Case, 1 Salk. 348.]
(2) [See observations, Burn, J., tit. Convictions; 1 East, 649. Hence, it has been a doctrine
that a different rule of evidence, as to the strictness of proof, should be required in the case
of proceedings on a summary information than in an action: see 1 East, 649; but that doc-
trine now seems to have been properly overruled: 1 East, 655; 1 M. and S. 206; for if the
legislature has thought fit to intrust magistrates or other inferior jurisdictions with the decis-
ion in certain matters, their proceedings ought to be governed by the same rules of evidence
as affect superior courts.]
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change in the administration of justice hath, however, had some mischievous
effects; as, 1. The almost entire disuse and contempt of the court-leet, and
sheriff's tourn, the king's ancient courts of common law, formerly much
revered and respected. *2. The burthensome increase of the business [*282]
-of a justice of the peace, which discourages so many gentlemen of rank and
character from acting in the commission; from an apprehension that the duty
of their office would take up too much of that time, which they are unwilling
to spare from the necessary concerns of their fTmilies, the improvement of their
understandings, and their engagements in other services of the public. Though
if all gentlemen of fortune had it both in their power and inclinations to act
in this capacity, the business of a justice of the peace would be more divided,
and fall the less heavy upon individuals: which would remove what, in the pres-
ent scarcity of magistrates, is really an objection so formidable that the country
is greatly obliged to any gentleman of figure who will undertake to perform
that duty, which, in consequence of his rank in life, he owes more peculiarly to
his country. However, this backwardness to act as magistrates, arising greatly
from this increase of summary jurisdiction, is productive of, 3. A third mis-
chief: which is, that this trust, when slighted by gentlemen, falls, of course,
into the hands of those who are not so; but the mere tools of office. And then
the extensive power of a justice of the peace, which, even in the hands of men
of honour, is highly formidable, will be prostituted to mean and scandalous
purposes to the low ends of selfish ambition, avarice or personal resentment.
And from these ill consequences we may collect the prudent foresight of our
ancient lawgivers, who suffered neither the property nor the punishment of the
subject to be determined by the opinion of any one or two men; and we may
also observe the necessity of not deviating any farther from our ancient consti-
tution, by ordaining new penalties to be inflicted upon summary convictions.(3)
The process of these summary convictions, it must be owned, is extremely
speedy. Though the courts of common law have thrown in one check upon
them, by making it necessary to summon the party accused before he is
*condemned. This is now held to be an indispensable requisite;(c) [*283
though the justices long struggled the point; forgetting that rule of
natural reason expressed by Seneca,
(c) Salk. 131. 2 Lord Raym. 1405.
(3) [Unless a power of appeal be expressly given by the legislature, there is no appeal: 6
East, 514; Wightw. 22; 4 M. and S. 421; 8 T. R. 218, note 6; but the party has, in general, a
right to a certiorari, to remove the conviction into the court of king's bench, unless that right
be expressly taken away. 8 Term Rep. 542. But though it seems to be a principle that an
appeal ought to be preserved in cases where the certiorari is taken away, yet in many cases,
although there be no appeal, yet the certiorari is expressly taken away. Per Lord Mansfield,
Dougl. 5,52. If a statute, authorizing a summary conviction before a magistrate, give an ap-
peal to the sessions, who are directed to hear and finally determine the matter, this does not
take away the certiorari, even after such an appeal made and determined; and Lord Kenyon
said, "The certiorari, being a beneficial writ for the subject, could not be taken away without
express words, and he thought it was much to be lamented, in a variety of cases, that it was
taken away at all." 8 T. R. 542. Where an appeal is given, the magistrates should make
known to the convicted party his right to appeal; but if he decline appealing, they need not
go on to inform him of the necessary steps to be taken in order to appeal. 3 M. and S. 493.
Upon an appeal, the magistrates are bound to receive any fresh evidence, although not ten-
dered on the former hearing. 3 M. and S. 133.
Upon a certiorari, the conviction of the magistrate is removed into the superior court, but there
is not (as upon an appeal) any rehearing of the evidence or merits; and the court can only look
to the form of the conviction, and see from that whether or not the party has been legally con-
victed, and the certiorari therefore operates in the nature of a writ of error, and no extrinsic ob-
jection to the proceedings can be taken. 6 T. R. 376; 8 id. 590. If, therefore, the magistrate,
in order to sustain his conviction, should mistake the evidence or other proceeding before him,
the remedy is by motion founded on affidavits to the court of K. B. for a rule to show cause
why a mandamus should not issue, requiring the magistrate to state the whole of the evidence
adduced before him correctly in his conviction, pursuant to 3 Geo. IV, c. 23. 4 Dowl. and R.
352. If a magistrate wilfully misstate material evidence, he will be subject to a criminal
information or indictment. 1 East, 186.]
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" Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera,
Aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit:"(4)
A rule, to which all municipal laws, that are founded on the principles of
justice, have strictly conformed: the Roman law requiring a citation at the
least; and our common law never suffering any fact (either civil or criminal)
to be tried, till it has previously compellea an appearance by the party con-
cerned. After this summons, the magistrate, in summary proceedings, may go
on to examine one or more witnesses, as the statute may require, upon oath;(5)
and then make his conviction of the offender, in writing: upon which he
usually issues his warrant, either to apprehend the offender, in case corporal
punishment is to be inflicted on him: or else to levy the penalty incurred, by
distress and sale of his goods. This is, in general, the method of summary pro-
(4) [" He who decides a case without hearing both parties, though his decision may be just.
is himself unjust ;" which is adopted as a principle of law by Lord Coke, in 11 Co. Rep. 99.
A summons is indispensably required in all penal proceedings of a summary nature by justices
of peace. Rex v. Dyer, 1 Salk. 181 ; 6 Mod. 41 ; and see the cases collected in 8 Mod. 154,
note (a). It is declared by Lord Kenyon to be an invariable rule of law: Rex v. Benn, 6 T. R.
198; and it is stated by Mr. Serj. Hawkins to be implied in the construction of all penal stat-
utes. 1 Hal. P. C. 420. So jealous is the law to enforce this equitable rule, that the neglect
of it by a justice in proceeding summarily without a previous summons to the party, has been
treated as a misdemeanor, proper for the interference of the court of king's bench by infor-
mation (Rex v. Venables, 2 Lord Ray. 1407; Rex v. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46; Rex v. Allington,
id. 678), which has been granted upon affidavits of the fact. Rex v. Harwood, 2 Stra. 1088; 3
Burr. 1716, 1768; Rex a. Constable, 7 D. and R. 663; 3 M. C. 488. As this is a privilege of
common right, which requires no special provision to entitle the defendant to the advantage
of it, so it cannot be taken away by any custom. Rex v. Cambridge (University), 8 Mod. 163.
Upon a sufficient information properly laid, the magistrates are bound to issue a summons,
and proceed to a hearing, and if they refuse to do so, will be compelled by mandamus. Rex
v. Benn, 6 T. R. 198. Where a particular form of notice is prescribed by the act, that must be
strictly pursued. Rex v. Croke, Cowp. 30. The intention of the summons being to afford the
person accused the means of making his defence, it should contain the substance of the charge,
and fix a day and place for his appearance; allowing a sufficient time for the attendance of
himself and his witnesses. Rex v. Johnson, 1 Stra. 260. A summons to appear immediately
upon the receipt thereof, has been thought insufficient in one case. 2 Burr. 681. In another,
an objection made to the summons that it was to appear on the same day, was only removed
by the fact of the defendant having actually appeared, and so waived any irregularity in the
notice. Rex a. Johnson, 1 Stra. 261. It is equally necessary that it should be to appear at a
place certain: otherwise the party commits no default by not appearing; and the magistrate
cannot proceed in the defendant's absence upon a summons defective in these particulars,
without making himself liable to an information. Rex v. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46. The service
of the summons must be personal, unless where personal service is expressly dispensed with
by statute. Parker, C. J., 10 Mod. 345.]
(5) [The examination of witnesses must be upon oath, and no legal conviction can be
founded upon any testimony not so taken. Dalt. c. 6, § 6; and see id. cc. 115, 164; Plowd.
12, a; Lamb. 517; Ex parte Aldridge, 4 D. and R. 83; 2 M. C. 120; Rex v. Glossopp, 4 B. and
A. 616; Paley, 33, 34. Although no mode of examination be pointed out by. the statutes
giving jurisdiction over the offence; yet, as justice requires that the accused should be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, and have an opportunity of cross-examination, it is
required by law, in the summary mode of trial now under consideration, that the evidence
and depositions should be taken in the presence of the defendant, where he appears. For
though the legislature, by a summary mode of inquiry, intended to substitute a more expedi-
tious process for the common-law method of trial, it could not design to dispense with the
rules of justice, as far as they are compatible with the method adopted. Indeed it may be
useful upon this occasion to notice the general maxim which has been laid down as a guide
to the conduct of magistrates in regulating all their summary proceedings, namely, that "acts
of parliament, in what they are silent, are best expounded according to the use and reason of
the common law." Rex v. Simpson, 1 Stra. 45. Unless, therefore, the defendant forfeits this
advantage by his wilful absence, he ought to be called upon to plead before any evidence is
given. 1 T. R. 320. And the witnesses must be sworn and examined in his presence. Rex
v. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163. Or, if the evidence has been taken down in his absence, and is read
over to him afterwards, the witness must at the same time, unless the defendant upon hearing
the evidence should confess the fact (Rex v. Hall, 1 T. R. 320), be resworn in his presence, and
not merely called upon to assert the truth of his former testimony. Rex V. Crowther, 1 T. R.
125. For the intent of the rule is, that the witness should be subjected to the examination of
the defendant upon his oath. 2 Burr. 1163; and see Rex v. Kiddy, 4 D. and R. 734;
2 M. C. 364.]
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ceedings before a justice or justices of the peace; but for particulars we must
have recourse to the several statutes, which create the offence, or inflict the
punishment: and which usually chalk out the method by which offenders are
to be convicted.(6) Otherwise they fall of course under the general rule, and
can only be convicted by indictment or information at the common law.
III. To this head, of summary proceedings, may also be properly referred the
method, immemorially used by the superior courts of justice, of punislhing
contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings thereon.
The contempts, that are thus punished, are either direct, which openly insult
or resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the judges who preside there;
or else are consequential, which (without such gross indolence or direct opposi-
tion) * plainly tend to create an universal disregard of their authority [*,284]
The principal instances, of either sort, that have been usually (d) pun-
ishable by attachment, are chiefly of the following kinds. 1.'Those committed
by inferior judges and magistrates; by acting unjustly, oppressively or irregu-
larly, in administering those portions of justice which are intrusted to their
distribution: or by disobeying the king's writs issuing out of the superior
courts, by proceeding in a cause after it is put a stop to or removed by writ of
prohibition, certiorari, error, suversedeas, and the like. For, as the king's
superior courts (and especially the court of king's bench) have a general super-
intendence over all inferior jurisdictions, any corrupt or iniquitous practices of
subordinate judges are contempts of that superintending authority, whose duty
it is to keep them within the bounds of justice. 2. Those committed by sber-
iffs, baliffs, gaolers, and other officers of the court, by abusing the process of the
law, or deceiving the parties, by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive
behaviour, or culpable neglect of duty. 3. Those committed by attorneys and
solicitors, who are also officers of the respective courts: by gross instances of
fraud and corruption, injustice to their clients, or other dishonest practice.(7)
For the malpractice of the officers reflects some dishonour on their employers:
and, if frequent or unpunished, creates among the people a disgust against the
courts themselves. 4. Those committed by jurymen, in collateral matters
relating to the discharge of their office; such as making default, when sum-
moned; refusing to be sworn, or to give any verdict; eating or drinking with-
out the leave of the court, and especially at the cost of either party; and other
misbehaviours or irregularities of a similar kind: but not in mere exercise of
their judicial capacities, as by giving a false or erroneous verdict. 5. Those
committed by witnesses: by making default when summoned, refusing to be
sworn or examined, or prevaricating in their evidence when sworn. 6. Those
committed by parties to any suit, or proceeding before the court: as by disobe-
(d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 142, &c.
(6) [These acts have been consolidated, and the duties of justices clearly defined by the
statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 43, which provides a procedure applicable to the great majority ot
cases in which in a summary conviction or order may be made by justices of the peace out of
sessions.)
And in the United States, where statutes authorize summary convictions, they point out
specifically the course of proceeding, and it is a rule of universal application that the magis-
trate must follow this course strictly, and the conviction must show upon its face a case
coming within the statute, and of which the justice had jurisdiction. No intendments will
be made in favor of these summary proceedings. See the general rule in Britain v. Kinnard,
1 Brod. and Bing. 432; Piper v. Pierson, 2 Gray, 120, and notes thereto, in Leading Criminal
Cases, by Bennett and Heard.
(7) [It is not, however, usual for the court to interfere in a summary way against an attor-
ney for a mere breach of promise, where there is nothing criminal: 2 Wils. 371; and see 2
Moore, 665; 1 Bing. 102, 105; or on account of negligence or unskilfulness: 4 Bfrr. 2060; 2
Bla. Rep. 780; 1 Chit. Rep. 651 ; except it be very gross: Say. 50, 169; nor for the misconduct
of an attorney independently of his profession. But see 4 B. and A. 47; 5 id. 898; 8 Chit.
Rep. 58; 1 Bingh. 91; 7 Moore, 424, 437; Tidd. 5th ed. 81.]
The power of courts to commit for contempt, and the limitations upon that power were
very fully considered in the Case of Yates, 4 Johns. 317; 6 id. 337, and 9 id. 395. And as to
justices' courts, see Onderdonk v. Ranlett, 3 Hill, 323.
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[*285] dience to any *rule or order, made in the progress of a cause; by non-
payment of costs awarded by the court upon a motion; or, by non-
observance of awards duly made by arbitrators or umpires, after having entered
into a rule for submitting to such determination.(e) Indeed the attachment for
most of this species of contempts, and especially for non-payment of costs and
non-performance of awards, is to be looked upon rather as a civil execution for
the benefit of the injured party, though carried on in the shape of a criminal
process for a contempt of the authority of the court. And, therefore, it hath
been held that such contempts, and the process thereon, being properly the
civil remedy of individuals for a private injury, are not released or affected by
the general act of pardon. And upon a similar principle, obedience to any rule
of court may also, by statute 10 Geo. III, c. 50, be enforced against any person
having privilege of parliament by the process of distress infinite. 7. Those
committed by any other persons under the degree of a peer: and even by peers
themselves, when enormous and accompanied with violence, such as forcible
rescous and the like ;(f) or when they import a disobedience to the king's great
prerogative writs of prohibition, habeas corpus,(g) and the rest. Some of these
contempts may arise in the face of the court; as by rude and contumelious
behaviour; by obstinacy, perverseness, or prevarication: by breach of the peace,
or any wilful disturbance whatever: others in the absence of the party; as by
disobeying or treating with disrespect the king's writ, or the rules or process of
the court; by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private malice,
extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or
judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts (or even
true ones without proper permission) of causes then depending in judgment;
and by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and
respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so
necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the people.
[*286] *The process of attachment, for these and the like contempts, must
necessarily be as ancient as the laws themselves. For laws, without a
competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and con-
tempt, would be vain and nugatory. A power, therefore, in the supreme courts
of justice to suppress such contempts, by an immediate attachment of the
offender, results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and must
be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. Accordingly, we find it
actually exercised as early as the annals of our law extend. And though a very
learned author(h) seems inclinable to derive the process from the statute of
Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 39 (which ordains, that in case the process of the king's
court be resisted by the power of any great man, the sheriff shall chastise the
resisters by imprisonment, "a qua non deliberentur sine Rpeciali prcecepto
domini regis :" and if the sheriff himself be resisted, he shall certify to the
courts the names of the principal offenders, their aiders, consenters, command-
ers, rend favourers, and by a special writ judicial they shall be attached by their
bodies to appear before the court, and if they be convicted thereof they shall be
punished at the king's pleasure, without any interfering by any other person
whatsoever), yet he afterwards more justly concludes, that it is part of the law
of the land; and, as such, is confirmed by the statute of ma qna carta.
If the contempt be committed in the'face of the court, the offender may be
instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, (i) with-
out any farther proof or examination. But in matters that arise at a distance,
and of which the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the con-
fession of the party or the testimony of others, if the judges upon affidavit see
sufficient ground to suspect that a contempt has been committed, they either
make a rule on the suspected party to show cause why an attachment should not
issue against him ;(J) or, in very flagrant instances of contempt, the attach-
[*287] ment issues in the first instance ;(k) as it also does, if no sufficient
cause be shown to discharge, and thereupon the court confirms, and
(e) See book HI, page 17. () Styl. 277. 2 Hawk. P. C. 152. Cro. Jac. 419. Salk. 586.
() 4 Burr. tiM. Lords' Journ. 7 Feb. 8 Jun. 1757. (h) Gilb. Hist.. CP. ch. 3.
s) Staund. P. C. 73, b. (j) Styl. 277. (k) Salk. 84. Stra. 185, 564.
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makes absolute, the original rule. This process of attachment is merely in-
tended to bring the party into court: and, when there, he must either stand
committed, or put in bail, in order to answer upon oath to such interrogatories
as shall be administered to him, for the better information of the court with re-
spect to the circumstances of the contempt. These interrogatories are in the
nature of a charge or accusation, and must by the course of the court be ex-
hibited within the first four days: (1) and, if any of the interrogatories is
improper, the defendant may refuse to answer it, and move the court to have it
struck out.(m) If the party can clear himself upon oath, he is discharged;
but, if perjured, may be prosecuted for the perjury.(n) If he confesses the con-
tempt, the court will proceed to correct him by fine, or imprisonment, or both,
and sometimes by a corporal or infamous punishment,(o) If the contempt be
of such nature that, when the fact is once acknowledged, the court can receive
no farther information by interrogatories than it is already possessed of (as in
the case of a rescous),(p) the defendant may be admitted to make such simple
acknowledgment, and receive his judgment without answering to any interrog-
atories: but if he wilfully and obstinately refuses to answer, or answers in an
evasive manner, he is then clearly guilty of a high and repeated contempt, to be
punished at the discretion of the court.
It cannot have escaped the attention of the reader, that this method of mak-
ing the defendant answer upon oath to a criminal charge, is not agreeable to the
genius of the common law in any other instance; (q) and seems indeed to have
been derived to the courts of king's bench and common pleas through the me-
dium of the courts of equity. For the whole process of the courts of equity,
in the several stages of a cause, and finally to enforce their decrees, was, till the
*introduction of sequestrations, in the nature of a process of contempt; [*288]
acting only in personam and not in rei. And there, after the party in
contempt has answered the interrogatories, such his answer may be contradicted
and disproved by affidavits of the adverse party: whereas, in the courts of law,
the admission of the party to purge himself by oath is more favourable to his
liberty, though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience; for, if he clears
himself by his answers, the complaint is totally dismissed. And, with regard to
this singular mode of trial, thus admitted in this one particular instance, I shall
only for the present observe, that as the process by attachment in general ap-
pears to be extremely ancient,(r) and has in more modern times been recognized,
approved, and confirmed by several express acts of parliament,(s) so the method
of examining the delinquent himself upon oath with regard to the contempt
alleged, is at least of as high antiquity, (t) and by long and immemorial usage is
now become the law of the land.
CHAPTER XXI.
OF ARRESTS.
WE are now to consider the regular and ordinary method of proceeding in the
courts of criminal jurisdiction; which may be distributed under twelve general
heads, following each other in a progressive order, viz.: 1. Arrest; 2. Com-
mitment, and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, and its inci-
dents; 6. Plea, and issue; 7. Trial, and conviction; 8. Clergy; 9. Judgment,
and its consequences; 10. Reversal of judgment; 11. Reprieve, or pardon;
() 6 Mod. 73. (m) Stra. 444. (n) 6 Mod. 73. (o) Cro. Car. 146.
'p) The King v Elkins, M. 8 Geo. III, B. R. (q) See book III, pp. 100, 101.
I') Yearb. 20 Hen. VI, c. 37. 22 Edw. IV, c. 29.
(s) Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 6, J 3. 13 Car. Ii, st. 2, c. 2, § 4. 9 and 10 Win. III, c. 15. 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 15, J 5.
(t) M. 5 Edw. IV, rot. 75, cited in East. Ent. 268, pl. 5.
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12. Execution; all of which will be discussed in the subsequent part of this
book.
First, then, of an arrest; which is the apprehending or restraining of one's
person, in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime. To
this arrest all persons whatsoever are, without distinction, equally liable in all
criminal cases: but no man is to be arrested, unless charged with such a crime
as will at least justify holding him to bail when taken. And, in general, an ar-
rest may be made four ways: 1. By warrant; 2. By an officer without war-
rant; 3. By a private person also without warrant; 4. By an hue and cry.
[*2 90] *1. A warrant may be granted in extraordinary cases by the privy
council, or secretaries of state; (a) (1) but ordinarily by justices of the
peace. This they may do in any cases where they have a jurisdiction over the of-
fence, in order to compel the person accused to appear before them: (b) for it would
be absurd to give them power to examine an offender, unless they had also a
power to compel him to attend, and submit to such examination. And thi ex-
tends undoubtedly to all treasons, felonies, and breaches of the peace; and also
to all such offences as they have power to punish by statute. (2) Sir Edward
Coke indeed (c) hath laid it down that a justice of the peace cannot issue
a warrant to apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion; no, not even till an
indictment be actually found: and the contrary practice is by others (d) held
to be grounded rather upon connivance than the express rule of law; though
now by long custom established. A doctrine which would in most cases give a
loose to felons to escape without punishment; and therefore Sir Matthew Hale
hath combatted it with invincible authority and strength of reason: maintain-
ing, 1. That a justice of the peace hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend
a person accused of felony, though not yet indicted; (e) and, 2. That he may
also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of felony, though the
original suspicion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant;
because he is a competent judge of the probability offered to him of such suspicion.
But in both cases it is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a war-
rant, as well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed.
without which no warrant should be granted; as also to prove the cause and
probability of suspecting the party against whom the warrant is prayed.(f) (3)
This warrant ought to be under the hand and seal of the justice, should set forth
the time and place of making, and the cause for which it is made, and should be
[*291] directed to the *constable or other peace officer (or, it may be, to
[ ] any private person by name), (g) requiring him to bring the party
either generally (4) before any justice of the peace for the county, or only
before the justice who granted it; the warrant in the latter case being called a
(a) 1 Lord Raym. 65. (b) 2 Hawk. P. C. 84. 4 Inst. 176. (d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 84.
(e) 2 Hal. P. C. 108. (f) Ibid. 110. (g) Salk. 176.
(1) [Or by the speaker of the house of commons (14 East, 1, 163), or house of lords (8 T. R.
314), or by a judge of the court of king's bench. 1 Hale, 578 ; and see 48 Geo. III, c. 58.
When the offender is not likely to abscond before a warrant can be obtained, it is in general
better to apprehend him by a warrant, than for a private person, or officer, to arrest him of his
own accord, because if the justice should grant his warrant erroneously, no action lies against
the party obtaining it. 3 Esp. 166, 167. And if a magistrate exceed his jurisdiction, the offi-
cer who executes a warrant is protected from liability; and no action can be supported
against the party procuring the warrant, though the arrest was without cause, unless it can be
proved that the warrant was obtained maliciously. 1 T. R. 535; 3 Esp. R. 135.]
Power is now, by several recent statutes, expressly conferred upon private individuals to
make arrest of persons found committing offences. The caution to abstain from so doing
where no apparent necessity exists is nevertheless worthy of being observed.
(2) [Where a statute gives a justice jurisdiction over an offence, it impliedly gives him power
to apprehend any person charged with such offence; and especially after a party has neglected
a summons. 2 Bing. 63; Hawk. b. 2, c. 13, s. 15; 12 Rep. 131 b; 10 Mod. 248.]
.(3) The power to grant such warrants is now regulated by statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 42,
which amends and consolidates the previous statutes.
(4) [The warrant need not state the time when the party is to be brought before the magis-
trate or examination. 8 T. R. 110; Fost. 143.]
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special warrant.(h) A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected,
without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and
void for its uncertainty; (i) for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not
to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion. And a warrant to
apprehend all persons, guilty of a crime therein specified, is no legal warrant:
for the point upon which its authority rests, is a fact to be decided on a subse-
quent trial; namely, whether the person apprehended thereupon be really guilty
or not.(5) It is therefore in fact no warrant at all; for it will not justify the
officer who acts under it: (k) whereas, a warrant properly penned (even though
the magistrate who issues it should exceed his jurisdiction); will, by statute 24
Geo. II, c. 44, at all events indemnify the officer who executes the same minis-
terially. And when a warrant is received by the officer he is bound to execute
it, so far as the jurisdiction of the magistrate and himself extends. A warrant
from the chief or other justice of the court of king's bench extends all over the
kingdom: and is teste'd, or dated, England; not Oxfordshire, Bercs, or other
particular county. But the warrant of a justice of the peace in one county, as
Yorkshire, must be backed, that it, signed by a justice of the *peace in [*2921
another, as Middlesex, before it can be executed there. Formerly, regu- 1*2921
larly speaking, there ought to have been a fresh warrant in every fresh county:
but the practice of backing warrants had long prevailed without law, and was
at last authorized by statutes 23 Geo. II, c. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 55. And now,
by statute 13 Geo. III, c. 31, any warrant for apprehending an English offender,
who may have escaped to Scotland, and vice versa, may be indorsed and executed
by the local magistrates, and the offender conveyed back to that part of the
united kingdom, in which such offence was committed.(6)
(7t) 2 Hawk. P. C. 85. (1) 1 Hal. P. c. 580. 2 Hawk. P. C. 82.
(k) A practice had obtained in the secretaries' office ever since the restoration, grounded on some clauses in
the acts for regulating the press of issuing general warrants to take up (without naming any person in particu-
lar) the authors, printers, pr publishers of such obscene or seditious libels as were particularly specified in the
warrant. When those act expired in 1694, the same practice was inadvertently continued in every reign, and
under every administration, except the four last years of Queen Anne, down to the year 1763; when such a
warrant being issued to apprehend the authors, printers, and publishers of a certain seditious libel, its validity
was disputed; and the warrant was adjudged by the whole court of king's bench to be void, in the case of
Money v. Leach. TrDin. 5 Geo. III, B. R. After which the issuingof such general warrants was .eclared illegal
by a vote of the house of commons. (Com. Journ. 22 Apr. 1766.)
(5) Warrants to arrest idle, loose, or disorderly persons are an exception to this rule, and
by several statutes, peace officers are expressly authorized to apprehend them without any
warrant at all.
(6) [By statute, all warrants issued in England, Scotland, or Ireland may be executed in
any part of the united kingdom. Independently of this, the secretary of state for Ireland
may, by his warrant, remove a prisoner there to be tried in England, for an offence committed
in the latter: 3 Esp. Rep. 178; and an English justice may commit a person here who has
committed an offence in Ireland, preparatory to sending him thither for trial. 2 Stra. 848;
4 Taunt. 84.
With respect to the time of arresting a person: A person may be apprehended in the night
as well as the day; 9 Co. 66; and though the statute 29 Car. II, c. 7, s. 6, prohibits arrests on
Sundays, it excepts the cases of treasons, felonies and breaches of the peace: in these cases,
therefore, an arrest may be made on that day. Cald. 291 ; 1 T. R. 265 ; Willes, 459.
As to the place in which a party may be arrested. Since the privileges of sanctuary and
abjuration were abolished, by 21 Jac. I, c. 28, no place affords protection against the criminal
law. And even the clergy may, on a criminal charge, be arrested whilst in their churches (Cro.
Jac. 821), though it is illegal to arrest them in any civil case, whilst in the church to perform
divine service, or going to or returning from the same on any day. Bac. Ab. Trespass, D. 8.
And if a person having committed a felony in a foreign country comes into England, he may
be arrested here, and conveyed and given up to the magistrates of the country against the
laws of which the offence was committed. 4 Taunt. 84.
It may be here observed as a general rule, that if the warrant be materially defective, or the
officer exceed his authority in executing it, and if he be killed in the attempt, this is only
manslaughter in the party whom he endeavored to arrest: 1 East, P. C. 310; 1 Leach, 206,
6 T. R. 122; 5 East, 808; 1 B. and C. 291; and any third person may lawfully interfere to
prevent an arrest under it, doing no more than is necessary for that purpose. 5 East, 304, 308;
1 Leach, 206.]
The statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 34, makes provision for the return of supposed offenders escaping
from the colonies to the united kingdom, and the statutes 6 and 7 Vic. cc. 75, 76, provide for
the extradition of supposed offenders who have escaped from France and the United Stats,
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2. Arrests by officers without warrant may be executed, 1. By a justice of the
peace; who may himself apprehend or cause to be apprehended, by word only,
any person committing a felony or breach of the peace in his presence. (1) 2.
The sheriff; (7) and, 3. The coroner, may apprehend any felon within the county
without warrant. 4. The constable, of whose office we formerly spoke,(m) bath
great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He may, without
warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace, committed in his view, and
carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of felony actually commit-
ted, or a dangerous wounding, whereby felony is like to ensue, he may upon
probable suspicion arrest the felon; (8)' and for that purpose is authorized (as
upon a justice's warrant) to break open doors, and even to kill the felon if he
cannot otherwise be taken; and, if he or his assistants be killed in attempting
such arrests, it is murder in all concerned. (n) 5. Watchmen, either those ap-
pointed by the statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, c. 4, to keep watch and ward
in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to the
constable, may virtute offlcii arrest all offenders, and particularly night-walkers,
and commit them to custody till the morning.(o)
3. Any private person (and a fortiori a peace officer) that is present when any
[*293] felony is committed, is bound by the law to *arrest the felon, on pain of
fine and imprisonment, if he escapes through the negligence of the
standers-by.(p) And they may justify breaking open the doors upon following
such felon ; and if they kill him, provided he cannot be otherwise taken, it is
justifiable; though if they are killed in endeavoring to make such arrest, it is
murder.(q) Upon probable suspicion also a private person may arrest the felon,
or other person so suspected.(r) (9) But he cannot justify breaking open doors
to do it; and if either party kill the other in the attempt, it is manslaughter,
and no more.(s) It is no more, because there is no malicious design to kill:
l) 1 Hal. P. C. 86. (m) See book 1, page 355. (n) 2 Hal. P. C. 88, 89. (o) Mbd. 98.
(p) 2 Hawk. P. C. 74. (q) 2 Hal. P. C. 77. (r) Stat. 30 Geo. II, c. 24. (s) 2 Hal. P. C. 82, 83.
into the united kingdom. The offences covered by these acts are murder, or assault with intent
to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, and forgery. Similar laws have been passed in France
and the United States for the return of the like offenders escaping to those countries from
the united kingdom. See the act of congress, 9 Stat. at Large, 302.
(7) [And the sheriff may arrest, though the party be merely suspected of a capital offence,
2 Hale, 87; and if the sheriff be assaulted in the execution of his office, he may arrest the
offender. 1 Saund. 77; 1 Taunt. 146.]
(8) [A constable may justify an imprisonment, without warrant, on a reasonable charge of
felony made to him, although he afterwards discharges the prisoner without taking him
before a magistrate, and although it turn out that no felony was committed by any one:
Holt. N. P. 418; Cald. 291; and the charge need not specify all the particulars necessary to
constitute the offence. R. and R. C. C. 329. In general, however, a constable cannot, without
an express charge or warrant, justify the arrest of a supposed offender, upon suspicion of his
guilt, unless some actual felony has been committed, and there is reasonable cause for the sus-
picion that the party imprisoned is guilty: 4 Esp. Rep. 80; Holt, C. N. P. 478; Hawk. b. 2,
c. 12, s. 16; 2 Hale, 92, 89, n. f ; Cald. 291; and a constable is not justified in apprehending
and imprisoning a person on suspicion of having received stolen goods, on the mere assertion
of one of the principal felons. 2 Stark. 167. There are, however, authorities in favor of an
exception to this rule in the case of night-walkers, and persons reasonably suspected of felony
in the night. 3 Taunt. 14; 1 East, P. C. 303 ; Hawk. b. 2, c. 12, s. 20; 2 Hale, 89; 5 Edw. II
c. 14; 2 Inst. 52: Bac. Ab. tit. Constable, G.]
(9) [Where a felony has been actually committed, a private person acting with a good inten-
tion, and upon such information as amounts to a reasonable and probable ground of uspicion,
is justified in apprehending without a warrant the suspected person in order to carry him be-
fore a magistrate. Cald. 291; 4 Taunt. 34, 35; Price, 525. But where a private person had
delivered another into the custody of a constable, upon a suspicion which appeared afterward
to be unfounded, it was held that the person so arrested might maintain an action of trespass
for an assault and false imprisonment against such private person, although a felony had been
actually committed. 6 T. R. 315.
With respect to interference, and arrests in order to prevent the commission of a crime, any
person may lawfully lay hold of a lunatic about to commit any mischief, which, if committed
by a sane person, would constitute a criminal offence; or any other person whom he shall see
on the point of committing a treason or felony, or doing any act which will manifestly en-
but it amounts to so much, because it would be of most pernicious consequence,
if, under pretence of suspecting felony, any private person might break open a
house, or kill another; and also because such arrest upon suspicion is barely
permitted by the law, and not enjoined, as in the case of those who are are pres-
ent when a felony is committed.
4. There is yet another species of arrest, wherein both officers and private
men are concerned, and that is upon an hue and cry raised upon a felony com-
mitted. An hue (from huer, to shout, and cry), hutesiun et clamor, is the old
common-law process of pursuing, with horn and with voice, all felons, and such
as have dangerously wounded another.(t) It is also mentioned by statute
Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 9, and 4 Edw. I, de oflicio coronatoris. But the principal stat-
ute, relative to this matter, is that of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, cc. 1 and 4, which
directs, that from thenceforth every county shall be so well kept, that imme-
diately upon robberies and felonies committed, fresh suit shall be made from
town to town, and from county to county; and that hue and cry shall be raised
upon the felons, and they that keep the town shall follow with hue and cry with
all the town and the towns near; and so hue and cry shall be made from town to
town, until they be taken and delivered to the sheriff. And that such hue and
cry may more effectually be made, the *hundred is bound by the same [*294]
statute, chapter 3, to answer for all robberies therein committed, unless
they take the felon; which is the foundation of an action against the hundred, (u)
in case of any loss by robbery. By statute 27 Eliz. c. 13, no hue and cry is suf-
ficient, unless made with both horsemen and footmen. And by statute 8 Geo.
II, c. 16, the constable or like officer, refusing or neglecting to make hue and
cry, forfeits 51.: and the whole vill or district is still in strictness liable to be
amerced, according to the law of Alfred, if any felony be committed therein
and the felon escapes.(10) An institution which hath long prevailed in many of
the eastern countries, and hath in part been introduced even into the Mogul
empire, about the beginning of the last century; which is said to have effectually
delivered that vast territory from the plague of robbers, by making in some places
the villages, in others the officers of justice, responsible for all the robberies com-
mitted within their respective districts.(w) Hue and cry (x) may be raised
either by precept of a justice of the peace, or by a peace officer, or by any private
man that knows of a felony. The party raising it must acquaint the constable
of the vill with all the circumstances which he knows of the felony, and the
person of the felon; and thereupon the constable is to search his own town,
and raise all the neighboring vills, and make pursuit with horse and foot; and
in the prosecution of such hue and cry the constable and his attendants have the
same powers, protection and indemnification, as if acting under a warrant of a
justice of the peace. But if a man wantonly or maliciously raises an hue and
cry, without cause, he shall be severely punished as a disturber of the public
peace.(y)
In order to encourage farther the apprehending of certain felons, rewards and
immunities are bestowed on such as bring them to justice, by divers acts of par-
(t) Bracton i. 3, tr. 2, . 1, J 1. Mirr. c. 2. § 6. (u) See book m, page 161.
(w) Mod. tn. Hist. vi, 883, vii, 156. (x) 2 Hal. P. C. 100-104. (Y) 1 Hawk. P. C. 75.
danger the life or person of another, and may detain him until it may be reasonably pre-
sumed that he has changed his purpose; but where he interferes to prevent others from fight-
ing, he should first notify his intention to prevent the breach of the peace. Hawk. b. 2, c. 12,
s. 19; 1 Hale, 589; 2 Roll. Ab. 559, E. p1. 3, n. 8; Selw. 3d ed. 830; Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 M
22; Bac. Abr. Trespass, D. 3; 1 East, P. C. 304. Thus, any one may justify breaking and
entering a party's house and imprisoning him, to prevent him from murdering his wife, who
cries out for assistance. 2 B. and P. 260; Selw. 3d ed. 830; Bac. Abr. Trespass, D. 3. And
the riding. in a body to quell a riot is lawful, and no information will be granted for small
irregularities in the pursuit of such a design. 1 Bla. Rep. 47; 1 B. and P. 264, n. a.; 1 East,
P. C. 304. If a man be found attempting to commit a felony in the night, any one may appre-
hend and detain him till he be carried before a magistrate. 1 R. and M. C. C. 93.]
(10) All these acts are now repealed.
ARRESTS. 293Chap. 2.
294 ARRESTS. [Book IV.
liament. The statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 8, enacts, that such as apprehend a
highwayman, and prosecute him to conviction, shall receive a reward of 401.
[*295] from the public; to be paid to them (or, if *killed in the endeavour to
take him, their executors) by the sheriff of the county; besides the
horse, furniture, arms, money, and other goods taken upon the person of such
robber; with a reservation of the right of any person from whom the same may
have been stolen: to which the statute 8 Geo. II, c. 16, superadds 101. to be paid
by the hundred indemnified by such taking. By statutes 6 and 7 Win. III, c.
17, and 15 Geo. II, c. 28, persons apprehending and convicting any offender
against those statutes, respecting the coinage, shall (in case the offence be trea-
son or felony) receive a reward of forty pounds; or ten pounds, if it only amount
to counterfeiting the copper coin. By statute 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 23, any
person apprehending and prosecuting to conviction a felon guilty of burglary,
house-breaking, horse-stealing, or private larceny to the value of 5s. from any
shop, warehouse, coach-house, or stable, shall be excused from all parish offices.
Aird by statute 5 Ann. c. 31, any person so apprehending and prosecuting a bur-
glar, or felonious house-breaker (or, if killed in the attempt, his executors), shall
be entitled to a reward of 401.(z) By statute 6 Geo. I, c. 23, persons discovering,
apprehending, and prosecuting to conviction, any person taking reward for
helping others to their stolen goods, shall be entitled to forty pounds. By
statute 14 Geo. II, c. 6, explained by 15 Geo. II, c. 34, any person apprehending
and prosecuting to conviction such as steal, or kill with an intent to steal, any
sheep, or other cattle specified in the latter of the said acts, shall for every such
conviction receive a reward of ten pounds. Lastly, by statute 16 Geo. II, c. 15,
and 8 Geo. III, c. 15, persons discovering apprehending, and convicting felons
and others being found at large during the term for which they are ordered to
be transported, shall receive a reward of twenty pounds.(11)
CHAPTER XXII.
OF COMMITMENT AND BAIL.
WiiEN a delinquent is arrested by any of the means mentioned in the preced-
ing chapter, he ought regularly to be carried before a justice of the peace: (1)
and how he is there to be treated, I shall next show, under the second head, of
commitment and bail.
The justice before whom such prisoner is brought is bound immediately to
examine the circumstances of the crime alleged: (2) and to this end by statute
(z) The statutes 4 and 5 W. and M, c. 8, 6 and 7 Wm. III, c. 17, and 5 Ann. c. 31 (together with 3 Geo. I, c.
15, § 4, which directs the method of reimbursing the sheriffs), are extended to the county palatine of Durham,
by stat. 14 Geo. III, c. 46.
(11) These statutes are repealed and new provisions substituted.
(1) [In a case where it was stated the party behaved improperly in a church, it was held that
though a constable might be justified in removing him from the church, and detaining him
till the service was over, yet he could not legally detain him afterwards to take him before a
magistrate. 2 B. and C. 699.
A watchman should deliver the supposed offender over to a constable, or take him before a
mazistrate. Dalt. J. c. 104.
A private person may do the same as a watchman. It has been held that a private person,
when he took a party endeavoring to commit a felony, might detain him, in order to take him
before a magistrate. 1 R. and M. C. C. 93.]
(2) [A constable, arresting a man on suspicion of felony, is bound to take him before a
magistrate as soon as he reasonably can; and he has no right to detain a prisoner three days
without taking him before a magistrate, in order that evidence may be collected in support
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2 and 3 P. and M. c. 10, he is to take in writing the examination of such prisoner,
and the information of those who bring him: (3) which, Mr. Lambard observes, (a)
was the first warrant given for the examination of a felon in the English law.
For, at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum: and his fault was
not to be wrung out of himself, but rather to be discovered by other means and
other men.(4) If upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that either no such
crime was committed, or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was
wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally to discharge him. Other-
wise he must either be committed to prison, or give bail: that is put in securi-
ties for his appearance, to answer the charge against him.(5) This commit-
ment, therefore, being only for safe custody, wherever bail will answer the same
intention, it ought to be taken; as in most of the inferior crimes: but in felo-
nies, and other offences of a *capital nature, no bail can be a security 297]
equivalent to the actual custody of the person. For what is there that [*29-
a man may not be induced to forfeit, to save his own life? and what satisfaction
or indemnity is it to the public, to seize the effects of them who have bailed a mur-
(a) Erenarch, b. 2, c. 7. See page 857.
of a felony with which he is charged. Wright v. Court, 6 D. and R. 628. And see 2 Haw.
P. C. 117.
It is the duty of the magistrate to take and complete the examination of all concerned, and
to discharge or commit the individual suspected as soon as the nature of the case will admit.
Fost. 142, 148.]
(8) [The prisoner's examination must not be upon oath; that of the witnesses must be.
2 Hale, P. C. 52; 1 id. 585; 1 Phil. Ev. 106. Where magistrates first took the examination of
witnesses, not on oath, in support of a conviction, and afterwards swore them to the truth of
their evidence, the court of king's bench expressed their disapprobation of the practice. Rex
v. Kiddy, 4 D. and R. 784.]
(4) The statute 2 and 8 P. and M. c. 10, is repealed. By statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 42, s. 17,
when a person appears or is brought before a justice or justices charged with an indictable
offence, the justice or one of the justices shall "read or cause to be read to the accused the
depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words or words to the like effect:
" Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say any thing in answer to the charge? You
are not obliged to say any thing unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be
taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you on your trial ;" and whatever
the prisoner shall then say in answer thereto shall be taken down in writing and read over
to him, and shall be signed by the said justice or justices, and kept with the depositions of
the witnesses, and shall be transmitted with them as hereinafter mentioned; and afterwards,
upon the trial of said accused person, the same may, if necessary, be given in evidence against
him without further proof thereof, unless it shall be proved that the justice or justices pur-
porting to sign the same did not in fact sign the same; provided always that the said justice
or justices, before such accused person shall make any statement, shall state to him and give
him clearly to understand that lie has nothing to hope from any promise of favor and nothing
to fear from any threat which may have been holden out to him to induce him to make any
admission or confession of his guilt, but that whatever he shall then say may be given in
evidence against him on the trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat; provided, never-
theless, that nothing herein enacted or contained shall prevent the prosecutor in any case
from giving in evidence any admission or confession or other statement of the person accused
or charged, made at any time, which by law would be admissible as evidence against such
.person." Some further provisions are made by statute 80 and 81 Vic. c. 85.
The statement of one defendant is not evidence against another arrested on the same
charge. Reg. v. Swinnerton, 1 C. and M. 598. It must not be taken on oath, or it will be
inadmissible. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. N. P. 242; R. v. Rivers, 7 C. and P. 177; R. V. Pikesley,
9 id. 124.
(5) [Besides this commitment and bail, the magistrate should take the recognizance of the
prosecutor to appear and prefer an indictment and give evidence at the next sessions of the
peace, or general gaol delivery, as the case may require, and in case of refusal may commit
him to gaol. 1 Hale, 586; 2 id. 52, 121 ; 8 M. and S. 1.
When it appears that a person brought before the magistrate as a witness, may probably
be able to give material evidence against the prisoner, he has, in the cases of manslaughter
and felony, by statute, authority to bind such witness by recognizance or obligation to
appear at the next general gaol delivery, to give evidence against the party indicted; and
infants and married women, who cannot legally bind themselves, must procure others to be
bound for them. And if the witness refuse to give such recognizance, the magistrate has
power to commit him, this being virtually included in his commission, and by necessary con-
sequence upon the above-mentioned statutes. 3 X. and S. 1; 1 Hale, 586.]
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derer, if the murderer himself be suffered to escape with impunity? lpon a prin-
ciple similar to which the Athenian magistrates, when they took a solemn oath
never to keep a citizen in bonds that could give three sureties of the same quality
with himself, did it with an exception to such as had embezzled the public money,
or been guilty of treasonable practices.(b) What the nature of bail is hath been
shown in the preceding book,(c) viz., a delivery of bailment, of a person to his
sureties, upon their giving (together with himself) sufficient security for his
appearance: he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of
going to gaol. In civil cases we have seen that every defendant is bailable; but
in criminal matters it is otherwise. Let us therefore inquire in what cases the
party accused ought, or ought not, to be admitted to bail.
And, first, to refuse or delay to bail any person bailable is an offence against
the liberty of the subject, in any magistrate by the common law,(d) as well as
by the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15, and the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II,
c. 2. And, lest the intention of the law should be frustrated by the justices
requiring bail to a greater amount than the nature of the case demands, it is
expressly declared by statute 1 W. and M., st. 2, c. 1, that excessive bail
ought not to be required; though what bail should be called excessive must be
left to the courts, on considering the circumstances of the case, to determine.
And, on the other hand, if the magistrate takes insufficient bail he is liable to
be fined, if the criminal doth not appear.(e) (6) Bail may be taken either in
court, or in some particular cases by the sheriff, coroner, or other magistrate,(7)
but most usually by the justices of the peace. Regularly, in all offences either
[*298] against the common *law or act of parliament, that are below felony,
the offender ought to be admitted to bail, unless it be prohibited by
some special act of parliament. (f) In order, therefore, more precisely to ascer-
tain what offences are bailable,
Let us next see, who may not be admitted to bail, or what offences are not
bailable. And here I shall not consider any one of those cases in which bail is
ousted by statute, from prisoners convicted of particular offences: for then
such imprisonment without bail is part of their sentence and punishment. But,
where the imprisonment is only for safe custody before the conviction, and not
for punishment afterwards, in such cases bail is ousted or taken away, wherever
the offence is of a very enormous nature: for then the public is entitled to
demand nothing less than the highest security that can be given, viz., the body
of the accused; in order to insure that justice shall be done upon him if guilty.
Such persons, therefore, as the author of the Mirror observes,(y) have no other
sureties but the four walls of the prison. By the ancient common law, before(h)
and since (i) the conquest, all felonies were bailable, till murder was excepted
by statute: so that persons might be admitted to bail before conviction
almost in every case. But the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 15, takes away the
power of bailing in treason, and in divers instances of felony. The statutes 23
len. VI, c. 9, and 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 13, give further regulations in this
matter; (8) and upon the whole we may collect, (k) that no justice of the peace
(b) Pott. Antiq.b. 1, c. 18. (c) See book III, pae 200. (d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 90.
e) Ibid. 89. (f) 2 Hal. P. C. 127. (g) C. 2.§24. (h) 2 Inst. 189.
(i) In omnibus placitis defelonia solet accusatus per plegios dimitti, preter quam in placito de komicidio, ubi ad
terrorem aliter otatutum est. (Glanv. 1. 14, c. 1.)
(k) 2 Inst. 186. 2 Hal. P. C. 129.
(6) [And even if the criminal does appear, yet, if the bail were taken corruptly, the magis-
trate would continue liable to an information or indictment. 2 T. R. 190]
(7) [The court of kinv's bench, or any judge thereof, in vacation, may at their discretion
admit persons to bail in all cases whatsoever: see 3 East, 163; 5 T. R. 169; but none can
claim this benefit de jure. 2 Hale, 129. As to when this court will bail, see 1 Chit. C. L.
2 ed. 98.]
(8) These statutes are since repealed, and much more liberal authority is conferred upon
justices to admit to bail.
In the United States it is provided by the national and state constitutions that unreasonable
bail shall not be required. But what is reasonable is necessarily left to the discretion of the
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can bail, 1. Upon an accusation of treason: (9) nor, 2. Of murder: nor, 3. In
case of manslaughter, if the prisoner be clearly the slayer, and not barely sus-
pected to be so; or if any indictment be found against him: nor, 4. Such as,
being committed for felony, have broken prison; because it not only carries a
presumption of guilt, but is also superadding one felony to another: 5. Persons
outlawed: 6. Such as have abjured the realm: 7. *Approvers, of whom [*29
we shall speak in a subsequent chapter, and persons by them accused:
8. Persons taken with the mainour, or in the fact of felony: 9. Persons
charged with arson. 10. Excommunicated persons, taken by writ de excom-
municato capiendo: all which are clearly not admissible to bail by the justices.
Others are of a dubious nature; as, 11. Thieves openly defamed and known:
12. Persons charged with other felonies, or manifest and enormous offences, not
being of good fame: and, 13. Accessories to felony, that labour under the same
want of reputation. These seem to be in the discretion of the justices, whether
bailable or not. The last class are such as must be bailed upon offering suffi-
cient surety; as, 14. Persons of good fame, charged with a bare suspicion of man-
slaughter, or other inferior homicide: 15. Such persons, being charged with
petit larceny, or any felony not before specified: or, 16. With being accessory
to any felony. Lastly, it is agreed that the court (1) of king's bench (or any
judge (m) thereof in time of vacation) may bail for any crime whatsoever, be it
treason,(n) murder,(o) or any other offence, according to the circumstances of
the case. And herein the wisdom of the law is very manifest. To allow bail
to be taken commonly for such enormous crimes would greatly tend to elude
the public justice: and yet there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which
it would be hard and unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of
the greatest offence. The law has therefore provided one court, and only one,
which has a discretionary power of bailing in any case: except only, even to
this high jurisdiction, and of course to all inferior ones, such persons as are
committed by either house of parliament, so long as the *session lasts: or [*300]
such as are committed for contempts by any of the king's superior courts
of justice.(p)
Upon the whole, if the offence" be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail,
he is to be committed to the county gaol by the mittimus of the justice, or
warrant under his hand and seal, containing the cause of his commitment:
there to abide till delivered by due course of law.(q) But this imprisonment, as
has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this
dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used
with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with needless fetters, nor sub-
jected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose
of confinement only; though what are so requisite must too often be left to the
discretion of the gaolers; who are frequently a merciless race of men, and, by
being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender sensation. Yet
(1) 2 Inst. 189. Latch. 12. Vaugh. 157. Comb. 111, 298. 1 Comyn's Dig. 495.
(i) Skin. 683. Salk. 105. Stra. 911. 1 Comyn's Dig. 497.
(n) In the reign of Queen Elizabeth it was the unanimous opinion of the judges, that no court could bal
upon a commitment for a charge of high treason, by any of the queen's privy council. 1 Anders. 298.
(o) In omnibus placitus de felonia solet aceusatu per pleqis dimittt, preterquam in plac.to de hoicidio.
(Glan. 1. 14, c. 1.) Sciendum tamen quod, in hoe placito n soret accueatus per ptegio8 diitti, niei ex regia poee-
tatis beneficio. (Ibid. c. 3.)
(p) Staundf. P. C. 73, b. (q) 2 Hal. P. C. 122.
officer who is empowered to fix it. Bail is usually denied in offences punishable capitally,
but it may be taken in any case. State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139 ; Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow.
89; U. S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 18; Commonwealth v. Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; U. S. v. Jones,
3 Wash. C. C. 224; Barronet's Case, 1 El. and Bl. 1.
As to the duty of the justice in taking bail to look into the nature of the caharge and the
evidence to sustain it, see the case last cited. The duty is essentially judicial. Linford a.
Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240; Reg. a. Badger, 4 id. 468.
(9) On a charge of treason bail cannot be taken, except by order of a secretary of state, or
by the court of queen's bench, or in vacation, by one of the judges thereof. 11 and 12 Vic.
C. 42.
Chap. 2.2.]
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the law (as formerly held) would not justify them in fettering a prisoner, unless
where he was unruly, or had attempted to escape; (r) this being the humane
language of our ancient lawgivers: (s) "custodes pwenam sibi commissorum non
augeant, nec eos torqueant; sed omni scevitia remota, pietateque adhibitajudicia
debite exequantur."
CHAPTER XXIII.
OF THE SEVERAL MODES OF PROSECUTIONS.
TiiE next step towards the punishment of offenders is their prosecution, or
the manner of their formal accusation. (1) And this is either upon a previous
finding of the fact by an inquest or grand jury; or without such previous find-
ing. The former way is either by presentment or indictment.
I. A presentment, generally taken, is a very comprehensive term; including
not only presentments, properly so called, but also inquisitions of office and
indictments by a grand jury. A presentment, properly speaking, is the notice
taken by a grand jury of any offence from their own knowledge or observation,(a)
without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of the king: as the
presentment of a nuisance, a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of the
court must afterwards frame an indictment, (b) before the party presented can
be put to answer it. An inquisition of office is the act of a jury summoned by
the proper officer to inquire of matters relating to the crown, upon evidence
laid before them. Some of these are in themselves convictions, and cannot
afierwards be traversed or denied; and therefore the inquest, or jury, ought to
hear all that can be alleged on both sides. Of this nature are all inquisitions
of felo de se; of flight in persons accused of felony; of deodands, and the like;
and presentments of petty offences in the sheriff's tourn or court-leet, where-
upon the presiding officer may set a fine.(2) Other inquisitions may be after-
[*302] wards traversed and examined; as, particularly the coroner's *inquisi-
tion of the death of a man, when it finds any one guilty of homicide ;(3)
(r) 2 Inst. 381. 3 Inst. 34. (s) Flet. . 1, c. 26. (a) Lamb. Eirenarch. 1. 4, c. 5. (b) 2 Inst. 739.
(1) [It may here be useful briefly to consider the time when the prosecution should be com-
menced. The habeas corpus act provides, that a person committed for treason or felony must
be indicted in the ensuing term or sessions, or the party must be bailed, unless it be shown, upon
oath, that the witnesses for the prosecution could not be produced at the preceding session.
31 Car. II, c. 2, -. 7. This regulation applies, however, only to persons actually confined upon
suspicion, and is solely intended to prevent the protracting of arbitrary imprisonment; so that
it does not preclude the crown from preferring an indictment at any distance of time from the
actual perpetration of the offence, unless some particular statute limits the time of prosecuting.]
(2) Mr. Justice Coleridge points out an inaccuracy here. He shows that inquisitions offelo
de se may be traversed by the executors or administrators of the deceased: Toomes v. Etther-
ington, 1 Saund. R. 363, n. 1, ed. 1824; that inquisition is not taken of the flight of persons
accused of felony distinct from the felony; that the finding as to deodands is not so conclusive
but that the court may interfere to diminish the value: Fost. 266; and that, as to presentments
of petty offences in the tourn or leet, Lord Mansfield has said that it cannot be true that they
are not traversable anywhere: Cowp. 459; and the law seems to be that, before the fine is
estreated and paid, though not afterwards, the presentment may be removed by certiorari into
the court of king's bench, and traversed there. Rex v. Heaton, 2 T. R. 184.
(3) [Upon this inquisition the party accused may be tried without the intervention of the
grand jury: 2 Hale, 61; 3 Camp, 371; 2 Leach, 1095; Russ. and R. C. C. 240, S. C.; and if an
indictment be found for the same offence, and the defendant be acquitted on the one, be must
be arraigned on the other, to which he may, however, effectually plead his former acquittal.
2 Hale, 61.
Verdict in an Action. There is also a mode in which a party may be put on his trial with-
out any written accusation, viz., the verdict of a jury in a civil cause. 2 Hale, 150; 4 T. R.
293; 3 Esp. 134. Thus, in an action for taking away goods,,if the jury found that they were
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for in such cases the offender so presented must be arraigned upon this inqui-
sition, and may dispute the truth of it; which brings it to a kind of indictment,
the most usual and effectual means of prosecution, and into which we will
therefore inquire a little more minutely.
II. An indictment (c) is a written accusation of one or more persons of a crime
or misdemeanor, preferred to, and presented upon oath by, a grand jury. To
this end the sheriff of every county is bound to return to every session of the
peace, and every commission of oyer and terminer, and of general gaol-delivery,
twenty-four good and lawful men of the county, some out of every hundred, to
inquire, present, do, and execute all those things which, on the part of our lord
the king, shall then and there be commanded them. (a) They ought to be
freeholders,(4) but to what amount is uncertain: (e) which seems to be casus
omissus, and as proper to be supplied by the legislature as the qualifications of
the petit jury, which were formerly equally vague and uncertain, but are now
settled by several acts of parliament. However, they are usually gentlemen of
the best figure in the county. As many as appear upon this panel are sworn
upon the grand jury, to the amount of twelve at the least, and not more than
twenty-three; that twelve may be a majority. Which number, as well as the
constitution itself, we find exactly described, so early as the laws of King Ethel-
red.(f) "Exeant seniores duodecim thani, et prcefectus cum eis, et jurent super
sanctuarium quod eis in manus datur, quod nolint ullum innocentem accusare,
nee aliquem noxium celare." In the time of King Richard the First (according
to Hoveden) the process of electing the grand jury ordained by that prince was
as follows: four knights were to be taken from the county at large, who chose
two more out of every hundred; which two associated to themselves ten other
principal freemen, and those twelve were to answer concerning all particulars
relating to their own district. This number was probably *found too [*303]
large and inconvenient; but the traces of this institution still remain
in that some of the jury must be summoned out of every hundred. This grand
jury are previously instructed in the articles of their inquiry, by a charge from
the judge who presides upon the bench. They then withdraw, to sit and receive
indictments, which are preferred to them in the name of the king, but at the
suit of any private prosecutor; and they are only to hear evidence on behalf of
the prosecution: for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an
inquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and "determined; and the
grand jury are only to inquire, upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient
cause to call upon the party to answer it. A grand jury, however, ought to be
thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence
goes; and not to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine that
might be applied to very oppressive purposes.(g)
The grand jury are sworn to inquire, only for the body of the county, pro
corpore comitatus; and therefore they cannot regularly inquire of a fact done
out of that county for which they are sworn, unless particularly enabled by an
act of parliament. And to so high a nicety was this matter anciently carried,
(e) See Appendix, S 1. (d) 2 Hal. P. C. 154. (e) Ibid. 155. (f) Wilk. LL. Angl. Sax. 117,
(g) State Trials, iv, 18.
taken feloniously, the verdict served also as an indictment. 2 Hale, 151; Hawk, b. 2, c. 15,
§ 6; Com. Dig. Indictment, C; Bac. Ab. Indictment, B, 5. And, at the present day, in an
action for slander, in which the plaintiff is charged with a criminal offence, and the defendant
justifies; if the jury find that the justification is true, the plaintiff may be immediately put
upon his trial for the crime alleged against him, without the intervention of a grand jury. 5
T. R. 293. But the verdict must be found in some court which has competent jurisdiction
over criminal matters, or otherwise it seems to have but little force. 2 Hale, 151; Hawk. b. 2,
c. 25, §6]
Generally in the United States, by express constitutional provisions, a party can only be put
on trial for a crime after presentment by a grand jury, except in the case of inferior offences,
And where this presentment is allowed to be dispensed with, an information filed by the pub-
lic prosecutor is substituted.
(4) It is not essential that they be freeholders. Russ. and R. 177.• 485
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that where a man was wounded in one county, and died in another, the offender
was at common law indictable in either, because no complete act of felony was
done in any one of them; but by statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 24, he is now
indictable in the county where the party died. And, by statute 2 Geo. II, c.
21, if the stroke or poisoning be in England, and the death upon the sea, or out
of England: or, vice versa; the offenders and their accessories may be indicted
in the county where either the death, poisoning, or stroke shall happen. And
so in some other cases; as particularly, where treason is committed out of the
realm, it may be inquired of in any county within the realm, as the king shall
direct, in pursuance of statutes 26 Hen. VIII, c. 13, 33 Hen. VIII, c. 23, 35
Hen. VIII, c. 2, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11. And counterfeiters, washers or
minishers *of the current coin, together with all manner of felons and[*304] their accessories, may by statute 026 Hen. VIII, c. 6 (confirmed and
explained by 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, §§ 75, 76), be indicted and tried for
those offences, if committed in any part (h) of Wales, before the justices of gaol-
delivery and of the peace in the next adjoining county of England, where the
king's writ runneth: that is, at present in the county of Hereford or Salop;
and not, as it should seem, in the county of Chester or Monmouth: the one
being a county-palatine where the king's writ did not run, and the other a part
of Wales, in 26 Hen. VII.(i) Murders, also, whether committed in England
or foreign parts,(k) may by virtue of the statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 23, be inquired
of and tried by the king's special commission in any shire or place in the king-
dom. By statute 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 25, all robberies and other capital
crimes, committed in Newfoundland, may be inquired of and tried in any
county in England. Offences against the black-act, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, may be
inquired of and tried in any county in England, at the option of the prose-
cutor.(l) So felonies in destroying turnpikes, or works upon navigable rivers,
erected by authority of parliament, may, by statutes 8 Geo. II, c. 20, and 13
Geo. III, c. 84, be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. By statute
26 Geo. II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from any vessel in distress or wrecked,
or breaking any ship contrary to 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18,(m) may be prosecuted
either in the county where the fact is committed, or in any county next adjoin-
ing; and, if committed in Wales, then in the next adjoining English county:
by which is understood to be meant such English county as by the statute 26
Hen. VIII, above mentioned, had before a concurrent jurisdiction with the
great sessions of felonies committed in Wales.(n) Felonies committed out of
[*305] the realm in burning or destroying the king's ships, *magazines or
stores, may by statute 12 Geo. III, c. 24, be inquired of and tried in any
county of England, or in the place where the offence is committed. By stat-
ute 13 Geo. III, c. 63, misdemeanors committed in India may be tried upon
information or indictment in the court of king's bench in England; and a
mode is marked out for examining witnesses by commission, and transmitting
their depositions to the court. But in general, all offences must be inquired
into, as well as tried, in the county where the fact is committed. Yet, if lar-
ceny be committed in one county, and the goods carried into another, the
offender may be indicted in either; for the offence is complete in both.(o) Or
he may be indicted in England, for larceny in Scotland, and carrying the goods
with him into Englard, or vice versa; or for receiving in one part of the united
kingdom goods that have been stolen in another.(p) But for robbery, bur-
glary, and the like, he can only be indicted where the fact was actually com-
mitted; for though the carrying away and keeping of the goods is a continuation
* (h) Stra. 533. 3 Mod. 134. (i) See Hardr. 66.
(k, Ely's Case, at the Old Bailey, Dec. 1720. Roache's Case, Dec. 1775.
(1) So held by all the judges, H. 11 Geo. III, in the case of Richard Mortis, on a case referred from the Old
Bailey.
(m) See page 245.
(n) At Shrewsbury summer assizes, 1774, Parry and Roberts were convicted of plundering a vessel which was
wrecked on the coast of Anglesey. It was moved in arrest of judgment, that Chester, and not balop, was te
next adjoining English county. But all the judges (in Mich. 15 Geo. III) held the prosecution to be regular.
(0) 1 Ha. P. C. 507. (p) Stat. 13 Geo. III, c. 31.
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of the original taking, and is therefore larceny in the second county, yet it is
not a robbery or burglary in that jurisdiction. And if a person be indicted in
one county for larceny of goods originally taken in another, and be thereof
convicted, or stands mute, he shall not be admitted to his clergy; provided the
original taking be attended with such circumstances as would have ousted him
of his clergy by virtue of any statute made previous to the year 1691.(q) (5)
When the grand jury have heard the evidence, if they think it a groundless
accusation, they used formerly to indorse on the back of the bill, "ignoramus ;"
or, we know nothing of it: intimating, that though the facts might possibly be
true, that truth did not appear to them: but now, they assert in English more
absolutely, "not a true bill;" or (which is the better way) "not found;" and
then the party is discharged without further answer. But a fresh bill may
afterwards be preferred to a subsequent grand jury. If they are satisfied
of the truth of the accusation, they then *indorse upon it, "a true bill;" [*306]
anciently "billa vera." The indictment is then said to be found, and the party
stands indicted. But to find a bill there must at least twelve of the jury agree:
for so tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no man can
be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital offence, unless by the unani-
mous voice of twenty-four of his equals and neigbours: that is, by twelve at
least of the grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the accusation : and after-
wards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding him guilty, upon his trial.
But if twelve of the grand jury assent, it is a good presentment, though some
of the rest disagree. (r) And the indictment, when so found, is publicly
delivered into court.
Indictments must have a precise and sufficient certainty. (6) By statute
(q) Stat. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 8. 3 W. and M. c. 9. (r) 2 Hal. P. C. 161.
(5) Formerly it was necessary to state the venue in the body of the indictment, but it is not
so now. See statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, 1 23. And as the court by the same statute has
power to allow an amendment in the statement of the venue, an objection on this score does
not often become available, unless the indictment on its face, or the evidence given on the
trial, shows that the court had no jurisdiction. And if the record on its face shows the court
to have no jurisdiction, a conviction cannot be sustained without amendment, notwithstand-
ing the court had jurisdiction in fact. Reg. v. Mitchell, 2 Q. B. 686.
(6) [The indictment must state the facts of the crime with as much certainty as the nature
of the case will admit. Cowp. 682; 5 T. R. 611-623. Therefore, an indictment charging
the defendant with obtaining money by false pretences, without stating what were the
particular pretences, is insufficient. 3T. R. 581. The cases of indictment for being a
common scold or barrator, or for keeping a disorderly house, or for conspiracy, may be
considered as exceptions to the general rule. 2 T. R. 586; 1 id. 754; 2 B. and A. 205. And an
indictment for endeavoring to incite a soldier to commit an act of mutiny, or a servant to rob
his master, without stating the particular means adopted, may also be considered as an
exception. 1 B. and P. 180.
The indictment ought to be certain to every intent, and without any intendment to the
contrary. Cro. Eliz. 490; Cro. Jac. 20. But this strictness does not so far prevail, as to
render an indictment invalid in consequence of the omission of a letter, which does not
change the word into another of different signification, as undertood for understood, and
receved for received : 1 Leach, 134, 145; and if the sense be clear, nice objections ought not to
be regarded: 5 East, 259; and in stating mere matter of inducement, not so much certainty
is required as in stating the offence itself. 1 Ventr. 170; Coin. Dig. Indictment, G. The
charge must be sufficiently explicit to support itself; for no latitude of intention can be
allowed to include any thing more than is expressed. 2 Burr. 1127; 2 M. and S. 381. And
every crime must appear on the face of the record with a scrupulous certainty: Cald. 187; so
that it may be understood by every one, alleging all the requisites that constitute the offence;
and that every averment must be so stated, that the party accused may know the general
nature of the crime of which he is accused, and who the accusers are, whom he will be
called upon to answer: 1 T. R. 69; and as a branch of this rule it is to be observed, that in
describing some crimes, technical phrases and expressions are required to be used, to express
the precise idea which the law entertains of the offence; see the instances in the text. The
offence must be positively charged, and not stated by way of recital, so that the words "that
whereas" prefixed, will render it invalid. 2 Stra. 900, n. 1; 2 Lord Ray. 18363. Stating an
offence in the disjunctive is bad. 2 Stra. 901, 200; and see further, 1 Chit. C. L. 2d ed. 236.
Repugnancy, in a material matter, may be fatal to the indictment. 5 East. 254. But though
the indictment must in all respects lie certain, yet the introduction of averments altogether
superfluous and immaterial will seldom prejudice. For if the indictment can be supported
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1 Hen. V, c. 5, all indictments must set forth the christian name, surname, and
addition of the state, and degree, mystery, town or place, and the county of the
offender: and all this to identify his person. The time, and place, are also
to be ascertained by naming the day and township, in which the fact was com-
mitted: though a mistake in these points is in general not held to be material,
provided the time be laid previous to the finding of the indictment, and the
place to be within the jurisdiction of the court; unless where the place is laid,
not merely as a venue, but as a part of the description of the fact. (s) But
sometimes the time may be very material, where there is any limitation in point
of time assigned for the prosecution of offenders: as by the statute 7 Wm.
III, c. 3, which enacts, that no prosecution shall be had for any of the treasons
or misprisions therein mentioned (except an assassination designed or attempted
on the person of the king), unless the bill of indictment be found within three
years after the offence committed: (t) and in case of murder, the time of the
death must be laid within a year and a day after the mortal stroke was given.
The offence itself must also be set forth with clearness and certainty; and in
some crimes particular words of art must be used, which are so appropriated by
[*307] the law to express the precise idea which it entertains of the *offence,
that no other words, however synonymous they may seem, are capable
of doing it. Thus, in treason, the facts must be laid to be done, "treasonably
and against his allegiance;" anciently, "proditorie et contra ligeantiae sue
debitum :" else the indictment is void. In indictments for murder, it is neces-
sary to say that the party indicted "murdered," not killed, or "slew," the
other; which till the late statute was expressed in Latin by the word "mur-
dravit." (u) In all indictments for felonies, the adverb "feloniously," "felonice,"
must be used; and for burglaries also, " burglariter," or in English, "burglari-
(s) 2 Hawk. P. C. 435. (t) Fost. 249. (u) See book III, page 321.
without the words, which are bad, they may, on arrest of judgment, be rejected as surplusage:
1 T. R. 322; 1 Leach. 474; 3 Stark. 26; and see further as to repugnancy and surplusage, I
Chit. C. L. 2d ed. 332, 238, &c.
Presumptions of law need not be stated: 4 M. and S. 105; 2 Wils. 147; neither need facts of
which the court will ex officio take notice. See ante, book 3, 293, note (1). It is not necessary
to state a conclusion of law resulting from the facts of a case, it suffices to state the facts and
leave the court to draw the inference. 2 Leach, 941. Neither is it necessary to state mere
matter of evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce, unless it alters the offence; for if
so, it would make the indictment as long as the evidence. 1 Stra. 139, 140 ; Forst. 194; 2
B. and A. 205. In general, all matters of defence must come from the defendant, and need not
be anticipated or stated by the prosecutor. 5 T. R. 84; 2 Leach, 580; 2 East, 19. And it is
never necessary to negative all the exceptions which, by some other statute than that which
creates the offence, might render it legal, for these must be shown by defendant for his own
justification. 2 Burr. 1036; 1 Bla. Rep. 230. Facts which lie more particularly within the
defendant's than the prosecutor's knowledge need not be shown with more than a certainty
to a common intent. 5. T. R. 607; Hawk. b. 2, c. 25, s. 112. If notice be necessary to raise
the duty which the defendant is alleged to have broken, it should be averred; but where
knowledge must be presmned, and the event lies alike in the knowledge of all men, it is never
necessary either to state or prove it. 5 T. R. 621. If a request or demand is necessary to
complete the offence, it must be stated in the indictment. 8 East, 52, 53; 1 T. R. 316; Cald.
554. Where an evil intent accompanying an act is necessary to constitute such act a crime
the intent must be alleged in the indictment, and proved. 2 Stark. 245; R. and R. C. C. 317; 1
Hale, 561 ; 2 East, P. C. 514,515; 2 R. and C. C. 317. Indictments must be in English. 4 Geo.
II, c. 6; 6 Geo. II, c. 6. But if any document in a foreign language, as a libel, be necessarily
introduced, it should be set out in the original tongue, and then translated, showing its
applications: 6 T. R. 162; 7 Moore, 1; but it has been said to be both needless and dangerous
to translate it. 1 Saund. 242, n. 1. By the same act, statutes 4 Geo. II, c. 26, and 6 Geo. II,
c. 14, all indictments must be in words at length, and therefore no abbreviations can be
admitted. 2 Hale, 170, n. g. Nor can any figures be allowed in indictments, but all numbers
must be expressed in words at length; but to this rule there is an exception, in case ot
forgery, and threatening letters, when a fac simile of the instrument urged must be given in
the indictment. 2 Hale, 170, 146.
If the name of a prisoner is unknown, and he refuses to disclose it, an indictment against
him as a person whose name is to the jurors unknown, but who is personally brought before
the jurors by the keeper of the prison, will be sufficient. Rex v. - , R. and R. C. C. 489.
But an indictment against him as a person to the jurors unknown, without something to
ascertain whom the grand jury meant to designate, is insufficient. Id.]
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ously:" and all these to ascertain the intent. In rapes, the word °°rapuit,"
or "ravished," is necessary, and must not be expressed by any periphrasis; in
order to render the crime certain. So in larcenies also, the words "Ifelonice
cepit et asportavit," "feloniously took and carried away," are necessary to every
indictment; for these only can express the very offence. Also in indictments
for murder, the length and depth of the wound should in general be expressed,
in order that it may appear to the court to have been of a mortal nature: but if
it goes through the body, then its dimensions are immaterial, for that is appa-
ren tly sufficient to have been the cause of the death. Also, where a limb, or the
like, is absolutely cut off, there such description is impossible. (v) Lastly, in
indictments, the value of the thing, which is the subject or instrument of the
offence, must sometimes be expressed. In indictments for larcenies this is neces-
sary, that it may appear whether it be grand or petit larceny; and whether entitled
or not to the benefit of clergy; in homicide of all sorts it is necessary; as the
weapon with which it is committed is forfeited to the king as a deodand. (7)
The remaining methods of prosecution are without any previous finding by a
ury, to fix the authoritative stamp of verisimilitude upon the accusation. One
of these by the common law, was when a thief was taken with the mainour,
that is, with the thing stolen upon him in manu. For he might, when so de-
tected flagrante deticto, be brought into court, arraigned, and tried, without in-
dictment: as by the *Danish law he might be taken and hanged upon [*308]
the spot, without accusation or trial.(w) But this proceeding was taken
away by several statutes in the reign of Edward the Third :(x) though in Scot-
land a similar process remains to this day.(y) So that the only species of pro-
ceeding at the suit of the king, without a previous indictment or presentment
by a grand jury, now seems to be that of information..III. Informations are of two sorts: first, those which are partly at the suit of
the king, and partly at that of a subject; and, secondly, such as are only in the
name of the king. The former are usually brought upon penal statutes, which
inflict a penalty upon conviction of the offender, one part to the use of the king,
and another to the use of the informer; and are a sort of qui tam actions (the
nature of which was explained in a former book),(z) only carried on by a crimi-
nal instead of a civil process: upon which I shall therefore only observe, that
by the statute 31 Eliz. c. 5, no prosecution upon an penal statute, the suit and
benefit whereof are limited in part to the king and in part to the prosecutor,
can be brought by any common informer after one year is expired since the
commission of the'offence; nor on behalf of the crown after the lapse of two
years longer; nor, where the forfeiture is originally given only to the king, can
l v) 5 Rep. 122. (w) Stieroh. dejure Sueon. 1. 3, c. 5. (x) 2 Hal. P. C. 149.
y) Lord Kaims, I, 331. (z) See book 1i, page 162.
Some important changes have been made in the law relative to indictments by recent
statutes. By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 24, no indictment is to be held insufficient for
omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed when time is not of the essence
of the offence, nor by stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offence to have been
committed on a day subsequent to the pending of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or
on a day that never happened. By section 9, a person on trial for an offence, if it shall
appear that he did not complete it, may be convicted of an attempt to commit the same. By
24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 85, a person on trial for robbery may be acquitted on the main
charge and convicted of an assault with intent to rob. By sectior 72 there may be a conviction
for larceny on an indictment for embezzlement. By section 88 a person indicted for false
pretences may be convicted of larceny. By 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 14, a woman indicted for
the murder of her infant child may be convicted of endeavoring to conceal its birth.
And by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, an accessory before the fact to any felony may be indicted in all
respects as if he were the principal felon. And by statutes 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100, in an
indictment for felonious homicide it is not necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the
means by which, the death was caused. Indictments in other cases have been very much
simplified.
(7) Very broad powers to amend indictments are conferred upon the courts by 14 and 15
Vic. c. 100. As to amendment of the record after judgment, see Gregory v. Reg., 15 Q. B.
9,57; Bowers v. Nixon, 12 id. 546.
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such prosecution be had after the expiration of two years from the commission
of the offence.(8)
The informations that are exhibited in the name of the king alone, are also of
two kinds: first, those which are truly and properly his own suits, and filed ex
officio by his own immediate officer, the attorney-general; secondly, those in
which, though the king is the nominal prosecutor, yet it is at the relation of
some private person or common informer; and they are filed by the king's cor-
oner and attorney in the court of king's bench, usually called the master of the
crown-office, who is for this purpose the standing officer of the public. The
objects of the king's own prosecutions, filed ex officio by his own attorney-
[*309] general, are properly such *enormous misdemeanors as peculiarly tend
to disturb or endanger his government, or to molest or affront him in
the regular discharge of his royal functions. For offences so high and danger-
ous, in the punishment or prevention of which a moment's delay would be fatal,
the law has given to the crown the power of an immediate prosecution, without
waiting for any previous application to any other tribunal: which power, thus
necessary, not only to the ease and safety, but even to the very existence of the
executive magistrate, was originally reserved in the great plan of the English
constitution, wherein provision is wisely made for the due preservation of all its
parts. The objects of the other species of informations, filed by the master of
the crown-office upon the complaint or relation of a private subject, are any
gross and notorious misdemeanors, riots, batteries, libels, and other immoralities
of an atrocious kind,(a) not peculiarly tending to disturb the government (for
those are left to the care of the attorney- general), but which, on account of
their magnitude or pernicious example, deserve the most public animadver-
sion.(9) And when an information is filed, either thus, or by the attorney-
general ex officio, it must be tried by a petit jury of the county where the offence
arises: after which, if the defendant be found guilty, the court must be resorted
to for his punishment.
There can be no doubt but that this mode of prosecution by information (or
suggestion), filed on record by the king's attorney-general, or by his coroner or
master of the crown-office in the court of king's bench, is as ancient as the com-
mon law itself.(b) For as the king was bound to prosecute, or at least to lend
the sanction of his name to a prosecutor, whenever the grand jury informed
him upon their oaths that there was a sufficient ground for instituting a crimi-
nal suit: so, when these his immediate officers were otherwise sufficiently as-
sured that a man had committed a gross misdemeanor, either personally against
the king or his government, or against the public peace and good order, they
were at liberty, without waiting for any farther intelligence, to convey that in-
[*310] formation to the court of king's bench by a *suggestion on record, and
to carry on the prosecution in his majesty's name. But these informa-
tions (of every kind) are confined by the constitutional law to mere misde-
meanors only: for, wherever any capital offence is charged, the same law
(a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 260. (b) 1 Show. 118.
(8) The time, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute relating to the particular case,
is limited, ill the case of offences punishable on summary conviction, to six calendar months.
,11 and 12 Vic. c. 43, s. 36.
(9) [The court will always take into consideration the whole of the circumstances of the
charge before they lend their sanction to this extraordinary mode of prosecution. They will
observe the time of making the application, and whether a long interval has elapsed since the
injury, and to what cause it may be fairly ascribed; also the evidence on which the charge is
founded, and weigh the probabilities which it seems to offer: they will also examine the
character and motives of the applicant, at least his share in the matter before them; and they
will look forward to the consequences of the measure they are requested to grant, in the pe-
culiar situation of the defendant. 1 Bla. Rep. 542. In applications of this nature for libels,
the applicant must, unless the charge be general, show his innocence of the matter imputed
to him. See Dougl. 284, 387, 588; 1 Burr. 402; 6 T. R. 294; 4 id. 285; 5 B. and A. 595; 1 D.
and R. 197; 2 Chit. Rep. 163. In applications against magistrates, the applicant must directly
impute corrupt motives for the misconduct complained of. 3 B. and A. 432.]
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requires that the accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men, before the
party shall be put to answer it. And, as to those offences in which informa-
tions were allowed as well as indictments, so long as they were confined to this
high and respectable jurisdiction, and were carried on in a legal and regulai
course in his majesty's court of king's bench, the subject had no reason to com-
plain. The same notice was given, the same process was issued, the same pleas
were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judgment was given by
the same judges, as if the prosecution had originally been by indictment. But
when the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, had extended the jurisdiction of the court of
star-chamber, the members of which were the sole judges of the law, the fact,
and the penalty; and when the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 3, had permitted infor-
mations to be brought by any informer upon any penal statute, not extending
to life or member, at the assizes or before the justices of the peace, who were to
hear and determine the same according to their own discretion; then it was
that the legal and orderly jurisdiction of the court of king's bench fell into dis-
use and oblivion, and Empson and Dudley (the wicked instruments of King
Henry VII), by hunting out obsolete penalties, and this tyrannical mode of
prosecution, with other oppressive devices(c) continually harassed the subject,
and shamefully enriched the crown. The latter of these acts was soon indeen
repealed by statute 1 Hen. VIII, c. 6, but the court of star-chamber continued id
high vigour, and daily increasing its authority, for more than a century longer;
till finally abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10.
Upon this dissolution the old common-law (d) authority of the court of
king's bench, as the custos morurn of the nation, being found necessary to reside
somewhere for the peace and good government of the kingdom, was again revived
in *practice.(e) And it is observable, that in the same act of parliament [*311]
which abolished the court of star-chamber, a conviction by information
is expressly reckoned up, as one of the legal modes of conviction of such persons
as should offend a third time against the provisions of that statute. (f) It is
true, Sir Matthew Hale, who presided in this court soon after the time of such
revival, is said (g) to have been no friend to this method of prosecution: and,
if so, the reason of such his dislike was probably the ill use which the master of the
crown-office then made of his authority, by permitting the subject to be harassed
with vexatious informations, whenever applied to by any malicious or revengeful
prosecutor; rather than his doubt of their legality, or propriety upon urgent
occasions.(h) For the power of filing informations, without any control, then
resided in the breast of the master: and, being filed in the name of the king,
they subjected the prosecutor to no costs, though on trial they proved to be
groundless. This oppressive use of them, in the times preceding the revolution,
occasioned a struggle, soon after the accession of King William,(i) to procure a
declaration of their illegality by the judgment of the court of king's bench. But
Sir John Holt, who then presided there, and all the judges, were clearly of opinion,
that this proceeding was grounded on the common law, and could not be then
impeached. And, in a few years afterwards, a more temperate remedy was ap-
plied in parliament, by statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 18, which enacts, that the
clerk of the crown shall not file any information without express directions from
the court of king's bench: and that every prosecutor, permitted to promote such
information, shall give security by a recognizance of twenty pounds (which now
seems to be too small a sum) to prosecute the same with effect; and to pay
costs to the defendant, in case he be acquitted thereon, unless the judge, who
tries the information, shall certify there was reasonable cause for filing it; and,
at all events, to pay costs, unless *the information shall be tried within [*312]
a year after issue joined. But there is a proviso in this act, that it
shall not extend to any other informations than those which are exhibited by
L e) 1 And. 157. (d) 5 Mod. 464.
e) Styl. Rep. 217, 245. Styl. Pract. Reg. tit. Information, p. 187, (edit. 1657). 2 Sid. 71. 1 Sid. 152.
Stat. 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 6. (g) 5 Mod. 460. (h) 1 Saund. 301. 1 Sid. 174.
M. 1 W. and M. 5 Mod. 459. Comb. 141. Far. 361. 1 Show. 106.
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the master of the crown-office: and, consequently, informations at the king's own
suit, filed by his attorney-general, are no way restrained thereby.
There is one species of informations, still farther regulated by statute 9 Ann.
c. 20, viz., those in the nature of a writ of quo warranto; which was shown, in
the preceding book,(k) to be a remedy given to the crown against such as had
usurped or intruded into any office or franchise. The modern information tends
to the same purpose as the ancient writ, being generally made use of to try the
civil rights of such franchises; though it is commenced in the same manner as
other informations are, by leave of the court, or at the will of the attorney-general:
being properly a criminal prosecution, in order to fine the defendant for his
usurpation, as well as to oust him from his office; yet usually considered at
present as merely a civil proceeding. (10)
These are all the methods of prosecution at the suit of the king. There yet
remains another, which is merely at the suit of the subject, and is called an
appeal.
IV. An appeal, in the sense wherein it is here used, does not signify any com-
plaint to a superior court of an injustice done by an inferior one, which is the
general use of the word; but it here means an original suit, at the time of its
first commencement.(l) An appeal, therefore, when spoken of as a criminal
prosecution, denotes an accusation by a private subject against another, for some
heinous crime; demanding punishment on account of the particular injury
suffered1 rather than for the offence against the public. As this method of prosecu-
tion is still in force, I cannot omit to mention it: but as it is very little in use,
[*313] on account of the *great nicety required in conducting it, I shall treat of
it very briefly; referring the student for more particulars to other more
voluminous compilations.(m)
This private process, for the punishment of public crimes, had probably its
original in those times when a private pecuniary satisfaction, called a weregild,
was constantly paid to the party injured, or his relations, to expiate enormous
offences. This was a custom derived to us, in common with other northern na-
tions,(n) from our ancestors, the ancient Germans; among whom, according to
Tacitus,(o) " luitur honicidiurn certo armentorum aepecorum numero; recipitque
satisfactionen. universa dornus."(p) In the same manner by the Irish brehon
law, in case of murder, the brehon or judge was used to compound between the
murderer and the friends of the deceased who prosecuted him, by causing the
malefactor to give unto them, or to the child or wife of him that was slain, a re-
compense which they called an eriach.(q) And thus we find in our Saxon laws
(particularly those of King Athelstan) (r) the several weregilds for homicide estab-
lished in progressive order from the death of the ceorl or peasant, up to that of
the king himself.(s) And in the laws of King Henry I, (t) we have an account
of what other offences were then redeemable by weregild, and what were not
so.(u) As therefore during the continuance of this custom, a process was
certainly given, for recovering the weregild by the party to whom it was due; it
(k) See book M. page 262.
(1) It is derived from the French," appeller," the verb active, which signifies to call upon, summon, orchallenge
one; and not the verb neuter, which signifies the same as the ordinary sense of "appeal" in English.
(i) 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 23. (n) Stiernh. dejure Sueen. 1. 3, c. 4. (o) de A. G. c. 21.
(p) And in another place,(e. 12), "Delictis, pro nodo pinarum, equorumpecorumque numero convicti nuletantur.
Pare muletce reg vel civitati; pars ipei qui wnndicatur, vel propinqais ejue ersovitur."
(q) Spencer's State of Ireland, p. 1513, edit. Hughes. (r) Judic. Civit. Lund, Wilk. 71.
(8) The weregild of a ceorl was 266 thrysmas, that of the king 30,000; each thrysma being equal to about a
shilling of our present money. The weregild of a subject was paid entirely to the relations of the party slain;
but that of the king was divided; one-half being paid to the public, the other to the royal family.
(t) c. 12.
(u) In Turkey this principle is still carried so far, that even murder is never prosecuted by the officers of the
government, as with us. It is the business of the next relations, and them only, to revenge the slaughter of
their kinsmen ; and if they rather choose (as they generally do) to compound the matter for money, nothing
more is said about it. (Lady M. W. Montague, lett. 42.)
(10) Rex v. Francis, 2 T. R. 484, in which it was held that a new trial might be granted in
these cases.
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seems that, when *these offences by degrees grew no longer redeemable, [*314
the private process was still continued, in order to insure the infliction
of punishment upon the offender, though the party injured was allowed no
pecuniary compensation for the offence.
But, though appeals were thus in the nature of prosecutions for some atrocious
injury committed more immediately against an individual, yet it also was an-
ciently permitted, that any subject might appeal another subject of high treason,
either in the courts of common law,(w) or in parliament, or (for treasons commit-
ted beyond the seas) in the court of the high constable and marshal. The cog-
nizance of appeals in the latter still continues in force; and so late as 1631 there
was a trial by battle awarded in the court of chivalry, on such an appeal of trea-
son: (x) but that in the first was virtually abolished (y) by the statutes 5 Edw.
III, c. 9, and 25 Edw. III, c. 24, and in the second expressly by statute 1 Hen. IV,
c. 14, so that the only appeals now in force, for things done within the realm,
are appeals of felony and mayhem.
An appeal of felony may be brought for crimes committed either against the
parties themselves, or their relations. The crimes against the parties themselves
are larceny, rape, and arson. And for these, as well as for mayhem, the persons
robbed, ravished, maimed, or whose houses are burnt, may institute this private
process. The only crime against one's relation, for which an appeal can be
brought, is that of killing him, by either murder or manslaughter. But this
cannot be brought by every relation: but only by the wife for the death of her
husband, or by the heir male for the death of his ancestor; which heirship was
also confirmed, by an ordinance of King Henry the First, to the four nearest
degrees of blood.(z) It is given to the wife on account of the loss of her husband:
therefore, if she marries again, before or pending her appeal, it is lost and gone;
or, if she marries after judgment, she shall not demand execution. The heir, as
was said, must also be heir male, and such a one as was the *next heir [*31
by the course of the common law, at the time cf the killing of the ances- [*3151
tor. But this rule hath three exceptions: 1. If the person killed leaves an inno-
cent wife, she only, and not the heir, shall have the. appeal: 2. If the]e be no
wife, and the heir be accused of the murder, the person who, next to him, would
have been heir male, shall bring the appeal: 3. If the wife kills her husband, the
heir may appeal her of the death. And, by the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 9,
all appeals of death must be sued within a year and a day after the completion
of the felony by the death of the party: which seems to be only declaratory of
the old common law: for in the Gothic constitutions we find the same "prwescripjio
annalis, quw currit adversus actorem, side homicida ei non constet intra annum
a ccede facta, nec quenquam interea arpuat et accuset."(a)
These appeals may be brought previous to an indictment: and if the appellee
be acquitted thereon, he cannot be afterwards indicted for the same offence. In
like manner as by the old Gothic constitution, if any offender gained a verdict in
his favour, when prosecuted by the party injured, he was also understood to be
acquitted of any crown prosecution for the same offence :(b) but, on the contrary,
if he made his peace with the king, still he might be prosecuted at the suit of the
party. And so, with us, if a man be acquitted on an indictment of murder, or
found guilty, and pardoned by the king, still he ought not (in strictness) to go
at large, but be imprisoned or let to bail till the year and day be past, by virtue
of the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, in order to be forthcoming to answer any appeal
for the same felony, not having as yet been punished for it, though, if he bath
been found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment, and bath had the benefit of
clergy, and suffered the judgment of the law, he cannot afterwards be appealed;
for it is a maxim in law that, "nemo his punitur pro eodem delicto." Before
this statute was made, it was not usual to indict a man for homicide within the
time limited for appeals; which produced very great inconvenience, of which
more hereafter.(c)
(w) Britt. c. 22.
(x) By Donald lord Rea against David Ramsey. (Rushw. vol. 2, part 2, p. 112.) (y) 1 Hal. P. C. 349.
(z) Mirr. c 2, q 7. (a) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 3, c. 4. (b) Stiernh. dejure Goth. 1. 1, c. 5.
(c) See page 335.
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[*316] *If the appellee be acquitted, the appellor (by virtue of the statute of
Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 12) shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and
pay a fine to the king, besides restitution of damages to the party for the im-
prisonment and infamy which he has sustained: and, if the appellor be incapable
to make restitution, his abettors shall do it for him, and also be liable to im-
prisonment. This provision, as was foreseen by the author of Fleta,(d) proved
a great discouragement to appeals; so that thenceforward they ceased to be in
common use.
If the appellee be found guilty he shall suffer the same judgment as if he
had been convicted by indictment: but with this remarkable difference; that
on an indictment, which is at the suit of the king, the king may pardon and
remit the execution ; on an appeal, which is at the suit of a private subject, to
make an atonement for the private wrong, the king can no more pardon it, than
he can remit the damages recovered in an action of battery.(e) In like man-
ner, as, while the weregild continued to be paid as a fine for homicide, it could
not be remitted by the king's authority.(f) And the ancient usage was, so
late as Henry the Fourth's time, that all the relations of the slain should drag
the appellee to the place of execution: (g) a custom founded upon that savage
spirit of family resentment, which prevailed universally through Europe, after
the irruption of the northern nations, and is peculiarly attended to in their
several codes of law; and which prevails even now among the wild and un-
tutored inhabitants of America: as if the finger of nature had pointed it out
to mankind, in their rude and uncultivated state.(h) However, the punishment
of the offender may be remitted and discharged by the concurrence of all parties
interested; and, as the king, by his pardon, may frustrate an indictment, so the
[*317] appellant by his release may *discharge an appeal; (i) "nam quilibet
potest renunciare juri pro se introducto.(11)
These are the several modes of prosecution instituted by the laws of Eng-
land for the punishment of offences; of which that by indictment is the most
general. I shall therefore confine my subsequent observations principally to
this method of prosecution; remarking by the way the most material variations
that may arise, from the method of proceeding by either information or appeal.
(a) .1, c. ,4, § 48. (e) 2 Hawk. P. C. 892. (f) LL. Edm. j 3.
(g) X. 11 Hen. IV, 12. 3 Inst. 131. (h) Robertson, Chas. V, i. 45. (i) 1 Hal. P. C. 9.
(11) [These appeals had become nearly obsolete, but the right still existing was claimed, and
in part exercised, in the year 1818, by William Ashford, eldest brother and heir at law of
Mary Ashford, who brought a writ of appeal against Abraham Thornton, for the murder of
his sister. Thornton had been tried at the Warwick summer assizes, 1817, for the murder,
and acquitted, though under circumstances of strong suspicion. The appellee, when called
upon to plead, pleaded "not guilty, and that he was ready to defend himself by his body;"
and, taking his glove off, he threw it upon the floor of the court. A counterplea was after-
wards delivered in by the appellant, to which there was a replication. A general demurrer
followed, and joinder thereon. See a full detail of the proceedings in that singular case, in
the report of it, under the name of Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. and A. 405. It was held, in
that case, that where, in an appeal of death, the appellee wages his battle, the counterplea, to
oust him of this mode of trial, must disclose such violent and strong presumptions of guilt,
as to leave no possible doubt in the minds of the court; and, therefore, that a counterplea,
which only stated strong circumstances of suspicion, was insufficient. It was also held, that
the appellee may reply fresh matter, tending to show his innocence, as, an alibi, and his
former acquittal of the same offence on an indictment. But it was doubted whether, when
the counterplea is per se insufficient, or where the replication is a good answer to it, the court
should give judgment that the appellee be allowed his wager of battle, or that he go without
day. Therefore, the appellant praying no further judgment, the court, by consent of both
parties, ordered that judgment should be stayed in the appeal, and that the appellee should
be discharged. This case, tle first of the kind that had occurred for more than half a century:
see Bigby v. Kennedy, 5 Burr, 2643; 2 W. B1. 713; Rex v. Taylor, 5 Burr, 2798; Smith v.
Taylor, id.; the last cases upon the subject, where the mode of proceeding is detailed at large,
led to the total abolition of appeals of murder, as well as of treason, felony, or other offences,
together with wagers of battle, by the passing of the statute 59 Geo. III, c. 46.]
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CHAPTER XXIV.
OF PROCESS UPON AN INDICTMENT.
WE are next, in the fourth place, to inquire into the manner of issuing pro-
cess, after indictment found, to bring in the accused to answer it. We have
hitherto supposed the offender to be in custody before the finding of the indict-
ment; in which case he is immediately (or as soon as convenience permits) to be
arraigned thereon. But if he had fled, or secretes himself, in capital cases; or
hath not, in smaller misdemeanors, been bound over to appear at the assizes or
sessions, still an indictment may be preferred against him in his absence; since,
were he present, he could not be heard before the grand jury against it. And,
if it be found, then process must issue to bring him into court; for the indict-
ment cannot be tried, unless he personally appears: according to the rules of
equity in all cases, and the express provision of statute 28 Edw. III, c. 3, in
capital ones, that no man shall be put to death, without being brought to
answer by due process of law.
The proper process on an indictment for any petit misdemeanor, or on a
penal statute, is a writ of venire facias, which is in the nature of a summons to
cause the party to appear. And if, by the return to such venire, it appears that
the party hath lands in the county, whereby he may be distrained, then a dis-
tress infinite shall be issued, from time to time, till he appears. But if the
sheriff returns that he hath no lands in his bailiwick, (then upon his non-
appearance) a writ of capias *shall issue, which commands the sheriff [*319]
to take his body, and have him at the next assizes; and if he cannot be [*3191
taken upon the first capias, a second and third shall issue, called an alias, and a
pluries capias. But, on indictments for treason or felony, a capias is the first
process: and, for treason or homicide, only one shall be allowed to issue,(a) or
two in the case of other felonies, by statute 25 Edw. III, c. 14, though the
usage is to issue only one in any felony; the provisions of this statute being
in most cases found impracticable.(b) And so, in the case of misdemeanors, it
is now the usual practice for any judge of the court of king's bench, upon cer-
tificate of an indictment found, to award a writ of capias immediately, in order
to bring in the defendant.(1) But if he absconds, and it is thought proper to
pursue him to an outlawry, then a greater exactness is necessary. For, in
such case, after the several writs have issued in a regular number, according to
the nature of the respective crimes, without any effect, the offender shall be put
in the exigent in order to his outlawry: that is, he shall be exacted, proclaimed,
or required to surrender, at five county courts; and if he be returned quinto
exactus, and does not appear at the fifth exaction or requisition, then lie is
adjudged to be outlawed, or put out of the protection of the law: so that he is
incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect, either by bringing actions
or otherwise.
The punishment for outlawries upon indictments for misdemeanors is the
same as for outlawries upon civil actions (of which, and the previous process
by writs of capias exigi facias, and proclamation, we spoke in the preceding
book); (c) viz., forfeiture of goods and chattels. But an outlawry in treason or
felony amounts to a conviction and attainder of the offence charged in the
(a) See Appendix, J 1. (b) 2 Hal. P. C. 195. (c) See book III, pp. 2M3, 284
(1) [By the statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 43, s. 3, when any indictment is found in any court of
oyer andterminer, or gaol delivery, or in any court of general or quarter sessions, against any
person at large, whether he has been previously bound to appear or not, the clerk of indict-
ments, or clerk of the peace, as the case may be, may at any time issue a certificate of such
indictment having been found; and, upon its production, a justice for the county or place
where the offence was committed, or where the defendant resides, may issue his warrant.
and thereupon commit him for trial or admit him to bail.]
Chap. 24.]
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indictment, as much as if the offender had been found guilty by his country.(d)
His life is, however, still under the protection of the law, as hath formerly been
[*320] *observed: (e) so that though anciently an outlawed felon was said to
have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head like a wolf, by
any one that should meet him; (f) because, having renounced all law, he was
to be dealt with as in a state of nature, when every one that should find him
might slay him; yet, now, to avoid such inhumanity, it is holden that no
man is entitled to kill him wantonly or wilfully: but in so doing is guilty of
murder,(g) unless it happens in the endeavour to apprehend him.(h) For any
person may arrest an outlaw on a criminal prosecution, either of his own head,
or by writ or warrant of capias utlagatum, in order to bring him to execution.
But such outlawry may be frequently reversed by writ of error; the proceed-
ings therein being (as it is fit they should be) exceedingly nice and circumstan-
tial; and, if any single minute point be omitted or misconducted, the whole
outlawry is illegal, and may be reversed: upon which reversal the party accused
is admitted to plead to, and defend himself against, the indictment.
Thus much for process to bring in the offender after indictment found; dur-
ing which stage of the prosecution it is that writs of certiorari facias are
usually had, though they may be had at any time before trial, to certify and
remove the indictment, with all the proceedings thereon, from any inferior
court of criminal jurisdiction into the court of king's bench; (2) which is the
sovereign ordinary court of justice in causes criminal. And this is frequently
done for one of these four purposes; either, 1. To consider and determine the
validity of appeals or indictments and the proceedings thereon; and to quash
or confirm them as there is cause: or, 2. Where it is surmised that a partial or
insufficient trial will probably be had in the court below, the indictment is
removed in order to have the prisoner or defendant tried at the bar of the
court of king's bench, or before the justices of nisi prius: or, 3. It is so
removed in order to plead the king's pardon there: or, 4. To issue process of
[*321] outlawry against the offender, in those *counties or places where the
process of the inferior judges will not reach him(i). Such writ of cer-
tiorari, when issued and delivered to the inferior court for removing any record
or other proceeding, as well upon indictment as otherwise, supercedes the juri.-
diction of such inferior court, and makes all subsequent proceedings therein
entirely erroneous and illegal; unless the court of king's bench remands the
record to the court below, to be there tried and determined. A certiorari may
be granted at the instance of either the prosecutor or the defendant: the for-
mer as a matter of right, the latter as a matter of discretion; and therefore it
(d) 2 Hal. P. C. 205. (e) See page li8. (f) Mirr. c. 4. Co. Litt. 128.
(g) 1 Hal. P. C. 497. (h) Bracton, fol. 125. (1) 2 Hal. P. C. 210.
(2) [For the definition and history of the writ of certiorari, see Fitz. N. B. 554. As the
court of king's bench has a general superintendence over all other courts of criminal juris-
diction, so it may award a certiorari to remove proceedings from them, unless they are ex-
pressly exempted from such superintendence by the statutes creating them. 2 Haw. P. C.
286; Rex v. Young, 2 T. R. 473; Rex v. Jukes, 8 id. 542. But certiorari cannot be taken
away by any general, but only by express negative words: Rex v. Reeve, 1 W. B1. 231; and
a statute, taking away certiorari, does not take it from the crown, unless expressly mentioned.
Rex v. - , 2 Chit. R. 136; and see Rex v. Tindal, 15 East, 339, n. Certiorari lies from the
court of king's bench to justices, even in cases which they are empowered finally to hear and
determine. 2 Haw. P. C. 286; Rex v. ?Morely, 2 Burr. 1040; Hartley v. Hooker, Cowp. 524.]
Now, by statute 5 and 6 Win. IV, c. 33, s. 1, no certiorari issues from the queen's bench,
except at the instance of the attorney-general, unless on leave obtained from the court, or a
judge at chambers. And by statute 16 and 17 Vic. c. 30, s. 4, no indictment, except indict-
ment against bodies corporate not authorized to appear by attorney in the court in which the
same are found, can be removed into the queen's bench or the central criminal court, by cer-
tiorari, at the instance of the prosecutor or defendant (other than the attorney-general acting
on behalf of the crown), unless it be made to appear to the court that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had in the court below, or that some question of law of more than usual diffi-
culty and importance is likely to arise upon the trial, or that a view of the premises in
respect whereof any indictment is preferred, or a special jury, may be required for the satis-
factory trial of the same.
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is seldom granted to remove indictments from the justices of gaol-delivery, or
after issue joined or confession of the fact in any of the courts below.(k)
At this stage of prosecution, also, it is that indictments found by the grand
jury against a peer must, in consequence of a writ of certiorari, be certified
and transmitted into the court of parliament, or into that of the lord high
steward of Great Britain; and that, in places of exclusive jurisdiction, as the
two universities, indictments must be delivered (upon challenge and claim of
cognizance) to the courts therein established by charter, and confirmed by act
of parliament, to be there respectively tried and determined.
CHAPTER XXV.
OF ARRAIGNMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.
WHEN the offender either appears voluntarily to an indictment, or was before
in custody, or is brought in upon criminal process to answer it in the proper
court, he is immediately to be arraigned thereon; which is the fifth stage of
criminal prosecution.
To arraign, is nothing else but to call the prisoner to the bar of the court, to
answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment.(a) The prisoner is
to be called to the bar by his name; and it is laid down in our ancient books(b)
that, though under an indictment of the highest nature, he must be brought to
the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be
evident danger of an escape, and then he may be secured with irons. But yet
in Layer's Case, A. D. 1722, a difference was taken between the time of arraign-
ment and the time of trial; and accordingly the prisoner stood at the bar in
chains during the time of his arraignment.(c)
*When he is brought to the bar, he is called upon by name to hold [*323]
up his hand: which, though it may seem a trifling circumstance, yet is t 3
of this importance, that, by the holding up of his hand, constat de persona, and
he owns himself to be of that name by which he is called.(d) However, it is
not an indispensable ceremony; for, being calculated merely for the purpose
of identifying the person, any other acknowledgment will answer the purpose
as well; therefore, if the prisoner obstinately and contemptuously refuses to
hold up his hand, but confesses he is the person named, it is fully sufficient.(e)
Then the indictment is to be read to him distinctly in the English tongue
(which was law, even while all other proceedings were in Latin), that he may
fully understand his charge. After which it is to be demanded of him, whether
he be guilty of the crime whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty. By the
old common law the accessorv could not be arraigned till the principal was
attainted, unless he chose it;'for he might waive the benefit of the law: and
therefore principal and accessory might, and may still, be arraigned, and plead,
and also be tried together. But otherwise, if the principal had never been
indicted at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors peremp-
torily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained a pardon, or had died
before attainder, the accessory in any of these cases could not be arraigned: for
non constitit whether any felony was committed or no, till the principal was
attainted; and it might so happen that the accessory should be convicted one
day, and the principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. However
this absurdity could only happen where it was possible that a trial of the prin-
cipal might be had subsequent to that of the accessory; and therefore the law
(k) 2 Hawk. P. C. 287. 2 Burr. 749. (a) 2 Hal. P. C. 216.
(b) Bract. 1. 3, de coron,. c. 18, J 3. Mirr. c. 5, sect. 1, § 54. Flet. L 1, c. 31, § 1. Brit. c. 5. Staundf. P. C. 78.
3 Inst. 34. Kel. 10. 2 Hal. P. C. 219. 2 Hawk. P. C. 308.
(4) State Trials, VI, 230. (d) 2 Hal. P. C. 219. (e) Raym. 408.
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still continues that the accessory shall not be tried so long as the principal
[*324] remains liable to be tried hereafter.(1) But by statute, *1 Ann. c. 9, if
the principal be once convicted, and before attainder (that is, before he
receives judgment of death or outlawry), he is delivered by pardon, the benefit
of clergy, or otherwise; or if the principal stands mute, or challenges peremp-
torily above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all ; in
any of these cases, in which no subsequent trial can be had of the principal,
the accessory may be proceeded against as if the principal felon had been at-
tainted; for there is no danger of future contradiction. And upon the trial
of the accessory, as well after as before the conviction of the principal, it seems
to be the better opinion, and founded on the true spirit of justice, (f) that the
accessory is at liberty (if he can) to controvert the guilt of his supposed prin-
cipal, and to prove him innocent of the charge, as well in point of fact as in
point of law.
When a criminal is arraigned, he either stands mute or confesses the fact;
which circumstances we may call incidents to the arraignment: or else he
pleads to the indictment, which is to be considered as the next stage of pro-
ceedings. But, first, let us observe these incidents to the arraignment, of stand-
ing mute, or confession.
I. Regularly, a prisoner is said to stand mute when, being arraigned for trea-
son or felony, he either, 1. Makes no answer at all: or, 2. Answers foreign to
the purpose, or with such matter as is not allowable; and will not answer other-
wise: or, 3. Upon having pleaded not guilty, refuses to put himself upon the
country.(g) If he says nothing, the court ought ex officio to empanel a jury to
inquire whether he stands obstinately mute, or whether he be dumb ex visita-
tione Dei. If the latter appears to be the case, the judges of the court (who
are to be of counsel for the prisoner, and to see that he hath law and justice)
shall proceed to the trial, and examine all points as if he had pleaded not
guilty.(h) (2) But whether judgment of death can be given against such a
[*325] *prisoner who hath never pleaded, and can say nothing in arrest of
judgment, is a point yet undetermined.(i)
(f) Foster, 365, &c. (g) 2 Hal. P. C. 316. (h) 2 Hawk. P. C. 327. (i) 2 Hal. P. C. 317.
(1) Now, by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, s. 1, an accessory before the fact to any felony may be
indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if he were the principal felon. By
section 2, whosoever shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit any felony
shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted, either as an accessory before
the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or may be indicted and
convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been
previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice, and may thereupon be pun-
ished in the same manner as an accessory before the fact to the same felony, if convicted as
an accessory, may be punished. And by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99, s. 3, the like provision is made
for the case of accessories after the fact.
(2) [By 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, s. 1, where a prisoner pleads "not guilty," without more, he
shall be put on his trial by jury; and, by section 2, if he refuses to plead, the court may order
a plea of "not guilty" to be entered, and proceed as in other cases. But the latter is dis-
cretionary; and where there is any real doubt whether the refusal to plead arises from obsti-
nacy or inability, the court may, and will, impanel a jury to try that question. In case of
insanity, this is specially provided for by the unrepealed statute of 39 and 40 Geo. III, c. 94,
section 1 of which enacts that the jury, in case of any person charged with treason, &c., prov-
ing upon the trial to be insane, shall declare whether he was acquitted by them on account
of insanity, and the court shall order him to be kept in custody till his majesty's pleasure be
known, and his majesty may give an order for the safe custody of such insane person; and
section 2 enacts that insane persons, indicted for any offense, and found to be insane by a jury,
to be impaneled on their arraignment, shall be ordered by the court to be kept in custody till
his majesty's pleasure be known. The latter section has been held to extend to cases of mis-
demeanor. Rex v. Little, R. and R. C. C. 430. In Rex v. Roberts, Car. Cr. L. 57, a prisoner
would not plead, and a jury being impaneled to try whether he stood mute by the visitation
of God, his counsel claimed a right to address the jury, as this was an issue with the affirma-
tive on the prisoner. This was allowed by Park and Abbott, JJ. The prisoner's counsel ad-
dressed the july, and called witnesses to prove he was insane. The jury found that he was
so, and Park, J., directed that he should be detained until his majesty's pleasure should be
known.]
See Reg. v. Pritchard, 7 C. and P. 303, 305, n.
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If he be found to be obstinately mute (which a prisoner hath been held to be
that hath cut out his own tongue),(k) then, if it be on an indictment of high
treason, it hath long been clearly settled, that standing mute is an equivalent to
a conviction, and he shall receive the same judgment and execution.(1) And as
in this the highest crime, so also in the lowest species of felony, viz.: in petit
larceny, and in all misdemeanors, standing mute hath always been equivalent
to conviction. But upon appeals or indictments for other felonies, or petit
treason, the prisoner was not, by the ancient law, looked upon as convicted, so
as to receive judgment for the felony; but should, for his obstinacy, have
received the terrible sentence of penance, or peine (which, as will appear pres-
ently, was probably nothing more than a corrupted abbreviation of prisone)
forte et dure.
Before this was pronounced the prisoner had not only trina admonitio, but
also a respite of a few hours, and the sentence was distinctly read to him, that
he might know his danger;(m) and, after all, if he continued obstinate, and his
offence was clergyable, he had the benefit of his clergy allowed him, even though
he was too stubborn to pray it.(n) Thus tender was the law of inflicting this
dreadful punishment.; but if no other means could prevail, and the prisoner
(when charged with a capital felony) continued stubbornly mute, the judgment
was then given against him without any distinction of sex or degree. A judg-
ment, which was purposely ordained to be exquisitely severe, that by that very
means it might rarely be put in execution.(3)
The rack, or question, to extort a confession from criminals, is a practice of a
different nature; this having been only *used to compel a man to put [*326]
himself upon his trial; that being a species of trial in itself. And the
trial by rack is utterly unknown to the law of England; though once when
the dukes of Exeter and Suffolk, and other ministers of Henry VI, had laid a
design to introduce the civil law into this kingdom as the rule of government,
for a beginning thereof they erected a rack for torture; which was called in
derision the duke of Exeter's daughter, and still remains in the tower of Lon-
don ;(o) where it was occasionally used as an engine of state, not of law, more
than once in the reign of Queen Elizabeth.(p) But, when upon the assassina-
tion of Villiers, duke of Buckingham, by Felton, it was proposed in the privy
council to put the assassin to the rack, in order to discover his accomplices; the
judges being consulted, declared unanimously, to their own honour and the
honour of the English law, that no such proceeding was allowable by the laws
of England.(q) It seems astonishing that this usage of administering the tor-
ture should be said to arise from a tenderness to the lives of men: and yet this
is the reason given for its introduction in the civil law, and its subsequent
adoption by the French and other foreign nations,(r) viz.: because the laws can-
(k) 8 Inst. 178. (l) 1 Hawk. P. C. 329. 2 Hal. P. C. 317. (m) 2 Hal. P. C. 320.
(I bid. 321. 2 Hawk. P. C. 332. (o) 3 lust. 35. (p) Burr. 92, 496.
(q) Rushw. Coll. i, 638. (r) Cod. 1. 9, t. 41, . 8, & t. 47, 1. 16. Fortesq. de LL. Ang. c. 22.
(3) [Aulus Gellius, with more truth, has made the same observation upon the cruel law of
the Twelve Tables, De inope debtore secando, "Eo consiaio tanta immanita pavna denuniata est,
n6 ad earn unquan perveniretur ;" for he adds, "dissectum eae antiquitus neminem equuem
neque tegi neque audivi," lib. 20, c. 1. But with respect to the horrid judgment of the peine
forte et dure, the prosecutor and the court could exercise no discretion, or show no favor to a
prisoner who stood obstinately mute. And in the legal history of this country there are
numerous instances of persons, who have had resolution and patience to undergo so terrible
a death in order to benefit their heirs by preventing a forfeiture of their estates, which would
have been the consequence of a conviction by a verdict.]
Many cases are on record in which this punishment was inflicted. See Case of Juliana
Quicke, Cro. Car. 118; Case of John Fussell, whose tortures are said to have been shortened
by compassionate by-standers casting stones upon him, Barrington's Statutes, 85, note. In
Kelynge's Rep., p. 27, it is said to have been the constant practice at Newgate, in the time of
Charles II, to tie the two thumbs together with whipcord in order that the pain might compel
the party to plead.
The only American case on record in which this punishment was inflicted was that of
Giles Corey. 3 Bancroft's U. S. 93; 2 Hildreth's U. S. 160.
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not endure that any man should die upon the evidence of a false or even a
single witness; and, therefore, contrived this method that innocence should
manifest itself by a stout denial, or guilt by a plain confession. Thus rating a
man's virtue by the hardiness of his constitution, and his guilt by the sensibil-
ity of his nerves !-But there needs only to state accurately,(s) in order most
effectually to expose this inhuman species of mercy, the uncertainty of which,
as a test and criterion of truth, was long ago very elegantly pointed out by
[*3271 Thlly; though he lived in a state wherein it was *usual to torture slaves
in order to furnish evidence; "tamen," says he, "illa tormenta gubernat
dolor moderatur natura cujusque tum animi turn corporis, regit quwesitor, flectit,
libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustiis nihil veritati
loci r ehinquatur."(t)
The English judgment of penance for standing (u) mute was as follows: that
the prisoner be remanded to the prison from whence he came; and put into a
low, dark chamber; and there be laid on his back, on the bare floor, naked,
unless where decency forbids: that there be placed upon his body as great a
weight of iron as he could bear, and more; that he have no sustenance, save
only, on the first day, three morsels of the worst bread; and, on the second day,
three draughts of standing water, that should be nearest to the prison door; and in
this situation this should be alternately his daily diet till he died, or (as anciently
the judgment ran) till he answered.(v)
It hath been doubted whether this punishment subsisted at the common
law,(w) or was introduced in consequence of the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c.
12,(x) which seems to be the better opinion. For not a word of it is mentioned
in Glanvil or Bracton, or in any ancient author, case, or record (that hath yet
been produced), previous to the reign of Edward I; but there are instances on
record in the reign of Henry III,(y) where persons accused of felony, and stand-
ing mute were tried in a particular manner by two successive juries, and convicted;
and it is asserted by the judges in 8 Hen. IV, that, by the common law before the
statute, standing mute on an appeal amounted to a conviction of the felony.(z) This
[*328] statute of Edward I directs such persons *"as will not put themselves upon
inquests of felonies before the judges at the suit of the king, to be put
into hard and strong prison (soient mys en la prisone fort et dure) as those which
refuse to be at the common law of the land." And immediately after this stat-
ute, the form of the judgment appears in Fleta and Britton to have been only
a very strait confinement in prison, with hardly any degree of sustenance; but
no weight is directed to be laid upon the body, so as to hasten the death of the
miserable sufferer: and indeed any surcharge of punishment on persons ad-judged to penance, so as to shorten their lives, is reckoned by Home in the
Mirror (a) as a species of criminal homicide. It also clearly appears, by a record
of 31 Edw. III,(b) that the prisoner might then possibly subsist for forty days
under this lingering punishment. I should, therefore, imagine that the practice
of loading him with weights, or, as it was usually called, pressing him to death,
was gradually introduced between 31 Edw. III, and 8 Hen. IV, at which last
period it first appears upon our books ;(c) being intended as a species of mercy
to the delinquent, by delivering him the sooner from his torment: and hence I
presume it also was, that the duration of the penance was then first (d) altered ;
and instead of continuing till he answered, it was directed to continue till he
died, which must very soon happen under an enormous pressure.
The uncertainty of its original, the doubts that were conceived of its legality,
(s) The marquis Beccaria (ch. 16), in an exquisite piece of raillery, has proposed this problem, with a gravity
and precision that are truly mathematical: "The force of the muscles and the sensibility of the nerves of an
innocent person being given, it is required to find the degree of pain necessary to make him confess himself
guilty of a given crime."
(t) Pro Sulla, 28. (u) 2 Hal. P. C. 319. 2 Hawk. P. C. 329.
() Britton, c. 4, & 22. Flet. 1. 1, t. 34, § 33. (w) 2 Inst. 179. 2 Hal. P. C. 322. 2 Hawk. P C. 830.
(x) Staundf. P. C. 149. Barr. 82. (y) Emlyn on 2 Hal. P. C. 322.
(z) Al common ley, avant Is statute de West. 1, c. 12, si ascum ust e8tre appeal, et ust estre mute, ill serra convict
defetony. (M. 8 He. IV. 2.)
(a) Ch. 1, % 9. (b) 6 Rym. 18. (c) Yearb. 8 Hen. IV, 1.
(d) Etfuit dit, que s contraire avait estre fait devant ces hears. (Ibid. 2.)
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and the repugnance of its theory (for it was rarely carried into practice) to the
humanity of the laws of England, all concurred to require a legislative abolition
of this cruel process. and a restitution of the ancient common law: whereby
the standing mute in felony, as well as in treason and in trespass, amounted to
a confession of the charge. Or, if the corruption of the blood and the con-
sequent escheat in felony had been removed, the judgment of peine forte et dure
might perhaps have still innocently remained, *as a monument of the [*329]
savage rapacity with which the lordly tyrants of feudal antiquity hunted
after escheats and forfeitures; since no one would ever have been tempted to
undergo such a horrid alternative. For the law was, that by standing mute,
and suffering this heavy penance, the judgment, and of course the corruption
of the blood and escheat of the lands, were saved in felony and petit treason,
though not the forfeiture of the goods: and, therefore, this lingering punish-
ment was probably introduced, in order to extort a plea: without which it was
held that no judgment of death could be given, and so the lord lost his escheat.
But in high treason, as standing mute is equivalent to a conviction, the same
judgment, the same corruption of blood, and the same forfeitures always
attended it, as in other cases of conviction.(e) And very lately, to the honour
of our laws, it hath been enacted by statute 12 Geo. III, c. 20, that every person
who, being arraigned for felony or piracy, shall stand mute or not answer
directly to the offence, shall be convicted of the same, and the same judgment
and execution (with all their consequences in every respect) shall be thereupon
awarded, as if the person had been convicted by verdict or confession of the
crime.(4) And thus much for the demeanor of a prisoner upon his arraignment,
by standing mute; which now, in all cases, amounts to a constructive con-
fession.
II. The other incident to arraignments, exclusive of the plea, is the prisoner's
actual confession of the indictment. Upon a simple and plain confession, the
court hathnothing to do but to award judgment: but it is usually very back-
ward in receiving and recording such confession, out of tenderness to the life
of the subject; and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it, and plead to
the indictment.(f)
But there is another species of confession, which we read much of in our
ancient books, of a far more complicated kind, which is called approvement.
And that is when a *person indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned [*330]
for the same, doth confess the fact before plea pleaded; and appeals or
accuses others, his accomplices, of the same crime, in order to obtain his pardon.
In this case he is called an approver or prover, probator, and the party appealed
or accused is called the appellee. Such approvement can only be in capital
offences; and it is, as it were, equivalent to an indictment, since the appellee is
equally called upon to answer it: and if he hath no reasonable and legal ex-
ceptions to make to the person of the approver, which indeed are very numer-
ous, he must put himself upon his trial, either by battel, or by the country; and
if vanquished or found guilty, must suffer the judgment of the law, and the
approver shall have his pardon ex deblto justitim. On the other hand, if the
appellee be conqueror, or acquitted by 'the jury, the approver shall receive
judgment to be hanged, upon his own confession of the indictment; for the
condition of his pardon has failed, viz., the convicting of some other person, and
therefore his conviction remains absolute.
But it is purely in the discretion of the court to permit the approved thus to
(e) 2 Hawk. P. C. 331. (f) 2 Hal. P. C. 225.
(4) [Two instances have occurred since the passing of this statute, of persons who refused
to plead, and who in consequence were condemned and executed. One was at the Old .Bailey,
for murder, in 1777; the other was for burglary, at the summer assizes at Wells, in 1792.]
The practice now, since the statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, is for the court to enter a plea
of not guilty for the accused party. See notes, pp. 324 and 325, 8upra.
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appeal or not: and, in fact, this course of admitting approvements hath been
long disused: for the truth was, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, that more mis-
chief hath arisen o good men by these kind of approvements, upon false and
malicious accusations of desperate villains, than benefit to the public by the
discovery and conviction of real offenders. And, therefore, in the times when
such appeals were more frequently admitted, great strictness and nicety were
held therein: (g) though, since their discontinuance, the doctrine of approve-
ments is become a matter of more curiosity than use. I shall only observe,
that all the good, whatever it be, that can be expected from this method of ap-
provement. is fully provided for in the cases of coining, robbery, burglary, house-
breaking, horse stealing, and larceny to the value of five shillings from shops,
warehouses, stables, and coach-houses, by statutes 4 and 5 W. and M c. 8,
[*331] *6 and 7 Win. III, c. 17, 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 23, and 5 Ann. c. 31,
which enact, that if any such offender, being out of prison, shall dis-
cover two or more persons, who have committed the like offences, so as they
may be convicted thereof; he shall in case of burglary or house-breaking receive a
reward of 401., and in general be entitled to a pardon of all capital offences, except-
ing only murder and treason; and of them also in the case of coining.(h) And
if any such person, having feloniously stolen any lead, iron, or other metal, shall
discover and convict two offenders of having illegally bought or received the same,
he shall, by virtue of statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30, be pardoned for all such felonies
committed before such discovery.(5) It hath also been usual for the justices of
the peace, by whom any persons charged with felony are committed to gaol, to
admit some one of their accomplices to become a witness (or, as it is generally
termed, king's evidence) against his fellows; upon an implied confidence, which
the judges of gaol-delivery have usually countenanced and adopted, that if such
accomplice makes a full and complete discovery of that and of all other felonies
to which he is examined by the magistrate, and afterwards gives his evidence
without prevarication or fraud, he shall not himself be prosecuted for that or
any other previous offence of the same degree. (i) (6)
) 2 Hal. P. C. ch. 29. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 24.
The pardon for discovering offences against the coinage act of 15 Geo. II, c. 28, extends only to all suck
offences.
(i) The King v. Rudd; Mich. 16 Geo. III, on a case reserved from the Old Bailey, Oct. 1775.
(5) The statutes here mentioned are since repealed.
(6) [It has now been solemnly decided that an accomplice admitted as king's evidence, and
performing the condition on which he is admitted as a witness, is not entitled, as matter of
right, to be exempt from prosecution for other offences with which he is charged, but that it will
be matter in the discretion of the judge whether he will recommend him for a pardon or not.
Rex v. Lee, R. and R. C. C. 361; Rex v. Brunton, id. 454. Even the equitable claim of an
accomplice to a pardon, on condition of his making a full and fair confession, does not extend
to prosecutions for other offences in which he was not concerned with the prisoner: with
respect to such offences, therefore, he is not bound to answer on cross-examination. Lee's,
Duce's, and West's Cases, 1 Phil. Ev. 37. But the judges will not, in general, admit an accom-
plice as king's evidence, although applied to for that purpose by the counsel for the prosecu-
tion, if it appear that he is charged with any other felony than that on the trial of which he
is a witness. 2 C. and P. 411; Car. Cr. L. 62. Where an accomplice is confirmed in his evi-
dence against one prisoner, but not with respect to another, both may be convicted, if the jury
think the accomplice deserving of credit. Rex v. Dawber and others; 2 Stark. N. P. C. 34;
Car. Cr. L. 67, 2d ed. And see Rex v. Dawber, 3 Stark. 34, 35, n., where it is said, that if the
testimony of an accomplice be confirmed so far as it relates to one prisoner, but not as to
another, the one may be convicted on the testimony of the accomplice, if the jury deem him
worthy of credit. An accomplice does not require confirmation as to the person charged,
provided he is confirmed in the particulars of his story. Rex V. Birkett and Brady, R. and R.
C. C. 251. And the corroboration of his evidence need not be on every material point, but
he must be so confirmed as to convince the jury that his statement is correct and true. Rex
v. Barnard, 1 C. and P. 88. A person indicted for a misdemeanor may be legally convicted
upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. Rex v. Jones, 2 Camp. 132. So may a
person indicted for a capital offence. Jordaine v. Lashbrook, 7 T. R. 609. But the testimony
of accomplices alone is seldom of sufficient weight with a jury to convict the offenders; the
temptation to commit perjury being so great, where the witness by accusing another may
escape himself. The practice, therefore, is to advise the jury to regard the evidence of an
502
Chap. 26.] PLEA AND ISSUE. 332
CHAPTER XXVI.
OF PLEA AND ISSUE.
WE are now to consider the plea of a prisoner, or defensive matter alleged by
him on his arraignment, if he does not confess or stand mute. This is either,
1. A plea to the jurisdiction; 2. A demurrer; 3. A plea in abatement; 4. A
special plea in bar; or, 5. The general issue.
Formerly, there was another plea, now abrogated, that of sanctuary; which
is however necessary to be lightly touched upon, as it may give some light to
many parts of our ncient law: it being introduced and continued during the
superstitious veneration that was paid to consecrated ground in the times of
popery. First, then, it is to be observed, that if a person accused of any crime
(except treason, wherein the crown, and sacrilege, wherein the church, was too
nearly concerned) had fled to any church, or church yard, and within forty days
after went in sackcloth and confessed himself guilty before the coroner, and
declared all the particular circumstances of the offence; and thereupon took the
oath in that case provided, viz., that he abjured the realm, and would depart from
thence forthwith at the port that should be assigned him, and would never
return without leave from the king; he by this means saved his life, if he ob-
served the conditions of the oath, by going with a cross in *his hand, *333]
and, with all convenient speed, to the port assigned, and embarking. [ ]
For if, during this forty days' privilege of sanctuary, or in his road to the sea-
side, he was apprehended and arraigned in any court, for this felony, he might
plead the privilege of sanctuary, and had a right to be remanded, if taken out
against his will(a) But by this abjuration his blood was attainted, and he
forfeited all his goods and chattels.(b) The immunity of these privileged placca
was very much abridged by the statutes 27 Hen. VIII, c. 19, and 32 Hen, VIII,
c. 12. And now, by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 28, all privilege of sanctuary, and
abjuration consequent thereupon, is utterly taken away and abolished.
Formerly also the benefit of clergy used to be pleaded before trial or con-
viction, and was called a declinatory plea; which was the name also given to
that of sanctuary.(c) But, as the prisoner upon a trial has a chance to be
acquitted, and totally discharged; and, if convicted of a clergyable felony, is
entitled equally to his clergy after as before conviction; this course is extremely
disadvantageous ; and therefore the benefit of clergy is now very rarely pleaded;
but, if found requisite, is prayed by the convict before judgment is passed upon
him.(1)
I proceed, therefore, to the five species of pleas before mentioned.
I. A plea to the jurisdiction, is where an indictment is taken before a court
that hath no cognzance of the offence; as if a man be indicted for a rape at
the sheriff's tourn, or for treason at the quarter sessions: in these, or similar
(a) Mir. c.1, § 13. 2 Hawk. P. C. 335. (b) 2 Hawk. P. C. 52. (c) 2 Hal. P. C. 236.
accomplice, only so far as he may be confirmed, in some part of his testimony, by unimpeach-
able testimony. Phil. Ev. 34, 3d ed. And see id. c. 4, § 2, and the several authorities there
cited and considered.]
Where an accomplice admits his own guilt, and testifies without reserve, immunity in
respect to that offence is substantially promised him. And after having given his testimony
for the prosecution, he cannot claim the privilege of not criminating himself on cross-
examination, but will be compelled to answer fully. State v. Coudry, 5 Jones (Law), 418;
Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray, 472; Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266.
The prisoner is not entitled of right to a charge from the court that the jury cannot con-
vict him on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305.
(1) It is now abolished.
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cases, he may except to the jurisdiction of the court, without answering at all
to the crime alleged.(d)(2)
II. A demurrer to the indictment. This is incident to criminal cases, as well
[*334] as civil, when the fact as alleged is *allowed to be true, but the prisoner
joins issue upon some point of law in the indictment, by which he in-
sists that the fact, as stated, is no felony, treason, or whatever the crime is alleged
to be. Thus, for instance, if a man be indicted for feloniously stealing a
greyhound; which is an animal in which no valuable property can be had, and
therefore it is not felony, but only a civil trespass, to steal it: in this case the
party indicted may demur to the indictment; denying it to be felony, though
he confesses the act of taking it. Some have held,(e) that if, on demurrer, the
point of law be adjudged against the prisoner, he shall have judgment and exe-
cution, as if convicted by verdict. But this is denied by others,(f) who hold,
that in such case he shall be directed and received to plead the general issue, not
guilty, after a demurrer determined against him.(3) Which appears the more
reasonable, because it is clear that if the prisoner freely discovers the fact in
court, and refers it to the opinion of the court, whether it be felony or no; and
upon the fact thus shown it appears to be felony; the court will not record the
confession, but admit him afterwards to plead not guilty.(g) And this seems to
be a case of the same nature, being for the most part a mistake in point of law,
and in the conduct of his pleading; and though a man by mispleading may in
some cases lose his property, yet the law will not suffer him by such niceties to
lose his life. However, upon this doubt, demurrers to indictments are seldom
used: since the same advantages may be taken upon a plea of not guilty; or
afterwards in arrest of judgment, when the verdict has established the fact.
III. A plea in abatement is principally for a misnomer, a wrong name, or a
false addition to the prisoner. As, if James Allen, gentleman, is indicted by the
name of John Allen, esquire, he may plead that he has the name of
James, and not of John; and that he is a gentleman, and not an esquire.
[*335] And, if either fact is found by a jury, then the *indictment shall be
abated, as writs or declarations may be in civil actions; of which we
spoke at large in the preceding book.(h) (4) But in the end, there is little
advantage accruing to the prisoner by means of these dilatory pleas; because,
if the exception be allowed, a new bill of indictment may be framed, according
to what the prisoner in his plea avers to be his true name and addition. For it
is a rule, upon all pleas in abatement, that he who takes advantage of a flaw
must at the same time show how it may be amended. Let us thereforenext
consider a more substantial kind of plea, viz.:
IV. Special pleas in bar; which go to the merits of the indictment, and give
a reason why the prisoner ought not to answer it at all, nor put himself upon
his trial for the crime alleged. These are of four kinds: a former acquittal, a
former conviction, a former attainder, or a pardon. There are many other pleas,
which may be pleaded in bar of an appeal ;(i) but these are applicable to both
appeals and indictments.
1. First, the plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on
this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence. And
hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is once fairly found not
(d) Ibid. 256. (e) 2 Hal. P. C. 257. (f) 2 Hawk. P. C. 334. (Y) 2 Hal. P. C. 225.
(A) See book M, page 302. (i) 2 Hawk. P. C. eh. 28.
(2) A plea to the jurisdiction is never important where the want of jurisdiction appears on
the face of the proceedings, as the defect may then be taken advantage of either by demurrer
or by motion in arrest of judgment. And if the objection is one which must appear from the
evidence of the prosecution, it may be taken without special plea whenever it appears.
(3) [This rule holds good in indictments for felonies, but not for misdemeanors. 8 East, 112.]
(4) Defects of this description are now amendable. Statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 1. If
objection was taken in any form, they would therefore be amended, and if not taken, they
would be cured by verdict.
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guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offence,( I) he may plead such acquittal in bar of
any subsequent accusation for the same crime.(5) Therefore an acquittal on an
appeal is a good bar to an indictment on the same offence. And so also was an
acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common law :(k) and
therefore, in favour of appeals, a general practice was introduced, not to try any
person on an indictment of homicide, till after the year and day, within which
appeals may be brought, were past; by which time it often happened that the wit-
nesses died, or the whole was forgotten. To remedy which inconvenience, the
statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, enacts, that *indictments shall be proceeded on, [.336]
immediately, at the king's suit, for the death of a man, without waiting [*33]
for bringing an appeal; and that the plea of autrefoits acquit on an indictment,
shall be no bar to the prosecuting of any appeal.
2. Secondly, the plea of autrefoits convict, or a former conviction for the
same identical crime, though no judgment was ever given, or perhaps will be
(being suspended by the benefit of clergy or other causes), is a good plea in bar
to an indictment. And this depends upon the same principle as the former,
that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the
same crime.(/) Hereupon it has been held, that-a conviction of manslaughter,
on an appeal or an indictment, is a bar even in another appeal, and much more
in an indictment of murder; for the fact prosecuted is the same in both,
though the offences differ in colouring and in degree. It is to be observed, that
the pleas of autrefoits acquit and autrefoits convict, or a former acquittal, and
former conviction, must be upon a prosecution for the same identical act and
crime. But the case is otherwise in,
3. Thirdly, the plea of autrefoits attaint, or a former attainder; which is a
good plea in bar, whether it be for the same or any other felony. For wherever
a man is attainted of felony, by judgment of death either upon a verdict or
confession, by outlawry, or heretofore by abjuration; and whether upon an
appeal or an indictment: he may plead such attainder in bar to any subsequent
indictment or appeal, for the same or for any other felony.(m) And this
(J) 3 Mod. 194. (k) 2 Hawk. P. C. 373. () 2 Hawk. P. C. 377. (m) Ibid. 375.
(5) [But such a plea must be strictly regular both in form and substance; for, in cases
of misdemeanof, if it is held bad on demurrer, final judgment may be entered up against the
defendant. Rex v. Taylor, 5 D. and R. 422; 3 B. and C. 502. And if it is irregularly
pleaded, and the acquittal which it sets forth appears to have been obtained by collusion, the
court will strike the plea off the file. Rex v. Taylor, 5 D. and R. 521; 3 B. and C. 612. A
plea of autrefoits acquit cannot be pleaded unless the facts charged in the second indictment
would, if true, have sustained the first. Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 East, P. C. 519. If, in a plea
of autrefoits acquit, the prisoner were to insist on two distinct records of acquittal, his plea
would be bad for duplicity. But semble, that if he insisted upon the wrong, the court would,
in a capital case, take care that he did not suffer by it. Rex v. Sheen, 2 C. and P. 635. And
if the prisoner could have been legally convicted on the first indictment upon any evidence
that might have been adduced, his acquittal on that indictment may be successfully pleaded
to a second indictment ; and it is immaterial whether the proper evidence was adduced at the
trial of the first indictment or not. Id. A prisoner indicted for felony may plead not
guilty after his special plea of autrefoits acquit has been found against him. Rex v. Welch,
Car. Cr. L. 56.] And in the United States he is allowed to do so in case of misdemeanor
also. Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 457.
That an acquittal on an indictment which was sufficient to warrant a conviction will be a
bar to future prosecution of the same offence, see Rex v. Emden, 9 East, 437; Heikes v. Com-
monwealth, 26 Penn. St. 513; People v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164. A person is not to be twice put
in jeopardy on the same charge; and he is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial before a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information which is so far valid as
to be sufficient to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. and R. 586; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 292; State V. Norvell, 2
Yerg. 24; State v. Ned, 7 Port. 217; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. and Bat. 162 ; Price v. State, 19
Ohio, 423. After the jury are impaneled and sworn, any discharge of them without verdict
and without the defendant's consent, except for reasons of necessity, will be equivalent to an
acquittal. People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, 304; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365. And see
Cooley's Const. Lim. 327; Whart. Cr. L. . 541, et seq. But the court must have had jurisdic-
tion: State v. Odell, 4 Blackf. 156; State v. Payne, 4 Mo. 376; State v. Hodgkins, 42 N. H. 474.
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because, generally, such proceeding on a second prosecution cannot be to any
purpose: for the prisoner is dead in law by the first attainder, his blood is
already corrupted, and he hath forfeited all that he had: so that it is absurd
and superfluous to endeavour to attaint him a second time. But to this gen-
eral rule, however, as to all others, there are some exceptions; wherein,
cessante ratione, cessat et ipsa lex. As, 1. Where the former attainder is
[,337] reversed for error, for then it *is the same as if it had never been. 'And
[*7 the same reason holds, where the attainder is reversed by parliament, or
the judgment vacated by the king's pardon, with regard to felonies committed
afterwards. 2. Where the attainder was upon indictment, such attainder is no
bar to an appeal: for the prior sentence is pardonable by the king; and if that
might be pleaded in bar of the appeal, the king might in the end defeat the
suit of the subject, by suffering the prior sentence to stop the prosecution of a
second, and then, when the time of appealing is elapsed, granting the delin-
quent a pardon. 3. An attainder in felony is no bar to an indictment of
treason: because not only the judgment and manner of death are different,
but the forfeiture is more extensive, and the land goes to different persons.
4. Where a person attainted of one felony is afterwards indicted as principal in
another, to which there are also accessories, prosecuted at the same time; in
this case it is held, that the plea of autrefoits attaint is no bar, but he shall be
compelled to take his trial, for the sake of public justice; because the accesso-
ries to such second felony cannot be convicted till after the conviction of the
principal.(n) And from these instances we may collect that a plea of
autrefoits attaint is never good, but when a second trial would be quite super-
fluous.(o) (6)
4. Lastly, apardon may be pleaded in bar; as at once destroying the end andpurpose of the indictment, by remitting that punishment which the prosecu-
tion is calculated to inflict. There is one advantage that attends pleading a
pardon in bar, or in arrest of judgment, before sentence is past; which gives it
by much the preference to pleading it after sentence or attainder. This is, that
by stopping the judgment it stops the attainder, and prevents the corruption of
the blood; which, when once corrupted by attainder, cannot afterwards be
restored, otherwise than by act of parliament. But as the title of pardons is
applicable to other stages of prosecution; and they have their respective force
[*338] and efficacy, as well after as before conviction, outlawry, or *attainder;
I shall therefore reserve the more minute consideration of them till I
have gone through every other title except only that of execution.
Before I conclude this head of special pleas in bar, it will be necessary once
more to observe, that though in civil actions when a man has his election what
plea in bar to make, he is concluded by that plea, and cannot resort to another
if that be determined against him (as if, on an action of debt, the defendant pleads
a general release, and no such release. can be proved, he cannot afterwards plead
the general issue, nil debet, as he might at first: for he has made his election
what plea to abide by, and it was his own folly to choose a rotten defence;)
though, I say, this strictness is observed in civil actions, quia interest reipublicm
ut sit finis litium : yet in criminal prosecutions in favorem vitwv, as well upon
appeal as indictment, when a prisoner's plea in bar is found against him upon
issue tried by a jury, or adjudged against him in point of law by the court;
still he shall not be concluded or convicted thereon, but shall have judgment
of respondeat ouster, and may plead over to the felony the general issue, not
guiltv.(p) For the law allows many pleas, by which a prisoner may escape
deatlh; but only one plea, in consequence whereof it can be inflicted: viz., on
(n) Poph. 107. (o) Staund. P. C. 107. (p) 2 Hal. P. C. 239.
(6) [By the 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, s. 4, it is enacted that no plea setting forth any attainder
shall be pleaded in bar of any indictment, unless the attainder be for the same offence as that
charged in the indictment; by which enactment the plea of autrefois attaint seems to be at
an end.]
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the general issue, after an impartial examination and decision of the fact, by
the unanimous verdict of a jury.(7) It remains, therefore, that I consider,
V. The general issue, or plea of not guilty,(q) upon which plea alone the
prisoner can receive his final judgment of death. In case of an indictment
of felony or treason, there can be no special justification put in by way of plea.
As, on an indictment for murder, a man cannot plead that it was in his own
defence against a robber on the highway, or a burglar; but he must plead the
general issue, not guilty, and give this special matter in evidence. For (besides
that these pleas do in effect amount to the general issue; since, if true, the
prisoner is most clearly not guilty) as the facts in treason are *laid to *339]
be done proditorie et contra ligeantiw suw debitum, and, in felony, that L*39
the killing was done felonice; the charges, of a traitorous or felonious intent,
are the points and very gist of the indictment, and must be added directly, by
the general negative, not guilty; and the jury upon the evidence will take
notice of any defensive matter, and give their verdict accordingly, as effectually
as if it were, or could be, specially pleaded. So that this is, upon all accounts,
the most advantageous plea for the prisoner.(r)
When the prisoner hath thus pleaded not guilty, non culpabilis, or nient
culpable; which was formerly used to be abbreviated upon the minutes, thus,
"non (or nient) cul.," the clerk of the assize, or clerk of the arraigns, on behalf
of the crown replies, that the prisoner is guilty, and that he is ready to prove
him so. This is done by two monosyllables in the same spirit of abbreviation,
"cul. prit.," which signifies, first, that the prisoner is guilty (cul., culpable or cul-
pabilis), and then that the king is ready to prove him so; prit presto sum, or
paratus verificare. This is therefore a replication on behalf of the king viva
voce at the bar; which was formerly the course in all pleadings, as well in civil
as in criminal causes. And that was done in the concisest manner: for when
the pleader intended to demur, he expressed his demurrer in a single word,
"Judgment;" signifying that he demanded judgment, whether the writ, declara-
tion, plea, &c., either in form or matter, were sufficiently good in law: and if
he meant to rest on the truth of the facts pleaded, he expressed that also in a
single syllable "prit;" signifying that he was ready to prove his assertions: as
may be observed from the year-books and other ancient lwpositories of law.(s)
By this replication the king and the prisoner are therefore at issue; for we may
remember, in our strictures upon pleadings, in the preceding book,(t) it was
observed, that when the parties came to a fact, which is affirmed on one side
and denied on the other, then they are said to be at issue in point *of F*340l
fact: which is evidently the case here, in the plea of non cul. by the L
prisoner; and the replication of cul. by the clerk. And we may also remember,
that the usual conclusion of all affirmative pleadings, as this of cul. or guilty
is, was by an averment in these words, "and this he is ready to verify; et hoe
paratus est verificare ;" which same thing is here expressed by the single word
" prit."
How our courts came to express a matter of this importance in so odd and
obscure a manner, "rem tantam tam negligenter," can hardly be pronounced
with certainty. It may perhaps, however, be accounted for by supposing, that
these were at first short notes, to help the memory of the clerk, and remind him
that he was to reply; or else it was the short method of taking down in court,
upon the minutes, the replication and averment, "cul prit;" which afterwards
(q) See Appendix, S 1. (r) 2 Hal. P. C. 258. (s) North's Life of Lord Guilford, 98.
(t) See book III, page 312.
(7) [But this is confined to cases of felony; a defendant having pleaded in bar in all cases
of misdemeanor, is precluded from the benefit of the plea of not guilty, if the plea of bar
should be found insufficient: 8 East, 107; 1 M. and S. 184; 3 B. and C. 502; 2 id. 512; unless
on demurrer. 6 East, 583, 602.]
See note 5, p. 335 mupra.
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the ignorance of succeeding clerks adopted for the very words to be by them
spoken.(u)
But however it may have arisen, the joining of issue (which though now
usually entered on the record,(w) is no otherwise joined(x) in any part of the
proceedings) seems to be clearly the meaning of this obscure expression :(y)
which has puzzled our most ingenious etymologists, and is commonly understood
as if the clerk of the arraigns, immediately on plea pleaded, had fixed an oppro-
brious name on the prisoner, by asking him, "Culprit, how wilt thou be tried?"
For, immediately upon issue joined, it is inquired of the prisoner, by what trial he
will make his innocence appear. This form has at present reference to appeals
and approvements only wherein the appellee has his choice, either to try the
r*34 11 *accusation by battel or by jury. But upon indictments, since the aboli-tion of ordeal, there can be no other trial but by jury, perpais, or by the
country; and therefore, if the prisoner refuses to put himself upon the inquest
in the usual form, that is, to answer that he will be tried by God and his
country,(z) if a commoner; and, if a peer, by God and his peers;(a) the indict-
ment, if in treason, is taken pro confesso; and the prisoner, in cases of felony,
is adjudged to stand mute, and if he perseveres in his obstinacy, shall now(b)
be convicted of the felony.(8)
When the prisoner has thus put himself on his trial, the clerk answers in the
humane language of the law, which always hopes that the party's innocence
rather than his guilt may appear, "God send thee a good deliverance." And
then they proceed, as soon as conveniently may be, to the trial; the manner of
which will be considered at large in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XXVII.
OF TRIAL AND CONVICTION.
THE several methods of trial and conviction of offenders established by the
laws of England, were formerly more numerous than at present, through the
superstition of our Saxon ancestors: who, like other northern nations, were
extremely addicted to divination: a character which Tacitus observes of the
ancient Germans. (a) They therefore invented a considerable number of
methods of purgation or trial, to preserve innocence from the danger of false
witnesses, and in consequence of a notion that God would always interpose
miraculously to vindicate the guiltless.
I. The most ancient(b) species of trial was that by ordeal: which was pecu-
liarly distinguished by the appellation of judicium Dei; and sometimes vulga-
ris purgatio, to distinguish it from the canonical purgation, which was by the
oath of the party. This was of two sorts,(c) either fire-ordeal, or water-ordeal;
(u) Of this ignorance we may see daily instances In the abuse of two legal terms of ancient French, one, the
prologue to allproclamations, "oyez," or hear ye, which is generally pronounced most umeaningly, '0 yes ;"
the other a more pardonable mistake, viz. when the jury are all sworn, the officer bids the crier number them,
for which the word in law-French is "countez;" but we now hear it pronounced in very good English, "count
these."
(w) See Appendix, % 1. (x) 2 Hawk. P. C. 399. (y) 2 Hal. P. C. 258.
(z) A learned author, who is very seldom mistaken in his conjectures, has observed that the proper answer is,
by God or the country," that is, either by ordeal or by jury; because the question supposes an option in the pris-
oner. And certainly it gives some countenance to this observation, that the trial by ordeal used formerly to be
calledjudicdum Dei. But it should seem, that when the question gives the prisoner an option, his answer must
be nositive" ,nd not in the disjunctive, which returns the option ack to the prosecutor.
(a) Keylin'ge, 57. State Trials, passim. (b) Stat. 12 e. In, c. 20. (a) De MAor. Germ. 10.
(b) LL. Inae, 3, e. 77. (c) Mirr. c. 3, § 23.
(8)'When a prisoner pleads "not guilty" he puts himself upon the country, and the
ceremony of asking him how lie will be tried is discontinued. And if he stands mute the
court will enter the plea of not guilty for him. 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, § 2.
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the former being confined to persons of higher rank, the latter to the common
people.(d) Both these might be performed by deputy: but the principal was
to answer for the success of the trial; the deputy only venturing some corporal
pain for hire, or perhaps for friendship.(e) Fire-ordeal was *performed [*3431
either by taking up in the hand, unhurt, a piece of red-hot iron of one,
two or three pounds weight; or else by walking barefoot and blindfold over nine
red-hot ploughshares, laid lengthwise at equal distances: and if the party
escaped being hurt, he was adjudged innocent; but if it happened otherwise, as
without collusion it usually did, he was then condemned as guilty. However, by
this latter method Queen Emma, the mother of Edward the Confessor, is men-
tioned as having cleared her character,- when suspected of familiarity with
Alwyn, bishop of Winchester.(f)
Water-ordeal was performed, either by plunging the bare arm up to the elbow
in boiling water, and escaping unhurt thereby: or by casting the person sus-
pected into a river or pond of cold water; and, if he floated therein without
any action of swimming, it was deemed an evidence of his guilt; but, if he
sunk, he was acquitted. It is easy to trace out the traditional relics of this
water-ordeal, in the ignorant barbarity still practiced in many countries to dis-
cover witches by casting them into a pool of water, and drowning them, to
prove their innocence. And in the eastern empire the fire-ordeal was used to
the same purpose by the emperor Theodore Lascarus: who, attributing his sick-
ness to magic, caused all those whom he suspected to handle the hot iron: thus
joining (as has been well remarked) (g) to the most dubious crime in the world
the most dubious proof of innocence.
And, indeed, this purgation by ordeal seems to have been very ancient and
very universal in the times of superstitious barbarity. It was known to the
ancient Greeks: for, in the *Antigone of Sophocles,(h) a person, sus- [*3441
pected by Creon of a misdemeanor, declares himself ready "to handle L 4
hot iron, and to walk over fire," in order to manifest his innocence; which, the
scholiast tells us, was then a very usual puigation. And Grotius (i) gives us
many instances of water-ordeal in Bythynia, Sardinia, and other places. There
is also a very peculiar species of water-ordeal, said to prevail among the Indians
on the coast of Malabar; where a person accused of any enormous crime is
obliged to swim over a large river abounding with crocodiles, and, if he escapes
unhurt, he is reputed innocent. As, in Siam, besides the usual methods of fire
and water ordeal, both parties are sometimes exposed to the fury of a tiger let
loose for that purpose; and, if the beast spare either, that person is accounted
innocent; if neither, both are held to be guilty; but if he spares both, the trial
is incomplete, and they proceed to a more certain criterion.(k)
One cannot but be astonished at the folly and impiety of pronouncing a man
guilty, unless he was cleared by a miracle; and of expecting that all the powers
of nature should be suspended by an immediate interposition of Providence to
save the innocent, whenever it was presumptuously required. And yet, in Eng-
land, so late as King John's time, we find grants to the bishops and clergy to
use the judicium ferri, aqucw, et iqnis. (1) And, both in England and Sweden,
the clergy presided at this trial, and it was only performed in the churches or
in other consecrated ground : for which Stiernhook (m) gives the reason: "non
defuit illis operw et laborispretium; semper enim ab ejusmodi judicio aliquid
lucri sacerdotibus obveniebat." But, to give it its due praise, we find the canon
law very early declaring against trial by ordeal, or vulgaris purgatio, as being
the fabric of the devil, "cum sit contra prteceptum Domini, non tentabis Domi-
num Deum tuum." (n) Upon this authority, though the canons *them- [*3451
selves were of no validity in England, it was thought proper (as had
(d) Tenetfur se purgare is qui accusatur, per Dei judicium; scilicet per catidam ferrmin, vel per aquam, pro
diversitate conditionis hominum: per ferrum calidum, sifuerit homo liber; per aquam sifuerit rusticus. (Glanv.
1. 14, c. 1.)
(e) .This is still expressed in that common form of speech, "of going through fire and water to serve another."
(f) Tho. Rudborne iet. maj. Winton, 1. 4, c. 1. (g) Sp. L. b. 12, c. 5. (h) v. 270. (i) On Numb. v, 17.
Mk) od. Univ. Hist. vii, 266. (1) Spelm. Gloss. 435. (m) Dejure Sueonum, 1. 1, c. S.
(n) Decret. part 2, cans. 2, qu. 5, dist. 7. Decretal, lib. 3, tit. 50, c. 9, and Gloss. ibid.
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been done in Denmark above a century before) (o) to disuse and abolish this trial
entirely in our courts of justice, by an act of parliament in 3 Hen. III, accord-
ing to Sir Edward Coke, (p) or, rather, by an order of the king in council. (q)
II. Another species of purgation, somewhat similar to the former, but proba-
bly sprung from a presumptuous abuse of revelation in the ages of dark super-
stition, was the corsned, or morsel of execration: being a piece of cheese or
bread, of about an ounce in weight, which was consecrated with a form of exor-
cism; desiring of the Almighty that it might cause convulsions and paleness,
and find no passage if the man was really guilty; but might turn to health and
nourishment, if he was innocent: (r) as the water of jealousy among the Jews(s)
was, by God's special appointment, to cause the belly to swell, and the thigh to
rot, if the woman was guilty of adultery. This corsned was then given to the
suspected person, who at the same time also received the holy sacrament :(t) if,
indeed, the corsned was not, as some have suspected, the sacramental bread
itself; till the subsequent invention of transubstantiation preserved it from
profane uses with a more profound respect than formerly. Our historians assure
us, that Godwin, earl of Kent, in the reign of King Edward the Confessor,
abjuring the death of the king's brother, at last appealed to his corsned, "per
buccellam deglutiendam abjuravit,"(u) which stuck in his throat, and killed
him. This custom has long since been gradually abolished, though the remem-
brance of it still subsists in certain phrases of abjuration retained among the
common people. (w)
[,346] *However, we cannot but remark, that though in European countries
*3 this custom most probably arose from an abuse of revealed religion, yet
credulity and superstition will, in all ages and in all climates, produce the same
or similar effects. And, therefore, we shall not be surprised to find that, in the
kingdom of Pegu, there still exists a trial by the corsned, very similar to that
of our ancestors, only substituting raw rice instead of bread.(x) And, in the
kingdom of Monomotapa, they have a method of deciding lawsuits equally
whimsical and uncertain. The witness for the plaintiff chews the bark of a
tree endued with an emetic quality; which, being sufficiently masticated, is then
infused in water, which is given the defendant to drink. If his stomach rejects
it, he is condemned: if it stays with him, he is absolved, unless the plaintiff
will drink some of the same water; and, if it stays with him also, the suit is
left undetermined. (y)
These two antiquated methods of trial were principally in use among our
Saxon ancestors. The next, which still remains in force, though very rarely in
use, owes its introduction among us to the princes of the Norman line. And
that is,
III. The trial by battel,(1) duel, or single combat; which was another species
of presumptuous appeal to Providence, under an expectation that Heaven would
unquestionably give the victory to the innocent or injured party. The nature
of this trial, in cases of civil injury, upon issue joined in a writ of right, was
fully discussed in the preceding book: (z) to which I have only to add, that the
trial by battel may be demanded at the election of the appellee, in either an
appeal or an approvement; and that it is carried on with equal solemnity as
that on a writ of right: but with this difference, that there each party might
hire a champion, but here they must fight in their proper persons. And, there-
[*347] fore, if the *appellant or approver be a woman, a priest, an infant, or of
the age of sixty, or lame, or blind, he or she may counterplead and
(o) Mod. Un. Hist. xxxii, 105. (p) 9 Rep. 32.
(q) 1 Rym. Foed. 228. Spelm Gloss. 326. 2 Pryn. Rec. Append. 20. Seld. Eadm.fol. 48.
(r)Spelm. G1. 439. (s) Numb. ch. v. (t) LL. Canut. c. 6. (u) Ingulph.
(w) As, "I will take the sacrament upon it, " "may this morsel be my last ;" and the like.
(x) Mod. Univ. Hist. vii, 129. (y) Ibd. xv, 464. (z) See book III, p. 337.
(1) Now abolished, statute 59 Geo. III, c. 46. See the proceedings in the case of Lord Rae
and Mr. Ramsey, 11 St. Tr. 124, and the case of Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. and Ald. 405. See
also 3 St. Tr. 483, note, and Mr. H. C. Lea's recent work entitled "Superstition and Force."
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refuse the wager of battel; and compel the appellee to put himself upon the
country. Also peers of the realm, bringing an appeal, shall not be challenged
to wage battel, on account of the dignity of their persons; nor the citizens of
London, by special charter, because fighting seems foreign to their education
and employment. So, likewise, if the crime be notorious; as, if the thief be
taken with a mainour, or the murderer in the room with a bloody knife, the
appellant may refuse the tender of battel from the appellee; (a) for it is unrea-
sonable that an innocent man should stake his life against one who is already
half-convicted.
The form and manner of waging battel upon appeals are much the same as
upon a writ of right; only the oaths of the two combatants are vastly more
striking and solemn.(b) The appellee, when appealed of felony, pleads not
guilty, and throws down his glove, and declares he will defend the same by his
body: the appellant takes up the glove, and replies that he is ready to make
good the appeal, body for body. And thereupon the appellee, taking the book
in his right hand, and in his left the right hand of his antagonist, swears to this
effect: "Hoc audi, homo, quem per manum teneo," &c. "Hear this, 0 man,
whom I hold by the hand, who callest thyself John by the name of baptism,
that I, who call myself Thomas by the name of baptism, did not feloniously
murder thy father, William by name, nor am any way guilty of the said felony.
So help me God, and the saints; and this I will defend against thee by my body,
as this court shall award." To which the appellant replies, holding the bible
and his antagonist's hand-in the same manner as in the other: "Hear this, 0 man,
whom I hold by the hand, who callest thyself Thomas by the name of baptism,
that thou art perjured; and therefore perjured, because that thou feloniously
didst murder my *father, William by name. So help me God, and the [*3481
saints; and this I will prove against thee by my body, as this court shall -1
award."(c) The battel is then to be fought with the same weapons, viz., batons,
the same solemnity, and the same oath against amulets and sorcery, that are
used in the civil combat: and if the appellee be so far vanquished that he can-
not or will not fight any longer, he shall be adjudged to be hanged immediately;
and then, as well as if he be killed in battel, providence is deemed to have deter-
mined in favour of the truth, and his blood shall be attainted. But if he kills
the appellant, or can maintain the fight from sunrising till the stars appear in
the evening, he shall be acquitted. So also if the appellant becomes recreant,
and pronounces the horrible word of craven, he shall lose his liberam legem, and
become infamous; and the appellee shall recover his damages, and also be for-
ever quit, not only of the appeal, but of all indictments likewise for the same
offence.
IV. The fourth method of trial used in criminal cases is that by the peers
of Great Britain, in the court of parliament, or the court of the lord high
steward, when a peer is capitally indicted: for in case of an appeal, a peer shall
be tried by jury.(d) (2) Of this enough has been said in a former chapter; (e)
to which I shall now only add, that, in the method and regulation of its pro-
ceedings, it differs little from the trial per patriam, or by jury; except that no
special verdict can be given in the trial of a peer; (f) because the lords of
parliament, or the lord high steward (if the trial be *had in his court), [.*49]
are judges sufficiently competent of the law that may arise from the [*349
fact: and except, also, that the peers need not all agree in their verdict; but
(a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 427. (b) Flet. 1. 1, c. 34. 2 Hawk. P. C. 426.(c) There is a striking resemblance between this process and that of the court of Areopagus at Athens formurder; wherein the prosecutor and prisoner were both sworn in the most solemn manner; the prosecutor, thathe was related to the deceased (for none but near relations were permitted to prosecute in that court), and thatthe prisoner was the cause of his death; the prisoner, that he was innocent of the charge against him. (Pott.
Antiq. b. i, c. 19.)
(d) 9 Rep. 30. 2 Inst. 49. (e) See page 259. (f) Hatt. 116.
(2) [The nobility are tried by their peers for treason and felony, and misprision of these;
but in all other criminal prosecutions they are tried like commoners, by a jury. 3 Inst. 30.
See book I, 401, note.]
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the greater number, consisting of twelve at the least, will conclude, and bind
the minority.(g)
V. The trial by jury, or the country, per patriam, is also that trial by the
peers of every Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his liberties, is
secured to him by the great charter: (h) "nullus liber homo capiatur, vel impris-
onetur, aut exulet, anut aliquo alio modo destrautur, nisi per legale .judicium
parium suorum, vel per legem terrce."
The antiquity and excellence of this trial, for the settling of civil property,
has before been explained at large.(i) And it will hold much stronger in crim-
inal cases; since, in times of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended
from the violence and'partiality of judges a ppointed by the crown, in suits
between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one individual
and another, to settle the metes and bpundaries of private property. Our law
has therefore wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment
and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of
the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance of our con-
stitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince: and yet this
power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if exerted
without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally named
by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch or
exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration
that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English law
have, with excellent forecast, contrived that no man should be called to an-
swer to the king for any capital crime, unless upon the preparatory accusation
of twelve or more of his fellow-subjects, the grand jury: and that the truth
of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information
[*350] or appeal, *should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage
of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior
to all suspicion. So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as
this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks
(which none will be so hardy as to make), but also from all secret machinations,
which may sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary methods
of tria l, by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and courts of
conscience. And however convenient these may appear at first (as doubtless all
arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient), yet let it be again
remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are
the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial
matters; that these inroads upon the sacred bulwark of the nation are funda-
mentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, though begun in
trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of
juries in questions of the most momentous concern.
What was said of juries in general, and the trial thereby, in civil cases, will
greatly shorten our present remarks, with regard to the trial of criminal suits:
indictments, informations and appeals; which trial I shall consider in tLe same
method that I did the former; by following the order and course of the pro-
ceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way of treating it.
When, therefore, a prisoner on his arraignment has pleaded not guilty, and
for his trial hath put himself upon the country, which country the jury are,
the sheriff of the county must return a panel of jurors, liberos et legales homines,
de vicineto; that is, freeholders, without just exception, and of the visne orneighbourhood; which is interpreted to be of the county where the fact is com-
mitted.(J') If the proceedings are before the court of king's bench, there is
[*351] time allowed, between the assignment and the trial, for a jury to be *im-
paneled by a writ of venirefacias to the sheriff, as in civil causes: and
the trial in case of a misdemeanor is had at nisi prius, unless it be of such
consequence as to merit a trial at bar; which is always invariably had when
(q) Kelynge, 56. Stat. 7 Wn. Il, c. 3, 11. Foster, 247. (h) 9 Hen. III, c. 29.
(i) See book HI, page 379. (j) 2 Hal. P. C. 264. 2 Hawk. P. C. 403.
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the prisoner is tried for any capital offence. But, before commissioners of oyer
and terminer and gaol-delivery, the sheriff, by virtue of a general precept directed
to him beforehand, returns to the court a panel of forty-eight jurors, to try all
felons that may be called upon their trial at that session; and therefore it is
there usual to try all felons immediately, or soon, after their arraignment. But
it is not customary, nor agreeable to the general course of proceedings (unless
by consent of parties, or where the defendant is actually in gaol.), to try per-
sons indicted of smaller misdemeanors at the same court in which they have
pleaded not guilty, or traversed the indictment. But they usually give security
to the court, to appear at the next assizes or session, and then and there to try
the traverse, giving notice to the prosecutor of the same.
In cases of high treason, whereby corruption of blood may ensue (except
treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals), or misprision of such treason,
it is enacted by statute 7 Win. III, c. 3, first, that no person shall be tried for any
such treason, except an attempt to assassinate the king, unless the indictment
be found within three years after the offence committed: next, that the pris-
oner shall have a copy of the indictment (which includes the caption),(k) but
not the names of the witnesses, five days at least before the trial; that is, upon
the true construction of the act, before his arraignment; (1) for then is his
time to take any exceptions thereto, by way of plea or demurrer; thirdly, that
he shall also have a copy of the panel of jurors two days before his trial; and,
lastly, that he shall have the same compulsive process to bring in his witnesses
for him as was usual to compel their appearance against him. And by statute
7 Ann. c. 21 (which did not take place till after the decease of the late pre-
tender), all persons indicted for high treason or misprision *thereof, shall *
have not only a copy of the indictment, but a list of all the witnesses L 352
to be produced, and of the jurors impaneled, with their professions and places
of abode, delivered to him ten days before the trial, and in the presence of two
witnesses; the better to prepare him to make his challenges and defence. But
this last act, so far as it affected indictments for the inferior species of high
treason, respecting the coin and the royal seals, is repealed by the statute 6
Geo. III, c. 53, else it had been impossible to have tried those offences in the
same circuit in which they are indicted: for ten clear days, between the find-
ing and the trial of the indictment, will exceed the time usually allotted for
any session of oyer and terminer.(m) And no person indicted for felony is, or
(as the law stands) ever can be, entitled to such copies, before the time of his
trial.(n) (3)
When the trial is called on, the jurors are to be sworn, as they appear, to the
number of twelve, unless they are challenged by the party.
Challenges may here be made, either on the part of the king, or on that of
the prisoner; and either to the whole array, or to the separate polls, for the very
same reasons that they may he made in civil causes.(o) For it is here at least
as necessary, as there, that the sheriff or returning officer be totally indifferent;
that where an alien is indicted, the jury should be de medietate, or half foreigners,
if so many are found in the place; (which does not indeed hold in treasons,(p)
aliens being very improper judges of the breach of allegiance; nor yet in the
case of Egyptians (4) under the statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10), that on every panel
(k) Fost. 229. Append. 1. (1) Ibid. 230. (m) Fost. 250. (n) 2 Hawk. P. C. 410.
(o) See book m, page 359. (p) 2 Hawk. P. C. 420. 2 Hal. P. C. 271.
(3) Although in England the prisoner is not entitled as of right to a copy of the indictment
in case of felony, yet the prosecution may give it, and their doing so on request would be
expected. If not given, the court would direct the indictment to be read over slowly, in order
that it might be taken down. Rex v. Parry, 7 C. and P. 836. In misdemeanors, the defendant
is entitled to a copy. Morrison v. Kelly, 1 W. Black. 385. In the United States, the right is gen-
erally secured by statute or constitution in all cases.
(4) This class of persons are now dealt with summarily, as rogues and vagabonds.
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there should be a competent number of hundredors; (5) and that the particular
jurors should be omni exceptione majores; not liable to objection either propter
honoris respectum, propter defectum, propter effectum, or propter delictum.
[*353] *Challenges upon any of the foregoing accounts are styled challenges
for cause; which may be without stint in both criminal and civil trials.
But in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is infavorem vit e, allowed
to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
number of jurors, without showing any cause at all; which is called aperemptory
challenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for
which our English laws are justly famous.(6) This is grounded on two reasons.
1. As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccountable
prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another;
and how necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should
have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him;
the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he
has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his
dislike. 2. Because upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned
prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indif-
ference may sometimes provoke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences
from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set
him aside.
The privilege of peremptory challenges, though granted to the prisoner, is
denied to the king by the statute 33 Edw. I, st. 4, which enacts, that the king
shall challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain, to be tried and ap-
proved by the court. However, it is held that the king need not assign his
cause of challenge, till all the panel is gone through, and unless there cannot
be a full jury without the person so challenged. And then, and not sooner, the
king's counsel must show the cause: otherwise the juror shall be sworn.(q) (7)
The peremptory challenges of the prisoner must, however, have some reason-
[*354] able boundary; otherwise he might never *be tried. This reasonable
boundary is settled by the common law to be the number of thirty-five;
that is, one under the number of three full juries. For the law judges that five-
and-thirty are fully sufficient to allow the most timorous man to challenge
through mere caprice; and that he who peremptorily challenges a greater num-
ber, or three full juries, has no intention to be tried at all. And, therefore, it
dealt with one who peremptorily challenges above thirty-five, and will not
retract his challenge, as with one who stands mute or refuses his trial; by sen-
tencing him to the peine forte et dure in felony, and by attainting him in
(q) 2 Hawk. P. C. 418. 2 Hal. P. C. 271.
(5) [The right to challenge for want of hundredors is now taken away by the 6 Geo. IV,
C. 50, s. 13.]
(6) [A peremptor, challenge is not allowed in the trial of collateral issues. Fost. 42. Nor
in any trial for a misdemeanor. 2 Harg. St. Tr. 808, and 4 H. St. Tr. 1.]
(7) [And the practice is the same both in trials for misdemeanors and for capital offences.
3 Harg. St. Tr. 519. Where there is a challenge for cause, two persons in court, not of the jury,
are sworn to try whether the juryman challenged will try the prisoner indifferently. Evidence
is then produced to support the challenge, and according to the verdict of the two triers, the
juryman is admitted or rejected.]
In the United States challenges to the favor are generally tried by two jurors already im-
paneled, if there are such, and if not, then by two indifferent by-standers appointed and sworn
by the court for that purpose, or by the court itself. The American decisions regarding
challenges are collected in 1 Waterman's Arch. Cr. L. 545, et wq. The subject of challenges to
the polls was quite fully considered in People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 281. There is a good deal
of diversity of opinion as to what previously received impressions of the party called as a
jUror, as to the guilt of the accused, should exclude him from sitting. Compare Freeman V.
People, 4 Denio, 9; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229; Baxter v. People, 3 Gil. 868, with Moran's
Case, 9 Leigh, 651 ; State v. Ellington, 7 Ired. 61 ; Moses v. State, 10 Humph. 456; Holt v.
People, 18 Mich. 224.
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treason. (r) And so the law stands at this day with regard to treason of any
kind.
But by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14 (which, with regard to felonies, stands un-
repealed by statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10), by this statute, I say, no person
arraigned for felony can be admitted to make any more than twenty peremptory
challenges. But how if a prisoner will peremptorily challenge twenty-one? what
shall be done? The old opinion was, that judgment of peine forte et dure
should be given, as where he challenged thirty-six at the common law: (s) but
the better opinion seems to be,(t) that such challenge shall only be disregarded
and overruled. Because, first, the common law does not inflict ihe judgment
of penance for challenging twenty-one, neither doth the statute inflict it; and
so heavy a judgment (or that of conviction, which succeeds it) shall not be im-
posed by implication. Secondly, the words of the statute are, "that he be not
admitted to challenge more than twenty;" the evident construction of which is,
that any further challenge be disallowed or prevented: and therefore, being
null from the beginning, and never in fact a challenge, it can subject the
prisoner to no punishment; but the juror shall be regularly sworn.(8)
If, by reason of challenges or the default of the jurors, a sufficient number
cannot be had of the original panel, a tales *may be awarded as in civil
causes,(u) till the number of twelve is sworn, "well and truly to try, and [*3551
true deliverance make, between our sovereign lord the king, and the prisoner
whom they have in charge; and a true verdict to give according to the
evidence."
When the jury is sworn, if it be a cause of any consequence, the indictment
is usually opened, and the evidence marshaled, examined, and enforced by the
counsel for the crown or prosecution. But it is a settled rule at common law,
that no counsel shall be allowed a prisoner upon his trial, upon the general
issue, in any capital crime, unless some point of law shall arise proper to be
debated.(w) (9) A rule, which (however it may be palliated under cover of that
noble declaration of the law, when rightly understood, that the judge shall be
counsel for the prisoner; that is, shall see that the proceedings against him are
legal and strictly regular) (x) seems to be not all of a piece with the rest of the
humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. For upon what face of
reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is
allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass ? Nor, indeed, is it, strictly
speaking, a part of our ancient law: for the Mirror, (y) having observed the
necessity of counsel in civil suits, "who know how to forward and defend the
cause, by the rules of law and customs of the realm," and immediately afterwards
subjoins; "and more necessary are they for defence upon indictments and
appeals of felony, than upon other venial causes."(z) And the judges themselves
(r) 2 Hal. P. C. 268. (s) 2 Hawk. P. C. 414. (t) 3 Inst. 227. 2 Hal. P. C. 270.
u) See bdok III, page 364. But in mere commissions of gaol delivery, no tales can be awarded: though the
court may ore tenus order a new panel to be returned instanter. (4 Inst. 68. 4 St. Tr. 728. Cooke's Case.)
(w) 2 Hawk. P. C. 400.
(x) Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst. 137) gives another additional reason for this refusal, "because the evidence to
convict a prisoner should be so manifest, as It could not be contradicted." Which Lord Nottingham (when
high steward) declared (3 St. Tr. 726) was the only good reason that couldbe given for it.(y) c. 3, J1.
(z) Father Parsons, the Jesuit and after him Bishop Ellys (of English liberty ii, 66), have imagined, that the
benefit of counsel to plead for them was first denied to prisoners by law of Hen. I, meaning (I presume) chapters
47 and 48 of the code which is usually attributed to that prince. "De caus criminalibus vel capltavi &us neo
quarat conMilum: quin implaotatus statim perneget, ein omn! petitions consilii.-ln ali s omnibus poteet et debet
ut coi/io."--But this com-ilium, I conceive, signifies only an imparance, and the petitio eonalii Is craving leave
to imparl; (see book I11 p age28), which is not allowabe in any criminal prosecution. Thiswillbemanifet
by comparing this law with a contemporary passage in the grand eonsterof Normandy (ch. 85), which speaksof imparlances in personal actions. "Apres ce, eat ten le qsrelie a reepondre ; el aura cogle de soe consefiler,
e'il is deanede; et quand ii sera conseille, iU pout myer le facit dont ill eat accuse." Or, as it stands in the tat.
text (edit. 1,39), " Querelatus autem potea tenetur respeldere; et habelt llcentlan conslendl, a requirat; haito
autem consillo, debetfactum negare quo accsatus est"
(8) By statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, s. 3, peremptory challenges beyond the number allowed
by law are entirely void.
(9) A full defence by counsel is now allowed in all cases. See statute 6 and 7 Win. IV,
c. 114. In the United States the right to counsel is a constitutional right, and if the accused
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are so sensible of this defect, that they neyer scruple to allow a prisoner counsel
[,6] to instruct him what questions to ask, or even to *ask questions for
him, with respect to matters of fact: for as to matters of law, arising on
the trial, they are entitled to the assistance of counsel. But, lest this indulgence
should be intercepted by superior influence, in the case of state criminals, the
legislature has directed by statute 7 Win. III, c. 3, that persons indicted for such
high treason, as works a corruption of the blood, or misprision thereof (except
treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals), may make their full defence
by counsel, not exceeding two, to be named by the prisoner and assigned by the
court or judge: and the same indulgence, by statute 20 Geo. II, c. 30, is extended
to parliamentary impeachments for high treason, which were excepted in the
former act.
The doctrine of evidence upon pleas of the crown is, in most respects, the
same as that upon civil actions. There are, however, a few leading points,
wherein, by several statutes, and resolutions, a difference is made between civil
and criminal evidence.
First, in all cases of high treason, petit treason, and misprision of treason, by
statutes 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11, two lawful -witnesses are
required to convict a prisoner; unless he shall willingly and without violence
confess the same. By statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10, a farther exception is
made as to treasons in counterfeiting the king's seals or signatures, and treasons
concerning coin current within this realm: and more particularly by chapter
11, the offences of importing counterfeit foreign money current in this king-
auum, and impairing, counterfeiting, or forging any current coin. The statutes
[*357] 8 and 9 Win. III, c. 25, and 15 and *16 Geo. II, c. 28, in their subsequent
*35"] extensions of this species of treason, do also provide, that the offenders
maybe indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, and attainted, by the like evidence,
and in such manner and form as may be had and used against offenders for
counterfeiting the king's money. But by statute 7 Win. III, c. 3, in prosecu-
tions for those treasons to which that extends, the same rule (of requiring two
witnesses) is again enforced; with this addition, that the confession of the
prisoner, which shall countervail the necessity of such proof, must be in open
court. In the construction of which act it hath been holden,(a) that a confes-
sion of the prisoner, taken out of court, before a magistrate or person having
competent authority to take it, and proved by two witnesses, is sufficient to con-
vict him of treason. But hasty, unguarded confessions, made to persons having
no such authority, ought not to be admitted as evidence under this statute.
And, indeed, even in cases of felony at the common law, they are the weakest
and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice,
false hopes, promises of favour, or menaces; seldom remembered accurately, or
repeated with due precision; and incapable in their nature of being disproved
by other negative evidence.(10) By the same statute, 7 Win. III, it is declared,
that both witnesses must be to the same overt act of treason, or one to one overt
act, and the other to another overt act, of the same species of treason,(b) and
not of distinct heads or kinds: and no evidence shall be admitted to prove any
(a) Fost. 240-244. (b) See St. Tr. II, 144. Foster, 235.
party is unable to employ counsel, the court will designate some member of the bar for that
purpose, and he is not at liberty to decline the appointment. See Vise v. Hamilton County,
19 Ill. 18. See also, Cooley's Const. Lim. 334.
(10) The confession is not sufficient evidence of the corpus ddeecti, but is only allowed for
the purpose of connecting the defendant with the offence when that has been established by
other evidence: People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147; Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157; State
v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349.
The confession, to be admissible in any case, ought to appear to have been made voluntarily,
and without motives of hope or fear being employed for the purpose of inducing it. Rex v.
Enoch, 5 C. and P. 539; Earle v. Picken, id. 542, note; Morehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635;
State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 214, and note; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and
Edwards, 514, and cases cited.
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overt act not expressly laid in the indictment.(11) And, therefore, in Sir John
Fenwick's Case in King William's time, where there was but one witness, an act
of parliament (c) was made on purpose to attaint him of treason, and he was
executed.(d) But in almost every other accusation one positive witness is suf-
ficient. Baron Montesquieu lays it down for a rule,(e) that those laws which
condemn a man to death in any case on the deposition of a single witness, are
fatal to liberty; and he adds this reason, that the witness who affirms, and the
accused who denies, make an equal balance ;(f) there is a necessity, therefore,
to call *in a third man to incline the scale. But this seems to be carry- [*358]
ing matters too far: for there are some crimes, in which the very pri-
vacy of their nature excludes the possibility of having more than one witness;
must these, therefore, escape unpunished ? Neither, indeed, is the bare denial
of the person accused equivalent to the positive oath of a disinterested witness.
In cases of indictments for perjury, this doctrine is better founded; and there our
law adopts it: for one witness is not allowed to convict a man indicted for perjury;
because then there is only one oath against another.(g) In cases of treason,
also, there is the accused's oath of allegiance, to counterpoise the information
of a single witness; and that may perhaps be one reason why the law requires
a double testimony to convict him: though the principal reason, undoubtedly,
is to secure the subject from being sacrificed to fictitious conspiracies, which
have been the engines of profligate and crafty politicians in all ages.
Secondly, though from the reversal of Colonel Sidney's attainder by act of
parliament, in 1689,(h) it may be collected,(i) that the mere similitude of hand-
writing in two papers shown to, a jury, without other concurrent testimony, is
no evidence that both were written by the same person; yet undoubtedly the
testimony of witnesses, well acquainted with the party's hand, that they believe
the paper in question to have been written by him is evidence to be left to a
j ury. (J ) (12)
hidly, by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 27, a mother of a bastard child, conceal-
ing its death, must prove by one witness that the child was born dead; other-
wise such concealment shall be evidence of her having murdered it.(k)(13)
Fourthly, all presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously;
for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer. *And Sir Matthew Hale in particular(l) lays down two [*359]
rules most prudent and necessary to be observed: 1. Never to convict a
man for stealing the goods of a person unknown, merely because he will give
no account how he came by them, unless an actual felony be proved of such
goods; and, 2. Never to convict any person of murder or manslaughter, till at
least the body be found dead; on account of two instances he mentions, where
persons were executed for the murder of others, who were then alive, but
missing.(14)
Lastly, it was an ancient and commonly received practice (M) (derived from
the civil law, and which, also, to this day obtains in the kingdom of France),(n)
that, as counsel was not allowed to any prisoner accused of a capital crime, so
(c) Stat. 8 Wm. iii, c. 4. (d) St. Tr. V. 40. (e) Sp. L. b. 12, c. a (Vf) Beccar. c. 13.
(g) 10 Mod. 194. (h) St. Tr. ViII, 472. (i) 2 Hawk. P. C. 431.
(j) Lord Preston's Case, A. D. 1690. St. Tr. IV, 453. Francis's Case, A. . 1716. St. Tr. Vi, 69. Layer's
Case, A. D. 1722. Ibid. 279. Henzey's Case, A. A. 1758. Burr. 644.
(k) See page 198. (1) 2 Hal. P. C. 290. (m) St. Tr. I, passim.
(n) Donat. publ. law, b. 3, t. 1. Montesq. Sp. L. b. 29, c. 11.
(11) .[By 5 and 6 Vic. c. 51, where the overt act is an attempt to injure the person of the
sovereign, a conviction may be had on the same evidence as if the prisoner were charged with
murder; so that, in this case, two witnesses are not required.]
(12) [But the proof of handwriting is not evidence in high treason, unless the papers are
found in the custody of the prisoner. 1 Burr. 644.]
(13) This statute is since repealed.
(14) A noted instance of conviction in America for the murder of a person who afterwards
returned alive, had principally upon the confessions of the accused parties, has had a ten-
dency towards still greater caution. See the case referred to in 1 Greenl. Ev. 214, n., and
given more at large by Mr. Gallison, in 10 N. A. Review, 418.
neither should he be suffered to exculpate himself by the testimony of any wit-
nesses. And, therefore, it deserves to be remembered to the honour of Mary 1.
(whose early sentiments, till her marriage with Philip of Spain, seem to have
been humane and generous),(o) that when she appointed Sir Richard Morgan
chief justice of the common pleas, she enjoined him, "that notwithstanding
the old error, which did not admit any witness to speak, or any other matter to
be heard, in favour of the adversary, her majesty being party; her highness's
pleasure was, that whatsoever could be brought in favour of the subject should
be admitted to be heard: and moreover, that the justices should not persuade
themselves to sit in judgment otherwise for her highness than for her sub-
ject."(p) Afterwards, in one particular instance (when embezzling the queen's
military stores was made felony by statute 34 Eliz. c. 4), it was provided, that
any person impeached for such felony, "should be received and admitted to
make any lawful proof that he could, by lawful witness or otherwise, for his
discharge and defence :" and in general the courts grew so heartily ashamed of
[*3 3 a doctrine so unreasonable and oppressive, that a practice was *gradu-
,1 ally introduced of examining witnesses for the prisoner, but not upon
oath:(q) the consequence of which still was, that the jury gave less credit to
the prisoner's evidence than to that produced by the crown. Sir Edward
Coke (r) protests very strongly against this tyrannical practice; declaring that
he never read in any act of parliament, book-case, or record, that in criminal
cases the party accused should not have witnesses sworn for him; and, there-
fore, there was not so much as scintillajuris against it.(s) And the house of
commons were so sensible of this absurdity, that, in the bill for abolishing hos-
tilities between England and Scotland,(t) when felonies committed by English-
men in Scotland were ordered to be tried in one of the three northern counties,
they insisted on a clause, and carried it (u) against the efforts of both the crown
an the house of lords, against the practice of the courts in England, and the
express law of Scotland,(w) "that in all such trials for the better discovery of
the truth, and the better information of the consciences of the jury and justices,
there shall be allowed to the party arraigned the benefit of such credible wit-
nesses, to be examined upon oath, as can be produced for his clearing and justi-
fication." At length by the statute 7 Win. III, c. 3, the same measure of justice
was established throughout all the realm, in cases of treason within the act:
and it was afterwards declared by statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, that in all cases of
treason and felony all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon oath,
in like manner as the witnesses against him.
When the evidence on both sides is closed, and, indeed, when any evidence
hath been given, the jury cannot be discharged (unless in cases of evident ne-
cessity)(x) till they have given in their verdict;(15) but are to consider of it,
and deliver it in, with the same forms as upon civil causes: only they cannot,
in a criminal case which touches life or member, give aprivy verdict.(y) But
the judges may adjourn while the jury are withdrawn to confer, and return to
receive the verdict in open court.(z) And such public or open verdict may be
[*361] either general, guilty, or not guilty; *or special, setting forth all the
circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the court,
whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder, manslaughter, or no
crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choose to
(ol See page 17. (p) Hollingsh. 1112. St. Tr. I, 72. (q) 2 Bulst. 147. Cro. Car. 292.
(r) 3 Inst. 79. (s) See also 2 Hal. P. C. 283, and his summary, 264. (t) Stat. 4 Jac. I, c. 1.
(u) Com. Journ. 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 29, 30 Jun. 1607. (w) Com. Journ. 4 Jun. i607.
(x) Co. Litt. 227. 3 Inst. 110. Fost. 27. Gould's Case, Hill. 1764.
(y) 2 Hal P. C. 300. 2 Hawk. P. C. 439. (z) 3 St. Tr. 731. 4 St. Tr. 231, 455, 485.
(15) The discharge of the jury from any overruling necessity does not entitle the defendant
to his discharge: U. S. v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. and Bat. 166; Com-
monwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205. The sickness or death
of the judge, or of a juror, or inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict, or the tcrm of the
court coming to an end before the conclusion of the trial, would be such a necessity. See
Miller v. State, 8 Ind. 325; Mahala v. State, 10 Yerg. 532; State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259.
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leave it to the determination of the court; though they have an unquestionable
right of determining upon all the circumstances, and finding a general verdict,
if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oaths: and if their verdict
be notoriously wrong, they may be punished, and the verdict set aside by attaint
at the suit of the king; but not at the suit of the prisoner.(a)(16) But the
practice heretofore in use of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing jurors,
merely at the discretion of the court, for finding their verdict contrary to the
direction of the judge, was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and illegal: and is
treated as such by Sir Thomas Smith, two hundred years ago; who accounted
"such doings to be very violent, tyrannical, and contrary to the liberty and cus-
tom of the realm of England."(b) For, as Sir Matthew Hale well observes,(c)
it would be a most unhappy case for the judge himself, if the prisoner's fate de-
pended upon his directions; unhappy, also, for the prisoner; for, if the judge's
opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be useless. Yet, in many
instances,(d) where contrary to evidence the jury have found the prisoner
guilty, their verdict hath been mercifully set aside, and a new trial granted by
the court of king's bench: for in such case, as hath been said, it cannot be set
right by attaint. But there hath yet been no instance of granting a new trial
where the prisoner was acquitted upon the first,(e)(17).
If the jury, therefore, find the prisoner nt guilty, he is then forever quit
and discharged of the accusation,(f) except hi be appealed of felony within the
time limited by law. And upon such his acquittal, or discharge for want of
*prosecution, he shall be immediately set at large without payment of [*362]
any fee to the gaoler.(g) But if the jury find guilty,(h) he is then said
to be convicted of the crime whereof he stands indicted. Which conviction
may accrue two ways: either by his confessing the offence and pleading guilty;
orby his being found so by the verdict of his country.
When the offender is thus convicted, there are two collateral circumstances
that immediately arise. 1. On a conviction (or even upon an acquittal where
there was a reasonable ground to prosecute, and in fact a bonafide prosecution)
for any grand or petit larceny, or other felony, the reasonable expenses of prose-
cution, and also, if the prosecutor be poor, a compensation for his trouble and
loss of time, are by statutes 25 Geo. II, c. 36, and 18 Geo. III, c. 19, to be al-
lowed him out of the county stock, if he petitions the judge for that purpose:
and by statute 27 Geo. II, c. 3, explained by the same statute, 18 Geo. III, c. 19,
all persons appearing upon recognizance or subpcena to give evidence, whether
any indictment be preferred or no, and as well without conviction as with it, are
entitled to be paid their charges, with a farther allowance (if poor) for their
trouble and loss of time. 2. On a conviction of larceny, in particular, the
prosecutor shall have restitution of his goods, by virtue of the statute 21 Hen.
VIII, c. 11.(18) For, by the common law, there was no restitution of goods
upon an indictment, because it is at the suit of the king only; and therefore the
party was enforced to bring an appeal of robbery, in order to have his goods
(a) 2 Hal. P. C. 310. (b) Smith's Commonw. 1. 3, c. 1. (c) 2 Hal. P. C. 313.
d) I Lev. 9. T. Jones, 168. St. Tr. X. 416. (e) 2 Hawk. P. C. 442.
(f) The civil law in such case only discharges him from the same accuser, hut not from the same accusation.
1lf, 48, 2, 't, S 2.
() Stat. 14 Oco. III, c. 20.
( ) In the Roman republic, when the prisoner was convicted of any capital offence by his judges, the form
of pronouncing that conviction was something peculiarly delicate; not that he was guilty, but that he had not
been enough upon his guard: "parum cavisse videtur." (Fests, 325.)
(16) Thisis no longer the law. Attaints are abolished, and the jury must be left perfectly
free to give such judgments as their conscience dictates, and be protected in so doing. See
Penn's Case, 6 Howell's St. Tr. 951; Vaughan, 135.
(17) If the prisoner is convicted on one count of an indictment and acquitted on another,
and then obtains a new trial, he is only tried afterwards on the count on which he was before
convicted. State v. Cooper, 1 Green. 360; Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 504; Price V.
State, 19 Ohio, 423; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414; People v. McGowen, 17 Wend. 886.
(18) These statutes are since repealed, and new provisions made. The present law on the
restoration of stolen, embezzled, &c., or received with guilty knowledge, is 24 and 25 Vic. c.
96, s. 100.
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again.(i) But, it being considered that the party prosecuting the offender by
indictment, deserves to the full as much encouragement as he who prosecutes
by appeal, this statute was made, which enacts, that if any person be convicted
of larceny, by the evidence of the party robbed, lie shall have full restitution
of his money, goods and chattels; or the value of them out of the offender's
goods, if he has any, by a writ to be granted by the justices. And the con-
struction of this act having been in a great measure conformable to the law of
appeals, it has therefore in practice superceded the use of appeals of larceny.
For instance: as formerly upon appeals,(') so now upon indictments of lar-
[*363] ceny, this writ of restitution *shall reach the goods so stolen, notwith-
standing the property(k) of them is endeavoured to be altered by sale in
market overt.(l) And though this may seem somewhat hard upon the buyer,
yet the rule of law is that "spoliatus debet, ante omnia, restitui;" especially
when he has used all the diligence in his power to convict the felon. And, since
the case is reduced to this hard necessity, that either the owner or the buyer
must suffer; the law prefers the right of the owner, who has done a meritorious
act by pursuing a felon to condign punishment, to the right of the buyer,
whose merit is only negative, that he has been guilty of no unfair transaction.
And it is now usual for the court, upon the conviction of a felon, to order,
without any writ, immediate restitution of such goods as are brought into
court, to be made to the several prosecutors. Or else, secondly, without such
writ of restitution, the party may peaceably retake his goods, wherever he hap-
pens to find them,(m) unless a new property be fairly acquired therein. Or,
lastly, if the felon be convicted and pardoned, or be allowed his clergy, the
party robbed may bring his action of trover against him for his goods; and re-
cover a satisfaction in damages. But such action lies not before prosecution;
for so felonies would be made up and healed:(n) and also recaption is unlaw-
ful, if it be done with intention to smother or compound the larceny; it then
becoming the heinous offence of theft-bote, as was mentioned in a former
chapter.(o)
It is not uncommon, when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor, which
principally and more immediately affects some individual, as a battery, imprison-
ment or the like, for the court to permit the defendant to speak with the prose,
cutor, before any judgment is pronounced; and, if the prosecutor declares him-
self satisfied, to inflict but a trivial punishment. This is done to re-imburse the
prosecutor his expenses, and make him some private amends, without the trouble
[*364] and circuity of a civil action. But it surely is a dangerous practice : *and
though it may be intrusted to the prudence and discretion of the judges
in the superior courts of record, it ought never to be allowed in local or inferior
jurisdictions such as the quarter sessions; where prosecutions for assaults are
by these means too frequently commenced rather for private lucre than for the
great ends of public justice. Above all, it should never be suffered where the
testimony of the prosecutor himself is necessary to convict the defendaut: for,
by these means, the rules of evidence are entirely subverted; the prosecutor be-
comes in effect a plaintiff, and yet is suffered to bear witness for himself. Nay,
even a voluntary forgiveness by the party injured ought not, in true policy, to
intercept the stroke of justice. "This," says an elegant writer,(o) who pleads
with equal strength for the certainty as for the lenity of punishment, "may be
an act of good nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the pub-
lic. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for his pri-
vate injury, he cannot remove the necessity of public example. The right of
punishing belongs not to any one individual in particular, but to the society in
general, or the sovereign who represents that society: and a man may renounce
his own portion of this right, but he cannot give up that of others."
() 3 Inst. 242. (j) Bracton, de Coron. e. 32. (k) See book II, page 450.
(1) 1 Hal. P. C. 543. (m) See book III, page 4. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 546. (o) See page 133.
(p) Bece. ch. 46.
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CHAPTER XXVIII.
OF THE BENEFIT OF CLERGY.
AFTER trial and conviction, the judgment of the court regularly follows,
unless suspended or arrested by some intervening circumstance : of which the
principal is the benefit of clergy: (1) a title of no small curiosity as well as use;
and concerning which I shall therefore inquire: 1. Into its original, and the
various mutations which this privilege of clergy has sustained. 2. To what
persons it is to be allowed at this day. 3. In what cases. 4. The consequences
of allowing it.
L Clergy, the privilegium clericale, or in common speech, the benefit of clergy,
had its original from the pious regard paid by Christian princes to the church
in its infant state; and the ill use which the popish ecclesiastics soon made of
that pious regard. The exemptions which they granted to the church, were
principally of two kinds: 1. Exemption of places consecrated to religious
duties, from criminal arrests, which was the foundation of sanctuaries; 2. Ex-
emption of the persons of clergymen from criminal process before the secular
judge in a few particular cases, which was the true original and meaning of the
privilegium clericale.
But the clergy, increasing in wealth, power, honour, number, and interest,
began soon to set up for themselves: and that which they obtained by the
favour of the civil government, they now claimed as their inherent right: and
as a *right of the highest nature, indefeasible, and jure divino. (a) By [*366]
their canons, therefore, and constitutions, they endeavoured at, and where
they met with easy princes obtained, a vast extension of these exemptions: as
well in regard to the crimes themselves, of which the list became quite uni-
versal; (b) as in regard to the persons exempted, among whom were at length
comprehended not only every little subordinate officer belonging to the church
or clergy, but even many that were totally laymen.
In England, however, although the usurpations of the pope were very many
and grievous, till Henry the Eighth entirely exterminated his supremacy, yet a
total exemption of the clergy from secular jurisdiction could never be thoroughly
effected, though often endeavoured by the clergy: (c) and, therefore, though the
ancient privilegium clericale was in some capital cases, yet it was not universally
allowed. And in those particular cases, the use was for the bishop or ordinary
to demand his clerks to be remitted out of the king's courts, as soon as they
were indicted: concerning the allowance of which demand there was for many
years a great uncertainty; (d) till at length it was finally settled in the reign
of Henry the Sixth, that the prisoner should first be arraigned; and might
either then claim his benefit of clergy, by way of declinatory plea; or, after
conviction, by way of arresting judgment. This latter way is most usually prac-
ticed, as it is more to the satisfaction of the court to have the crime previously
ascertained by confession or the verdict of a jury: and also it is more advanta-
geous to the prisoner himself, who may possibly be acquitted, and so need not
the benefit of his clergy at all.
Originally the law was held, that no man should be admitted to the privilege
of clergy, but such as had the *habitum et tonsuram clericalem. (e) But *367]
in process of time a much wider and more comprehensive criterion was
established: every one that could read (a mark of great learning in those days
of ignorance and her sister superstition) being accounted a clerk or clericus,
(a) The principal argument upon which they founded this exemption was that text of Scripture: "Touch
not mine annointed, and do my prophets no harm." (Keilw. 181.)
(b) See book Iii, page 62. (c) Keilw. 180. (d) 2 Hal. P. C. 877.
(e) 2 Hal. P. C. 372. M. Paris, A. D. 1259. See book I, p. 24.
(1) Benefit of clergy is now abolished, and the law of this chapter is obsolete.
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and allowed the benefit of clerkship, though neither initiated in holy orders, nor
trimmed with the clerical tonsure. But when learning, by means of the inven-
tion of printing, and other concurrent causes, began to be more generally
disseminated than formerly; and reading was no longer a competent proof of
clerkship, or being in holy orders; it was found that as many laymen as divines
were admitted to the privilegium clericale: and, therefore, by statute 4 Hen. VII,
c. 13, a distinction was once more drawn between mere lay scholars, and clerks
that were really in orders. And, though it was thought reasonable still to
mitigate the severity of the law with regard to the former, yet they were not
put upon the same footing with actual clergy; being subjected to a slight
degree of punishment, and not allowed to claim the clerical privilege more than
once. Accordingly, the statute directs that no person once admitted to the
benefit of clergy shall be admitted thereto a second time, unless he produces
his orders: and in order to distinguish their persons, all laymen who are
allowed this privilege shall be burnt with a hot iron in the brawn of the left
thumb. This distinction between learned laymen, and real clerks in orders,
was abolished for a time by the statutes 28 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII,
c. 3, but it is held (e) to have been virtually restored by statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12,
which statute also enacts that lords of parliament and peers of the realm, having
place and voice in parliament, may have the benefit of their peerage, equivalent
to that of clergy, for the first offence (although they cannot read, and with-
out being burnt in the hand), for all offences then clergyable to commoners,
and also for the crimes of house-breaking, highway robbery, horse-stealing, and
robbing of churches. (2)
* After this burning, the laity, and before it the real clergy, were dis-[*368]
charged from the sentence of the law in the king's court, and delivered
over to the ordinary, to be dealt with according to the ecclesiastical canons.
Whereupon the ordinary, not satisfied with the proofs adduced in the profane
secular court, set himself formally to work to make a purgation of the offender
by a new canonical trial; although he had been previously convicted by his
country, or perhaps by his own confession. (f) This trial was held before the
bishop in person, or his deputy; and by a jury of twelve clerks: and there,
first, the party himself was required to make oath of his own innocence; next,
there was to be the oath of twelve compurgators, who swore they believed he
spoke the truth; then, witnesses were to be examined upon oath, but on behalf
of the prisoner only: and, lastly, the jury were to bring in their verdict upon
oath, which usually acquitted the prisoner; otherwise if a clerk, he was
degraded, or put to penance. (g) A learned judge, in the beginning of the last
century, (h) remarks with much indignation the vast complication of perjury
and subornation of perjury, in this solemn farce of a mock trial; the witnesses,
the compurgators, and the jury, being all of them partakers in the guilt: the
delinquent party also, though convicted before on the clearest evidence, and
conscious of his own offence, yet was permitted and almost compelled to swear
(e) Hob. 294. 2 Hal. P. C. 375. (f) Staundford, P. C. 138, b.
(g) 3 P. Wms. 447. Hub. 289. (h) Hob. 291.
(2) [Upon the conviction of the duchess of Kingston for bigamy, it was argued by the
attorney-general, Thurlow, that peeresses were not entitled by 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, like peers to
the privilege of peerage; but it was the unanimous opinion of the judges, that a peeress con-
victed of a clergyable felony ought to be immediately discharged without being burnt in the
hand, or without being liable to any imprisonment. 11 H. St. Tr. 264. If the duchess had
been admitted like a commoner, only to the benefit of the clergy, burning in the hand at that
time could not have been dispensed with. The argument was, that the privilege of peerage
was only an extension of the benefit of clergy, and therefore granted only to those who
were or might be entitled to that benefit; but as no female, peeress or commoner, at that time
was entitled to the benefit of clergy, so it was not the intention of the legislature to grant to
any female the privilege of peerage. And in my opinion the argument of the attorney-
general is much more convincing and satisfactory, as a legal demonstration, than the argu-
ments of the counsel on the other side, or the reasons stated for the opinions of the judges.]
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himself not guilty: nor was the good bishop himself, under whose countenance
this scene of wickedness was daily transacted, by any means exempt from a
share of it. And yet by this purgation the party was restored to his credit, his
liberty, his lands, and his capacity for purchasing afresh, and was entirely made
a new and an innocent man.
This scandalous prostitution of oaths, and the forms of justice, in the almost
constant acquittal of felonious clerks by purgation, was the occasion, that upon
very heinous and *notorious circumstances of guilt, the temporal [*369]
courts would not trust the ordinary with the trial of the offender, but [*369]
delivered over to him the convicted clerk, absque purgatione facienda: in which
situation the clerk convict could not make purgation; but was to continue in
prison during life, and was incapable of acquiring any personal property, or
receiving the profits of his lands, unless the king should please to pardon him.
Both these courses were in some degree exceptionable; the latter being perhaps
too rigid, as the former was productive of the most abandoned perjury. As,
therefore, these mock trials took their rise from factious and popish tenets,
tendinl.g to exempt one part of the nation from the general municipal law; it
became high time, when the reformation was thoroughly established, to abolish
so vain and impious a ceremony.
Accordingly, the statute of 18 Eliz. c. 7, enacts that, for the avoiding of such
perjuries and tbuses, after the offender has been allowed his clergy, he shall not
be delivered to the ordinary, as formerly; but, upon such allowance and burn-
ing in the hand, he shall forthwith be enlarged and delivered out of prison;
with proviso, that the judge may, if he thinks fit, continue the offender in gaol
for any time not exceeding a year. And thus the law continued, for above a
century, unaltered, except only that the statute of 21 Jac. I, c. 6, allowed, that
women convicted of simple larcenies under the value of ten shillings should
(not properly have the benefit of clergy, for they were not called upon to read ;
but) be burned in the hand, and whipped,(3) stocked, or imprisoned for any
time not exceeding a year. And a similar indulgence, by the statutes 3 and 4
W. and M. c. 9, and 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 24, was extended to women, guilty of
any clergyable felony whatsoever; who were allowed once to claim the benefit
of the statute, in like manner as men might claim the benefit of clergy, and to
be discharged upon being burnt in the hand, and imprisoned for any time not
exceeding a year. The punishment of burning in the hand, being found in-
effectual, was also changed by statute 10 and 11 Win. III, c. 23, into burning in
the most visible part of the left cheek, nearest the nose; but such an indelible
stigma being found by experience to render offenders desperate, this provision
was repealed, about seven years afterwards, by statute 5 Ann. c. 6, and till that
period, all women, all peers of parliament and peeresses, and all male com-
moners who could read, were discharged *in all clergyable felonies; the [*370]
males absolutely, if clerks in orders; and other commoners, both male
and female, upon branding; and peers and peeresses without branding, for the
first offence: yet, all liable (excepting peers and peeresses), if the judge saw
occasion, to imprisonment not exceeding a year. And those men who could
not read, if under the degree of peerage, were hanged.
Afterwards, indeed, it was considered, that education and learning were no
extenuations of guilt, but quite the reverse: and that, if the punishment of
death for simple felony was too severe for those who had been liberally instructed,
it was, a fortiori, too severe for the ignorant also. And, thereupon, by the
same statute, 5 Ann. c. 6, it was enacted, that the benefit of clergy should be
granted to all those who were entitled to ask it, without requiring them to read,
by way of conditional merit. And, experience having shown that so very
universal a lenity was frequently inconvenient, and an encouragement to com-
mit the lower degrees of felony; and that, though capital punishments were
too rigorous for these inferior offences, yet no punishment at all (or next to
(3) [Whipping of women is abolished by 1 Geo. IV, c. 57.]
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none), was as much too gentle; it was further enacted by the same statute, that
when any person is convicted of any theft, or larceny, and burnt in the hand
for the same, according to the ancient law, he shall also, at the discretion of
the judge, be committed to the house of correction or public workhouse, to be
there kept to hard labour, for any time not less than six months, and not ex-
ceeding two years; with a power of inflicting a double confinement in case of
the party's escape from the first. And it was also enacted, by the statutes
4 Geo. I, c. 11, and 6 Geo. I, c. 23, that when any persons shall be convicted of
any larceny, either grand or petit, or any felonious stealing or taking of money,
or goods and chattels, either from the person or the house of any other, or in
any other manner, and who by the law shall be entitled to the benefit of clergy,
and liable only to the penalties of burning in the hand, or whipping, the court
in their discretion, instead of such burning in the hand, or whipping, may
direct such offenders to be transported to America (or, by statute 19 Geo.
III, c. 74, to any other parts beyond the seas) for seven years: and, if they
*37113 *return or are seen at large in this kingdom, within that time, it shall
[*1- J be felony, without benefit of clergy. And by the subsequent statutes
16 Geo. II, c. 15, and 8 Geo. III, c. 15, many wise provisions are made for the
more speedy and effectual execution of the laws relating to transportation, and
the conviction of such as transgress them. But now, by the statute 19 Geo. III,
c. 74, all offenders liable to transportation may, in lieu thereof, at the discretion
of the judges, be employed, if males, except in the case of petty larceny, in hard
labour for the benefit of some public navigation; or, whether males or females,
may, in all cases, be confined to hard labour in certain penitentiary houses, to
be erected by virtue of the said act, for the several terms therein specified, but
in no case exceeding seven years; with a power of subsequent mitigation, and
even of reward, in case of their good behaviour. But if they escape, and are
retaken, for the first time an addition of three years is made to the term of their
confinement; and a second escape is felony, without benefit of clergy.
In forming the plan of these penitentiary houses, the principal objects have
been, by sobriety, cleanliness, and medical assistance, by a regular series of
labour, by solitary confinement during the intervals of work, and by due re-
ligious instruction, to preserve and amend the health of the unhappy offenders,
to inure them to habits of industry, to guard them from pernicious company,
to accustom them to serious reflection, and to teach them both the principles
and practice of every Christian and moral duty. And if the whole of this plan
be properly executed, and its defects be timely supplied, there is reason to hope
that such a reformation may be effected in the lower classes of mankind, and
such a gradual scale of punishment be affixed to all gradations of guilt, as may
in time supersede the necessity of capital punishment, except for very atrocious
crimes.
It is also enacted by the same statute, 19 Geo. III, c. 74, that instead of burn-
ing in the hand (which was sometimes too slight and sometimes too disgraceful
a punishment) the court, in all clergyable felonies, may impose a pecuniary fine;
or (except in the case of manslaughter) may order the offender to be once, or
oftener, but not more than thrice, either publicly or privately whipped; such
private whipping (to prevent collusion or abuse) to be inflicted in the presence
of two witnesses, and in case of female offenders in the presence of females
only. Which fine or whipping shall have the same consequences as burning in
the hand; and the offender, so fined or whipped, shall be equally liable to a
subsequent detainer or imprisonment.
In this state does the benefit of clergy at present stand; very considerably
different from its original institution: the wisdom of the English legislature
having, in the course of a long and laborious process, extracted by a noble
alchemy rich medicines out of poisonous ingredients; and converted, by grad-
ual mutations, what was at first an unreasonable exemption of particular popish
ecclesiastics, into a merciful mitigation of the general law, with respect to capi-
tal punishment.
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From the whole of this detail we may collect, that however in times of
ignorance and superstition that monster in true policy may for a while subsist,
of a body of men, residing in the bowels of a state, and yet independent of
its laws; yet, when learning and rational religion have a little enlightened
men's minds, society can no longer endure an absurdity so gross, as must destroy
its very fundamentals. For, by the original contract of government, the price
of protection by the united force of individuals is that of obedience to the
united will of the community. This united will is declared in the laws of
the land: and that united force is exerted in their due and universal execution.
II. I am next to inquire, to what persons the benefit of clergy is to be allowed
at this day: and this must be chiefly collected from what has been observed in
the preceding *article. For, upon the whole, we may pronounce, that [*372]
all clerks in orders are, without any branding, and of course without
any transportation, fine, or whipping, (for those are only substituted in lieu of
the other) to be admitted to this privilege, and immediately discharged; and
this as often as they offend.(/) Again, all lords of parliament and peers of the
realm, having place and voice in parliament, by the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12,
(which is likewise held to extend to peeresses) (k) shall be discharged in all
clergyable and other felonies provided for by the act, without any burning in
the hand, or imprisonment, or other punishment substituted in its stead, in the
same manner as real clerks convict: but this is only for the first offence.
Lastly, all the commons of the realm, not in orders, whether male or female,
shall, for the first offence, be discharged of the capital punishment of felonies,
within the benefit of clergy, upon being burnt in the hand, whipped, or fined,
or suffering a discretionary imprisonment in the common gaol, the house of
correction, one of the penitentiary houses, or in the places of labour, for the
benefit of some navigation; or, in case of larceny, upon being transported for
seven years, if the court shall think proper. It hath been said, that Jews, and
other infidels and heretics, were not capable of the benefit of clergy, till after
the statute 5 Ann. c. 6, as being under a legal incapacity for orders.(1) But I
much question whether this was ever ruled for law, since the re-introduction
of the Jews into England, in the time of Oliver Cromwell. For, if that were
the case, the Jews are still in the same predicament, which every day's experience
will contradict: the statute of Queen Anne having certainly made no alteration
in this respect; it only dispensing with the necessity of reading in those per-
sons, who, in case they could read, were before the act entitled to the benefit of
their clergy.
III. The third point to be considered is, for what crimes the privilegium
clericale, or benefit of clergy, is to be allowed. And, it is to be observed, that
neither in high treason, nor in petit larceny, nor in any mere misdemeanors, it
was indulged at the common law; and therefore we may lay it down for a rule
that it was allowable only in petit treason and capital felonies: which, for the
most part, became legally entitled to this *indulgence by the statute de [*373]
clero, 25 Edw. III, st. 3, c. 4, which provides that clerks convict for trea-
sons or felonies, touching other persons than the king himself or his royal
majesty, shall have the privilege of holy church. But yet it was not allowable
in all felonies whatsoever: for in some it was denied even by the common law,
viz., insidiatio viarum, or lying in wait for one on the highway; depopulatio
agrorum, or destroying and ravaging a country ;(m) and combustio domorum,
or arson, that is, the burning of houses:(n) all which are a kind of hostile acts,
and in some degree border upon treason. And, farther, all these identical crimes,
together with petit treason, and very many other acts of felony, are ousted of
clergy by particular acts of parliament; which have in general been mentioned
under the particular offences to which they belong, and therefore need not here
be recapitulated. Upon all which statutes for excluding clergy I shall only
observe, that they are nothing else but the restoring of the law to the same
(i) 2 Hal. P, C. 375. (k) Duchess of Kingston's Case in Parliament, 22 Apr. 1776.
2 Hal. P. C. 373. 2 Hawk. P. C. 338. Fost. 306. (m) 2 Hal. P. C. 333. (n) 2 Hal. P. C. 346.
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rigour of capital punishment in the first offence that it exerted before the privi-
legium clericale was at all indulged; and which it still exerts upon a second
offence in almost all kinds of felonies, unless committed by clerks actually in
orders. But so tender is the law of inflicting capital punishment in the first
instance for any inferior felony, that, notwithstanding by the marine law, as
declared in statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, the benefit of clergy is not allowed in
any case whatsoever; yet, when offences are committed within the admiralty-
jurisdiction, which would be clergyable if committed by land, the constant
course is to acquit and discharge the prisoner. (o) (4) And, to conclude this head
of inquiry, we may observe the following rules: 1. That in all felonies, whether
new created or by common law, clergy is now allowable, unless taken away by
express words of an act of parliament.(p) 2. That, where clergy is taken away
from the principal, it is not of course taken away from the accessory, unless he
be also particularly included in the words of the statute.(q) 3. That when the
benefit of clergy is taken away from the offence (as in case of murder, buggery,
robbery, rape, and burglary), a principal in the second degree being present,
[*374] aiding and abetting the crime, is as well *excluded from his clergy as
he tat is principal in the first degree: but, 4. That, where it is only
taken away from the person committing the offence (as in the case of stabbing,
or committing larceny in a dwelling-house, or privately from the person), his
aiders and abettors are not excluded; through the tenderness of the law which
bath determined that such statutes shall be taken literally.(r)
IV. Lastly, we are to inquire what the consequences are to the party, of allow-
ing him this benefit of clergy. I speak not of the branding, fine, whipping,
imprisonment, or transportation ; which are rather concomitant conditions, than
consequences of receiving this indulgence. The consequences are such as affect
his present interest, and future credit and capacity: as having been once a felon,
but now purged from that guilt by the privilege of clergy; which operates as a
kind of statute pardon.
And we may observe, 1. That by this conviction he forfeits all his goods to the
king; which, being once vested in the crown, shall not afterwards be restored to
the offender.(s) 2. That, after conviction, and till he receives the judgment of
the law, by branding, or some of its substitutes, or else is pardoned by the king,
he is to all intents and purposes a felon, and subject to all the disabilities and
other incidents of a felon. (t) 3. That after burning, or its substitute, or pardon,
he is discharged forever of that, and all other felonies before committed, within the
benefit of clergy; but not of felonies from which such benefit is excluded: and
this by statute 8 Eliz. c. 4, and 18 Eliz. c. 7. 4. That, by the burning, or its sub-
stitute, or the pardon of it, he is restored to all capacities and credits, and the
possession of his lands, as if he had never been convicted. (u) 5. That what is
said with regard to the advantages of commoners and laymen, subsequent to
the burning in the hand, is equally applicable to all peers and clergymen,
although never branded at all, or subjected to other punishment in its stead.
For they have the same privileges, without any burning, or any substitute for it,
which others are entitled to after it. (w)
(o) Moor, 756. Fost. 288. (p) 2 Hal. P. C. MO. (q) 2 Hawk. P. C. 342.
(r) 1 Hal. P. C. 529. Fost. 856, 857. (s) 2 Hal. P. C. 888. (t) 3 P. Wmns. 487.
(u) 2 Hal. P. C. 889. 5 Rep. 110. (w) 2 Hal. P. 0. 889, 890.
(4) By subsequent statutes, offences committed on the high seas are to be considered and
treated in the same manner as if committed on shore
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CHAPTER XXIX.
OF JUDGMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
WE are now to consider the next stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and
conviction are past, in such crimes and misdemeanors as are either too high or
too low to be included within the benefit of clergy: which is that of judgment.
For when, upon a capital charge, the jury have brought in their verdict guilty,
in the presence of the prisoner, he is either immediately, or at a convenient time
soon after, asked by the court if he has any thing to offer why judgment should
not be awarded against him. And in case the defendant be found guilty of a
misdemeanor (the trial of which may, and does usually, happen in his absence,
after he has once appeared), a capias is awarded and issued, to bring him in to
receive his judgment; and, if he absconds, he may be prosecuted even to out-
lawry. But whenever he appears in person, upon either a capital or inferior
conviction, he may, at this period, as well as at his arraignment, offer any excep-
tions to the indictment, in arrest or stay of judgment: as, for want of sufficient
certainty in setting forth either the person, the time, the place, or the offence.
And, if the objections be valid, the whole proceedings shall be set aside; but the
party may be indicted again. (a) (1) And we may take notice, 1. That none of
-the statutes of jeofails, (b) for amendment of errors, extend to indictments or
proceedings in criminal cases; *and therefore a defective indictment is [*376]
not aided by a verdict, as defective pleadings in civil cases are. 2. That,
in favour of life, great strictness has at all times been observed, in every point
of an indictment. Sir Matthew Hale indeed complains, "that this strictness
is grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration
thereof: for that more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions
in indictments, than by their own innocence." (c) And yet no man was more
tender of life than this truly excellent judge. (2)
A pardon, also, as has been before said, may be pleaded in arrest of judgment,
and it has the same advantage when pleaded here as when pleaded upon arraign-
ment, viz., the saving the attainder, and, of course, the corruption of blood:
which nothing can restore but parliament, when a pardon is not pleaded till
after sentence. And certainly, upon all accounts, when a man hath obtained a
pardon, he is in the right to plead it as soon as possible.
Praying the benefit of clergy may also be ranked among the motions in arrest
of judgment: of which we spoke largely in the preceding chapter.
If all these resources fail, the court must pronounce that judgment which
the law hath annexed to the crime, and which hath been constantly men-
tioned, together with the crime itself, ii some or other of the former chapters.
Of these some are capital, which extend to the life of the offender, and consist
generally in being hanged by the neck till dead; though in very atrocious
crimes other circumstances of terror, pain or disgrace, are superadded; as, in
treasons *of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execu- [*377]
tion; in high treason affecting the king's person or government, embow-
eling alive, beheading, and quartering; and, in murder, a public dissection.
And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment is to be
burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a
tacit consent, an almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgments
as savour of torture or cruelty: a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to
such traitors as are condemned to be drawn; and there being very few instances
(a) 4 Rep. 45. (b) See book III, p. 407. (C) 2 Hal. P. C. 193.
(1) See Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. 351; Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455.
(2) But now, formal defects apparent on the face of the indictment can only be taken advan-
tage of by demurrer or motion to quash, and not afterwards. Statute 14 and 15 Vie
c. 100, § 25.
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(and those accidental or by negligence) of any person's being emboweled or
burned, till previously deprived of sensation by strangling. Some punishments
consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation:
others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some ex-
tend to confiscation, by forfeiture of lands, or movables, or both, or of the
profits of lands for life: others induce a disability of holding offices or employ-
ments, being heirs, executors, and the like. Some, though rarely, occasion a
mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears; others fix a last-
ing stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or
cheek. Some are merely pecuniary, by stated or discretionary fines: and lastly,
there are others that consist principally in their ignominy, through most of them
are mixed with some degree of corporal pain; and these are inflicted chiefly
for such crimes as either arise from indigence, or render even opulence dis-
graceful. Such as whipping, hard labour in the house of correction, or other-
wise, the pillory, the stocks, and the ducking-stool.
Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English
reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking
apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of almost
every other nation in Europe. And it is moreover one of the glories of our
English law, that the species, though not always the quantity or degree, of pun-
ishment is ascertained for every offence; and that it is not left in the breast of
[*378] any *judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment, which the law
has beforehand ordained, for every subject alike, without respect of per-
sons. For, if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men
would then be slaves to their magistrates; and would live in society without
knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under. And
besides, as this prevents oppression on the one hand, so on the other it stifles
all hopes of impunity or mitigation; with which an offender might flatter him-
self, if his punishment depended on the humour or discretion of the court.
Whereas, where an established penalty is annexed to crimes, the criminal may
read their certain consequence in that law; which ought to be the unvaried
rule, as it is the inflexible judge, of his actions.
The discretionary fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our
courts are enabled to impose, may seem an exception to this rule. But the
general nature of the punishment, viz., by fine or imprisonment, is, in these
cases, fixed and determinate: though the duration and quantity of each must
frequently vary, from the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality
and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances. The
quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines, neither can, nor ought to be ascer-
tained by an invariable law. The value of money itself changes from a thou-
sand causes: and, at all events, what ig ruin to one man's fortune, may be
matter of indifference to another's. Thus the law of the twelve tables at Rome
fined every person that struck another five-and-twenty denarii: this, in the
more opulent days of the empire, grew to be a punishment of so little consid-
eration, that Aulus Gellius tells a story of one Lucius Neratius, who made it
his diversion to give a blow to whomsoever he pleased, and then tender them the
legal forfeiture. Our statute law has not, therefore, often ascertained the quan-
tity of fines, nor the common law ever; it directing such an offence to be pun-
ished by fine in general, without specifying the certain sum; which is fully
[*379] sufficient, when we consider that *however unlimited the power of the
court may seem, it is far from being wholly arbitrary; but its discretion
is regulated by law. For the bill of rights (d) has particularly declared, that
excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in the
court of king's bench, in the reign of King James the Second): and the same
statute farther declares, that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures ot
(d) Stat. I W. and M. st. 2, c. 2.
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particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void. Now the bill of rights
was only declaratory of the old constitutional law: and accordingly we find it
expressly holden, long before,(e) that all such previous grants are void; since
thereby many times undue means, and more violent prosecution, would be used
for private lucre, than the quiet and just proceeding of law would permit.
The reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually regulated
by the determination of magna car/a, c. 14, concerning amercements for misbe-
haviour by the suitors in matters of civil right. "fiber homo non amercietur
pro parvo delicto, nisi secundum modum ipsius delicti; et pro magno delicto,
secundum magnitudinem delicti; salvo contenemento suo; et mercator eodem
modo, salva mercandisa sua; et villanus eodem modo agnercietur, salvo wainagio
suo." A rule that obtained even in Henry the Second's time,(f) and means
only, that no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his
circumstances or personal estate will bear; saving to the landholder his conten-
ement,(3) or land; to the trader his merchandize; and to the countryman his
wainage, or team and instruments of husbandry. In order to ascertain which,
the great charter also directs that the amercement, which is always inflicted in
general terms ("sit in misericordia"), shall be set, ponatur, or reduced to a cer-
tainty, by the oath of good and lawful men of the neighbourhood. Which
method of liquidating the amercement to.a precise sum, was usually performed
in the superior courts by the assessment or affeerment of the coroner, a sworn
officer chosen by the neighbourhood, under the equity of the statute Westm. 1, c.
18; and then the judges estreated them into the exchequer.(g) But in the
court-leet and court-baron it is still performed by *affeerors, or suitors [*380]
sworn to affeere, that is, tax and moderate the general amercement ac-
cording to the particular circumstances of the offence and the offender.(h)
Amercements imposed by the superior courts on their own officers and ministers
were affeered by the judges themselves; but when a peculiar mulct was inflicted
by them on a stranger (not being party to any suit), it was then denominated
a fine; (i) and the ancient practice was, when any such fine was imposed, to
inquire by a jury "quantum inde regi dare valeat per annum, salva sustentatione
sua, et uxoris, et liberorurn suorum."(j) And since the disuse of such inquest,
it is never usual to assess a larger fine than a man is able to pay, without touch-
ing the implements of his livelihood; but to inflict corporal punishment, or a
limited imprisonment, instead of such fine as might amount to imprisonment
for life. And this is the reason why fines in the king's court are frequenty
denominated ransoms, because the penalty must otherwise fall upon a man s
person, unless it be redeemed or ransomed by a pecuniary fine; (k) according to
an ancient maxim, qui non habet in crumena luat in corpore. Yet, where any
statute speaks both of fine and ransom, it is holden that the ransom shall be
treble to the fine at least.(l) (4)
When sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment in the laws
of England, is pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence from the
common law is attainder. For when it is now clear beyond all dispute, that
(e) 2 Inst. 48. (f) Glanv. 1. 9, cc. 8 and 11. (y) F. N. B. 76.
(A) The affeeror's oath is conceived in the very terms of magna carta. Fitzh. Survey, ch. 11.
(i) 8 Rep. 40. (j) Gilb. Exch. c. 5. (k) Mirr. c. 5, § 3. Lamb. Eirenarch. 575. () Dyer, 232.
(3) [Lord Coke says, that "contenement signifieth his countenance, as the armour of a soldier
is his countenance, the books of a scholar his countenance, and the like." 2 Inst. 28. He
also adds, that "the wainagium is the countenance of the villein, and it was great reason to
save his wainage, for otherwise the miserable creature was to carry the burden on his back."
Id.]
(4) In any case, the judgment must be the same which the law allows, and not other or
different; for if it is, it will be erroneous, and the prisoner may have it reversed, even though
it be not so severe as should have been inflicted. Bourne v. Rex, 7 A. and E. 58; Hartung v.
People, 16 N. Y. 167; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365. But if the punishment consist of two
severable things, as fine and imprisonment, the prisoner cannot be heard to complain that
only one is imposed. See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203.
VOL. II.-67 529
380 JUDGMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. [Book IV
the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as
a monster and a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy upon him,
puts him out of its protection, and takes no farther care of him than barely to
see him executed.(5) He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or blackened.
He is no longer of any credit or reputation; he cannot be a witness in any
court: neither is he capable of performing the functions of another man: for,
by an anticipation of his punishment, he is already dead in law.(m) This is
after judgment; for there is great difference between a man convicted and at-
tainted: though they are frequently through inaccuracy confounded together.
[*381] After conviction *only a man is liable to none of these disabilities; for
there is still in contemplation of law a possibility of his innocence.
Something may be offered in arrest of judgment; the indictment may be erro-
neous, which will render his guilt uncertain, and thereupon the present convic-
tion may be quashed: he may obtain a pardon, or be allowed the benefit of
clergy: both which suppose some latent sparks of merit, which plead in exten-
uation of his fault. But when judgment is once pronounced, both law and fact
conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there is not the remotest possi-
bility left of any thing to be said in his favour. Upon judgment therefore of
death, and not before, the attainder of a criminal commences: or upon such
circumstances as are equivalent to judgment of death; as judgment of outlawry
on a capital crime, pronounced for absconding or fleeing from justice, which
tacitly confesses the guilt. And therefore either upon judgment of outlawry,
'or of death, for treason or felony, a man shall be said to be attainted.
The consequences of attainder are forfeiture and corruption of blood.
I. Forfeiture is twofold; of real and personal estates. First, as to real
estates: by attainder in high treason(n) a man forfeits to the king all his lands
and tenements of inheritance, whether fee-simple or fee-tail, and all his rights
of entry on lands or tenements which he had at the time of the offence com-
mitted, or at any time afterwards, to be forever vested in the crown; and also
the profits of all lands and tenements, which he had in his own right for life or
years, so long as such interest shall subsist. This forfeiture relates backwards
to the time of the treason committed: so as to avoid all intermediate sales and
incumbrances,(o) but not those before the fact: and therefore a wife's jointure
is not forfeitable for the treason of her husband; because settled upon her
[*3,82] previous to the treason committed. But her dower *is forfeited by the
express provision of statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11. And yet the hus-
band shall be tenant by the curtesy of the wife's lands, if the wife be attainted
of treason :(p) for that is not prohibited by the statute. But, though after
attainder the forfeiture relates back to the time of the treason committed, yet
it does not take effect unless an attainder be bad, of which it is one of the fruits;
and therefore if a traitor dies before judgment pronounced, or is killed in open
rebellion, or is hanged by martial law, it works no forfeiture of his lands: for
he never was attainted of treason.(q) But if the chief justice of the king's
bench (the supreme coroner of all England) in person, upon the view of the
body of one killed in open rebellion, records it and returns the record into his
own court, both lands and goods shall be forfeited.(r)
The natural justice of forfeiture or confiscation of property, for treason,(s) is
founded on this consideration: that he who hath thus violated the fundamental
rinciples of government, and broken his part of the original contract between
ing and people, hath abandoned his connections with society; and hath no
longer any right to those advantages, which before belonged to him purely as a
member of the community; among which social advantages, the right of trans-
ferring or transmitting property to others is one of the chief. Such forfeitures
(m) 3 Inst. 218. (n) Co. Litt. 392: 3 Inst. 19; 1 Hal. P. C. 240; 2 Hawk. P. C. 448. (o) 3 Inst. 211.
(p) 1 Hal. P. C. 359. (q) Co. Litt. 13. (r) 4 Rep. 57. (8) See book I, page 299.
(5) [This must be taken with some qualification; for the person of an attainted felon is still
under the protection of the law, and to kill him without warrant would be marder. Fost. 73.J
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moreover, whereby his posterity must suffer as well as himself, will help to
restrain a man, not only by the sense of his duty, and dread of personal pun-
ishment, but also by his passions and natural affections; and will interest
every dependent and relation he has to keep him from offending: according to
that beautiful sentiment of Cicero,(t) "nec vero me fugit quam sit acerbum,
parentum scelera filiorum penis lui: sed hoc prceclare legibus comparatum est,
ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicte redderet." And therefore
Aulus Cascellius, a Roman lawyer in the time of the triumvirate, used to boast
that he had two reasons for *despising the power of the tyrants; his old [*383]
age and his want of children: for children are pledges to the prince
of the father's obedience.(u) Yet many nations have thought, that this post-
humous punishment savours of hardship to the innocent; especially for crimes
that do not strike at the very root and foundation of society, as treason against
the government expressly does. And therefore, though confiscations were very
frequent in the times of the earlier emperors, yet Arcadius and Honorius in
every other instance but that of treason thought it more just, "ibi esse pjenam,
ubist noxa est ;" and ordered that "peccata suos teneant auctores, nec ulterius,
orogrediatur nzetus, quam reperiatur delictum :" (v) and Justinian also made a
law to restrain the punishment of relations,(w) which directs the forfeiture to
go, except in the case of crimen majestatis, to the next of kin to the delinquent.
On the other hand, the Macedonian laws extended even the capital punishment
of treason, not only to the children, but to all the relations of the delinquent :(x)
and of course their estates must be also forfeited, as no man was left to inherit-
them. And in Germany, by the famous golden bulle(y) (copied almost verbatim
from Justinian's code),(z) the lives of the sous of such as conspire to kill an
elector are spared, as it is expressed, by the emperor's particular bounty. But
they are deprived of all their effects and rights of succession, and are rendered
incapable of any honour, ecclesiastical or civil: "to the end that, being always
poor and necessitous, they may forever be accompanied by the infamy of their
father; may languish in continual indigence; and may find (says this merciless
edict) their punishment in living, and their relief in dying."
With us, in England, forfeiture of lands and tenements to the crown for
treason is by no means derived from the feudal policy (as has been already
obselved),(a) but was antecedent to the establishment of that system in this
island; *being transmitted from our Saxon ancestors,(b) and forming [*- 4]
a part of the ancient Scandinavian constitution.(c) But in certain [*384]
treasons relating to the coin (which, as we formerly observed, seem rather a
species of the crimen falsi, than the crimen laesae majestatis), it is provided by
some of the modern statutes(d) which constitute the offence, that it shall work
no forfeiture of lands, save only for the life of the offender; and by all, that it
shall not deprive the wife of her dower.(e) And, in order to abolish such
hereditary punishment entirely, it was enacted by statute 7 Ann. c. 21, that,
after the decease of the late pretender, no attainder for treason should extend
to the disinheriting of any heir, nor to the prejudice of any person other than
the traitor himself. By which, the law of forfeitures for high treason would by
this time have been at an end, had not a subsequent statute intervened to give
them a longer duration. The history of this matter is somewhat singular, and
worthy observation. At the time of the union, the crime of treason in Scot-
land was, by the Scots' law, in many respects different from that of treason in
England; and particularly in its consequence of forfeitures of entailed estates,
which was more peculiarly English; yet it seemed necessary, that a crime so
nearly affecting government should, both in its essence and consequences, be put
on the same footing in both parts of the united kingdoms. In new-modeling
these laws, the Scotch nation and the English house of commons struggled
hard, partly to maintain, and partly to acquire, a total immunity from forfeiture
(t) ad Brutum, ep. 12. (u) Gravin. 1. J 68. Cc) Cod. 9, 47, 22. (w) Nov. 134, c. 1.
( C) u. curt. t. 6. (y) cap. 24. (z) 1. 9, t. 8, .5. (a) See book 1, page251.a) L. Aelfr. c 4 Canut c. 54. (c) Stiernh. dejure Goth. . 2, e. 6, andg. ,c..3.
(d) Stat. 5 tliz. c. ii; 18 Eliz. c. 1. (e) lbdd. 8 and 9 Win. HI, c. 26. 15 and 16 Geo. H, c. 28.
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and corruption of blood, which the house of lords as firmly resisted. At
length a compromise was agreed to, which is established by this statute, viz.:
that the same crimes, and no other, should be treason in Scotland that are so in
England; and that the English forfeitures and corruption of blood should take
place in Scotland till the death of the then pretender; and then cease through-
out the whole of Great Britain :(f) the lords artfully proposing this temporary
[*385] clause, in *hopes (it is said) (g) that the prudence of succeeding
parliaments would make it perpetual.(h) This has partly been done by
the statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39 (made in the year preceding the late rebellion),
the operation of these indemnifying clauses being thereby still farther sus-
pended till the death of the sons of the pretender.(i) (6)
In petit treason and felony, the offender also forfeits all his chattel interests
absolutely, and the profits of all estates of freehold during life ; and after his death,
all his lands and tenements in fee simple (but not those in tail) to the crown, for a
very short period of time: for the king shall have them for a year and a day,
and may commit therein what waste he pleases; which is called the king's year,
day and waste.(j) Formerly the king had only a liberty of committing waste
on the lands of felons, by pulling down their houses, extirpating their gardens,
ploughing their meadows, and cutting down their woods. And a punishment
of a similar spirit appears to have obtained in the oriental countries, from the
decrees of Nebuchadnezzar and-Cyrus in the books of Daniel(k) and Ezra;(l)
which, besides the pain of death inflicted on the delinquents there specified,. ordain, "that their houses shall be made a dunghill." But this tending greatly
to the prejudice of the public, it was agreed, in the reign of Henry the First, in
this kingdom, that the king should have the profits of the land for one year and
a day, in lieu of the destruction he was otherwise at liberty to commit:(m) and
therefore magna carta(n) provides, that the king shall only hold such lands for
a year and a day, and then restore them to the lord of the fee; without any
mention made of waste. But the statute 17 Edw. II, de prarogativa regis
seems to suppose, that the king shall have his year, day and waste; and not the
r,386] *year and day instead of waste. Which Sir Edward Coke (and the
author of the Mirror, before him) very justly look upon as an encroach-
ment, though a very ancient one, of the royal prerogative.(o) This year, day
and waste, are now usually compounded for; but otherwise they regularly
belong to the crown; and after their expiration, the land would naturally have
descended to the heir (as in gavelkind tenure it still does), did not its feudal
quality intercept such descent, and give it by way of escheat to the lord. These
forfeitures for felony do also arise only upon attainder; and therefore a felo de
se forfeits no lands of inheritance or freehold, for he never is attainted as a
felon.(p) They likewise relate back to the time of the offence committed, as
well as forfeitures for treason; so as to avoid all intermediate charges and con-
veyances. This may be hard upon such as have unwarily engaged with the
offender: but the cruelty and reproach must lie on the part, not of the law,
but of the criminal; who has thus knowingly and dishonestly involved others
in his own calamities.
These are all the forfeitures of real estates created by tie common law, as
consequential upon attainders by judgment of death or outlawry. I here omit
the particular forfeitures created by the statutes of prwmunire and others:
because I look upon them rather as a part of the judgment and penalty,
inflicted by the respective statutes, than as consequences of such judgment ; as
in treason and felony they are. But I shall just mention, as a part of the for-
(f) Burnet's nist. A. . 1709. (g) Considerations on the law of forfeiture, 6. (h) See Fost. 250.
(s) The justice and expediency of this provision were defended at the time with much learning and strength
of argument in the consderations on the law of forfeiture, first published A. D. 1744. (See book 1 page 244.)
(j) 2 Inst. 37. (k) ch. iii, 29. (1) ch. vi, 11. (m) Mirr. c. 4, § 16. Fket. 1. 1, c. 28.
(n) 9Hen. 111, c. 22. (o) Mirr. c. 5, § 2. 2 Inst. 37. (p) 3 Inst. 55.
(6) The modification of the law of forfeiture by later statutes is referred to elsewhere.
See book 2, pp. 267, 409, 420.
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feiture of real estates, the forfeiture of the profits of lands during life: which
extends to two other instances, besides those already spoken of; misprision of
treason, (q) and striking in Westminster-hall, or drawing a weapon upon a judge
there sitting in the king's courts of justice.(r)
The forfeiture of goods and chattels accrues in every one of the higher kind
of offence: in high treason or misprision *thereof, petit treason, felonies F.387
of all sorts, whether clergyable or not, self-murder or felony de se, petit L*387
larceny, standing mute, and the above mentioned offences of striking, &c., in
Westminster-hall. For flight also, on an accusation of treason, felony, or even
petit larceny, whether the party be found guilty or acquitted, if the jury find
the flight, the party shall forfeit his goods and chattels: for the very flight is an
offence, carrying with it a strong presumption of guilt, and is at least an
endeavour to elude and stifle the course of justice prescribed by the law. But
the jury very seldom find the flight: (s) forfeiture being looked upon since the
vast increase of personal property of late years, as too large a penalty for
an offence, to which a man is prompted by the natural love of liberty. (7)
There is a remarkable difference or two between the forfeiture of lands and
of goods and chattels. 1. Lands are forfeited upon attainder, and not before:
goods and chattels are forfeited by conviction. Because, in many of the cases
where goods are forfeited, there never is any attainder; which happens only
where judgment of death or outlawry is given: therefore in those cases the
forfeiture must be upon conviction or not at all; and, being necessarily upon
conviction in those, it is so ordered in all other cases, for the law loves uniform-
ity. 2. In outlawries for treason or felony, lands are forfeited only by the judg-
ment: but the goods and chattels are forfeited by a man's being first put in the
exigent without staying till he is quinto eractus, or finally outlawed; for the
secreting himself so long from justice is construed a flight in law.(t) The
forfeiture of lands has relation to the time of the fact committed, so as to avoid
all subsequent sales and incumbrances; but the forfeiture of goods and chat-
tels has no relation backwards; so that those only which a man has at the time
of conviction shall be forfeited. Therefore a traitor or felon may bona fide sell
any of his chattels real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and family
between the fact and conviction; (u) for personal property is of *so
fluctuating a nature, that it p.asses through many hands in a short time; [*388]
and no buyer could be safe, if he were liable to return the goods which he had
fairly bought, provided any of the prior vendors had committed a treason
or felony. Yet if they be collusively and not bona fide parted with merely to
defraud the crown, the law (and particularly the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5) will reach
them; for they are all the while truly and substantially the goods of the
offender: and as he, if acquitted, might recover them himself, as not parted
with for a good consideration; so in case he happens to be convicted, the law
will recover them for the king.
II. Another immediate consequence of attainder is the corruption of blood,
both upwards and downwards, (8) so that an attainted person can neither inherit
lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is already
in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall
escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king's superior right of forfeiture:
and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever
they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor.(v)
This is one of those notions which our laws have adopted from the feudal
q) Hid. 21. C4r) Id. 141. (a) Staundf. P. C. 183, b. () 3 Inst. 232.
u) 2 Hawk. P. c. 45P (V) See book II, page 251.
(7) [By 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, s. 5, it is enacted, "that where any person shall be indicted for
treason or felony, the jury impaneled to try such person shall not be charged to inquire
concerning his lands, tenements, or goods, nor whether he fled for such treason or felony."
The practice has been wholly discontinued for some years.]
(8) [But now descents are not thus obstructed. See statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 106, s. 10.]
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constitutions, at the time of the Norman conquest; as appears from its being
unknown in those tenures which are indisputably Saxon, or gavelkind: wherein,
though by treason, according to the ancient Saxon laws, the land is forfeited to
the king, yet no corruption of blood, no impediment of descents, ensues; and,
on judgment of mere felony, no escheat accrues to the lord. And therefore as
every other oppressive mark of feudal tenure is now happily worn away in these
kingdoms, it is to be hoped, that this corruption of blood, with all its connected
consequences, not only of present escheat, but of future incapacities of inheri-
tance even to the twentieth generation, may in process of time be abolished by
act of parliament: as it stands upon a very different footing from the forfeiture
[*389] of lands for high *treason, affecting the king's person or government.
And indeed the legislature has, from time to time, appeared very inclin-
able to give way to so equitable a provision; by enacting, that, in certain
treasons respecting the papal supremacy(w) and the public coin,(x) and in many
of the new-made felonies, created since the reign of Henry the Eighth by act
of parliament, corruption of blood shall be saved. But as in some of the acts
for creating felonies (and those not of the most atrocious kind) this saving was
neglected, or forgotten, to be made, it seems to be highly reasonable and expe-
dient to antiquate the whole of this doctrine by one undistinguishing law:
especially as by the afore-mentioned statute of 7 Ann. c. 21 (the operation of
which is postponed by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39), after the death of the sons of
the late pretender, no attainder for treason will extend to the disinheriting any
heir, nor the prejudice of any person, other than the offender himself; which
virtually abolishes all corruption of blood for treason, though (unless the legis-
lature should interpose) it will still continue for many sorts of felony.
CHAPTER XXX.
OF REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.
WE are next to consider how judgments, with their several connected con-
sequences of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood, may be set aside.
There are two ways of doing this; either by falsifying or reversing the judg-
ment, or else by reprieve or pardon.
A judgment may be falsified, reversed, or avoided, in the first place, without
a writ of error, for matters foreign to or dehors the record, that is, not apparent
upon the face of it; so that they cannot be assigned for error in the superior
court, which can only judge from what appears in the record itself: and there-
fore if the whole record be not certified, or not truly certified, by the inferior
court, the party injured thereby (in both civil and criminal cases) may allege a
diminution of the record, and cause it to be rectified. Thus, if any judgment
whatever be given by persons who had no good commission to proceed against the
person condemned, it is void; and may be falsified by showing the special matter
without writ of error. As, where a commission issues to A and B, and twelve
others, or any of them, of which A or B shall be one, to take and try indict-
ments; and any of the other twelve proceed without the interposition or presence
[*391] *of either A or B : in this case all proceedings, trials, convictions, and judg-
ments, are void for want of a proper authority in the commissioners, and
maybe falsified upon bare inspection without the trouble of writ of error; (a)(1)
(w) Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 1.
(x) Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 11. 8 Eliz. c. 1. 18 and 9 W. I, c. 26. 15 and 16 Geo. II, c. 28. (a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 459.
(1) That is, if the court had no jurisdiction of the case, its proceedings may be treated as
void whenever they come in question. Even the prosecution may treat them as void, and
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it being a high misdemeanor in the judges so proceeding, and little (if any
thing) short of murder in them all, in case the person so attainted be executed
and suffer death. So, likewise, if a man purchases land of another; and after-
wards the vendor is, either by outlawry or his own confession, convicted andattainted of treason or felony previous t  the sale or alienati n; whereby such
land becomes liable to forfeiture or escheat; now upon any trial, the purchaser
is at liberty, without bringing any writ of error, to falsify not only the time ofthe felony or treason supposed, but the ve y point of the felony or treason
itself; and is not concluded by the confession or the outlawry of the vendor;
though the vendor himself is concluded, and not suffered now to deny the fact,
which he has by confession or flight acknowledged. But if such attainder of
the vendor was by vedict, on the oath of his peers, the alienee cannot be
received to falsify or contradict the fact of the crime committed; though he is
at liberty to prove a mistake in time, or that the offence was committed after
the alienation, and not before.(b)
Secondly, a judgment may be reversed by writ of error: which lies from all
inferior criminal jurisdictions to the court of king's bench, and from the king's
bench to the house of peers; and may be brought for notorious mistakes in the
judgment or other parts of the record: as, where a man is found guilty of per-
jury and receives the judgment of felony, or for other less palpable errors; such
as any irregularity, omission, or want of form in the process of outlawry, or
proclamation ; the want of a proper addition to the defendant's name, accord-
ing to the statute of additions; for not properly naming the sheriff or other
officer of the court, or not duly describing where his county court was held;
for laying an offence committed in the time of the late king, to be done
*against the peace of the present ; and for many other similar causes, which [*39
(though allowed out of tenderness to life and liberty) are not much to
the credit or advancement of the national justice. These writs of error, to
reverse judgments in case of misdemeanors, are not to be allowed of course,
but on sufficient probable cause shown to the attorney-general; and then they
are understood to be grantable of common right, and exr debito just itiw.(2) But
writs of error to reverse attainders in capital cases are only allowed ex gratia;
and not without express warrant under the king's sign manual, or at least by
the consent of the attorney-general.(c) These, therefore, can rarely be brought
by the party himself, especially where he is attainted for an offence against the
state: but they may be brought by his heir, or executor, after his death, in more
favourable times; which may be some consolation to his family. But the easier
and more effectual way is,Lastly, to reverse the attainder by act of parliament. This may be and hath
been frequently done, upon motives of compassion, or perhaps from the zeal of
the times, after a sudden revolution in the government, without examining tooclosely into the truth or validity of the errors assigned. And sometimes,
though the crime be universally acknowledge and fconfessed, yet the merits of
the criminal's family shall after his death obtain a restitution in blood, honours,
and estate, or some, or one of them, by act of parliament; which (so far as it
extends) has all the effect of reversing the attainder without casting any reflec-
tions upon the justice of the preceding sentence.
The effect of falsifying, or reversing, an outlawry, is that the party shall be
in the same plight as if he had appeared upon the capias; and, if it be before
plea pleaded, he shall be put to plead to the indictment; if after conviction, he
shall receive the sentence of the law; for all the other proceedings, except only
(0) 8 Inst. 281. 1 Hal. P. C. 861. (c) 1 Vern. 170,175.
put the accused party on trial again for the same offence. Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13
ass. 455; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.
(2) See Mansell v. Reg. 8 E. and B. 54; Ex parte Newton, 4 id. 869.
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I the process or outlawry for his non-appearance, *remain good and
[*39J effectual as before. But when judgment pronounced upon conviction,
is falsified or reversed, all former proceedings are absolutely set aside, and the
party stands as if he had never been at all accused; restored in his credit, his
capacity, his blood, and his estates: with regard to which last, though they
be granted away by the crown, yet the owner may enter upon the grantee with
as little ceremony as he might enter upon a disseisor.(d) But he still remains
liable to another prosecution for the same offence; for the first being erroneous,
he never was in jeopardy thereby.(3)
CHAPTER XXXI.
OF REPRIEVE AND PARDON.
THE only other remaining ways of avoiding the execution of the judgment
are by a reprieve, or a pardon; whereof the former is temporary only, the latter
permanent.
I. A reprieve,(1) from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawving of a sen-
tence for an interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended. This may
be, first, ex arbitrio judicis; either before or after judgment; as, where the
judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the
indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offence be within
clergy; or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any favourable circumstances
appear in the criminal's character, in order to give room to apply to the crown
for either an absolute or conditional pardon. These arbitrary reprieves may be
granted or taken off by the justices of gatol delivery, although their session be
finished, and their commission expired: but this rather by common usage, than
of strict right.(a)
Reprieves may also be ex necessitate legis: as, where a woman is capitally con-
victed, and pleads her pregnancy; though this is no cause to stay the judgment, yet
[*395] it is to respite the execution till she be delivered. This is a mercy *dic-
tated by the law of nature, in favorem prolis; and therefore no part of
the bloody proceedings, in the reign of Queen Mary, hath been more justly
detested than the cruelty that was exercised in the island of Guernsey, of burn-
ing a woman big with child: and when, through the violence of the flames,
the infant sprang forth at the stake, and was preserved by the bystanders, after
some deliberation of the priests who assisted at the sacrifice, they cast it again
into the fire as a young heretic.(b) A barbarity which they never learned from
the laws of ancient Rome; which direct,(c) with the same humanity as our
own, "quod prwgynantis mulieris damnatce pmno differatur, quodpariat :" which
doctrine has also prevailed in England as early as the first memorials of our
law will reach.(d) In case this plea be made in stay of execution, the judge
d) 2 Hawk P C 462. (a) 2 Hal. P. C. 412.' (b) Fox, Acts and Mon. (o) 1F. 48, 19, 3.
d) Flet. . , . 8.
(3) [Where the indictment has been preferred in the court of queen's bench, or where it has
been removed thither by certiorari, a new trial will be granted by that court in a case of mis
demeanor, or even of felony-as for misdirection or surprise (Reg. v. Whitehouse, Dearsl. 1),
or the improper admission of evidence (Reg. v. Scaife, 17 Q. B. 238), to further the ends of
justice. But after acquittal on a charge of felony, or with certain peculiar exceptions, of
misdemeanor, a new trial will not be granted. Reg. v. Russell, 3 E. and B. 942.]
(1) [In addition to the reprieves mentioned by the learned commentator is that ex mandatw
regis, or from the mere pleasure of the crown, expressed in any way to the court by whom the
execution is to be awarded. 2 Hale, 412; 1 id. 368 ; Hawk. b. 2, c. 51, s. 8.]
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must direct a jury of twelve matrons or discreet women to inquire the fact:
and if they bring in their verdict quick with child (for, barely with child,
unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient), execution shall be staid gener-
ally till the next session; and so from session to session, till either she is deliv-
ered, or proves by the course of nature not to have been with child at all. But
if she once hath had the benefit of this reprieve, and been delivered, and after-
wards becomes pregnant again, she shall not be entitled to the benefit of a far-
ther respite for that cause.(e) For she may now be executed before the child is
quick in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence
of justice.(2)
Another cause of regular reprieve is, if the offender becomes non compos be-
tween the judgment and the award of execution: (f) for regularly, as was for-
merly (g) observed, though a man be compos when he commits a capital crime,
yet if he becomes non compos after, he shall not be indicted; if after indictment,
he shall not be convicted; if after conviction, he shall not receive judgment;
if after judgment, he *shall not be ordered for execution: for "furiosus [*39
solo furore punitur," and the law knows not but he might have offered 6]
some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed these respective proceedings. It is
therefore an invariable rule, when any time intervenes between the attainder
and the award of execution' to demand of the prisoner what he hath to allege
why execution should not be awarded against him: and if he appears to be
insane, the judge in his discretion may and ought to reprieve him.(3) Or, the
party may plead in bar of execution; which plea may be either preghancy, the
ing's pardon, an act of grace, or diversity of person, viz., that he is not the
same as was attainted, and the like. In this last case a jury shall be impaneled
to try this collateral issue, namely, the identity of his person; and not whether
guilty or innocent; for that has been decided before. And in these collateral
issues the trial shall be instanter,(h) and no time allowed the prisoner to make
his defence or produce his witnesses, unless he will make oath that he is not the
person attainted: (i) neither shall any peremptory challenges of the jury be
allowed the prisoner; (f) though formerly such challenges were held to be allow-
able, whenever a man's life was in question.(k)
II. If neither pregnancy, insanity, non-identity, nor other plea, will avail to
avoid the judgment, and stay the execution consequent thereupon, the last and
surest resort is in the king's most gracious pardon; the granting of which is
the most amiable prerogative of the crown. Law (says an able writer) cannot
be framed on principles of compassion to guilt; yet justice, by the constitution
of England, is bound to be administered in mercy; this is promised by the king
in his coronation oath, and it is that act of his government which is the most
personal, and most entirely his own.(1) The king himself condemns no man;
that rugged task he leaves to his courts of justice: the great operation of his
sceptre is *mercy. His power of pardoning was said by our Saxon [*397
ancestors (m) to be derived a lege sum dignitatis: and it is declared in [ 39]
parliament, by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 24, that no other person hath power to
pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever: but that the king hath the
(e) 1 Hal P. C. 369. (f) ibid. 370. (g) Seepage 24. (A) 1 Sid. 72. See Appendix, § 3.
(i) Fost. 42. (J) 1 Lev. 61. Fost. 42, 46. (k) Staundf. P.-C. 163. Co. Litt. 157. Hal. Sam. 259.
(1) Law of Forfeit. 99. (in) LL. Edw. Conf. c. 18.
(2) [It is usual for the clerk of assize to ask women, who receive sentence of death, if they
have any thing to say why execution shall not be awarded according to the judgment. As
the execution of the law in the first instance is respited not from regard for the mother,
but from tenderness toward the innocent infant;, if then it should happen that she became
quick of a second child, this surely is as much an object of compassion and humanity as
the first.]
(3) [See ante, 25, n., as to the trial of an insane person.
By the 56 Geo. III, c. 117, provision is made for convicted crim'nals who become insane.
See also the 55 Geo. III, c. 46, and 5 Geo. IV, c. 71.]
Also statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 54, and 30 and 31 Vic. c. 12.
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whole and sole power thereof, united and knit to the imperial crown of this
realm.(n)
This is indeed one of the great advantages of monarchy in general, above any
other form of government; that there is a magistrate who has it in his power
to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved: holding a court of inquiry
in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal cases
as merit an exemption from punishment. Pardons (according to some theo-
rists)(o) should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where punishments are mild
but certain: for that the clemency of the prince seems a tacit disapprobation
of the lays. But the exclusion of pardons must necessarily introduce a very
dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law by
the spirit instead of the letter; (p) or else it must be holden, what no man will
seriously avow, that the situation and circumstances of the offender (though they
alter not the essence of the crime) ought to make no distinction in the punish-
ment. In democracies, (4) however, this power of pardon can never subsist; for
there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the
laws: and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and pardoning to centre
in one and the same person. This (as the president Montesquieu observes)(q)
would oblige him very often to contradict himself, to make and to unmake his
decisions: it would tend to confound all ideas of right among the mass of the
people; as they would find it difficult to tell whether a prisoner was discharged
[*398] by his innocence, or obtained a pardon through favour. In *Hollaind,
therefore, if there be no stadtholder, there is no power of pardoning lodged
in any other member of the state. But in monarchies the king acts in a su-
perior sphere; and, though he regulates the whole government as the first mover,
yet he does not appear in any of the disagreeable or invidious parts of it. When-
ever the nation see him personally engaged, it is only in works of legislature,
magnificence, or compassion. To him, therefore, the people look up as the
fountain of nothing but bounty and grace; and these repeated acts of goodness,
coming immediately from his own hand, endear the sovereign to his subjects,
and contribute more than any thing to root in their hearts that filial affection and
personal loyalty which are the sure establishment of a prince.
Under this head of pardons, let us briefly consider, 1. The object of pardon:
2. The manner of pardoning: 3. The method of allowing a pardon: 4. The effect
of such pardon when allowed.
1. And, first, the king may pardon all offences merely against the crown, or
the public; excepting, 1. That, to preserve the liberty of the subject, the com-
mitting any man to prison out of the realm is, by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car.
II, c. 2, made a prcamunire, unpardonable even by the king. Nor, 2. Can the
king pardon, where private justice is principally concerned in the prosecution
of offenders: "non potest rex gratiam facere cum injuria et damno aliorum."(r)
Therefore in appeals of all kinds (which are the suit, not of the king, but of the
party injured) the prosecutor may release, but the king cannot pardon. (s)
Neither can he pardon a common nuisance, while it remains unredressed, or so
as to prevent an abatement of it, though afterwards he may remit the fine:
because though the prosecution is vested in the king to avoid multiplicity of
suits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of a
[*399] private *injury to each individual in the neighborhood, than of a public
wrong. (t) Neither, lastly, can the king pardon an offence against a
popular or penal statute, after information brought; for thereby the informer
hath acquired a private property in his part of the penalty.(u)
(n) And this power belongs only to a king defacto, and not to a king de jure during the time of usu patton.
(Bro. Abr. t. charter de pardon, 22.)
(o) Beccar. ch. 46. (p) Ibid. ch. 4. (q) Sp. L. b. 6, e. 5. (r) 3 Inst. 286.
(s) Ibid. 237. (M 2 Hawk. P. C. 391. (u) 3 Inst. 238.
(4) In the United States the power to reprieve and pardon is vested in the president, and in
the several states it is given to the executive of the state, with some restrictions in some of them.
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There is also a restriction of a peculiar nature, that affects the prerogative of
pardoning in cases of parliamentary impeachments ; viz., that the king's pardon
cannot bepleaded to any such impeachment so as to impede the inquiry, and
stop the prosecution of great and notorious offenders. Therefore when, in the
reign of Charles the Second, the earl of Danby was impeached by the house of
commons of high treason, and other misdemeanors, and pleaded the king's par-
don in bar of the same, the commons alleged,(v) "that there was no precedent
that ever any pardon was granted to any person impeached by the commons of
high treason, or other high crimes, depending the impeachment;" and thereupon
resolved, (w) "that the pardon so pleaded was illegal and void, and ought not to
be allowed in bar of the impeachment of the commons of England ;" for which
resolution they assigned (x) this reason to the house of lords, "that the setting
up a pardon to be a bar of an impeachment defeats the whole use and effect of
impeachment; for should this point be admitted, or stand doubted, it would
totally discourage the exhibiting any for the future; whereby the chief institu-
tion for the preservation of the government would be destroyed." Soon after
the revolution, the commons renewed the same claim, and voted, (y) "that a
pardon is not pleadable in bar of an impeachment." And, at length, it was
enacted by the act of settlement, 12 and 13 Win. III, c. 2, "that no pardon under
the great seal of England shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons
in parliament." But, after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and
determined, it is not understood that the *king's royal grace is farther re- [*400]
strained or abridged: for, after the impeachment and attainder of the
six rebel lords in 1715, three of them were from time to time reprieved by the
crown, and at length received the benefit of the king's most gracious pardon.(5)
2. As to the manner of pardoning. 1. First, it must be under the great seal.
A warrant under the privy seal, or sign manual, though it may be a sufficient
authority to admit the party to bail, in order to plead the kiug's pardon, when
obtained in proper form, yet is not of itself a complete, irrevocable pardon. (z)
2. Next, it is a general rule that, wherever it may be reasonably presumed the
king is deceived, the pardon is void. (a) Therefore any suppression of
truth, or suggestion of falsehood, in a charter of pardon, will vitiate the whole;
for the king was misinformed.(b) 3. General words have also a very imperfect
effect in pardons. A pardon of all felonies will not pardon a conviction or
attainder of felony (for it is presumed the king knew not of those proceedings),
but the conviction or attainder must be particularly mentioned ;(c) and a pardon
of felonies will not include piracy ;(d) for that is no felony punishable at the
common law. 4. It is also enacted by statute 13 Ric. II, st. 2, c. 1, that no par-
don for treason, murder, or rape shall be allowed unless the offence be particularly
specified therein; and particularly in murder it shall be expressed, whether it
was committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice prepense. Upon which Sir
Edward Coke observes (e) that it was not the intention of the parliament, that
the king should ever pardon murder under these aggravations; and therefore
they prudently laid the pardon under these restrictions, because they did not
conceive it possible that the king would ever excuse an offence by name, which
was attended with such high aggravations. And it is remarkable enough, that
(v) Com. Journ. 28 Apr. 1679. (w) ibNd. 5 May, 1679. (x) Ibid. 26 May, 1679. (y) ibid. 6 June, 1689.
(z) 5 St. Tr. 166, 173. (a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 883. (b) 3 Inst. 288. (C) 2 Hawk. P. C. 88.
(d) 1 Hawk. P. C. 99. (e) 3 Inst. 236.
(5) [After the lords have delivered their sentence of guilty, the commons have the power of
pardoning the impeached convict, by refusing to demand judgment against him; for no judg-
ment can be pronounced by the lords till it is demanded by the commons. Lord Macclesfield
was found guilty without a dissenting voice in the house of lords; but when the question was
afterwards proposed in the house of commons, that this house will demand judgment of the lords
against Thomas, earl of Macclesfteld, it occasioned a warm debate, but (the previous question
being first moved) it was carried in the affirmative by a majority of 136 voices against 65.]
In the United States the president can grant no pardon in case of impeachment. Const.
of U. S., art. 2, § 2.
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there is no precedent of a pardon in the register for any other homicide than
[*401] that *which happens se defendendo or per infortunium: to which two
species the king's pardon was expressly confined by the statutes 2 Edw.
III, c. 2, and 14 Edw. III, c. 15, which declare that no pardon of homicide shall
be granted, but only where the king may do it by the oath of his crown; that is
to say, where a man slayeth another in lis own defence, or by misfortune. But
the statute of Richard the Second, before mentioned, enlarges by implication the
royal power; provided the king is not deceived in the intended object of his mercy.
And, therefore, pardons of murder were always granted with a non obstante
of the statute of King Richard, till the time of the revolution; when the doc-
trine of non obstante's ceasing, it was doubted whether murder could be pardoned
generally; but it was determined by the court of king's bench,(f) that the king
may pardon on an indictment of murder, as well as a subject may discharge an
appeal. Under these and a few other restrictions, it is a general rule, that a
pardon shall be taken most beneficially for the subject, and most strongly against
the king.
A pardon may also be conditional; that is, the king may extend his mercy
upon what terms he pleases; and may annex to his bounty a condition either
precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the pardon
will depend; and this by the common law.(g) Which prerogative is daily
exerted in the pardon of felons, on condition of being confined to hard
labour for a stated time, or of transportation to some foreign country for life, or
for a term of years; such transportation or banishment(h) being allowable and
warranted by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II, c. 2, § 14, and both the impris-
onment and transportation rendered more easy and effectual by statutes 8 Geo.
III, c. 15, and 19 Geo. III. c. 74.(6)
3. With regard to the manner of allowing pardons: we may observe, that a
[*402] pardon by act of parliament is more *beneficial than by the king's char-
ter; for a man is not bound to plead it, but the court must ex officio take
notice of it; (i) neither can he lose the benefit of it by his own laches or negli-
gence, as he may of the king's charter of pardon.(k) The king's charter of
pardon must be specially pleaded, and that at a proper time: for if a man is
indicted, and has a pardon in his pocket, and afterwards puts himself upon his
trial by pleading the general issue, he has waived the benefit of such pardon.(l)
But, if a man avails himself thereof, as soon as by course of law he may, a par-
don may either be pleaded upon arraignment, or in arrest of judgment, or in
the present stage of proceedings, in bar of execution. Anciently, by statute 10
Edw. III, c. 2, no pardon of felony could be allowed, unless the party found
sureties for the good behaviour before the sheriff and coroners of the county.(n)
But that statute is repealed by the statute 5 and 6 W. and M. c. 13, which, instead
thereof, gives the judges of the court a discretionary power to bind the criminal,
pleading such pardon, to his good behaviour, with two sureties, for any term not
exceeding seven years.
4. Lastly, the effect of such pardon by the king, is to make the offender a new
man; to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to that
offence for which he obtains his pardon; and not so much to restore his former, as
to give him a new credit and capacity. But nothing can restore or purify the
blood when once corrupted, if the pardon be not allowed till after attainder, but
the high and transcendent power of parliament. Yet, if a person attainted
receives the king's pardon, and afterwards hath a son, that son may be heir to
his father, because the father being made a new man, might transmit new
inheritable blood; though, had he been born before the pardon, he could never
have inherited at all.(n)
K) Salk. 499. (q) fHawk. P. C. 894.
(Transportation is said (Bar. 352) to have been first inflicted as a punishment by statute 39 Eliz. c. 4.
(1) Fost. 43. (k) 2 Hawk. P. C. 397. (1) 2 Hawk. P. C. 396. (m) Salk. 499.
(n) See book I, page 254.
(6) These statutes are since repealed and new provisions made.
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CHAPTER XXXII
OF EXECUTION.
THERE now remains nothing to speak of, but execution; the completion of
human punishment. And this, in all cases, as well capital as otherwise, must
be performed by the legal officer, the sheriff or his deputy; whose warrant for
so doing was anciently by precept under the hand and seal of the judge, as it is
still practiced in the court of the lord high steward, upon the execution of a
peer :(a) though in the court of the peers in parliament, it is done by writ from
the king.(b) Afterwards it was established,(c) that, in case of life, the judge
may command execution to be done without any writ. And now the usage is,
for the judge to sign the calendar, or list of all the prisoners' names, with their
separate judgments in the margin, which is left with the sheriff. As for a cap-
ital felony, it is written opposite to the prisoner's name, "let him be hanged by
the neck ;" formerly in the days of Latin an abbreviation,(d) "sus. per col.," for
"suspendatur per collum." And this is the only warrant that the sheriff has
for so material an act as taking away the life of another.(e) It may certainly
afford matter of speculation, that in civil causes there should be sueh a variety
of writs of execution to recover a trifling debt, issued in the king's name, and
under the seal of the court, without which the sheriff *cannot legally [*404]
stir one step; and yet that the execution of a man, the most important
and terrible task of any, should depend upon a marginal note.
The sheriff, upon receipt of his warrant, is to do execution within a con-
venient time; which in the country is also left at large. In London, indeed, a
more solemn and becoming exactness is used, both as to the warrant of execu-
tion, and the time of executing thereof: for the recorder, after reporting to the
king in person the case of the several prisoners, and receiving his royal pleasure,
that the law must take its course, issues his warrant to the sheriffs; directing
them to do execution on the day and at the place assigned.(f)(1) And, in the
court of king's bench, if the prisoner be tried at the bar, or brought there by
habeas corpus, a rule is made for his execution; either specifying the time and
place,(g) or leaving it to the discretion of the sheriff.(h) And, throughout the
kingdom, by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, it is enacted that, in case of murder, the
judge shall in his sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day
but one after sentence passed.(i)(2) But otherwise, the time and place of exe-
cution are by law no part of the judgment.(k) It has been well observed,(l)
that it is of great importance, that the punishment should follow the crime as
early as possible; that the prospect of gratification or advantage, which tempts
a man to commit the crime, should instantly awake the attendant idea of pun-
ishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate these ideas; and then the
execution itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight,
than as the necessary consequence of transgression.
The sheriff cannot alter the manner of the execution by substituting one
death for another, without being guilty of felony himself, as has been formerly
said.(m) It is held also *by Sir Edward Coke(n) and Sir Matthew [*405]
Hale, (o) that even the king cannot change the punishment of the law,
by altering the hanging or burning into beheading; though, when beheading
(a) 2 Hal. P. C. 409. (b) See Appendix, § 5. (c) Finch, L. 478. (d) Staundf. P. c. 182.
e) 5 Mod. 22. f) See Appen ix, S 4. ()St. Trials, VI, 332. Fost. 4.3.
(h) See Appendix, 5 3. (i) See page 202. k) So held by the twelve judges, Mich. 10 Geo. Il.
() Beccar. ch. 19. (m) See page 179. (n) 3 Inst. 52. (o) 2 Hal. P. C. 412.
(1) [But now by statute 1 Vic. c. 77, § 1, no report is to be made to her majesty of the case
of any capital convict at the central criminal court; but by section 5 the court shall of its
own authority direct execution to be done on offenders.]
(2) This is no longer the law. Stat. 6 and 7 Win. IV. c. 30.
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is part of the sentence, the king may remit the rest. And, notwithstanding
some examples to the contrary, Sfir Edward Coke stoutly maintains that "judi-
candum est legibus, non exemplis." But others have thought, (p) and more
justly, that this prerogative, being founded in mercy, and immemorially exer-
cised by the crown, is part of the common law. For, hitherto, in every in-
stance, all these exchanges have been for more merciful kinds of death; and
how far this may also fall within the king's power of granting conditional par-
dons (viz., by remitting a severe kind of death, on condition that the criminal
submits to a milder), is a matter that may bear consideration. It is observable
that when Lord Stafford was executed for the popish plot in the reign of King
Charles the Second, the then sheriffs of London, having received the king's
writ for beheading him, petitioned the house of lords for a command or order
from their lordships how the said judgment should be executed; for, he being
prosecuted by impeachment, they entertained a notion (which is said to have
been countenanced by Lord Russel) that the king could not pardon any part
of the sentence.(q) The lords resolved(r) that the scruples of the sheriffs were
unnecessary, and declared that the king's writ ought to be obeyed. Disap-
pointed of raising a flame in that assembly, they immediately signified(s) to the
house of commons by one of the members that they were not satisfied as to
the power of the said writ. That house took two days to consider of it; and
then (t) sullenly resolved that the house was content that the sheriff do execute
Lord Stafford, by severing his head from his body. It is further related, that
when, afterwards, the same Lord Russel was condemned for high treason
upon indictment, the king, while he remitted the ignominious part of the
c.1061 *sentence observed, "that his lordship would now find he was possessed
of that prerogative which, in the case of Lord Stafford, he had denied
him." (u) One can hardly determine (at this distance from those turbulent
times) which most to disapprove of, the indecent and sanguinary zeal of the
subject, or the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sovereign.
To conclude: it is clear that if, upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till
he is dead, the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must
hang him again. (w) For the former hanging was no execution of the sentence;
and if a false tenderness were to be indulged in such cases a multitude of col-
lusions might ensue. Nay, even while abjurations were in force, (x) such a
criminal, so reviving, was not allowed to take sanctuary and abjure the realm;
but his fleeing to sanctuary was held an escape in the officer. (y) (3)
And, having thus arrived at the last stage of criminal proceedings, or execu-
tion, the end and completion of human punishment, which was the sixth and
last head to be considered under the division of public wrongs, the fourth and
last object of the laws of England; it may now seem high time to put a period
to these Commentaries, which, the author is very sensible, have already swelled
to too great a length. But he cannot dismiss the student, for whose use alone
these rudiments were originally compiled, without endeavouring to recall to his
memory some principal outlines of the legal constitution of this country; by a
short historical review of the most considerable revolutions that have happened
in the laws of England from the earliest to the present times. And this task
he will attempt to discharge, however imperfectly, in the next or concluding
chapter.
(p) Fost. 270. F. N. B. 244, h. 19 Rym. Fbed. 284. (q) 2 Hum. Hist. of G. B. 328.
(r) Lord's Journ. 21 Dec. 1680. (s) Com. Journ. 21 Dec. 1680. (t) Ibid. 23 Dec. 1680.
(u) 2 Hume, 360. (w) 2 Hal. P. C. 412. 2 Hawk. P. C. 463. (x) See page 332.
(y) Fitz. Abr. t. corone. 33. Finch. L, 467.
(3) Executions in England are now private, and within the walls of the prison. Statute
31 and 32 Vic. c. 24. And burning, as before stated, is abolished. See suora, 376, note.
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CHAPTER XXXIII.
OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND GRADUAL IMPROVEMENTS OF
THE LAVS OF ENGLAND.
BEFORE wc enter on the subject of this chapter, in which I propose, by way
of supplement to the whole, to attempt an historical review of the most remark-
able changes and alterations that have happened in the laws of England, I
must, first of all, remind the student that the rise and progress of many prin-
cipal points and doctrines have been already pointed out in the course of these
Commentaries, under their respective divisions; these having therefore been
particularly discussed already, it cannot be expected that I should re-examine
them with any degree of minuteness; which would be a most tedious under-
taking. What I therefore at present propose is, only to mark out some outlines
of our English juridical history, by taking a chronological view of the state of
our laws, and their successive mutations at different periods of time.
The several periods, under which I shall consider the state of our legal polity,
are the following six: 1. From the earliest times to the Norman conquest:
2. From the Norman conquest to the reign of King Edward the First: 3. From
thence to the reformation: 4. From the reformation to the *restoration [*408]
of King Charles the Second: 5. From thence to the revolution in 1688:
6. From the revolution to the present time.
I. And, first, with regard to the ancient Britons, the aborigines of our island,
we have so little handed down to us concerning them with any tolerable cer-
tainty that our inquiries here must needs be very fruitless and defective. How-
ever, from Casar's account of the tenets and discipline of the ancient Druids
in Gaul, in whom centered all the learning of these western parts, and who
were, as he tells us, sent over to Britain (that is, to the island of Mona or An-
glesey) to be instructed; we may collect a few points which bear a great affinity
and resemblance to some of the modern doctrines of our English law. Par-
ticularly the very notion itself of an oral, unwritten law, delivered down from
age to age, by custom and tradition merely, seems derived from the practice of
the Druids, who never committed any of their instructions to writing: possibly
for want of letters; since it is remarkable that in all the antiquities, unques-
tiohably British, which the industry of the moderns has discovered, there is
not in any of them the least trace of any character or letter to be found. The
partible quality, also, of lands by the custom of gavel-kind, which still obtains in
many parts of England, and did universally over Wales till the reign of Henry
VIII, is undoubtedly of British original. So likewise is the ancient division
of the goods of an intestate between his widow and children, or next of kin;
which has since been revived by the statute of distributions. And we may also
remember an instance of a slighter nature, mentioned in the present volume,
where the same custom has continued from Cosar's time to the present; that
of burning a woman guilty of the crime of petit treason by killing her hus-
band. (1)
The great variety of nations that successively broke in upon and destroyed
both the British inhabitants and *constitution, the Romans, the Picts, E.409]
and after them the various clans of Saxons and Danes, must necessarily [49
have caused great confusion and uncertainty in the laws and antiquities of the
kingdom; as they were very soon incorporated and blended together, and there-
fore, we may suppose, mutually communicated to each other their respective
usages, (a) in regard to the rights of property and the punishment of crimes.
So that it is morally impossible to trace out with any degree of accuracy, when
the several mutations of the common law were made, or what was the respective
(a) Hal. Hist. C. L. 62.
(1) Both petit treason, and burning as a mode of execution, are now abolished.
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original of those several customs we at present use, by any chemical resolution
of them to their first and component principles. We can seldom pronounce
that this custom was derived from the Britons; that was left behind by the
Romans; this was a necessary precaution against the Picts; that was intro-
duced by the Saxons; discontinued by the Danes, but afterwards restored by
the Normans.
Wherever this can be done, it is a matter of great curiosity, and some use:
but this can very rarely be the case; not only from the reason above mentioned,
but also from many others. First, from the nature of traditional laws in gen-
eral; which, being accommodated to the exigencies of the times, suffer by
degrees insensible variations in practice :(b) so that, though upon comparison
we plainly discern the alteration of the law from what it was five hundred years
ago, yet it is impossible to define the precise period in which that alteration
accrued, any more than we can discern the changes of the bed of a river, which
varies its shores by continual decreases and alluvions. Secondly, this becomes
impracticable from the antiquity of the kingdom and its government: which
alone, though it had been disturbed by no foreign invasions, would make it
impossible to search out the original of its laws; unless we had as authentic
monuments thereof as the Jews had by the hand of Moses.(c) Thirdly,
r*101 *this uncertainty of the true origin of particular customs must also in
L -J part have arisen from the means whereby christianity was propagated
among our Saxon ancestors in this island; by learned foreigners brought over
from Rome and other countries, who undoubtedly carried with them many of
their own national customs; and probably prevailed upon the state to abrogate
stich usages as were inconsistent with our holy religion, and to introduce many
others that were more conformable thereto. And this perhaps may have partly
been the cause that we find not only some rules of the Mosaical, but also of the
imperial and pontifical laws, blended and adopted into our own system.
A farther reason may also be given for the great variety, and of course the
uncertain original, of our ancient established customs; even after the Saxon
government was firmly established in this island, viz.: the subdivision of the
kingdom into an heptarchy, consisting of seven independent kingdoms, peopled
and governed by different clans and colonies. This must necessarily create an
infinite diversity of laws: even though all those colonies, of Jutes, Angles,
Anglo-Saxons, and the like, originally sprung from the same mother-country,
the great northern hive; which poured forth its warlike progeny, and swarmed
all over Europe, in the sixth and seventh centuries. This multiplicity of laws
will necessarily be the case in some degree, where any kingdom is cantoned out
into provincial establishments; and not under one common dispensation of
laws, though under the same sovereign power. Much more will it happen,
where seven unconnected states are to form their own constitution and super-
structure of government, though they all begin to build upon the same or sim-
ilar foundations.
When, therefore, the West Saxons had swallowed up all the rest, and King
Alfred succeeded to the monarchy of England, whereof his grandfather Egbert
was the founder, his mighty genius prompted him to undertake a most great
[*411] and necessary work, which he is said to have executed in as *masterly a
manner: no less than to new-model the constitution; to rebuild it on a
plan that should endure for ages; and, out of its old, discordant materials,
which were heaped upon each other in a vast and rude irregularity, to form one
uniform and well connected whole. This he effected, by reducing the whole
kingdom under one regular and gradual subordination of government, wherein
each man was answerable to his immediate superior for his own conduct and
that of his nearest neighbours: for to him we owe that master-piece of judicial
polity, the subdivision of England into tithings and hundreds, if not into coun-
ties; all under the influence and administration of one supreme magistrate,
the king; in whom, as in a general reservoir, all the executive authority of the law
(b) 1Md. 57. (c) Hal. Hist. C. L. 59.
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was lodged, and from whom justice was dispersed to every part of the nation by
distinct, yet communicating, ducts and channels; which, wise institution has
been preserved for near a thousand years unchanged, from Alfred's to the present
time. He also, like another Theodosius, collected the various customs that he
found dispersed in the kingdom, and reduced and digested them into one uni-
form system or code of laws, in his Dom-bec, or liber judicialis. This he com-
piled for the use of the court-baron, hundred, and county court, the court-leet,
and sheriff's tourn; tribunals, which he established, for the trial of all causes
civil and criminal, in the very districts wherein the complaint arose: all of
them subject, however, to be inspected, controlled, and kept within the bounds
of the universal or common law, by the king's own courts; which were then
itinerant, being kept in the king's palace, and removing with his household in
those royal progresses which he continually made from one end of the king-
dom to the other.
The Danish invasion and conquest, which introduced new foreign customs,
was a severe blow to this noble fabric: but a plan so excellently concerted could
never be long thrown aside. So that, upon the expulsion of these intruders,
the English returned to their ancient law; retaining, however, some few of the
customs of their late visitants; which went *under the name of Dane- [*412
La e: as the code compiled by Alfred was called the West-Saxon-Lage;
andtbe local constitutions of the ancient kingdom of Mercia, which obtained
in the counties nearest to Wales, and probably abounded with many British
customs, were called the Mercen-Lage. And these three laws were, about the
beginning of the eleventh century, in use in different counties of the realm:
the provincial polity of counties, and their subdivisions, having never been
altered or discontinued through all the shocks and mutations of government,
from the time of its first institution; though the laws and customs therein
used have (as we shall see) often suffered considerable changes.
For King Edgar (who, besides his military merit, as founder of the English
navy, was also a most excellent civil governor), observing the ill effects of three
distinct bodies of laws prevailing at once in separate parts of his dominions,
projected and begun what his grandson, King Edward the Confessor, afterwards
completed, viz., one uniform digest or body of laws, to be observed throughout
the whole kingdom; being probably no more than a revival of King Alfred's
code, with some improvements suggested by necessity and experience; particu-
larly the incorporating some of the British, or rather Mercian, customs, and also
such of the Danish as were reasonable and approved, into the West-Saxon-Lage,
which was still the groundwork of the whole. And this appears to be the best
supported and most plausible conjecture (for certainty is not to be expected) of
the rise and original of that admirable system of maxims and unwritten customs
which is now known by the name of the common law, as extending its authority
universally over all the realm; and which is doubtless of Saxon parentage.
Among the most remarkable of the Saxon laws we may reckon, 1. The con-
stitution of parliaments, or, rather, general assemblies of the principal and wisest
men in the nation: the wittena-gemote, or commune consilium, of the ancient
Germans, which was not yet reduced to the forms and *distinctions of [*413]
our modern parliament; without whose concurrence, however, no new [ -13
law could be made, or old one altered. 2. The election of their magistrates by
the people; originally even that of their kings, till dear-bought experience
evinced the convenience and necessity of establishing an hereditary succession
to the crown. But that of all subordinate magistrates, their military officers or
heretochs, their sheriffs, their conservators of the peace, their coroners, their
port-reeves (since changed into mayors and bailiffs), and even their tything-men
and borsholders at the leet, continued, some till the Norman conquest, others for
two centuries after, and some remain to this day. 3. The descent of the crown,
when once a royal family was established, upon nearly the same hereditary prin-
ciples upon which it has ever since continued; only that, perhaps, in case of
minority, the next of kin of full age would ascend the throne, as king, and not
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as protector; though, after his death, the crown immediately reverted back to
the heir. 4. The great paucity of capital punishments for the first offence; even
the most notorious offenders being allowed to commute it for a fine or weregeld,
or, in default of payment, perpetual bondage; to which our benefit of clergy has
now in some measure succeeded. 5. The prevalence of certain customs, as heriots
and military services in proportion to every man's land, which much resembled
the feudal constitution: but yet were exempt from all its rigorous hardships:
and which may be well enough accounted for, by supposing them to be brought
from the continent by the first Saxon invaders, in the primitive moderation and
simplicity of the feudal law, before it got into the hands of the Norman jurists,
who extracted the most slavish doctrines and oppressive consequences out of
what was originally intended as a law of liberty. 6. That their estates were
liable to forfeiture for treason, but that the doctrine of escheats and corruption
of blood for felony, or any other cause, was utterly unknown amongst them.
7. The descent of their lands to all the males equally, without any right ot
primogeniture; a custom which obtained among the Britons, was agreeable to
the Roman law, and continued among the Saxons till the Norman conquest:
[*414] *though really inconvenient, and more especially destructive to ancient
families; which are, in monarchies, necessary to be supported, in order
to form and keep up a nobility, or intermediate state between the prince and the
common people. 8. The courts of justice consisted principally of the county
courts, and, in cases of weight or nicety, the king's court, held before himself in
person, at the time of his parliaments; which were usually holden in different
places, according as he kept the three great festivals of christmas, easter, and
whitsuntide. An institution which was adopted by King Alonzo VII, of Cas-
tile, about a century after the conquest: who, at the same three great feasts, was
wont to assemble his nobility and prelates in his court; who there heard and
decided all controversies, and then, having received his instructions, departed
home. (d) These county courts, however, differed from the modern ones, in that.
the ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction were blended together, the bishop and the
ealdorman or sheriff sitting in the same county court; and also that the decisions
and proceedings therein were much more simple and unembarrassed: an advan-
tage which will always attend the infancy of any laws, but wear off as they
gradually advance to antiquity. 9. Trials, among a people who had a very strong
tincture of superstition, were permitted to be by ordeal, by the corsned, or mor-
sel of execration, or by wager of law with compurgators, if the party chose it;
but frequently they were also by jury: for, whether or no their juries consisted
precisely of twelve men, or were bound to a strict unanimity; yet the general
constitution of this admirable criterion of truth, and most important guardian
both of public and private liberty, we owe to our Saxon ancestors. Thus stood
the general frame of our polity at the time of the Norman invasion; when the
second period of our legal history commences.
II. This remarkable event wrought as great an alteration in our laws as it did
in our ancient line of kings: and though the alteration of the former was
[*415] effected rather by the *consent of the people than any right of conquest,
yet that consent seems to have been partly extorted by fear, and partly
given without any apprehension of the consequences which afterwards ensued.
1. Among the first of these alterations we may reckon the separation of the
ecclesiastical courts from the civil: effected in order to ingratiate the new king
with the popish clergy, who for some time before had been endeavouring all over
Europe to exempt themselves from the secular power; and whose demands the
conqueror, like a politic prince, thought it prudent to comply with, by reason
that their reputed sanctity had a great influence over the minds of the people;
and because all the little learning of the times was engrossed into their hands.
which made them necessary men, and by all means to be gained over to his
interests. And this was the more easily effected, because the disposal of all the
episcopal sees being then in the breast of the king, he had taken care to fill
them with Italian and Norman prelates.
(d) Mod. Un. Hist. xx, 114.
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2. Another violent alteration of the English constitution consisted in the
depopulation of whole counties, for the purposes of the king's royal diver-
sion; and subjecting both them and all the ancient forests of the kingdom
to the unreasonable severities of forest-laws imported from the continent,
whereby the slaughter of a beast was made almost as penal as the death of a
man. In the Saxon times, though no man was allowed to kill or chase the
king's deer, yet he might start any game, pursue, and kill it, upon his own
estate. But the rigour of these new constitutions vested the sole property of
all the game in England in the king alone; (2) and no man was entitled to
disturb any fowl of the air, or any beast of the field, of such kinds as were
specially reserved for the royal amusement of the sovereign, without express
license from the king by a grant of a chase or free warren: and these fran-
chises were granted as much with a view to preserve the breed of animals as
to indulge the subject. From a similar principle to which, though the forest-
laws are now mitigated, and by degrees *grown entirely obsolete, yet *,6,
from this root has sprung a bastard slip, known by the name of the [46
game-law, now arrived to and wantoning in its highest vigour: both founded
upon the same unreasonable notions of permanent property in wild creatures;
and both productive of the same tyranny to the commons; but with this dif-
ference, that the forest-laws established only one mighty hunter throughout
the land, the game-laws have raised a little Nimrod in every manor. And in
one respect the ancient law was much less unreasonable than the modern:
for the king's grantee of a chase or free-warren might kill game in every part
of his franchise; but now, though a freeholder of less than 1001. a year is for-
bidden to kill a partridge upon his own estate, yet nobody else (not even the
lord of the manor, unless he hath a grant of free-warren) can do it without
committing a trespass, and subjecting himself to an action.
3. A third alteration in the English laws was by narrowing the remedial in-
fluence of the county courts, the great seats of Saxon justice, and extending
the original jurisdiction of the king's justiciars to all kinds of causes, arising
in all parts of the kingdom. To this end the aula regis, with all its multi-
farious authority, was erected; and a capital justiciary appointed, with powers
so large and boundless, that he became at length a tyrant to the people, and
formiaable to the crown itself. The constitution of this court, and the judges
themselves who presided there, were fetched from the duchy of Normandy:
and the consequence naturally was, the ordaining that all proceedings in the
king's courts should be carried on in the Norman, instead of the English lan-
guage. A provision the more necessary, because none of his Norman justiciars
understood English; but as evident a badge of slavery as ever was imposed upon
a conquered people. This lasted till King Edward the Third obtained a double
victory, over the armies of France in their own country, and their language in
our courts here at home. But there was one mischief too deeply rooted thereby,
and which this caution of *King Edward came too late to eradicate. r*417l
Instead of the plain and easy method of determining suits in the county L4]
courts, the chicanes and subtleties of Norman jurisprudence had taken posses-
sion of the king's courts, to which every cause of consequence was drawn. In-
deed that age, and those immediately succeeding it, were the twra of refinement
and subtility. There is an active principle in the human soul, that will ever be
exerting its faculties to its utmost stretch, in whatever employment, by the
accidents of time and place, the general plan of education, or the customs and
manners of the age and country, it may happen to find itself engaged. The
northern conquerors of Europe were then emerging from the grossest ignorance
in point of literature; and those who had leisure to cultivate its progress, were
such only as were cloistered in monasteries, the rest being all soldiers or peas-
ants. And, unfortunately, the first rudiments of science which they imbibed
(2) This is controverted by 31r. Christian, book 2, page 419, note.
Chap. 33.]
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were those of Aristotle's philosophy, conveyed through the medium of his Ara
bian commentators; which were brought from the east by the Saracens into
Palestine and Spain, and translated into barbarous Latin. So that, though the
materials upon which they were naturally employed, in the infancy of a rising
state, were those of the noblest kind; the establishment of religion, and the
regulations of civil polity; yet having only such tools to work with, their exe-
cution was trifling and flimsy. Both the divinity and the law of those times
were therefore frittered into logical distinctions, and drawn out into metaphysi-
cal subtleties, with a skill most amazingly artificial: but which serves no other
purpose than to show the vast powers of the human intellect, however vainly
or preposterously employed. Hence law in particular, which (being in-
tended for universal reception) ought to be a plain rule of action, became a
science of the greatest intricacy; especially when blended with the new refine-
ments engrafted upon feudal property: which refinements were from time to
time gradually introduced by the Norman practitioners, with a view to super-
cede fas they did in great measure) the more homely, but more intelligible,
maxims of distributive justice among the Saxons. And, to say the truth, these
[*418] *scholastic reformers have transmitted their dialect and finesses to pos-
terity, so interwoven in the body of our legal polity that they cannot
now be taken out without a manifest injury to the substance. Statute after
statute has in later times been made, to pare off these troublesome excrescences,
and restore the common law to its pristine simplicity and vigour; and the en-
deavour has greatly succeeded: but still the scars are deep and visible; and the
liberality of our modern courts of justice is frequently obliged to have recourse
to unaccountable fictions and circuities, in order to recover that equitable and
substantial justice, which for a long time was totally buried under the narrow
rules and fanciful niceties of metaphysical and Norman jurisprudence.
4. A fourth innovation was the introduction of the trial by combat, for the
decision of all civil and criminal questions of fact in the last resort. This was
the immemorial practice of all the northern nations; but first reduced to regu-
lar and stated forms among the Burgundi, about the close of the fifth century,
and from them it passed to other nations, particularly the Franks and the Nor-
mans: which last had the honour to establish it here, though clearly an
unchristain, as well as most uncertain, method of trial. But it was a sufficient
recommendation of it to the conqueror and his warlike countrymen, that it was
the usage of their native duchy of Normandy.
5. But the last and most important alteration, both in our civil and military
polity, was the engrafting on all landed estates, a few only excepted, the fiction
of feudal tenure ; which drew after it a numerous and oppressive train of servile
fruits and appendages; aids, reliefs, primer seisins, wardships, marriages, escheats,
and fines for alienation; the genuine consequences of the maxim then adopted,
that all the lands in England were derived from, and holden, mediately or im-
mediately, of the crown.
The nation at this period seems to have groaned under as absolute a slavery
[*419] as was in the power of a warlike, an *ambitious, and a politic prince to
*9 create. The consciences of men were enslaved by sour ecclesiastics,
devoted to a foreign power, and unconnected with the civil state under which
they lived: who now imported from Rome for the first time the whole farrago
of superstitious novelties, which had been engendered by the blindness and cor-
ruption of the times, between the first mission of Augustin, the monk, and the
Norman conquest; such as transubstantiation, purgatory, communion in one
kind, and the worship of saints and images; not forgetting the universal
supremacy and dogmatical infallibility of the holy see. The laws, too, as well
as the prayers, were administered in an unknown tongue. The ancient trial by
jury gave way to the impious decision by battel. The forest-laws totally re-
strained all rural pleasures and manly recreations. And in cities and towns the
case was no better; all company being obliged to disperse, and fire and candle
to be extinguished, by eight at night, at the sound of the melancholy curfeu.
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The ultimate property of all lands, and a considerable share of the present
profits, were vested in the king, or by him granted out to his Norman favour-
ites; who, by a gradual progression of slavery, were absolute vassals to the
crown, and as absolute tyrants to the commons. Unheard of forfeitures, tal-
liages, aids, and fines were arbitrarily extracted from the pillaged landlords, in
pursuance of the new system of tenure. And, to crown all, as a consequence
of the tenure by knight-service, the king had always ready at his command an
army of sixty thousand knights or milites; who were bound, upon pain of con-
fiscating their estates, to attend him in time of invasion, or to quell any domestic
insurrection. Trade, or foreign merchandise, such as it then was, was carried
on by the Jews and Lombards, and the very name of an English fleet, which
King Edward had rendered so formidable, was utterly unknown to Europe: the
nation consisting wholly of the clergy, who were also the lawyers; the barons,
or great lords of the land; the knights, or soldiery, who were the subordinate
landholders; and the burghers, or inferior tradesmen, who, from their insignifi-
cancy, happily retained, in their socage and burgage tenure, some *points [*420]
of their ancient freedom. All the rest were villeins or bondmen.
From so complete and well-concerted a scheme of servility, it has been the
work of generations for our ancestors to redeem themselves and their posterity
into that state of liberty which we now enjoy: and which, therefore, is not to
be looked upon as consisting of mere encroachments on the crown, and infringe-
ments on the prerogative, as some slavish and narrow-minded writers in the
last century endeavoured to maintain; but as, in general, a gradual restoration
of that ancient constitution, whereof our Saxon forefathers had been unjustly
deprived, partly by the policy, and partly by the force, of the Norman. How
that restoration has, in a long series of years, been step by step effected, I now
proceed to inquire,
William Rufus proceeded on his father's plan, and in some points extended
it; particularly with regard to the forest-laws. But his brother and successor,
Henry the First, found it expedient, when first he came to the crown, to in-
gratiate himself with the people; by restoring (as our monkish historians tell
us) the laws of King Edward the Confessor. The ground whereof is this: that
by charter he gave up the great grievances of marriage, ward, and relief, the
beneficial pecuniary fruits of his feudal tenures; but reserved the tenures them-
selves for the same military purposes that his father introduced them. He,
also, abolished the curfeu :(e) for, though it is mentioned in our laws a full
century afterwards,(f) yet it is rather spoken of as a known time of night (so
denominated from that abrogated usage), than as a still subsisting custom.
There is extant a code of laws in his name, consisting partly of those of the
Confessor, but with great additions and alterations of his own; and chiefly
calculated for the regulation of the county courts. It contains some directions
as to crimes and their punishments (that of theft being made capital in his
reign), and a few things relating to estates, * particularly as to the de- *4,,1
scent of lands: which being by the Saxon laws equally to all the sons, [
by the feudal or Norman to the eldest only, King Henry here moderated the
difference; directing the eldest son to have only the principal estate, "primum
patris feudun," the rest of his estates, if he had any others, being equally
divided among them all. On the other hand, he gave up to the clergy the free
election of bishops and mitred abbots: reserving, however, these ensigns of
patronage, conge d'eslire, custody of the temporalties when vacant, and homage
upon their restitution. He lastly united again for a time the civil and ecclesi-
astical courts, which union was soon dissolved by his Norman clergy: and,
upon that final dissolution, the cognizance of testamentary causes seems to
have been first given to the ecclesiastical court. The rest remained as in his
father's time; from whence we may easily perceive how far short this was of a
thorough restitution of King Edward's, or the Saxon laws.
The usurper Stephen, as the manner of usurpers is, promised much at his
(e) Spelm. Cod. LL. Wm. I, 288. Hen. I, 299. (.f) Stat. Civ. Load. ma Edw. I.
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accession, especially with regard to redressing the grievances of the forest-laws,
but performed no great matter either in that or in any other point. It is from
his reign, however, that we are to date the introduction of the Roman civil
and canon laws into this realm: and at the same time was imported the doc-
trine of appeals to the court of Rome, as a branch of the canon law.
By the time of King Henry the Second, if not earlier, the charter of Henr
the First seems to have been forgotten: for we find the claim of marriage, ward,
and relief, then flourishing in full vigour. The right of primogeniture seems
also to have tacitly revived, being found more convenient for the public than
the parcelling of estates into a multitude of minute subdivisions. However, in
this prince's reign much was done to methodize the laws, and reduce them into a
regular order; as appears from that excellent treatise of Glanvil; which, though
some of it be now antiquated and altered, yet, when compared with the code of
Henry the First, *carries a manifest superiority.(g) Throughout his
[*421reign, also, was continued the important struggle, which we have had
occasion so often to mention, between the laws of England and Rome: the
former supported by the strength of the temporal nobility, when endeavoured
to be supplanted in favour of the latter by the popish clergy. Which dispute
was kept on foot till the reign of Edward the First: when the laws of England,
under the new discipline introduced by that skilful commander, obtained a
complete and permanent victory. In the present reign of Henry the Second,
there are four things which peculiarly merit the attention of a legal antiquarian:
1. The constitutions of the parliament at Clarendon, A. D. 1164, whereby the
king checked the power of the pope and his clergy, and greatly narrowed the
total exemption they claimed from the secular jurisdiction: though his farther
progress was unhappily stopped by the fatal event of the disputes between him
and Archbishop Becket. 2. The institution of the office of justices in eyre,
in itinere; the king having divided the kingdom into six circuits (a little dif-
ferent from the present), and commissioned these new created judges to ad-
minister justice, and try writs of assize in the several counties. These remedies
are said to have been then first invented; before which all causes were usually
terminated in the county courts, according to the Saxon custom; or before the
king's justiciaries in the aula regis, in pursuance of the Norman regulations.
The latter of which tribunals, traveling about with the king's person, occasioned
intolerable expense and delay to the suitors; and the former, however proper
for little debts or minute actions, where even injustice is better than procrasti-
nation, were now become liable to too much ignorance of the law, and too much
partiality as to facts, to determine matters of considerable moment. 3. The
introduction and establishment of the grand assize, or trial by special kind ofjury in a writ of right, at the option of the tenant or defendant, instead of the
barbarous and. Norman trial by battel. 4. To this time must also be referred the
[*423] introduction of escuage, or pecuniary *commutation for personal mili-
tary service; which in process of time was the parent of the ancient
subsidies granted to the crown by parliament, and the land tax of later times.
Richard the First, a brave and magnanimous prince, was a sportsman as well
as a soldier; and, therefore, enforced the forest laws with some rigour; which
occasioned many discontents among his people: though (according to Matthew
Paris) he repealed the penalties of castration, loss of eyes, and cutting off the
hands and feet, before inflicted on such as transgressed in hunting; probably
finding that their severity prevented prosecutions. He also, when abroad, com-
posed a body of naval laws at the Isle of Oleron, which are still extant, and of
high authority; for in his time we began again to discover, that (as an island)
we were natur ally a maritime power. But with regard to civil proceedings, we
find nothing very remarkable in this reign, except a few regulations regarding
the Jews, and the justices in eyre: the king's thoughts being chiefly taken up
by the knight errantry of a croisade against the Saracens in the holy land.
In King John's time, and that of his son, Henry the Third, the rigours of the
(g) Hal. Hist. C. L. 138
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feudal tenures and the forest laws were so warmly kept up, that they occasioned
many insurrections of the barons or principal feudatories : which at last had this
effect, that first King John, and afterwards his son, consented to the two famous
charters of English liberties, magna carta and carta deforesta. Of these the latter
was well calculated to redress many grievances and encroachments of the crown, in
the exertion of forest law: and the former confirmed many liberties of the church,
and redressed many grievances incident to feudal tenures, of no small moment
at the time; though now, unless considered attentively and with this retrospect,
they seem but of trifling concern. But, besides these feudal provisions, care was
also taken therein to protect the subject against other oppressions, then frequently
arising from unreasonable amercements, from illegal distresses, or other process
for debts or services due to the crown, and *from the tyrannical abuse [*424]
of the prerogative of purveyance and pre-emption. It fixed the forfeiture
of lands for felony in the same manner as it still remains; prohibited for the
future the grants of exclusive fisheries; and the erection of new bridges so as to
oppress the neighbourhood. With respect to private rights: it established the
testamentary power of the subject over part of his personal estate, the rest being
distributed among his wife and children; it laid down the law of dower, as it
hath continued ever since; and prohibited the appeals of women, unless for the
death of their husbands. In matters of public police and national concern: it
enjoined an uniformity of weights and measures; gave new encouragements to
commerce, by the protection of merchant strangers; and forbad the alienation
of lands in mortmain. With regard to the administration of justice: besides
prohibiting all denials or delays of it, it fixed the court of common pleas at
Westminster, that the suitors might no longer be harassed with following the
king's person in all his progresses; and at the same time brought the trial of
issues home to the very doors of the freeholders, by directing assizes to be taken
in the proper counties, and establishing annual circuits; it also corrected some
abuses then incident to the trials by wager of law and of battel; directed the
regular awarding of inquest for life or member; prohibited the king's inferior
ministers from holding pleas of the crown, or trying any criminal charge,
whereby many forfeitures might otherwise have unjustly accrued to the ex-
chequer: and regulated the time and place of holding the inferior tribunals
of justice, the county court, sheriff's tourn, and court-leet. It confirmed and
established the liberties of the city of London, and all other cities, boroughs,
towns, and ports of the kingdom. And, lastly (which alone would have merited
the title that it bears, of the great charter), it protected every individual of
the nation in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty, and his property, unless
declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.(3)
*However, by means of these struggles, the pope, in the reign of King [*42
John, gained a still greater ascendant here, than he ever had before 5
enjoyed; which continued through the long reign of his son, Henry the Third:
in the beginning of whose time the old Saxon trial by ordeal was also totally abol-
ished. And we may by this time perceive, in Bracton's treatise, a still farther
improvement in the method and regularity of the common law, especially in the
point of pleadings.(h) Nor must it be forgotten, that the first traces which remain
of the separation of the greater barons from the less, in the constitution of
parliaments, are found in the great charter of King John; though omitted in
that of Henry III, and that, towards the end of the latter of the sereigns, we
(A) Hal. Hist. C. L. 156.
(3) [The following is the celebrated 29th chapter of magna carta, the foundation of the
liberty of Englishmen.
"Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, ant disseisiatur de libero tenemento suo vel
libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, ant utlagetur, aut ex ulet, ant aliquo modo destruatur,
nec super eum ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel
per legem terrm. Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justiciam."]
This is the chapter as it stood in the charter as confirmed by Henry III. In the original
charter it was somewhat different. See Blackstone's Charters; Cooley's Const. Lim. 351, note.
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find the first record of any writ for summoning knights, citizens and burgesses
to parliament. And here we conclude the second period of our English legal
history.
Ill. The third commences with the reign of Edward the First, who hath
justly been styled our English Justinian. For in his time the law did receive
so sudden a perfection, that Sir Matthew Hale does not scruple to affirm,(i) that
more was done in the first thirteen years of his reign to settle and establish the
distributive j astice of the kingdom, than in all the ages since that time put
together.
It would be endless to enumerate all the particulars of these regulations; but
the principal may be reduced under the following general heads. 1. He estab-
lished, confirmed, and settled the great charter and charter of forests. 2. He
gave a mortal wound to the encroachments of the pope and his clergy, by limit-
ing and establishing the bounds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: and by obliging
the ordinary, to whom all the goods of intestates at that time belonged, to dis-
charge the debts of the deceased. 3. He defined the limits of the several tem-
poral courts of the highest jurisdiction, those of the king's bench, common
[*426] pleas, and exchequer; so as *they might not interfere with each other's
proper business: to do which they must now have recourse to a fiction,
very necessary and beneficial in the present enlarged state of property. 4. He
settled the boundaries of the inferior courts in counties, hundreds and manors:
confining them to causes of no great amount, according to their primitive insti-
tution: though of considerably greater, than by the alteration of the value of
money they are now permitted to determine. 5. He secured the property of the
subject, by abolishing all arbitrary taxes and talliages, levied without the con-
sent of the national council. 6. He guarded the common justice of the king-
dom from abuses, by giving up the royal prerogative of sending mandates to
interfere in privatQ causes. 7. He settled the form, solemnities and effect of
fines levied in the court of common pleas: though the thing itself was of
Saxon original. 8. He first established a repository for the public records of the
kingdom; few of which are ancienter than the reign of his father, and those
were by him collected. 9. He improved upon the laws of King Alfred, by that
great and orderly method of watch and ward, for preserving the public peace
and preventing robberies, established by the statute of Winchester. 10. He
settled and reformed many abuses incident to tenures, and removed some
restraints on the alienation of landed property, by the statute of quia emptores.
11. He instituted a speedier way for the recovery of debts, by granting execu-
tion, not only upon goods and chattels, but also upon lands, by writ of elegit ;
which was of signal benefit to a trading people: and, upon the same commer-
cial ideas, he also allowed the charging of lands in a statute merchant, to pay
debts contracted in trade, contrary to all feudal principles. 12. He effectually
provided for the recovery of advowsons, as temporal rights; in which, before,
the law was extremely deficient. 13. He also effectually closed the great gulf,
in which all the landed property of the kingdom was in danger of being swal-
lowed, by his reiterated statutes of mortmain; most admirably adapted to meet
the frauds that had then been devised, though afterwards contrived to be evaded
[*427] by the invention of uses. *14. He established a new limitation of
property by the creation of estates-tail; concerning the good policy of
which, modern times have, however, entertained a very different opinion.
15. He reduced all Wales to the subjection, not only of the crown, but in great
measure of the laws of England (which was thoroughly completed in the reign
of Henry the Eighth); and seems to have entertained a design of doing the like
by Scotland, so as to have formed an entire and complete union of the island
of Great Britain.
I might continue this catalogue much farther-but upon the whole we may
observe, that the very scheme and model of the administration of common
(0 Hal. Hist. C. L. 158.
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justice between party and party, was entirely settled by this king :(k) and has
continued nearly the same, in all succeeding ages, to this day, abating some few
alterations, which the humour or necessity of subsequent times hath occasioned.
The forms of writs, by which actions are commenced, were perfected in his
reign, and established as models for posterity. The pleadings, consequent upon
the writs, were then short, nervous and perspicuous; not intricate, verbose and
formal. The legal treatises, written in his time, as Britton, Fleta, Heugham,
and the rest, are, for the most part, law at this day; or at least were so, till the
alteration of tenures took place. And, to conclude, it is from this period, from
the exact observation of magna carta, rather than from its making or renewal,
in the days of his grandfather and father, that the liberty of Englishmen began
again to rear its head: though the weight of the military tenures hung heavy
upon it for many ages after.
I cannot give a better proof of the excellence of his constitutions than that
from his time to that of Henry the Eighth, there happened very few, and those
not very considerable, alterations in the legalforms of proceedings. As to matter
of substance: the old Gothic powers of electing the principal subordinate magis-
trates, the sheriffs, and *conservators of the peace, were taken from the [*428]
people in the reigns of Edward II and Edward III; and justices of the
peace were established instead of the latter. In the reign, also, of Edward the
Third, the parliament is supposed most probably to have assumed its present
form; by a separation of the commons from the lords. The statute for defining
and ascertaining treasons was one of the first productions of this new-modelled
assembly; and the translation of the law proceedings from French into Latin
another. Much also was done, under the auspices of this magnanimous prince,
for establishing our domestic manufactures; by prohibiting the exportation of
English wool, and the importation or wear of foreign cloth or furs; and by
encouraging cloth-workers from other countries to settle here. Nor was the
legislature inattentive to many other branches of commerce, or, indeed, to com-
merce in general: for, in particular, it enlarged the credit of the merchant, by
introducing the statute staple; whereby he might the more readily pledge his
lands for the security of his mercantile debts. And, as personal property now
grew by the extension of trade to be much more considerable than formerly,
care was taken, in case of intestacies, to appoint administrators, particularly
nominated by the law, to distribute that personal property among the creditors
and kindred of the deceased, which before had been usually applied, by the
officers of the ordinary, to uses then denominated pious. The statutes also of
prcsmunire, for effectually depresssing the civil power of the pope, were the work
of this and the subsequent reign. And the establishment of a laborious parochial
clergy, by the endowment of vicarages out of the overgrown possessions of the
monasteries, added lustre to the close of the fourteenth century: though the seeds
of the general reformation, which were thereby first sown in the kingdom, were
almost overwhelmed by the spirit of persecution, introduced into the laws of the
land by the influence of the regular clergy.
From this time to that of Henry the Seventh, the civil wars and disp~uted
titles to the crown gave no leisure for farther *juridical improvement;
"nam silent leges inter arma." And yet it is to these very disputes that [*429]
we owe the happy loss of all the dominions of the crown on the continent of
France; which turned the minds of our subsequent princes entirely to domestic
concerns. To these, likewise, we owe the method of barring entails by the fiction
of vommon recoveries; invented originally by the clergy, to evade the statutes
of mortmain, but introduced under Edward the Fourth for the purpose of un-
fettering estates, and making them more liable to forfeiture: while, on the
other hand, the owners endeavoured to protect them by the universal establish-
ment of uses, another of the clerical inventions.
In the reign of Henry the Seventh, his ministers (not to say the king himself)
were more industrious in hunting out prosecutions upon old and forgotten penal
(k) Hal. Hist. C. L. 162.
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laws, in order to extort money from the subject, than in framing any new and
beneficial regulations. For the distinguishing character of this reign was that
of amassing treasure in the king's coffers, by every means that could be devised:
and almost every alteration in the laws, however salutary or otherwise in their
future consequences, had this and this only for their great and immediate object.
To this end the court of star-chamber was new-modeled, and armed with powers
the most dangerous and unconstitutional, over the persons and properties of
the subject. Informations were allowed to be received, in lieu of indictments,
at the assizes and sessions of the peace, in order to multiply fines and pecuniary
penalties. The statute of fines for landed property was craftily and covertly
contrived, to facilitate the destruction of entails, and make the owners of real
estates more capable to forfeit as well as to alien. The benefit of clergy (which
so often intervened to stop attainders and save the inheritance) was now allowed
only once to lay offenders who only could have inheritances to lose. A writ of
capias was permitted in all actions on the case, and the defendant might in con-
sequence be outlawed; b6cause upon such outlawry his goods became the prop-
[*430] erty of the crown. In short, there is hardly a statute in this reign *in-
troductive of a new law, or modifying the old, but what either directly
or obliquely tended to the emolument of the exchequer.
IV. This brings us to the fourth period of our legal history, viz.: the reforma-
tion of religion under Henry the Eighth, and his children; which opens an
entire new scene in ecclesiastical matters; the usurped power of the pope being
now forever routed and destroyed, all his connections with this island cut off,
the crown restored to its supremacy over spiritual men and causes, and the
atronage of bishoprics being once more indisputably vested in the king. And,
ad the spiritual courts been at this time reunited to the civil, we should have
seen the old Saxon constitution with regard to the ecclesiastical polity com-
pletely restored.
With regard also to our civil polity, the statute of wills, and the statute of
uses (both passed in the reign of this prince), made a great alteration as to
property: the former by allowing the devise of real estates by will, which before
was in general forbidden; the latter, by endeavouring to destroy the intricate
nicety of uses, though the narrowness and pedantry of the courts of common
law prevented this statute from having its full beneficial effect. And thence
the courts of equity assumed a jurisdiction, dictated by common justice and
common sense: which, however arbitrarily exercised or productive of jealousies
in its infancy, has at length been matured into a most elegant system of rational
jurisprudence; the principles of which (notwithstanding they may differ in
forms) are now equally adopted by the courts of both law and equity. From the
statute of uses, and another statute of the same antiquity (which protected estates
for years from being destroyed by the reversioner), a remarkable alteration took
place in the mode of conveyancing: the ancient assurance of feoffment and
livery upon the land being now very seldom practiced, since the more easy
and more private invention of transferring property, by secret conveyances to
uses, and long terms of years, being now continually created in mortgages
[*431] *and family settlements, which may be moulded to a thousand useful
[*41]purposes by the ingenuity of an able artist.
The farther attacks in this reign upon the immunity of estates-tail, which
reduced them to a little more than the conditional fees at the common law,
before the passing of the statute de donis; the establishment of recognizances in
the nature of a statute-staple, for facilitating the raising of money upon landed
security; and the introduction of the bankrupt laws, as well for the punish-
ment of the fraudulent, as the relief of the unfortunate, trader; all these were
capital alterations of our legal polity, and highly convenient to that character,
which the English began now to re-assume, of a great commercial people. The
incorporation of Wales with England, and the more uniform administration of
justice, by destroying some counties palatine, and abridging the unreasonable
privileges of such as remained, added dignity and strength to the monarchy;
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and, together with the numerous improvements before observed upon, and the
redress of many grievances and oppressions which had been introduced by his
father, will ever make the administration of Henry VIII a very distinguished
sara in the annals of judicial history.
It must be however remarked, that (particularly in his latter years) the royal
prerogative was then strained to a very tyrannical and oppressive height; and,
what was the worst circumstance, its encroachments were established by law,
under the sanction of those pusillanimous parliaments, one of which, to its
eternal disgrace, passed a statute, whereby it was enacted that the king's proc-
lamations should have the force of acts of parliament; and others concurred in
the creation of that amazing heap of wild and new-fangled treasons, which
were slightly touched upon in a former chapter.(l) Happily for the nation,
this arbitrary reign was succeeded by the minority of an amiable prince; during
the short sunshine of which, great part of these extravagant laws were repealed.
And to do justice to the shorter reign of Queen Mary, *many salutary F*4321
and popular laws in civil matters were made under her administration; [*432
perhaps the better to reconcile the people to the bloody measures which she was
induced to pursue, for the re-establishment of religious slavery: the well-con-
certed schemes for effecting which, were (through the providence of God)
defeated by theseasonable accession of Queen Elizabeth.
The religious liberties of the nation being, by that happy event, established
(we trust) on an eternal basis (though obliged in their infancy to be guarded,
against papists and other non-conformists, by laws of too sanguinary a nature) ;
the forest-laws having fallen into disuse; and the administration of civil rights
in the courts of justice being carried on in a regular course, according to the
wise institutions of King Edward the First, without any material innovations;
all the principal grievances introduced by the Norman conquest seem to have
been gradually shaken off, and our Saxon constitution restored, with consider-
able improvements: except only in the continuation of the military tenures,
and a few other points, which still armed the crown with a very oppressive and
dangerous prerogative. It is also to be remarked that the spirit of enriching
the clergy and endowing religious houses had (through the former abuse of it)
gone over to such a contrary extreme, and the princes of the house of Tudor
and their favourites had fallen with such avidity upon the spoils of the church,
that a decent and honourable maintenance was wanting to many of the bishops
and clergy. This produced the restraining statutes, to prevent the alienation
of lands and tithes belonging to the church and universities. The number of
indigent persons being also greatly increased, by withdrawing the alms of the
monasteries, a plan was formed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, more humane
and beneficial than even feeding and clothing of millions; by affording them
the means (with proper industry) to feed and to clothe themselves. And, the
farther any subsequent plans for maintaining the poor have departed from this
institution, the more impracticable and even pernicious their visionary attempts
have proved.
*However, considering the reign of Queen Elizabeth in a great and F*433]
political view, we have no reason to regret many subsequent alterations in. L 
the English constitution. For, though in general she was a wise and excellent
princess, and loved her people; though in her time trade flourished, riches
increased, the laws were duly administered, the nation was respected abroad, and
the people happy at home: yet the increase of the power of the star-chamber,
and the erection of the high commission court in matters ecclesiastical, were
the work of her reign. She also kept her parliament at a very awful distance:
and in many particulars she, at times, would carry the prerogative as high as
her most arbitrary predecessors. It is true, she very seldom exerted this pre-
rogative, so as to oppress individuals; but still she had it to exert: and there-
fore the felicity of her reign depended more on her want of opportunity and
inclination, than want of power, to play the tyrant. This is a high enconium
() See page 86. -
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on her merit; but at the same time it is sufficient to show, that these were not
those golden days of genuine liberty that we formerly were taught to believe:
for surely, the true liberty of the subject consists not so much in the gracious
behaviour, as in the limited power, of the sovereign.
The great revolutions that had happened, in manners and in property, had
paved the way, by imperceptible yet sure degrees, for as great a revolution in
government: yet, while that revolution was effecting, the crown became more
arbitrary than ever, by the progress of those very means which afterwards
reduced its power. It is obvious to every observer that, till the close of the
Lancastrian civil wars, the property and the power of the nation were chiefly
divided between the king, the nobility, and the clergy. The commons were
generally in a state of great ignorance; their personal wealth, before the exten-
sion of trade, was comparatively small; and the nature of their landed property
was such as kept them in continual dependence.upon their feudal lord, being
[*434] usually some powerful baron, some opulent abbey, *or sometimes the king
[] himself. Though a notion of general liberty had strongly pervaded
and animated the whole constitution, yet the particular liberty, the natural
equality, and personal independence of individuals, were little regarded or
thought of; nay, even to assert them was treated as the height of sedition and
rebellion. Our ancestors beard, with detestation and horror, those sentiments
rudely delivered, and pushed to most absurd extremes, by the violence of a Cade
and a Tyler; which have since been applauded, with a zeal almost rising to
idolatry, when softened and recommended by the eloquence, the moderation,
and the arguments of a Sidney, a Locke, and a Milton.
But when learning, by the invention of printing and the progress of religious
reformation, began to be universally disseminated; when trade and navigation
were suddenly carried to an amazing extent, by the use of the compass and
the consequent discovery of the Indies; the minds of men, thus enlightened by
science and enlarged by observation and travel, began to entertain a more just
opinion of the dignity and rights of mankind. An inundation of wealth flowed
in upon the merchants, and middling rank; while the two great estates of the
kingdom, which formerly had balanced the prerogative, the nobility and clergy,
were greatly impoverished and weakened. The popish clergy, detected in their
frauds and abuses, exposed to the resentment of the populace, and stripped of
their land and revenues, stood trembling for their very existence. The nobles,
enervated by the refinements of luxury (which knowledge, foreign travel and
the progress of the politer arts, are too apt to introduce with themselves), and
fired with disdain at being rivaled in magnificence by the opulent citizens, fell
into enormous expenses; to gratify which they were permitted, by the policy of
the times, to dissipate their overgrown estates, and alienate their ancient patri-
monies. This gradually reduced their power and their influence within a very
moderate bound: while the king, by the spoil of the monasteries and the great
increase of the customs, grew rich, independent and haughty; and the
[*435] *commons were not yet sensible of the strength they had acquired, nor
urged to examine its extent by new burthens or oppressive taxations,
during the sudden opulence of the exchequer. Intent upon acquiring new
riches, and happy in being freed from the insolence and tyranny of the orders
more immediately above them, they never dreamed of opposing the prerogative
to which they had been so little accustomed; much less of taking the lead in
opposition, to which by their weight and their property they were now entitled.
The latter years of Henry the Eighth were therefore the times of the greatest
despotism that have been known in this island since the death of William the
Norman: the prerogative as it then stood by common law (and much more
when extended by act of parliament), being too large to be endured in a land
of liberty.
Queen Elizabeth, and the intermediate princes of the Tudor line, had almost
the same legal powers, and sometimes exerted them as roughly, as their father,
King Henry the Eighth. But the critical situation of that princess with
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regard to her legitimacy, her religion, her enmity with Spain, and her jealousy
of the Queen of Scots, occasioned greater caution in her conduct. She, proba-
bly, or her able advisers, had penetration enough to discern how the power of
the kingdom had gradually shifted its channel, and wisdom enough not to pro-
voke the commons to discover and feel their strength. She therefore threw a
veil over the odious part of the prerogative; which was never wantonly thrown
aside, but only to answer some important purpose: and, though the royal
treasury no longer overflowed with the wealth of the clergy, which had been all
granted out, and had contributed to enrich the people, she asked for supplies
with such moderation, and managed them with so much economy, that the
commons were happy in obliging her. Such, in short, were her circumstances,
her necessities, her wisdom and her good disposition, that never did a prince so
long and so entirely, for the space of half a century together, reign in the
affections of the people.
*On the accession of King James I, no new degree of royal power
was added to or exercised by him; but such a sceptre was too weighty [*436]
to be wielded by such a hand. The unreasonable and imprudent exertion of
what was then deemed to be prerogative, upon trivial and unworthy occasions, and
the claim of a more absolute power inherent in the kingly office than had ever
been carried into practice, soon awakened the sleeping lion. The people heard
with astonishment doctrines preached from the throne and the pulpit, subver-
sive of liberty and property, and all the natural rights of humanity. They
examined into the divinity of this claim, and found it weakly and fallaciously
supported: and common reason assured them, that if it were of human origin,
no constitution could establish it without power of revocation, no precedent
could sanctify, no length of time could confirm it. The leaders felt the pulse
of the nation, and found they had ability as well as inclination to resist it: and
accordingly resisted and opposed it, whenever the pusillanimous temper of the
reigning monarch had courage to put it to the trial; and they gained some little
victories in the cases of concealments, monopolies and the dispensing power.
In the mean time, very little was done for the improvement of private justice,
except the abolition of sanctuaries, and the extension of the bankrupt laws, the
limitation of suits and actions, and the regulating of informations upon penal
statutes. For I cannot class the laws against witchcraft and conjuration under
the head of improvements; nor did the dispute between Lord Ellesmere and
Sir Edward Coke, concerning the powers of the court of chancery, tend much
to the advancement of justice.
Indeed, when Charles First succeeded to the crown of his father, and at-
tempted to revive some enormities, which had been dormant in the reign of
King James, the loans and benevolences extorted from the subject, the arbi-
trary imprisonments for refusal, the exertion of martial law in time of peace,
and other domestic grievances, clouded the morning of that *misguided 437]
prince's reign; which, though the noon of it began a little to brighten, [* -7
at last went down in blood, and left the whole kingdom in darkness. It must
be acknowledged that, by the petition of right, enacted to abolish these en-
croachments, the English constitution received great alteration and improve-
ment. But there still remained the latent power of the forest-laws, which the
crown most unseasonably revived. The legal jurisdiction of the star-chamber
and high commission courts was extremely great; though their usurped
authority was still greater. And if we add to these the disuse of parliaments, the
ill-timed zeal and despotic proceedings of the ecclesiastical governors in matters
of mere indifference, together with the arbitrary levies of tonnage and pound-
age, ship-money and other projects, we may see grounds most amply sufficient
for seeking redress in a legal, constitutional way. This redress, when sought,
was also constitutionally given: for all these oppressions were actually abol-
ished by the king in parliament, before the rebellion broke out, by the several
statutes for triennial parliaments, for abolishing the star-chamber and high
commission courts, for ascertaining the extent of forests and forest-laws, for
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renouncing ship-money and other exactions, and for giving up the prerogative
of knighting the king's tenants in capite in consequence of their feudal tenures;
though it must be acknowledged that these concessions were not made with so
good a grace as to conciliate the confidence of the people. Unfortunately,
either by his own mismanagment, or by the arts of his enemies, the king had
lost the reputation of sincerity; which is the greatest unhappiness that can
befall a prince. Though he formerly had strained his prerogative, not only
beyond what the genius of the present times would bear, but also beyond the
examples of former ages, he had now consented to reduce it to a lower ebb than
was consistent with monarchical government. A conduct so opposite to his
temper and principles, joined with some rash actions and unguarded expressions,
made the people suspect that this condescension was merely temporary. Flushed,
[*438] therefore, with the success they had gained, fired with resentment for
past oppressions, *and dreading the consequences if the king should
regain his power, the popular leaders (who in all ages have called themselves the
people) began to grow insolent and ungovernable: their insolence soon ren-
dered them desperate: and despair at length forced them to join with a set of
military hypocrites and enthusiasts, who overturned the church and monarchy,
and proceeded with deliberate solemnity to the trial and murder of their sovereign.
I pass by the crude and abortive schemes for amending the laws in the times
of confusion which followed; the most promising and sensible whereof (such
as the establishment of new trials, the abolition of feudal tenures, the act of
navigation, and some others) were adopted in the
V. Fifth period, which I am next to mention, viz., after the restoration of
King Charles II. Immediately upon which, the principal remaining grievance,
the doctrine and consequences of military tenures, were taken away and abol-
ished, except in the instance of corruption of inheritable blood, upon attainder
of treason and felony: And though the monarch, in whose person the regal
government was restored, and with it our ancient constitution, deserves no com-
mendation from posterity, yet in his reign (wicked, sanguinary and turbulent
as it was), the concurrence of happy circumstances was such that from thence
we may date not only the re-establishment of our church and monarchy, but
also the complete restitution of English liberty, for the first time since its total
abolition at the conquest. For therein not only these slavish tenures, the badge
of foreign dominion, with all their oppressive appendages, were removed from
incumbering the estates of the subject; but also an additional security of his
person from imprisonment was obtained by that great bulwark of our constitu-
tion, the habeas corpus act. These two statutes, with regard to our property
and persons, form a second magna carta, as beneficial and effectual as that of
Running-Mead. That only pruned the luxuriances of the feudal system; but
[*439] the statute of Charles the Second extirpated all its *slaveries; except
perhaps in copyhold tenure; and there also they are now in great meas-
ure enervated by gradual custom, and the interposition of our courts of justice.
Magna carta only, in general terms, declared, that no man should be imprisoned
contrary to law: the habeas corpus act points him out effectual means, as well
to release himself, though committed even by the king in council, as to punish all
those who shall thus unconstitutionally misuse him.
To these I may add the abolition of the prerogatives of purveyance and pre-
emption; the statute for holding triennial parliaments; the test and corporation
acts, which secure both our civil and religious liberties; the abolition of the
writ de hceretico comburendo; the statute of frauds and perjuries, a great and
necessary security to private property; the statute for distribution of intestates'
estates, and that of amendments and jeofails, which cut off those superfluous
niceties which so long had disgraced our courts; together with many other
wholesome acts that were passed in this reign, for the benefit of navigation and
the improvement of foreign commerce: and the whole, when we likewise con-
sider the freedom from taxes and armies which the subject then enjoyed, will
be sufficient to demonstrate this truth, "that the constitution of England bad
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arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative
was happily established by law, in the reign of King Charles the Second.'
It is far from my intention to palliate or defend many very iniquitous proceed-
ings, contrary to all law, in that reign, through the artifice of wicked politi-
cians, both in and out of employment. What seems incontestible is this; that
by the law,(m) as it then stood (notwithstanding some invidious, nay, danger-
ous, branches of the prerogative have since been lopped *off, and the [*440
rest more clearly defined), the people had as large a portion of real lib- ]
erty as is consistent with a state of society; and sufficient power, residing in
their own hands, to assert and preserve that liberty, if invaded by the royal
prerogative. For which I need but appeal to the memorable catastrophe of the
next reign. For when King Charles's deluded brother attempted to enslave the
nation, he found it was beyond his power: the people both could, and did, resist
him; and, in consequence of such resistance, obliged him to quit his enterprise
and his throne together. Which introduces us to the last period of our legal
history, viz.:
VI. From the revolution in 1688 to the present time. In this period many
laws have passed; as the bill of rights, the toleration-act, the act of settlement,
with its conditions, the act for uniting England with Scotland, and some others:
which have asserted our liberties in more clear and emphatical terms; have reg-
ulated the succession of the crown by parliament, as the exigencies of religious
and civil freedom required; have confirmed and exemplified the doctrine of
resistance, when the executive magistrate endeavours to subvert the constitu-
tion ; have maintained the superiority of the laws above the king, by pronounc-
ing his dispensing power to be illegal; have indulged tender consciences with
every religious liberty, consistent with the safety of the state; have established
triennial, since turned into septennial, elections of members to serve in parlia-
ment; have excluded certain officers from the house of commons; have re-
strained the king's pardon from obstructing parliamentary impeachments; have
imparted to all the lords an equal right of trying their fellow-peers; have reg-
ulated trials for high treason; have afforded our posterity a hope that corrup-
tion of blood may one day be abolished and forgotten; have (by the desire of
his present majesty) set bounds to the civil list, and placed the administration
of that revenue in hands that are accountable to parliament; and have (by the
like desire) made the judges completely independent of the king, his ministers,
and his successors. Yet, though these provisions have, in appearance and
*nominally, reduced the strength of the executive power to a much [*441]
lower ebb than in the preceding period; if on the other band we throw into I
the opposite scale (what perhaps the immoderate reduction of the ancient pre-
rogative may have rendered in some degree necessary) the vast acquisition of
force, arising from the riot-act, and the annual expedience of a standing army;
and the vast acquisition of personal attachment, arising from the magnitude of
the national debt, and the manner of levying those yearly millions that are
appropriated to pay the interest; we shall find that the crown has, gradually
and imperceptibly, gained almost as much in influence as it has apparently lost
in prerogative.
The chief alterations of moment (for the time would fail me to descend to
minutiwv) in the administration of private justice during this period, are the
solemn recognition of the law of nations with respect to the rights of ambassa-
dors: the cutting off, by the statute for the amendment of the law, a vast num-
ber of excrescences, that in process of time had sprung out of the practical
part of it: the protection of corporate rights by the improvements in writs
of mandamus, and informations in nature of quo warranto: the regulations of
trials by jury, and the admitting witnesses for prisoners upon oath: the farther
restraints upon alienation of lands in mortmain: the annihilation of the ter-
rible judgment of peinefort et dure: the extension of the benefit of clergy, by
(m) The point of time at which I would choose to fix this theoretical perfection of our public law, Is in the
year 1679, after the habeas corps act was passed, and that for licensing the press had expired; though the years
which immediately followed it were times of great practkal oppression.
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abolishing the pedantic criterion of reading: the counterbalance to this mercy,
by the vast increase of capital punishment: the new and effectual methods for
the speedy recovery of rents: the improvements which have been made in
ejectments for the trying of titles: the introduction and establishment of paper-
credit, by indorsements upon bills and notes, which have shown the legal possi-
bility and convenience (which our ancestors so long doubted) of assigning a
chose in action; the translation of all legal proceedings into the English lan-
guage: the erection of courts of conscience for recovering small debts, and
(which is much the better plan) the reformation of county courts: the
great system of marine jurisprudence, of which the foundations have been laid,
[*442] by clearly *developing the principles on which policies of insurance are
founded, and by happily applying those principles to particular cases:
and, lastly, the liberality of sentiment, which (though late) has now taken pos-
session of our courts of common law, and induced them to adopt (where facts
can be clearly ascertained) the same principles of redress as have prevailed in
our courts of equity, from the time that Lord Nottingham presided there; and
this, not only where specially empowered by particular statutes (as in the case
of bonds, mortgages, and set-offs), but by extending the remedial influence of
the equitable writ of trespass on the case according to its primitive institution
by King Edward the First, to almost every instance of injustice not remedied
by any other process. And these, I think, are all the material alterations that
have happened with respect to private justice in the course of the present century.
Thus, therefore, for the amusement and instruction of the student, I have
endeavoured to delineate some rude outlines of a plan for the history of our laws
and liberties; from their first rise and gradual progress, among our British and
Saxon ancestors, till their total eclipse at the Norman conquest; from which
they have gradually emerged, and risen to the perfection they now enjoy, at dif-
ferent periods of time. We have seen, in the course of our inquiries, in this
and the former books, that the fundamental maxims and rules of the law, which
regard the rights of persons, and the rights of things, the private injuries that
may be offered to both, and the crimes which affect the public, have been and
are every day improving, and are now fraught with the accumulated wisdom of
ages; that the forms of administering justice came to perfection under Edward
the First; and have not been much varied, nor always for the better, since:
that our religious liberties were fully established at the reformation: but that
the recovery of our civil and political liberties was a work of longer time: they
not being thoroughly and completely regained till after the restoration of King
Charles, nor fully and explicitly acknowledged and defined till the era of the
[*443] happy revolution. Of a constitution so wisely contrived, *so strongly
raised, and so highly finished, it is hard to speak with that praise which
is justly and severely its due :-the thorough and attentive contemplation of it will
furnish its best panegyric. It hath been the endeavour of these Commentaries,
however the execution may have succeeded, to examine its solid foundations, to
mark out its extensive plan, to explain the use and distribution of its parts, and,
from the harmonious concurrence of those several parts, to demonstrate the ele-
gant proportion of the whole. We have taken occasion to admire at every turn
the noble monuments of ancient simplicity, and the more curious refinements
of modern art. Nor have its faults been concealed from view, for faults it has,
lest we should be tempted to think it of more than human structure; defects,
chiefly arising from the decays of time, or the rage of unskilful improvements
in later ages. To sustain, to repair, to beautify this noble pile, is a charge in-
trusted principally to the nobility, and such gentlemen of the kingdom as are
delegated by their country to parliament. The protection of THE LIBERTY OF
BRITAIN is a duty which they owe to themselves, who enjoy it; to their ances-
tors, who transmitted it down; and to their posterity, who will claim at their
hands this, the best birthright, and noblest inheritance of mankind.(4)
(4) The just exultation with which our commentator reviewed the gradual improvement il
the laws of England, which had continued to his own time, may well be felt by the English
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statesmen of the present day, when the legislation of the succeeding period is presented to his
view. During no equal period in English history were the changes in the English constitution
so great and manifest, nor the modifications in English law so radical or so beneficent. In-
deed, the England of to-day is, in many particulars, so different from the England of Black-
stone's time, and its system of law is pervaded by a spirit so much milder and more just, that,
upon many points, our author seems to be writing of some far off and barbarous realm, rather
than of the England which we know, and the justice, humanity and equity of whose laws we
admire, and are, for the most part, content to copy.
In notes to the preceding pages we have sought to point out the changes in the law which
have been introduced by statute, and the student will be enabled, as he progresses, to compare
the past with the present, and to form some estimate of how the English system of laws
which now prevails differs from that which was in force when our English ancestors colonized
this country, bringing with them the common law to plant and acclimate upon our shores.
But it may be desirable that, at the conclusion of our task, we refer briefly to some of the most
striking and important of the changes which have been made, as we may thus, by bringing
them together into one general summary, the better appreciate the general effect of all, than
we could possibly by the contemplation of each as a separate and distinct event.
The union of Ireland with England, and the abolition of the Irish parliament, was an act
which promised at once strength to the empire and beneficence to Ireland, by incorporating
it more intimately as a constituent part of the realm, and advancing its people from the con-
dition of those of a conquered province, controlled and governed mainly in the interest of the
conquerors, to that of freemen, entitled to a like voice with their fellows in the making of the
laws, and to the like redress for all injuries. If the result of the union has not thus far
answered the expectation of its advocates, it is, in part, because the difficulties were too
deeply seated to be reached, except by long and patient probing and experiment, and we may
reasonably hope that the more recent efforts in that direction-the abolition of the Irish
church establishment, and the pending reform in the land-laws - will do much to relieve the
distress of that unhappy country, and to place it, in point of prosperity and contentment, on
a level with other parts of the empire.
The most important statutes in the interests of our common humanity were those which
made the foreign slave trade piracy, and which finally uprooted utterly the condition of servi-
tude in all the territories subject to the crown of Great Britain. In immediate prosperity
to the countries directly concerned, this act, also, has failed to answer expectation, but the
general benefit to the world at large has been incalculable, and the effects are constantly
spreading wider and farther, until the present generation may well hope to witness the utter
extinction of human slavery among the nations professing the Christian religion, or entitled,
by their civilization and intelligence, to claim the benefits and come under the obligations of
the law of nations.
The representation of the people in the house of commons was greatly changed by the
reform act of 1832, and many boroughs which had ceased to be populous and invited cor-
rnption, were entirely disfranchised. Further changes were made by the reform acts of
1867, which increased very largely the number of electors, and established such liberality of
qualification as to bring the elective franchise within the reach of all but the hopelessly poor
and dependent. Concurrent with the changes in public sentiment which have made these
reforms possible, has gone on another change, perceptible only at considerable intervals of time,
by which the house of lords has been shorn of a considerable portion of its former power and
importance, and the authority of the government has been steadily concentrating in the house
of commons. Hitherto this change has been beneficial, but how far it can continue without
necessitating other and more radical changes, the future alone can tell. In alluding to the
reforms in parliament we must not forget to mention the improvement in the laws for the
punishment of bribery in elections, and the reference of contested elections to a judicial
tribunal, by means of which party favoritism in their determination is rendered impossible,
and the actual will of the electors is reasonably certain to prevail.
The advance in religious liberty has been so remarkable that we do not know, in the brief
space we can allot to the subject here, how fitly to characterize or indicate it. A century ago
the law not only supported and encouraged the state church, but, from motives of state policy,
it threatened severe penalties against the teachers of another prominent body of Christians, and
it imposed burdens and disabilities upon all who were not connected with the establishment.
Jews and catholics, in particular, were made to feel the weight of governmental displeasure,
but all classes of dissenters were, in various ways, discriminated against, and, so far as the
laws could effectually do so, conformity with the established church was sought to be enforced.
It cannot yet be said that religious equality is the law of England, nor can it be so long as
burdens are imposed upon the people for the support of a favored church; but religious
toleration is now universal, and all classes may take part in the making of the laws which
are to govern them. The corporation and test acts, which excluded catholics and dissenters
from petty offices, and even from some other employments, were at length swept away by an
act passed in 1828, though with a proviso which excluded Jews from some of its benefits, and
precluded their taking seats in parliament as representatives of the people for thirty years
longer. The last obstacle was then removed by a statute, which allowed the obnoxious words
"on the faith of a Christian " to be omitted from the declaration made by a member on taking
his seat. The marriage laws have been wholly reformed, so as to enable all parties to have
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this most important rite celebrated according to such form as will satisfy their own con-
sciences; the scruples of quakers and others, however singular or absurd they may seem to
others, are respected by law, and there is a steady and very rapid advance to that entire
equality of sects, and perfect freedom of religious opinion and expression, which now pre-
vails in America. Catholic emancipation, after long resistance on the part of the crown and
of a majority of the national church, was finally effected, under the leadership of Sir ROBERT
PEEL, in 1829, and the penal legislation aimed at that denomination since, in order to defeat
the supposed encroachments of the court of Rome, has been allowed to remain a dead letter,
and will probably be repealed at any time when any considerable portion of the people shall
express a desire to that end. And a crowning act of justice to the catholics has been done in
the abrogation of the state church in Ireland, where it was the church of a small fraction of
the people only, so that its support was a grievous oppression.
The last half of the reign of George III was characterized by exceedingly stringent
measures to repress freedom of opinion and of expression, which, indeed, at one time
threatened the most alarming disorders, and were well calculated to excite intense anxiety.
The excesses of the French revolution and the spirit of independent inquiry which that
great event made so active in England, alarmed the conservative government of the day, and
led to coercive measures which tended to produce the very dangers which the government
sought to preclude. The prosecutions for treason for engaging in organized, and sometimes,
it must be confessed, in imprudent and threatening opposition to the existing authorities,
were treated by British juries with an independence, a prudence and a wisdom which was
something new in state prosecutions, and the liberties of the people found protection in the
courts of law at a time when the parliament was lending itself to despotic measures. The
parliament, however, is entitled to the credit of passing the libel act, under which juries
were at liberty to pass upon the intent of publications prosecuted as libelous, and which
perhaps, has done more than any thing else to make the press as free in fact as it was before
in theory. Indeed, we may safely say, now, that the restraint upon the licentiousness of the
press in its discussion of public afairs and of the conduct of public men, consists rather in a
regard to a just and enlightened public opinion than in any penalties which the law threatens
or would be likely to impose. And while the press of Great Britain is now much more free
and much less subject to restraining laws than that of many other countries, it is gratifying
to know that its freedom has not been productive of license, but that a gradual improvement
in its tone and character is perceptible, and self-imposed restraints are generally found suffi-
cient to prevent serious abuse.
The ameliorations in the criminal law have been so numerous and so great, that it would
be impossible to enumerate them all in the compass of a note. Among the principal are,
allowing a full defence by counsel in all cases; the entire abolition of trials by battel, appeals
of murder and felony, and the absurd privilege of benefit of clergy, and the reduction of the
list of capital offences to the two - treason and murder - regarded as the most heinous; the
discontinuance of the pillory, the burning and whipping Of females, the hanging in chains,
the horrible accompaniments of capital executions for treason, and the punishment of families
of offenders by corruption of blood. And at length, by the statutes of 24 and 25 Victoria,
the body of the criminal law has been revised and methodized, and its punishments mod-
erated and better proportioned. And, by extradition treaties with other nations, provision
is made by which one country no longer becomes an asylum for the desperate criminals of
others.
Imprisonment for debt has at last been abolished in Great Britain. A clear idea of the
barbarity of treating an unfortunate debtor as a criminal seems to have dawned slowly upon
the minds of legislators in any country, but when once the public attention was fixed upon
it, the inhuman laws which permitted it were not long suffered to disgrace the statute books.
Only in cases of fraud or other wrong in contracting the debt, or in obstructing the creditor
in obtaining satisfaction, can the body of the debtor be now seized, and even then he is re-
lieved from imprisonment on making surrender of his property to be applied to the just
demands against him. And while thus the good of the unfortunate has been had in view, the
interest of the creditor, also, has been consulted in various statutory changes which have im-
proved his remedies. One of the principal of these-the subjecting of real estate to the
payment of debts -is alluded to further on; but the creation of courts for small demands,
in which justice could be had speedily and inexpensively, has also had an effect highly bene-
ficial upon all the branches of small trade and commerce in which the middle and poorer
classes of the people are most particularly interested, while it has aided the poor in giving
confidence to credit, and protecting them against ruinous costs in cases of misfortune. The
law of bankruptcy has also been wholly remodeled, and its barbarous penalties mitigated;
many restraints upon trade and upon the freedom of artificers to employ their services in
their discretion have been abolished, and the penalties for usury have been entirely done away
with, without being followed by the evils which so many were ready to predict.
The same spirit of philanthropy which has secured the improvement of the criminal code,
has also effected great reforms in prison management, and the law now endeavors to prevent
parties who are accused of crime being punished as criminals before condemnation, or sub-
jected to needless and inhuman barbarities afterwards. The care of insane persons is also
better provided for, and asylums in which they are confined are not now, as formerly, mere
prisons in which to restrain their excesses, but are retreats where, unless improper persons
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shall chance to obtain the management, the most careful, patient and humane efforts are
made for their cure, so long as cure is believed possible, and for their comfort afterwards.
No invention of either ancient or modern times has so sensibly affected the laws as the
application of steam as a motive power, and especially for the conveyance of freight and
passengers. Railroads have introduced many new questions in the law of eminent domain,
of principal and agent, of bailments, and of negotiable securities, which have been solved by
the application of old principles of the common law, but under such new circumstances as
to make them really innovations, and sometimes of a very remarkable character. To par-
ticularize all these cases would fill many pages of this work, and even a complete enumera-
tion would give but a faint impression of the manner in which business and society have
been affected by them, unless we go beyond the law books, and, at the centres of traffic and
exchange, consider how large a proportion of all business transactions is connected with
steam transportation, and governed by the principles of law which have been laid down and
established with special reference to these improved modes of conveyance. Railroad securi-
ties now constitute a very large share of the commercial paper of the world, and the law of
negotiable paper has been modified and changed so as to embrace them: and they have become
for many purposes a substitute for money in the markets of the world, not surpassed in value
or convenience by any other securities, except, possibly, the public debt of a few of the lead-
ingnations.
Perhaps in no particular has the change in the law of property been so palpable and so bene-
ficial as in its relations to real estate. This species of property has at last been made liable
generally to the payment of the debts of its owner, and the absurd exemption which formerly
prevailed has been done away. Estates tail are also brought under more reasonable rules;
restraints upon alienation have been limited within narrow bounds; the forms of conveyance
have been simplified; fines and recoveries have given way to a simple deed, acknowledged by
the party and expressing the real purpose of the conveyance; real actions have been abolished,
and the proceedings to try claims to real property have been reduced to the action of eject-
ment, which, at the same time has been divested of all its cumbrous forms and needless fic-
tions. Limitation laws have also been passed, under which claims to real property must be
pursued within a reasonable period; and the law of descent has been considerably improved.
The establishment of penny postage has increased the correspondence of the kingdom to
enormous proportions, and has doubtless tended, in a considerable degree, to the spread of
intelligence among the people, and to a more general desire that the means of education may
be brought within the reach of all, which bids fair, at a period not now remote, to result in a
general system of free schools supported by public taxation. Postage to the colonies and to
foreign countries is also established at very low rates, and the facilities which are afforded for
still more rapid communication by means of the electric telegraph, though now expensive,
are made available, by means of a cheap public press, for diffusing among all classes of the
people the speedy intelligence of important affairs as they transpire in every quarter of the
globe.
When our commentator wrote, the general disposition among the statesmen in England
was, to assert and maintain the unlimited power of the British parliament to control and
govern the British colonies at its discretion, and to bind them by its enactments as well in
respect to local concerns as to those of a more general nature. The attempt to enforce this
view by military power lost to the empire the finest portion of her colonies, and the dissev-
ered country has since, by the establishment of free institutions, by the enactment of just
laws, and by the cultivation of the arts of peace, attracted to itself a large immigration of
industrious, enterprising and liberty-loving people, and attained a population, a wealth of
resources and a financial standing that gives it rank among the first nations of the globe in
point of influence, power and importance The lesson of this loss has not been thrown
away upon the British nation, and a more liberal and just spirit now controls the relations
between the mother country and its colonies. The right of the colonies to regulate their internal
affairs is conceded and protected. At the same time it is perceived that those colonies are but
embryo states, whose maturity and independence must at some time be recognized, and the
government, instead of seeking to perpetuate their condition of pupilage and dependence,
favors and encourages their increase in strength, population and resources, and prepares the
way for making the separation, should it take place, result in the mutual benefit of both, and
in permanent amity between them. The cruel and exacting government of India by the East
India company has been abolished, and though the subject people of that country are not
likely soon to be in condition to share the blessings of self-government, the rule of the crown
will be found much more mild and just than that which it has superseded, and the change is
a long stride in the direction of substantial progress.
Much has been done in the interest of humanity by the laws which regulate the working of
children in mines, factories, &c., and which give for the benefit of the surviving family an
action against the party whose negligence or default has caused the death of another. Much
also has been done for public morals, and for the equal and just administration of the law in
the interest of the people, by the abolition of profitable sinecures, and by modification of official
emoluments, to make them correspond in some degree with the services performed and the
responsibilities assumed. And, while to those who live under a simpler form of government,
and in a society less decidedly aristocratic in organization, habits and sentiment, the emolu-
ments of many English offices must still appear enormous, yet the change in the direction of
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economy has been as great, perhaps, as could reasonably have been expected, and the phrase
that "all abuses are freeholds," once justly applied to the English official system, may now be
dismissed as obsolete.
Of the petty annoyances to which British subjects were liable, and which, in the aggregate,
amounted to serious evils, two of the chief were abolished by the statutes so modifying the
game laws as to do away with the previous qualifications, and those for abolishing tithes and
substituting a rent charge instead. These will be found particularly alluded to, and the
extent of the changes indicated in the preceding pages. The abolition of tithes has undoubt-
edly done something to strengthen and support the national church, or, at least, to render it
less odious to those not in communion with it, and the statutory provisions against pluralities
have also removed another source of serious complaint, and all together have resulted to the
substantial benefit of the cause of religion and public morals.
The poor laws of Great Britain have been wholly revised since the time of our author;
and we wish we could say, with entire confidence, that they have been greatly improved. No
doubt the changes are for the better; but, with so large a pauper population as that country
unfortunately possesses, the inherent difficulties are great, and we must still look to the future
for reforms which can benefit their condition to any considerable degree. Upon these, and
similar subjects, changes must generally be in the nature of experiment, and it is difficult to
determine, many times, until after considerable experience, whether they constitute sub-
stantial improvements or not.
Upon one particular subject we are glad to have it in our power to say that the English
system and English opinions have undergone no change. We refer to the deep settled con-
viction, that standing armies are inconsistent with liberty, which has prevented the people
from being burdened with the support of large military forces, which could only constitute a
means of oppression to the people at home, and of menace to other nations. While some of
the neighboring nations have been steadily and rapidly enlarging their standing armies, until
they constitute a very large proportion of their able-bodied men, and the life and energy of
their people are exhausted by their withdrawal from the avocations of industry, and being
made a charge upon the public, instead of contributing to the public wealth, Great Britain,
secure in her insular position, and trusting to the patriotism of her people to protect her
against unexpected assaults, has contented herself with garrisons for her forts and other
fortified places, and relied upon the voluntary training of the people to arms to fit them for
the wars which may be inevitable, but which the policy, not less than the best sentiment of
her Christian people, now inclines her to avoid. In this policy she is followed by the great
republic of the western hemisphere, which, in the most important and threatening crisis of
its national existence, has demonstrated that, with a free people, standing armies are worse
than useless, and that the best dependence of any government is in civil and political liberty,
in just laws, justly administered.
A mong the minor changes deserving of note are the abolition of the counties palatine, and
the bringing of Wales more directly within the jurisdiction of the English courts. Among
those of greater importance are the simplification and expediting of proceedings in chancery;
the abolition of the office of master in chancery, and the introduction of jury trial in the
courts of equity; the taking away, from the ecclesiastical courts, the jurisdiction over probate
and matrimonial causes, and conferring it upon courts specially created for its exercise; the
simplification of pleadings and proceedings in courts of law; the remodelling of the judicial
committee of the privy council, so as greatly to enlarge its powers and give to its constitu-
tion and proceedings more of the judicial character and importance; the establishment of a
court of criminal appeal, and the almost total abolition of the legal objections to the com-
petency of witnesses. All the new improvements in these and similar matters are noted in
the preceding pages, and so given as to enable the reader to compare the existing system
with that which it has displaced.
Many of the most useful and beneficial changes in English law could not, with any pro-
priety, be given in notes to the foregoing Commentaries, because they relate to subjects not
treated in them, and but distantly, if at all, referred to. Among these are the establishment
of a board for the administration of charitable trusts; the statutes establishing or providing
for local regulations of police for ensuring cleanliness and good order, and thereby promoting
the health and happiness of the people, and those, also, which encourage local libraries and
schools, and other means of voluntary instruction of the people. And, while these sheets are
passing through the press, the people of Great Britain are discussing earnestly a general
system of public secular instruction, to be supported from the public treasury, and brought
within the reach of rich and poor alike; and with every prospect of its early establishment.
The condition of women has also been improved - indeed, we might justly say, the condition
of society- by the more distinct recognition of their right to property, and by lessening the
power of control which the common law allowed to the husband over the wife and over her
possessions. And we must not omit to mention, in this place, that the system of local self-
government, which has always characterized England, has been greatly improved and ampli-
ed by the modern municipal corporation acts; and the tendency of late in Great Britain -
unlike that in some other countries -has been tow ards a strengthening of the local authorities,
and an increase of their powers and jurisdiction.
In closing this review of the recent modifications in English law, it may be justly remarked
that the changes have not been made in haste and unadvisedly, or often under the influence
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of passion or excitement, but that they have been introduced with caution, discussed freely,
fully and calmly, and only adopted after reasonable deliberation, and after all objections had
been considered and weighed. Indeed, the eminent conservatism of the English character
has often tended to continue for long periods what have been known and admitted to be
abuses in their system; but if this has been a just ground for reproach, we must at the same
time admit that the general result has been that, when amendments have finally been made in
the law, they have been beneficial, safe, prudent and permanent, and that English legislation
has been characterized by more stability than that of some other countries.
The changes in American law have not been so great or so striking as those in the law of
England, because, in many particulars, America began at a point which Great Britain has
only now reached. In the adoption of the constitution of the United States, the great idea
of religious freedom and equality was assumed as fundamental; no state had a church
establishment; there were no tithes to abolish, or religious oppression to be relieved from;
and the few traces of discriminations against particular classes of persons, based on religious
beliefs or profession, have been allowed to disappear by common consent. The oppressive
features of the feudal system, which clung so long to the law of real estate in England, were
never transplanted in America; the right of promogeniture in descents was generally dis-
carded; the forms of conveyance were always simple, and real estate was, from the first,
made assets for the payment of debts. And many of the most repulsive features in the com-
mon law of England were never engrafted in the law of America, which, from the very
beginning, gave more full effect to the presumption of innocence on behalf of persons accused
of crime, and avoided the severe punishments, in the case of small offences, which were
deemed necessary in England at the middle of the last century.
The United States exerted its authority to forbid the importation of slaves into the country
at the very earliest period permitted by its constitution, and followed this prohibition, in a
few years, by making the slave trade piracy. Within the states, however, the government of
the nation had no control of the domestic institutions, and the relation of slavery was allowed
to exist in some of them, until overthrown in the course of a great civil war. It is now
entirely at an end throughout the whole country; but some of the evils, necessarily resulting
from so great and sudden a change in society, are still upon the country, and it will require
time, patience and wise statesmanship to wholly eradicate them.
The right of married women to the real and personal estate of every name and description,
possessed by them at the time of their marriage, or in any manner acquired afterwards, and to
make contracts in relation thereto, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the same, has gradually
come to be recoL-iized in most of the states; and the evils anticipated from this great departure
from the common-law principle, that the civil existence of the wife is swallowed up in that of
the husband, have been looked for in vain. At the same time, the law has come to pay more
regard to the rights of the family in the property acquired by its head, generally through the
joint exertions of all; and while facilitating and simplifying the processes for the collection
of debts, it has in most states made liberal exemptions for the benefit of the family, and, in
the case of the homestead, and sometimes of other property also, has forbidden the husband
to incumber or dispose of it, except with the wife's assent.
Marriage is generally recognized as a mere civil contract, into which parties can enter by
such ceremony as they please, or without any ceremony whatever; and the regulations by
statute are only such as are deemed essential to prevent irregular and discreditable relations,
and to insure a proper record of so important a transaction.
Imprisonment for debt is abolished throughout the country, and ample provision is made
everywhere for the support of the helpless poor. Asylums for the insane and for other un-
fortunate classes are established by state laws, and supported by state taxation; and, it is be-
lieved, they are made generally to subserve faithfully the purposes of their creation. The
large number of immigrants landing every year upon our shores renders regulations for their
comfort, and to protect them against fraud and dishonesty, important; and provision of the
most liberal character has been made for these purposes. The vast public domain is thrown
open to actual settlers for the choice of homesteads, which, to a reasonable amount, are
donated to them by the government; and if they desire to add to these possessions from the
adjacent territory, the price of other public lands is fixed at a rate to make them accessible
to any person who, having the ability to labor, joins thereto a disposition to industry, frugality
and economy.
Suffrage in the United States has always been nearly universal; generally only the depend-
ent classes being excluded from participation; and in the states in which a small property
qualification was at first established, it has afterward been abolished; and provision has been
made by law for the naturalization of the aliens who come to cast their lot in the new world,
through a proceeding both simple and inexpensive. Indeed, in some of the new states, even
this formality has once been dispensed with, for, in framing their constitutions, they have allowed
every bona fide resident to participate, and given to all an equal voice in the government.
One of the most noticeable changes in the law of America has been in the direction of im-
posing restraints upon the legislative power in the enactment of laws. The American people,
from the first, have shown great solicitude, lest fundamental individual rights should be
trampled upon, and they have made each of their constitutions a magna carts, by means of
which barriers are erected against the encroachments of government. The promise extorted
from King John, that no freeman should be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed or
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banished, or any way destroyed, except by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land,
is repeated in substance in them all, and, lest this comprehensive declaration should prove
insufficient, there is a careful enumeration of rights, which are guarded from the encroach-
ments of power, and of securities for the protection of liberty, where government is exercising
its acknowledged authority. Religious liberty shall not be invaded; freedom of speech shall
be inviolate; soldiers shall not be quartered upon citizens in time of peace; unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be allowed; the press shall be free; and a jury shall pass upon
the criminality of any of its alleged excesses. Taxes shall only be levied in accordance with
law, and when voted by the people's representatives; the military shall be subordindte to the
civil authority; the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be inviolate; no accused party
shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, and none shall be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb for the same offence. But the disposition of late is to go far beyond this
specification of individual rights, to inhibit class legislation, as well as the omnibus system of
making laws, and to restrain within reasonable bounds the private legislation of which all
our law-making bodies are apt to be so prolific. Forms of proceeding are also prescribed in
some cases, the purpose of which is to ensure care and deliberation in the enactment of laws,
and to prevent the legislature being taken by surprise by designing and unscrupulous men.
And a strong inclination has been developed to forbid private and special acts in all cases
where public and general laws can reasonably accomplish the end designed.
The proceedings in courts of justice have been greatly simplified within a few years. In
this direction, however, there was not the same room for improvement as in England. Many
of the states had no distinct equity system, and those which had established one had, at the
same time, established regulations to render its remedies speedy and reasonably inexpensive.
At this time equitable and legal remedies are generally administered by the same courts, and
under forms which are very simple, and with such ample power in the court to amend the
pleadings and proceedings for the advancement of justice, that it is not easy for the forms of
law to be employed for the furtherance of unjust and oppressive schemes. In some states
statutes have been passed, the purpose of which was to sweep away at a single blow all legal
subtleties and technicalities in the forms of pleadings and proceedings; and where changes
so radical have been avoided, the old forms have been greatly simplified, and the lawyer may
now safely give more attention to the merits of his cause, and less to the forms provided by
law, by means of which his client's rights are to be protected or his wrongs redressed.
Many of the modern changes in the English law enumerated in this note have been simul-
taneously made in America, and with the like good result. Among them may be mentioned
the remedy given to the family of any deceased person whose death has been caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another, and the doing away with objections to the com-
petency of witnesses based upon their interest or connection with the cause. The latter
innovation has been followed in some states by statutes permitting accused parties in criminal
cases to give their own account of the transaction to the jury; and the result has been
generally satisfactory. America preceded England in abolishing imprisonment for debt, and
she has also exhibited a greater readiness to modify the law of nations for the protection of
the rights and interests of neutrals in time of war. But, as, in this respect, the interest of
each is identical, and the voice of religion and humanity pleads earnestly for such changes as
will so limit and circumscribe the calamities of war as to make them affect the least possible
number of persons, we may confidently expect the efforts in this direction to be hereafter
made by these two nations conjointly, and with a reasonable degree of success.
Great as have been the changes in the law here chronicled, we may still look forward, with
reasonable confidence, to others, of the like gratifying character, to be introduced by the
Anglo-Saxon nations, upon the basis of the common law of England, by the like gradual but
sure and safe steps, and as speedily as the public sentiment may be prepared to receive and
perpetuate them.
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SECT. 1. RECORD OF AN INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION OF MURDER,
AT TEE AssIzEs.
Warwickshire, BE IT REMEMBERED, that at the general session of the lord the Session of oywp
to wit, f king of oyer and terminer holden at Warwick, in and for the and terminer.
said county of Warwick, on Friday, the twelfth day of March, in the second year
of the reign of the lord George the Third, now king of Great Britain, before Sir
Michael Foster, knight, one of the justices of the said lord the king assigned to
hold pleas before the king himself, Sir Edward Clive, knight, one of the justices
of the said lord the king, of his court of common bench, and others their fellows,
justices of the said lord the king, assigned by letters patent of the said lord the
king, under his great seal of Great Britain, made to them the aforesaid justices Commission of
and others, and any two or more of them, (whereof one of them the said Sir
Michael Foster and Sir Edward Olive, the said lord the king would have to be
one),to inquire (by the oath of good and lawful men of the county aforesaid, by
whom the truth of the matter might be the better known, and by other ways,
methods, and means, whereby they could or might the better know, as well within
liberties as without) more fully the truth of the treasons, misprisions of treasons,
insurrections, rebellions, counterfeitings, clippings, washings, false comings, and
other falsities of the moneys of Great Britain, and of other kingdoms or do
minions whatsoever; and of all murders, felonies, manslaughters, killings
burglaries, rapes of women, unlawful meetings and conventicles, unlawful utter-
ing of words, unlawful assemblies, misprisions, confederacies, false allegations
trespasses, riots, routs, retentions, escapes, contempts, falsities, negligences, con-
cealments, maintenances, oppressions, champerties, deceits, and all other mis
deeds, offences, and injuries whatsoever, and also the accesosries of the same,
within the county aforesaid, as well within liberties as without, by whomsoever
and howsoever done, had, perpetrated, and committed, and by whom, to whom,
when, how, and in what manner; and of all other articles and circumstances in
the said letters patent of the said lord the king specified; the premises, and
every or any of them howsoever concerning; and for this time to hear and Oyer and ter-
determine the said treasons and other the premises, according to the law and miner,
custom of the realm of England; and also keepers of the peace, and justices of.
the said lord the king, assigned to hear and determine diverse felonies, trespasses, d of the
and other misdemeanors committed within the county aforesaid, by the oath 
p ce .
of Sir James Thomson, baronet, Charles Roper, Henry Dawes, Peter Wilson, Grand jury.
Samuel Rogers, John Dawson, James Phillips, John Mayo, Richard Savage,
William Bell, James Morris, Laurence Hall, and Charles Carter, esquires, good
and lawful men of the county aforesaid, then and there impaneled, sworn, and
charged to inquire for the said lord the king and for the body of the said county,
it is presented; That Peter Hunt, late of the parish of Lighthorn in the said Indictment
county, gentleman, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved
and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the fifth day of March, in the
said second year of the reign of the said lord the king, at the parish of Light-
borne aforesaid, with force and arms, in and upon one Samuel Collins, in thepeac  of God nd of the said lord the king then and there being, feloni usly wilful-
l, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault; 
and that the said Peter
Hunt, with a certain drawn sword, made of iron and steel, of the value of five
shillings, which he the said Peter Hunt in his right hand then and there had and
held, him the said Samuel Collins, in and upon the left side of the belly of him
the said Samuel Colfins, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his maliceaforethought, did strike, thrust, stab, and penetrate; giving unto the said Samuel
Collins, then and there, with the sword drawn as aforesaid, in and upon the left
side of the belly of him the said Samuel Collins, one mortal wound of the breadth
of one inch, and the depth of nine inches; of which said mortal wound he the
said Samuel Collins, at the parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the said county ofWarwick, from the said fifth day of March, in the year aforesaid, until the seventh
day of the same month in the same year, did languish, and languishing did
live; on which said seventh day of March, in the year aforesaid, the said Samuel
Collins, at the parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, of the
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said mortal wound did die; and so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath afore-
said, do say, that the said Peter Hunt him the said Samuel Collins, in manner
and form aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill
and murder, against the peace of the said lord the now king, his crown, and
Capias. dignity. Whereupon the sheriff of the county aforesaid is commanded, that he
omit not for any liberty in his bailiwick, but that he take the said Peter Hunt
if he may be found in his bailiwick, and him safely keep, to answer to the felony
Session of gaol and murder whereof he stands indicted. Which said indictment the said justices
delivery, of the lord the king above named, afterwards, to wit, at the delivery of the gao_
of the said lord the king, holden at Warwick, in and for the county aforesaid, on
Friday,the sixth day of August, in the said second year of the reign of the said lord
the king, befbre the right honourable William lord Mansfield, chief justice of the
said lord the king, assigned to hold pleas before the king himself, Sir Sidney Staf-
ford Smythe, knight, one of the barons of the exchequer of the said lord the king,
and others their fellows, justices of the said lord the king, assigned to deliver
his said gaol of the county aforesaid of the prisoners therein being, by their proper
hands to deliver here in court of record in form of the law to be determined.
Arraignment. And afterwards, to wit, at the same delivery of the gaol of the said lord the king
of his county afiresaid, on the said Friday, the sixth day of August, in the said
second year of the reign of the said lord the king, before the said justices of the
lord the king last above named, and others their fellows aforesaid, here cometh
the said Peter Hunt, under the custody of William Browne, esquire, sheriff of
the county aforesaid, (in whose custody in the gaol of the county aforesaid, for
the cause aforesaid, he had been before committed,) being brought to the bar here
in his proper person by the said sheriff, to whom he is here also committed:
And forthwith being demanded concerning the premises in the said indictment
Plea: not above specified and charged upon him, how he will acquit himself thereof, he
guilty. saith, that he is not guilty thereof ; and thereof for good and evil, puts himself
Issue. upon the country: And John Blencowe, esquire, clerk of the assizes for the
county aforesaid, who prosecutes for the said lord the king in this behalf, doth
Venire. the like: Therefore, let a jury thereupon here immediately come before the said
justices of the lord the king last above mentioned, and others their fellows afore-
said, of free and lawful men of the neighbourhood of the said parish of Light-
home, in the county of Warwick aforesaid, by whom the truth of the matter
may be the better known, and who are not of kin to the said Peter Hunt, to
recognize upon their oath, whether said Peter Hunt be guilty of the felony
and murder in the indictment aforesaid above specified, or not guilty: because
as well the said John Blencowe, who prosecutes for the said lord the king in this
behalf, as the said Peter Hunt, have put themselves upon the said jury. And
the jurors of the said jury, by the said sheriff for this purpose impaneled and
returned, to wit, David Williams, John Smith, Thomas Horne, Charles Nokes,
Richard May, Walter Duke, Matthew Lion, James White, William Bates, Oliver
Green, Bartholomew Nash, and Henry Long, being called, come; who, being
elected, tried and sworn, to speak the truth of and concerning the premises, upon
Verdict: guilty their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt is guilty of the felony and murder afore-
of murder. said, on him above charged in the form aforesaid, as by the indictment aforesaid
is above supposed against him; and that the said Peter Hunt, at the time of
committing the said felony and murder, or at any time since to this time, had
not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands or tenements, in the said county of
Warwick, or elsewhere, to the knowledge of the said jurors.(1) And upon this
it is forthwith demanded of the said Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any
thing to say, wherefore the said justices here ought not upon the premises and
verdict aforesaid to proceed to justice and execution against him: who nothing
further saith, unless as he before hath said. Whereupon, all and singular the
Judgment of premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, it is considered
death, by the court here, that the said Peter Hunt be taken to the gaol of the said lord
the king of the said county of Warwick from whence he came, and from thence
to the place of execution on Monday now next ensuing, being the ninth day of
and dissection, this instant August, and there be hanged by the neck until he be dead; and that
afterwards his body be dissected and anatomized.
SECT. 2. CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER.
Verdict: not upon their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt is not gnilty of the
guilty of mur- murder aforesaid, above charged upon him; but that the said Peter Hunt is
;guiity of guilty of the felonious slaying of the aforesaid Samuel Collins; and that he
mans(tug ter. had not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands or tenements, at the time of the
felony and manslaughter aforesaid, or ever afterwards to this time, to the
(1) This averement is now rendered unnecessary. See 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28; ante, p. 387,
n. (7).
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knowledge of the said jurors.(2) And immediately it is demanded of the said
Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any thing to say, wherefore the said justices
here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment
and execution against him: who saith that he is a clerk, and prayeth the ben- Clergy prayed.
efit of clergy to be allowed him in this behalf. Whereupon, all and singular Judgment to
the premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, it is be burned in
considered by the court here, that the said Peter Hunt be burned in his left the hand, and
hand, and delivered. And immediately he is burned in his left hand, and is delivered.
delivered, according to the form of the statute.(3)
SECT. 8. ENTRY OF A TRIAL INSTANTER IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH,
UPON A COLLATERAL ISSUE; AND RULE OF COURT FOR EXECUTION
THEREON.
Michaelmas Term, in the Sixth Year of the Reign of King George the Third.
Kent; The King) THE PRISONER at the bar being brought into this court
against j in custody of the sheriff of the county of Sussex, by
Thomas Rogers. virtue of his majesty's writ of habeas corpus, it is Habeas corpus.
ordered that the said writ and the return thereto be filed. And it appear- Record of at-
ing by a certain record of attainder, which hath been removed into this tainder read,
court by his majesty's writ of certiorari, that the prisoner at the bar stands at-
tainted, by the name of Thomas Rogers, of felony for a robbery on the high- for felony and
way, and the said prisoner at the bar having heard the record of the said robbery.
attainder now read to him, is now asked by the court here what he hath to say Prisoner asked
for himself, why the court here should not proceed to award execution against what he can say
him upon the said attainder. He for plea saith, that he is not the same Thomas i bar of execu-
tion.Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment Plea; not the
was pronounced: and this he is ready to verify and prove, &c. To which said same person.
plea the honorable Charles Yorke, esquire, attorney-general of our present soy- Replication,
ereign lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecuteth,
being now present here in court, and having heard what the said prisoner at
the bar hath now alleged, for our said lord the king by way of reply saith, that
the said prisoner now here at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in the said averring that
record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was pronounced as he is.
aforesaid ; and this he prayeth may be inquired into by the country; and the said Issue joined.
prisoner at the bar doth the like: Therefore let a jury in this behalf immediately Venire awarded
come here into court, by whom the truth of the matter will be the better known, intanter.
and who have no affinity to the said prisoner, to try upon their oath, whether
the said prisoner at the bar be the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of
attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced as aforesaid
or not: because, as well the said Charles Yorke, esquire, attorney-general of
our said lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecutes,
as the said prisoner at the bar, have put themselves in this behalf upon the said
jury. And immediately thereupon the said jury come here into court: and Jury sworn.
being elected, tried and sworn to speak the truth touching and concerning the
premises aforesaid, and having heard the said record read to them, do say, upon
their oath, that the said prisoner at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in the Verdict: that
said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced he is the same.
as aforesaid, in manner and form as the said attorney-general hath by his said
replication to the said plea of the said prisoner now here at the bar alleged.
And hereupon the said attorney-general, on behalf of our said lord the king,
now prayeth that the court here would proceed to award execution against
him, the said Thomas Rogers, upon the said attainder. Whereupon, all and Award of
singular the premises being now seen and fully understood by the court here, execution.
it is ordered by the court here, that execution be done upon the said prisoner at
the bar for the said felony, in pursuance of the said judgment, according to due
form of law: And it is lastly ordered, that he, the said Thomas Rogers, the
prisoner at the bar, be now committed to the custody of the sheriff of the
county of Kent (now also present here in court) for the purpose aforesaid; and
that the said sheriff of Kent do execution upon the said defendant, the pris-
oner at the bar, for the said felony, in pursuance of the said judgment, accord-
ing to due form of law. On the motion of Mr. Attorney-General.
By the Court.
(2) See preceding note.
(3) Benefit of clergy and burning in the hand being now abolished: see 6 Geo. IV, c, 25; 7
and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, ante, p. 374, n. (8); this form will require alteration accordingly.
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SECT. 4. WARRANT o EXECUTION ON JUDGMENT OW DEATH, AT THE GENE-
RAL GAOL DELIVERY IN LONDON AND MIDDLESEX.
London ) To the sheriffs of the city of London; and to the sheriff of
and ]- the county of Middlesex: and to the keeper of his majesty's
Middlesex.) gaol of Newgate.
Whereas, at the session of gaol delivery of Newgate, for the city of London
and county of Middlesex, holden at Justice Hall, in the Old Bailey, on the
nineteenth day of October last, Patrick Mahony, Roger Jones, Charles King
and Mary Smith received sentence of death for the respective offences in their
several indictments mentioned; Now it is hereby ordered, that execution of the
said sentence be made and done upon them, the said Patrick Mahony and
Roger Jones, on Wednesday, the ninth day of this instant month of Novem-
ber, at the usual place of execution. And it is his majesty's command, that
execution of the said sentence upon them, the said Charles King and Mary
Smith, be respited until his majesty's pleasure touching them be further known.
GIVEN under my hand and seal, this fourth day of November, one thousand
seven hundred and sixty-eight. JAMEs EntE, Recorder. [t. s.]
SECT. 5. WRIT OF EXECUTION UPON A JUDGMENT OF MURDER, BEFORE THE
KING IN PARLIAM NT.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ire-
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriffs of London, and
sheriff of Middlesex, greeting. Whereas, Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount
Tamworth, hath been indicted of felony and murder, by him done and com-
mitted, which said indictment hath been certified before us in our present par-
liament; and the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath been
thereupon arraigned, and upon such arraignment hath pleaded not guilty; and
the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath before us in our said
parliament been tried, and in due form of law convicted thereof ; and whereas,
judgment hath been given in our said parliament that the said Lawrence Earl
Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, shall be hanged by the neck till he is dead, and
that his body be dissected and anatomized, the execution of which judgment
remaineth to be done: We require, and by these presents strictly command
you, that, upon Monday, the fifth day of May instant, between the hours of
nine in the morning and one in the afternoon of the same day, hhn, the said
Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, without the gate of our tower of
London (to you then and there to be delivered, as by another writ to the lieu-
tenant of our tower of London or his deputy directed, we have commanded)
into your custody you then and there receive: and him, in your custody so be-
ing, you forthwith convey to the accustomed place of execution at Tyburn:
and that you do cause execution to be done upon the said Lawrence Earl Fer-
rers, Viscount Tamworth, in your custody so being, in all things according to
the said judgment. And this you are by no means to omit, at your peril.
Witness ourself at Westminster, the second day of May, in the thirty-third year
of our reign. YORu and YORKE.
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Abandonment of right gained by prescription,
ii, 9, 36, n., 264, n.
of bastard children, i, 458.
Abatement, iii, 167.
plea in, iii, 301.
not admitted in partition suit, iii, 302.
verification of, id.
to indictment, iv, 334.
of suit in equity, iii, 448.
of nuisance, iii, 5,220 and n.
Abbey lands, molesting possessors of, iv, 116.
exemption of, from tithes, ii, 32.
Abbots, i, 155.
Abbreviations in legal proceedings, iii, 323.
Abdication of the king, i, 211 ; iv, 78.
of James II, i, 212.
Abduction of wife, iii, 139.
of child, i, 140.
and marriage of women, i, 443
of heiress, iv, 208.
of girl under fourteen, iv, 16.
or kidnapping, iv, 219.
Abearance, security for, iv, 251-257.
Abettors, iv, 34,323.
Abeyance of the freehold, ii, 107.
Abiegi, or cattle stealers, iv, 239.
Abjuration, oath of, i, 162, n., 368.
of the realm, i, 132; iv, 55, 124, 332,377.
Abolition of slavery, i, 423, n., 425, n.
Abortion, iv, 198.
Abroad, homicide committed, iv, 269, n.
action for matter arising, iii, 293, n.
Absolute power of the crown, i, 250.
of the parliament, i, 160.
limitation upon, in America, i, 125, n.
Absolute property, ii, 389.
Absolute rights and duties, i, 123.
Accedas ad curiam, iii, 24.
Acceptance of bills, ii, 468.
Access, presumption of, i, 457.
Accessories, iv, 35.
before the fact, iv, 36, 39.
after the fact, iv, 37, 39.
when to be tried, iv, 323.
Accession, title by, ii, 404.
Accident, remedy in case of, iii, 431.
(See "Negligence.")
Accomplices, discovery of, iv, 330, 331.
(See "Accessories.")
Accord and satisfaction, iii, 15.
requisites of, iii, 16, n.
tender of satisfaction, iii, 16 and n.
Account, action of, iii, 162.
stated, iii, 162.
books of, when evidence, iii, 368.
in equity, iii, 163.
Accroaching royal power, iv, 76.
Accumulation of income, i, 174, n.
Ac etiam, clause of, iii, 287, 289.
Acknowledgment of feme covert's deed, ii,
293, n.
of fine, ii, 350.
Act of bankruptcy, ii, 477.
in the United States, ii, 477, n.
Act of grace or pardon, i, 184; iv, 396.
when pleaded, iv, 396, 402.
Act of indemnity, i, 136.
Act of parliament, i, 85.
how enrolled, i, 182.
how made, i, 181.
its ancient form, i, 182.
its approval, i, 184.
its authority, i, 186.
private, i, 86; ii, 3, 344.
public, i, 85.
when binding on the crown, i, 261
disobedience to, iv, 122.
endeavor to repeal by intimidation, iv, 82, n.
Action, chose in, ii, 290, 396.
Action at law, iii, 116.
feudal, iii, 117.
real, id.
personal, lb.
mixed, iii, 118.
for matter arising abroad, iii, 394.
for civil injury in case of felony, iii, 119.
on the case, iii, 122, 209, 222, 226; iv, 442.
for trespass, iii, 208, 209.
of replevin, iii, 146.
of trover, iii, 151.
of debt, iii, 155.
of covenant, iii, 156.
of assumpsit, iii, 157 et seq.
possessor y, iii, 180.
popular, ii, 437
what rights of may not be assigned, ii, 290.
plea to, iii, 303.
Additions of estate, &c., persons to be styled
by, i, 407.
erroneous in pleading, iii, 302.
statute of, iv, 306, 334.
Adherence to the king's enemies, iv, 82.
Adjoining county, trial of offence in, iv, 304.
Adjournment of parliament, i, 186.
Admeasurement of dower, ii, 136; iii, 183.
of pasture, writ of, iii, 238.
Administration, granting of, iii, 98.
to infant, i, 463, n.
Administration, the, what is, i, 230, n.
the, in United States, i, 232, n.
Administrator.
See "Executors and Administrators."
Admiralty, court of, iii, 68.
its jurisdiction and power, i, 231 ; iii, 106.
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Admiralty, proceedings in, iii, 108.
suit for beaconage may be brought in it, iii,
107.
has jurisdiction as to prizes, iii, 68, n., 108, n.
law in, i, 83.
trial of offences in, iv, 268, 269, n.
Admission of a clerk, i, 390.
Admittance to copyhold, ii, 866, 370.
Admittendum clericum, writ ad, iii, 350.
Ad quod damnum, writ of, ii, 271.
Adultery, i, 441 ; iv, 64, 65, 191.
divorce for, i, 441.
alimony not allowed in cases of divorce
for, iii, 94.
action of trespass, or on the case, may be
brought for, iii, 139.
Adverse possession, ii, 198, n., 266, n.
conveyances in case of, ii, 290, n.
Advocates, iii, 126.
liability of, for negligence or want of skill,
iii, 164, and n.
Advocatus fisci, iii, 27.
Advowson, ii, 21 ; iv, 426.
appendant or in gross, ii, 22.
how conveyed, id.
right of presentation before and after va-
cancy, ii, 22, 24, n.
presentative, collative, or donative, ii, 22.
donative, how destroyed, ii, 23.
lapse, i, 24, n, 276.
prerogative presentation, ii, 24, n.
simony, ii, 278, et seq.
curtesy of, ii, 127.
who may be disturbers of right of, iii, 244.
limitation to actions for, iii, 25, n.
writ of right of, abolished, iii, 250, n.
XEquitas sequitur legem, ii, 330; iii, 441.
Affectum, challenge propter, iii, 363; iv, 352.
Affeerors of amercements, iv, 380.
Affidavit, iii, 304.
verification of plea in abatement to indict-
ment by, iv, 334, n.
Affinity, i, 434, 435, n.
Aflirmance of judgments, iii, 411.
Affray, iv, 145.
breach of the peace chargeable upon him
who begins, iii, 3.
Age, action formerly suspended by non-
age, iii, 300.
of consent to marry, i, 436.
full, what, i, 463; iv, 22.
of criminal responsibility, iv, 22 et seq.
Agents, embezzlement by, iv, 231.
Aggregate corporation, i, 469.
Aggregate fund, i, 330.
Agistment, ii, 452.
Agnati, ii, 235.
Agnus Dei, &c., iv, 115.
Agreement, specific performance of, iii, 435,438.
(See "Contract.")
Agriculture, its origin, il, 7.
Aid-prayer, iii, 300.
Alders and abettors, iv, 34.
Aids, feudal, ii, 63, 86, 87; iv, 411.
parliamentary, i, 307.
Air, right to, ii, 14,266 n.
(See "Easement.")
prescriptive right to, not recognized in
America, ii, 395; n. iii, 217, n.
nuisance by infecting, iii, 122.
Albinatus jus, i, 372.
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Alderman, i, 116.
Alderney, Isle of, i, 106.
Alehouses, offences in, iv, 64,168.
Alfred, his laws, i, 64, 113.
his dome-book, i, 64, 66, 114; iv, 411.
Alias writ, iii, 283.
Alien priories, i, 386 ; iv, 113.
Alienation of mind of Geo. III, i, 248, n.
Alienation, history of the right of, ii, 287.
fines for, ii, 71 ; iv, 418.
who may alien and to whom, ii, 290.
restraint on, allowed in favor of a married
woman, ii, 434, n.
of rights of action, &c., ii, 290.
different modes of, ii, 293.
by deed, ii, 295.
by devise, ii, 373.
by special custom, ii, 365.
by matter of record, ii, 344.
forfeiture by, ii, 268.
conditions in restraint of, ii, 157, n
Aliens, i, 366, 371.
disabilities of, i, 371.
duty on, i, 315, 372.
may take, but cannot hold lands, ii, 249,
274, 293.
merchants and artificers, leases to, ii, 298.
dower of, ii, 131.
descent through, ii, 226, n.
royal grant to, ii, 847.
naturalization and denization of, ii, 249.
enemy, prize of goods, ii, 401.
proemunire by, iv, 111.
enemies, i, 373, n.; iii, 132, n.
Alimony, i, 441.
suit for, iii, 94.
none allowed in case of divorce for adultery,
id.
Allegation, iii, 100.
Allegiance, i, 866, 369, n.; iv, 74.
local, i, 370.
natural, i, 369, 370, n.
oath of, i, 367-369; iv, 273.
to whom due, i, 371.
origin of oath of, ii, 53.
refusing oath of, iv, 116.
withdrawing from, iv, 87:
seducing soldiers or sailors from, iv, 102, n.
Alliances, how made, i, 257.
Allodial property, ii, 47, 60.
Allodium, derivation and nature of, ii, 45, 47,
60, 105.
Allowance of franchise, iil, 263.
of pardon, iv, 401, 402,
of writs of error, iv, 392.
Alluvion, title to, ii, 261, 262, n.
Almanac, inspection of, iii. 333.
Alteration of deeds, ii, 308.
Ambassadors, how appointed, i, 253.
their privileges, i, 254-256.
violation of privilege of, iv, 70, 441.
killing, iv, 86.
Amendments of pleadings, history of the doc-
trine of, iii, 408.
of variances in indictments, iv, 439.
American colonies, i, 107, 109, n.
transportation to, iv, 401.
American states, how constitutions of, differ
from English, i, 49, n.
ex post facto laws cannot be passed in, i,
46, n.
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American states, statutes of, when to take
effect, i, 46, n.
exercise of legislative power in, i, 52, n.,
58, n., 89, n., 125, n.
sovereignty in, i, 49, n., 52, n.
rights of married women to property in, i,
55, n.; ii, 433, n.; iv, 443, n.
common law of, i, 68, n.
civil divisions of, i, 119, n.
habeas corpus in, i, 135, n.
protection of private property in, i, 139, n.
right of petition in, i, 143, n.
right to bear arms in, i, 143, n.
property qualification of electors, i, 179, n.
executive power in, i, 214, n, 232, n.
treaties, how made in, i, 257, n.
war, how declared by, i, 257, n.
judicial tenure in, i, 268, n.
titles of nobility forbidden, i, 272, n.
how corporations created, i. 273, n.
legal tender in, i, 277, n.
corruption of blood, i, 300, n.; ii, 251, n.
escheats in, i, 302, n.
national taxes of, i, 321, n.
independence of, as affecting status of in-
habitants, i, 366, n., 369, n.
escheats for alienage, i, 372, n.
naturalization in, i, 375, n.
religious societies in, i, 376, n.
abolition of slavery in, i, 423, n.
tenures of land, ii, 102, n.
estates tail in, ii, 119, n.
foreclosure of mortgages in, ii, 159, n.
registry system in, ii, 343, n.
conveyances in, by private statutes, ii, 346, n.
married women's property in, ii, 433, n.
bankrupt law of, ii, 476, n., 481, n., 484, n.,
488, n.
courts of, iii, 60, n., 70, n.
habeas corpus in, iii, 138, n.
suits against, iii, 257, n.
treason in, iv, 76, n.
American war, i, 119, n.
Anatomy, offence of stealing bodies for, ii,
429.
Ancestors, ii, 203,209.
not heirs, ii, 210; see 240, n.
Ancestral actions, iii, 186.
Ancient demesne, i, 286; ii, 90, 99.
writings prove themselves, iii, 367.
Animals, property in, ii, 5, 389, 390, 403.
laming of, iv, 235.
killing or maiming, iv, 244.
ferie nature, ii, 389, 403.
trespasses by, iii, 211.
trespass in hunting wild, iii, 213
(See "Cattle," "Game.")
Animosity between clergy and lawyers, i, 20, n.
Animus furandi, iv, 230, 232.
Animus revertendi, ii, 392.
Annual parliaments, i, 153.
Annuities, ii, 20, n., 40.
may be granted in fee or in tail, ii, 40, n.,
113.
for lives, ii, 461.
memorial of, ii, 461.
Annulum et baculum, investiture per, i, 378.
Annus luctus, i, 457.
Answer in equity, iii, 437, 438, 446.
upon oath, iii, 100.
of a peer upon honor, i, 402.
Apology for defamation, iii, 125, n.
Apostacy, iv, 43.
Apparel, excess in, iv, 171.
Apparent heir, ii, 208.
Appeal, iii, 56.
by approvers, iv, 330.
of death, iv, 314,424, 443, n.
of felony, id.
of treason, iv, 314.
in convictions, iv, 282.
prosecution by, iv, 312, 424.
to parliament, iii, 454.
to Rome, iv, 115, 421.
courts of, iii, 441.
from decree in equity, iii, 453, 454.
in matters of lunacy, iii, 427.
from commission under statute of charitable
uses, iii, 428.
to quarter sessions, ill, 455.
new evidence on, id.
from Irish courts, i, 104.
different from writ of error, iii, 56.
Appearance, iii, 286, 290.
by defendant, how made, iii, 287, n.
in chancery, iii, 443, 445.
Appearance day of the term or return, iii, 28.
Appellee on approvement, iv, 330.
Appendants and appurtenants distinguished,
ii, 22, 33, n.
Appointment to charitable uses, ii, 376.
Apportionment of rent, ii, 124.
Appraisement, commission of, iii, 262.
Apprentices, i, 426, 427.
duty on fee, i, 324.
embezzlement by, iv, 230.
exercising trade without having been, iv,
160, and n.
Apprenticil ad legem, iii, 27.
Appropriation of supplies, i, 335, n.
of ecclesiastical dues, i, 384.
Approvement of common, ii, 34; iii, 240.
Approvers, iv, 329.
Appurtenants and appendants distinguished,
ii, 22, 33, n.
grant of, ii, 18, n., 34, n.
Arbitrary consecration of tithes, i, 113.
power, i, 160.
Arbitration, iii, 16.
submission to, revocable, iii, 16, n.
agreement to settle controversies by, id.
Archbishops, i, 155, 377.
court of, i, 83.
mode of appointment of, i, 377.
powers and duties of, i, 380.
Archdeacon, i, 383.
Archdeacon's court, iii, 64.
Archdeaconry, i, 112.
Arches, court of, iii, 64.
dean of, iii, 65.
Areopagus, court of, iii, 365; iv, 169, 348.
Aristocracy, i, 49,164, 396; iii, 380.
Armed, being unusually, Tv, 149.
Armies, who can raise, i, 262, 366.
standing, i, 413, 414; iv, 419, 439, 441,443, n.
Armorial ensigns, ii, 428; iii, 105.
Armor, &c., embezzling the king's, iv, 101.
statutes of, i, 411.
Arms, right of having, i, 143.
training to, iv, 102, n.
going armed, iv, 149.
and ammunition, exporting, i, 265.
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Army, regular, i, 413.
history of, i, 408.
how raised, i, 262, 366.
standing, i, 413, 414; iv, 419, 439, 441.
Arraignment, iv, 322, 449.
incidents to, iv, 324.
Array, commissions of, i, 411.
challenge to the, iii, 358; iv, 352.
Arrest of judgment, iii, 393; iv, 375
of persons, when allowed, iii, 287, n.
of seamen and soldiers, i, 421.
how made, iii, 288, and n.
what persons are privileged from, iii, 288.
liability of soldiers, &c., to, iv, 421.
of persons in criminal cases, iv, 289.
by warrant, and by whom, and for what
granted, iv, 290.
form of warrant, id.
backing warrant, iv, 291.
time and place of, iv, 292.
by officers without warrant, iv, 292.
by private persons, iv, 293.
by hue and cry, iv, 293.
of clerymen going to perform divine ser-
vice, &c., iv, 218.
in trespass, iii, 281.
Arrha, ii, 447.
Arson, in general, iv, 220, 372.
what a house to constitute this offence, iv,
221.
where house must be burnt, id.
what a burning, iv, 222.
malice, id.
punishment, id.
appeal of, iv, 314.
(See "Burning," "Fire.")
Articles of the navy, i, 420.
of war, i, 415, 417.
of the peace, iv, 255.
Artificers, i, 407.
laws against combination by, iv, 159.
seducing from the realm, iv, 160.
As, Roman, divisions of, ii, 462.
Asportation, what is, iv, 231.
Assault, what is, and how redressed, iii, 120;
iv, 216, 217.
costs in action for, iii, 100.
on king's chancellor, &c., iv, 84.
in king's palace, iv, 125.
in courts of justice, id.
on constables, iv, 129.
on clergymen, iv, 217.
in rescues, iv, 131.
to raise price of wages, iv, 159, 217, n.
to stop progress of grain, &c., iv, 217, n.
with intent to commit felony, id.
on doorkeepers and gamekeepers, id.
on persons saving wreck, id.
on revenue officers, iv, 155.
on commissioners of taxes, iv, 158.
Assembly, riotous or unlawful, iv, 146.
of estates, i, 147.
Assessed taxes, i, 325.
Assessment of damages for waste, iii, 228.
Assets, ii, 510.
estates pour autre vie, ii, 260.
by descent, ii, 244, 302, 340; iii, 430.
when not liable for personal wrongs, ii, 302.
real, in equity, iii, 430.
Assignees in bankruptcy, ii, 480.
(See "Bankruptcy.")
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Assignments, ii, 326, 440.
fraudulent, ii, 296, 441.
of chose in action, ii, 397, n., 442.
distinguished from an underlease, ii, 327, n.
of bills of exchange, &c., ii, 468.
of errors, iii, 406.
Assigns, ii, 289.
Assize, general, i, 148.
of arms, i, 411 ; ii, 66.
commission of, iii, 60; iv, 269, 424.
grand, iv, 422.
justices of, iii, 59; iv, 269.
killing them, iv, 84.
could not formerly sit in their own county,
iii, 59, 335.
of bread, the offence of breaking, iv, 157.
of nuisance, iii, 220.
courts of, iii, 58.
certificate of, iii, 389.
writ of, iii, 184; iv, 422.
of mort d'ancestor, &c., iii, 185, 232.
turned into an inquest, iii, 402.
Association, writ of, iii, 60.
Assumpsit, implied, iii, 159, 162.
consideration to support, ii, 443.
Assurance.
(See "Insurance.")
Assurances, common, ii, 294.
covenant for further, ii, App.
Atheling, i, 199.
Attachment in pone, iii, 280.
against witnesses, iii, 369.
for contempts, iii, 443; iv, 283.
Attachments, court of, iii, 71.
Attainder, act of, iv, 259.
forfeiture of real property by, in treason, iv,381.
in felony, iv, 385.
by premunire, iv, 386.
of personal property, id.
difference between forfeiture of lands and
goods, iv, 387.
plea of previous attainder, iv, 336.
escheat on, ii, 251, 290.
dower of felon's wife, ii, 253.
Attaint, writ of, iii, 351.
verdicts formerly reversed by, iii, 388.
superseded by motions for new trials, iii, 404.
abolished, iii, 351, n.
Attainted persons, iv, 380.
Attempts to rob, iv, 242.
to steal fish, iv, 235.
Attestation of deed, ii, 307.
royal, ii, 308.
of wills, ii, 376, 501.
Attesting witness, proof by, iii, 368.
Attorney, iii, 25.
subject to censure of the judges, iii, 26.
must be admitted and sworn, iii, 26.
communications made to him in his profes-
sional capacity, iii, 36.
may recover fees in United States, iii, 28, n.
liability of, iii, 164 and n.
right of, to defend client for felony, iv, 356.
summary proceedings against, iv, 284.
to deliver seizin, ii, 315.
warrant of, iii, 397.
Attorney-general, iii, 97.
information by, iii, 261; iv, 308.
information by, in matters of charity, iii, 427.
Attornment, ii, 72, 290.
INDEX.
Attornment, wrongfiul, a forfeiture, ii, 275.
Aubaine, droit d', i, 372.
Audita querela, when it lies, iii, 405.
Augmentation of vicarages and curacies, i, 388.
Aula regia, iii, 37; iv, 416, 422.
Aulnager, i, 275.
Aurum reginse, i, 221.
Authorities in law, i, 72.
Auterfois acquit, iv, 335.
attaint, iv, 336.
convict, id.
Autre droit, ii, 177.
Autre vie, ii, 120.
(See " Estate.")
Averium, ii, 424.
Averment, in pleading, iii, 313.
in indictments, iv, 340.
Avowry, iii, 149.
Avulsion of land, ii, 261.
Award, what is, iii, 16.
real property cannot pass by, id.
under rule of court, id.
Ayle, writ of, iii, 186.
Bachelor, knight, i, 404.
Backing warrants, iv, 291.
Bail, above, iii, 290.
below, iii, 291.
common, iii, 287.
sheriff obliged to take, iii, 289.
to the action, if not put in, plaintiff may sue
the sheriff's bail, iii, 290.
when and how put in, id.
special, when required, iii, 291.
plaintiff in error must find, iii, 411.
when may be proceeded against, iii. 416.
scire facias against, id.
in criminal cases, iv, 297.
taking excessive, i, 135; iv, 297.
taking insufficient, iv, 297.
what offences bailable, iv, 298.
what to be done, if offence not bailable,
iv, 300.
personating of, iv, 128, n.
bond, iii, 290.
piece, iii, 291.
Bailable or not, who, iv, 297, 298, 299.
Bailee, larceny by, iv, 230.
larceny from, iv, 231.
Bailiffs, 1, 345.
of hundreds, i, 116, 345.
special, i, 346.
Bailiwick, i, 344; iv, 38.
Bailments, ii, 295, et seq.
classification of, ii, 451 and n.
Bakers, regulation as to baking, &c., bread,
iv, 157.
selling bad bread, iv, 162.
Ballot for jurors, iii, 358.
Balnearii, iv, 239.
Banc, what are days in, iii, 277.
Banishment, i, 133, 137; iv, 377, 401.
Bank notes, ii, 470, n.
checks, id.
Bank of England, misbehavior of its officers,
iv, 234.
embezzlement by, iv, 230.
notes, forgery of, iv, 248.
stealing notes of, iv, 234.
Bankers, checks of, ii, 470, n
Bankers, embezzlement by, iv, 231, n.
forging their plates, iv, 250 and n.
Bankrupt, the word, ii, 472.
promise to pay by, after certificate must be
in writing, ii, 466, n.
embezzlement of effects by, iv, 156.
Bankruptcy, ii, 271, 488, n; iv, 431, 436.
Roman law of, ii, 472.
bankrupt formerly treated as an offender, ii,
471 n.
confined to traders, ii, 473, 474.
what is a trading, ii, 476.
feme covert, ii, 477.
petitioning creditors' debt, ii, 475.
act of bankruptcy, ii, 477.
fraudulent, iv, 155 and n.
proceedings in, ii, 479.
assignee's title to estate and property of
bankrupt, ii, 285, 485.
dividend, ii, 487, 488, n.
priorities of creditors, id.
landlord's rent, ii, 487.
contingent debts, ii, 488.
interest, id.
superceding commission, id.
court of bankruptcy, iii, 56, 428, n.
court of review, iii, 428, n.
jurisdiction of equity, iii, 428.
Banks of rivers, &c., destroying, iv, 144, 245.
Banneret, knight, i, 403.
Banns, i, 439.
Bar, plea in, iii, 306; iv, 835, 896.
trial at, iii, 352 ; iv, 351.
Bargain and sale of lands, ii, 338.
Barn, setting fire to, iv, 245.
Baron, i, 398.
and feme, i, 4383.
(See "Husband and Wife.")
Baronet, i, 403.
Baronies, ii, 62, 90.
Baronies of bishops, i, 156.
Barratry, iv, 134.
Barrister, i, 23; iii, 26.
no action lies to recover his fee, iii, 28.
defence of prisoner by, iii, 27.
Base fee, ii, 109.
service and tenure, ii, 61, 148.
Bastard, i, 454.
incapacities of, i, 458.
maintenance of, i, 457, 458.
legitimation of, i, 455.
cannot inherit, ii, 247
eign, ii, 248.
administration to, ii, 505.
concealment of its death, iv, 858.
punishment for having, iv, 65.
Bastardy, issue as to, iii, 335.
Bath, knight of the, i, 403.
Battle, trial by, iii, 105, 337, 346, 418, 421, 424.
Battery, iv, 216.
of a clergyman, iv, 317.
what is, iii, 120.
when justifiable, id.
remedies for, id.
inspection of, iii, 333.
(See "Assault and Battery."
Bawdy houses, iv, 29, 64, 167.
Beaconage, suit for in admiralty court, iii, 107.
Beacons, i, 264.
Beasts of the plough, when they may be dis-
trained, iii, 9.
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Beaumount, Viscount, i, 398.
Bees, property in, ii, 393 and n.
Behavior, good, security for, iv, 251, 256, 402.
Beheading, iv, 92, 377.
Benefices, iv, 107.
Benefit of clergy, i, 377, 402, n.; iv, 333, 365,
413, 429,441.
Benevolence, compulsive, i, 140; iv, 436.Bequest. (See "Will.")
Berwick-upon-Tweed, i, 99.
Besayle, writ of, iii, 186.
Bible, right to print, ii, 410 and n.
Bigamy, iv, 163.
Bill in parliament, 1, 181.
how passed, id.
of rights i, 128, 211-217; iv, 440
for patent, ii, 346.
of indictment, iv, 302.
of exceptions, iii, 372.
of Middlesex, iii, 285.
in equity, iii, 442.
of privilege, iii, 289.
Bills of exchange and promissory notes, ii, 466
et seq.
consideration for, ii, 446.
negotiability of, ii, 442, n.
may be taken in execution, iii, 417, n.
foreign and inland, ii, 47.
for what amount legal, ii, 468.
assignment of, id.
acceptance, protest, presentment for pay-
ment, days of grace, ii, 469.
notice of dishonor, ii, 470.
stamp, ii, 469.
action on, ii, 470.
interest on, ii, 463, n.
forging, iv, 248, 249, and 250, n.
stealing, iv, 234, and n.
Bills of banks, ii, 470, n.
Bills of lading, ii, 449, n.
Billa vera, iv, 305.
Billeting military, i, 413.
Bishops, i, 155, 377, 382.
are not peers, i, 401.
mode of appointment, i, 377.
powers and duties, i, 381, 382.
crown entitled to hounds of, on death of, ii,
413.
mortuary to crown on death of, ii, 426.
used to sit in the county court, iii, 61.
what matters tried by certificate of, iii, 335.
not electing or consecrating, iv, 115.
not entitled to trial as peers, i, 401 ; iv, 264.
Bishoprics, nominating to, iv, 108,115,415,430.
Bissextile year, ii, 141.
Black act, threatening letters, iv, 144.
shooting at another, iv, 208.
going disguised, &c., iv, 244.
burning houses, &c., iv, 246.
Black mail, ii, 43; iv, 244.
Blanch rent, ii, 43.
Blasphemy, iv, 59.
Blench holding, ii, 43.
Blind persons, wills by, ii, 497 and n.
Blood, corruption of, ii, 251; iv, 388.
restitution in, iv, 402.
half, i, 70, 194; ii, 227.
royal, i, 225, 226.
Boat, stealing from, iv, 240, n.
Bocland, ii, 90.
576
Bodies, remedy for stealing, &c., ii, 429.
Body corporate, i, 467.
protection of, i, 134.
Boiling to death, iv, 196.
Bona notabilia, ii, 509.
Bona vacantia, i, 296, 299.
Bonds in general, ii, 340, and App.; iv, 442.
how far a charge on land, ii, 340.
effect of illegal or impossible condition, ii,
340.
the whole penalty not always recoverable,
ii, 341.
of arbitration, iii, 16.
to resign a living, when legal, ii, 280.
relief against penalty, iii, 432.
stealing of, iv, 234.
forgery of, iv, 249.
Bono et malo, writ de, iv, 270.
Books, copyright in, ii, 405.
popish, importing or selling, iv, 110.
and papers, production of, iii, 382.
Books of account, entries in, when may be
read in evidence, iii, 368.
Books of rates, i, 317.
Borcugh English, i, 75; ii, 83.
Boroughs, i, 115
corporations of, i, 475, n.
parliamentary, i, 172, n
election for, i, 174.
members for, i, 174.
courts, iii, 80.
Borrowing, contracts of, ii, 453.
Borsholder, i, 115, 356; iv, 413.
Botes or estovers, ii, 35, 122.
Bottomry, ii, 457, 461.
Bound bailiffs, i, 345.
Bounties on exportation, i, 315.
Bounty, Queen Anne's, i, 286.
Bourdeaux, mayor of; his certificate, iii, 334.
Boxing, offence of, iv, 183.
Bracton, i, 72, 425.
Breach of the peace, iv, 142.
chargeable upon him who begins an affray,
iii, 3.
Breach of prison, iv, 180.
of close, iii, 209.
of pound, iii, 146.
Breaking, in burglary, iv, 226.
to make distress, iii, 11.
to make arrest, iii, 288.
Brehon laws in Ireland, i, 100; iv, 313.
Brevia testata, ii, 307.
Bribery of magistrates, &c., iv. 139 and n.
in elections, i, 179, 180 n.
Bridges, i, 357; iv, 424.
annoyances in, iv, 167.
British constitution, i, 50, 51.
(See "Constitution.")
islands, i, 105.
subjects abroad, where to be tried, iv, 305.
Britons, ancient, their laws, i, 63; iv, 108.
Britton, i, 72, 427.
Brooke, i, 72.
Brothels, frequenting, iv, 64.
keeping, iv, 29, 64, 167.
Bubbles, iv, 117.
Buggery, iv. 215.
Buildings, erected under license, ii, 297, n.
lateral support for, ii, 36, n.
Bulles, papal, iv, 109, 110.
Burgage tenure, ii, 82; iv, 419.
INDEX.
Burgesses. (See "Boroughs.")
Burglary, what, iv, 222, 223.
as to the time, iv, 224 and n.
as to the place and residence, id. and n.
as to the mode of committing, iv, 226.
there must be a breaking, iv, 226 and n.
also an entry, iv, 227 and n.
as to the intent, iv, 228 and n.
Burial, of felo de se, iv, 190.
expenses allowed to executor, ii, 508.
Burning in the check, iv, 99, 370, 377.
in the hand, iv, 367, 369, 370, 372, 377, 451.
malicious, iv, 244, 245, 246.
to death, iv, 93, 204, 216, 222, 377, 408.
Butlerage, i, 315.
Bye-law of corporation, i, 475, 476, n.
action of debt on, iii, 160.
Cabinet, i, 230, n.
in United States, i, 232, n.
Calais, captain of, his certificate, iii, 334.
Calendar, new style, ii, 140, n
Calendar of prisoners, iv, 403.
Calling the plaintiff, iii, 376.
Canal, destroying works of, iv. 244.
banks, &c., breaking down, id.
Cancellation of deed, ii, 309.
of will, ii. 503.
of letters patent, iii, 47, 260, 261.
Canon law, i, 14, 19, 82, 83; iv, 421, 423.
authority of, i, 79, 83, n.
degrees of consanguinity under, ii, 206.
Canonical obedience, iv, 106, 112, 204.
purgation, iv, 368.
Canonists should study the common law, i, 15.
Canons of a church, i, 383.
of Edw. VI, i, 83.
of A. D. 1603, id.
Canterbury, archbishop of, i, 381.
precedence of, i, 380, n.
Canterbury and York, struggle between arch-
bishops of, i, 115, n., 404, n.
Capacity to purchase or convey, ii, 290
of guilt, iv, 20.
Capias ad audiendum judicium, iv, 375.
Capias ad respondendum in criminal cases, iv,
318,429, 459.
allowed in actions of account by the stat-
utes of Marlbridge, iii, 281.
in actions of debt and detinue by 25 Edw.
III, c. 17, id.
in all actions on the case by 19 Hen. VII, c.
9, id.
was usually sued out in the first instance,
ifi, 282.
return of non est inventus to, id.
testatum, id.
arrest of defendant upon, iii, 287.
Capias ad satisfaciendum, iii, 413.
when it may issue after writ of elegit, iii, 419.
if non est inventus returned, plaintiff may
proceed against the bail, iii, 416.
Capias in withernam, iii, 148.
Capias pro fine, iii, 398.
Capias utlagatum, iii, 284; iv, 320.
Capiatur, judgment quod, iii, 398, and App.
Capita, distribution per, ii, 517.
succession per, ii, 218.
Capital punishment, iv, 9,18,237,376,413,441.
Capite, tenure in, ii, 60.
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Caption of indictment, iv, 351, 448.
Captives, property in, ii, 402.
Caput lupinum, iv, 320.
Carnal knowledge of infants, iv, 212.
of women by fbrce, iv, 210.
boy under fourteen presumed incapable of,
iv, 212.
Carriers, special and general, ii, 45, n.
liabilities of special and general, i, 430, n.;
iii, 164.
lien of, ii, 451, n.
traveling on Sunday, iv, 64.
larceny by, iv, 230.
Cart-bote, ii, 35.
Case, action on, iii, 122; iv, 442.
and trespass, iii, 209.
for nuisance, iii, 222.
for waste, iii, 226.
reserved, iii, 378.
from chancery, iii, 453.
Castigatory for scolds, iv, 169.
Castle, what, ii, 19 and n.
Castration, iv, 206.
Casual ejector, iii, 201.
Catholics.
(See "Church," "Roman Catholics.")
Cattle, owner of, liable for trespass by, iii, 212.
estrays, i, 297.
impounding, iii, 12.
malicious killing or maiming, iv, 244.
owner when answerable criminally for in-
juries by, iv, 197.
Causa matrimonii preilocuti, writ of entry, iii,
183.
Cause, challenge for, iii, 361; iv, 353,
Caveat against proving will, iii, 98.
against admission of clerk, iii, 246.
Centenarius, i, 115.
Centeni, i, 116; iii, 34.
Centumviri, iii, 315.
Cepi corpus, iii, 288.
Certificate of bankrupt, ii, 482, 488.
of marriage, i, 438.
of poor, i, 364.
of bishop, iii, 335.
for costs, iii, 214.
into chancery, iii, 453
of assize, iii, 389.
of customs of London, iii, 338.
trial by, id.
Certiorari facias, iv, 262, 265, 272, 320, 321.
Cessavit, writ of, iii, 232.
Cessio bonorum, ii, 473, 483, 488.
Cession of a benefice, i, 392.
Cestuy que trust, ii, 328.
Cestuy que use, ii, 328.
Cestuy que vie, ii, 123.
Chains, hanging in, iv, 202.
Challenge of jury, iii, 359, 365; iv, 352.
to fight, iv, 150.
Chamberlain, lord great, iii, 37.
Champerty, iv, 135.
Champions in trial by battle, iii, 339.
Chance, iv, 26.
Chancellor, lord high, his authority, iii, 37,47
formerly not a layman, iii, 433.
killing of, iv, 84.
Chancellor of a diocese, i, 382.
of duchy of Lancaster, iii, 78.
of exchequer, iii, 44.
of university, his court, iii, 83.
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Chance medley, iv, 184.
Chancery, court of, iii, 47; iv, 436.
(See "Equity.")
original writs issue out of, iii, 48.
origin of the name, iii, 46.
jurisdiction of legal court of, iii, 47.
equity, court of, history of its jurisdiction,
iii, 49.
appeal from equity court to house of peers,
iii, 56, 427.
guardianship of infants, iii, 426.
custody of idiots and lunatics, iii, 427.
appeal from, in matters of lunacy, iii, 427.
jurisdiction over charities, iii, 427.
(See" Charities.")
Chapters, i, 382.
Character of witnesses in rape, questioning,
iv., 213.
infamous witness, iii, 370.
defaming.
(See "Libel.")
Charge to grand jury, iv, 303.
to traverse jury, iii, 375.
Chariots and cabriolets, i, 325.
Charitable uses, i, 479.
void gifts to, ii, 268, 273,876.
estate tail may be appointed to, ii, 119.
Charities, jurisdiction of chancery, iii, 427.
remedy for breaches of trust, iii, 427.
Chapel, breaking and stealing from, iv, 241.
Charles I, his judges, i, 209, 816.
Charter, ii, 295.
of the king, ii, 346.
government in America, i, 108.
Charter land, it, 90.
Charter of incorporation, i, 473.
of our liberties, i, 127, 129.
Chase, i, 38, 416; iv, 415.
beasts of, id.
Chattels, real and personal, ii, 143, 884.
(See "Personalty.")
estates. (See "Estate.")
Chastity, homicide in defence of, iv, 181.
of queen consort, &c., violation of, iv, 81.
violating by force, iv, 210.
Cbaud medley, iv, 184.
Cheat, action against, iii, 164.
Cheating, offence of, iv, 157.
at play, iv, 173.
Cheek, burning in, iv, 99, 870, 377.
Cheque, banker's, ii, 470, n.
stealing, iv, 234.
forging of, iv, 249.
Chester, county palatine of, i, 117, 118.
courts of county palatine of, abolished, iii,
79.
Chevisance, the word, ii, 474.
Chief justices, iii, 40, 41.
Chief justiciar, iii, 37; iv, 416.
decline of his authority, iii, 39.
Chief rent, ii, 42.
Child stealing, iv, 219.
Child in ventre sa mere, i, 130.
Children, duties of, i, 453.
custody of, id.
parent's remedy for abduction of, iii, 140.
evidence of, iv, 214.
(See "Infants.")
Chirograph, ii, 296.
Chivalry, tenure in, ii, 61.
(See "Tenure.")
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Chivalry, court of, iii, 68; iv, 267.
its jurisdiction, iii, 103; iv, 267.
proceedings in, iii, 104.
guardian in, i, 462.
Chose in action, ii, 396, 442.
what are assignable, ii, 468, 470, n.
how assigned, iii, 441, 442.
stealing, iv, 234.
Christian courts, iii, 64.
Christianity, offences against, iv, 43 et 8eq
part of the law of England, iv, 60.
Church, head of, i, 279.
marriages in, i, 439.
rate, i, 395 ; iii, 92.
title to pews in, ii, 429.
repair of, iii, 92.
burglary in, iv, 224.
larceny in, iv, 241.
riotously demolishing, iv, 143.
offences against, iv, 50.
church yards, of affrays in, iv, 145.
societies in America, i, 376, n.
Churchwardens, i, 394.
Cinque ports, courts of, iii, 79.
Circuits, iii, 58, 356 ; iv, 422, 424.
Circumstantial evidence, iii, 371.
Citation in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Citizens in parliament.
(See "Boroughs.")
City, i, 115.
Civil corporations, i, 470.
Civil death, i, 132; iii, 121,257; iv, 440.
Civil injuries, iii, 2.
Civil law, i, 81 ; iv, 421, 422.
always preferred by the clergy, i, 18-20.
its authority, i, 79.
not strictly law, i, 79, n.
degrees ofconsanguinity according to, ii,
206.
Civil liberty, i, 6, 125, 251.
Civil list, i, 382, 335.
Civil state, i, 396.
subjection, iv, 28.
Civilians should study the common law, i, 15.
Clarendon, constitutions of, iv, 422.
Clausum fregit, iii, 209.
Clementine constitutions, i, 82.
Clergy, i, 376.
adverse to the common law, i, 18-20.
and lawyers, animosity between, i, 20, n.
formerly proficients in law, i, 17.
excluded from parliament, i, 175, n.
should study law, i, 13, 14.
simony by, iv, 62.
benefit of, i, 377, 402, n. ; iv, 333, 365, 413,
429,441.
plea of, iv, 334.
prayer of, iv, 447.
abolition of, iv, 365, n.
Clergyman, beating of, iv, 217.
mortuary to bishop on death of, ii, 426.
when prohibited from hunting, ii, 412.
Clerical privileges and disabilities, i, 377.
habit and tonsure, iv, 336.
Clerico admittendo, writ de, iii, 413.
Clerk in office, i, 17.
in orders, i, 388; iv, 367.
parish, i, 395.
of the market, his court, iv, 275.
of the peace, iv, 272.
or servant, embezzlement by, &c., iv, 231
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Clipping the coin, iv, 90.
Close, breach of, iii, 209.
Close writs and rolls, ii, 346.
Clothes, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.
Coal mines, setting fire to, &c., iv, 246.
Coat of arms, ii, 306; iii, 105.
Code of Justinian, i, 81.
of Theodosius, id.
Codicil, ii, 500.
Cognate, ii, 235.
Cognizance, iv, 278.
must be claimed before defence made, iii,
297.
when it may be claimed, id.
in replevin, iii, 149.
Cognizor and cognizee, ii 341, 350; iii, 157.
Cognovit actionem, iii, 297, 304.
Coin, falsifying, &c., iv, 84, 88, 90, 98, 100,
120.
felonies and misdemeanors relating to, iv,
84, 88, 90 et seq.
Coinage, instruments of, offences relating to,
iv, 90 et seq.
duties, i, 295.
right of, i, 277.
Coke, Sir Edward, i, 72, 73.
causes of his removal from the office of
chief justice of the king's bench, iii, 55.
Collateral consanguinity, ii, 204, 220.
Collateral issue, iv, 338, 396.
Collatio bonorum, ii, 517.
Collation to a benefice, iv, 391.
Colleges, i, 471.
their visitors, i, 482.
leases by, ii, 322.
Collegia in the civil law, i, 469.
Collieries, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.
Colonial assemblies, i, 109.
Colonies, i, 107-110.
transportation to, iv, 401.
Colonization, right of, ii, 7.
Color, in pleading, iii, 309.
Combinations, among workmen, &c., iv, 133,
160.
Combustio domorum, iv, 374.
Comburendo heretico, writ de, iv, 46, 439.
Commenda, iv, 107.
Commendams, i, 393.
Commentaries, plan of the, i, 34.
Commerce, king the arbiter of, i, 273.
Commission of array, i, 411.
of lunacy, i, 305, 306, n.
of the peace, i, 351; iv, 270.
in bankruptcy, ii, 480.
of rebellion, iii, 444.
high court of, iii, 68,
of review, iii., 67.
to examine witnesses, &c., iii, 75, n., 383,
438, 449.
under the statute of charitable uses, iii, 427.
Commitment of persons accused, iv, 296.
reason for which it is made must be ex-
pressed, iii, 133.
Committee, judicial, of the privy council, i,
231, n., 280, n.
how organized, iii, 69, n.
of lunatic, i, 306.
of peers, iii, 56.
Common assurances, ii, 294.
Common, estate in, ii, 191, 399.
(See "Estate.")
Common, right of, ii, 32 et seq., 263.
approvement and inclosure of, ii, 34.
of piscary, ii, 34, 39, 40.
of turbary, ii, 34.
of estovers, ii, 35.
disturbance of, iii, 236.
distress for surcharging, iii, 237.
action on the case for surcharging, iii, 239.
enclosure or obstructing, id.
when the lord may enclose, iii, 240.
Common barretor, iv, 133.
Common bench, iii, 37.
justices of, killing, iv, 84.
Common carriers, ii, 451, n.
action against, iii, 164.
Common jury, how returned, iii, 358.
Common law, i, 63, 67; iii, 267; iv, 411, 412.
despised by the clergy, i, 20.
distinguishable into three kinds, i, 67.
corporation by, i, 472.
guardian by, i, 461.
preference of operation of a deed by, ii,
380.
Common informer, iii, 160.
Common nuisances, iv, 166.
Common pleas, court of, its origin, iii, 38.
fixed at Westminster, i, 22, 23; iv, 424.
only sergeants admitted, iii, 28.
number of judges, iii, 40.
writ of error from, id.
Common prayer book, offence of reviling, iv,
50.
Common recovery, iv, 429.
(See "Recovery.")
Common scold, iv, 169.
Common seal, i, 475.
Common utterer of false money, iv, 100.
Commonalty, i, 403.
Commoners, when they may abate a nuisance
to a common, iii, 239, n.
Commons, house of, i, 158.
its members should study law, i, 9, 10.
its peculiar laws, i, 169.
Commonwealth, offences against, iv, 127.
Commorancy, iv, 273.
Communem legem, writ of entry ad, iii, 180.
Community of property, ii, 14.
Commutation of penance, iv, 105, 217, 276.
of tithes, i, 388, n.
Compact distinguished from law, ii, 45.
Companies, public, forgeries on, iv, 249.
(See "Corporations.")
Compassing the death of the king, &c., iv, 76.
Compensatio, iii, 305.
Composition with creditors, ii, 484.
Compound larceny, iv, 239.
(See "Larceny.")
Compounding felony, iv, 133.
other prosecutions, iv, 136.
Compulsion, iv, 27.
Compurgators, iii, 343; iv, 368, 414.
in equity, iii, 447.
Computation of time, ii, 140, n.
Concealment from the crown, iv, 436.
of bastard's death, iv, 198.
Conclusion of pleas, iii, 303.
Concord in a fine, ii, 304 i iii, 157.
Condemnation of goods in the exchequer, iii,
262.
of deodands, i, 300; iii, 259.
Condition, ii, 17, n., 110, 299.
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Condition, distinguished from a remainder
and a conditional limitation, ii, 156.
estates upon, ii, 152.
implied or express condition, ii, 152,154,299.
precedent or subsequent, ii, 154.
in deed and in law, ii, 155.
effect of breach of, ii, 156, 281.
impossible or illegal, ii, 156, 340.
estate in mortgage, ii, 157.
(See "Mortgage.")
Conditional fee, ii, 109, n.
(See "Estate.")
Conditional limitation, ii, 156.
Conditional pardon, iv, 401.
Confession by prisoners, iv, 357.
of indictment, iv, 329.
in divorce cases, i, 441, n.
of cause of action, iii, 303, 397.
in ejectment, iii, 203.
of debt barred by statute, iii, 306, n.
Confinement to the realm, i, 265.
Confirmation, ii, 325.
of bishops, i, 378, 380; iv, 115.
Confiscation, iv, 377.
Confiscations, part of royal revenue, i, 299.
Confusion and intermixture of goods, ii, 405.
Conge d'eslire, i, 379, 382; iv, 421.
Congregations, religious, disturbance of, iv, 54
and n.
Congress of United States, meetings of, i, 153,
n., 189, n.
how composed, i, 160, n.
revenue bills in, i, 170, n.
approval of bills, i, 185, n.
Conies, taking, killing or stealing, iv, 235.
Conjugal rights, suit for restitution of, iii, 94.
Conjuration, iv, 60, 436.
Conquest, the words ii, 48, 242.
Conquest, Norman, i, 199; iv, 414, 415.
introduction of feudal tenures on, ii, 48.
Consanguinity, i, 434, 435, n.
degrees of, ii, 202, 206.
collateral, ii, 204.
Conscience, laws binding on the, i, 54, 57, n.
courts of, iii, 441.
Consecration of bishops, i, 380; iv, 115.
Consequential damages, iii, 153.
Conservators of the peace, i, 350; iv, 413, 431.
(See" Justice.")
Conservators, truce and safe-conducts, iv, 69.
Conservatory, robbery of, iv, 233, and n.
Consideration for a contract, ii, 443, 444, n.,
468.
moral obligation, ii, 445, n.
in a deed, ii, 296.
different kinds of, ii, 444.
inadequacy of, ii, 444, n.
Consideratum est per curiam, iii, 396.
Consilium, or imparlance, iv, 356.
Consimili casu, writ of entry in, iii, 183.
Consistory court, iii, 64.
Consolidated fund, i, 331.
Consort, queen's, i, 219.
Conspiracy, law of, in general, iv, 136.
to raise wages, iii, 160.
action of, iii, 126.
Constable, i, 355, 411; iv, 292.
high, i, 115.
lord high, i, 355; iii, 37; iv, 268.
his court, iii, 68; iv, 267.
his duty, on arrest in criminal cases, iv, 296.
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Constable, petty, i, 355.
Constitution, British, i, 49, 50, 127, 144, 154,
160, 213, 217, 233, 237; iv, 439.
changes in, i, 155, n.
American, how they restrain legislative
power, i, 49, n., 52, n., 58, n., 89, n., 125, n.
(See "American States.")
Construction of deeds and wills, ii, 115, 297
et seq., 397 et seq.
rules of, in equity, the same as at law, iii,
430.
of statutes, rules for, i, 87, 91.
(See also "Interpretation of Law.")
Constructive treason, iv, 75, 85.
taking, in larceny, iv, 230, n.
Consul, offences to his person, iv, 70 n.
Consultation, writ of, why so called, iii, 114.
Contempt against the king, iv, 121.
in courts of law, iv, 283.
of court, process in equity, iii, 443.
Contenement, iv, 379.
Contingent remainders, ii, 169.
(See "Remainder.")
conveyance of, ii, 290, 354.
uses, ii, 334.
legacy, ii, 513.
Continual claim, ii, 316; iii, 174.
Continuances, iii, 316.
Continuando, laying trespass with a, iii, 212.
Contract of marriage, i, 439; iii, 93.
implied in the organization of government,
iii, 158.
original, between king and people, i, 233.
Contracts, ii, 442 et seq.
are either special or parol, ii, 446, 465.
when to be in writing, ii, 442, 447.
partial execution, ii, 447.
signature by one party only, ii, 442.
express or implied, ii, 443; iii, 153, 158.
executed or executory, ii, 443.
simple or special, ii, 465.
consideration to support, ii, 296, 443.
improvidence of, ii, 444.
nudum pactum, ii, 445.
kinds of, ii, 446.
(See "Bailments," "Borrowing," "Debt,"
"Exchange,' "Hiring,' "Sale.")
of marriage, i, 439; iii, 93.
actions on, iii, 117.
specific performance of, iii, 435, 438.
for sale of lands, possession under, ii, 140,
n., 146, n.
Contractu, action e, iii, 117.
Convention of estates, i, 151, 152
of parliament, i, 152.
Conversion, iii, 152.
Conveyances, origin and history of, ii, 9, 287;
iv, 430.
attornment, ii, 290.
who may convey, and to whom, id.
to a corporation, id.
kinds of, ii, 294, 309, et seq.
writing essential to, ii, 297.
to be signed, ii, 306.
by deed, ii, 295.
lease and release, ii, 339.
to lead or declare uses, id.
of revocation and defeasance, id.
at the common law, or under the stattte of
uses, iil 309, 337.
by matter of record, ii, 341.
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Conveyances, of freehold, ii, 811, et seq.
of contingent remainder, ii, 290, n., 854.
of incorporeal hereditaments, ii, 317.
fraudulent, ii, 296.
Convict, transportation of, iv, 401.
rescue of, iv, 131.
execution of, iv, 403.
Conviction in general, iv, 280.
in frauds against revenue laws, iv, 281.
before justices for disorderly offences in
general, id.
by judgment, iv, 862.
Convocation, i, 279.
court of bishops in, iii, 67.
Coparceners, ii, 187.
(See "Estate.")
Copper coin, counterfeiting, iv, 100.
Copy of indictment, right of prisoner to, iv,
351.
of record of indictment, iii, 126.
Copyhold, ii, 90, 95, 147.
varieties of tenures by custom, ii, 148.
tenant's right of renewal, ii, 148.
customary freeholds, ii, 107, 149.
lands, parcel of the manor, ii, 97.
demisable immemorially by custom, id.
inheritable, or for life, ii, 97, 98.
heriots, ii, 97, 422, 424.
wardship, ii, 98.
admittance of heir, ii, 97, n., 371.
customary court and court-baron, i, 90, n.
court of ancient demesne, ii, 100.
fines, ii, 98.
modes of alienation, ii, 865.
surrender, re-grant and admittance, ii, 866,
368 et seq.
trusts of, ii, 867, n.
devisee of, by unadmitted heir, devisee or
surrenderee, ii, 367, n.
estate of surrenderor, ii, 368.
entails of, how barred, ii, 113.
free bench, ii, 132.
forfeiture for breach of custom, ii, 284.
when affected by an act of parliament, ii,
113.
could not formerly be taken in execution,
iii, 418.
but may now, iii, 419, n.
Copyright, ii, 405 et seq., 410.
prerogative copyright of crown in acts of
parliament, bibles, &c., ii, 410.
Corn, may be distrained, iii, 9.
destroying, iv, 246.
sporting, &c., in, iv, 174.
stopping it going to market, iv, 158.
Corn rents, ii, 322.
Cornage, ii, 74.
Cornwall, duchy of, i, 225, n.
Corody, i, 284; ii, 40.
Coronation oath, ancient, i, 236.
modern, i, 235.
made use of to prevent Catholic emancipa-
tion, i, 235, n.
Coronatore eligendo, writ de, i, 347.
ex onerando, writ de, i, 348.
Coroner, i, 346; iv, 292, 413.
duration of office of, i, 348.
mode of appointing, i, 347.
power and duty of, i, 348.
of duchy of Lancaster, 1, 119, n.
when venire facias issues to, iii, 354.
Coroner, his court, iv, 274.
apprehending felon, iv, 292.
Saxon laws, as to, iv, 413.
inquest of, equivalent to finding of grand
jury, when, iv, 274, n.
inquisition of, formal defects in, id.
Corporate counties, i, 120.
name, i, 474.
offices, remedy by mandamus for refusal to
admit to, i, 264.
franchises, usurpation of, iii, 262.
Corporation acts, iv, 58, 439, 443, n.
Corporations, i, 467.
aggregate, i, 469.
ecclesiastical, i, 470.
eleemosynary, id.
dissolution of, i, 484.
duties of, i, 480.
how created, i, 472.
incidents and powers of, i, 476,479.
lay, i, 470.
origin of, i, 468.
privileges and disabilities of, i, 476, 477.
sole, i, 469.
visitors of, i, 484.
franchises of, are granted upon condition, ii,
153, n.
proceedings against, in the reign of Charles
II, iii, 263.
process by distringas against, iii, 445.
courts of, iii, 80.
property passes by succession, ii, 430.
when may take chattel by succession, ii, 481.
conveyance to, ii, 108, 290.
no escheat or extinction of, ii, 256.
leases by, ii, 318 et seq.
grants to, in mortmain.
(See "Mortmain.")
Corporeal hereditaments, ii, 17.
Corpse, stealing of, ii, 429.
Corpus juris canonica, i, 82.
Corpus juris civil, i, 81.
Correction of apprentices, i, 428.
of children, i, 452, 453; iv, 182.
of scholars, i, 458; iv, 182.
of servants, i, 428; iv, 182.
of wives, i, 444.
house of, iv, 370, 371, 377.
Corruption of blood, ii, 251; iv, 388,413,488,440.
Corse-present, ii, 425.
Corsned, trial by, iv, 345,414.
Cosinage, writ of, iii, 186.
Costs, title to, by judgment, ii, 432.
statutes by which they are given, iii, 399.
king neither pays nor receives, iii, 400.
exceptions, iii, 400, n.
when executors liable to pay, iii, 400.
in actions on the case, when plaintiff re-
covers less damages than 40s., iii, 214,400.
paupers excused from paying, iii, 400.
in trespass, iii, 214.
on notgoing to trial, iii, 857.
in equity, iii, 451.
in criminal cases, iv, 362 and n.
Council, judicial committee of privy, i, 232, n.,
280, n. ; iii, 61, n., 80, n.
president of the, i, 230, n.
its present organization, iii, 69, n.
the great, i, 148.
Councils of the king, i, 227.
Counsel, iii, 26.
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Counsel, king's, iii, 27.
cannot maintain an action for his fees, iii, 28.
action against, iii, 164.
not answerable for any matter spoken by
him, iii, 29.
for prisoners, iv, 355.
Count, i, 116, 398.
in declaration, iii, 293,295.
in indictment, iv, 98, 306, n.
Counterfeiting the king's coin, iv, 84,88, 100, n.
the king's seals, iv, 83, 89.
Counterpart of deed, ii, 296.
Counties, i, 116 ; iv, 411.
corporate, i, 120.
palatine, i, 117-119 ; iv, 431.
courts of, iii, 79.
members for, i, 159.
electors for, i, 172, 173.
Country, trial by the, iv, 349.
County court, i, 267 ; iii, 35: iv, 411, 441.
of Middlesex, iii, 82.
holden by the sheriff, i, 343.
its jurisdiction, iii, 36.
when holden, id.
formerly a court of great dignity, id.
formerly as much a spiritual as a temporal
tribunal, iii, 61.
Court-baron, ii, 90; iii, 33; iv, 411.
may hold plea of personal actions under
40s. ; iii, 34.
writ of false judgment lies to courts at West-
minster, id.
Court, payment into, when it may be, iii, 304, n.
Court hand, iii, 323.
Courts, their nature and incidents, iii, 23; iv,
258, 414.
derived from the power of the crown, iii, 23.
some are of record, others not, iii, 24.
their constituent parts, iii, 25.
assaults in, iv, 125.
are of four sorts, common law and equity,
ecclesiastical, military, and maritime,iii,30.
origin of, id.
inferior, have fallen into decay, id.
aula regia, iii, 37.
establishment of distinct, has been advan-
tageous, iii, 31, 40.
power to erect, i, 267 ; iii, 24.
practice of tried by certificate of officer, iii,
335.
of equity, i, 62, 92.
jurisdiction of, iii, 46, 443.
proceedings in, iii, 425 et seq.
(See "Chancery," "Equity," "Pleading,"
"Practice.")
Christian, and others, which receive peculiar
laws, i, 83; iii, 61.
martial, i, 416; iii, 6.
profits of, i, 289.
of piepoudre, iii, 32.
baron, iii, 33.
customary, ii, 90.
of bankruptcy, iii, 56, 428, n.
hundred court, iii, 34.
county, iii, 35.
of wards and liveries, ii, 69.
of common pleas, iii, 37.
of exchequer, equitable jurisdiction of, iii,
426.
jurisdiction of, in respect of royal matters,
iii, 428.
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Courts of exchequer, general jurisdiction of,
iii, 43.
of high commission, iii, 447.
of master of rolls, iii, 451.
of vice chancellors, iii, 426.
criminal, iv, 259 etseq.
of parliament, iii, 56 ; iv, 259.
of lord high steward, iv, 261.
of king's bench, iii, 41 ; iv. 265.
of star chamber, i, 230; iii, 445; iv, 266, 310,
429,433,437.
of chivalry, iii, 68 ; iv, 267.
of admiralty, iii, 68 ; iv, 268.
of oyer and terminer, iii, 58; iv, 269.
commission of assize and nisi prius, iii, 57;
iv, 269.
of general quarter sessions, iv, 271 and n.
central criminal court, iv, 271, n.
sheriff's tourn, iv, 273.
court-leet, or view of frank-pledge, id.
of coroner, iv, 274.
of clerk of market, iv, 275.
of special and private jurisdiction, id.
of lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of
king's household, iv, 276.
forest, iii, 71.
of commissioners of sewers, iii, 73.
of policies of insurance, iii, 74.
of the marshalsea, iii, 76.
of Wales, iii, 77.
of duchy of Lancaster, iii, 78 429.
of counties palatine, iii, 79.
stannary, iii, 80.
of London, &c., iii, 81.
of the Universities, iii, 83.
Costumier of Normandy, i, 107.
Covenant, what it is, iii, 156.
who may take advantage of, iii, 157 and n.
what run with the land, iii, 157, n.
against devisees, iii, 430, n.
by or with persons not parties to the deed,
iii, 296, n.
implied, ii, 443, n.
real, ii, 304; iii, 157.
for title, ii, 304.
when it runs with the land, ii, 304, n.
to stand seized, ii, 338.
writ of, ii, 350; iii, 156.
Covert-baron, i, 442.
Coverture, i, 442.
(See "Husband and Wife.")
Craven, iv, 348.
meaning of the word, iii, 340, n.
Credible witness, iii, 370.
Creditors, payment of debts of, by executor,
ii, 511.
appointing debtor executor, ii, 511 and n.
executor, iii, 18.
conveyances and assignments, when fraudu-
lent against, ii, 296.
Crimes, divisions of, iv, 1, 2, 5.
Criminal conversation, iii, 139.
information, iv, 308.
punishments, i, 133; iv, 7-16, 252, 258, 377.
Croft, what, ii, 19.
Crops of corn, &c., setting fire to, iv, 246.
Cross-bill, iii, 448, 451.
Cross-remainders, implication of, ii, 381.
Crown, descent of the, i, 191; iv, 413.
office, iv, 265, 308.
lands, i, 286.
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Crown, leases, i, 287.
power of, i, 335-337.
all lands are held of, ii, 51.
royal mines, ii, 18, 43.
royal fish, ii, 403.
title to chattels by prerogative, ii, 408, 505.
ancient jewels of, are heir-looms, ii, 428.
may take a chattel by succession, ii, 432.
cannot be joint owner of a chattel with a
subject, ii, 409.
prerogative copyright, ii, 410.
property in game, id.
no lapse of right to present by, ii, 277.
mortuary on death of bishop, ii, 413, 426.
forfeiture of lands to, ii, 267.
no general occupancy against, ii, 259.
words of limitation in grants to, ii, 109.
descent of, to collateral relation of the half-
blood allowed, ii, 253.
reversion in, not barrable, ii, 118.
not bound by sale in market overt, ii, 449.
grants by, ii, 308, 346.
mistake or deceit of, ii, 348.
cannot grant monopolies, except for inven-
tions, ii, 407.
injuries to, remedied by usual common-law
actions or inquests of office, iii, 257.
peculiar jurisdiction of exchequer in respect
of, iii, 428.
Cucking stool, iv, 169.
Cui ante divortium, writ of, iii, 183.
Cui in vita, writ ot1 iii, 183.
Culprit, ii, 339.
Cumberland, theft in, iv, 238.
Curate, i, 393.
his remedy for non-payment of his stipend,
iii, 90 and n.
Curator of infants, i, 460.
Curatores viarum, i, 358.
Curfew, iv, 419, 420.
Curialitas, ii, 126.
Currency, i, 276-279.
Cursing, iv, 59.
Curtesy, ii, 126.
of trusts, ii, 127, n.
of advowson, ii, 127.
Custody of idiots and lunatics, i, 303; iii, 427.
of temporalities, i, 282.
Custody of the law, goods in not to be dis-
trained, iii, 7, n.
Custom of London, i, 75, 76.
of merchants, i, 75.
distinguished from prescription, ii, 263.
title to personalty by, ii, 422.
of York and London, as to distribution of
intestate's effects, ii, 517.
of London, how tried, iii, 334.
alienation by, ii, 365.
dower by, ii, 132.
Customary court, ii, 91, n.
freeholds, ii, 100, 149.
dues to mills, &c., iii, 235.
Customs general, i, 68-74; iii, 50.
how proved, i, 70-74, 76.
how settled, i, 69.
Customs, particular, i, 74-79.
how allowed, i, 78.
when legal, i, 76-78; ii, 35, n.
Customs on merchandize, i, 314, 316.
Custos rotulorum, i, 349; iv, 272.
Custuma antiqua sive magna, i, 315.
Custuma parva et nova, i, 315.
Cutpurses, iv, 242.
Cy pres doctrine, i, 480, n.
Damage to things personal, iii, 152.
Damage feasant, iii, 6.
Damages, title to, by judgment, ii, 438; iii, 187.
Dane-lage, i, 65; iv, 412.
Darrein presentment, assize of, iii, 245.
abolished, iii, 245, n.
execution in, iii, 412.
Date of deed, ii, 304.
Day, fraction of a, ii, 140, n.
in banc, iii, 277.
in court, iii, 316.
of grace, iii, 279.
Deacon, i, 388.
Dead body, stealing, ii, 429.
stealing shroud from, iv, 236.
Dead man's part, ii, 518.
Deadly feud, iv, 244.
Deaf, dumb and blind, i, 304; ii, 497.
wills by, ii, 497 and n.
Dean and chapter, i, 382.
Dean, rural, i, 383.
Death, civil, i, 132; ii, 121.
appeal of, iv, 314,424.
execution of sentence of, iv, 408, 404.
action for causing, iii, 119.
of party, when suit abated by, iii, 301.
De bene esse, iii, 383.
Debenture, for money, &c., stealing, iv, 234.
Debet et detinet, action in, iii, 155.
Debt, national, and charge thereof, i, 325; iv,
441.
its legal acceptation, iii, 154.
action of, when it may be brought, id.
on amercement, iii, 159.
on escape, iii, 164.
on bye-law, iii, 159.
on judgment, iii, 158.
on penal statutes, iii, 159.
information of, iii, 261.
formerly the exact sum demanded must
have been recovered, iii, 155.
Debts, ii, 464 et seq.
of record, ii, 465.
by specialty, ii, 465.
(See "Bond," "Covenant," "Judgment.")
by simple contract, ii, 465
merger of, id.
negotiable, ii, 466.
(See "Bills of Exchange.")
promise to pay, when to be in writing, ii,
466.
acknowledgment of, id.
payment by executors, and priority of, ii,
511.
Debtor, relief of insolvent, iii, 415; iv, 415.
refusing to discover his effects, iv, 156.
(See "Bankruptcy.")
Deceit, action of, iii, 165, 166, 405.
writ of, iii, 405.
Decennary, i, 114; iv, 252.
Deception of the king in his grants, i, 246.
Decisions of the courts, i, 69.
Decisive oath, iii, 342.
Declaration, iii, 293.
different counts formerly inserted in, iii, 294.
conclusion of, iii, 294.
Declaratory part of a law, i, 54.
statutes, i, 86.
Declinatory plea, iv, 333, 336.
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De consuetudinibus et servitis, writ, iii, 232.
abolished, iii, 232, n.
Decree in equity, iii, 451.
has the force of a judgment, iii, 453.
Decretals, i, 82.
Decretum Gratiana, i, 82.
Dedication of ways, ii, 35, n.
dower barred by, ii, 138, n.
Dedimus potestatem, i, 352; ii, 351 ; iii, 447.
Deed, conveyance by, ii, 295.
what is, id.
several species of deeds, ii, 309.
indenture or deed-poll, ii, 295.
original and counterpart, ii, 296.
covenants by or with persons not parties, id.
may be printed, ii, 297.
consideration not essential to, ii, 296.
by feme covert, ii, 361, 362, 392.
construction of, ii, 19, 379.
recitals in, ii, 298.
deed-poll taken most strongly against the
grantor, ii, 121, 380.
the first of two repugnant clauses preferred,
ii, 381.
intended to operate one way may operate
another, ii, 338, 379.
preference of operation at the common law,
ii, 379, n.
creation of estates by.
(See" Estate.")
form of conveyance of estate for life, ii, 120.
effect of conveyance without words of lim-
itation, ii, 107, 108, n., 120, n.
implication of cross-remainders, ii, 381,
formal parts of, ii, 298.
premises, id.
habendum, ii, 298.
tenendum, id.
reddendum, ii, 299.
condition, ii, 299.
warranty, ii, 300.
covenants for title, &c., ii, 304.
conclusion, date, &c., id.
must be read on request, id.
signing and sealing, ii, 305.
statute of frauds, ii, 306.
execution while incomplete, ii, 307.
delivery, ii, 306.
escrow, id.
attestation, ii, 307.
stamps on, ii, 297.
defeasance to, ii, 327.
how avoided, ii, 308.
erasure or alteration of, id.
breaking the seal, cancellation, id.
disclaimer, ii, 309.
avoiding by judgment or decree, id.
right to custody of, ii, 428.
presumption of a lost deed, ii, 266, n.
stealing of, iv, 324.
forging of, iv, 248.
Deer in a park are heir-looms, ii, 427.
Deer stealing, iv, 235, 239.
hunting, killing, &c., in general, iv, 174.
in disguise, iv, 144.
Default, judgment by, iii, 296, 395.
Defeasance, ii, 327, 342.
Defectum, challenge propter, iii, 362; iv, 352.
Defence, its legal signification, iii, 296.
by counsel in criminal cases, iii, 355.
Defensive allegation, iii, 100.
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Deforcement, iii, 172.
Deforciant, ii, 350; iii, 174.
Definitive sentence, iii, 101.
Degradation of peer, i, 402.
Degrees conferred by the archbishop, i, 381.
of guilt, iv, 34-
in writs of entry, iii, 181.
of kindred, computation of, ii, 207 and n.,
224.
De homine replegiando, writ of, iii, 128.
Dehors, matter of, iii, 387; iv, 390.
Delay of the law, iii, 423.
Delgates, court of, iii, 66, 69.
its powers transferred to the king in council,
iii, 67, n.
Delegation not representation, i, 159.
Delictum, challenge propter, iii, 362; iv, 352.
Deliverance, second writ of, iii, 150.
Delivery of deed, ii, 306.of goods. (See "Sale.")
Demandant and tenant.
(See "Ejectment.")
De medietate lingue, jury, iii, 359.
Demesne, seisin in, ii, 105.
lands, ii, 90, 100.
Demesnes of the crown, i, 286,
Demi-mark, tender of, iii, 5.
Demise, ii, 317.
Demise of the crown, i, 188, 249.
Demi-vills, i, 115.
Democracy, i, 49.
Demolishing churches, houses, &c., iv, 143.
Demurrer, iii, 314.
joinder in, iii, 315.
to evidence, iii, 372.
how decided, iii, 323.
in equity, iii, 446.
by the parol, iii, 430.
to indictment, iv, 333.
Demurrer book, iii, 317.
Denizen, i, 374; ii, 249, 293.
Deodands, i, 300, 302; iii, 259.
De otio et atia, writ of, iii, 128.
Departure in pleading, iii, 310.
De populatio agrorum, iv, 374.
Depositions, iii, 383.
against prisoners, iv, 296.
in equity, iii, 449.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Deprivation of clerks, i, 393.
De proprietate probanda, iii, 148.
Dereliction of property, ii, 9.
title to new land left by the sea, ii, 261.
Descender, formedon in, iii, 192.
Descent of the crown collateral, i, 193 ; iv, 413.
hereditary, but subject to limitation by par-
liament, i, 194.
of lands, iv, 413, 421.
title by, ii, 200 et seq.
feudal, origin of, ii, 56.
distinguished from purchase and escheat, ii,
201.
different kinds of, ii, 202.
in borough English and gavel-kind, ii, 83,
84.
no lineal ascent, ii, 210. See 240, n.
males preferred to females, ii, 212.
primogeniture, ii, 56, 214.
consanguinity and degrees, ii, 202, 207, n.,
and 224.
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Descent, collateral consanguinity, ii, 204.
heirs apparent and presumptive, ii, 208.
canons of descent, ii, 208, et seq.
lineal descent to issue of person last seised,
ii, 208.
partible descent among daughters, ii, 214.
descent of title of honor to daughter, ii, 216.
ancient partible descent in socage, ii, 215.
representation, ii, 216, 219.
collateral heir, ii, 220, 224.
fiction of feudum novum, bld aut antiquum,
ii, 221.
effect of union of legal and equitable titles,
ii, 222, n.
different heirs to the same person in respect
of different estates, id.
immediate descent between brothers and sis-
ters, ii, 226, 250.
half blood, ii, 227, 233, 240.
possessio patris, ii, 228,
preference of male stocks, ii, 234, 240, n.
rules of descent, subsequent to the year 1833,
ii, 240, n.
lineal ascent, id.
through an alien, ii, 226, n., 250, 251.
corruption of blood, ii, 251, 253.
escheat, ii, 244.
(See "Escheat.")
modes of failure of hereditary blood, ii, 246.
changing the stock of descent, ii, 240, n.
effect of partition on, ii, 191.
of equity changed by merger in legal estates
ii, 837, n.
change of by recovery, ii, 362.
when heir takes by purchase, ii, 240, n.
may toll right of entry, iii, 176.
of copyholds, admittance of heir, ii, 371.
rules followed in equity, iii, 430.
Desertion of children, i, 458.
by soldiers, i, 416; iv, 102.
Description of property, construction of par-
ticular words, ii, 19.
Detainer, forcible, iii, 179: iv, 148.
unlawful, iii, 151.
Determinable fee, ii, 109.
(See "Estate.")
Determination of will, ii, 146.
Detinet, action of debt in the, iii, 156.
Detinue, action of, when it may be brought,
iii, 152.
execution, iii, 413.
Devastation, ii, 508.
Devises, ii, 373; iv, 430.
(See "Wills.")
executory, ii, 172.
title by, in general, ii, 878.
by married woman, ii, 375, n.
revocation of, ii, 376.
Die eat sine, iii, 816, 899.
Diet, excess in, iv, 171.
Diets, i, 147.
Digests, i, 81.
Dignity of the king, i, 241.
Dignities, ii, 37, 91.
descent of, ii, 216.
curtesy of, ii, 126, n.
Dilapidations, remedy for, iii, 91.
Dilatory pleas, iii, 301.
within what time to be pleaded, iii, 801, n.
Diminishing the coin, iv, 90.
Diminution of record, iv, 390.
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Diocese, i, 111.
Direct prerogatives, i, 239.
Directory part of a law, i, 55.
Disabilities, iv, 877.
to purchase and convey, ii, 291.
of Roman catholics, relief from, i, 868, n.
plea to, iii, 301.
Disabling a man's limbs or members, iv, 205-
207.
Disabling statutes, ii, 320; iv, 432.
Disclaimer of tenure, ii, 275; iii, 233.
of estate, ii, 309.
Discontinuance of suit, iii, 296
of estate, iii, 171.
Discovery on oath, iii, 382, 437.
of accomplices, iv, 330, 831.
by bankrupt, ii, 483.
Discretion of judges, iii, 483.
Discretionary fines and imprisonment, iv,
378.
Disfiguring, iv, 207.
Disguise, offences in, iv, 144.
Dismembering, punishment by, iv, 377.
Dismission of bill, iii, 4,51.
Disorderly houses, iv, 167.
persons, iv, 169.
Disparagement, ii, 70.
Dispensing power of the king, i, 142, 186, 342;
iv, 436, 460.
Dispensation from the pope, iv, 115.
Dispossession, iii, 167, 198.
Dissection of murderers, iv, 202, 377, 453.
Disseisin, ii, 195, 302; iii, 169.
at election, iii, 170.
warranty commencing by, ii, 302.
writ of entry, sur, iii, 183.
release of right, ii, 325.
Dissenters, protestant, iv, 50.
disturbing worship of, iv, 54.
Dissolution of parliament, i, 187.
Dissuading witnesses, offence of, iv, 126.
Distrainers, must find a proper pound, iii, 13, n.
Distress, remedy by, ii, 41, 42, 43, 452; iii, 5.
for what it may be made, iii, 6.
must be an actual demise at a fixed rent, id.
what may be distrained, iii, 6.
exemptions from, iii, 7.
for benefit of trade, iii, 7, n.
goods in custody of the law, ifi, 9, n.
when goods or cattle of a stranger may be
distrained, iii, 8.
fixtures cannot be taken, iii, 9.
of emblements, ii, 123, n., 404.
when corn may be taken, iii, 9.
when implements of trade may be taken,
iii, 9, n.
formerly looked upon as a mere pledge,
iii, 9.
must be made by day, iii, 10.
unless in case of damage feasant, id.
may be made within six months after deter-
mination of lease, id.
goods clandestinely carried off premises
may be taken, stat. 8 Ann. c. 14, iii, 10
and n.
cannot be made twice, iii, 11.
must not be excessive, id.
remedy for excessive, id.
how to be disposed of, iii, 12.
impounding, id.
sale of, iii, 13.
INDEX.
Distress, party distraining not to be deemed
trespasser ab initio, iii, 13.
remedy by, for subtraction, iii, 231.
illegal for crown debts, iv, 423.
irregularity in, does not make the landlord a
trespasser ab initio, iii, 213.
infinite, iii, 231, 280; iv, 285, 318.
Distribution of intestate's effects, ii, 315; iv,
408, 424, 439.
law of domicile, ii, 887, n.
District of Columbia, i, 112, n.
Distringas, iii, 280.
now abolished, iii, 280, n.
in detinue, iii, 413.
in equity, iii, 445.
Disturbance, iii, 236.
of common, iii, 237.
of franchises, iii, 236.
of patronage, iii, 292.
of tenure, id.
of ways, iii, 241.
Disturbance of religious assemblies, iv, 54 and n.
Disturber, ii, 278.
Diversity of person, plea of, iv. 396.
Dividend warrants, forgery of, iv, 248, 250.
Dividend on bankruptcy, ii, 487.
Divine law, i, 42.
offences against, iv, 250.
right of bishops, iv, 436.
of kings, i, 191.
Divine service, tenure by, ii, 102.
Divorce, i, 440; iii, 94.
dower lost by, ii, 130, n.
court of, iii, 67, n., 95, n.
Dock, stealing from, iv, 240.
Docket of judgment, ii, 511 ; iii, 397.
Doctrines, illegal, asserting or publishing, iv,
91, 116, 123.
Dogs, property in, ii, 393.
right to keep, ii, 416.
damage by, iii, 153.
stealing, iv, 236.
Dome-book of Alfred, i, 64, 66, 114; iv, 411.
Domesday-book, ii, 49, n., 99; iii, 331.
Domicile, regulates succession to personalty,
ii, 387, n.
(See "Dwelling House.")
Dominions, foreign, i, 110.
Donatio mortis causa, ii, 514.
Double plea, iii, 308.
Dowager, queen, i, 224; iv, 81.
princess, iv, 81.
Dower, title by, in general, iv, 424.
estate in, its origin, nature and incidents, ii,
129 et seq.
how barred, ii, 136 et seq.
of wife of heir, who died without having
been seized, ii, 209, n.
of a trust, ii, 127, 132, n.
of wife of felon, ii, 253.
how prevented, ii, 136.
jointure in lieu of, ii, 137.
unde nihil habet, writ of, iii, 182.
writ of right of, id.
writ of admeasurement of, id.
Draft for money, ii, 467.
forgery of, iv, 248.
Dramatic piece, right to represent, ii, 407, n.
Drawbacks, i, 315.
Drawing to the gallows, iv, 92, 337.
Druids, their customs, i, 63; iv, 408.
Drunkenness, how far it excuses crime, iv, 25.
punishment fbr, &c., iv, 64.
will made during, ii, 497 and n.
Duchy court of Lancaster, iii, 78.
Ducking-stool, iv, 167, 377.
Due process of law, what is, i, 135, n.
Duelling, iii, 337, 351 ; iv, 145, 185, 199.
Dukes, 1, 397, 409.
Dumb and deaf persons, trial of, iv, 324.
wills by, ii, 497.
Dum fuit infra etatem, writ of, iii, 183.
Dum non compos mentis, writ of, id.
Duodecima manus, iii, 343.
Duplex querela, iii, 246.
Duplicates, iii, 310.
Duplicity in pleading, iii, 308, 311.
Duress of imprisonment, i, 131, 136.
per minas, i, 131.
wills made under, ii, 497.
conveyance by person under, ii, 292.
of testator, ii, 497.
Durham, county palatine of, i, 117, 118.
now united to the crown, iii, 79, n.
Duties of persons, i, 123.
of the king, i, 233.
Duty, origin of, ii, 8, n.
action for breach or neglect of, iii, 164.
Dwelling-house, what is, iv, 224 and n.
breaking in, burglary, iv, 226.
to make distress, iii, 11, n.
to make arrest, iii, 288.
Ealdormen, i, 398.
Ear, loss of, iv, 146, 157, 160, 206, 248, 377.
Earl, i, 166, 398.
Earl marshal, his court, iii, 68; iv, 267.
Earnest, ii, 447.
Easements, distinguished from rights of com-
mon, &c., ii, 32, n.
description and classification of, ii, 36, n.
how gained and transferred, ii, 36, 266, n.
peculiarity of right to light and air, ii, 266,
n., 402.
right of way, by grant, by prescription, by
necessity, ii, 35.
abandonment of, ii, 264, n.
Eat inde sine die, iii, 316, 399.
Eaves-droppers, iv, 168.
Ecclesiastical matters.
(See "Advowson," "Simony."
Ecclesiastical courts, separation of, from the
civil, iii, 62 ; iv, 415, 421.
what injuries are cognizable by, iii, 87.
have no jurisdiction to try the right to
tithes, iii, 88.
method of proceeding in, iii, 98.
jurisdiction, how limited at present, iii, 67, n.
societies in America, i, 376, n.
corporations, i, 470.
when separated from civil, iv, 415, 421.
Ecclesiastical persons, residence of, ii, 322.
leases and renewals by, ii, 318 et seq.
Edgar, King, his laws, i, 66; iv, 412.
Education of children, i, 450.
Edward the Confessor, his laws, i, 66, 67, n.,
iv, 412, 420.
Egyptians, iv, 126.
Ejectione firm.e, writ of, iii, 197.
Ejectment, action of, iv, 441.
now the only mode of trying title of lands,
iii, 197, n.
INDEX.
Ejectment, when it lies, iMi, 199.
introduction of judgment to recover the
term, and writ of possession, iii, 200.
how applied to the use of trying the title to
land, iii, 201.
notice to be given. to the tenant in posses-
sion, id.
reular method of bringing an action of,
ii, 202.
invention of new method of trying titles
by, id.
notice to tenant in possession, iii, 203.
tenant may defend, id.
landlord may be made defendant, iii, 204.
tenant must confess, lease, entry and ouster,
iii, 203.
must specify in the rule of court the premises
for which he intends to defend, iii, 204, n.
if lease, entry and ouster not confessed at
the trial, plaintiff must be non-suited,
iii, 204.
consequence thereof, id.
question may be retried, id.
when a court of equity will interfere to pre-
vent it, id.
will not lie for incorporeal hereditaments,
except tithes, iii, 206.
remedy where rent is in arrear, id.
Election of bishops, i, 377; iv, 115, 421.
by corporations, i, 478, n.
of magistrates, i, 340; iv, 413, 427.
of members of parliament, i, 170, 177.
of Scotch peers, i, 169 ; iv, 416.
of Irish peers, i, 104, n.
of widow between devise and dower, ii,
138, n.
of remedy in case of nuisance, iii, 220 and n.
Elective monarchy, iv, 413.
Electors in boroughs, i, 172, n
in counties, i, 172, n.
privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n.
Eleemosynary corporations, i, 471.
Elegit, ii, 161.(See "Judgment.")
ouster of estate held by, iii, 198.
writ of, iii, 417; iv, 426.
when capias ad satisfaciendum may issue
after, iii, 419.
Elisors, i, 349; iii, 355.
Elopement, i, 442.
Ely, Isle of, i, 120.
county of, now abolished, iii, 79, n.
destroying powdikes in, iv, 244.
Emancipation of slaves, i, 423, n., 425, n.
of children, i, 453, n.
Embargo, i, 270.
Embezzlement of the king's stores, &c., iv, 101.
by clerks or servants, iv, 231.
by servants of persons deceased, iv, 231.
by bankrupts, iv, 156.
by persons in the public service, iv, 122.
by persons employed in the post-office, iv,
235 and n.
Emblements, right to, ii, 403.
o to the executor, id.
istress of, ii, 404.
of tenant for life, ii, 122,
of tenant for years, ii, 145.
of tenant at will, ii, 146.
what are emblements, ii, 143.
Emblements, rights of devisee and heir re-
spectively, ii, 122.
rights of incumbents, executors, &c., ii, 123.
rights of sub-lessees, ii, 123.
Emboweling alive, iv, 92, 377.
Embracery, iv, 140.
Eminent domain, i, 139, n; ii, 35, n.
Emperor, his authority, i, 242.
Empson and Dudley, iv, 310.
Enabling statute, ii, 819.
Enciente, capacity of child of which woman
is, i, 130; ii, 169.
jury to determine whether woman is, iii,
362; iv, 395.
Enclosure, disseisin by, iii, 170.
of common, ii, 34.
Enclosure acts, ii, 34, n.
Encroachment by a sea or river, ii, 261
Endowment of vicarages, i, 387.
Enemies, i, 257, 373, n.
adhering to, offence of, iv. 82.
Enemy, prize of goods of, ii, 401.
contract with, id.
right to bring suit suspended during war, ii
401, n.
captives, ii, 402.
Enfranchisement of villeins, ii, 94
of slaves, i, 423, n., 425, n.
of copyhold, ii, 150.
England, countries subject to, i, 93.
classification of laws of, i, 63.
parliament of, i, 146.
king of, i, 190.
people of, i, 366.
civil divisions of, i, 113.
ecclesiastical divisions, i, 110.
Engleschire, iv, 195.
English courts, delays in, as compared with
courts of civil law, iii, 424.
enumeration of.
(See "Courts.")
for trial of criminal causes, iv. 259, et seq.
English law, proceedings in, iii, 322 ; iv, 441.
variety of, iii, 265.
causes of intricacy of, iii, 266.
vindicated, iii, 327.
English language, pleadings required to be in,
iii, 317.
proceedings ordered to be in, except techni-
cal words, iii, 322.
Engravings, copyright in, ii, 407.
Engrossing, offence of, iv, 160.
Enlarger 1estate, ii, 324.
Enlarging statutes, i, 87.
Enquiry, writ of, iii, 398.
Enrollment of annuity, ii, 461.
of bargain and sale, ii, 338.
Entails, ii, 112; iv. 427, 431.
of personalty, ii, 398.
(See "Estate.")
Entry, ii 312; iii, 5, 174.
when may be made, iii, 175.
within what time must be made, iii, 179, n.
could not formerly be made after alienation
by tenant in tail, iii, 178.
nor upon deforcement, iii, 178.
tolled by descent, iii, 176, 177.
a speedy remedy in Saxon times, iii, 183.
forcible, iv, 148.
in burglary, iv, 226 and n.
Equity, history of, iii, 49, 430.
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Equity, courts of, i, 62, 92.
distinguished from law, iii, 436, 442.
jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 44, 426.
origin of its jurisdiction, iii, 436, 442.
full developement of, iii, 440.
former jealousy of, id.
character of, in its infancy, iii, 433.
sometimes makes merely technical distinc-
tions, iii, 482.
foundation of jurisdiction of, iii, 434, 442.
when it follows rules of law, iii, 429, 430,
434, 441.
general nature of, iii, 429.
cannot alter the common law, id.
concurrent jurisdiction, when exercised,
iii, 431.
sends some matters to law, iii, 431.
bound by precedents, iii, 432.
cognizance of fraud, iii, 430.
relieves against accident and mistake, iii, 431.
remedies defective assurances in some cases,
iii, 431.
interferes in whose favor, iii, 431, n.
proceedings in courts of, iii, 425, 442 et seq.
jurisdiction in bankruptcy, iii, 428.
jurisdiction over charities, iii, 427.
jurisdiction in case of infants, lunatics, &c.
iii, 426, 427.
favors creditor's children, &c., iii, 481, n.
remedy in case of bonds, mortgages, &c., iii,
434, 439.
jurisdiction to enforce agreements, iii,
435, 438.
relief against penalties in, iii, 435.
regards foreign law, when, iii, 436.
enforcing discovery by, iii, 437.
mode of proof in, iii, 437, 438.
jurisdiction in cases of fraud, iii, 487, 489.
mode of trial in, iii, 438.
examination of witnesses, id.
jurisdiction to perpetuate testimony, iii,
438, 450.
mode of relief, specific performance, iii, 438.
administration of assets by, iii, 439.
jurisdiction over loans and securities, id.
jurisdiction over trusts, iii, 431, 439.
proceedings in, iii, 442 et seq.
(See "Pleading ;" "Practice.")
right of parol to demur, iii, 430.
time given to infants by, iii, 430, n.
of statute, i, 61, 62, n.; iii, 431.
reserved, iii, 453.
Equity of redemption, ii, 159.
Erasure in deed, effect of, ii, 308, n.
Eriach, iv, 813.
Error, writ of, iii, 406 ; iv, 391.
where prosecuted, iv, 391.
differences between appeals and writs of,
iii, 56.
bail by plaintiff in, iii, 411.
costs in, iii, 399, 410.
in equity, iii, 454.
in lunacy, iii, 427.
Escape, iii, 290, 415.
upon mesne process, action on the case for,
iii, 165.
after judgment, action of debt for, id.
sheriff liable for, iii, 415.
voluntary, prisoner cannot be taken after, id.
negligent, when sheriff excused for, id.
assisting in, iv, 131.
Escheat, i, 302; ii, 11, 72, 89, 241; iv, 388,
413, 418.
distinguished from purchase and descent,
ii, 201.
where there is a trust, ii, 246, n.
none when corporation becomes extinct,
ii, 256.
of gavelkind lands, ii, 84.
writ of, iii, 194.
whether inquest of office necessary, i, 372, n.
Escrow, ii, 307.
Escuage, ii, 74; iv, 422.
Esquire, i, 406.
son of, entitled to kill game, when, iv, 175.
Essoign day, iii, 277.
Estates in personalty, ii, 898.
conditional limitations, conditions and re-
mainders, ii, 169 et seq.
in remainder, ii, 168.
(See "Remainder.")
rules as to limitations by way of remainder,
executory devise and springing uses, ii,
165 et seq.
freehold to commence in futuro, ii, 144, 165.
alienation of, ii, 287 et seq., 290, n.
on condition, ii, 152 et seq.
(See "Condition," " Mortgage.")
in severalty, ii, 179.
in joint tenancy, ii, 179 et seq., 192.
lease by joint tenants, ii 102.
severance of jointure, ii, 185.
crown cannot hold chattel in, ii, 409.
in coparcenary, ii, 187 et seq.
partition of, ii, 189.
in common, ii, 191.
adverse possession by tenant, ii, 194, n.
good faith required of tenants, ii, 194, n.
possession by tenants, ii, 194.
repairs by, ii, 194, n.
disclaimer of, ii, 809.
forfeiture of, ii, 274.
division of, ii, 168.
a freehold or a chattel, ii, 16.
in fee simple, ii, 104.
in demesne, ii, 105.
abeyance of the freehold, ii, 107.
rule in Shelley's Case, ii, 172, n., 242.
in fee in annuity, ii, 41.
fees simple, conditional and determinable
distinguished, ii, 109, 110.
base fee, ii, 109.
fee tail in personalty, ii, 398; iii, 113.
in lands, ii, 110 et seq.
in annuity, ii, 41, 112.
quasi in tail, iii, 113.
incidents to, ii, 115.
destruction of entail, ii, 116, 348, 354, n., 364.
in copyholds, how barred, ii, 871.
forfeiture of entail, ii, 117.
liable for debts to the crown or of a bank-
rupt, ii, 119.
may be appointed to a charity, ii, 119.
cannot merge, ii, 177.
leases of, ii, 319.
after possibility, &c., ii, 124.
in term for years, ii, 398.
frankmarriage, ii, 115.
not of inheritance, ii, 120.
indefinite grant passes estate for life of
grantee, when, ii, 121.
for life determinable, ii, 121.
INDEX.
Estate, joint life, ii, 121.
civil death, id.
estovers, emblements, &c., ii, 122.
apportionment of rent, ii, 124.
by the curtesy, ii, 126.
(See "Curtesy.")
in dower, ii, 129.
(See "Dower.")
pour autre vie, occupancy of, ii, 258.
in case of copyhold, ii, 260.
in incorporeal hereditaments, id.
is assets, ii, 260.
entail of, ii, 113, 260.
compelling appearance of tenant for life,
ii, 177.
less than freehold, ii, 140 et 8eq.
for years, ii, 140, 386.
goes to executor, ii, 431.
origin of, ii, 141.
requisites to lease, ii, 143.
(See "Lease.")
may commence in futuro, ii, 143.
inter esse termini, ii, 144.
entail of term, ii, 398.
from year to year, ii, 144, n., 147.
arising out of parol lease, ii, 147.
tenancy under mortgagee, ii, 150, n.
estovers and emblements, ii, 144, 145.
particular estate, remainder and reversion,
ii, 176.
executory bequest of term, ii, 175, n.
notice to quit, i, 146, n.
tenant holding over, ii, 160.
forcible ejectment, ii, 151.
under lease and assignment, ii, 327, n
merger, ii, 177.
by statute and elegit, ii, 160.
(See "Judgment.")
at will, ii, 145.
emblements, in case of, ii, 146.
determination of the will, id.
copyholders, ii, 147.
(See" Copyholds.")
cannot support a remainder, ii, 165.
at sufferance, ii, 150.
Estates of the kingdom, i, 156.
Estoppel, iii, 307.
by possession, from disputing title, ii, 144, n.
by record, ii, 465, n.
by fine, ii, 354, n.
by recovery, ii, 361.
by deed, ii, 295, 808.
Estovers, common of, ii, 35.
tenant's right to, ii, 35, n.
of tenant for life, ii, 122.
of tenant for years, ii, 144.
of a wife, i, 441.
Estoveris habendis, writ de, 1, 441.
Estrays, i, 297.
title of crown to, ii, 409.
Estreat of recognizance, &c., iv, 253.
Estrepement, writs of, iii, 224.
Evidence, written, iii, 367.
must be the best, nature of case will admit
of, iii, 368.
meaning of this rule, iii, 368, n.
privileged communications, ill, 368, n.
hearsay, when admissible, iii, 368.
demurrer to, iii, 372.
in equity, iii, 437, 438, 447, 449.
of witnesses abroad, iii, 438.
Evidence, preservation of, iii, 438, 450.
on an appeal, iii, 455.
of foreign law, iii, 436.
must be relevant to issue, iii, 367.
deeds not stamped, ii, 297.
in criminal cases, iv, 356.
recognizance to give, iv, 296, n.
stifling, offence of, iv, 308.
Examination of prisoners, iv, 296 ana n.
in equity, iii, 449.
of witnesses, iii, 372.
trial by, iii, 331.
Exception, distinguished from a reservation,
ii, 299.
Exceptions, till of, iii, 372.
to answer in equity, iii, 448.
Exchange, ii, 323.
implied warranty and right of re-entry in
case of, id.
of chattels, ii, 446.
bills of, iii, 466.
Exchequer chamber, iii, 56 and n.
Exchequer, court of, set up by William the
Conqueror, iii, 44.
why so called, id.
common-law court of, its jurisdiction, iii, 45.
equity court of, its jurisdiction, iii, 44, 426,
427.
equity jurisdiction transferred to lord chan-
cellor, iii, 45, n.
writs of error to exchequer chamber, iii,
46, n.
Excise, i, 288, 319, 322.
Exclusion bill, i, 210.
Excommunication, greater and lesser, iii, 101.
consequences of, iii, 102.
discontinued except as a spiritual censure,
iii, 101, n.
Excusable homicide, iv, 182.
Execution, iii, 412, 279.
in real or mixed actions, iil, 412.
in other cases, id.
what may be taken in, iii, 417.
from what time goods bound by, iii, 421.
when to be sued out, id.
by elegit, ii, 161.
certificate of judge for immediate, iii, 394.
sale of goods after, ii, 447.
priority of conflicting executions, ii, 447, n.
criminal, iv, 403.
award of, iv, 263, 452.
plea in bar of, iv, 896.
precept of, iv, 403.
rule for, iv, 404.
varying from judgment, iv, 179, 404.
of devises, i, 376.
of uses, ii, 333.
Executive power, i, 190, 250.
Executors and administrators, history of right
to administer, ii, 491.
appointment of executor, ii, 503.
infant executor, id.
appointment of administrators, ii, 504.
administration durante minoritate, ii, 503.
administration cum testamento annexo, ii,
503.
de bonis non, ii, 506.
durante absentia, ii, 503.
husband's right to on wife's estate, ii, 435.
where there are no relations, ii, 505.
executor of executor, &c., ii, 506.
INDEX.
Executors, duties of executor of, ii, 507 et eq.
acts before probate, ii, 507.
executor de son tort, id.
probate of will, ii, 508.
burial of deceased, id.
iuventory, ii, 510.
collecting and converting assets, id.
payment of debts, in what order, ii, 511.
appointing debtor or creditor to be executor,
ii, 511, 512.
payment of legacies, ii, 512.
abatement and refunding of legacies, i,512.
right to residue, ii, 513.
distribution among next of kin, &c., ii, 515
et seq.
distribution by custom, ii, 517.
promise by, to pay debt of estate, iii, 158.
actions by, iii, 301 and n.
may be sued on simple contract demands,
ii, 846 n.
when liable to pay costs, iii, 400 and n.
Executory devise, ii, 173, 334.
contract, ii, 443.
estate, ii, 163.
remainder, ii, 169.
Exigent, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 319.
Exigi facias, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 319.
Exile, i, 137.
of offenders, &c, iv, 862.
Ex officio informations, iii, 427; iv, 808.
Ex officio oath, iii, 100, 447.
Ex parte remedies, iii, 1 et seq., 15, n.
Expatriation, right of, i, 369, 870 and n.
Expectancy, estates in, ii, 163.
Expenses of prosecution, iv, 362 and n.
of witnesses, iii, 369; iv, 862 and n.
Exportation of wool, &c., iv, 154, 428.
Exposing person, offence of, iv, 65.
goods for sale on Sunday, iv, 64.
infected persons, iv, 161.
Ex post facto laws, i, 46.
cannot be passed in America, i, 46, n.
constitutional meaning of the term, id.
Express malice, iv, 198.
condition, ii, 154.
contract, ii, 443; iii, 154.
warranty, ii, 801.
Extendi facias, iii, 420.
Extent, when issued, iii, 420.
Extinguishment of right, ii, 825.
Extortion by officers, iv, 141.
or blackmail, iv, 244.
Extra judicial remedy does not exclude ordi-
nary course of justice, iii, 22.
Extra parochial places, i, 114.
Extra parochial tithes, i, 284.
Extravagantes Joannis, i, 82.
Eye, putting out, iv, 206, 207.
Eyre, justices in, iii, 58, 72; iv, 422, 423.
killing of, iv, 84.
Facto, king de, i, 204, 371 ; iv, 77.
Factor, i, 427; iii, 437.
goods in hands of, not distrainable, 8, n.
Fair, ii, 88; iii, 218.
who appoints, i, 274.
nuisance to, iii, 218.
False imprisonment, what constitutes, iii, 127;
iv, 218.
action of, iii, 138.
False judgment, writ of, iii, 84, 406.
False personation of bail, iv, 128.
of soldiers, seamen, &c., iv, 250.
False pretences, offence of, iv, 158.
False return, action for, iii, 110.
False rumors, when indictable, iv, 149.
False verdict, iii, 402; iv, 140.
False weights and measures, iv, 157.
Falsi crimen, iv, 89, 184, 156, 247.
Falsifying attainder, iv, 890
coin, iv, 84, 88, 90, 98, 100, n.
judgment, iv, 390.
records, iv, 128.
Fealty, i, 867; ii, 45, 58, 86, 176, 867.
subtraction of, iii, 230.
how remedied, iii, 281.
Fear, putting in, iv, 242.
of crime, security in case of, iv, 251.
Fee simple, ii, 104.
tail, ii, 112.
what words will pass a, ii, 108 n., 109, n.
(See "Estate.")
Fee farm rent, ii, 48.
Fees, ecclesiastical, must not be contrary to
common law, iii, 89.
action to recover back from barrister will
not lie, id.
counsel cannot maintain action for, iii, 28.
physician cannot recover, iii, 28, n.
Feigned issue, iii, 452.
Felo de se, iv, 189 and n.
forfeiture of goods of, ii, 409, 499.
Felon cannot make will, ii, 499.
who is, iv, 94.
Felonious homicide, iv, 188.
(See "Murder," "Manslaughter.")
Felony, definition of, iv, 94.
appeal of, iv, 810.
compounding, iv, 134.
misprision of, iv, 121.
punishment of, iv, 98, 216, 222.
forfeiture by, ii, 284, 409, 499.
conveyance to felon, ii, 290.
Females, discrimination against, i, 445, n.
punishment of, for treason, iv, 93.
as reigning monarchs, i, 215.
petty treason by, iv, 75, 203.
stea ing or seduction of, iv, 209.
jury of, it, 862; iv, 895.
Feme covert, i, 442.
(See "Dower," "Husband and Wife.")
Feoffment, ii, 310 et seq.
livery of seisin, ii, 311 et seq., 815.
Feorme, ii, 318.
Fern naturn, animals, ii, 389, 408.
Fern, setting fire to, iv, 246, n., 247.
Ferry near ancient ferry a nuisance, iii, 218.
Fetters, iv, 300, 822.
Feudal actions, iii, 117.
Feudal system, history of, ii, 44 et seq., 52, n.
iv, 413, 418.
services due to the lord, ii, 54.
oath of fealty, ii, 58.
homage, ii, 54.
feuds not hereditary at first, ii, 55.
reliefs, ii, 56, 87.
descent, ii, 56.
restraints on alienation, ii, 57.
feuds, proper and improper, ii, 58.
all lands held of the crown, ii, 51.
gradual relaxation, ii, 52.
Feudum antiquum, ii, 212, 221.
INDEX.
Feudum novum held ut antiquum, ii, 52, n.,
221.
Fictions, legal, beneficial and useful, iii, 43,107.
in fictione juris, consistit waquitas, iii, 283.
Fictitious plaintiff, iv, 134.
bail, iii, 291.
Fidel Commissum, ii, 327.
Fide jussors, iii, 108, 291.
Fief, ii, 45.
Fieri facias, iii, 416, 417.
Fifteenths, i, 309.
Fighting, offence of, iv, 183.
Filial portion, ii, 519.
Final judgment, iii, 898.
decree, iii, 452.
Finding indictments, iv, 805.
Finding of goods, i, 295; ii, 9, 402.
Fine for alienation, ii, 71, 89.
for endowment, ii, 135.
for copyholds, ii, 98.
Fine of lands, ii, 118, 348, 352; iii, 156, 166;
iv, 426, 429.
bar by non-claim, ii, 354, 356.
how it affects parties, privies and strangers,
ii, 358.
bar of feme covert, ii, 355.
deeds to declare uses of, ii, 363.
now abolished, ii, 364, n.
Fines and forfeitures, when grantable, iii, 259;
iv, 379.
for misdemeanors, iv, 877, 878.
are debts, iii, 159.
Finger, disabling, iv, 206.
Fire, negligence of, i, 431; iv, 222.
(See "Arson," "Burning.")
liability of tenant for accidental, ii, 281.
Fire-bote, ii, 35.
Fire ordeal, iv, 342.
First fruits, i, 284; ii, 66; iv, 107.
Fish, royal, i, 223, 290 ; ii, 403.
in a pond are heir looms, ii, 427.
stealing, iv, 236.
Fishery, ii, 39, 40, 417; iv, 424.
common of, ii, 34.
right of, in public waters, ii, 34
Fish pond, destroying, iv, 246.
Fitzherbert, i, 72; iii, 183.
Fixtures, when removable, ii, 281, n.
cannot be distrained, iii, 9.
stealing or ripping from building, &c., iv,
233.
Fleet prison, iii, 444.
Fleets, i, 262; iv, 419.
Fleta, i, 72; iv, 427.
Flight, confession by, iv, 387.
Floodgates, destroyng, iv, 144, 245.
Flotsam, i, 293; iii, 106.
FolkIand, ii, 90.
Food, offence of selling short weight, &c., iv,
158.
forestalling, regrating, &c., iv, 159.
supplying unwholesome, iv, 162.
stinting apprentices in, iv, 197.
implied warranty in sale of, ii, 451, n.
Force, when repellable by death, iv, 181.
injuries with and without, iii, 118.
Forcible abduction and marriage, iv, 208
and n.
entries, remedies for, iii, 179.
entry and detainer, iii, 179; iv, 148.
resumption of possession, iii, 5, n., 179.
ejectment, ii, 151, n.
Foreclosure of mortgage, ii, 159 and n.
Foreign bills, ii, 467.
Foreign coin, forging, iv, 89, 99, 100, n., 120.
Foreign country, indictment in, iv, 303, 305
and n.
Foreign documents, forgery of, iv, 250 and n.
Foreign dominions, i, 110.
Foreign law, when regarded and on what evi-
dence, iii, 436.
succession, regulated by law of domicil, ii,
387, n.
Foreign prince, pension from, iv, 122.
Foreign service, iv, 100.
Forest laws, ii, 38, 416, 419; iii, 73; iv, 415,
420, 421.
Forest courts, iii, 71.
Foresta, carta de, iv, 423.
Forests, i, 289; ii, 14, 38.
Forestalling, iv, 159.
Foretooth, striking out, iv, 206.
Forfeiture, i, 299.
title by, ii, 153, 267; iii, 160; iv, 381, 886.
for crimes and misdemeanors, ii, 267, 409,
420, 421 ; iv, 377, 381, 386, 423, 424.
of estate tail for treason, ii, 117; iv, 381.
for alienation in mortmain, ii, 268.
for alienation to an alien, ii, 274.
by tortious alienation, id.
by disclaimer, ii, 275.
on lapse of presentation, ii, 276.
by simony, ii, 278.
by breach of condition, ii, 281.
for waste, id.
of copyholds by breach of custom, ii, 284.
by bankruptcy, ii, 285.
relief from, in equity, iii, 435.
equity will not aid,
Forfeitures are debts, iii, 159.
Forgery, what is, iv, 247.
what instruments the subjects of, iv, 248,
249, 250 and n.
of parish registers, iv, 163.
forged indorsement of bill, ii, 450, n.
Forgiveness by prosecutor, iv, 364.
Forma pauperis, suit in, iii, 400.
Formedon, action of, iii, 191.
Forms of law, unalterable except by parlia-
ment, i, 142.
of action, iii, 116.
Fornication, iv, 64.
Forts and castles, i, 263.
Fortune tellers, iv, 62.
Forty days' court, iii, 71.
Founder of a corporation, who is, i, 480.
Foundling hospitals, i, 131.
Fraction of a day, ii, 141, n.
Frames, breaking of, &c., iv, 247.
Franchise, royal, i, 302.
Franchises, ii, 37, 40, n.
disturbance of, iii, 236.
usurpation of, iii, 262.
allowance of, iii, 263.
(See "Corporations.")
Frankalmoign, ii, 77, 101.
Franking letters, i, 323, n.
Frankmarriage, ii, 115, 190.
Frank-pledge, i, 114; iv, 252.
view of, iv, 273.
Frank tenement, ii, 61, 104.
(See "Tenures.")
Fraud, jurisdiction in case of, iii, 431,437, 489,
442.
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Fraud, criminal, iv, 158.
vitiates contracts, ii, 444, n.
Frauds and perjuries, statute of, ii, 297, 306,
364, 376, 448, 466, 500, 515; iii, 158; iv,
439.
parol leases, when valid, ii, 297.
as to contracts, ii, 442.
trusts, ii, 337.
declaration of uses of fines, &c., ii, 363, 364.
execution of wills, ii, 376.
Fraudulent conveyances, &c., ii, 296, 441.
devises, ii, 378; iii, 430.
Free warren, ii, 38, 417.
Free-bench, ii, 122, 129, n.
Free fishery, ii, 39, 410, 417.
Free services, ii, 60.
Freehold, fixtures to,when removable, ii, 281, n.
(See "Estate.")
customary freeholds, ii, 149.
Freeholders, judges of county courts, iii, 36.
Fresh suit, i, 297.
Fruit trees, destroying or damaging, iv, 246
and n.
Full age, i, 463.
Fumage, i, 324.
Funds, public, i, 331.
Funeral expenses, ii, 508.
Furandi animus, iv, 230, 232.
Furze, setting fire to, iv, 247.
Futuro, freehold in, ii, 144, 166.
Gage, estates in, iii, 157.
and pledges, iii, 280.
Game, property in, ii, 14, 394, 410, et seq.
laws respecting, ii, 410 et seq.; iv, 175, n.,
217, n.
of free warren, ii, 39.
beasts of park or chase, ii, 38.
shooting person in pursuit of, iv, 27, n., 174.
trespass in pursuing, iii, 213, 214.
Game-keeper, ii. 418; iv, 217, n.
Gaming, iv, 167, 170, 171.
(See "Wagers.")
Gaming-houses, iv, 171.
Gaol delivery, iv, 270.
Gaol distemper, i, 346.
Gaols, i, 346; iv, 377.
Gaolers, i, 346; iv, 300.
compelling prisoners to be approvers, iv, 128.
when guilty of murder in cruelty, iv, 197.
Gardens, robbing of, iv, 233.
damaging trees in, iv, 247.
Garter, knight of the, i, 403.
Gavelkind, i, 74, 76, n., 79 ; ii, 84, 128, 220;
iv, 409, 413.
General demurrer, iii, 315.
General fund, i, 331.
General issue, why so called, iii, 305.
when formerly pleaded, iii, 305; iv, 338.
what it is in the several actions, iii, 305.
special plea amounting to, iii, 309.
General occupancy, ii, 258.
General services, iv, 272.
General statute, i, 85.
General verdict, iii, 378; iv, 354.
General warrant, iv, 291.
Generalissimo, i, 261.
Gentlemen, i, 405, 406.
should know the laws, i, 7, 13, 36.
Gibbon, commendation of Blackstone by, i,
37, n.
Gifts of land, ii, 316.
of chattels, ii, 440.
Gilda mercatoria, i, 473.
Girl, abduction of, iv, 209.
carnally abusing, iv, 212.
Glanvil, i, 72, 421.
Gleaning, illegal, iii, 213, n., 312.
God and religion, offences against, iv, 43 to
65, 402.
Good behavior, security for, iv, 251, 256.
Good consideration, ii, 297.
Goods and chattels, ii, 384.
(See " Personalty.")
effect of condemnation of, in exchequer, iii,
262, n.
when bound by execution, iii, 421.larceny of,
(See "Larceny.")
Gorse, setting fire to, iv, 246.
Government, origin and object of, i, 48.
its forms, i, 49.
contempts against, iv, 123.
Grand assize, trial by, iii, 341, 350; iv, 422.
Grand coustumier of Normandy, i, 106.
Grand juror disclosing evidence, iv, 126.
Grand jury, iii, 351, 402; iv, 302.
Grand and petty larceny, iv, 229.
Grand seijeanty, ii, 73, 77, 78.
Grant, of hereditaments, ii, 817.
construction of, 379 et seq.
presumption of a lost grant, ii, 266, n.
of chattels, ii, 440.
by the crown, ii, 346.
Great council, i, 147.
Great seal, ii, 346; iii, 47.
counterfeiting it, iv, 83, 93.
Great tithes, i, 388.
Green-house, robbery of, iv, 233.
Gregorian code, i, 81.
Growing crops.
(See "Emblements.")
Guardian and ward, i, 460; iii, 141.
by appointment of the court of chancery, i,
463.
by custom, i, 462.
by election, i, 462, n.
by nature, i, 461.
by statute, i, 462.
for nurture, i, 461.
in socage, id.
of the poor, i, 361, n., 462, n.
of the royal family, i, 225,462, n.
guardian s remedy if his ward be taken from
him, iii, 140.
court of chancery is general guardian, iii,
426.
Guardian ad litem, i, 461, n.; iii, 427.
Guardianship, in chivalry, i, 462; ii, 67; iii,
140.
in socage, ii, 88.
Guernsey, Isle of, i, 107.
Guild or Guildhall, i, 474.
Gunpowder, exclusive patent for making or
importing, iv, 116.
keeping or carrying it illegally, iv, 168.
G ypsies, iv, 165.
Habeas copora juratorum, iii, 354.
Habeas corpus ad respondendum, iii, 129.
ad satisfaciendum, id.
ad prosequendum, testificandum, &c.,iii, 130.
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Habeas corpus, ad faciendum et recipien- Heriot service and heriot custom, ii, 422.dum, id. seizing, &c., iii, 14.when cause not to be removed by, id. Hermogenian code, i, 81.ad subjiciendum, iii, 131-134. High commission court, iii, 67, 447; iv, 42,433,cum causa, iii, 77. 439.Habeas corpus act, i, 128, 135; iv, 438. High constable of England, i, 355; iv, 268.suspension of, i, 136. court of, iii, 68; iv, 267.passage of, iii, 135, n. High misdemeanors, iv, 121.subsequent extension of, iii, 137, n. impeachments for, iv, 259.substance and use of, id. (See "Impeacjiment.")
Habendum, ii, 298. High steward of Great Britain, court of, iv,Habere facias possessionem, iii, 412. 261, 348.Habere facias seisinam, iii, 412. in parliament, iv, 260, 263.
Habitation, offenses against, iv, 220. High steward of Oxford, court of, iv, 277.(See "Arson," "Burglary," " Dwelling- High treason, iv, 75.
house.") trials in, iv, 351, 440.Hackney coaches and chairs, i, 325. Highway, remedy when out of repair, ii, 86, n.Hal-f-blood, i, 70,194; ii, 233. how established ii, 35, n.Hame secken, iv, 223. annoyances in, iv, 167.Hamlets, i, 115. offence of not repairing, id.Hannaper office, iii, 49. robbery in or near, iv, 243.Hand, burning in, iv, 367, 369, 371, 377. nuisances to, iii, 5.
disabling, iv, 206. Highways, surveyors of, i, 357, 358.
holding up, iv, 323. Hiring, ii, 453.
loss of, iv, 125,154, 276,377. History of the law, iv, 407.
Handsel, ii, 448. Hogs, keeping of in towns, iv, 168.Handwriting, similitude of, iv, 358. Holding over by tenant, iii, 210.Hanging, iv, 376. penalty therefor, ii, 151 ; iii, 211.Hanover, i, 110. Holidays, note not to be protested on, ii, 469, n.Harbors, injuries to, iv, 144. Homage, by bishops, i, 284, 379; iv, 421.Hard labor, punishment of, iv, 377. nature and varieties of, ii, 54, n., 300.Hares, stealing of, iv, 235. of a court-baron, ii, 91.
Havens, i, 264. iege i, 367.
Hay bote, R, 35. simple, id.
Hawks, stealing of, iv, 236. Homicide, iv, 177.Head of the church, i, 279; iv, 430. when justifiable, iv, 178, 179.
Headborough, i, 114. in self-defence, iii, 3, n.; iv, 183.Health, protection of, i, 124. when excusable, iv, 182.offences against public, iv, 161. felonious, iv, 188.nuisances to, iii, 122. self-murder, iv, 189.Hearing in equity, iii, 451. manslaughter, iv, 191, 192.Hearsay evidence, iii, 368. murder, iv, 194 et seq.Hearth money, i, 326. Homine replegiando, writ de, iii, 129.Hedge-bote, ii, 35. Honor of peer, i, 402.Heir, apparent and presumptive, ii, 208. answer upon, iii, 446..expectant, sale by, ii, 444. Honor, court of, iii, 104.when he takes by purchase, ii, 240, n. titles of, i, 271 ; ii, 37, 91, 216; iv, 271.favor to, i, 450. Honoris respectum, challenge propter, iii, 261;nemo est heres viventis, ii, 224. iv, 352.
(See "Descent.") Hop-binds, destroying, iv, 246.Heiress, stealing of, iv, 208, 209, n. Horse races, iv, 173.Heir looms, ii, 17, 427 et seq. Horses, sale of, ii, 450.not devisable apart from freehold, ii, 429. ill treatment of, iv, 246.Heirs, when word necessary to create fee, ii, Hospitals, i, 471, 474.107, 120, n. their visitors, i, 482.exceptions to this rule, ii, 108, n., 109, n. Hotchpot, ii, 190,515, 517.Helping to stolen goods for reward, iv, 132. Hot house, robbery of, iv, 233.Hengham, i, 72; iii, 409 ; iv, 427. House, is land, ii, 18.Henry I, his laws, iv, 420. grant of, ii, 18, n.Heptarchy, iv, 410. immunities of, iv, 223.
Heralds' visitation books, evidence of pedigree, larceny from, iv, 240.iii, 105. entering to demand or pay money not a tres-Herbage, right to, ii, 34, 35, n. pass, iii, 212.Hereditament, what, ii, 17, 20,106. (See "Arson," "Burglary.")ejectment for, iii, 206. House-bote, ii, 35.
Hereditary excise, i, 288, 319, 322. House duties, 1, 325.Hereditary right to the crown, i, 1912 209. House of commons, i, 158.Heresy, iv, 44. how elected, i, 175, 177.Heretico comburendo, writ de, iv, 46, 439. its peculiar laws, &c., i, 169.Heretochs, i, 397, 408; iv, 413. methods of proceeding in elections, i, 177,Heriots, ii, 97, 422. 181.
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House, its members should understand law, i,
9,10.
House of lords, i, 155,158.
its peculiar laws, &c., i, 167.
writ of error to, from Ireland, iii, 410, n.
appeal to, from chancery, iii, 56.
its jurisdiction upon appeals and writs of
error, iii, 57, 427, 428.
quorum of, iii, 56, n.
Hue and cry, iv, 293.
Hundred, i, 116.
action against for robbery, &c., iii, 160; iv,
246,293,411.
Hundred court, iii, 34, 35; iv, 411.
Hundredors, as jurors, iii, 359; iv, 352.
Hunger, does not excuse stealing, iv, 31.
Hunting.
(See "Game.")
Husband and wife, i, 433; iii, 92
joint estate of, ii, 182, n.
power of wife to convey, ii, 292, 361. 362.
lease of wife's lands, ii, 319.
will of feme, ii, 497.
husband's power over wife's property, ii,
483 et eq.
wife's title by survivorship, ii, 433.
wife's equity to a settlement, ii, 434, n.
separate estate and restraint on anticipation,
ii, 293, n., 434, n., 436, n.
wife's paraphernalia, ii, 435.
husband's title by administration, ii, 435,504.
liability of husband on wife's contracts, ii,
445, n.
liability of wife to be made bankrupt, ii
477, 488, n
restitution of conjugal rights, iii, 94.
action by husband for battery of wife, iii,
140.
how far wife's crime is excused, iv, 28.
surety of peace for, iv, 204.
(See "Curtesy, "Divorce," Dower.")
Husband of the queen, i, 224.
Hustings, court of, iii, 80.
Hydages, i, 310.
Hypotheca. ii, 159.
Hypothecation of ship, ii, 457.
bond, suit upon, iii, 117, n.
Identity of person, iv, 396.
Idiots, custody of lands of, i, 303, 307.
their marriages, i, 438.
who are, i, 303.
cannot make wills, ii, 497.
jurisdiction of chancellor, iii, 427.
inspection of, iii, 332.
cannot appear by attorney, iii, 125.
conveyance by or to, iii, 127, 291.
Idiota inquirendo, writ de, i, 303.
Idleness, iv, 169.
Ignominious punishments, iv, 377.
Ignoramus, iv, 305.
Ignorance, when it excuses crime, iv, 27.
Illegality of deed, &c., ii, 156.
Imagining the king's death, iv, 76.
Imbezzling king's stores, &c., iv, 101.
(See "Embezzlement.")
Immorality, public offence of, iv, 65.
Immoral work, &c., no copyright in, ii, 407, n.
Imparlances, iii, 299, 301.
Impeachment, in parliament, iv, 259.
not affected by session terminating, i, 186, n.
Impeachment of president of United States,
i, 246, n.
Impediments of marriage, i, 434.
Imperial chamber, iii, 39.
Imperial constitutions, i, 80.
Imperial crown and dignity, i, 241.
Implements of trade, distress of, iii, 9. n.
Implication, corporations by, i, 472, n.
Implied contracts, ii, 443; iii, 159.
condition, &c., ii, 152, 300, 381, 443.
malice, iv, 200.
warranty, ii, 300.
Importing agnus del, crosses, &c., iv, 115.
counterfeit money, iv, 84, 89, 100, n.
Impossible condition, ii, 156.
Impostures, religious, iv, 62.
Impotency, i, 434.
Impressment, i, 420.
Imprisonment, i, 134, 136; iv, 244, 377, 426.
beyond sea, i, 137; iv, 116.
false, iii, 127; iv, 218.
relief from, iii, 130 et seq.
for debt, iii, 289, n.
Improper feuds, ii, 58.
Impropriations, i, 386.
Improvements, patents for invention of, ii,
407 and n.
Incapacities, imposed as punishments, iv, 377.
Incendiaries, iv, 220.
Incest, iv, 64.
Incidental prerogatives, i, 240
Inclosure of common, ii, 34; iii, 240.
destroying, iv, 247.
Income tax, i, 314, n.
Incorporation, power of, i, 472, 474.
Incorporeal hereditaments, ii, 20, 36, n., 106.
ejectment for, iii, 206.
Incorrigible roguery, iv, 169.
Incumbrances, covenant against, ii, App.
(See ":Mortgage.")
Indecency, public offence of, iv, 65.
by vagrants, iv, 170, n.
Indebitatus assumpsit, iii. 154.
Indefeasible right to the throne, i, 195.
Indentures, ii, 295, 351.
of apprenticeship, i, 426.
Independence of the United States, i, 109, n.,
366, n.
India, government of, i, 109, n.
misdemeanors in, iv, 305.
Indicavit, writ of, iii, 91.
Indictable, what is, iv, 218.
Indictment, form of, iv, 306.
venue in, iv, 305.
copy of, iii, 126; iv, 351.
locality of, iv, 303.
certainty required in, iv, 306 and n.
when sufficient after verdict, iv, 306, n.,
334, n.
Indorsement of bills and notes, ii, 467; iv, 441.
Induction to a benefice, i, 391; ii, 312; iv, 107.
Industriam, property per, ii, 391.
Infamous witness, iii, 370.
Infancy, its incidents, i, 464, 466.
Infants, contracts by, i, 465, 466, n.
in ventre sa mere, i, 129, 130, 463, n.; ii, 169
mortgagees, i, 465.
trustees, id.
who are, i, 463.
demurrer by parol and time to show cause
iii, 430.
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Infants, conveyances by and to, ii, 291.
wills of, ii, 497.
executors, ii, 503.
jurisdiction of chancery over, iii, 426.
inspection of, iii, 332.
carnal knowledge of, iv, 212.
evidence by, iv, 214,
when liable for crimes, iv, 22, 24, 158.
instigating to crimes, iv, 40.
stinting in food, &c., iv, 217.
child stealing, iv, 219.
Inferior courts, writs of error from, iii, 411
and n.
Information in the exchequer, iii, 261.
in respect of charities, iii, 427.
in the ecclesiastical courts, iii, 101.
appeal from, iii, 428.
compounding of, iv, 136.
criminal, iv, 308, 429, 436.
ex officio, iii, 427; iv, 308.
in crown office, iv, 308.
in nature of quo warranto, iv, 312, 441.
Informer, common, it, 437; iii, 160; iv, 308.
Infortunium, homicide per, iv, 182.
Injunction, iii, 442.
to stay waste, it, 282, n.
dissolution of, id.
Injuries, civil, iii, 2, 118.
Inheritable blood, it, 246.
Inheritance, words of, essential to create a fee,
it, 107 and n.
(See "Descept," "Estate.")
Inn, entering an, not a trespass, iii, 212.
disorderly, iv, 167.
Innkeeper, liabilities and lien of, i, 414, n.,
430, n.; it, 451, n.; iii, 164.
Inns of court and chancery, i, 23, 25.
Inuendo, iii, 126.
Inofficious wills, i, 448; it, 502.
Inquests by coroners, i, 248, 302, n.
Inquests of office, remedy for injuries to crown,
iii, 257; iv, 301, 424.
in case of escheats, i, 372, n.; iii, 258.
prosecutions on, iv, 274, 301,302.
Inquiry, writ of; iii, 398.
Inquisitio post mortem, it, 68; iii, 257.
Inquisition, what it is, iii, 257.
gives the king his right by record, iii, 258.
may be traversed, iil, 260.
Inrolment of annuity deeds, ii, 461.
of bargain and sale, it, 338.
Insidiatio viarum, iv, 374.
Insimul computassent, iii, 162.
Insolvent debtors, relief of, iii, 415, n. 484.
Inspection, trial by, iii, 331.
Installment, ii, 312.
Instanter, trial, iv, 396.
Institutes of Justinian, i, 81.
Institution to a benefice, i, 890; if, 23; iv, 107.
Insurance, ii, 458 et seq.; iii, 74; iv, 441.
on lives, it, 459.
marine, ii, 460.
wagering policies, ii, 460.
interest or no interest, ii, 460.
of lender on bottomry and respondentia,
it, 461.
of lives by annuitants, ii, 461.
Intent in larceny material, iv, 232.
in forgery, iv, 248, n.
in offences against the person, iv, 208, n.
in case of crime by drunken person, iv, 25, n.
Interdictum, iii, 42.
Interesse termini, ii, 144.
Interest on money, ii, 454 et seq., 463, n.
among the Romans, ii, 462.
on legacy, ii, 513.
in bankruptcy, ii, 488.
distinction between contract for reducing
and contract for increasing, iii, 432.
Interested witness, iii, 370.
Interlineation in deed, ii, 308.
presumption of law as to the making, ii,
308, n.
Interlocutory judgment, iii, 896, 448.
decrees, iii, 101, 452.
Interpleader, iii, 300, n.
by a sheriff, iii, 417, n.
in equity, iii, 448.
Interpretation of law, i, 58.
rules for, i, 60, 62.
(See "Statutes.")
Interregnum, i, 196, 249.
Interrogatories, iii, 383, 438, 444.
examination on, iv, 287.
Intestate, ii, 494; iv, 425, 428.
(See "Executors and Administrators.")
Intrusion, iii, 169.
information'of, iii, 261.
writ of, iii, 183.
Inventions, patents for, it, 407.
Inventory of deceased's effects, it, 510.
Investiture, ii, 32, 53, 209, 311.
Involuntary manslaughter, iv, 192.
Ireland, i, 99, 104.
writ of error from superior courts of, iii,
410, n.
relief from forfeitures of leases in, iii, 435.
disestablishment of state church of, iv, 443,n.
Irish peerages, i, 100, n, 154, n.
Irons to secure prisoners, iv, 300, 322.
Islands, title to new, ii, 261.
Issuable terms, iii, 353.
Issue, collateral, iv, 396.
in criminal cases, iv, 899.
joinder of, iii, 315; iv, 840.
tender of, iii, 312, 314.
of fact, when said to be joined, iii, 315.
directed by court of equity, iii, 452.
on distringas, iii, 280.
Itinerant courts, iv, 411,422.
justices, iii, 59; iv, 422.
Jactitationis matrimonii causa, iii, 98.
Jenks, refusal to grant habeas corpus to, iii,1 35.
Jeofails, statutes of, iii, 407; iv, 375, 439.
Jersey, Isle of, i, 106.
Jetsam, i, 293; iii, 106.
Jew bill, i, 375.
Jews, iv, 373.
exclusion of, i, 875.
appointment of guardians by, i, 462, n.
legal protection to, i, 425.
maintenance of their protestant children, i,
449.
marriages of, 1, 435, n.
may now sit in parliament, i, 157, n., 875, n.
relief from disabilities, i, 157, n., 375, n.; iv,
443, n.
John, King, his resignation of the crown to
the pope, iv, 108, 111.
magna charta of, i, 127; iv, 423,425.
Joinder of issue, ill, 315.
in demurrer, ill, 115.
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Joinder of actions, iii, 295, n.
Joint owner of chattel, crown cannot be, ii, 409.
Joint tenancy, ii, 180 et seq.
dissolution of, ii, 185.
good faith required in, ii, 194, n.
Jointure, ii, 137, 180.
Judgment, title to chattels by, ii, 436.
debt by, ii, 465.
remedy by elegit, ii, 162.
void if jurisdiction wanting, iii, 24, n.
arrest of, iii, 893, 394.
operates as a charge upon lands, iii, 419, n.
from what time it binds lands, iii, 420.
scire facias to revive, iii, 421 and n.
action of debt on, iii, 160.
jurisdiction of equity over, iii, 437.
decree in equity has the force of, iii, 453.
in criminal cases, iv, 375 et seq.
Judge in one's own cause, iii, 289 and n.
Judges, iii, 25, 356; iv, 440.
commissions of, i, 267.
are counsellors to the king, i, 229.
depositories of the common law, i, 69.
killing of, iv, 84.
assaults upon, iv, 125.
threats or reproaches to, iv, 126.
how counsel for prisoners, iv, 355.
are always made sergeants, iii, 26.
in equity, iii, 441, 442, 444.
punishment for misbehavior, iii, 408.
summing up of, iii, 375, n.
Judicial committee of the privy council, i, 232,
n., 280, n. ; iii, 67, n., 80, n.
its present organization, iii, 69, n.
Judicial decisions, i, 63, 64.
Judicial power, i, 267, 269.
Judicial writs, iii, 282.
Judices ordinarii, iii, 315.
Judicium Del, iv, 341, 342.
ferri, aquoe et ignis, iv, 344.
Jure, king de, i, 204; iv, 77.
Jure divino right of kings, i, 191.
Juris utrum, writ of, iii, 252.
Jurisdiction, plea to, iii, 301 ; iv, 833.
of courts of equity, iii, 426.
encroachment of, iii, 111.
want of, renders judgments void, iii, 24, n.
Jurors, fining or imprisoning, iv, 361.
list of, in sheriff's office, iii, 354, n.; iv, 351.
challenge of, iii, 358, 362, 363 ; iv, 352.
qualification of, iii, 361 and n.
trial of challenge of, iii, 362.
verdict formerly on their own knowledge,
iii, 874.
may be sworn as witnesses, id.
should understand law, i, 8.
Jury, trial by, iii, 349.
its establishment in England, iii, 860
excellence of trial by, iii, 354.
the glory of the English law, iii, 378.
impartial administration of the law pro-
moted by, iii, 379.
defects of trial by, iii, 381.
must formerly be hundredors, iii, 358.
may retire to consider verdict, iii, 375.
special, iii, 357.
common, iii, 358.
trial by, in criminal cases, iv. 348.
jury process, iv, 350.
award of tales, iv, 354.
verdict, iv, 360.
Jury, what persons exempted from serving on,
iii, 363.
unanimity of, iii, 375.
jury of women, iii, 362; iv, 365.
Jury, grand, iv, 302-306.
indictment by, iv, 303.
Jus ad rem, ii, 212.
Jus divinum of kings, i, 204.
Jus prmtorium, iii, 49.
Justice, origin of, ii, 8, n.
right to, i, 141.
king, the fountain of, i, 266.
remedy by party's own act, iii, 1 et seq.
remedy by means of the courts, iii, 22 et seq.
neglect or refusal of, iii, 109.
offences against iv, 128.
obstructing process, iv, 129.
escapes, prison breaches and rescues, iv, 129.
returning from transportation, iv, 132.
receiving stolen goods, &c., iv, 132.
theft-bote, iv, 133.
barretry, maintenance and champerty, iv,
134, 135.
compounding criminal information, iv, 136.
conspiracy, iv, 136.
threatening letters, and perjury, iv, 137.
bribery, embracery and false verdict, iv, 140.
official negligence and oppression, iv, 140,
141.
homicide, in advancement of, iv, 179.
Justice-seat, court of, iii, 72.
Justices bf the peace, i, 349.
appointment of, i, 350.'
number and qualification, i, 352.
power and duty of, i, 353.
should understand law, i, 8.
Justicies, writ of, iii, 36.
Justifiable homicide, iv, 178.
Justification, plea of, iii, 306.
in slander, iii, 125.
of bail, iii, 291.
Justinian, pandects of, i, 81.
Keeper, lord, iii, 47.
Kidnapping, iv, 219.
Killing, what amounts to murder, iv, 196.
what to manslaughter, iv, 190.
(See "Homicide.")
Kin, ii, 205.
(See " Descent," "Executors and Administra-
tors.")
Kindred, degrees of, how computed, ii, 207
and n.
King, i, 190. (See "Crown.")
lord paramount, ii, 59.
a constituent part of parliament, i, 154,261.
can do no wrong, i, 246; iii, 254; iv, 32.
councils of, i, 227.
dignity of, i, 241.
duties of, i, 226.
sovereignty of, i, 241.
title of, i, 190.
ubiquity of, i, 270.
expenditures of, i, 334, 335.
the arbiter of commerce, i, 273.
the fountain of justice, i, 266.
the fountain of honor, i, 271.
head of the church, i, 279.
injuries by or to, iii, 254.
perfection of, i, 246.
perpetuity of, i, 249.
INDEX.
King, power of, i, 250.
prerogative of, i, 237.
compassing or imagining death of, iv, 76.
adhering to enemies of, iv, 82.
contempts against government of, iv, 128.
against courts of, iv, 124.
counterfeiting money of, iv, 84, 98, 100, n.
all lands held of, ii, 51.
right to mines, ii, 18.
royal fish, ii, 403.
title to chattels by prerogative, ii, 408, 505.
cannot be joint owner with subject, ii, 409.
prerogative copyright, ii, 410.
property in game, id.
may take a chattel by succession, ii, 432.
ancient jewels of, are heir-looms, ii, 428.
prerogative presentation to a living, ii, 24, n.
no lapse of time to present by, ii, 277.
mortuary on death of bishop, ii, 413, 426.
forfeiture of lands to, ii, 267.
no general occupancy against, ii, 259.
words of limitation in grants to, ii, 109.
descent of crown to half-blood, ii, 253.
not bound by sale in market overt, ii, 449.
grants by, ii, 308, 346.
restrictions on alienations by, ii, 346, n.
mistake or deceit, ii, 348.
cannot grant monopolies except for inven-
tions, ii, 407.
revenue extraordinary of, i, 306.
ordinary revenue, i, 281.
royal family of, i, 219, 225.
seals of, ii, 346; iii, 47.
suits formerly discontinued by demise of, iii,
295.
when preferred to other creditors, iii, 420
and n.
judgment of, affects all lands of his officers,
iii, 420.
neither pays nor receives costs, iii, 400.
exceptions, iii, 400, n.
jurisdiction of exchequer in matters con-
cerning, iii, 420.
palaces of, contempts against, iv, 124.
person of, contempts against, iv, 123.
prerogative of, contempts against, iv, 122.
felonies against, iv, 98.
counterfeiting seals of, iv, 83, 89, 92, n.
levying war against, iv, 123.
refusing to advise or assist, iv, 122.
can do no wrong, i, 243-246; iii, 254.
personal irresponsibility of, iii, 254.
King's bench, court of, iii, 40; iv, 265.
not fixed to certain place, iii, 41.
jurisdiction of, iii, 41.
fiction of defendant being in custody, iii,
42, n.
from what courts a court of appeal, iii, 43
and n.
writ of error from, to exchequer chamber,
iii, 43 and n.
process in, by original, iii, 284.
by bill of Middlesex, iii, 285.
by latitat, id.
justices of, killing, iv, 84.
King's counsel, iii, 27.
King's silver, ii, 850.
Knight, tenure of lands by, ii, 62.
bachelor, i, 404.
banneret, i, 403.
of the bath, id.
Knight of the garter, i, 410.
to be returned on a lord's jury, iii, 359
of the shire, i, 176.
Knighthood, i, 404; ii, 69; iv, 437.
Knight's fee, i, 404; ii, 62.
Knight service, ii, 62.
Labor, the origin of property, ii, 5.
punishment by, iv, 370, 371, 377.
Laborers, i, 407, 426.
Laches of infants, i, 465.
not imputable to the crown, i, 247.
Lmsa majestatis crimen, iv, 75, 79.
Lnsione fidei, suit pro, iii, 52.
Laity, i, 396.
Lancaster, county palatine of, i, 117, 119.
court of duchy and county of, iii, 78,429.
practice of court of common pleas of, il,
79, n.
Land, what is, ii, 16.
license to occupy, ii, 279, n.
left by sea or river, ii, 261.
history of right to alien, ii, 287.
re-entry on, iii, 4.
limitation of actions to recover, iii, 178, n.
in eye of the law is always enclosed, iii,
209.
possession of, sufficient to maintain trespass
against strangers, iii, 210, n.
plea in abatement not admitted in suit for,
iii, 302.
judgment is a charge upon, iii, 419.
from what time judgment binds, iii, 420.
Landlord, when may break open doors, iii, 11.
liability for nuisance, ii, 144, n.
may be made defendant in ejectment, iii,
204.
who considered such, iii, 204, n.
summary remedy by, when rent is in ar-
rear, iii, 206, n.
priority of, before execution creditor, iii, 417.
tenant estopped from disputing title, ii,
144, n. (See "Tenure.")
Land tax, i, 309-814; iv, 423.
Lapse of devise and bequest, ii, 512.
of right to present to church, ii, 276 ; iv, 107.
Larceny, iv, 229-243.
must be a taking, iv, 280,231.
by servants, clerks, agents, officers, &c., iv,
231,235.
by lodgers, iv, 231 and n.
by party stealing his own goods, iv, 231.
the asportation, iv, 231.
the felonious intent, iv, 232.
of letters, iv, 235.
from wrecks, id.
of reclaimed animals, ii, 289; iv, 235.
of fish, hawks and swans, iv, 236.
of domestic animals, ii, 289; iv, 235.
where owner is not known, iv, 236.
punishment of, iv, 237.
aggravating circumstances in, iv, 239.
from specified buildings, &c., 241, 242.
from the person, iv, 242.
by robbery, iv, 243.
sale of stolen goods, ii, 450.
receiving stolen goods, iv, 182.
taking reward to help to stolen goods, id.
Latitat, iii, 285.
Law, study of the, i, 1.
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Law, care and circumspection of the, iii, 422.
signification of, i, 38.
a science, i, 27.
French, iii, 317; iv, 416, 428.
Greek, iii, 321.
history of, iv, 407 et seq.
civil, i, 14, 19, 79, 80, 83.
canon, authority of, i, 14, 19, 79, 83; iv, 421,
422.
common, i, 63-67.
courts of, their profits, i, 289.
divine or revealed, i, 42.
written, i, 185.
interpretation of, i, 59-62, 87-91.
unwritten, i, 63-67; iv, 408.
martial, i, 413; iv, 436.
merchant, i, 75, 273.
moral obligation of, i, 43, n., 57, 58.
municipal, i, 44.
of God, i, 41.
offences against, iv, 43.
of nations, i, 43, 44, n.
offences against, iv, 66.
of nature, i, 39.
parts of a law, i, 54, 58.
promulgation of, i, 6, n., 45.
statute, i, 85.
study of, i, 1-37.
amendment of, statute for, iv, 441.
feudal, iv, 418.
Latin, iii, 319; iv, 428.
causes of delays of, iii, 423.
of property, necessarily arbitrary, ii, 12.
consistency of, with natural justice, ii, 13.
wager of, iii, 341; iv, 414, 424.
Law of the land, i, 135, n.
Law schools, i, 23, 25, n., 30, n.
Law side of the chancery court, iii, 47.
of the exchequer, iii, 45.
Laws of Alfred, i, 64.
of Edward the Confessor, i, 66.
Law suits, cause of multitude of. iii, 328,
chiefly arise from disputed facts, iii, 329.
Lawyers, noble, i, 11, 25.
attempts to exclude from parliament, i, 177.
calling to the bar, i, 24, n.
Lay corporations, i, 470.
investiture of bishops, i, 378.
Lazarets, escaping from, iv, 162.
Lead, stealing of, iv, 233.
receiving stolen, iv, 132, 133.
Leading interrogatories, iii, 449.
Leap year, ii, 141.
Lease, ii, 317 et seq., 144, n., 150, n. ; iii, 41.
when by parol and when by deed, ii, 297.
who may make, ii, 318 et seq., 290 et seq., 319.
non-residence of incumbent, ii, 322.
college leases, id.
corn rents, id.
must be perfected by lessee's entry, ii, 314.
tenant cannot deny landlord's title, ii, 144, n.
to an alien, ii, 293.
defeasance of, ii, 327.
distinction between assignments and under-
leases, ii, 327, n.
relief from forfeiture, iii, 435.
and release, ii, 339.
entry and ouster, iii, 204.
Lectures, copyright in, ii, 407, n.
Leet, iv, 273,411, 424.
Legacies, ii, 512; iii, 98.
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Legacies, suits for in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 98.
in chancery, in, 98, n.
lapsed, ii, 513.
when vested, ii, 513, n.
payable in future, id.
interest upon, id.
Legal memory, i, 67; ii, 31.
Legal proceedings, wherein their uncertainty
consists, and to what owing, iii, 325.
Legal tender, i, 277 and n.
Legatine constitutions, i, 82.
Legislative power, i, 51, 53, 147.
cannot be delegated, i, 52, n.
how restrained in America, i, 52, n., 58, n.,
89, n.
one legislature cannot limit power of sub-
sequent, i, 91, n.
how far controllable, i, 161.
Legislature.
(See "Legislative Power, . Parliament.")
Legitimacy, i, 446.
English and Scotch laws respecting, ii,
248, n.
Letter missive, iii, 445.
for electing a bishop, i, 379.
Letters, stealing of, iv, 235.
sending threatening, iv, 144.
opening in the post-office, i, 322, n.
copyright in, ii, 407, n.
Letters of marque, i, 258, 259, n.
Letters patent, ii, 346.
scire facias, for repeal of, iii, 260, 261.
for inventions, ii, 407.
Levant and couchant, meaning of, iii, 8, n., 239.
Levari facias, iii, 4 t7.
Levitical degrees, i, 435.
Levying money without consent of parlia-
ment, i, 140.
Levying war against the king, iv, 81.
Lewdness, iv, 64.
Lex mercatoria, i, 76.
Lex talionis, iv, 12.
Libel, remedies for, iii, 125.
truth as a defence, iii, 126, n.
apology in mitigation of damages, id.
what kind indictable, and how, iv, 150.
blasphemous, iv, 59.
on king and government, iv, 123.
on judges, &c., iv, 150.
how far things imputed must be criminal,
iv, 150.
malice in, id.
what publication necessary, id.
modes of prosecution, iv, 151.
trial of, id.
in newspaper, proof of, iv, 150.
judgment and punishment, iv, 151.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Liberam legem, losing, iii, 340, 404; iv, 348.
Liberties or franchises, ii, 167.
English charters of, i, 127-129.
Liberty, civil, 1, 6, 125, 251.
natural, i, 125.
personal, i, 134.
political, i, 6, 125, 251.
of the press, iv, 151.
personal, injuries to, and crimes against, iii,
127 ; iv, 218.
License to erect buildings, ii, 297, n.
of mortmain, ii, 269.
of alienation, ii, 72.
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License, to administer oaths, ifl, 59.
marriage, i, 439.
wine, i, 289.
from the pope, iv, 115.
implied, to enter on lands, iii, 212.
Licensing of books, iv, 152, 439.
Licentia loqueddi, iii, 299.
Liege, i, 367.
Lien of vendor of goods, ii, 449, n.
of bailee, ii, 453, n.
Lieutenant, lord, of Ireland, i, 412; iv, 272.
Life, i, 129.
action for deprivation of, iii, 119.
distinction between natural and civil, ii, 121.
presumption of death, ii, 177, n.
compelling production of cestui que vie,
ii, 177.
annuities, ii, 461.
peerages, i, 401, n.
crimes against, iv, 177.
estates for.
(" See Estates.")
Ligan, i, 293; iii, 106.
Ligeance, i, 366.
Light, prescriptive right to, ii, 14, 266, n., 395,
n., 402; iii, 217, n.
obstruction of, a nuisance, iii, 216.
Light-houses, i, 264.
Limbs, i, 130; iii, 121, 333.
(See "Mayhem.")
Limitation of actions, &c., ii, 194, n., 266, n.;
iii, 178, 188, 192, 196, 250, 306.
(See "Estate.")
adverse possession by tenant in common,
ii, 194, n.
acknowledgement of debt, iii, 306, n.
not stopped by subsequent disability, iii,
306, n.
entry of writs to save statute of, iii, 307, n.
in equity, iii, 439.
of indictments, iv, 306, 308, 315, 351,436.
Limited administration, ii, 506.
fee, ii, 109.
property, ii, 391.
Lineal descent of the crown, i, 194.
of lands.
(See "Descent.")
consanguinity, ii, 203.
warranty, ii, 301.
Linen, stealing, iv, 238.
Lip, cutting off, iv, 207.
Literary property, ii, 405.
Littleton, i, 72, 73.
Litigious church, iii, 243, 246.
Liturgy, reviling, iv, 50.
Livery of seisin, ii, 311.
abolished, ii, 314, n.
of ward, ii, 68.
in deed, ii, 315.
in law, ii, 316.
Loan, compulsive, i, 140; iv, 436.
interest upon, il, 454 et seq.
(See " Interest.")
Local actions, i, 99; iii, 294.
Locality of trial, iii, 384; iv, 303.
(See "Venue.")
Locks on rivers, destroying, iv, 144.
Lodgers, larceny by, iv, 231.
distress of goods of, iii, 7.
Logic, its effects upon law and theology, i, 33;
ii, 58; iv. 417.
Lollardy, iv, 47.
London, franchises of, not forfeitable, iii, 264;
iv, 424.
courts of, iii, 81.
customs of, i, 75, 76.
custom of, on intestacy, ii, 518.
market overt in, ii, 449.
trading by feme covert in, ii, 477.
chamberlain of may take bonds, &c., by
succession, ii, 432.
customs of, how tried, iii, 333.
whether defendant be a citizen, how tried,
iii, 334.
Lord, feudal, ii, 53.
Lords, house of, i, 155, 168.
its peculiar laws, i, 167.
spiritual, i, 155, 156.
temporal, i, 157-159.
Lords' act, ii, 488, n.
Lords committees for courts, iii, 57.
Lords justices, iii, 55, n.
Lords triors, iv, 259, 260, 440.
Lotteries, iv, 168.
Lunacy, jurisdiction over, iii, 427.
appeal in matters of, id.
Lunatic, iv, 24, 395.
(See "Idiot.")
conveyance by, ii, 291.
plea of non-competency, id.
fine by, ii, 355, n.
will of, ii, 497.
marriage of, i, 439.
when chargeable for crimes, iv, 24, 195.
Luxury, laws against, iv, 170.
Machinery, destroying or injuring, iv, 247,
and n.
exportation of, iv, 160, and n.
Madder roots, stealing of, 4, 233.
Magistrates, i, 146.
supreme and subordinate, i, 338.
oppression by, iv, 141.
Magna assisa elegenda, writ de, iii, 351.
Magna charta, i, 127; iv, 423, 425.
contents of, iv, 423, 424.
Mail, stealing from, iv, 235, n.
opening letters in, i, 322, n.
Maniour, iii, 71; iv, 307.
Mainpernors, iii, 128.
Mainprize, writ of, iii, 128.
Maintenance of bastards, i, 458.
of children, i, 447.
of parents, i, 454.
of suits, i, 428; iv, 134.
of wife, i, 442.
law of, in America, ii, 290, n.
Making law, iii, 343.
Mal-administration of government, iv, 121.
Mala in se and mala prohibita, i, 54, 57,
58.
distinction reprobated, i, 58, n.
Male line preferred to female in descent to
crown, i, 194.
preferred to female in descent, ii, 212.
Malice, express, iv, 199.
implied, iv, 200.
prepense, iv, 198, 206.
in libels, iii, 123, n.; iv, 150.
in false prosecutions, iii, 126, n.
in murders, iv, 198.
in arson, iv, 222 and n.
INDEX.
Malice, under black act, iv, 246.
intent to injure inferred from wrongful act,
iv, 222, n.
Malicious prosecution, action for, iii, 126.
Malicious destruction of powdike in fens in
Norfolk and Ely, iv, 245.
of sea and river, &c., banks, bridges, turn-
pikes, &c., iv, 144, 145.
of corn, barns, stacks, &c., iv, 245-247.
of horses, cattle, &c., iv, 246.
ships, &c., iv, 245.
of other property, iv, 247.
Malt tax, i, 314.
Malum prohibitum and malum in se, i, 54, 57, n.
Man, Isle of, i, 406.
Mandamus, writ of, iii, 110; iv, 441.
return to, iii, 110.
demurrer to return, id.
writ of error in case of, id.
remedy for refusal to admit corporate offi-
cer, iii, 264.
to elect corporate officers, ili, 265.
is now in the nature of an action, ill, 264.
Mandates, royal, to the judges, i, 142 ; iv, 426.
Manhood, ceremony of, ii, 54.
Manors, ii, 20, 90.
demesne lands, ii, 90.
within manors or houses, ii, 91.
court-baron or customary court, ii, 90.
extinguishment of, id.
cannot now be created, ii, 91.
Mansion house, ii, 90; iv, 224.
Manslaughter, iv, 191.
punishment of, iv, 192.
conviction of, iv, 219.
Man stealing, iv, 219.
Manufacturers, seducing them abroad, iv, 160.
embezzlement by, iv, 231, 300.
encouragement of, iv, 428.
Manufactories, rioters destroying engines in,
iv, 143.
injuries to, iv, 247.
stealing from, iv, 240.
Manumission of villeins, ii, 94, 347.
Marchers, lords, i, 898.
Marechal, lord, iii, 38, 68.
Marine felonies, how triable, iv, 269 and n.
Marine insurance, ii, 460.
Marines, i, 416.
impressment of, i, 420.
Mariners, wandering, iv, 165.
Maritagium, ii, 70, 80.
Maritime causes, iii, 106.
courts, iii, 69.
state, i, 419.
Mark, signature by, ii. 305.
Market, l, 38.
how established, i, 274.
overt, sale in, ii, 449.
holding near another, a nuisance, iii, 218.
towns, i, 114.
clerk of, his court, iv, 275.
Marque and reprisal, letters of, i, 258, 259, n.
Marquesses, i, 397.
Marriage, i, 433.
injuries to rights of, iii, 92.
(See "Husband and Wife.")
statutes regulating, i, 435, 437, n., 438, n.
a civil contract, iv, 433, 439.
clandestine, i, 439; iv, 162.
disabilities of, i, 434, 435.
Marriage, royal, i, 225, 226; iv, 92, n., 117.
when good, i, 436, 439, 440.
of ward, ii, 70, 88.
settlement, ii, 364.
suit on contract of, iii, 93.
conditions in restraint of, ii, 154, 155, n.
forcible, iv, 208.
in chivalry, iv, 418, 420, 421.
licenses and registers, forging or destroying,
iv, 163, 249.
Married Woman.
(See "Husband and Wife.")
Marshal of the king's bench, iii, 43, 285.
of the king's host, iii, 334.
Marshalsea, court of, iii, 76; iv, 276.
Martial courts, i, 413, n.; iv, 436.
Martial law, i, 413, n., 415.
Mass books, iv, 115.
Master and servant, i, 423.
liability of master, i, 429.
action for inveigling servant, iii, 141.
action for battery of servant, id.
stinting servant m food, offence of, iv, 217.
embezzlement by servant, iv, 231.
Master in chancery, iii, 442, 453.
Master of the rolls, iii, 56, 442, 451.
Matrimonial causes, iii, 92.
(See "Divorce.")
new court for, iii, 67, n.
Matrons, jury of, iii, 362; iv, 395.
Maxims of law, i, 68.
Mayhem, what is, and how remedied, i, 130;
iii, 121, 333.
appeal of, iv, 314.
inspection of, iii, 332.
offence of, iv, 205.
elements of the offence, iv, 207, 208.
Mayors among the Saxons, iv, 413.
Measures and weights, i, 274-277; iv, 275, 424,
false, iv, 159.
Medietate, jury de, iii, 246, 360; iv, 128, 166,
278, 352.
Meeting for military training forbidden, iv,
143.
Members of congress privileged from arrest,
iii, 289, n.
Members of parliament, i, 153.
elections of, i, 170-180.
number of, i, 159.
qualifications of, i, 175.
should study the law, i, 9, 10.
privileges of, i, 164-170.
Memorial of annuity, ii, 461.
Memory, time of legal, i, 67; ii, 31.
Menaces, iii, 120.
Menial servants, i, 425.
Mercen-lage, i, 65; iv, 412.
Merchants, custom of, i, 75.
foreign, i, 260; iv, 424.
Mercheta, ii, 83.
Merger, doctrine of, ii, 177.
Merton, parliament of, i, 19.
Mesne profits, action for, iii, 205, 279, 419.
Mesne, writ of, iii, 284.
Mesne lords, ii, 59.
Messuage, what, ii, 19, n.
Metal stealing, iv, 233.
Metaphysics, their effects upon law and the-
ology, ii, 58; iv, 417.
Michel-gemote, i, 147.
Michel-synoth, i, 147.
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Middlesex, county court of, iii, 82.
bill of, iii, 285.
Migration, ii, 7.
Military courts, i, 83; iii, 68.
law, i, 417; iii, 103.
offences, i, 415; iv, 101.
power of the crown, i, 262.
state, i, 408.
history of, i, 409.
testaments, i, 418.
service, i, 287; ii. 54, 57, 61.
(See "Tenure.")
Militia, i, 410, 412.
Milk, may be sold on Sunday, iv, 64.
Mill, customary dues to, iii, 235.
Mines, i, 295.
right to dig turf, gravel, &c., ii, 34.
included in land, ii, 18.
royal mines, ii, 18.
firing, iv, 246.
destroying works of, 247.
stealing ore out of, iv, 234.
Ministers, responsibility of, 1, 250.
Ministry.
(See " Cabinet.")
Minority, incidents of, i, 464.
(See " Infant.")
none in the king, i, 248.
Misadventure, homicide by, iv, 182.
Mischief, malicious, iv, 244 et seq.
Misdemeanor, iv, 1-5.
forcible, self-defence against, iii, 3, n.
Mise,iii, 305.
Misfortune, unlawful act by, iv, 26.
Misnomer, consequence of, iii, 302; iv, 334.
Mispleading, when cured by verdict, iii, 394.
Misprision against king and government, iv,
119-126.
Mistake, iv, 27,
remedies at law and in equity, iii, 431.
Misuser in office, ii, 153.
of franchise, i, 485, n.
Mitigation of damages in slander, iii, 125, n.
Mitter le droit, ii, 325.
Mitter l'estate, ii, 324.
Mittimus, iv 300.
Mixed actions, iii, 118.
Modus, ii, 29.
(See "Tithes.")
Molliter manus imposuit, iii, 5, n., 121.
Monarchy, i, 49.
(See "King.")
not elective, but hereditary, i, 192.
Monasteries, effect of dissolution of, upon
tithes, ii, 32.
Money, i, 276.
bills, i, 170, 184.
payment of, into court, iii, 304.
paid for another, iii, 162.
received to another's use, id.
counterfeiting, iv, 84, 88.
interest upon, ii. 454, et seq.
(See "Interest.")
legal tender, i, 277 and n.
Monks, i, 132.
Monopolies, statute against, ii, 407; iv, 159,436.
Monster cannot inherit, ii, 246.
Monstrans de droit, iii, 256.
Monuments are heir-looms, ii, 428.
Month, lunar and calendar, ii, 141.
Moral consideration, ii, 445, n.
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Mort d' ancestor, assize of, iii, 185.
for rent, iii, 231.
Mortgage, ii, 157 et seq.
distinguished from pawn, ii, 452.
tacking, ii, 160.
who primarily liable upon, id.
power of sale in, id.
equitable mortgage by deposit of title
deeds, id.
tenancy under mortgagee, ii, 150, n.
effect of bankruptcy of mortgagor, ii, 487.
jurisdiction of equity over, iii, 435, 439.
provision for reduction of interest, iii, 432.
parol evidence to show deed to be, ii, 158, n.
Mortmain, statutes of, i, 479; ii, 268; iv, 108,
424, 426, 441.
personal annuities of inheritance, ii, 41.
devises in, ii, 375.
license of, ii, 268, 272.
Mortuaries, ii, 425.
Mother church, i, 112.
Motion in court, iii, 304.
Mount, or bank, i, 328.
Mountebanks, iv, 167.
Movables, ii, 384.
(See "Personalty.")
Mulier puisn6, ii, 248.
Multiplicity of laws, iii, 325.
Municipal corporation, i, 475.
(See "Corporation.")
Municipal law, i, 44; iii, 1.
Murder, defined, iv, 194.
by perjury, iv, 138, 196.
person killed must be reasonable being, iv,
197.
malice aforethought, iv, 198.
punishment of, iv, 201.
when pardonable, iv, 194, 400.
Murdrum, iii, 321; iv, 195.
Music, copyright in, ii, 407, n.
Muta canum, ii, 427.
Mute, standing, iv, 324 and n.
advising it, iv, 126.
Mutilation, i, 130; iii, 121; iv, 207.
punishment by, iv, 377.
Mutiny act, i, 152, 415, 416.
Mutual debts, iii, 305.
Namium vestitum, iii, 148.
National debt, i, 328-331.
Nations, law of, i, 43, 44, 68-71.
offences against laws of, iv, 66-71.
violation of safe conducts, &c., iv, 68.
offences against ambassadors, iv, 70.
piracy, iv, 71.
Natural liberty, i, 125.
life, i, 132.
persons, i, 123.
born subjects, 1, 366, 370.
Naturalization, i, 374; ii, 249.
Nature, state of, as to property, ii, 3, 8, n.
guardian by, 1, 461.
law of, i, 36, 39.
crime against, iv, 215.
Navigable rivers.
(See "Rivers.")
Navigation acts, i, 418; iv, 439.
Navy, articles of, i, 420.
Ne admittas, writ of, iii, 248.
Ne exeat regno, i, 137, 266; iv, 122.
Ne injustZ vexes, writ of, iii, 234.
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Necessaries, liability for, 1, 449, 466, n.
Necessity, when it excuses crime, iv, 27, 31.
homicide by, iv, 178.
ways by, ii, 35, n.
Negative in corporations, i, 478.
of the kin*, i, 154, 184, n.
Negligence, iii, 163.
liability of advocate for, iii, 165 and n.
of bailee, ii, 451, n.
of officers, iv, 140.
Negligent escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.
Negotiable paper, ii, 442, n.
(See "Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes.')
Negro, i, 127, 425; ii, 402.
slavery abolished, i, 425; iv,
Neife, ii, 94.
Nembda, iil, 350.
New assignment, iii, 311.
New promise to revive debt, iii, 306, n,
New trial, when granted, iii, 387, 391.
origin of practice of granting, iii, 388.
promotes the ends of justice, iii, 891.
granting upon terms, iii, 893.
motion for, when to be made, id.
in criminal cases, iv, 361, 438.
New style, ii, 140.
News, spreading of false, iv, 149.
Newspaper, libel by, ili, 125, n.
Next of kin, ii, 224.
right of, to administer, ii, 504.
distribution among, ii, 515.
guardian for lunatic, &c., 1, 305.
Nient culpable, plea of, iv, 339.
Night, in burglary what is, iv, 224.
Nightwalkers, iv, 292.
Nihil, return of, iii, 282.
Nihil debet, plea of, iii, 305.
Nihil dicet, judgment by, iii, 396.
Nisi prius, courts of, iii, 58.
commission of, iii, 60 ; iv, 269.
opening of commission, id.
clause of, in venire facias, iii, 352.
trial at, iv, 351.
writ of, not grantable when the king is a
party, iii, 352, n.
Nobility, i, 157, 396.
how created, i, 399.
how lost, i, 402.
king the fountain of, i, 271.
incidents of, i, 401.
study of law by, i, 11, 12, 25.
Nocturnal crimes, preventing or resisting, iv,
180.
Non assumpsit, plea of, iii, 305.
infra sex annos, iii, 308.
Non claim after a fine, iii, 354.
of infants, i, 465.
Non compos mentis,i, 304; ii, 497; iv, 24, 395.
(See "Lunacy.")
Non-conformity, iv, 51, 432.
Non culpabilis, iii, 305; iv, 339,
Non est factum, plea of, iii, 805,
Non est inventus, return of, iii, 383.
Non-juror, iv, 124.
Non prosequitur, iii, 296.
Non obstante, i, 342; ii, 273; iv, 401.
Non obstante verdicto, judgment, iii, 394, n.,
397, n.
Non residence of clergy, i, 391.
Nonsuit, iii, 296, 316, 357, 376.
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Non sum informatus, judgment by, iii, 397.
Northern borders, rapine on, iv, 244.
Norman conquest, i, 99; ii, 60; iv, 414, 415.
Normandy, grand coustumier of, i, 107.
Norman French, use of, in legal proceedings,
iii, 317.
Nose, cutting or slitting, iv, 207, 377.
Not guilty, plea of, iv, 888, 450.
effect of plea in actions of trespass, iii, 305.
in actions on the case, iii, 305.
Note of hand, ii, 467.
small notes prohibited, ii, 468, n.
of banking companies, id.
of a fine, ii, 351.
Notice to quit, ii, 146, n., 147, n.
to terminate estate at will, ii, 146, n.
of dishonor, ii, 470.
of trial. iii, 357.
in ejectment, iii, 203, 463.
Novel disseisin, assize of, iii, 186.
Novels in the civil law, i, 81.
Nudum pactum, ii, 296, 445.
Nul disseisin, plea of, iii, 305.
Nul tiel record, iii, 331.
Nul tort, iil, 305.
Nuncupative will, ii, 500, 514.
Nuper obiit, writ of, iii, 186.
Nurture, guardian for, i, 461.
Nuisance, definition of, iii, 216.
cases of, iii, 216 et seq.
indictment for, iii, 219.
when action lies for, id.
every continuance a fresh, iii, 220.
assize of, iii, 221, 413.
liability of landlord for, ii, 144, n.
abatement of, iii, 5, 220 and n.
when notice to remove must be given, iii, 5, n.
to private ways, iii, 241.
to highways, bridges, rivers, &c., iv, 167.
by offensive trades, disorderly houses, &c.,
iv, 167.
lotteries, fireworks, eavesdroppers andcom-
mon scolds, iv, 168.
Oath against bribery at elections, i, 180.
of allegiance, i, 367.
of supremacy and abjuration, i, 368, n.
to witness, form of, iii, 365.
of the party, iii, 382, 437.
ex officio, abolished, iii, 100, 447.
to the government, refusal or neglect to
take, iv, 116, 117, 123.
when nature of not understood, trial may be
put off, iv, 214, n.
voluntary and extra-judicial, iv, 137.
Obedience to parents, i, 452.
Obligation of human laws, i, 43, 57, 59.
or bond, ii, 340.
Obstructing process, iv, 129.
Occupancy the origin of property, ii, 3, 8,258,
400.
of new lands left by the sea or river, ii, 261.
special, ii, 258.
Odhal right, ii, 45.
Odio et atia, writ de, iii, 128.
Offensive trades, &c., nuisance by, iii, 217.
Office, king the fountain of, i,271.
inquest of, iii, 258.
of the six clerks, iii, 443.
"Office found," i, 370, n.; ii, 249, n., 268, n.
iii, 259, n.
INDEX.
Officers, arrest by, iv, 292.
Officers, killing of, in execution of office, iv, 200.
of revenue, assault on, iv, 155.
constable, assault on, iv, 129.
public, embezzlement by, iv, 230.
refusal to admit, iii, 264.
Offices, ii, 36.
when grantable in reversion, ii, 36.
property in, ii, 37, n.
curtesy of, ii, 126, n.
pay of certain officers not assignable, ii, 36,
441, n.
and pensions, duty on, i, 327, 328, n.
usurpation of, how remedied, iii, 262.
Old age does not disqualify from making will,
ii, 497.
Oleron, laws of, i, 419; iv, 423.
Omnipotence of parliament, i, 160.
Oppression of crown, how remedied, i, 243.'
of magistrates, iv, 141.
Option of tbe archbishop, i, 381.
Optional writs, iii, 274.
Orchards, robbery of, iv, 233.
damaging plants, &c., in, iv, 247.
Ordeal, trial by, iv, 342, 414, 425.
Order of sessions, iv, 272.
for money, &c., forgery of, iv, 250.
Orders, holy, i, 388.
Ore, stealing, iv, 234.
Original contract of king and people, i, 211,233.
conveyances, ii, 310.
writ, iii, 272, 273.
teste and return of, iii, 274.
process in king's bench by, iii, 284.
Orphanage, ii, 519.
Ouster, different methods of, iii, 167, 198.
Ouster le main, ii, 68.
Outlawry, proceedings to, iii, 283.
consequences of, iii, 284.
reversal of, id.
now abolished, iii, 280, n.
in criminal cases, i, 142; iv, 319.
Overseers of the poor, i, 359, 361.
antiquity of office of, i, 359.
Overt acts of treason, iv, 79, 86, 357.
market, ii, 449,
pound, iii, 12.
Owling, ii, 421; iv, 154.
Oyer, iii, 299.
Oyer and terminer, commission of, iv, 269,
448.
justices of, killing, iv, 84.
Oyez, iv, 340.
Oysters, stealing of, iv, 236 and n.
property in, ii, 393, n.
Pains and penalties, act to inflict, iv, 259.
act for, forbidden in America.
Pals, trial per, iii, 349; iv, 349.
matter in, ii, 294.
Palace, court of, iii, 76.
assault in, iv, 125.
Palatine counties, i, 116, 119; iii, 79; iv, 431.
Pandects of Justinian, i, 17, 81.
Panel of jurors, iii, 354; iv, 302, 350.
Papal encroachment, iv, 104.
process, obedience to, iv, 115.
Paper credit, ii, 466; iv, 441.
Paper books, iii, 317, 407.
Papirian code, i, 81.
Papists, disabilities of, ii, 257, 293.
children of, i, 449, 451.
Papists, laws against, iv, 55, 87, 425.
relief of.
(See "Pope," "Roman Catholics."
Paramount lord, ii, 59, 91.
Paraphernalia, ii, 435.
Paravail, tenant, ii, 60.
Parcels, construction of particular words, it, 19.
Parceners, ii, 187.
Parco fracto, writ de, iii, 146.
Pardon, iv, 316, 337, 376, 396.
for discovering accomplices or receivers,
iv, 331.
not pleadable to impeachment, i, 334; iv,
261, 339, 440.
king's prerogative of, i, 269; iv, 397.
Parent and child, i, 446.
Parents, remedy for abduction of children,
iii, 140.
duties of, i, 446-452.
powers of, i, 452-454.
consent of to marriage of children, i, 437.
defence of children by, iii, 3, n.
deserting children, iv, 170, n.
of bastard children, i, 458.
Pares curite, ii, 54.
Pares, trial per, iii, 349.
Par materia, statutes in, i, 60, n.
Parish, i,112.
clerk, i, 395.
Parks, ii, 38, 416.
Parliament, i, 141, 146; iv, 412, 425, 428.
adjourning, i, 186.
convention, i, 152, 211, 214.
constituent parts of, i, 154.
dissolving, i, 188.
estates of, i, 154, n., 156.
intermission of, i, 153.
laws of, i, 160-163.
of France, i, 147.
of Merton, i, 19.
origin of, i, 147-149.
power of, i, 160.
privileges of, i, 164-167.
proroguing, i, 187.
rolls, i, 181.
sessions of, i, 46, 186, 187.
summons of, i, 150.
process against members of, in chancery,
iii, 445.
court of the king in, iv, 259, 263.
disuse of, iv, 437.
stealing proceedings of, from post, iv, 235, n.
houses of public meeting near, iv, 148.
Parliamentum indoctum, i, 177.
Parol, distinguished from writing, ii, 296,
446, n.
contracts, ii, 296, 442, 447.
evidence, iii, 369.
pleadings, iii, 292.
demurrer, iii, 300.
demurrer by the, iii, 430.
Parricide, iv, 202.
Parsons and vicars, i, 384.
appointment of, i, 388.
powers and duties of, i, 391.
Particular estate, ii, 165.
Particulars of demand, iii, 300, n.
Parties to suits in equity, iii, 442.
Partitions, it, 185, 189, 194, 300, 323; iii, 302.
Partners, interest of, in personalty, ii, 399, n.
survivorship between, ii, 399.
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Partners, accounts of, in equity, iii, 437.
Passports, i, 260.
violation of, iv, 68.
Pasturage, right of, ii, 32, 84, n., 35, n.
common of, ii, 82.
Pasture, writ of admeasurement, iii, 237.
waste by plowing up, ii, 282.
Patent, letters, ii, 846; iii, 3.
rolls and writs, ii, 346.
for inventions, law of, ii, 407; iv, 159.
scire facias to repeal, iii, 260.
of peerage, i, 400.
of precedence, iii, 28.
Patriam, trial per, iii, 349; iv, 349.
Patron, ii, 21.
Patronage, usurpation of, iii, 242.
how remedied, iii, 243.
Patterns, copyright in, ii, 407.
Pauper, when excused from paying costs,
iii, 400.
support of. (See "Poor.")
Pawn of goods, ii, 452.
Pawnbroker, nature of contract with, ii, 452.
Payment into court, iii, 804.
of debts of deceased person, ii, 511.
tender of, i, 277.
place of tender, iii, 308.
Peace and war, right of making, i, 257.
Peace, commission of, i, 351; iv, 270.
conservation of, i, 349.
justices of, i, 849; iv, 270, 282, 428.
(See "Justices of the Peace.")
the king's, i, 118, 268, 350.
breach of, iv, 142.
security for, iv, 251, 254.
clerk of, iv, 272.
offences against, iv, 142-150.
Peculatus, iv, 122.
Peculiars, court of, iii, 65.
Peerage, benefit of, in offences, iv, 867.
Peeresses, i, 401.
trial of, id.
Peers, privileges of, i, 401; iii, 859; iv, 258,
273, 867.
great council of, i, 227, 228; iii, 56.
hereditary counsellors of the crown, i, 227.
how created, i, 899.
Irish and Scotch, i, 401.
pedigrees of, iii, 106.
foreign, i, 401.
protests by, i, 168.
proxies of, id.
process against, in equity, iii, 445.
trial by, i, 401; iv, 260, 868.
of the lords' court, ii, 54.
answer of, in equity, i, 12, n.
spiritual, i, 157.
house of, i, 156.
jurisdiction of, upon appeals and writs of
error, iii, 57.
pedigrees to be delivered in, iii, 106.
quorum of, iii, 56, n.
Peine forte et dure, iv, 325 and n.
Penal statutes, i, 88; iv, 429.
construction of, i, 82, n.
actions on, iii, 161.
Penalties, title to, by judgment, ii, 437.
relief against, iii, 435.
Penance, commutation of, iv, 105, 217, 276.
for standing mute, iv, 325.
in ecclesiastical courts, iv, 105, 275, 368.
[Penitentiary houses, iv, 871.
Pensions, from foreign princes, iv, 122.
ecclesiastical, i, 281.
from the crown, i, 176; ii, 40.
duties on, i, 826.
Pensioners excluded from house of commons,
i, 175.
People, i, 866.
sovereignty in, i, 49, n., 52, n.
Per quod, iii, 124.
Per quod consortium amisit, ill, 140.
Peremptory challenges, iv, 353, 396.
Peremptory mandamus, iii, 111, 265.
Perfection of the king, i, 246.
Perjury, iv, 137 and n.
in capital cases, iv, 188, 196.
Permissive waste, ii, 281.
Perpetual curate, i, 394.
Perpetuating testimony, iii, 450.
Perpetuities, rule against, ii, 174.
Perpetuity of the king, i, 249.
Persecution, religious, iv, 46, 428, 482.
Person, larceny from the, iv, 242 and n.
injuries to and offences against, iii, 119; iv,
177 et seq.
Personal actions, iii, 117.
what die with the person, iii, 802.
liberty, i, 134.
security, i, 129.
Personalty, ii, 384, 889 et seq.
property in animals, ii, 889, 400.
little regarded in former times, ii, 884.
chattels real and chattels personal, ii, 885.
succession to, regulated by domicil, ii, 887, n.
finder of, entitled to possession except as
against owner, ii, 896, n.
chose in action, ii, 396.
may be settled for life with remainder over,
ii, 898.
entail of, id.
title of partners to, ii, 899.
real estate converted into, in equity, ii, 899.
title to, by occupancy, ii, 400.
prize, &c., ii, 401.
goods found, ii, 402.
animals ferm naturae, id.
emblements, ii, 403.
title by accession, confusion and intermix-
ture, ii, 404.
copyright, designs, &c., ii, 405, 407.
distinctive trade-marks, ii, 405, n.
patents for inventions, ii, 407.
title by gift, grant and contract, ii, 440.
title of crown by prerogative, ii, 409.
fraudulent assignments of, ii, 441.
Personating others in courts, &c., iv, 128.
proprietors of stock, iv, 248.
bail, iv, 128.
Persons, natural, i, 123.
artificial, i, 123, 467.
rights of, i, 122.
Peter pence, iv, 107.
Petit sergeanty, ii, 81.
Petition of appeal, iii, 454.
of right, i, 128, 243; iv, 487.
to what applicable, iii, 255, n., 256,428.
de droit, iii, 256.
Petitioning, right of, i, 143; iv, 147.
tumultuous, id.
Petty bag office, iii, 428.
why so called, iii, 49.
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Petty constables, 1, 355.ury, iii, 351.
larceny, iv, 229.
sergeanty, ii, 81.
sessions, iv, 272.
treason, iv, 75, 203, n.
Pews, title to, ii. 429 and n.
Physician, iv, 197.
cannot maintain an action for fees, iii, 28, n.
may make special contract, id.
liable for negligence or unskillfulness, iii, 122.
should be acquainted with law, i, 14.
Piepoudre, court of, iii, 32.
Pignus, ii, 159.
Pillory, iv, 136, n., 377.
Piracy, iv, 71.
Piscary, common of, ii, 34, 39.
Placemen, excluded from house of commons,
i, 175; iv, 440.
Plagiarii, iv, 219.
Plague, irregularity during, iv, 161.
Plaint, iii, 273.
Plaintiff, iii, 25.
Plantation, burning or destroying, iv, 246.
Plantations, law in the, 1, 107.
Plants, destruction of, iv, 246.
stealing of, iv, 233.
Play, right to represent, ii, 407, n.
Plays and players, license of, iv, 167.
Plea, dilatory, iii, 301.
within what time to be pleaded, iii, 301, n.
must be verified, iii, 302.
conclusion of, id.
effect of allowing or overruling, iii, 303.
to the action, iii, 303.
in bar, iii, 306.
conditions and qualities of, iii, 307.
special, conclusion of, id.
in equity, iii, 446.
in abatement, not admitted in suit for lands,
iii, 302.
to indictments, iv, 332.
sanctuary, id.
benefit of clergy, iv, 332, 364.
to the jurisdiction, iv, 333.
demurrer, id.
in abatement, iv, 334 and n.
autrefois acquit, iv, 335.
autrefois convict, iv, 336.
autrefois attaint, id.
pardon, iv, 337.
not guilty, iv, 338 et seq.
in bar of execution, iv, 396.
of lunacy, ii, 291.
Pleading, times for, iii, 299.
departure in, iii, 309.
formerly viva voce, now in writing, iii, 293.
in criminal cases, iii, 427.
required to be in English, iii, 317.
Pleading in equity, iii, 442 et seq.
commencement of suit, bill, iii, 422.
information, iii, 437.
parties to suit, iii, 442.
demurrer, iii, 446.
pleas, id.
answer, iii, 443, 446, 447.
cross-bill, iii, 448, 451.
amended and supplemental bill, iii, 448.
bills of revivor and interpleader, id.
bill to perpetuate testimony, iii, 450.
right of parol to demur, iii, 430. •
Pleading in equity, bill of review, iii, 453.
Pleas of the crown, ii, 424.
Pledge, ii, 157, 452.
estates in, ii, 157.
Pledges of prosecution, iii, 147, 275.
of appearance, iii, 280.
Plenarty, iii, 243.
Plough, beasts of the, when may be distrained,
iii, 9, n.
Plough-bote, ii, 85.
Pluralities, i, 392.
Pluries, writ, iii, 283; iv, 319.
habeas corpus, iii, 135.
Poaching in night, iv, 175, n.
Pocket sheriffs, i, 342.
Poisoning, iv, 196 and n.
administering poison with intent to murder,
id.
to woman quick with child, iv, 198.
attempts at, iv, 196, n.
Police, offences against, iv, 162.
Policies of insurance, iv, 441.
(See "Insurance.")
court of, iii, 74.
Political liberty, 1, 125.
rights, i, 129, 145.
Polling at elections, i, 178.
Polls, challenge to, iii, 361 ; iv, 352.
Polygamy, i, 436; iv, 163.
Pone, iii, 34, 37, 195,280.
Poor, i, 359.
laws, history of, i, 359-362; iv, 432.
settlements, i, 362.
returning to parish, &c., vagrants, iv, 170, n.
overseers of, i, 359-361.
Pope, his authority how abolished, iv, 104,421,
428, 430.
encroachments of, iv, 104, 419, 424, 425.
jurisdiction, defending, iv, 87, 115.
reconciliation to, iv, 87.
Popery, iv, 55.
(See "Roman Catholics.")
Popish books, importing or selling, iv, 115.
priests, iv, 57, 87, 115.
recusants, iv, 56, 124.
seminaries, education in, i, 451, iv, 55, 115.
maintaining, iv, 115.
Popular action, ii, 437; iii, 160.
Portland, Isle of, i, 105.
Port-reeve, iv, 413.
Ports and havens, i, 264.
injuries to, iv, 144.
Positive proof, iii, 371.
Posse comitatus, i, 343.
neglecting to join, iv, 122.
Possessin fratris, ii, 227.
Possession, estate in, ii, 163, 389.
title by, ii, 195.
right of, ii, 196; iii, 177, 180.
adverse, ii, 266, n.
when must be surrendered before adverse
claim can be set up, ii, 144, n.
of land, insufficient to maintain trespass
against stranger, iii, 210, n.
of land under contract of sale, ii, 140, n.,146,n.
writ of, iii, 202, 412.
Possessory actions, nature of, ii, 198; iii, 179.
limitation to, iii, 188.
Possibility upon a possibility, ii, 169.
not assignable, ii, 290.
Postea, iii, 386.
INDEX.
Post-fine, ii, 350.
Post, writ of entry in, iii, 182.
Post-disseasin, writ of, iii, 188.
Post-man in exchequer, iii, 28.
Post-office duties, &c., i, 322-324.
embezzlement by servants in, iv, 231.
misbehavior of officers of, iv, 234.
examining correspondence in, i, 322, n.
Posthumous children, i, 130; ii, 160.
Pound, iii, 12.
breach, what, and remedies for, iii, 146.
troy, of gold and silver, i, 276, n.
Poundage, i, 316; iv, 437.
Powdike, cutting, iv, 244.
Power of appointment, how executed by will,
iio 379, n.
Of the crown, i, 250.
sovereign, where lodged, i, 51.
in America, i, 49, n., 52, n.
Poyning's, laws, i, 102, 103.
Practice in equity, iii, 442, et sg.
injunction, iii, 442-443.
filing bill and subpoena, iii, 443.
officers of court, iii, 443.
affidavits, iii, 443.
answer, iii, 443, 447.
process of contempt, iii, 443, 444.
appearance, iii, 443, 445.
commission of rebellion, iii, 444.
sequestration, id.
taking bill pro confesso, id.
process against corporation by distringas,
iii, 455.
process against peer or member of parlia-
ment, id.
defendant's pleading, id.
amendments, iii, 446, 488.
hearing of cause, iii, 488, 450, 451.
examination of witnesses, iii, 449.
publication of evidence, id.
dismissing bills for want of prosecution,
iii, 451.
subpcena to hear judgment, id.
decree, interlocutory or final, iii, 451, 453.
decree against infant, iii, 430, n.
costs, iii, 451.
feigned issue, iii, 452.
reference to master, iii, 453.
master's report, id.
final decree, id.
rehearing, id.
appeal, iii, 453, 454.
enforcement of decree, iii, 453.
enrolment of decree, id.
bill of review, iii, 454.
new evidence on appeal, iii, 455.
Prfecipe, ii, 350; iii, 195, 274.
tenant to, ii, 358; iii, 182.
Praemunire, iv, 103, 428.
Prtetor's edicts, i, 80.
Prayer in aid, iii, 299.
Preamble of statute, i, 60, n.
Pre-audience, iii, 28.
Prebendary, i, 383.
Precedence, how settled, i, 272; iii, 105.
of royal family, i, 225.
table of, i, 405, n. ; iii, 257.
letters patent of, iii, 28.
among bishops, i, 380, n.
Precedents, authority of, i, 70, n.
in equity, iii, 432.
Precept of election to parliament, i, 177.
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Pre-contract of marriage, i, 434.
Pre-emption, i, 287; iv, 116, 424, 439.
Pregnancy, plea of, iv, 394.
trial of, i, 456 ; iv, 395.
Premier sergeant, iii, 27.
Premises in a deed, ii, 298.
Prerogative, different kinds of, i, 239.
limited, i, 141.
review of its progress, i, 336; iv, 431, 432.
causes of its increase and decline, iv, 433.
contempts against, iv, 122.
offences relating to coin and treason, iv.,
98-100..
offences against king's council, iv, 100.
other offences against, iv, 101-103.
title to chattels by, ii, 408.
(See "Crown.")
Prerogative court, ii, 509; iii, 65, 77, n.
Prescription, title by, ii, 28, 263, 264, 266, n.
abandonment of right by, ii, 264, n.
none, of right arising by record, ii, 265.
in gross, ii, 266, n.
donative advowson by, ii, 23.
discharge from tithes, ii, 28 et seq.
commencement of time of legal memory,
ii, 31.
in respect of common, ii, 33; iii, 238.
to right of way, ii, 36.
for pews, ii, 429.
franchises, fisheries, &c., ii, 38 et seq.
corporation by, i, 473.
not applicable to highways, ii, 35, n.
Presentation to benefice, i, 389.
(See "Advowson.")
Presentment of offences, iv, 301.
President of the council, i, 230.
of corporations, i, 478.
of the United States, i, 214, n.
oath of office of, i, 235, n.
cabinet of, i, 232, n.
impeachment of, i, 246, n.
approval of bills by, i, 185, n.
Press, liberty of, iv, 151
Pressing to death, iv, 328.
of seamen, i, 419.
Presumption, iii, 371.
of a grant, ii, 31, n., 35, n., 266, n.
of corporate grant, i, 473.
of death, ii, 177, n.
Presumptive evidence of felony, iv, 353.
heir, ii, 208.
Pretended titles, selling or buying, iv, 136.
Pretender and his sons, treasons relating to,
iv, 91.
Prevention of crimes, iv, 251.
homicide in, iv, 180.
Priest, i, 388.
(See "Roman Catholics.")
Primarise preces, i, 381.
Primer fine, ii, 350.
Primer seisin, ii, 66, 87; iv, 418.
Primogeniture, i, 194; ii, 56; iv, 421.
Prince of Wales, i, 94, 223.
Princes and princesses of the royal blood, i,
226.
Princess of Wales, i, 94, 223.
violation of, iv, 81.
Principal and accessory, iv, 34 et seg.
principals, iv, 34.
accessories, iv, 35.
what offences admit of, id.
before the fact, iv, 36.
INDEX.
Principal and accessory, after the fact, iv, 37.
punishment of, iv, 39.
Principal challenge, iii, 363.
Prints, copyright in, ii, 407.
Priority of debts, ii, 511.
Priors, i, 155.
Prisage, i, 314.
Prison of the Fleet, iii, 444.
breach of, iv, 130.
Prisoner, insolvent, relief of, ii, 488.
of war, ii, 402 ; iii, 132, n.
Prisons, regulation of, iv, 377.
Prit, iv, 339.
Private act of parliament, i, 86; ii, 344.
nuisance, iii, 216.
property, rights to, i, 138.
persons, arrest by, iv, 293.
ways, ii, 35 and n.
(See "Ways.")
Privateering, i, 259, n.
Privately stealing from the person, iv, 242.
Privies to a fine, ii, 355.
bound by estoppel.
(See "Estoppel.")
Privilege, king, the fountain of, i, 272.
of parliament, i, 164-167.
bill of, iii, 289.
from arrest, id.
Privileged places, iv, 129.
Privilegia, i, 46.
Privilegium clericale, iv, 365.
Privy council, i, 229-232, 280, n.
judicial committee of, i, 231, n., 280, n.; iii,
69, n.
appeal to, in lunacy, iii, 427.
Privy councillor, killing or attempting to kill,
i, 232; iv, 100.
Privy purse, i, 334.
Privy seal and signet, ii, 347.
forging, iv, 89.
Privy verdict, iii, 377; iv, 360.
Prize, of enemy's goods, &c., 1, 259; ii, 401.
court, iii, 70, n.
commission of, iii, 69.
admiralty court no jurisdiction as to, iii,
70, n.
Probable cause, iii, 126, n.
Probate, ii, 494, 507; iii, 98.
(See" Wills.")
court of, iii, 67, n., 95, n.
Procedendo, writ of, i, 353; iii, 109.
Process, iii, 279, 286.
in equity, iii, 426, 443.
former, abolished and new writs substituted,
iii, 287, n.
Prochein ami, i, 464.
Proclamation by the king, i, 270,271 ; iv, 431.
of estrays, i, 298.
writ of, iii, 284.
in outlawry, iv, 319.
under the riot act, iv, 143.
on attachment in chancery, iii, 444.
Proctor, iii, 25.
Procuration money, iv, 157.
Prodigals, i, 305.
Profanity, iv, 59.
Profert in curia, iii, App.
Profession of arms, i, 408.
religious i, 133.
Profits of courts, i, 289.
Progress, royal, iv, 411.
Progress of the laws, iv, 407.
Prohibition, writ of, iii, 112.
to what courts may issue, id.
in what cases, id.
procedure upon, iii, 113.
Promise, what it is, iii, 158.
(See "Contract.")
remedy for breach of, id.
Promissory note, ii, 467.
(See "Bill of Exchange.")
Promulgation of laws, i, 45,185, n.
Proof, when positive, required, iii, 370.
generally, iii, 368.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Proper feuds, ii, 58.
Property, rights to, in general, i, 138; ii, 8, n.,
12, 197.
origin of rights of alienation and descent,
ii, 9.
some things still in common, ii, 14.
title by occupancy, ii, 400.
division according to nature of subject and
estate therein, ii, 16, n.
realty and personalty, ii, 16.
right of presentation to church, ii, 23.
in water, ii, 18.
in things personal, ii, 389 et seq.
in animals, ii, 389, 402.
qualified, limited or special, ii, 391, 396.
in personalty, as to time of enjoyment and
number of owners, ii, 398.
(See "Personalty.")
injuries to, iii, 144, 167.
crimes against, iv, 230 et seq.
tax, i, 314, n.
Prophecies, pretended, iv, 149.
Proprietary governments in America, i, 109.
Proprietate probanda, writ de, iii, 148.
Prorogation of parliament, i, 187.
Prosecution by the king i, 268.
expenses of, iv, 362.
of offenders, different modes of, iv, 301.
malicious, iii, 126.
Prostitutes, vagrants, iv, 170.
Protection of children, i, 450.
of ambassadors, i, 254.
writ of, iii, 289.
Protector or regent, 1, 248.
Protest of bill of exchange, ii, 467, n., 469.
of peers, i, 168.
Protestant dissenters, iv, 53.
succession, i, 216, 217; iv, 90.
treason against, iv, "90.
Protestation, iii, 311.
Province, i, 111.
Provincial constitutions, i, 82.
governments in America, i, 109.
Provisions, papal, i, 60; iv, 107.
selling unwholesome, iv, 162.
forestalling, &c., iv, 158.
warranty in sale of, ii, 451, n.
Proviso, trial by, iii, 357.
Provisors, statutes against, iv, 100 et seq.
Proxies in house of lords, i, 168.
Puberty, age of, iv, 22.
Public act of parliament, i, 85.
debts, i, 328-331.
companies, stock in, may be charged with
judgment debt, iii, 419, n.
policy, excludes copyright in immoral work,
iii, 407, n.
INDEX.'
Public verdict, iii, 377; iv, 360.
Publication of deposition, iii, 450.
Pueritia, iv, 22.
Puis darrein continuance, plea of, iii, 315,817.
Puisne barons of exchequer, iii, 44.
judges, iii, 40, 41.
Pulling down churches, houses, &c., iv, 143.
Pulsation, iii, 120.
Punishment, nature of, i, 133; iv, 7.
capital, iv, 9, 18, 236.
certainty of, iv, 377.
end and purpose of, iv, 11, 252.
mode of inflicting, iv, 258.
measure of, iv, 12.
power of punishing, iv, 7.
severity of, iii, 404; iv, 16.
(See " Correction.")
Pur auter vie, estate in.
(See "Estate.")
Purchase, i, 215.
distinguished from escheat and descent, ii,
201, 241, 243, 245.
rule in Shelley's Case, ii, 242.
modes of taking by, ii, 244.
heir taking by, ii, 240, n.
of writs, iii, 273, 274.
Purgatio vulgaris, iv, 342.
Purgation, canonical, iii, 842; iv, 868.
oath of, iii, 100, 447.
Purlieu, ii, 419, n.
Purpresture, iv, 167.
Pursuit of remedies, iii, 270.
Purveyance, i, 287; iv, 116, 424, 439.
Putting in fear, iv, 242.
Quadruplicatio, iii, 810.
Qualification for killing game. iv, 175.
of electors to parliament, i, 171, 175.
of justices of the peace, i, 852.
of members of parliament, i, 175.
of jurors, iii, 362; iv, 852.
Qualified fee, ii, 109.
(See "Estate.")
property, ii, 391.
Quantum meruit, iii, 161.
valebat, id.
Quarantine, irregularity in, iv, 161.
of widow, ii, 135.
Quare ejecit infra termino, writ of, iii, 199.
when it lies, iii, 206.
abolished, iii, 207, n.
Quare clausum fregit, iii, 281.
Quare impedit, writ of, iii, 246-251.
costs in, iii, 249.
execution in, iii, 412.
Quare incumbravit, iii, 248.
Quare non admissit, iii, 250.
uarreling in church or church yard, iv, 146.
Quartering of soldiers, i, 414, 415.
Quartering traitors, iv, 93, 377.
Quarter sessions, court of, iv, 271.
appeal to, iii, 455.
Quarto die post, iii, 278.
Quashing, iii, 303; iv, 321.
Quays, i, 264.
Que estate, ii, 264.
Queen, i, 219.
(See "Crown," "King.")
Anne's bounty, i, 286 ; ii, 273.
consort, i, 220.
dowager, i, 224.
husband of, id.
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Queen regnant, i, 219.
her attorney and solicitor, i, 219; iii, 28.
her revenue, i, 219.
regnant's husband, i, 222.
consort, compassing or imagining her death,
iv, 76.
violating, iv, 81.
offences against person of, not treasonable,
iv, 102, n.
Question or torture, iv, 325.
Qui tam actions, iii, 160; iv, 307.
Quia dominus remisit curiam, iii, 195.
Quia emptores, statute of, ii, 91, 102; iv,
426.
Quick with child, plea of, iv, 895.
uinto exactus, iii, 283; iv, 319.
uit rents, ii, 42.
uo minus, writ of, iii, 45, n.
in exchequer, iii, 286.
Quod ei deforciat, writ of, iii, 193.
Quod nocumentum amoveatur, iii, 418.
Quod permittat, iii, 240.
Quod permittat prostenere, iii, 221.
Quorum, i, 351.
clause in commissions, id.
in corporations, i, 478, n.
of house of peers, iii, 56, n.
Quo wairranto, writ of, iii, 262.
information in nature of, i, 485; iii, 262; iv,
311, 441.
used in corporation disputes, iii, 263.
within what time to be brought, iii, 264.
Rabbits, taking, &c., iv, 235.
Racing, when unlawful, iv, 178.
Rack, iv, 825.
Rack rent, ii, 43.
Rail, stealing of, iv, 233.
destroying and injuries, iv, 247.
Railroads, ii, 35, n., iv; 443, n.
Ransom, illegal, ii, 402; iii, 436; iv, 67, 880.
Rape of women, iv, 210.
evidence in, iv, 213.
assault to commit, iv, 217.
appeal of, iv, 314.
Rape in counties, i, 117.
Rapina, iv, 248.
Rasure in deed, ii, 308.
Rationabili parte, writ de, iii, 194.
Rationabili parte bonorum, writ de, ii, 492.
Ravishment of children, iii, 141 ; iv, 212.
of ward, iii, 141.
of wife, iii, 139.
Reading on claim of clergy, iv, 367,441
Real actions, iii, 117, 177, 198, 232.
Real property, annuity of inheritance is not,
ii, 41, n.
what is an interest in land, ii, 806, n.
(See "Property.")
Reasonable part, ii, 492, 516 ; iv, 408, 424.
estovers.
(See "Estovers.")
Re-assurance, ii, 460.
Rebellion, commission of, iii, 444.
Rebutter, iii, 310.
Recall of subjects from abroad, i, 265; iv, 122,
160.
Recaption, iii, 3; iv, 868.
rights of, how exercised, iii, 4.
writ of, iii, 151.
Receipt, forgery of, iv, 250 and n.
INDEX.
Receipt of part of a debt in satisfaction of all,
16, 23.
Receiving stolen goods, offence of, iv, 132, 133.
letters, iv, 234, n.
Recitals in a deed, ii, 297.
Recognizance, ii, 341, 465.
for the peace or good behavior, iv, 252.
to prosecute, iv, 296.
to give evidence, id.
-Recompense in value, ii, 359.
Reconciliation to the pope, &c., iv, 87.
Record, i, 69; iii, 24, 317; iv, 426.
is tried by nothing but itself, iii, 24.
when may be disputed, iii, 24, n.
for the assizes, iii, 356.
transcript of, to be annexed to writ of error,
iii, 400, n.
alienation by, ii, 344.
debts of, ii, 465.
no prescription of right by, ii, 265.
embezzling, &c., iv, 128.
courts of, iii, 24, 34, 406.
nisi prius, iii, 356.
trial by, iii, 330.
Recordari facias loquelam, iii, 34, 195.
Recoupment, iii, 306, n.
Recoveries, ii, 357 et seq.
common, invention of, ii, 116, 270.
vouchers in, ii, 358-360.
regarded as common assurances, ii, 360.
tenant to the precipe, ii, 362.
deeds to lead or declare the uses of, ii, 363.
abolished, ii, 364, n.
of copyholds, ii, 371 ; iii, 166.
Recreant, iii, 340; iv, 348.
Rector of a church, i, 384.
Rectorial tithes, i, 388.
Recusants, popish, iv, 56, 124.
Recusatio judicis, iii, 361.
Reddendum, ii, 299.
Re-disseisin, writ of, iii, 188.
Reditus, ii, 57. (See "Rent.")
Re-entry on land, iii, 4.
after exchange, on eviction, ii, 323.
Reeve land, ii, 48, n., 90.
Reference to master, iii, 453.
Reform acts, i, 157, n., 159, n., 172, n., 175, n.
Reformation of religion, iv, 430.
Refusal of a clerk, i, 389.
Regalia majora et minora, i, 241.
Regard, court of, iii, 72.
Regent, i, 248 and n.
queen, i, 219.
Register of seamen, i, 419.
of mariners, iii, 105.
falsifying, iv, 163.
Registrum omnium brevium, iii, 183.
Registry of conveyances, ii, 342.
Regrating, iv, 160.
Rehearing in equity, iii, 453.
Rejoinder, iii, 310.
Relation back, of title of bankrupt's assignees,
ii, 485, 486, n.
of judgment, iii, 420, 421.
in forfeiture, iv, 381, 386, 387.
Relations, domestic, 1, 422-466.
public, i, 146.
Relative rights and duties, i, 123, 146.
Relatives, defence of, iii, 3.
Relator, iii, 264, 427; iv, 308.
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Release, by way of enlargement, ii, 324.
lease and, ii, 339.
per mitter 'estate, ii, 324.
per mitter le droit, ii, 325.
by extinguishment, id.
by entry and feoffment, id.
Relction, ii, 261, n.
Reliefs, ii, 56, 65, 87; iv, 418, 420.
Religion, offences against, iv, 43 et seq.
Religious impostures, iv, 61, 62.
societies in United States, i, 376, n.
Rem, information in, iii, 262.
Remainders, ii, 163.
fee limited in remainder on a fee, H 165.
alternative contingent, id.
freehold in futuro, id.
particular estate, ii, 166, 167.
vested or contingent, ii, 168, 169.
possibility upon a possibility, ii, 169.
conveyance of contingent estates, ii, 290, n.
destruction of, ii, 117, 119, 171, 354, n.
trustees to preserve contingent, ii, 171.
executory devises, ii, 172 et seq.
rule in Shelley's Case, ii, 172, n.
rule against perpetuities, ii, 174.
distinguished from conditional limitations,
ii, 156.
distinguished from reversions, ii, 176.
cross, implication of, ii, 381.
in personalty, ii, 398.
formedon in, iii, 192.
Remainder-man, defence of freehold by, iii, 204.
may cause tenant for life to be produced,
iii, 211.
Remedial part of laws, i, 55; iii, 23.
statute, i, 86, 88.
Remitter, iii, 189, 190.
what it is, iii, 19.
reason of, iii, 20.
to owner of stolen goods, ii, 450.
Remoteness, rule against, ii, 174.
Removal, fraudulent, iii, 11.
of poor, i, 364.
Renewals of copyholds for lives, ii, 98.
Rent, origin of, ii, 41, 57,86, 299.
rent-service, rent-charge and rent-seek, ii,
41 et seq.
rent of assize, quit rents, rack rents and fee
farm rents, ii, 42.
distinguished from annuity, ii, 41.
reservation of, ii, 297.
incident to the reversion, ii, 176.
rent-service may issue out of tithes, ii, 42, n.
none out of personalty, id.
when and where payable, ii, 43; iii, 10, n.
appointment of, ii, 43, n., 124.
extinguishment of, ii, 43.
limitation of right to recover arrears, ii, 266,n.
remedy for, iii, 6, 206, 231 ; iv, 441.
action of debt for, iii, 231.
to be paid by sheriff, iii, 417.
Repair of way, ii, 36, n.
of leasehold premises, ii, 144, n.
Repleader, when it will be awarded, il, 395.
Replevin, iii, 13, 170.
how made, iii, 147.
action of, when may be brought, iii, 146.
proceedings in, iii, 149.
execution in, iii, 413.
bond, iii, 147.
Replication, iii, 309.
INDEX.
Replication in equity, iii, 448.
in criminal cases. iv, 339.
Reports of adjudged cases, i, 71.by master, iii, 453.
Representation not delegation, i, 159.
in descent of the crown, i, 194, 201.
in descent of real property, ii, 216, 219.
of facts, distinguished from warranty, ii,
460, n.
in distribution, ii, 517.
Reprieves, iv, 394.
Reprisals on foreigners, i, 258.
of goods, &c., iii, 4.
Republication of Wills, i, 502.
Repugnant conditions, ii, 156.
Reputation, protection of, i, 134; iii, 123.
Requests, court of, i, 230; iii, 51, 81.
Rere fiefs, ii, 57.
Rescous, what and how remedied, iii, 146.
Rescripts of the emperor, i, 58.
Rescue, when it may be made, iii, 12, 170; iv,
125, 131.
Reservations, ii, 299.
Residence of spiritual persons, i, 390, 392.
Resignation, i, 382, 393.
legality of engagements to resign a living,
ii, 280.
Resistance, right of, 1, 251 ; iv, 436, 440.
must not exceed bounds of mere defence
and protection, iii, 4 and n.
Respite of jury, iii, 854.
Respondentia, ii, 458, 461.
Respondeat ouster, judgment of, iii, 303, 396;
iv, 338.
Restitution of temporalities, i, 380; iv, 421.
in blood, &c., iv, 402.
of conjugal rights, iii, 94.
of stolen goods, iv, 362.
writ of, iv, 188, 863.
Restoration of 1660, i, 210; iv, 488.
Restraining statute, i, 87; ii, 320; iv, 482.
Resulting use, on a conveyance, ii, 296, n. 1,
335; iv, 430.
Retainder of debts, ii, 511 ; iii, 18.
executor of his own wrong cannot retain,
iii, 19.
of servant, iii, 142.
Retaliation, law of, iv, 12.
Retorno habendo, plegli de, iii, 147.
writ de, iii, 150, 413.
Retraxit, iii, 296, 395.
Retrospective legislation, i, 91, n.
Return days, iii, 275.
false or double, i, 180; iii, 111, 372.
irreplevisable, writ of, iii, 150.
of writs, iii, 273,275.
Revealed law of God, i, 42.
Revenue, extraordinary, i, 807.
ordinary, i, 281.
jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 428.
causes, trial of, iv, 281.
officers, assaults on, iv, 155 and n.
Reversal of judgment, iii, 411 ; iv, 390.
of outlawry, iii, 284 ; iv, 320, 362.
Reversion, ii, 111, 175.
incidents to, fealty and rent, ii, 175.
merger, ii, 177.
Reverter, formedon in, iii, 192.
Review, commission of, iii, 67.
court of, iii, 428, n.
bill of, iii, 454.
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Reviling church ordinances, iv, 50
Revivor in equity, iii, 448.
Revocation of uses, ii, 385, 389.
of wills, ii, 876, 502.
Revolution of 1688, i, 211 ; iv, 440.
Reward, taking of, to help to stolen goods, iv,
132.
for apprehending offenders, iv, 294, 295.
for discovering accomplices, iv, 331.
Rhuddland, statute of, i, 94.
Ridings, i, 117.
Right, nature and varieties of, ii, 8, n., 15, n., 197
of property and possession, ii, 196.
release and extinguishment of, i, 325.
of advowson, writ of, iii, 243, 250.
close, writ of, ii, 99; iii, 34, 195.
where there is a legal, there is also a legal
remedy, iii, 23.
writ of, iii, 192.
when must formerly have been brought, iii,
190.
in what court proceedings upon, iii, 195.
patent, writ of, iii, 141.
of dower, writ of, iii, 183.
of ward, writ of, iii, 141.
petition of, iii, 256.
Rights of persons and rights of things, iii, 2.
of persons, absolute and relative, iii, 119.
and wrongs, i, 122; iii, 2.
absolute, i, 123-125.
bill of, i, 128, 142, n. ; iv, 440.
how secured, i, 141.
personal, i, 129.
petition of. i, 128; iv, 437.
political, i, 129-145.
relative, i, 146.
to property, i, 138.
Riot, iv, 125, 142, 146.
act, iv, 142. 143, 440.
Riotous assemblies felonious, iv, 142
River, title to land left by, ii, 261.
Rivers, annoyances in, iv, 167, n.
banks, destroying of, iv. 144.
sluices on, destroying, id.
thefts on navigable, iv, 239.
nuisances to navigation, iii, 5, n.
Roads, ii, 85, n., 36, n.
(See "Highway.")
Robbery, iv, 242, 244, n.
(See "Larceny.")
there must be a taking, iv, 243.
not material when taken, id.
must be a force or putting in fear, id.
punishment, iv, 245 and n.
assaulting, with intent to rob, id
Roguery, incorrigible, iv, 169, n.
Rogues, iv, 169.
(See "Vagrants.")
Rolls, master of, iii, 451.
Roman law.
(See "Civil Law.")
division of money and interest, i, 462.
Roman Catholics, disabilities of, ii, 257, 293;
iv, 55.
relief from disabilities, i, 368, n. ; ii, 257, n.
schools of, i, 451.
members of parliament, i, 163, n.
rights and protection of, iv, 58.
patrons, rights of universities to benefices
belonging to, iii, 251.
guardians, i, 462, n.
INDEX.
Rome, appeals to, in ecclesiastical cases, iii, 66.
Romney marsh, laws of. iii, 74.
Roots, destroying, iv, 246.
stealing, iv, 233.
Rope dancers, iv, 168.
Routs, iv, 146.
Royal assent to bills, i, 185.
authority, i, 250.
dignity, i, 241.
family, i, 218, 224.
marriages, i, 225; iv, 117.
fish, i, 223, 290; ii, 403.
forests, i, 289.
income, i, 332, 834.
liability, i, 243.
mines, i, 295.
perfection, i, 246.
perpetuity, i, 249.
prerogative, i, 237.
revenue, i, 281.
sovereignty, i, 241.
ubiquity, 1, 267.
Rule in Shelley's Case, ii, 172, n., 242.
of court, iii, 304.
Rural dean, i, 383.
deanery, i, 111.
Rider to a bill, i, 183.
Sabbath breaking, iv, 63.
Sacrament, reviling of, iv, 50.
Sacramentum decisionis, iii, 342.
Safe conducts, i, 259, 260; iv, 68.
Saint Martin le grand, court of, iii, 80.
Saladine tenth, i, 309.
Sale of chattels, ii, 9, 446.
after execution, ii, 447.
of distress, iii, 14.
what contracts of, to be in writing, ii, 448.
effect of part execution, id.
of earnest, ii, 447.
delivery, ii, 448, 449.
when property passes, ii, 448.
when right of possession passes, ii, 449.
stoppage in transitu, id.
of goods to be manufactured, id.
bill of lading, id.
vendor's lien, id.
of horses, ii, 450.
of stolen goods, ii. 449.
warranty of title, ii, 451.
of quality, id.
Salt duty, i, 322.
Salvage, i, 293; ii, 458, 460.
Sanction of laws, i, 56.
Sanctuary, iv, 832, 365, 436.
Sark, Isle of, i, 107.
Satisdatio, iii, 291.
Satisfaction, entry on record, iii, 421; iv, 428.
Saxon laws, i, 64; iv, 410, 412.
Scale of crimes and punishments, iv, 18.
Scandal and impertinence in pleading, iii, 442.
Scandalum magnatum, i, 402; iii, 123.
Schire-men, i, 398.
Schoolmaster, i, 453; iv, 54.
Sciences, auxiliary to study of the law. i, 33.
Scire facias to repeal patents, iii, 47, 260, 861.
against bail, iii, 416.
in detinue, iii, 413.
to remove usurper's clerk, iii, 248.
to revive judgment, iii, 421.
Scold, common, iv, 169.
Scot or assessment, iii, 74.
Scotch peers, election of, i, 169; iv, 117.
privileges of, i, 97, 99,165,401, n.
Scotland, i, 95-98.
arrest of offenders in, iv, 292.,
offences committed in, iv, 304.
Scripture, scoffing at; iv, 59.
Scutage, i, 310; ii, 74.
Se defendendo, homicide, i, 180; iii, 3; iv, 182.
Sea, title to land left by, ii, 261.
rights of fishing, ii, 39, 40.
banks, destroying, iv, 144.
marks, i, 264.
destroying, i, 294.
Seal, great and privy, ii, 346, 847; iii, 46.
counterfeiting the king's, iv, 83, 89.
of a corporation, i, 475.
Sealing of a deed, ii, 305.
Seamen, i, 420.
impressment of, id.
wages of, iii, 107.
counterfeiting will or powers of, iv, 248.
personation of, iv, 249.
Second deliverance, writ of, iii, 150.
Surcharge, writ of, iii, 239.
Secretaries of state, i, 338.
Secta, iii, 295, 344.
ad molendinum, iii, 235.
Secunda superoneratione, iii, 239.
Security of person, i, 129.
for good behavior, iv, 251, 256.
for the peace, iv, 251, 254.
for money, iii, 439.
(Se "Bond" " Mortgage," " Statute.")
Seduction , action, for, iii, 140, n.
public offence of, iv, 64.
of women and children, iv, 209, 212.
of soldiers and sailors, iv, 102.
of artificers, iv. 160.
Seisin, formerly important in descents, ii, 208,
209, n.
in deed, ii, 209.
livery of, ii, 311.
in one's demesne, ii, 105.
of incorporeal hereditaments, ii, 106.
writ of, ii, 359; ill, 412.
Seisin of heriots, iii, 15,
Selden, conduct of judges upon committal of,
iii, 134.
Selecti judices of the Romans, iii, 866.
Self-defence, excuse for breaches of peace, iii, 3.
in homicide, i, 130; iii, 8; iv, 188
Self-murder, iv, 189.
Semi-plena probatio, iii, 870.
Senatus consulta, i. 80, 86.
Senatus decreta, i, 86.
Separate estate of wife, ii, 293, n.
Septennial elections, i, 189.
Sequestration, iii, 417,444, 445.
Sergeant at law, i, 24; iii, 26, 28.
premier, iii, 28.
at arms, iii, 444.
Sergeantry, ii, 73, 77, 81.
Servants, i, 423.
battery of, iii, 142.
characters to, iii, 125.
fires by negligence of, i, 432; iv, 222.
husbandry, i, 425.
liability of, i, 429.
master of, when answerable for, i, 430, 431;
iii, 153.
INDEX.
Servants, menial, i, 425.
retainer of, id.
duties of, i, 327.
embezzlement by, iv, 231.
larceny by, iv, 230.
of ambassador, i, 256.
Service, incidents of, i, 427.
Services, ii, 41, 60.
(See "Tenure.")
subtraction of, iii, 234.
remedy for, iii, 235.
Session of gaol delivery, iv, 270.
great, of Wales, iii, 77.
of parliament, i, 186, 187.
formerly one day, i, 46, n.
of oyer and terminer, iv, 270.
quarter, iv, 271, 274.
Set-off, iii, 304; iv, 442.
must be pleaded, iii, 304, n.
in bankruptcy, ii, 487, n.
Settlement of the crown, i, 128, 216; iv, 440.
of the poor, i, 362, 364.
marriage, trustees to preserve contingent
remainders, ii, 171.
protector of, ii, 364, n.
of personalty, ii, 398.
Severalty, estate in, ii, 179.
Severance of joint estate, ii, 186.
Severity of punishments, impolicy of, iv, 16.
Sewers, commissioners of, iii, 73.
Sextons, i, 395.
Sheep, &c., stealing, and killing with intent
to steal, iv, 239.
Shelley's Case, rule in, ii, 172, n., 242.
Shepway, court of, iii, 79.
Sheriff, i, 117, 339 ; iv, 292, 413, 428.
duration of office, i, 342.
duties and powers, i, 343.
how chosen, i, 339.
officers, i, 345.
trial before, iii, 61, n.
official misfeasance or nonfeasance, iii, 163.
obliged to take bail, iii, 289.
responsible if bail not put in to action, iii,
290.
return of jurors by, iii, 358, n. ; iv, 350.
liability for escape of prisoner, iii, 415.
cannot retake prisoner after voluntary es-
cape, 415.
when excused for negligence, id.
Sheriff's court in London, iii, 80.
Sheriff's tourn, iW, 273, 411, 424.
Ship, prize and ransom of, ii, 401, 402.
bottomry and respondentia, ii, 4,57-461.
insurance, ii, 458.
in distress, plundering, i, 293.
money, iv, 437.
seizeUas prize, remedy for, iv, 69.
plundering in distress, iv, 235.
burning, destroying, &c., iv, 246.
burning, &c., king's ships, iv, 102, 245.
Shipwrecks, i, 291.
Shire, i, 116.
Shooting at another, iv, 207.
Shop books, iii, 368.
Shroud, stealing of, iv, 235.
Shrubs, destroying, iv, 246.
stealing, iv, 233.
Si fecerit te securm, iii, 274.
Sign manual, ii, 347.
lorgery of, iv, 89, 93, n.
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Signature by a mark, ii, 305, 377, n.
to deed, ii, 305.
Signet, privy, ii, 347.
Significavit, iii, 102.
Similitude of handwriting, iv, 358.
Simony, i, 389, 393; ii, 278 et seq. ; iv, 62.
Simple contract, ii, 465.
(See "Parol.")
Sinecure, i, 386.
Single combat iv. 346.
Si non omnes, writ of, iii, 60.
Six clerks, iii, 443, 451.
Skins, exporting of, iii, 154.
Slander, iii, 123.
when actionable, iii, 124.
when republication of, may be justified, iii,
124, n.
truth as a justification, iii, 125.
when words privileged, iii, 125.
mitigation of damages in, iii, 125, n.
Slavery, i, 418, 423.
abolition of, i, 423, n., 425, n.
Slaves, i, 127 and n., 423-425; ii, 402.
Sluices on rivers, destroying, iv, 144.
Small debts, courts for, iii, 81; iv, 441.
Small debtor's act, iii, 488, n.
Small tithes, i, 388.
Smells, offensive, iii, 217.
Smoke farthings, i, 324.
Smuggling, i, 318; iv, 155.
Socage, free and villein, ii, 78 et seq.; iv, 409.
guardian in, i, 461.
Society, origin and nature of, i, 47; ii, 8.
Sodomy, offence of, iv, 215.
soliciting to commit, iv, 215.
assault to commit, iv, 217.
sending letters charging party with, iv, 144.
Sodor and Man. bishopric of, i, 106, 112.
Sokeman, ii, 100.
Soldiers, i, 179, 408.
wandering, iv, 164.
quartering, i, 414, 415.
Solicitor, iii, 26.
general, iii, 27.
Son assault demesne, iii, 120, 306.
Sorcery, iv, 60.
South Sea Company, misbehavior of officers
of, iv, 231, n., 234.
fund, i, 331.
Sovereign power, where lodged, i, 51.
in America, i, 52, n.
Sovereignty, royal, i, 242.
Speaker of each house of parliament, i, 181.
Speaking with prosecutor, iv, 363.
Special bailiffs, i, 345.
bail, iii, 287.
statute, i, 86.
sessions, iv, 272.
verdict, iii, 377; iv, 306.
warrant, iv, 291.
administrator, ii, 506.
imparlance, iii, 306.
property, ii, 391.
Special case, verdict subject to, iii, 377.
stating for the opinion of the court, iii 377, n.
Special jury, when had, iii, 357.
how struck, id.
certificate that cause required, iii, 367, n.
Special plea, iii, 305.
Specialty, ii, 465; iii, 155.
Specific performance of contract, iii, 438.
INDEX.
Specific performance of agreement to arbi-
trate, iii, 17. n.
Spiriting away persons, iv, 219.
Spiritual corporations, i, 470.
courts, i, 61; iii, 61.
lords, i, 155, 157.
persons, i, 376.
Spoliation, remedy for, iii, 90.
Sporting, restrictions upon, ii, 413.
Springing uses, ii, 334.
Squibs, nuisance by, iv, 168.
Stabbing, iv, 193.
Stage plays, when a nuisance, iv, 167.
Stamp duties, i, 323; iii, 323.
on deed, &c., ii, 297.
on bill of exchange, ii, 469.
forgery of, iv, 249.
when material in forgery, &c., iv, 247, 248.
Standard of coin, i, 278.
of weights and measures, i, 274, 275; iv, 275.
Standing armies, i, 413, 414.
Stannary courts, iii, 80.
Staple commodities, i, 315.
Star chamber, court of, i, 230; iii, 445; iv,
266, 310, 429, 433, 437.
Stated damages, iii, 435.
Statute, i, 85.
equity of, i, 62, n.
how passed, i, 181.
guardian by, i, 462.
labor, i, 58,358.
law, i, 85.
private, ii, 344.
when applicable to copyhold, ii, 113.
of distributions, ii, 515.
de religiosis, ii, 270.
of frauds,
(See "Frauds, Statute of.")
merchant, ii, 160; iv, 426, 431.
staple, id.
Statutes, rules for construction of, i, 87-91.
division of, i, 85, 86.
how enrolled, i, 182, n.
how stated, 1, 85, n.
of mortmain, i, 108, n., 479,
promulgation of, i, 45, 185, n.
in pari materia, i, 60, n.
preambles of, i, 60, n.
penal, how construed, i, 86.
Staundforde, i, 72.
Stealing an heiress, iv, 209 and n.
(See "Larceny.")
Step-children i, 449, n.
Sterling, i, 278.
Steward, i, 427.
lord high, his court, iii, 37; iv, 260, 261,263.
of the household, his court, iii, 76; iv, 276.
of the university, his court, iv, 277.
Stipend, curate's remedy for non-payment
of, ii, 90 and n.
Stipulatio, iii, 291.
Stipulation in admiralty court, iii, 108.
Stirpes, claim per, ii, 217, 517.
Stocks, punishment of, iv, 377.
Stolen goods, receiving, &c., iv, 132,238.
taking reward to help to, iv, 131.
sale of, ii, 449.
stolen marriages, iv, 209.
Stoppage in transitu, ii, 448, n.; iii, 305.
Stores, embezzling the king's, iv, 101.
receiving stolen, iv, 133.
Stranger, when his goods or chattels may be
distrained, iii, 8.
Stream of water, property in, ii, 18, n., 266,
n., 402.
Striking in the king's palace or courts, iv,
125, 276.
Study of the law, to whom essential, i, 6-16.
discouragements of, i, 31.
uses of, i, 6.
in the universities, i, 16, 26-37.
mode of commencing, i, 31.
should be combined with other studies, i,
27, 33.
formerly restrained in London, i, 24.
neglected in the universities, i, 4.
Style, new and old, ii, 140, n.
Subinfeudations, statute against, ii, 91, 102.
Subjection, civil, excuse from crime by, iv, 28.
Submission to arbitration, iii, 16.
Subornation of perjury, iv, 137.
Subpoena ad testificandum, writ of, iii, 369.
duces tecum, iii, 382.
in equity, iii, 442, 443.
writ of, by whom devised, iii, 51.
opposition to, in parliament, iii, 52.
Subscriptions unlawful, iv, 117.
Subsequent, condition, ii, 154.
evidence, iii, 403, 454.
Subsidies, ecclesiastical, i, 312.
lay, i, 308, 311; iv, 423.
on exports and imports, i, 316.
Subtraction of fealty, suit of court and rent,
iii, 230.
remedy for, by distress, iii, 231.
of conjugal rights, iii, 94.
of legacies, iii, 98.
of tithes, iii, 88, 102.
Succession to the crown, history of, i, 197; iv.
440.
title to personalty by, ii, 430.
Sufferance, estate at, ii, 150.
Suffrage, who entitled to, i, 172, n.
Suggestion for prohibition, iii, 113.
prosecution by, iv, 309.
Suicide, iv, 189.
abetting, is murder, when, iv, 189, n., 200.
forfeiture of goods on, ii, 409.
suit at law, iii, 116.
Suit, general and orderly parts of, ill, 272.
when abated by death of party, iii, 301,
399, n.
in equity, iii, 442.
of court, how compelled, iii, 231.
of witnesses, iii. 295.
Summary convictions, iv, 280 et 8eq.
Summoners, iii, 279.
Summons, iii, 279.
to parliament, i, 149, 150.
before conviction, iv, 281.
Sumptuary laws, iv, 170.
Sunday, no judicial day, iii, 278, 290.
rule when paper falls due upon, ii, 469, n.
business and entertainments on, iv, 64.
Sabbath breaking generally, iv, 63.
Supersedeas, writ of, i, 353.
Superstitious uses, ii, 272; iii, 428.
Supplemental bill, iii, 448.
Suppletory oath, iii, 370.
Supplicavit, iv, 253.
Supplies, i, 308, 313.
Support of land, right to, ii, 36, n.
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Support of children by parents, i, 447, 458.
of parents by children, i, 453.
of the poor, i, 359.
Supremacy, oath of, i, 368 and n; iv, 115, 420.
Supreme magistrate, i, 146.
power, i, 49, 146.
Surcharge of common, iii, 237.
Sur disclaimer, iii, 253, n.
Surgeon, liability of, for negligence, &c., iii,
122.
Sur-rebutter, iii, 310.
Sur-rejoinder, iii, 310.
Surrenders, ii, 326.
in law, ii, 326, n.
of copyholds, ii, 366.
Surveyors of highways, i, 357.
Survivorship, ii, 183, 399 ; iii, 163, 164.
Suspension of habeas corpus, i, 136.
of action for civil injury in case of felony,
iii, 119.
Sus. per col., iv, 403.
Sussex, marriage of duke of, 1, 226, n.
Swans, ii, 392; iv, 236.
Swearing, profane, iv, 60.
the peace, iv, 255.
of witnesses, iii, 371.
Sweinmote, court of, iii, 72.
Syngrapha, ii, 296.
Synods, i, 279.
Table of precedence, 1, 405, n.
of consanguinity, ii, 202-206.
Tacking mortgages, ii, 160, n.
Tail, estate in.
(See "Estates.")
Taking, felonious, iv, 230, 232.
unlawful, iii, 145.
Tale or count, iii, 293.
Tales, iii, 365; iv, 344.
Talionis, lex, iv, 12.
Talliage, i, 311 ; iv, 419, 426.
Tariff, i, 313.
Taxation, by house of commons, i, 169.
principle of imposition of, i, 318.
of costs, iii, 399.
Taxes, i, 139, 308.
their annual amount, i, 328; iv, 426, 489.
Teacher and scholar, i, 453 and n.
Technical words in indictments, iv, 306.
Temporal peers, i, 157-159.
Temporalities of bishops, i, 282; iv, 421.
their restitution, i, 380; iv, 421.
Tenant, to the precipe, ii, 359, 361.
(See "Estate.")
in capite, ii, 60.
paravail, id.
bound to give landlord notice of eject-
ment, iii, 204.
not liable for accidental fire, ii, 281; iii,
228, n.
when bound to rebuild, id.
liable to pay rent after fire, id.
estopped to dispute landlord's title, ii, 144, n.
right of, to demand repairs, ii, 144, n.
assignment by, id.
Tenant-right of renewal, ii, 101, 148.
Tender of amends, iii, 16.
of issue, iii, 313.
of money, i, 277; iii, 303.
plea of, iii, 303.
of oaths, i, 368; iv, 124.
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Tenement, ii, 16, 59, 102.
Tenemental lands, ii, 90, 93.
Tenendum, ii, 298.
Tenths, ecclesiastical, i, 284; iv, 309.
temporal, i, 309; iv, 107.
Tenure, ancient English, ii, 59 et seq.
lord paramount and mesne lord, ii, 59.
tenant paravail and tenant in capite, ii, 60.
statute quia emptores, ii, 91, 102.
lay tenure, ii, 60.
free and base services, ii, 60, 61, 79.
certain and uncertain services, ii, 61, 79.
frank tenement and villeinage, id.
tenure in chivalry, ii, 61.
incidents to knight service, ii, 63 e seq.
aids, ii, 63, 86.
reliefs, ii, 65, 87.
primer seisin or first fruits, ii, 66, 87.
wardship, ii, 67, 87.
court of wards and liveries, ii, 69.
knighthood, id.
marriage of ward, ii, 70, 88.
fines for alienation, ii, 71, 89.
attornment, ii, 72.
escheat, ii, 72, 89.
grand sergeanty, cornage, ii, 73, 74, 77, 81
escuage, ii, 74.
destruction of military tenures, ii, 76.
frankalmoign, ii, 77.
modem English tenures, ii, 78 et seq.
free socage, ii, 78.
petit sergeanty, ii, 81.
burgage, ii, 82.
borough English, ii, 83.
gavelkind, ii, 84.
incidents of socage tenures, it, 86-88.
villeinage, ii, 89, 92, 98.
copyholds, ii, 97, 98.
manors, ii, 90.
ancient demesne, ii, 98.
spiritual, or frankalmoign, ii, 101.
by divine service, ii, 102.
profits of military, i, 287.
disturbance of, iii, 242.
Term of years, ii, 143; iv, 430.
executory bequest of, ii, 175, n.
Terms of court, origin of the, iii, 275.
when they begin and end, iii, 277, n.
Terre tenant, ii, 91, 328.
Test act, iv, 59, 439.
Testament, ii, 489, 499; iv, 424, 480.
(See " Will.")
Testamentary causes in county courts, iii, 95;
iv, 421.
in equity, iii, 437.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 96,437.
Testamentary guardian, i, 462.
Testatum capias, iii, 283.
Teste of writs, i, 179; iii, 274.
Testes, trial per, iii, 335.
Thainland, ii, 90.
Thanet, Isle of, i, 105.
Theater, copyright in plays, &c., ii, 407, n.
Theft, iv, 229, 236, 420.
(See "Larceny.")
Theft-bote, iv, 133, 363.
Thellusson act, ii, 175, n.
Theodosian code, i, 81.
Things real and personal, ii, 16, 384.
(See "Property.")
Threatening letters, iv 137, 144.
INDEX.
Threats of accusation, to extort money, iv,
144.
remedy for, iii, 120.
duress by, i, 131.
Timber, ii, 34, n., 281.
stealing, iv, 233.
destroying, iv, 247.
Time, division and computation of, i, 463; ii,
140, 141, n.
the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi,
i, 247.
Tippling, iv, 64..
Tithes, i, 384, 388; ii, 24-32; iii, 46, 88, 102,
437.
limitation of right to, ii, 266, n.
now practically at an end, i, 388, n.; ii, 32, n.
Tithing, i, 114; iv, 411.
Title of acts of parliament, i, 183.
to the crown, i, 190.
pretended, selling or buying, iv, 136.
warranty of, to goods sold, ii, 451.
to things real, ii, 195.
by possession, id.
right of possession, ii, 196.
right of property, ii, 197.
complete, ii, 199.
by occupancy of lands left by sea or rivers,
ii, 261.
under statute of limitations, ii, 266, n.
by alienation, ii, 287.
by descent, ii, 208.
of chattels by occupancy, ii, 400.
by custom, ii, 422.
by succession, ii, 430.
by marriage, ii, 433.
by gift, grant and contract, ii, 440.
by bankruptcy, ii, 471.
by testament and administration, ii, 489.
regulated by law of domicil, ii, 387, n.
by judgment, ii, 436.
of honor, descent to daughters, ii, 216.
curtesy of, ii, 126, n.
Toft, ii, 19.
Toleration, iv, 52, 53, 440.
Tolling entry, iii, 176.
Tolt, writ of, iii, 34, 195.
Tongue, cutting out, or disabling, iv, 206, 207.
Tonnage, i, 316; iv, 437.
Tonsura clericalis, iv, 367.
Tort, action of, iii, 117.
Torture, iv, 325.
Tourn of the sheriff, iv, 272, 411, 424.
Tout temps prist, ill, 303.
Town, i, 115.
Trade, its progress in England, iv, 419-438.
offensive, iv, 167.
unlawful exercise of, iv, 159.
offences against, iv, 151.
owling, iv, 154.
smuggling, id.
fraudulent bankruptcy, iv, 156.
usury, iv, 156.
cheating, iv, 157.
assize of bread, iv, 157.
false weights and measures, id.
false pretences, iv, 158.
regrating and engrossing, id.
monopolies, iv, 158, 159.
exercising trade without apprenticeship, iv,
160.
seducing artists, id.
Trade, restrictions on exercise of, i, 427.
Trade marks, ii, 405, n.
Trader, ii, 474, 488 n.
(See " Bankruptcy.")
Tradesmen, i, 407.
actions against, iii, 164.
Training to arms, &c., iv, 104.
Traitors, iv, 75.
(See "Treason.")
Transitory action, iii, 294.
Transportation, i, 137; iv, 371, 377, 401.
returning from, iv, 132, 371.
Traverse of indictment, iv, 351.
of officer, iii, 260.
of plea, iii, 312.
Treason, appeal of, iv, 314.
misprision of, iv, 120.
petit, iv, 75, 203.
trials in, iv, 351, 440.
compassing, &c., death of king, iv, 76.
how far words treasonable, iv, 80.
violating king's companion, &c., iv, 81.
levying war, id.
adhering to enemies, iv, 82.
counterfeiting king's seal, iv, 83, 89.
counterfeiting king's money, iv, 84.
slaying chancellor or judges, id.
treason since 1 Mary, c. 1, iv, 87.
for securing protestant succession, iv, 89.
punishment of, iv, 92, 93.
Treasure trove, i, 295.
concealment of, i, 297; iv, 121.
Treasurer, lord high, iii, 44, 56.
killing of, iv, 84.
Treaties, leagues and alliances, i, 257.
Trebucket, iv, 169.
Trees, right to cut, ii, 34, n., 281.
destroying, &c., iv, 247.
stealing, iv, 233.
Tresayle, iii, 186.
Trespass, signification of, iii, 208.
what constitutes, iii, 209.
what property in land requisite to maintain,
iii, 209.
when justifiable, iii, 2103.
cured by right of entry and freehold, iii,
213.
regulations as to costs in, iii, 214, 401.
vi et armis, iii, 120, 209.
by certificate, when allowed, iii, 333.
merged in felony, when, iv, 6.
malicious, offence of, iv, 247.
ab initio, iii, 15, 151, n., 213.
Trespass on the case, iii, 122, 212
Trial, what it is, iii, 329.
seven species of, iii, 330.
by record, id.
by inspection, iii, 331.
by witnesses, iii, 335.
notice of, iii, 356.
countermand of, id.
locality, iii, 383.
in criminal cases, iv, 342, 411.
new, iii, 387; iv, 361, 438.
by ordeal, iv, 342, 414, 425.
by battle, iii, 105, 337, 346, 418, 421, 424.
Triennial elections, i, 189.
parliaments, i, 153.
Trinity, denial of, iv, 50.
Trinoda necessitas, i, 263, 357; ii, 102.
Triors, lords, iv, 262, 263.
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Triors of jurors, iii, 263.
Triplicatio, iii, 310.
Trithing, i, 116.
Triverbial days, iii, 424.
Trover, action of, iii, 152; iv, 363.
Truce breakers, iv, 68.conservators of, iv, 69.
Trustees of charities, &c., jurisdiction of equity
in regard to, iii, 427, n.
Trusts, ii, 327 et seq., 336.
jurisdiction over, iii, 431, 439.
when cognizable, id.
of lands, must be manifested by writing, ii,
306, 337.
estates of trustee and cestui que trust, ii, 337.
curtesy of, ii, 127, n., 132, n.
merger of, ii, 337, n.
Tub-man in the exchequer, iii, 28.
Tumultuous petitioning, i, 143; iv, 147.
Turbary, common of, ii, 34.
Turnips, stealing, iv, 233.
Turnpikes, destroying, iv, 145.
Tutor, i, 306, 453, 460.
Twelve tables, laws of, i, 80.
Tyranny, i, 126, 133.
Ubiquity of the king, i, 270.
Udal right, ii, 45.
Umpire, iii, 16.
Unanimity of jurors, iii, 376; iv, 414.
Uncertainty of legal proceedings, iii, 326.
Uncore prist, iii, 303.
Underlease, iii, 176, 327.
Under-sheriff, i, 345.
Underwood, stealing, iv, 233.
injuring, &c., iv, 247.
Union of England and Scotland, i, 96.
of Great Britain and Ireland, i, 99, n.; iv,
427, 440.
Unitarians, iv, 50, n.
United States of America.
(See "American States.")
Unities of joint estates, ii, 180.
University, study of law in, i, 16, 26-37.
burgesses of, i, 174.
courts of, i, 83; iii, 83; iv, 277.
nature of, i, 26, 37, 471.
certificate of chancellor of, iii, 335.
copyrights of, ii, 407.
rights of, to benefices, iii, 241.
Unknown persons, larceny from, iv, 236, 359.
Uses, invention of, ii, 271.
and trusts, ii, 137, 271, 327 et seq.; iii, 52.
statute of, ii, 332; iv, 430.
springing, shifting and resulting, ii, 334.
what not executed by statute of, ii, 335.
continued as trusts, ii, 336.
estates of trustee and cestui que trust, ii,
837.
forms of conveyances, i, 337.
resulting, rebutted by parol, ii, 364, n.
deeds to lead, declare or revoke, ii, 339, 363.
in equity, ii, 43.
Usura maratima, ii, 458.
Usurpation of patronage, iii, 242.
remedy for. iii, 243.
of franchise or office, iii, 262.
Usury, ii, 454 et seq.; iv, 116, 156.
Usus fructus, ii, 327.
Uttering false money, iv. 89, 90.
forged notes, iv, 248, 250.
Vacancy of the throne, i, 212, 214.
Vacantia bona, i, 296, 299.
Vacant possession, iii, 202.
Vacating records, iv, 128.
Vacations of court, iii, 276.
sittings in, iii, 278, n.
Vadium, ii, 157.
Vagabonds, iv, 169.
Vagrants, iv, 170.
harboring, id.
in criminal cases, iv, 305.
Valor beneficiorum, i, 285.
maritagii, ii, 70, 88.
Valuable consideration, ii, 297.
Valvagors, i, 403.
Variance, amendment of, iii, 393, n.
Vassal, ii, 45 et seq.
(See "Feudal System.")
the word, ii, 53, n.
Vendor's lien, ii, 158, n.
Venire de novo, when awarded, iii, 394.
Venire facias, iii, 351, 357.
teste and return of, iii, 353.
when it issues to coroners or elisors, iii, 354.
Ventre inspiciendo, writ de, i, 456.
Ventre sa mere, children in, i, 130; ii, 169.
Venue, how to be laid, iii, 293; iv, 305.
changing, iii, 293, 384.
in criminal cases, iv, 304.
Verberation, iii. 120.
Verderors, iii. 71, 72.
Verdict, iv, 860, 457.
false, iii, 402; iv, 140.
in action, indictment on, iv, 302, n.
must be unanimous, iii, 375.
plaintiff must be present at delivery of,
iii, 376.
privy verdict, id.
public, iii, 377.
special, id.
formerly reversed by writ of attaint, iii, 388.
what omissions aided by, iii, 394.
Verge, tenant by, ii, 148.
Verge of the court, iii, 76; iv, 276.
Verification, iii, 313.
Vert, venison, and covert, injury to, iii, 71.
Vesting of estates, ii, 168, 174.
of legacies, ii, 513.
Vesture of land, ii, 34, n.
Vetitum namium, iii, 148.
Veto, i, 184, n., 185, n.
Vicar, i, 384; ii, 318 et eq.
(See "Tithes.")
Vicarages. i, 387; iv, 428.
Vice-admiralty court, iii, 69.
Vice-chancellors, iii, 55, n., 426, n.
Vice-warden of the stannaries, court of, iii, 80,n.
Vicineto, jury de, iii, 385.
Vicontiel writs, iii, 238.
Vidames, i, 403.
View, iii, 299, 358.
of frankpledge, iv, 279.
Viewers, appointment of jurors for, iii, 358.
Vill, i, 114.
Villeins, ii, 92; iv, 420.
enfranchisement of, ii, 94.
waste of, ii, 282.
Villenage, ii, 53, 61, 89, 92, 98.
Villeinous judgment, iv, 136.
Vinculo divorcia, iii, 94.
Vindicatory part of a law, i, 56-59.
INDEX.
Viner's foundation, i, 27.
Violating the queen, &c., 1, 222, 223; iv, 81.
forcible. (See "Rape.")
Violent presumption, iii, 371.
Viscount, i, 398.
Visitor, i, 480.
of civil corporations, i, 481.
of eleemosynary corporations, i, 482.
of lay corporations, i, 480.
power of i, 483.
Virgin Mary, a civilian and canonist, i, 21.
Visitation books of heralds, iii, 105.
Visne, iii, 294; iv, 350.
Viva voce examination in equity, iii, 378.
Vivum vadium, ii, 157.
Void and voidable, ii, 291,325,432.
Voir dire, iii, 332.
Voluntary conveyances, when fraudulent and
void, ii, 296.
escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.
jurisdiction, iii, 66.
manslaughter, iv, 191.
oaths, iv, 137.
Voucher, iii, 300.
in recoveries, ii, 857 et seq.
Vulgaris purgatio, iv, 842.
Wagering policies, ii, 459, 460.
Wager of battle, trial by, iii, 337; iv, 346, 418,
421, 424.
abolished, iii, 837, n.
history and mode of, iii, 337 et seq.
Wager of law, iii, 342; iv, 414, 424.
manner of, iii, 342.
when not allowed, iii, 845.
abolished, iii, 341, n., 347.
Wagers, when illegal, ii, 460; iv, 173.
Wages, of members of parliament, i, 174.
of servants, i, 428.
Waifs, i, 297; ii, 409.
Wainage, iv, 379.
Wales, i, 93, 94.
part of England, i, 99.
venue in criminal cases in, iv, 304.
prince of, i, 94, 225.
compassing and imagining his death, iv,
76.
princess of, i, 225.
violation of, iv, 81.
court of principality of, abolished, iii, 78, n.
Wandering soldiers and mariners, iv, 164.
persons, vagrants, iv, 170, n.
Wapentakes, i, 116.
War, articles of, i, 415, 417.
levying against the king, iv, 81.
War and peace, right of making, i, 257.
Ward by constables, &c., i, 356; iv, 292, 426.
Wards and liveries, court of, iii, 258.
Wardship, i, 52, 67, 87, 97.
in chivalry, iv, 418, 420, 421.
Warlike stores, embezzlement of, iv, 101.
Warrant, i, 137.
arrest by, iv, 290.
arrest without, iv, 292, 293.
Warrant of attorney, iii, 397.
Warrantia chartse, iii, 300.
Warranty, express and implied, ii, 300; iii,
165.
lineal and collateral, ii, 301.
present effect of, ii, 302, 803, n.
on exchange, ii, 823.
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Warranty, of goods, ii, 451 and n.
on exchange of goods, ii, 446, n.
Warren, ii, 417.
robbery of, iv, 235.
in disguise, iv, 144.
beasts and fowls of, ii, 38.
Waste, ii, 185, 281 et seq.; ili, 223.
voluntary or permissive, ii, 281.
by tenant in tail, ii, 115; iii, 223.
by tenant in tail after possibility, &c., ii, M2.
of villeins, ii, 282.
who may sue for, iii, 244.
injunction to stay, ii, 282, n., iii, 227, 442,
writ of, iii, 227.
action on the case in nature of, iii 229, n.
estates without impeachment of, ii, 122b .
by stranger, tenant may be held liable for,
iii, 229, n.
Waste lands, ii, 14, 90.
Watch, i, 356 ; iv, 292, 426.
Water, how described, i, 18.
property in, ii, 18, 266, n., 402.
Water course, ii, 36, n., 266, n.
alluvion, &c., upon, ii, 261, n.
offences as to, iv, 167.
abatement of nuisances in, iii, 5, n.
Watermen overloading their boats, iv, 192.
plying on Sunday, iv, 64.
Water ordeal, iv, 342.
Way, right ofby grant, prescription, and ne-
cessity, ii, 85.
remedy, when out of repair, ii, 36 and n.
obstruction of a nuisance, iii, 218.
action for obstruction, iii, 241.
Ways and means, committee of, 1, 807.
Weights and measures, i, 274-277; iv, 975
278, 424.
false, iv, 159.
Wells, property in, ii, 5.
Welsh mortgage, ii, 157, n.
Weregild, iv, 188, 313, 413.
West Saxon lage, i, 65; iv, 412.
Whales, royal fish, i, 223.
Wharfs, i, 264.
Whipping, punishment of, iv, 372, 877.
White rent, ii, 42.
Widow's chamber, ii, 518.
quarantine, ii, 135.
Wife, i, 433.
when she may be taken in execution, iii, 418,n.
battery of, fi", 140.
(See "Husband and Wife.")
Wight, Isle of, i, 105.
Will, defect of, excuse for crime, iv, 20.
vicious, iv, 21.
estate at, ii, 145.
(See "Estate.")
Wills, origin of, ii, 10, 12, 373, 489, et s.; iv,
424, 430.
jurisdiction over, ii. 491.
probate of, ii, 494, 507; iii, 98.
who may make, ii, 496 et seq., 502.
definition of, ii, 499.
codicil, ii, 500.
verbal or nuncupative, ii, 500, 514.
how avoided, ii, 502.
unofficious, id.
appointment of executor, ii, 508.
jurisdiction over, iii, 95.
administration cure testamento annexo, I,
508.
INDEX.
Wills of ciattels,regulatedby domicil, ii, 387, n. Women, when guilty of clergyable offences,
payment, &c., of legacies, ii, 512, 513. iv, 369.
donatio mortis causa, ii, 514. jury of, iii, 862: iv, 395.
right of executor to residue, ii, 514. Wood, stealing, iv, 233.
alienation by devise, history of, ii, 373. burning, damaging, &c., iv, 246.
customary power of devising, ii, 867, 871, n. Woodmote, court of, iii, 71.
dvseofaus373. e of 875. Wool, &c., transporting, iv, 154, 428.
devise of use, ii, 375. Words, action for, iii, 123.
devises to charity, &e., id. costs in action for, iii, 400.
signature and attestation of, ii, 376, 501. treasonable, iv, 79.
revocation of, ii, 376, 379, 502. of statutes must prevail, i, 81, 88.
gifts to witnesses, ii, 377. Work-house iv, 371.
raudulent devises, ii, 378. Wounding, iii, 121; iv, 208, 216.
land purchased after will made, ii, 379, n. Wreck, i, 291, 293; ii, 14,409.
lapse of gifts, ii, 379, n., 513. plundering, iv, 239, 304.
what words pass a fee, ii, 108, 120, n. Writ, iii, 273.
heir-looms not devisable apart from free- close and patent, ii, 846.
hold, ii, 429. of election to parliament, i, 177.
rules of construction, ii, 379. of peerage, i, 400.
(See "Deed." of error, how differs from appeal, iii, 56.
implication of cross remainders in, ii, 381. when it lies coram nobis or vobis, iii, 406, n.
fraudulently obtained, ii, 431. from and to what courts it lies, iii, 411.
forgery of, iv, 249, 250. of inquiry, iii, 397.
Winchester measure, i, 274. of protection, iii, 289.
Window duties, i, 325. 326. of summons, personal actions now com-
Windows, ancient, ii, 402. menced by, il, 287, n.
Wine, adulteration of, iv, 162. form, teste and service of, id.
licenses, i, 288. original, issued out of chancery, iii, 48.
Witchcraft, iv, 60, 436. forms of, iii, 51, 183, 273; iv, 427.
Withdrawing from allegiance, i, 869, 870, n.; Writing, treason by, iv, 80.
iv, 87. stealing of writings, iv, 284.
record, iii, 357. Written instrument, contents of, how proved,
Withernam, iii, 129, 146, 413. iii, 368.
Witness to deed, ii, 307. Wrongs, 1, 122.
to will, ii, 878, 501. how remedied, iii, 116.
trial by, iii, 886. classification of, as public and private, iii, 2.
may be compelled to attend before arbitra- private, termed civil injuries, id.
tor, il, 16, n. public, called crimes and misdemeanors, iv, 1.
oath of, iii, 871. how private wrongs redressed, iii, 2.
privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n. three several species of private wrongs, iii, 3.
what persons admissible as, ill, 319.
how attendance of, compelled, iii, 369. Year, ii, 140.
two always required by civil law, iii, 870; Year and day, i, 292, 297, 298; iii, 175.
iv, 850. in appeals of death, iv, 315,335.
advantages of open examination, ii, 373. in murder, iv, 197, 306.
examination when abroad or unable to at- Year, day and waste, ii, 252; iv, 385.
tend, il, 883, n. Year books, i, 72.
for prisoners, iv, 359, 441. Years, estate for, ii, 140.
their expenses, iv, 362. (See "Estate.")
two, when necessary, iii, 370; iv, 350. Yeoman, i, 406.
recognizance to give evidence by, iv, 296. of the guard, i, 408.
Wittena-gemote, i, 148; iii, 37; iv, 412. York, custom of, on intestacy, ii, 517.
Women, appeals by, iv, 424. archbishop of, claimed precedence over Can-
and children, stealing or seduction of, iv, 209. terbury, i, 404, n.
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